

Senate Armed Services Committee
Advance Policy Questions for Platte B. Moring III
Nominee to be Inspector General of the Department of Defense¹

Duties and Qualifications

1. What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense (DOD IG)?

The DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG) is a statutorily created independent entity in the Department whose mission is to promote the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of DoD programs, and the integrity of its workforce and operations, through impactful audits, evaluations, investigations and reviews. The DoD OIG is the principal advisor to the Secretary of War for matters relating to the prevention and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse in the programs and operations of the Department. The DoD OIG also keeps Congress fully and currently informed concerning fraud and other serious problems, abuses, and deficiencies related to the Department's programs and operations.

Section 3 of the *Inspector General Act of 1978* provides that Inspectors General shall be appointed solely on the basis of their “integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or investigations.”

2. Describe your background, experience, and what “demonstrated ability” you possess in each of these areas.

As a licensed attorney, my demonstrated ability is law, management analysis, public administration, and investigations. Upon graduating from law school, I served as a law clerk to a federal judge. At the U.S. Department of Justice, I was a trial attorney in the Commercial Litigation Branch of the Civil Division for five years. In the private practice of law, I managed a regional office of a Philadelphia law firm. As a District of Columbia and Pennsylvania Army National Guardsman, I was the Command Judge Advocate stateside and Rule of Law Officer for the entire Afghanistan theater in Operation Enduring Freedom from 2003 through 2004. At DoD, I served as Deputy General Counsel (Legal Counsel) from 2019 through 2020 and led a team of over 75 personnel. Both my public and private practice of law required litigation of complicated cases involving investigations, financial analysis, and management analysis. My experience with accounting and auditing is limited to

¹ As this position is designated as the Department of Defense Inspector General in statute (5 U.S.C. § 408), I will use this title in this document for submission to Congress. However, I acknowledge that the President has promulgated an Executive Order authorizing the use of a secondary name—the Department of War—and will use that designation when communicating exclusively within the Executive Branch.

the review of financial statements in my capacity as a board member for nonprofit organizations.

3. What leadership and management experience do you possess that you would apply to your service as DOD IG, if confirmed?

My leadership and management positions described above provide the necessary experience to lead an OIG workforce of approximately 1800 personnel in more than 50 offices worldwide. As DoD Deputy General Counsel, I managed a team of over 90 attorneys, contractors, and paralegals. As a private-practice attorney, I was a managing partner in a Philadelphia law firm with over 250 attorneys and staff. As a college professor, I was responsible for the education and welfare of over 125 students.

4. In your view, are there any steps you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of the DOD IG?

Yes. If confirmed, I would immediately take steps to improve my understanding of the Department of War auditing, accounting, and procurement processes.

5. If confirmed, what duties and responsibilities would you assign to the Principal Deputy Inspector General of the Department of Defense?

The Principal Deputy Inspector General will serve as the Chief Operating Officer of the OIG, responsible for overall management of audits, investigations, reviews, and evaluations and supervision over the internal operations of the OIG.

6. Are there any additional authorities or resources that, in your view, would enhance your ability to perform the duties and functions of the DOD IG, if confirmed?

The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, provides sufficient authorities to perform the duties and functions of the DoD OIG. With respect to budget and human resources, I will need to make an assessment in consultation with the management team of Deputy Inspectors General to determine their sufficiency to perform the mission.

Conflicts of Interest

Federal ethics laws, to include 18 U.S.C. §208, prohibit government employees from participating in matters where they, or certain family members or organizations with which they have certain relationships, have a financial interest.

7. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to disclose any potential conflicts of interest, including investments, business ties, family relationships, or other connections that could be perceived as influencing your decision making?

I agree to comply with all conflicts of interest disclosure requirements set forth in the Ethics in Government Act and implementing regulations.

- 8. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, that if a conflict of interest arises, you will recuse yourself from participating in any decisions regarding that specific matter?**

I agree to comply with all recusal requirements under 18 U.S.C. § 208 and implementing regulations.

- 9. Do you commit, without qualification, if confirmed, to decide matters on the merits, and exclusively in the public interest, without regard to private gain or personal benefit?**

I commit to deciding matters on the merits based on the public interest, without regard to any private gain or personal benefit.

Major Challenges and Priorities

- 10. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next DOD General Counsel?**

I am answering this question as if posed to the DoD Inspector General. The Reports Consolidation Act of 2000 requires that each IG prepare an annual statement that summarizes what they consider to be the most serious management challenges facing the agency. If confirmed, I will be guided by the management and performance challenges identified for FY 2026. Foremost among these challenges is providing oversight to the support of the warfighter. One major challenge confronting the OIG is collaborating with the entire Department in achieving the statutorily required clean audit by the end of FY 2028. Another challenge is the real possibility of having to do more with less. From publicly available information, I am aware that the OIG has acquired more statutory requirements for reports and audits while at the same time potentially facing reduced budgets and manpower.

- 11. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing each of the challenges you identified, and on what timeline?**

The achievement of a clean audit will require a whole of the Defense Department effort. With anticipated direction and support from the Office of the Secretary of War, each DoW Component must have a commitment to produce a financial statement free of material weaknesses. The timeline is by the end of FY28. The Comptroller and the IG must monitor this effort on, at a minimum, a quarterly basis. The manpower and budget challenges are addressed in response to question no. 12 below.

12. In your view, are there business process reforms that the DOD IG could undertake internally that would contribute to the Department achieving a more efficient use of resources?

Unable to opine at this time based upon lack of familiarity with the office and existing policies and procedures. If confirmed, I will have in-depth meetings with the Deputy Inspectors General for the oversight and investigative Components of the OIG, the Deputy Inspector General for Mission Support, and the rest of the management team to develop a plan for possibly more efficient use of resources.

Civilian Control of the Military

13. What are your personal views on the principle of civilian control of the military?

This principle is a key component of the United States Constitution and a foundational element of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

14. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure that your tenure as the Inspector General epitomizes the fundamental requirement for civilian control of the Armed Forces embedded in the U.S. Constitution and other laws?

The DoD OIG would provide oversight of the Department's implementation of laws, regulations, and policies concerning the mobilization and deployment of the Armed Forces.

Independence and Objectivity

15. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to maintain the independence and objectivity of the Office of the DOD IG?

There will be an adherence to the IG Act and a personal pledge to maintain independent judgment and action. The Act provides the IG with the general authority to conduct investigations and issue reports that are in his/her judgement necessary or desirable. Also, the Act prohibits the head of the agency from preventing or prohibiting the IG from initiating any audit or investigation. For the Department of War, the Secretary of War may only prohibit the Inspector General from conducting an audit or investigation or issuing a subpoena regarding a limited list of subjects, if the Secretary determines it is "necessary to preserve the national security interests of the United States." Additionally, established standards for the conduct of audits, investigations, and evaluations require personnel to carry out their duties independently and impartially. If confirmed, I would ensure the OIG's investigators, auditors, and evaluators meet those standards. Finally, the Act authorized the OIG to have an independent General Counsel, budget, human resource section, and Chief Information Officer.

16. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would be appropriate for the DOD IG to consult with DOD officials outside of the Office of the Inspector General before issuing an audit, investigation, or inspection report, regarding the findings and recommendations set forth in that report?

The IG Act requires the Inspector General to submit any audit, inspection, or evaluation report to the agency head three days before it is posted on the OIG website. Before then, the DoD OIG formally seeks review, comments, and concurrence from relevant DoD officials on a draft of the audit or evaluation report, including findings and recommendations. For administrative investigations, the DoD OIG has a process where subjects of potentially substantiated allegations may review and comment on a draft of the report.

17. To the extent you believe it appropriate, how would you conduct such consultation so as to maintain the independence and objectivity of the DOD IG, and to ensure perceptions of IG independence and objectivity are not compromised?

The consultation process would most likely involve telephone calls, receipt of memoranda, and possibly in-person meetings. These mechanisms would have the express and only purpose of correcting any clear errors of fact and/or clear misstatements of the law.

18. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would be appropriate for a senior official to request that the DOD IG not audit, investigate, inspect, or review a particular matter?

Pursuant to the Inspector General Act, the DoD IG shall be under the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of War with respect to audits or investigations that relate to, or the issuance of subpoenas that require access to information concerning, sensitive operational plans, intelligence matters, counterintelligence matters, ongoing criminal investigations by other administrative units of the Department of War related to national security or other matters the disclosure of which would constitute a serious threat to national security.

19. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would be appropriate for a senior official to request that the DOD IG not issue a report on a particular matter?

With respect to the information listed above in response to Question No. 18, the Secretary of War may prohibit the IG from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation, or from issuing any subpoena, after the IG has decided to initiate, carry out or complete such audit or investigation to the issue such subpoena, if the Secretary determines that such prohibition is necessary to preserve the national security interests of the United States. The IG Act requires that any exercise of the Secretary's power to prohibit an audit or investigation shall be reported to Congress

by the DoD IG and the Secretary must transmit his reasons for exercising this power to Congress.

20. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would be appropriate for a senior official to request that the DOD IG alter findings, recommendations, or other pertinent material in a report on a particular matter?

In addition to the circumstances described above in response to Question Nos. 18 and 19, I can foresee the possibility of the DoD IG altering the content of a report to correct a material error of fact or redact pertinent material that might lead to the identification of a whistleblower.

21. If confirmed, what action would you take if a senior official sought to prevent you from “initiating, carrying out, or completing” any audit, investigation, or inspection within the jurisdiction of the Office of the DOD IG?

Other than in the circumstances described above in response to Questions 18-20, I would object to the senior official action, attempt to reach a reasonable accommodation, and ultimately, if necessary, refuse the request. If these approaches fail, I would consider whether the senior official’s action is such that I should report the attempt to prevent me from executing my statutory responsibilities to the Secretary of War and Congress in accordance with the Inspector General Act.

22. In your view, would an assertion of executive privilege from the White House with regard to a matter relating to the Department of Defense prevent the DOD IG from accessing information that has been shielded from Congress?

The DoW has an obligation to protect information subject to Constitutional privileges. However, an assertion of executive privilege should not preclude the DoD IG from obtaining access to the information. As with any privileged information, I will take all necessary precautions to ensure that privileged information is not inappropriately released to the public.

President Trump’s February 18, 2025, Executive Order entitled “Ensuring Accountability for All Agencies” states in section 7 that “No employee of the executive branch acting in their official capacity may advance an interpretation of the law as the position of the United States that contravenes the President or the Attorney General’s opinion on a matter of law. . . .”

23. What is your understanding of the role of the DOD Inspector General in seeking the advice of the General Counsel to the DOD IG with respect to questions of legal interpretation that arise during an investigation?

Pursuant to the Inspector General Act, there is a General Counsel to the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, who shall be appointed by the DoD IG. The DoD IG is the exclusive legal client of this General Counsel. The General Counsel to

the IG provides legal advice and counsel on all matters relating to the missions, functions, responsibilities, and duties of the Office of Inspector General. With respect to questions of legal interpretation that arise during an investigation, I would seek the advice of the General Counsel to the DoD IG.

24. If confirmed, what rules of professional responsibility would you expect the General Counsel to the DOD IG to apply in the practice of law?

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 530B, an attorney for the government shall be subject to State laws and rules, and local Federal court rules, governing attorneys in each State where such attorney engages in that attorney's duties, to the same extent and in the same manner as other attorneys in that State.

25. If confirmed, how would you address a situation where your independent professional legal judgment differs from the opinion of the President?

I would comply with the February 18, 2025, Executive Order of the President of the United States.

Supervision by the Secretary of Defense

26. What is your understanding of the general supervisory authority of the Secretary of Defense over the DOD IG, in view of the language provided by sections 2 and 3 of the *Inspector General Act*?

Pursuant to the IG Act, as implemented by DoD Directive 5106.01, the DoD IG shall report to and be under the general supervision of the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, but shall not report to, or be subject to supervision by, any other officer of the DoD. I anticipate that the DoD IG will meet regularly with the Secretary and Deputy Secretary to discuss the scope and timing of OIG projects, findings of completed OIG reports and investigations, potential oversight areas, and other matters of importance to the mission of the Department.

27. If confirmed, what would be your relationship with the Secretary of Defense?

I would have regularly scheduled meetings with the Secretary of War as part of a working relationship to provide briefings and solicit input on existing and potential OIG projects to promote the effective, efficient, and economical administration of the Department of Defense.

28. What would be your relationship with the Deputy Secretary of Defense and how would it differ from your relationship with the Secretary?

The Deputy Secretary of War serves as the Department's chief operating officer, responsible for overseeing the day-to-day management of the Department and executing the Secretary of War's strategic priorities. If confirmed, I would consult

with the Deputy Secretary of War on budget and oversight issues as well as seek his guidance and cooperation in resolving any disagreements between OIG and the DoD Components concerning the implementation of IG recommendations.

29. What is your understanding of the procedures in place to effectuate the authority and control of the Secretary of Defense over the matters delineated in section 8 of the *Act*?

If the Secretary of War exercises any power provided by the IG Act, the Secretary shall, within 30 days after the submission of a statement by the IG to the committees of statutory jurisdiction in the United States Senate, provide a statement of the reasons for his exercise of such power.

30. What is your understanding of the extent to which the DOD IG has, as a matter of practice, initiated, conducted, and reported on audits or investigations covered by section 8 differently from other audits or investigations?

I have no such knowledge.

31. What changes, if any, do you believe are needed in the practices of the DOD IG for initiating, conducting, and reporting on audits or investigations covered by section 8?

Having never served as an employee of the DoD OIG, I have no basis of knowledge to offer any changes in practices, if appropriate.

Sections 4 and 8 of the *Inspector General Act of 1978* set forth various duties and responsibilities of Inspectors General in addition to the conduct of audits and investigations.

32. What is your understanding of the supervisory authority exercised by the Secretary of Defense with regard to these additional duties and responsibilities?

The DoD IG shall keep the Secretary of War fully and currently informed concerning fraud and other serious problems relating to the administration of programs and operations at the Department so that corrective action may be taken by the Secretary.

General Counsel to the DOD IG

33. What is your understanding of the history and purpose of section 907 of the NDAA for FY 2009, regarding the position of General Counsel to the DOD IG?

The 2009 NDAA amended the IG Act to establish a General Counsel to the Inspector General, appointed by the IG and independent of the General Counsel of DoD. It also established an Office of General Counsel to the DoD IG and authorized the IG to appoint such legal counsel as the IG considers appropriate.

Prior to this amendment, counsel to the IG for DoD was an attorney under the supervision and control of the General Counsel, DoD, via the Defense Legal Services Agency (pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 140(b)).

The purpose was to provide for each Inspector General to obtain legal advice from a counsel either reporting directly to the Inspector General or to another Inspector General.

34. What is your understanding of the role played by the General Counsel to the DOD IG with respect to completed investigations?

The General Counsel will review the results of the investigation for compliance with all applicable statutes, regulations, and DoD policies.

35. If confirmed, how would you address differences of opinion between the DOD IG General Counsel and a DOD IG investigative team as to findings of fact and the appropriate weight to be given such facts in a completed investigation?

I would give credence to the veracity of the facts determined by the DoD OIG investigative team and rely upon advice of counsel to the IG with respect to the application of law to those facts.

36. If confirmed as the DOD IG, what manner of relationship would you expect the General Counsel to the DOD IG to maintain with the General Counsel of the DOD, who by law serves as the department's chief legal officer?

I would expect the DoW General Counsel and the IG General Counsel to maintain a professional working relationship attempting to reach accommodation with respect to all matters within the purview of the Office of Inspector General.

37. What is your understanding of the authority of the DOD IG to access for official purposes records of the Department of Defense that may be protected by an institutional attorney-client privilege?

The DoD IG has statutory authority to obtain access to all records, information and documents available to the DoD relating to any program or operation over which the DoD IG has responsibilities. Any claim of institutional attorney-client privilege will not serve as a basis for withholding documents from the DoD IG. All communications covered by the claim of privilege will be protected from disclosure as required by law and Department policies.

38. What is your view of the authority of the DOD IG to access for official purposes—including for purposes of responding to a congressional request—records of the Department of Defense that may be protected by executive privilege?

The DoD IG has statutory authority to obtain access to all records, information and documents available to the DoD relating to any program or operation over which the DoD IG has responsibilities. Any claim of executive privilege will not serve as a basis for withholding documents from the DoD IG unless the Secretary of War invokes the provisions of Section 8 of the IG Act. All communications covered by the claim of privilege will be protected from disclosure as required by law and Department policies.

Relationships with Component Inspectors General

39. What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the component Inspectors General, including the Inspectors General of the military departments?

The OIG has oversight and coordination responsibility for other Components with the DoD that provide oversight within their Service or agency, such as the military service inspectors general and auditors general, combatant command inspectors general, military Service criminal investigative organizations, defense agency inspectors general, the Defense Contract Audit Agency, and the Defense Contract Management Agency. These agencies do not have authority under the IG Act. Military Service IGs report directly to their respective Secretaries and are subject to their direction and control.

40. What are your views on the component Inspectors General's ability to maintain their independence in conducting administrative investigations?

The Component Inspectors General should conduct administrative investigations independent from any influence from their chain of command and with the understanding that those IGs comply with the investigative standards established by the DoD OIG, including DoD Directive 5506.06 for senior official investigations, DoD Directive 7050.06 and DoD Instruction 7050.09 for military whistleblower reprisal investigations.

41. If confirmed, what would be your plan for working with and overseeing the component Inspectors General and their internal audit, investigation, and inspection units, with a view to avoiding duplication of effort in inspector general operations and activities?

The DoD OIG is responsible for establishing investigative and audit policy to guide the work of those that perform it across the DoD, including the Component Inspectors General and Service IGs and audit agencies. Additionally, the DoD IG is responsible for overseeing and approving investigations of misconduct conducted by the Military Service and Defense agency IGs to ensure those IGs comply with appropriate investigative standards.

42. What is your understanding of the relationship between the DOD IG and the IGs of the Defense intelligence agencies – the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency?

These agency IGs, unlike other military Service and DoD Component IGs, have authority under the IG Act. As such, they can act more independently from the DoD OIG. Nonetheless, the DoD OIG has an oversight and coordination function with the Defense intelligence community IGs including with respect to their engagements with the congressional intelligence committees.

43. What is your understanding of the relationship between the DOD IG and the Intelligence Community IG with respect to the DOD intelligence agencies?

I envision a cooperative and coordinating relationship striving to maintain necessary oversight while, at the same time, protecting national security, particularly sources and methods of investigation.

44. What is your understanding of the roles of inspectors general assigned to the personal staffs of commanders and civilian leaders in headquarters and field commands across the DOD? If confirmed, what would be your relationship with these inspectors general?

I would chair the Defense Council on Integrity and Efficiency (DCIE). The DCIE comprises representatives from 35 organizations within the Defense oversight community, including OIGs, audit entities, and criminal investigative organizations. The DCIE will ensure effective coordination and cooperation between the OIG and the activities of the internal audit, inspection, and investigative organizations within the DoW.

45. In your view, how can the DOD IG and the military department Inspectors General work with military department audit agencies, criminal investigative organizations, internal review offices, and other functional staffs, to fulfill their oversight obligations?

The DoD OIG will publish and, in some circumstances, train clear standards, set goals and expectations with respect to oversight obligations, establish open lines of communication, and provide periodic and systematic monitoring of duties and responsibilities.

46. What is your understanding of the value of the “teach and train” mission undertaken by the military department Inspectors General?

The Army Inspector General Agency’s Teaching and Training Guide describes the proactive value of OIG teaching and training to enhance readiness and warfighting capabilities with the military departments. Teaching and training commanders,

service members, and civilians on current Service policies supports and enhances the operating efficiency of Service organizations, systems, and processes. The dissemination of information, regulatory requirements (e.g., whistleblower protection and confidentiality requirements), and lessons learned instill confidence in the OIG system and can improve individual and organizational performance, programs, and operations.

Keeping Congress Informed and Responsiveness to Congressional Requests

Section 2(3) of the *Inspector General Act of 1978* provides that one of the purposes of establishing the DOD IG was to keep the Secretary of Defense and Congress “fully and currently informed” of problems and deficiencies in the administration of DOD programs and operations and the “necessity for, and progress of corrective action.”

47. If confirmed, specifically what steps would you take to ensure that the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives are “fully and currently informed” of problems and deficiencies in DOD programs and operations?

If confirmed, I will provide the SASC and HASC with copies of all of our oversight reports and our SAR, as required by the IG Act, as amended. Further, I will ask my Congressional liaison staff to stay in contact with professional staff from both Committees to respond to questions. I will personally review and answer any correspondence from the Committees. I will make myself available to brief the Committees and their staff on any problems and deficiencies the DoD OIG identified in the Department’s programs and operations.

48. Congressional Committees and individual Members of Congress frequently request that the Office of the DOD IG audit, investigate, or review matters of public interest. What is your understanding of the manner in which the Office of the DOD IG addresses such requests?

The OIG considers all congressional requests, but the IG makes an independent determination on whether oversight of a particular matter is appropriate or needed.

49. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you make in the current policies and practices of the Office of the DOD IG for responding to congressional requests?

None at this time. I am open to the possibility of revising current policies and practices for responding to congressional requests consistent with law and existing Department policies.

50. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure the timeliness of Office of the DOD IG responses to congressional requests?

The OIG will respond to congressional requests as quickly as possible and, when appropriate, in full coordination with the Department. I will impose deadlines for providing acknowledgement of receipt of congressional requests.

51. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would be appropriate for the Office of the DOD IG to redact certain information contained in a report it provides to the congressional oversight committee or an individual Member of Congress?

The DoD IG will protect sensitive information, such as the identities of whistleblowers, documents from other Executive Branch agencies, and privileged communications.

52. In your view, does the independence of the DOD IG, as guaranteed in the *Inspector General Act of 1978*, include independence from Congress?

As required by the IG Act, the DoD IG shall keep Congress “fully and currently informed” concerning fraud and other issues relating to the Department’s administration of programs and operations. To do so, the OIG produces semiannual reports to the Secretary of War for transmission to Congress. In addition, all published reports are provided to the appropriate committee of jurisdiction in Congress. Finally, the OIG will be available to meet with Members of Congress and their staff at their request.

53. Are there certain categories of audits, investigations, or other inquiries that, in your view, are better conducted by the Government Accountability Office in its role as a component of the legislative branch? Please explain your answer.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent, non-partisan oversight agency in the Legislative Branch that works for Congress. The OIG regularly coordinates with the GAO on oversight projects and areas of mutual interest to prevent duplication and foster effective cooperation. The OIG regularly shares its ongoing and anticipated work with the GAO. The IG periodically meets with the Comptroller General or other GAO officials to discuss relevant issues facing the two organizations and the IG community at large. In my view, the GAO may be better postured to address statutory requirements involving financial management on matters outside the express responsibility of the OIG.

Senior Official Investigations

The Office of the DOD IG plays a key role in the investigation of allegations of misconduct by senior military officers and civilian employees of the DOD. The Senate Committee on Armed Services has a particular interest in investigations concerning senior officials who are subject to Senate confirmation and relies upon the Office of the DOD IG to ensure that these investigations are accurate, complete, and accomplished in a timely manner.

54. What is your understanding of the definition of “DOD senior official” for purposes of the DOD IG?

General officers, flag officers, members of the Senior Executive Service, and Presidential appointees.

55. What is your understanding of the circumstances in which a suspicion or allegation against a DOD senior official must be reported to the DOD IG?

DoD Directive 5505.06, “Investigations of Allegations Against Senior DoD Officials,” governs reporting requirements. The Directive requires the Military Services and other DoD Components to notify the OIG when they receive allegations of misconduct by senior officials.

56. If confirmed, what will be your process for determining whether to open an investigation of allegations against a senior officer or senior DOD official?

I am aware from publicly available information that the DoD OIG has a process to review incoming complaints to determine whether the complaint contains allegations of misconduct that warrant further investigation. This process allows the DoD OIG to decide whether to close a case if it does not retain it for investigation or refer the case to a DoD Component OIG for investigation. If confirmed, I will follow these standards.

57. Do you believe that the current allocation of responsibility for senior official investigations between the DOD IG and the Inspectors General of the military departments ensures fair and impartial outcomes—regardless of which Inspector General conducts the investigation? Please explain your answer.

I am unable to opine at this time based upon lack of familiarity with the office and existing procedures and results. If confirmed, I will have in-depth meetings with the Deputy Inspector General for Administrative Investigations and the rest of the management team to gauge the fairness and impartiality of the two investigative processes.

58. If confirmed to be the DOD IG, what steps would you take to oversee and ensure the accuracy, completeness, and timeliness of senior official investigations conducted by a military department Inspector General? Under what circumstances would you consider it is appropriate to expedite the completion of Inspector General investigations of DOD senior officials?

The DoD OIG’s oversight review process for senior official investigations reviews the military department OIGs’ investigations for compliance with Counsel of Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) professional standards, which include whether the investigation was completed in an objective manner was

thorough and well documented; contained conclusions supported by the evidence; was completed with any statutory or regulatory timeframes; and was determined to be legally sufficient.

If confirmed, I will meet with my Deputy Inspector General for Administrative Investigations and my General Counsel to review these procedures and determine whether I need to take any additional steps to ensure that the Service Inspectors General perform quality administrative investigations.

A circumstance that might demand expediting an investigation is one in which the Commander-in-Chief needs a particular senior official in a billet to lead troops into battle at war.

59. Under what circumstances would it be appropriate, in your view, for the DOD IG to change the findings of a military department Inspector General in regard to a senior official investigation?

The DoD OIG provides oversight of investigations of senior official misconduct conducted by the DoD Components. (DoD Directive 5505.06). The DoD OIG oversight of these investigations specifically examines the DoD Component's adherence to CIGIE professional standards for due professional care. DoD OIG personnel perform the oversight by reviewing case documents to determine whether the investigation complied with each CIGIE standard, whether there were any deficiencies, and, if there were deficiencies, whether they adversely impacted the investigation. DoD OIG personnel may require the DoD Component to resolve identified deficiency before the investigation is officially closed.

60. At what point in an investigation, and based on what criteria, would you take action to ensure that a "flag" or suspension of favorable personnel action is initiated against a senior military official?

DoD policy and guidance do not give the DoD OIG any authority to initiate a "flag" or suspension of favorable personnel action against a senior military officer. Also, neither the IG Act nor DoD policy authorizes the DoD IG to initiate personnel actions against DoD military senior officials. The DoD OIG notifies the DoD in certain instances when in receipt of an allegation against senior military officials. If the DoD OIG receives notification that a senior military officer has been nominated for promotion, DoD Directive 5505.06 requires the DoD OIG to notify the Under Secretary of War for Personnel and Readiness. The DoD OIG also notifies the appropriate Military Department when opening an investigation of a senior military officer and provides the results of the investigation upon completion.

61. In your view, to what extent should a senior official investigation conducted by the DoD IG or a military department Inspector General automatically be released to the public, to a congressional committee, or to an individual Member of Congress?

If confirmed, I would follow the standards set forth in DoD Directive 5505.06, as referenced in Question No. 55 above. The release of a report of a senior official investigation by the DoD OIG is subject to federal law, including the Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act. Under those statutes, certain types of information, including information implicating personal privacy, legal privilege, and pre-decisional deliberative processes, are exempt from public release. Release determinations involve balancing the public interest in disclosure against any protectable privacy interest of the subjects, complainants, witnesses, and others, while protecting privileged information from release. The DoD OIG does not routinely release reports of senior official investigations if none of the allegations are substantiated. The DoD OIG has publicly released senior official investigations for substantiated cases by posting them on the DoD OIG website. These reports are redacted and anonymized to protect the individuals. The IG Act requires the DoD OIG to provide in its Semi-Annual Report to Congress (SAR) information on substantiated senior official misconduct investigations and on any senior official investigation that was closed and not disclosed to the public.

62. In your view, how can the DoD IG contribute to promoting ethical conduct across the Department? What more could the DoD IG do in this regard?

Within the OIG, a culture of accountability must be maintained by entry level and annual training on standards of conduct. Department-wide, the OIG should exercise all its authorities to accomplish its missions of law enforcement and timely and thorough administrative investigations.

63. What is your understanding of the function of the Directorate of Investigative Oversight and Special Investigations and Reviews (IOSIR)?

Unable to opine at this time based upon lack of familiarity with this office and if it has existing procedures and responsibilities. If confirmed, I will have in-depth meetings with the responsible Deputy Inspector General and the rest of the management team to learn more about IOSIR.

64. If confirmed, how will you utilize the IOSIR? Will you modify its current responsibilities? If so, how and why?

References to IOSIR are not present or readily available within the public information sphere and I did not presume asking OIG employees to explain to me what the directorate does or does not do because of its unavailability.

Whistleblower Protection

65. What is your understanding of the role played by the DoD IG and the military department Inspectors General in investigating complaints of reprisal against

members of the military, DoD civilian employees, and DoD contractor employees, who raise allegations concerning fraud, waste, and abuse?

The DoD OIG investigates whistleblower reprisal, retaliation, and service member restriction complaints under different statutes and DoD policies. The DoD OIG operates the DoD Hotline to receive confidential reports of fraud, waste, abuse, and other violations of law or policy, including reprisal and restriction complaints. The DoD OIG, with the assistance of the Military Service IGs, investigates military restriction and reprisal cases pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1034 and as implemented by DoD Directive 7050.06, "Military Whistleblower Protection." As with senior official misconduct allegations, the DoD OIG has the right of first review but may refer a case for investigation to a DoD Component IG. (DoD Directive 7050.06). The DoD OIG evaluates and investigates allegations of military whistleblower reprisal or prohibited restriction or oversights the DoD Component IG's evaluation and investigation of these allegations.

66. If confirmed, what role would you establish for yourself in educating service members, DoD civilian employees, and DoD contractor employees about the whistleblower protection program?

The DoD OIG is statutorily mandated by the IG Act to have a Whistleblower Protection Coordinator (WPC) to educate employees and assist the Inspector General. According to the DoD OIG's website, the DoD OIG WPC's primary roles are to educate all DoD employees, including DoD civilian employees, military service members, defense contractors, subcontractors on reporting fraud, waste, and abuse within the DoD, without fear of reprisal.

67. If confirmed, what would you do to improve the timeliness of DoD IG whistleblower reprisal investigations?

If a report is not issued 180 days after commencement of the investigation, and every 180 days thereafter, the DoD OIG must notify the Under Secretary of War for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)), the Secretary of the Military Department concerned, and the Service member of the reasons for the delay and an estimate of when the report will be issued. I would work closely with the Deputy Inspector General for Administrative Investigations and her Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations Directorate to monitor the opening dates of new complaints, track the progress of opened investigations, and chart the time used to resolve the complaints. I will learn more about the OIG's challenges or impediments to timely completion of these investigations and examine options to address any issues.

68. How does the Office of the DoD IG ensure the accuracy, completeness, and timeliness of investigations into whistleblower reprisal allegations undertaken by component Inspectors General?

The DoD OIG conducts similar oversight reviews for whistleblower retaliation cases conducted by DoD Component IGs as explained for senior official misconduct investigations. The DoD OIG reviews the military whistleblower reprisal and restriction cases the DoD Component IGs recommend for dismissal at the intake phase as well as completed investigations, ensuring that the DoD Component IG adhered to the standards set forth in DoD Instruction 7050.09, “Uniform Standards for Evaluating and Investigating Military Reprisal or Restriction Complaints.”

69. What is your understanding of the different burdens of proof applicable under the military, Federal civilian, and contractor whistleblower protection statutes? Do you believe these standards are appropriate for the communities these statutes protect?

There are various standards and burdens dependent upon the nature of the allegation. For Contractor Whistleblower Reprisal, the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that they would have taken the personnel action absent the protected disclosure. In military reprisal and restriction investigations and non-appropriated fund instrumentality reprisal investigations under 10 U.S.C. § 1587, the evidentiary standard is a preponderance of the evidence.

70. What is the role of the DoD IG with respect to Intelligence Community whistleblowers?

The DoD OIG investigates intelligence whistleblower complaints as do the statutory IGs of the Defense Intelligence Components that are members of the Intelligence Community, including the DIA, NRO, NSA, and NGA. The DoD OIG has no jurisdiction or authority over Intelligence Community whistleblowers who are not employed by the Defense Intelligence Components.

Some military department Inspectors General have in recent years suggested that the whistleblower system is being “weaponized” within the military as the number of reprisal allegations have grown substantially, including in some cases as an apparent attempt to insulate the effects of misconduct.

71. What is your view of this suggestion?

I have insufficient experience with the work of the OIG to opine on this subject. If confirmed, I will address this issue with the Deputy IG for Administrative Investigations and explore methodologies to minimize the abuse of this law.

72. Does the DoD Inspector General system have the ability to triage prima facie baseless complaints while still ensuring full protection for whistleblowers?

While no protocol will identify each and every baseless complaint, I have become aware of mechanisms instituted by the Deputy IG for Administrative Investigations to screen for and close out baseless complaints.

73. Do you perceive a need for further legislation to ensure that members of the military, DoD civilian employees, DoD contractor employees, or Intelligence Community personnel are appropriately protected from reprisal for whistleblowing?

I have insufficient experience with the work of the OIG to opine on this subject. If confirmed, I will address this issue with the Deputy IG for Administrative Investigations and determine whether any statutory revisions are necessary to protect whistleblowers from reprisal.

74. What is your understanding of the prevalence across DoD of unlawful actions to restrict communications by service members, DoD civilian employees, or DoD contractor employees with an inspector general or with Congress?

I have no understanding at this time. If confirmed, I will address this issue with the Deputy IG for Administrative Investigations to determine the nature and extent of these unlawful actions, if any.

75. What do you perceive to be the most effective tools available to the DoD IG to prevent and respond to incidents of unlawful restrictions of communications by service members, DoD civilian employees, or DoD contractor employees with an inspector general or with Congress?

The DoD OIG only has the ability to investigate unlawful restriction of communication of military members. The Whistleblower Protection Coordinator can help educate DoD civilian employees and military members on the prohibition against restricting communications of military members with an inspector general or Congress. If confirmed, I will determine what statutory or policy tools may be available to prevent and respond to incidents of restriction of communications on DoD civilian employees or DoD contractors.

The Committee is aware of reprisal cases in which a Secretary's response to the Inspector General has been delayed by months or years. Furthermore, in some of these cases, the Secretary has responded that no corrective or disciplinary action had been taken against the perpetrator because of a belief that the Inspector General's substantiation of reprisal was erroneous or improper.

76. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to ensure that the Secretaries of the military departments are responsive to whistleblower reprisal complaints substantiated by the DoD IG or a component Inspector General?

I would require that each substantiated complaint for which no corrective or disciplinary action has been taken be reported directly to me. In each instance, I will seek an explanation from the DoD Component Head as to the reasons for the inaction and attempt to reach a resolution.

77. The Office of the DoD IG maintains a DoD Hotline to provide a confidential, reliable means through which any person can make a report. What is the current DoD Hotline report backlog? If confirmed to be the DoD IG, what steps would you take to reduce this backlog and on what timeline?

I do not have knowledge of the DoD Hotline's current reporting backlog. If confirmed as the DoD IG, I will meet with the Deputy IG for Administrative Investigations and the Director of the DoD Hotline to learn about their operations, determine whether they have a backlog, and, if so, work with my staff to develop a plan to address it.

The Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE)

Section 11 of the *Inspector General Act of 1978* established the CIGIE as an independent entity within the executive branch. In previous years, the CIGIE has been used to focus on oversight of emerging technology issues, such as Artificial Intelligence, that are critical to strategic competition with China.

78. How do you envision leading the DoD IG in this area and what are the most important near-term efforts for DoD IG audits and evaluations on Artificial Intelligence and other emerging technology issues?

The DoD OIG has recognized the importance of artificial intelligence and other emerging technology issues in its FY 2025 Top Management and Performance Challenges. Specifically, the report stated that artificial intelligence and quantum technology are rapidly developing and advancing threats to the DoD. A related area where the DoD OIG has an opportunity to lead is in ensuring through its oversight that the Department's use of artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies does not unduly risk or result in the compromise of sensitive or classified national security information.

79. If confirmed to be the DoD IG, what would be your role and relationship with respect to the CIGIE?

Pursuant to the Inspector General Act, the Chair of the Council for Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) designates a Lead or Special IG for Overseas Contingency Operations. At present, DoD IG is serving as the Lead/Special IG for Operation Inherent Resolve, Operation Enduring Sentinel, Operation Southern Guard, and Operation Atlantic Resolve. My role with CIGIE would be to coordinate the quarterly reporting and oversight of these Lead/Special IGs and serve on the Council in appointed committees.

Use of Contractors in Support of DoD IG Functions

Some federal agencies have reacted to limited inspector general resources by using contractors to perform some audit, investigation, inspection, and evaluation functions.

80. Do you believe that the Office of the DoD IG has sufficient resources to carry out its audit, investigation, inspection, and evaluation responsibilities?

I am unable to opine at this time, based on a lack of familiarity with the office and existing resources. If confirmed, I will have in-depth meetings with the Deputy Inspector General for Mission Support and the rest of the management team to gauge the adequacy of resources.

81. Under what circumstances, if any, would the use of contractor resources or personnel to perform audit, investigation, inspection, and evaluation functions be appropriate, in your view?

Outside contractors may be retained when there is insufficient manpower at OIG to perform a necessary task, such as auditing, and/or the required task requires a special skill set not within the then existing manpower resources at OIG.

82. What would be the effect, in your view, of reducing the civilian workforce of the DoD IG by 5 to 8 percent? Would the Office of the DoD IG assume any risk under such reductions?

In the DoD OIG FY 2025 Annual Oversight Plan, DoD OIG stated that it planned to perform 101 projects. With fewer personnel to perform audits and evaluations, I would expect the number of projects to decrease as well. Additionally, the Annual Oversight Plan identified that 21 percent of the planned projects were required by statute. With fewer personnel to perform audits and evaluations and no reduction in statutory requirements, there will be less capacity for non-statutory work, which will make it more difficult for OIG to accomplish its mission. The DoD OIG also performs both administrative and criminal investigations, which are not covered by the oversight plan and would also be impacted by a reduction in staff.

DoD Financial Management and Audit

DoD is the only federal agency unable to complete a financial audit in accordance with the law, despite having invested billions of dollars over the past 20 years to do so.

83. If confirmed, how would your office help Congress in overseeing and improving DoD's financial management so that the department can receive a clean opinion by 2027?

The achievement of a clean audit will require whole of Defense Department effort. With anticipated direction and support from the Office of the Secretary of War, each DoD Component must have a commitment to produce a financial statement free of

material weaknesses. The timeline is FY 2028. The Comptroller and the IG must monitor this effort on, at a minimum, a quarterly basis.

84. What is your view of the relative priority of financial audits within the Department of Defense, and the resources that should be devoted to such audits?

Obtaining a clean audit by the statutory deadline is a top priority for OIG. All necessary and available assets should be devoted to achieving this mandate. Focusing on the organizations that are the biggest impact to the financial statements will also help. While having smaller organizations pass an audit is critical, the DoD's larger Components impact the results for the agency-wide financial statements the most.

85. If confirmed, in which specific areas of your duties and responsibilities would you expect to coordinate with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer)?

I would meet with the Deputy Inspectors General for Mission Support and for Audit to understand the current coordination from both a budgetary and financial statement audit perspective. I will then determine whether I need to change how or when that coordination occurs.

86. If confirmed as the DoD IG, how would you objectively evaluate whether DoD's initiatives to improve financial management and business operations are resulting in meaningful progress?

Among other metrics, monitoring the number of repeat material weaknesses being identified by accountants in reporting agencies financial statements. I would plan to meet with the Deputy Inspector General for Audit to learn how the financial auditors currently monitor DoD's progress and then make any changes, if necessary.

87. Do you believe the Department can achieve a clean audit opinion through better accounting and auditing, or is a systemic improvement of DoD's business systems architecture a prerequisite?

The prerequisite is a systemic improvement of DoD's business systems architecture.

88. In your view, what incentives need to be in place to ensure senior leaders in each DoD Component—not only the financial management community—are fully invested and engaged in the process of achieving a clean audit opinion? Are those incentives currently in place in the Department?

Emphasis by senior civilian and military leadership is key. I would plan to meet with the Deputy Inspector General for Audit to learn how the financial auditors believe that DoD management can be better incentivized and engaged.

89. What are some specific examples of systemic improvements that have resulted from the DoD IG reviews of DoD financial management processes?

I will plan to meet with the Deputy Inspector General for Audit to learn what specifically the auditors have done to identify specific systemic improvements in DoD's financial management.

Acquisition and Contracting

In 2021, DoD IG's report "Audit of Department of Defense Middle Tier of Acquisition Rapid Prototyping and Rapid Field Programs" found that DoD effectively leveraged the authorities on 11 programs reviewed.

90. Do you believe that responsible use of rapid acquisition authorities should be encouraged in DoD?

It should be noted that the DoD IG does not make policy for the Department. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2016 provided the DoD with the authority to prototype and field rapid capabilities under a new acquisition pathway and required the DoD to issue implementing guidance (DoD Instruction 5000.80, "Operation of the Middle Tier of Acquisition"). The reforms included an expedited and streamlined alternative acquisition process—referred to as Middle Tier Acquisition (MTA). The DoD OIG exercised oversight with respect to the MTA and determined that the DoD must continue to balance management and oversight of these programs with the risk involved to ensure the efficient delivery of needed, useful capabilities at a fair and reasonable cost.

91. In your opinion, do you believe all defense programs should meet their cost, schedule, and performance estimates, or could some measure in program failure be beneficial as a catalyst for learning and innovation?

It has been said that failure is the mother of all innovation. However, the mission of DoD OIG is to conduct oversight of cost, schedule, and contract performance. The DoD must act early and often and identify what capabilities it can afford to lose in a particular acquisition and which it can't. DoD IG oversight projects have determined that acquisition officials should develop performance requirements early in the acquisition process and continually evaluate the contract requirements to ensure that DoD acquires quality products and services that satisfy user needs and improve mission capability and operational support.

In 2024, DoD IG announced a self-generated evaluation of the Replicator initiative to determine the effectiveness with which the capabilities can meet operational demands.

92. In your opinion, do you believe that DoD IG has personnel with the skills and experience to evaluate Replicator or is that better addressed by other oversight organizations such as for operational test and evaluation?

The DoD OIG can use subject matter experts to perform specific work, and the IG Act allows it to contract for specific services, if needed. With respect to any specific DoD program or activity, the role of DoD IG is one of oversight based upon certain written standards. The DoD IG performs best when it exercises its authorities consistent with its mission of promoting efficiency, economy, and effectiveness within the Department.

93. If confirmed, how do you envision DoD IG's role in helping the Department adopt modern business and innovation practices, if at all?

The DoD OIG's role is to oversee how effectively the DoD implements its policies. The adoption of modern business and innovative practices are the responsibility of DoD management. The DoD OIG may offer to hold "best practices" meetings with the Department to provide lessons learned, best practices, and other recommendations. These best practices meetings (formerly known as gold standard meetings) are a model for coordinated oversight designed to provide the DoD with the benefit of lessons learned from prior DoD OIG oversight work that can reduce fraud and improve the effectiveness of new programs.

For decades, DoD IG has performed evaluations of contract price reasonableness determinations.

94. Do you believe that accounting systems unambiguously identify the full set of costs and resources a company incurs in the production of individual end items on government purchase orders?

No. Until companies are required to provide DoD contracting officers with their complete cost and pricing data, price reasonableness will continue to be an issue with respect to DoD obtaining the best value for the lowest reasonable costs in its acquisition of individual end items.

95. In your opinion, are accounting costs plus not more than 15 percent profit the proper method for determining price reasonableness? Why or why not?

At the present time, this methodology is not discretionary. It is a statutory and regulatory requirement. The 15 percent profit margin is established by the Federal Acquisition Regulation and U.S. Code unless changed by Congress.

96. Do you believe the DoD IG should get a full understanding of government-unique requirements, such as for airworthiness certifications, prior to issuing reports on price reasonableness?

Yes. The DoD OIG must obtain and understand the quality standards applicable to a specific acquisition when performing its audits and evaluations and may consult outside experts in its work. The quality standards require that the DoD OIG collect the right type and enough evidence to support its findings and conclusions.

The integrity of defense supply chains is paramount, not merely for readiness but as a strategic imperative to eliminate single points of failure and reduce dependency on potential adversaries.

97. What tools can the Office of the DoD IG bring to bear to deter the provision to DoD of counterfeit, defective, or nonconforming parts and to hold fraudulent suppliers accountable?

The IG has the authorities and tools to root out fraud in defective parts and hold their manufacturers accountable. As stated in the IG Act, the DoD OIG is responsible for preventing and detecting fraud in DoD programs and operations. The Defense Criminal Investigative Service investigates fraud, including counterfeit, defective, and nonconforming parts. The Defense Criminal Investigative Service lists procurement fraud and product substitution as investigative priorities. I have become aware of the fact that the Service has closed over 60 investigations related to procurement fraud and product substitution in the first six months of FY 2025.

98. How would you evaluate DoD's ability to track government property as it moves through the supply chain?

If confirmed, I will meet with the OIG team and obtain a better understanding of the oversight of the supply chain process. I have become aware from public sources that the DoD OIG has done work on tracking DOD supplies, spare parts, and other defense articles as they are transported and move through the logistics chain.

99. In your view, are additional legislative changes needed to ensure that contracting officers have the authority they need to require contractors to disclose pricing data for sole-source parts?

Based on publicly available information, I have become aware that the DoD OIG has published several reports finding that the DoD has paid excess profits on sole source contracts where cost analysis was not used to determine fair and reasonable prices. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about the current status of this issue so I can have a more informed view to determine whether legislative changes are needed.

100. What is your understanding of your obligation, if confirmed, to consult with the Attorney General of the United States when an audit, investigation, or inspection under the auspices of the DoD IG yields reasonable grounds to believe there has been a violation of Federal criminal law—including procurement fraud?

The Inspector General Act requires Inspectors General to report expeditiously to the Attorney General when he or she has reasonable grounds to believe there has been a violation of Federal criminal law. Section 8 requires the DoD OIG to expeditiously report suspected or alleged violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice to the Secretary of the military department concerned or the Secretary of War.

Intelligence

- 101. What is your understanding of the role of the DoD IG in ensuring that intelligence and other sensitive activities within DoD are conducted in accordance with relevant legal standards?**

Consistent with its oversight responsibilities, the DoD IG has only a very limited role after the activity has already occurred. However, as noted in the Fiscal Year 2025 Oversight Plan, the DoD OIG regularly conducts evaluations of the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of DoD intelligence and classified programs.

- 102. If confirmed, in which areas of DoD IG responsibility would you expect to coordinate with the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight?**

The activities of the Inspectors General for the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and National Security Agency. Additionally, as noted on its website, the Assistant to the Secretary of War for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD-IO) is responsible for providing oversight of DoD intelligence, counterintelligence, and intelligence-related activities. The DoD OIG regularly conducts evaluations of DoD intelligence and classified programs.

Cyber

The Office of the DoD IG has consistently reported on problems the DoD has in protecting its cyber systems, networks, and data.

- 103. What are your views on whether the Office of the DoD IG has the expertise and capacity to adequately assess DoD cybersecurity plans, policies, and capabilities?**

Auditors and evaluators are required by their respective quality standards to be competent to perform the work they do. The DoD OIG can also use outside experts when needed to perform specific work, and the IG Act allows it to contract for specific services, if needed.

- 104. If confirmed to be the DoD IG, what would be your priorities for cybersecurity, and where would cybersecurity rank in terms of your overall priorities?**

The DoD OIG's identified FY 2025 Top Management and Performance Challenges for the Department highlighted the risk to the DoD from cyber threats. Cybersecurity-related audits are a focus of the DoD OIG. Its Audit Component has a directorate dedicated to oversight of Cybersecurity Operations.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

105. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer yes or no.

Yes.

106. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.

Yes, consistent with the Inspector General Act and other applicable laws, policies, and practices.

107. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.

Yes.

108. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer yes or no.

Yes, consistent with the Inspector General Act and other applicable laws, policies, and practices.

109. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.

Yes, consistent with the Inspector General Act and other applicable laws, policies, and practices.

110. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer yes or no.

Yes.

111. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer yes or no.

Yes.