

Senate Armed Services Committee
Advance Policy Questions for Matthew Napoli
Nominee to be Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation,
National Nuclear Security Administration

Duties and Qualifications

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)?

Response: The primary duties and functions of the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation are (1) prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and associated nuclear technologies , (2) coordinate nonproliferation activities with partners and allies including the International Atomic Energy Agency to deter state and non-state actors from acquiring nuclear and radiological weapons, and (3) stand ready to respond in the event of nuclear or radiological weapons usage.

What background and experience do you possess that qualify you to perform the duties of the Deputy Administrator for DNN?

Response: My 20-year experience in the U.S. government focused on the application of nuclear energy for defense purposes, professional experience of building coalitions with partners and allies, and advanced educational background in engineering, policy, and national security provide a firm foundation for me to perform the duties of Deputy Administrator, if confirmed.

If confirmed, do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Deputy Administrator?

Response: To deepen my expertise as Deputy Administrator, if confirmed, my first priority will be to receive detailed briefings from NNSA teams including: global material security; nonproliferation research and development; material management and minimization; nonproliferation and arms control; and counterterrorism and counterproliferation.

If confirmed, what additional duties and responsibilities, if any, do you expect that the Administrator for Nuclear Security would prescribe for you?

Response: None.

Conflicts of Interest

Federal ethics laws, to include 18 U.S.C. §208, prohibit government employees from

participating in matters where they, or certain family members or organizations with which they have certain relationships, have a financial interest.

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to disclose any potential conflicts of interest, including investments, business ties, family relationships, or other connections that could be perceived as influencing your decision making?

Response: Yes.

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, that if a conflict of interest arises, you will recuse yourself from participating in any decisions regarding that specific matter?

Response: Yes.

Do you commit, without qualification, if confirmed, to decision-making on the merits and exclusively in the public interest, without regard to private gain or personal benefit?

Response: Yes.

Major Challenges and Priorities

In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation?

Response: The threats posed by the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs, the rapid increase of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, managing risks and opportunities associated with emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, maintaining focus on nuclear security to prevent an attack on the U.S. homeland or our interests abroad, and supporting responsible civil nuclear power development and deployment are significant challenges facing the next Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.

If confirmed, how would you address these challenges?

Response: If confirmed, in the context of potential future nonproliferation or arms control agreement that the administration may choose to pursue, I would direct NNSA's unique technical capabilities to support those activities. I will also ensure that DNN is taking full advantage of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence to support its mission while assessing and responding to malicious use of such technologies by adversaries. I would also leverage DNN's unique capabilities to help ensure that the American nuclear renaissance advances U.S. national security goals. This will include helping American companies design nuclear reactors that are more secure and easier to safeguard, streamlining approvals for U.S. nuclear technology exports, and working with the IAEA and partner countries to strengthen safeguards and security infrastructure to create favorable conditions for U.S. exports.

If confirmed, what would be your main priorities?

Response: If confirmed, my main priorities will be to support a whole-of-government solution to the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs, to support any potential future arms control agreements the President chooses to pursue with Russia and/or China, to maintain focus on nuclear security, and to support the global deployment of nuclear reactors developed in the United States, ensuring that such exports advance both our economic and security interests.

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) includes a diverse portfolio of nonproliferation programs, subprograms, and activities. What criteria would you apply and what processes would you follow to establish priorities and evaluate tradeoffs in investment between the various DNN commitments?

Response: If confirmed, I will prioritize programs based on the extent to which they make America safer, stronger, and more prosperous. I will consider both near-term and long-term impacts to American interests, including the need to responsibly steward the unique technical capabilities at the national laboratories.

Relations with Congress

What are your views on the state of the relationship between the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and the Senate Armed Services Committee in particular, and with Congress in general?

Response: I believe DNN has enjoyed a positive and productive relationship with the Senate Armed Services Committee and Congress writ large. I look forward to maintaining clear and transparent communications to continue fostering this relationship if confirmed.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a productive and mutually beneficial relationship between Congress and the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation?

Response: It is my view that proactive communication and transparency is imperative for a productive and mutually beneficial relationship between Congress and the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. If confirmed, I commit to maintaining robust channels of communication, including through briefings, reports, and seeking input on the development and implementation of the organization's work.

International Norms and Agreements

In what ways do you see the United States exercising its global leadership on nonproliferation issues, and, if confirmed as Deputy Administrator, what would you do to advance and balance both U.S. interests and the global nonproliferation

regime?

Response: The United States exercises global leadership on nonproliferation through a wide variety of means, including leadership roles in the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons review process, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. A strong global nonproliferation regime advances U.S. interests by stopping threats before they can reach the homeland and creating favorable conditions for U.S. nuclear exports. If confirmed, I would aim to strengthen U.S. nonproliferation leadership by working with colleagues in the Department of Energy and interagency to help the United States reclaim its status as a global leader in civil nuclear exports. This will enhance U.S. influence in the global nonproliferation regime while also making America more prosperous.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) regime has been challenged since the Treaty entered into force in 1970, and the divisions between the nuclear weapons states and the non-nuclear weapons states are becoming more apparent, as exemplified by the conclusion of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty which now has entered into force without the signature of nuclear weapons states.

What are your views with respect to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)?

Response: As President Trump has stated, he supports pursuit of a world without nuclear weapons. To achieve that goal, the complex military, political, and technical requirements for the elimination of nuclear weapons, and the risks undermining U.S. deterrence relationships that are necessary for international peace and security must be addressed with adequate mechanisms to improve the security environment.

What do you see as your role, if confirmed, in strengthening support for the NPT and the nuclear nonproliferation regime, as compared to the tenets of the TPNW?

Response: I continue to see the NPT as the cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime, and I believe NNSA can contribute to strengthening the NPT across all three of its pillars of nonproliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. If confirmed, I will work to strengthen international support for the NPT, including through leveraging NNSA and laboratory capabilities to contribute to preventing proliferation, supporting the U.S. nuclear modernization program and extended deterrence, and facilitating the peaceful uses of nuclear technology by unleashing American nuclear energy in more countries around the world.

If confirmed, what would be your role in mitigating the international perception that the United States is not committed to its NPT Article VI commitments in the context of modernizing its nuclear deterrent?

Response: Modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent is a national security imperative and is not negotiable. As long as nuclear weapons exist, and until the security environment

becomes conducive to disarmament, the fundamental roles of U.S. nuclear weapons are to deter strategic attacks, assure allies and partners, and achieve objectives if deterrence fails. The United States is committed to full scope modernization of its nuclear forces to achieve that mission and to maintain a safe, secure, reliable, and effective nuclear deterrent and credible extended deterrence commitments. If confirmed, I will work to identify actions that will make America safer and stronger while also addressing international concerns around NPT Article VI commitments. While many states criticize the U.S. modernization program as against the spirit of NPT Article VI, modernization has directly supported NPT goals by allowing the United States to reduce both the number of warhead types and the total quantity of warheads in our stockpile.

What are your views on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)?

Response: I understand that the Administration is in the process of an across-the-board review of U.S. participation in treaties and international organizations. If confirmed, I will leverage NNSA's unique technical and policy expertise to support this review process, including as related to CTBT.

The CTBT Organization (CTBTO) has, among its organizational goals, achieving universality of the treaty.

Do you agree with this goal? If yes, and if confirmed, how might you support attainment of this goal as Deputy Administrator? If not, what do you think the United States' role should be in continuing to work with the CTBTO?

Response: I understand that the Administration is in the process of an across-the-board review of U.S. participation in treaties and international organizations. If confirmed, I will leverage NNSA's unique technical and policy expertise to support this review process, including as related to CTBT.

What are your views on the zero-yield standard to which the United States adheres, as compared to the interpretation by other CTBT signatories such as Russia and China?

Response: In my current capacity, I am not privy to the details of U.S. subcritical experiments to support the stockpile stewardship program, but it is my understanding that the U.S. Government has observed its voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosive testing since 1992. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to work with the NNSA Administrator and NNSA Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs to ensure that the United States maintains its advantage compared to Russia and China, in support of the Administration's national security strategy. As noted in the Department of State's recent Compliance Report to Congress, lack of transparency by Russia and China into their nuclear testing activities and previously identified issues raise concerns about adherence to their respective nuclear explosive testing moratoria.

For the past several years, the Intelligence Community and the Department of State

have highlighted U.S. concerns that Russia, and especially China, are conducting nuclear tests that may be inconsistent with this standard.

In your view, should countries that conduct tests producing nuclear yield face repercussions?

Response: If confirmed, I will make it a priority to address any factors putting the United States at a disadvantage compared to Russia and China, in support of the Administration's national security strategy.

If so, what actions would you recommend the international community take in response to these alleged activities on the part of China and Russia?

Response: If confirmed, I will make it a priority to address any factors putting the United States at a disadvantage compared to Russia and China, in support of the Administration's national security strategy.

What do you view as the purpose of Iran's nuclear program?

Response: In my current capacity, I am not privy to intelligence assessments on this issue. However, I view Iran's nuclear program as a major threat to U.S. national security, and I believe Iran must never be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon.

In your assessment, do Iran's nuclear program and ballistic missile program indicate a desire by the Iranian government to have a nuclear weapons capability?

Response: In my current capacity, I am not privy to intelligence assessments on this issue. However, I view Iran's nuclear program as a major threat to U.S. national security, and I believe Iran must never be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon.

Under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the limitations on Iran's uranium enrichment expire between 2026 and 2031.

If the U.S. rejoins the JCPOA, do you assess that Iran will be legally able to increase its uranium enrichment after 2031?

Response: In my current capacity, I am not privy to U.S. legal and diplomatic assessments on this issue. If confirmed, I commit to becoming informed on this matter.

If Iran acquires enough fissile material to produce a nuclear weapon, what is the risk of other countries in the region seeking a nuclear weapons capability, in your assessment?

Response: In my current capacity, I am not privy to intelligence assessments on this issue. However, I believe Iran must never be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon, and the risk of a nuclear proliferation chain reaction is one reason for this.

In 2018, Israel's Mossad released a series of Iranian nuclear files, which included information about at least three uranium enrichment facilities that Iran had hidden from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Do you agree that providing the IAEA access to those sites is essential to ensuring oversight of Iran's nuclear program?

Response: In my current capacity, I am not privy to details of Iran's nuclear program. However, I believe a strong and effective IAEA safeguards system, including all required access to suspect locations, is part of the solution to dealing with Iran.

Given the existence of these sites (and possibly others), do you assess that returning to the 2015 JCPOA would effectively constrain Iran's nuclear program?

Response: In my current capacity, I am not privy to intelligence assessments on this issue. I believe the United States has much more leverage over Iran today than we did a decade ago, thanks to President Trump's first maximum pressure campaign.

Fissile Material Disposition

In 2000, the United States and Russia entered into the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), under which both countries committed to dispose of 34 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. However, while Russia abandoned this agreement in 2016, the United States has continued efforts to eliminate the material, currently via a dilute and dispose approach, with final disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP).

In your view, should the U.S. continue to eliminate its plutonium stocks absent any reciprocal Russian efforts?

Response: If confirmed, I will honor NNSA's legal commitment to remove plutonium from the state of South Carolina. In parallel, I will work with interagency partners to assess whether continued adherence to the PMDA is in the interest of the United States.

The United States has observed a more than four-decade long moratorium on reprocessing spent nuclear fuel. However, the previous Secretary of Energy made several comments in favor of nuclear recycling during her tenure, and the current Secretary has made nuclear energy production a core priority.

In your view, should the U.S. reconsider its self-imposed moratorium on nuclear fuel reprocessing?

Response: As the President and Secretary work to unleash the long-awaited nuclear renaissance, it is necessary to take a fresh look at U.S. civil nuclear policies across the board, including as related to recycling of spent fuel. If confirmed, I will ensure NNSA's

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation is closely involved in reviews and decisions in this area and contributes to discussions about proliferation and security risks associated with these technologies.

If so, how would such a move affect U.S. nonproliferation efforts globally?

Response: As part of any review of U.S. nuclear fuel policy, nonproliferation impacts must be carefully considered. If confirmed, I will ensure NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation informs reviews and provides input as the Administration makes decisions in this area.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Safeguards

Timely and consistent IAEA access and monitoring is integral to verifying countries' compliance with safeguards. The Department of Energy and the NNSA are considered the Executive Branch's technical experts for verification and assessment of these mechanisms.

What is your understanding of role of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation in supporting IAEA capability and will to execute its mission, while at the same time maintaining IAEA independence and without making it reliant on any one member state?

Response: The Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation plays a key role in supporting international nuclear safeguards, including through development of new technologies and methodologies at the national laboratories and provision of technical assistance to the IAEA and its Member States. These activities strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of the international safeguards system and the IAEA's ability to draw credible and sound conclusions—they are fully consistent with the IAEA's independence. DNN also plays an important role in coordinating and encouraging critical technical assistance from other Member States.

Do you believe the IAEA is adequately resourced to effectively apply safeguards on reprocessing programs?

Response: In my current capacity, I am not privy to details of how the IAEA applies its resources. However, I do understand that verification activities at the IAEA and application of safeguards at reprocessing facilities is especially resource-intensive.

What is your understanding of the role of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation regarding the IAEA's development of safeguard techniques and technologies applicable to reprocessing programs?

Response: Under the Deputy Administrator's leadership, the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation funds and directs U.S. experts at the national laboratories to develop safeguards techniques and technologies to support the IAEA's verification mission,

including as related to reprocessing programs. However, in my current capacity, I am not privy to the details of the safeguards tools being developed for such programs.

What other concerns, if any, do you have with reprocessing and plutonium accumulation in East Asia and elsewhere?

Response: Preventing the spread of enrichment and reprocessing facilities and technology globally is a critical and long-held U.S. national security goal. This is especially important in the strategically vital region of East Asia. Accumulation of separated plutonium, which is often associated with reprocessing of nuclear fuels, presents significant proliferation and security risks. Limiting accumulation of plutonium in East Asia is therefore vital.

What is your assessment of recent actions by Iran to increase enrichment levels as well as actions Iran has taken with respect to its heavy water reactor?

Response: In my current capacity, I am not privy to intelligence assessments on this issue. However, I view Iran's nuclear program as a major threat to U.S. national security, and I believe Iran must never be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon.

In your view, what are the other emerging challenges for the international safeguards regime/IAEA safeguards and how might the Office of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation contribute to addressing or be leveraged to meet those challenges?

Response: Preparing for and facilitating a new nuclear renaissance is both a challenge and an opportunity for this office. The deployment of new and novel reactors in "nuclear newcomer" countries and an increase in the number of nuclear facilities and the amount of nuclear material under safeguards carry risks. DNN helps to meet these challenges by working with nuclear newcomers to build safeguards infrastructure, engaging U.S. industry to incorporate safeguards-by-design principles into designs, and developing new technologies and techniques at the national laboratories for transfer to the IAEA. This work also helps make America more prosperous by creating favorable conditions for exports of U.S. nuclear facilities and technology.

Nuclear Material Security

What is your view of the strategy, if any, that NNSA has developed for prioritizing its nuclear security activities so that material that poses the highest risk is identified and addressed first?

Response: In my current capacity, I am not privy to the details of NNSA's criteria for prioritizing nuclear security activities. If confirmed, I will ensure that NNSA's nuclear security activities are rigorously risk-informed and based on careful coordination with the Intelligence Community.

U.S. nuclear security cooperation programs with Russia are currently inactive after years of joint investment between our two countries to ensure our stockpiles of fissile materials have adequate protection.

What are your views with respect to the state of safeguards currently in place in Russia and the level of risk of diversion of Russia's fissile material?

Response: In my current capacity, I am not privy to the details of Russian nuclear safeguards and risks. My understanding is that NNSA lost visibility into many Russian security efforts when cooperation ended in 2013.

What visibility should the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation have on Russian efforts to sustain the equipment and technology the United States has provided?

Response: The Deputy Administrator should carefully follow Russian efforts to sustain such equipment and technology, to the extent that such information is available.

What, in your view, are the other areas of nuclear security and nonproliferation cooperation that could be sustained or initiated with Russia in the next five years?

Response: The President's initiative to reach peace in Ukraine has the potential to remove a major barrier in the U.S.-Russian relationship and could open up new avenues for cooperation. At the same time any cooperative activities must be carefully assessed to ensure they are in the U.S. interest. If confirmed, I will leverage DNN's unique capabilities to assess and, if possible, implement such opportunities, in coordination with the U.S. interagency.

Significant progress has been made over the past two decades to improve security over vast amounts of vulnerable nuclear material and to consolidate fissile material to fewer, more secure locations. Yet, some countries remain unwilling or reluctant to cooperate with U.S. nuclear material security programs.

Do you agree with the assertion by some that efforts to secure fissile material around the world have run their course? Please explain your answer.

Response: I do not believe that efforts to secure fissile material around the world have run their course. While I am not privy to intelligence estimates on global fissile material inventories in my current position, I understand there are large quantities of fissile material remaining to be secured. I also believe it is possible to make progress on consolidating, securing, and, in some cases, removing materials to reduce the risk of those materials getting in the hands of malign actors and threatening the security of the homeland.

How do you believe the United States should address countries that, to date, have been unwilling to cooperate with these efforts?

Response: Where appropriate in the context of broader U.S. foreign policy, I believe that the United States should engage diplomatically and stand ready to bring our technical expertise to bear to work with all countries to address fissile material stocks. I believe we should continue to seek creative ways to engage these countries, drawing on the unique technical expertise of the national laboratories and the extensive experience of DNN in working around the globe to reduce nuclear risks.

What would you do differently, and what new strategies would you employ to this end, if confirmed?

Response: Political barriers in this area cannot be discounted. However, President Trump's trade and foreign policy has the potential to open up new opportunities to advance American interests globally. If confirmed, I will work closely with my colleagues in the Department of State and the interagency to identify and pursue such opportunities.

With the end of the Nuclear Security Summits, what are your thoughts on how international consensus building and dialogue on nuclear security can continue between the United States and senior leadership of key foreign governments? What models or mechanisms would you propose, if confirmed?

Response: I believe that nuclear security is best advanced through a combination of multilateral and bilateral means. If confirmed, I will leverage DNN's unique capabilities to break new ground in both areas.

This administration has emphasized working with other countries on a bilateral basis. In your view, what are the top five countries with which the United States needs to work most closely on nuclear security technical and policy issues, and what are the most pressing issues that need to be addressed with each of those countries?

Response: In my current capacity, I am not privy to the intelligence assessments on foreign nuclear material holdings and security postures. If confirmed, I will ensure that DNN's international engagements on nuclear security are rigorously risk-informed.

In your view, what are the guidelines and objectives that should be part of developing nuclear security cooperation with China? India? Pakistan?

Response: In my current capacity, I am not privy to the intelligence assessments on the nuclear material holdings and security postures of these countries. If confirmed, I am committed to seeking out this information and advancing nuclear security cooperation as directed by the Administration's policy priorities.

What is your understanding of the role of NNSA-sponsored Centers of Nuclear Security Excellence in engaging such countries, and what tangible results have you observed from the programs sponsored by those centers?

Response: In my current capacity, I am not privy to the details of the Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence. If confirmed, I will carefully review such cooperation to ensure it is making America safer, stronger, and more prosperous.

Historically, efforts to minimize, inventory/account for, and secure nuclear materials have focused on civilian stockpiles, to the exclusion of military stockpiles. Crossover between civilian/military nuclear programs is problematic.

What do you envision as the role, if any, of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation in addressing the dangers posed by military fissile material stockpiles?

Response: I believe that foreign military fissile material stockpiles are a key part of the global nuclear security challenge. If confirmed, I will vigorously pursue opportunities to minimize, account for, and secure such materials, with the understanding that foreign governments are often reluctant to grant access to the United States.

As with other nuclear materials security programs, DNN has significant accomplishments in terms of converting research reactors to run on low-enriched uranium. However, a number of highly enriched uranium-fueled reactors continue to operate around the world, and converting some of these reactors presents greater technological and other challenges than NNSA has previously encountered in other reactor conversions, including strong political resistance to such conversions.

In your view, how should the Deputy Administrator for DNN approach these challenges?

Response: DNN has made significant accomplishments in converting research reactors around the world, but the job is not done yet. It does not take very much highly enriched uranium to make a nuclear weapon, so we must be relentless in minimizing material in civilian use.

The Office of the Deputy Administrator sponsors an ongoing program to replace Cesium-137 blood irradiators in hospitals, but this program is modest and faces limitations.

Do you believe the Office of the Deputy Administrator has the requisite capacity for a more comprehensive program?

Response: While I am not privy to all of the details of the cesium-137 blood irradiator replacement program, I understand that DNN has made tremendous progress and is nearing completion of its goal to remove all cesium-137 blood irradiators in the United States by 2027. I do believe the organization has proven it is ready to tackle a more comprehensive program to permanently reduce the risk of radioactive materials in the United States.

If confirmed, how would you plan on overcoming the current program's limitations?

Response: I believe the program could be expanded to include a broader universe of radioactive sources. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to develop options for such an expanded program.

Former Soviet states that border Russia have historical trade and smuggling routes that stretch from the Russian border to the Levant.

What are your perceptions of the extent of nuclear smuggling in these regions?

Response: In my current capacity, I am not privy to intelligence assessments on nuclear smuggling.

If confirmed, what do you believe NNSA should or should not be doing to control nuclear smuggling in this region and along these routes?

Response: In my current capacity, I am not privy to intelligence assessments on nuclear smuggling. I do believe that controlling nuclear smuggling in this region is a key part of a multi-layered defense to stop nuclear and radiological threats before they can reach the U.S. homeland.

What are your views on the way forward in securing nuclear materials in the Levant?

Response: In my current capacity, I am not privy to intelligence assessments on nuclear smuggling. If confirmed, I will make the Levant a priority for DNN's nuclear material security programs, given security challenges in the region, many of which are driven by Iran's destabilizing influence.

Nuclear Cooperation Agreements and Export Controls

For years, the United States has worked to develop a nonproliferation agreement with Saudi Arabia under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act.

Do you believe that Saudi Arabia should be required to adhere to the IAEA additional protocols?

Response: I strongly support efforts to universalize adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol. However, in my current capacity, I am not privy to the specific details of current U.S. discussions with Saudi Arabia on civil nuclear cooperation. I do note that it is vital that any nuclear cooperation with a partner is consistent with the Atomic Energy Act and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Do you believe Saudi Arabia should be allowed to reprocess spent nuclear fuel or have the ability to enrich uranium?

Response: I strongly support efforts to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing facilities and technology. However, I am not privy to the specific details of current U.S. discussions with Saudi Arabia on civil nuclear cooperation, and it would not be prudent to comment.

What proliferation risks do you see as arising from any nonproliferation agreement with Saudi Arabia, and if confirmed, what would be your role in and approach to managing these risks?

Response: Saudi Arabia is a key U.S. partner and a responsible part of the global nuclear order. As with any country operating nuclear reactors, IAEA safeguards are necessary to ensure material and facilities remain in peaceful use. If confirmed, I will help Saudi Arabia establish the necessary infrastructure to facilitate IAEA safeguards.

To what extent do you believe the likelihood of reaching such an agreement could be affected by reports of Saudi Arabia's conclusion of agreements for uranium exploration with two Chinese entities, one of which is China's primary nuclear weapons infrastructure construction provider?

Response: I am not privy to this specific information. If confirmed, I will support the Department of State in civil nuclear cooperation discussions with Saudi Arabia to enable peaceful U.S. nuclear exports. I would also vigorously implement any Administration policy related to countering Chinese influence abroad.

In spite of process improvements, the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation has faced criticism from the nuclear industry for its implementation of 10 C.F.R. Part 810 regulations controlling the export of civilian nuclear technology.

What ideas do you have for improving the implementation of Part 810, and how would you go about implementing them, if confirmed?

Response: I am not privy to current Part 810 approval timelines and detailed processes, although I have general familiarity with the statutory authority underpinning Part 810 and DNN's critical role in implementing this authority. If confirmed, I will work with the DNN staff and interagency partners to identify efficiencies in the Part 810 process.

In the debates surrounding Part 810, which implements section 57(b) of the Atomic Energy Act, there is disagreement as to the extent to which some of the controlled technologies—such as some types of light-water reactor technology—pose a proliferation risk.

To what extent do you believe that export controls should cover such technologies?

Response: In my current capacity, I am not privy to the details of NNSA Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation policies and procedures for the application of Part 810 regulations to light-water reactor technology. If confirmed, I commit to examine this issue further, with the understanding that Part 810 nuclear export controls are ultimately driven by statutory requirements in the Atomic Energy Act.

In your view, how does one ensure enforcement through export control licenses and conditions when it is increasingly common for end users to change affiliations?

Response: I am not privy to the Department's specific export control license enforcement procedures. However, there are a mix of departmental and whole-of-government enforcement mechanisms—administrative or legal—that can be employed. If confirmed, I will work closely with staff and interagency partners to address this challenge.

If confirmed, how would you address the challenges posed by increasingly sophisticated illicit procurement networks that can circumvent export controls with apparent ease?

Response: If confirmed, I will work closely with departmental elements and interagency partners, including intelligence and law enforcement elements, to address this challenge.

If confirmed, how would you go about substantiating the claim that the United States must maintain a leadership role in the global nuclear industry in order to maintain leadership in global nonproliferation efforts?

Response: I believe strongly that U.S. leadership in civil nuclear energy and nuclear nonproliferation are mutually reinforcing. For example, by helping U.S. companies design nuclear reactors that are more physically secure and easier to safeguard, DNN can help launch the American nuclear renaissance while also reducing nuclear proliferation risks. Both lines of effort can help make the United States the “partner of choice” in the nuclear field, limiting the influence of China and Russia.

How does this argument frame the role of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in maintaining global standards?

Response: By re-establishing a leadership role in the global nuclear industry, the United States will bolster its credibility and influence in the NSG, as well as the IAEA. The NSG is an effective means to responsibly facilitate more prosperous civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade in a manner that makes the world safer and is consistent with international nuclear nonproliferation practices. To unleash our commercial nuclear energy potential and realize the long-awaited nuclear renaissance, we must ensure a competitive and efficient global civil nuclear marketplace. Controlling access to materials, equipment, and technology needed to build a nuclear weapon is critical for global security. We must therefore continue our important work of identifying emerging and evolving technologies of proliferation concern and preventing gaps in our controls.

If confirmed, what ideas and approaches would you apply to strengthening the NSG export guidelines?

Response: I am not privy to internal NSG discussions, but if confirmed, I will make it a priority to leverage DNN's unique capabilities to support the NSG's vital work and to identify opportunities to strengthen the NSG export guidelines.

NNSA has previously advocated for India's membership in the NSG, which has in turn led Pakistan to advocate for its membership.

Do you support India's and/or Pakistan's membership in the NSG despite neither being a party to the NPT?

Response: I am not privy to internal NSG discussions, but I commit to learning more about this issue if confirmed.

If confirmed, what would you perceive to be your role in advocating for or against membership by India and Pakistan?

Response: If confirmed, my role would be to use NNSA's technical resources to support the President's objectives for the NSG.

Nonproliferation Research and Development

North Korea enriches and reprocesses fissile material for its nuclear weapons program.

In your view, what areas of research and development do you believe are needed to further assess the advances North Korea has or is making in its nuclear weapons program?

Response: In my current capacity, I am not privy to the details of the North Korean nuclear weapons program. If confirmed, I will ensure that DNN's R&D activities are aligned with the most pressing national security challenges, including the North Korean nuclear program. I will also ensure that DNN's R&D activities position the nation to be able to address future challenges.

If North Korea were to freeze its nuclear weapons program, what additional safeguards do you believe would be needed to verify such a freeze?

Response: In my current capacity, I am not privy to the details of safeguards measures that would be required to verify a North Korean nuclear freeze. If confirmed, I ensure that DNN supports verification of any future agreement in this area.

Future arms control agreements may propose a cap on the total number of nuclear warheads in each country. This would require significant portal monitoring of locations

where such warheads are stored or employed.

What is your assessment of the capabilities of portal monitoring technologies to accurately identify nuclear warheads and their types?

Response: In my current capacity, I am not privy to the capability of portal monitoring technologies for this purpose. If confirmed, I will prioritize research and development on verification technologies, including improving the ability to independently verify agreements, so that the United States can enter any future negotiations with confidence regarding verification capabilities.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) and others have reported on issues affecting the nonproliferation research and development capacity in the NNSA nuclear security enterprise, including deteriorating facilities, stagnant or diminishing production capacity, a retirement-driven “brain drain,” and a constrained resource environment with many competing priorities.

In your view, what complex-related priorities should NNSA focus on to ensure continued capability and advancement in the nonproliferation area?

Response: I believe DNN’s key complex-related priority is to steward foundational competencies in nuclear nonproliferation, such as uranium and plutonium science. If confirmed, I will work to strengthen DNN’s existing programs in this area.

Budget Execution and Program Management

The Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation has made progress in recent years in providing transparency to the cost and schedule for some programs by issuing an annual strategic plan to reduce global nuclear threats. However, because of international agreements, DNN has been identified as maintaining carry over accounts for extremely long periods of time.

In your view, what is the appropriate degree of program management that DNN should exercise to ensure its programs can demonstrate performance against cost and schedule commitments, while also acknowledging the uncertainty of its operating environment—for example, its dependence on international partners to accomplish its mission?

Response: I believe that DNN should exercise rigorous program management to ensure that every taxpayer dollar is making America safer, stronger, and more prosperous. If confirmed, I will leverage my 20-year career as a military and federal civilian for both the Departments of Energy and Navy to bring innovative and practical solutions to this challenge.

If confirmed, to what extent would you support a requirement for all DNN programs to establish life-cycle cost and schedule baselines and measure

performance against those baselines in its annual report?

Response: In my current capacity, I am not privy to the policy and management details of the cost and schedule baselines and performance measures within NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation used to generate this annual report. If confirmed, I agree to investigate a requirement for all DNN programs to establish life-cycle cost and schedule baselines and measure performance against those baselines in its annual report.

Other agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security, also have nuclear forensics programs that are carried out by the NNSA nonproliferation program. Should these programs be consolidated under the NNSA, in your view? Why or why not?

Response: In my current capacity, I am not privy to the organizational breakdown of the U.S. Government's nuclear forensics activities. Generally, we need to take a close look at how we can better deliver on our missions for the American public by streamlining and avoiding needless bureaucracy. NNSA is the primary United States Government developer and user of nuclear forensics capabilities. If confirmed, I will work with interagency partners to ensure our activities are structured efficiently, are carried out in a way that aligns with each organization's core competencies, and that avoids any unnecessary duplication.

Sexual Harassment

What is your assessment of the current climate regarding sexual harassment and gender discrimination in the Office of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation?

Response: Organizations are most effective when employees at all levels are respected and safe. Sexual harassment and discrimination threaten organizational productivity, and I intend to raise awareness of this issue and stress reporting and prevention in cooperation with NNSA leadership if confirmed. I am committed to taking expeditious and appropriate action if incidents involving these matters are brought to my attention.

If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to receive or become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or discrimination from an employee of the Office of the Deputy Administrator?

Response: If confirmed, if I become aware of any complaints of sexual harassment or discrimination, I will ensure they are dealt with in a swift and serious manner. I will work with the proper entities in NNSA to take appropriate action and ensure a safe work environment.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this

committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Response: Yes.

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner without delay? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Response: Yes.

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Response: Yes.

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Response: Yes.

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees, and their respective staffs with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Response: Yes.

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or

no.

Response: Yes.

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Response: Yes.