

**Senate Armed Services Committee**  
**Advance Policy Questions for Lieutenant General Stephen N. Whiting, USSF**  
**Nominee for Appointment to be Commander, United States Space Command**

**Duties and Responsibilities**

**U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM) has an area of responsibility (AOR) equal to, or greater than, 100 kilometers equal to, or above, the earth's surface. Further, the Commander, U.S. Space Command, is responsible to plan and execute, as directed, global offensive and defensive space operations through all domains, including the electromagnetic spectrum.**

**1. What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the Commander, U.S. Space Command, within in the Department of Defense (DOD)?**

**Answer:** I will execute the following *primary duties* of the CCDR, IAW 10 U.S.C. § 164. Commanders of combatant commands: assignment; powers and duties: (b3A) To produce plans for the employment of the armed forces to execute national defense strategies and respond to significant military contingencies; (b3) To take actions, as necessary, to deter conflict; and (b3C) To command United States armed forces as directed by the Secretary and approved by the President. The CDRUSSPACECOM's *responsibilities* are assigned by the POTUS in the Unified Command Plan: (1) Space Operations; (2) Global Sensor Manager. (CDRUSSPACECOM is responsible for planning, managing, and conducting operations of DoD Space Domain Awareness, missile defense and missile warning sensors, global integrated networks, and associated command and control networks); (3) Global Satellite Communications Operations Manager; (4) Trans-Regional Missile Defense. (CDRUSSPACECOM conducts trans-regional missile defense planning and operations support in coordination with other CCMDs, the Services, and as directed, appropriate U.S. Government agencies, Allies and partners; supports assessment of missile defense operational capabilities; and ensures continuity of operations, as required); (5) Space Joint Force Provider.

**2. Specifically, what are your views with respect to operations that involve offensive and defense space operations?**

**Answer:** The USSPACECOM Commander ensures the successful execution of the missions assigned in the UCP. In particular, the Commander deters threats to US/Allied interests and, if deterrence fails, defeats those threats. Space is considered a warfighting domain and as with all regional domains, and any use of force must comply with domestic law, international law, the UN Charter, and applicable treaties, regardless of the domain in which the use of force originates, transits, or terminates. We must also factor in our assessment of the costs, risks, and benefits of any offensive or defensive space operation. My recommendation of military force in space operations will always be balanced, measured, and proportional to the hostile act or intent of an adversary. I will also factor in external issues such as non-military assets.

**3. What background, expertise, and experience do you possess that qualify you to serve as Commander, U.S. Space Command?**

**Answer:** It is a privilege to be nominated by the President to serve as the next Commander, United States Space Command. I have been a career-long space operations officer since I was a Second Lieutenant in 1990 and have served during a period of consequential change in our military space enterprise for almost 33 years. I have commanded space units at the squadron (2004), group (2006-2008), wing (2009-2011), Numbered Air Force (2017-2019), Joint Component (2019), and Field Command (2020-2023) levels. I have also served in numerous Joint positions, including as a staff member at the first instantiation of United States Space Command (2002), as a staff member at United States Strategic Command (2002-2004), as the Director of the Joint Space Operations Center (2006-2008) during the historic Chinese ASAT test in 2007, as the Military Assistant and Acting Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (2011-2013), as the Deputy Joint Force Space Component Commander for United States Strategic Command (2017-2019), as the first Combined Force Space Component Commander (2019) for the new United States Space Command when it stood up in 2019, and as the Space Force Service Component Commander to United States Space Command (2020-2023). I believe these experiences have prepared me, if confirmed, to serve as the next Commander, United States Space Command.

**4. Do you believe there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of the Commander, U.S. Space Command?**

**Answer:** I am devoted to being a life-long learner, and I look forward, if confirmed, to engaging with this committee, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Service, the Combatant Commands and Agencies, and key Interagency and Allied stakeholders to continue to learn what they need from United States Space Command to be successful. I am committed to being a productive team member to ensure the success of all stakeholders in our national security space enterprise.

**5. What are your views on protecting U.S. Allied, partner, and critical commercial space capabilities.**

**Answer:** We must be prepared to defend U.S., and as directed, Allied, partner, and key commercial space capabilities in order to prevent and/or mitigate hostile and/or irresponsible acts in space. Our adversaries continue to reinforce the fact that space is a warfighting domain with the capabilities they are developing and we should address this in kind. The best way to protect and defend U.S., Allied and partner space operational capabilities is to deter adversary aggression towards them. Deterrence only occurs from a position of strength and posture – therefore, strengthening our relationships with our Allies and partners as well as fielding new capabilities are key steps to protecting and defending on-orbit capabilities.

**6. If confirmed, what are your views on serving as the DOD manager for human space flight operations?**

**Answer:** I expect USSPACECOM's support to human space flight operations will be increasingly important as NASA's Commercial Crew Program and the Artemis program move forward. USSPACECOM serves as the DOD entry point for NASA's requests and requirements for human space flight support (HSFS) and should continue to do so ensuring safety and success of those programs and pursuits. Part of this responsibility continues to include integrating with other Combatant Commands with HSFS activities and involves the C2 of the actual rescue forces by 1st Air Force, USSPACECOM's Air Force Service component. USSPACECOM will continue to coordinate with commercial, civil, and international partners to help facilitate safe and reliable human space flight operations.

**7. What are your views on providing warning and assessment of attack on space assets, defending on-orbit space assets, and data links including SPACECOM terrestrial assets?**

**Answer:** Within USSPACECOM's UCP missions, the Command is tasked to ensure our assets are survivable, defended, and enabled for adaption to the threat environment. Examples to accomplish this, but not limited to, are our close working relationship with USSTRATCOM to support and provide Missile Warning, and working closely with USCYBERCOM to provide the necessary defenses against cyber attacks. USSPACECOM must continue to monitor potential adversary space and counterspace developments to provide effective indications and warning analysis to inform U.S. military decisionmakers. We will continue to closely work with other OSD, Joint Staff, and Intelligence Community partners in this effort to coordinate assessments and plan for adaptation to adversary threats.

**8. What are your views on advocating for space operations capabilities?**

**Answer:** If confirmed, I will advocate for, and set priorities for space operations capabilities through the Combatant Command's Integrated Priority List, in coordination with DOD, Intelligence Community, and the military Services to identify seams in our current capabilities, establish warfighting requirements, and develop future space capabilities to enhance our combat power and ensure space superiority.

**9. If confirmed, what are your views on providing space capabilities to the Joint Force including communications; missile warning; nuclear detonation detection; environmental monitoring; space domain awareness; military intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT)?**

**Answer:** If confirmed, I will ensure that providing these critical space capabilities to the Joint Force will remain the top priority for the command. These mission-essential space capabilities are a key force multiplier for other Combatant Commands, Allies, and agencies. While the capabilities themselves are predominantly provided by the U.S. Space Force, all of the Services may contribute to these mission areas, and in such a way that enables the command to maximize its Department-wide support. And as China and Russia field new capabilities, we collectively need to improve and adapt our nation's response to these challenging new threats. To that end, USSPACECOM must continue to work closely with the Services and with other government

organizations defining command warfighter requirements that will drive the development and fielding of the next generation of space capabilities.

**10. If confirmed, what are your views on serving as the Global Sensor Manager?**

**Answer:** If confirmed, I will lead the Command continuing to partner with the Joint, Combined, and Interagency community to build a robust picture of the space domain, with emphasis on identifying threats and maintaining our Nation's space superiority. We will continue to use traditional and long-proven space surveillance network assets, while at the same time look to incorporate not only more modern assets already being developed but also non-traditional sensors and techniques from across the Services, agencies and partners. Our current sensors support multiple mission areas include missile warning, missile defense and space domain awareness. Support is from the tactical through the strategic level. As the DoD Global Sensor Manager, if confirmed, I will leverage the USSPACECOM staff to manage and synchronize support from these multi-mission sensors to ensure all mission areas are served as operationally and technically feasible.

**11. If confirmed, what are your views on serving as the Global Satellite Communications Manager?**

**Answer:** If confirmed, USSPACECOM will continue to partner with the Joint, Combined, and Interagency community to facilitate reliable satellite communications for the Joint Force to ensure decision-makers and stakeholders at all levels of government have access to satellite communications (SATCOM) on a prioritized basis. As the DoD modernizes its SATCOM force design and expands the use of commercial and Allied satellite services, USSPACECOM will play a central role in operationally integrating these services into a cohesive and interoperable enterprise.

**12. If confirmed, what are your views on serving as the Joint Staff lead and global synchronizer for Missile Defense, as well as supporting assessments of missile defense capabilities through the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense?**

**Answer:** USSPACECOM is now assigned the UCP mission of Trans-Regional Missile Defense, and this new mission is well-suited to USSPACECOM's current sensor and C4 responsibilities and capabilities as the Global Sensor Manager, as well as USSPACECOM responsibilities for prompt and accurate Missile Warning. Trans-Regional Missile Defense complements USSPACECOM's other UCP missions including Space Operations and Space Domain Awareness. Many systems used for space missions are also used for Missile Defense so assigning all these missions to a single CCMD creates clear command and control. Over the last several years, USSPACECOM HQs and USSTRATCOM HQs prepared for transferring both the Trans-regional Missile Defense mission and the executing unit, JFCC-IMD. USSPACECOM ensured USSTRATCOM's divestiture plan nested with USSPACECOM's assumption plan, and USSPACECOM is currently executing the mission.

**Major Challenges and Opportunities**

**13. What do you consider to be the most significant challenges you will face if confirmed as the Commander, U.S. Space Command?**

**Answer:** The space domain is a competitive, contested, and congested environment:

- Per the National Defense Strategy (NDS), the most significant challenge is China as the pacing challenge. China is moving fast in space and has demonstrated cutting-edge capabilities and technologies routinely. Additionally, Russia, as evidenced by the Ukraine conflict, demonstrates a degree of unpredictability and remains a significant threat as well:
  1. Since 2015, Beijing and Moscow have reorganized their militaries to place increased emphasis on the space domain, both in accelerating their R&D efforts and analyzing our capabilities and reliance
  2. PRC and Russia are committed to fielding diverse counterspace capabilities across multiple domains
  3. Over the past 4 years, Chinese on-orbit satellites more than doubled (from 335 in 2019 to 681 in 2023 to date)
  4. Russian on-orbit satellites increased ~40 % (from 143 total in 2019 to 197 in 2023)
- USSPACECOM provides the Joint Force, partners, and Allies assured space capabilities they have come to rely on in all phases of conflict.
- USSPACECOM must continue the critical work of building unity of effort with other national security space stakeholders and international partners enabling an “asymmetric advantage” for the U.S.
- There is a clear debris concern (e.g. 58% increase of ISS conjunctions). Irresponsible use of space includes the 2007 China’s ASAT test which resulted in an additional 3000+ pieces of long-lived debris, and the 2021 Russia’s ASAT test which resulted in 1788 pieces of debris.
- Operational lessons from Russia’s Ukraine conflict revealed effects on PNT EW jamming of friendly GPS, advantages of incorporation of commercial ISR, and observation of Russia’s battle rhythm and use of space.
- Integration of systems is complex yet vital. Through my experience, I understand that integrating capabilities from the Services, Agencies, Allies, and Partners, including industry and the commercial market, allows seamless and expedited flow of concise information for C2 of the space Joint Forces.
- Continuing expansion of command talent is key. They are our strongest and most valuable asset. I will also focus on providing purpose-built, permanent facilities (after a final basing decision has been made) to optimize our critical work force with the necessary security, IT systems, resilience, and equipment needed.
- USSPACECOM also must maximize the amount space-related information shared with Allies and Partners while minimizing risk.

**14. What plans do you have for addressing each of these challenges, if confirmed?**

**Answer:** Conflict is not inevitable, but we have a responsibility to be ready to protect and defend the domain and ensure exquisite support to the Joint Force. We need to normalize the domain by continuing to improve our awareness and knowledge of the threats, which then drives a need to

change how we approach the domain. If confirmed, I will focus on capabilities, plans, training, and innovative/disruptive solutions to outpace the threat to ensure we maintain superiority in the domain. I will continue to set requirements and the operational demand signal. Alliances and partnerships provide a critical advantage our adversaries cannot match. Since the beginning of the Russian war on Ukraine, USSPACECOM has provided approximately 14,500 indications and warning of theater ballistic missile launches to NATO Allies and other U.S. partners. We must continue to leverage these partnerships for military advantage and to promote deterrence.

Manpower is the driving force to success. The Command's culture and reputation of professional excellence will attract and retain the best talent our nation has to offer.

With regard to establishing the permanent USSPACECOM HQ, once the basing decision is announced, I am confident the staff is postured to move out rapidly to design and construct mission-enabling facilities that put us in the best position to fight and win. I will seek your support for resourcing a unique facility and implementing mitigations to offset risk for whatever location is selected.

If confirmed, I will ensure that USSPACECOM will sustain USSTRATCOM's missile defense procedures, instructions, and arrangements as the command initially executes this mission. Over the next 18-24 months, USSPACECOM will deliberately assess and adjust procedures and operations to achieve the efficiencies envisioned by merging Space Operations, Global Sensor Manager, and Trans-regional Missile Defense responsibilities under a single CCMD.

This Command has been leveraging and will continue to leverage, if I'm confirmed, the increasingly vast and capable group of Allied and partners in support of the space domain and ensuring integration of our space and space-enabling capabilities where feasible. Being able to aggregate capabilities with Allies and partners enables greater operational flexibility and global response options and fully supports the NDS's approach to "Anchoring our Strategy in Allies and Partners."

Additionally, to effectively address the pacing challenge and other emerging threats, now and in the future, I plan to take calibrated risks between campaigning and deterring *today* and building warfighting advantage for the *future*. This balance, in line with the 2022 NMS's concept of Strategic Discipline, requires calculated risk and concerted coordination between the CCMD and the Services.

The Department is faced with multifaceted challenges across all domains that necessitate a robust, cyber-secure, AI/ML-driven Command and Control (C2) system, built on Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) tenets. This system, integrating space platforms, sensors, and weapons, is vital to safeguarding U.S. national security interests. Addressing hurdles in integration, interoperability, threat intelligence, cybersecurity, Space Domain Awareness (SDA), global cooperation, resilience, and training requires a common operational picture, effective intelligence partnerships, proactive cyber defenses, enhanced SDA, international collaborations, resilient architectures, and frequent training. CJADC2 provides the framework for achieving these, offering open system architectures, real-time cyber threat response, data fusion capabilities, Interagency networking, and training simulations. If

confirmed, I aim to leverage these CJADC2 principles fully, optimizing mission command and control.

**15. Given the major challenges you identified, what other priorities would you set for your term as Commander, U.S. Space Command, if confirmed?**

**Answer:** If confirmed, I will focus on:

- (1) building a coalition of superior military spacepower by strengthening alliances and establishing new partnerships to make the U.S. the preferred partner by the international community of nations
- (2) Incorporating greater Space Ops / Missile Warning / Missile Defense integration using multi-mission sensors supporting situational awareness and weapon systems enhancing Integrated Deterrence, and if needed, achieve all-domain dominance
- (3) Master understanding of activities in and affecting the space domain through space domain awareness
- (4) Continued expansion of redundancy and cyberspace monitoring capability ensuring our network and control nodes are protected and resilient against adversary offensive cyberspace operations against space superiority capabilities to protect and defend space missions which support the Joint Force, Allies, and the nation (e.g. MW, PNT, and SATCOM), as well as to protect the Joint Force and Allies from the space-enabled capabilities of potential adversaries.
- (6) Enhancing integration with the other Combatant Commands, Allies, and Interagency stakeholders to ensure we have the plans in place to maximize our ability to deter potential adversaries and the readiness to win if conflict materializes

**16. If confirmed, what actions would you take to focus SPACECOM, and the Department of Defense, on each of these priorities?**

**Answer:** Within the UCP assigned areas for USSPACECOM, I will collaborate with:

1. OSD leadership on the Combined Space Operations initiative.
2. JS support for MD capability development affecting both MDA and the Services' development and acquisitions.
3. USSF and NRO for space capability development.
4. Other CCDRs and our Allies and partners for all-domain Integrated Deterrence and dominance.
5. Industry and academia to continue to pursue R&D activities seeking the next generation of space capabilities.
6. Institutionalizing and advocating for "Allied by Design" multilateral approaches to CCMD-level operational planning efforts.
7. Leverage the Integrated Priority List, Joint Urgent Operational Need, and Joint Emergent Operational Need submissions to drive the Services toward more rapid acquisitions that deliver capabilities on relevant timelines.
8. Coordinate with the Services, Joint Staff, and OSD for commercial augmentation capabilities and framework.
9. Participates in Joint Exercises to train and validate the command's global capabilities while simultaneously supporting other Combatant Commanders.

10. Conduct experiments to provide technical demonstrations of emerging capabilities and analysis of tactics, techniques, and procedures to address emerging threats.
11. Pursue Wargaming opportunities to provide an analytic operational environment promoting the collaboration and coordination required to inform decisions across all event horizons and mission sets.

Further, I will certify USSPACECOM's readiness to win in competition, crisis, and conflict. In collaboration with all USG agencies, we will maintain the U.S.'s position of advantage in the space domain to ensure it remains sustainable, safe, stable, and secure for all.

### **Civil-Military Relations**

**17. How would you define effective civilian control of the military? Aside from civilian control of the military via the Executive Branch, please describe the extent to which you believe Congress plays a role in furthering civilian control of our military?**

**Answer:** Both the Executive Branch and Congress play vital Constitutional roles in civilian control of the military. Congress is Constitutionally empowered to declare war, raise and support armies, provide and maintain a navy, make rules for the government and regulation of the armed forces, and to make all laws that are necessary and proper for executing these constitutional powers. The President is Constitutionally the Commander-in-Chief, and the Secretary of Defense is responsible to the President for all facets of the Department of Defense.

**18. As a military officer, you take an oath to support and defend the Constitution. How do you balance this obligation with the responsibility to provide your best military advice to civilian leadership, even when that advice may differ from civilian political priorities?**

**Answer:** Military personnel, and commanders in particular, must be rigorously apolitical in all their actions. This is also true when providing best military advice. My best military advice will always be based on a factual assessment of any given situation or issue, informed by discussions with key staff members, and presented clearly. It will not be swayed by civilian political priorities. When our civilian leaders then make a decision, I will also faithfully follow their lawful orders in accordance with the framework established in our Constitution of civilian leadership of the military.

### **Use of Military Force**

**19. In your view, what factors should be considered in making recommendations to the President on the use of military force?**

**Answer:** Space is a warfighting domain and we must be prepared to defend U.S., Allied and partner space capabilities, in accordance with the rules of engagement as approved by the National Command Authority, and consistent with the Law of Armed Conflict, in order to prevent and/or mitigate hostile acts in space. We must also factor in our assessment of the

potentially hostile intent of adversaries, as well as the costs, risks, and benefits of potential options.

**20. Are there other factors that, in your view, should be considered in making recommendations on the use of military force in space operations, whether conducted in the terrestrial or space domains, or through the electromagnetic spectrum?**

**Answer:** We must always be cognizant that in space, we operate in an area of close proximity to non-military and commercial assets. My recommendation of military force in space operations will always be balanced, measured, and proportional to the hostile act or intent of an adversary. I will also factor in external issues, such as civilian assets.

**21. In your view, what is the appropriate role of a combatant commander in establishing policies for the use of military force and rules of engagement?**

**Answer:** If confirmed, I will ensure that my civilian and military subject matter experts shape any revised policies. In parallel action, we will work to establish policy in coordination with stakeholders across the Department of Defense. We believe that close partnership with all stakeholders is essential to establish the most appropriate policies on the use of force and rules of engagement.

**22. In your view, should a combatant commander's role in this regard differ when establishing policies for the use of military force and the rules of engagement for space operations?**

**Answer:** All Combatant Commander's must apply the same framework in establishing policies for their respective area of responsibility. While each Combatant Commander has the same role, the unique circumstances of each AOR do impact that analysis. I believe it would be my responsibility to advise the Secretary of Defense in establishing policies that apply the uniqueness of the space domain across the spectrum of military conflict. I realize that a policy cannot be a "one size fits all" approach, but we will work within the framework of existing international law and domestic policies for the use of military force and the rules of engagement. We will also not hesitate to request additional authorities, when necessary for national security.

### **National Defense Strategy**

**The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) identified China as the "most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge for the Department" and stated that Russia poses an "acute threat," as illustrated by its brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. The NDS also identifies "[m]utually-beneficial Alliances and partnerships" as "an enduring strength for the United States."**

**23. In your view, does the 2022 NDS accurately assess the current strategic environment, including prioritization among the most critical challenges and enduring threats to the national security of the U.S. and its Allies? Please explain your answer.**

**Answer:** Yes, the NDS correctly recognizes the shift from great power competition with the PRC and Russia in favor of prioritizing strategic competition specifically with the PRC as our pacing challenge, including other strategic challenges such as Russia as an acute threat and threats to the US Homeland. Additionally, I concur with the characterization of space as a “rapidly evolving domain” instead of as “emerging” domain. While norms and considerations of competition and conflict in space may be relatively new, the domain itself no longer is. With the democratization of actors in space, diffusion of space technology, and increasing relevance of space activities to support terrestrial domains, the domain’s overarching maturation is accurately represented and facilitates the normalization of space throughout Joint Force processes.

**24. Does the 2022 NDS properly focus the U.S. on preparing to compete, deter, and win against the range of threats in the domain of space? Please explain your answer.**

**Answer:** Yes, the three-pronged approach through integrated deterrence, campaigning, and building enduring advantages enables the Department and USSPACECOM more specifically to address threats across the competition continuum in space. It provides a balance between addressing the current challenges with preparing for the future across readiness, OAI, and capabilities development.

**25. What is your understanding of U.S. strategic objectives in space and what role do you believe SPACECOM should play in supporting these objectives?**

**Answer:** The strategic objectives in space are supporting the four defense priorities as outlined in the NDS: defend the Homeland, deter strategic attack, deter aggression while prepared to prevail in conflict, and building a resilient Joint Force. With that in mind, our strategic ends for national security space are two-fold based on Secretary of Defense guidance:

- Maintain the benefits derived by all from space by preserving stability in, access to, and freedom to operate in, from, and through the space domain.
- Deter hostile uses of space that threaten the national security interests of the US and its Allies and partners; if deterrence fails, be prepared to prevail in conflict.

USSPACECOM’s roles in achieving these objectives are in line with the Command’s delineated UCP responsibilities as the warfighting combatant command for the defined AOR.

**26. In your view, how should SPACECOM be sized, structured, and resourced to implement the 2022 NDS and execute U.S. strategic objectives in the space domain?**

**Answer:** We continue building the command toward Full Operational Capability and demonstrating that we can meet our assigned responsibilities in the UCP. The PB24 request maintains the command’s path to its validated manpower requirement.

Going forward, we will continue to conduct our operations and planning, assess our effectiveness, and make changes to our organizational structure and allocation of resources as

required. Additionally, our components that were established more recently continue to mature and offer us increased capability. As these capabilities continue to grow, USSPACECOM will depend even more on our components to develop robust support plans and execute our operations.

**27. If confirmed, how will you address any gaps or shortfalls in the ability of SPACECOM to meet the demands placed on it by the 2022 NDS and the operational plans that implement the strategy?**

**Answer:** If confirmed, I will advocate, and set priorities for space operations capabilities through existing DoD processes like the Combatant Command's Integrated Priority List, in coordination with DoD, IC, and the Military Services, to identify seams in our current capabilities, establish requirements and develop future space capabilities to enhance our combat power and ensure space superiority.

**28. If confirmed, what changes or adjustments, if any, would you advise the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make in DOD's implementation of the 2022 NDS as regards the domain of space?**

**Answer:** As we implement the NDS, it is important to continue to evolve the Department's approach to global integration by leveraging space capabilities to achieve effects that allow us to compete with the PRC and enable the warfighter in all domains. If confirmed, I would advise both the Secretary and the Chairman to continue this global focus over a regional approach when establishing DoD priorities. We must acknowledge the global nature of strategic competition, the iterative strategic gains made by our pacing challenge in other regions, and the irreplaceable relationships we have our Allies and partners external to the region. Further, if confirmed, I would recommend that we prioritize campaigning and effects geared toward the *global* PRC challenge.

### **DODReadiness in Space**

**29. How would you assess the current readiness of the DOD and the U.S. Government as a whole—across the domains of materiel and equipment, personnel, and training—to implement the 2022 NDS and U.S. strategic objectives as they relate to the domain of space?**

**Answer:** I assess that the United States currently enjoys both a qualitative and quantitative advantage over any potential adversary, including our world-class space professionals who provide us significant advantage. However, competitors are actively and aggressively seeking to close the gap by developing, deploying, and demonstrating counterspace capabilities. Potential adversaries are also rapidly expanding their space-based capabilities that will enable their forces to monitor, track, and target U.S. and Allied forces. Such efforts create the potential for an adversary to negate U.S. space advantage, reduce U.S. and Allied military effectiveness, and impede our freedom of action in, through, and from the space domain. Accordingly, the DoD must further develop and enhance integration of space warfighting doctrine, capabilities, and

personnel into national, Joint, and Combined operations if we are to maintain our warfighting advantage.

**30. If confirmed, what actions would you take to move DOD and, as appropriate, other U.S. Government organizations toward full spectrum readiness to execute global space operations and missions, and under what timelines?**

**Answer:** If confirmed, I would continue the processes begun by my predecessors integrating our Allies and partners in which synergies between our different capabilities add to our capacity to provide space effects for the Joint and Combined force. USSPACECOM has already established itself as a key partner in planning and integrating with other combatant commands in plans, exercises, and operations enhancing the readiness of the Joint Force. I would continue this and expand where and when possible.

**31. If confirmed, how would you oversee compliance with your timelines to ensure that readiness goals are met?**

**Answer:** If confirmed, I will work with the military Services, space agencies and this committee to develop, implement, and oversee compliance with readiness standards. I will utilize existing processes for readiness reporting and oversight. Prioritization of resources must be a part of any solution to ensure readiness goals are met.

**Alliances and Partnerships**

**Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are crucial to U.S. success in competition and conflict against a great power. To this end, the 2022 NDS stresses the importance of strengthening existing U.S. alliances and partnerships, building or enhancing new ones, and promoting “mutual respect, responsibility, priorities, and accountability” in these relationships. If confirmed as Commander, U.S. Space Command, you would serve as the single point of contact for military space operational matters to U.S. Government agencies, U.S. commercial entities, and international agencies for matters related to military space operations.**

**32. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to strengthen existing U.S. alliances and partnerships, build new partnerships, and exploit opportunities for cooperation in space operations activities and missions?**

**Answer:** First, we need to continue to expand space cooperation with our Allies and partners. Led by ASD Plumb, significant effort is underway to break down the barriers to cooperation. If confirmed, I would continue to support, expand, and accelerate this work. For example, in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Space Policy (OSD-SP) and the Joint Staff, I would work to expand Allies membership in the Combined Space Operations Initiative (CSpO). CSpO improves cooperation, coordination, and interoperability to sustain freedom of action in space, optimize resources, enhance mission assurance and resilience, and deter conflict. I believe the initiative is ripe for further expansion. Additionally, I would continue to work with Allies to enhance Operation OLYMPIC DEFENDER (OOD). In addition to

strengthening and expanding collective space power with Allies and partners multi-laterally, USSPACECOM has entered into bi-lateral Enhanced Space Cooperation (ESC) MOUs which codify cooperative activities with three key space Allies: United Kingdom (UK), Canada (CAN), and Australia (AUS). The ESC MOUs are the command's primary vehicle by which to increase bi-lateral interoperability, bolster capabilities, and increase information sharing. Additionally, we will continue to encourage participation by additional Allies and partners through avenues such as GLOBAL SENTINEL and Joint Task Force-Space Defense Joint Commercial Operations (JCO). Lastly, I would expand our reciprocal network of exchange and liaison officers.

**33. How would you characterize your familiarity with the leaders of other nations' military space operations enterprises, international consultative forums regarding space operations, and processes for enhancing space-related interoperability between Allies and partners?**

**Answer:** I have a solid working relationship with the military leaders of our most capable Allies and partners in the space arena. I plan to continue to foster relationships with Allied and partner space leadership should I be confirmed through engagements in a variety of forums and specific strategic engagements. These include the CSPO Initiative, annual Space Symposium, USSPACECOM Commander's Conference, as well as numerous opportunities to engage Allied and partner leaders at home and abroad. Given the global nature of the space domain, I intend to reach out to space leaders across the globe to further strengthen relationships that can help us achieve our objectives in support of the National Defense Strategy.

**34. How would you characterize your familiarity with the leaders of the private sector commercial space operations community and how would you engage with them if confirmed as Commander, U.S. Space Command?**

**Answer:** I have a solid working relationship with a number of commercial space leaders, and have worked with them in various forums and activities for the past decade. Further, USSPACECOM published the Combatant Command's (CCMD) Commercial Integration Strategy during the summer of 2022, which seeks to partner, collaborate, and integrate commercial capabilities into the CCMD's space warfighting architecture. If confirmed, I would continue implementing the various lines of effort within the Commercial Integration Strategy with the ultimate end-state of enhancing overall military space power through commercial integration.

**35. What is your assessment of the risks and benefits associated with building partnerships with private industry to accomplish certain SPACECOM missions and activities? How would you mitigate any risks you identify?**

**Answer:** Building partnerships with private industry expands the ability for USSPACECOM to conduct its mission. Many space effects and capabilities can be accomplished or conducted by private industry in ways that are advantageous, because: (1) commercial funding is not beholden to the POM cycle, (2) they have access to independent research and development funding (IRAD), and (3) their acquisition process is agile and is based on market principles. Some examples are Space Domain Awareness, SATCOM, and space-based imaging/surveillance.

Risks which we must closely watch are the targeting of commercial assets by potential adversaries, to include the risk of cyberattack. By working in close partnership with commercial industry and relevant agencies such as USCYBERCOM and the Services, we can reduce this risk.

**36. If confirmed, what steps will you take to improve information-sharing, integration, coordination, and collaboration between SPACECOM, other DOD commands and organizations, the Intelligence Community, and other governmental agencies?**

**Answer:** The Command's success relies on a Whole of Government approach and integration of Allies and partners, including commercial entities. We will proactively seek to expand our influence through space domain awareness sharing agreements, technology exchanges, and transparency through routine engagements. USSPACECOM works with OSD to prioritize information within USSPACECOM's areas of responsibilities for sharing with the interagency and our allies and foreign partners. USSPACECOM continues to grow an embedded presence of national agencies at our headquarters to facilitate integration and information exchange. Likewise, the Command has embedded Joint Integrated Space Teams at each combatant command.

**SPACECOM**

**37. In your view, what are the priority tasks you will, if confirmed, undertake as the Commander, U.S. Space Command?**

**Answer:** The CCDR's priority tasks, IAW 10 U.S.C. § 164, are to exercise the authority of combatant command giving authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, Joint training, and logistics; prescribing the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command; organizing commands and forces within that command as he considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command; employing forces within that command as he considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command; assigning command functions to subordinate commanders; coordinating and approving those aspects of administration and support (including control of resources and equipment, internal organization, and training) and discipline necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command; and exercising the authority with respect to selecting subordinate commanders, selecting combatant command staff, suspending subordinates, and convening courts-martial.

**38. If confirmed as Commander, U.S. Space Command, how would you structure the command and its subordinate components to unify the command and control of operational forces in the space operations domain across the Intelligence Community and the Military Services?**

**Answer:** If confirmed, I will continue to structure USSPACECOM and subordinate components to drive an integrated unity of effort across the Services, the Intelligence Community, and the Combatant Commands to enable a warfighting space architecture that unifies C2 while

increasing the speed and effectiveness of response. As the Space Operations Command (SpOC) Commander, I have had the opportunity to participate in key USSPACECOM exercises and assess options to better enable our warfighting approach. If confirmed, I am committed to continuing those reviews and maintaining an agile and lean staff structure that remains focused on maintaining our competitive advantage in the space domain for years to come.

**39. If confirmed, what first steps would you take to integrate space operations and activity planning and execution across all combatant commanders' campaign and contingency plans?**

**Answer:** With space as a global domain that enables all other warfighters, it is critical that USSPACECOM plans are integrated with other combatant commands. If confirmed, I will continue the integration that was the hallmark of the process which produced USSPACECOM's first operational plan (OPLAN). USSPACECOM planners conducted over 30 engagements with fellow combatant command planners and the Joint Staff to ensure this plan enabled their warfighting objectives and to establish requirements for when terrestrial and cyber effects would be required to meet USSPACECOM OPLAN objectives. Additionally, we will continue our campaign efforts and work with other combatant commands to compete with the pacing challenge on all fronts. This includes ensuring that space capabilities are synchronized with other combatant command efforts for integrated deterrence. Finally, we must coordinate and collaborate with other combatant commands as we build our partnerships with countries from around the globe to enhance operational capability, leverage key terrain, and shape strategic messaging to provide a competitive advantage over the PRC.

**40. In your view, where is SPACECOM in its ongoing effort to reach Initial Operating Capability? Full Operating Capability?**

**Answer:** USSPACECOM achieved initial operating capability (IOC) in the summer of 2021. The Command will soon reach full operational capability (FOC) having surpassed several milestones: (1) Accomplishing its UCP missions alongside global campaigning, exercising, and responding to crisis; (2) Attaining the right number and skills for human capital; (3) Acquiring the infrastructure needed to support C2 across USSPACECOM mission and business functions; (4) Establishing necessary command processes and functions; (5) Setting the conditions and requirements for the future fight; (6) Strengthening Allied and international partnerships; and (7) Integrating commercial capabilities.

**41. In your view, what missions, functions, and tasks should remain in each Service and which should transfer to U.S. Space Force?**

**Answer:** The Services' functions as force and capability providers to the CCMDs are generally clear in the lanes of organizing, training, and equipping personnel, producing and providing equipment, and support to fielded systems. In the space domain, it is not surprising that United States Space Force, as a Service singularly focused on this domain, is the primary force provider to United States Space Command. The other Services, however, continue to provide critical capabilities to USSPACECOM as well in fulfillment of UCP responsibilities. Like the USSF,

the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force may retain some space capabilities within their Service combat elements to further their Service-particular missions. Those capabilities should not be duplicative to the global capabilities provided by United States Space Force. In general, with the planned transfer of the Joint Tactical Air Ground System (JTAGS) from the Army to the Space Force planned for FY24, I think the missions, functions, and tasks will be appropriately aligned within the Services.

### **SPACECOM Operational Missions and Tasks**

**The Commander, U.S. Space Command, is responsible for the planning and execution of global space operations missions and activities, providing space-related support to other combatant commands and their operational plans, and the defense of space assets.**

**42. What are your views on the “pros” and “cons” of unity of command as compared to unity of effort in space with respect to other assets in space under the Intelligence Community?**

**Answer:** Today we effectively execute unity of command of our Joint space forces and unity of effort among USSPACECOM and NRO forces. The relationship between USSPACECOM and the NRO is excellent and effective. We’re well aligned through our protect and defend strategy, concept of operations, programs, and organizations. We have built a strong “unity of effort” construct at the National Space Defense Center, which serves us very well in day-to-day space operations. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to strengthen this relationship.

**43. Should there be a conflict—whether in space or another domain—what are your views on the importance of unity of command or unity of effort between DOD and Intelligence Community assets, both in space on the ground?**

**Answer:** Given the integral nature of our civilian and military space systems to our way of life and way of warfare, it is absolutely essential to have unity of command and unity of effort where and when required to maximize delivery of effects and optimized efficient use of space capabilities. If confirmed, I will work closely with every organization that operates U.S. government space assets to ensure all US national security assets are protected and defended, and will, as directed, protect those Allied, partner, and critical commercial space capabilities as well.

**44. In your view, in a time of conflict in space, is unity of command, unity of effort, or some other approach the most effective in ensuring the protection and defense of U.S. Government and Allied space assets? Please explain your answer.**

**Answer:**

Unity of command is absolutely required for Joint forces during a time of conflict, and the creation of USSPACECOM clearly provides that in the space AOR. For organizations and assets not placed under Combatant Command authority, unity of effort is a sound approach, even in a time of conflict and even when protecting and defending space assets. Today, USSPACECOM and the NRO have created an effective unity of effort construct to ensure we protect and defend our assets in concert from the National Space Defense Center.

**45. Do you believe that in the event of a conflict in space, reliance on a single operational commander would benefit or detract from U.S. success? Please explain your answer.**

**Answer:** The creation of USSPACECOM in 2019 provides the single Combatant Commander responsible for operations in the space AOR and for supporting the rest of the Joint Force. Since the creation of the command, it has produced unity of command inside the Department and unity of effort with organizations outside of DoD. It is vital we sustain USSPACECOM, and if confirmed, I will continue to look for ways to optimize the internal command and control of the command.

**The tasking of on-orbit assets must be conducted, and the data collected made available in a timeframe relevant to the warfighter, in order to ensure mission accomplishment.**

**46. Given the current allocation of authorities and responsibilities across DOD and the Intelligence Community, in your view can these processes be accelerated to increase mission impact? If so, how?**

**Answer:** USSPACECOM is a warfighting combatant command focused on protecting and defending national security on-orbit space capabilities, which allows for the continuous delivery of sensor data, satellite communications, and navigation to the Joint Force, the Nation, and our Allies and partners. A comprehensive review of classification for collection data would ensure widest dissemination possible to the warfighter in a timely fashion. Additionally, continued integration and exchange of personnel between USSPACECOM and intelligence organizations will foster common understanding of strategic, operational, and tactical uses of on-orbit data collection. Leveraging technology, in particular machine to machine interfaces and machine learning/artificial intelligence, will better orchestrate collection and accelerate existing processes to a greater degree.

**47. Given the growth of both the space enterprise and threats to space assets, how will you ensure the mission resiliency and survivability of SPACECOM assets?**

**Answer:** In order to achieve both resiliency and survivability of space combat power, I will advocate for a multi-faceted and multi-layered approach that leverages diversity in assets, orbits, and relationships with Allies, partners, and commercial suppliers, as well as integration of defensive technologies in our space systems. I also recognize that the defense of space assets may require support from other combatant commanders, and USSPACECOM must be integrated into the Joint fires planning process to ensure those supporting requirements are established. With strong budget support, improvements are underway in both offensive and defensive space capabilities. We are developing new counterspace systems while new and legacy space systems are incorporating defensive measures, tactics, techniques, and procedures. We'll need to effectively integrate those capabilities across all domains and ensure requisite authorities are in place.

**DOD military operations against peer competitors and rogue nation threats require constant monitoring and tracking of critical ground and air mobile targets, close integration between space and airborne intelligence systems, and tight coupling with strike planning and execution systems.**

**48. If confirmed, how would you propose to satisfy these warfighting requirements from space?**

**Answer:** If confirmed, I will push for an integrated approach to defend our space capabilities and provide space-based capabilities to the warfighter. On orbit we are building capacity to secure our satellites systems which provide these essential services. We are increasing our ability to see satellites on orbit and identify nefarious actions of our peer competitors. We are working with our Allies and partners to establish norms of behavior for responsible nations to follow and enhance security of our orbiting systems. Space is increasingly congested and contested. Nefarious actions of our competitors necessitate we adapt and build our capacity to defend our critical space systems. Defending against the scope and scale of existing and emerging threats necessitates close cooperation in all warfighting domains. Delivering space-based capabilities to the warfighter is our top priority given the high ground of space delivers a critical advantage to our nation's warfighters.

**49. What are the implications of these tactical military requirements for constellation planning, processing agility, speed of dissemination, and coordination with the Military Services and commanders?**

**Answer:** Tactical requirements necessitate greater integration of space warfighting operations, intelligence, capabilities, and personnel into military plans and staffs. The integration of superior space capabilities into and throughout the Joint Force, along with operational integration with Allies and partners, is essential for securing our military advantage against threats in space. The establishment of USSPACECOM, with a full-time operational focus on the integration and employment of military space power, further enables DOD to meet tactical warfighter needs on operationally relevant timelines. USSPACECOM has embedded Joint Integrated Space Teams within each of the other combatant commands to globally integrate space operations for execution.

**Tasking and control between overhead satellites has grown and evolved significantly.**

**50. If confirmed, what would you do to ensure unity of effort and deconfliction of taskings in the space warfighting domain across DOD and the Intelligence Community?**

**Answer:** USSPACECOM ensures unity of effort and deconfliction through existing processes and mechanisms for the Intelligence Community and United States Space Command. The Command leverages the large, embedded presence of the national agencies in the headquarters to facilitate integration. The Intelligence Community responds to the National Intelligence Priorities Framework to which we have input. The Command prioritizes and coordinates our needs through the intelligence requirement systems managed by the national agencies. I will

focus on the National Defense Strategy, our UCP responsibilities, our approved Operations Plan, and resulting Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) to drive Joint Force operations in the space domain. The Command's Joint Reconnaissance Center and J2 collections team emphasize those PIRs, ensuring unity of effort and deconfliction across the DoD and IC to meet warfighting needs.

**51. In your view, would there be operational advantages in National Security Agency (NSA) and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) overhead tasking organizations fully integrated their operations? Please explain your answer.**

**Answer:** USSPACECOM ensures unity of effort and deconfliction through existing processes and mechanisms for deconfliction between the Intelligence Community and United States Space Command. The Command leverages the large, embedded presence of the representatives from Intelligence Community organizations in the headquarters to facilitate integration. The Intelligence Community responds to the National Intelligence Priorities Framework to which we have input. The Command prioritizes and coordinates our needs through the intelligence requirement systems managed by the national agencies. I will focus on the National Defense Strategy, our UCP responsibilities, our approved Operations Plan, and my resulting Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) to drive Joint Force operations in the space domain. The Command's Joint Reconnaissance Center and J2 collections team emphasize those PIRs, ensuring unity of effort and deconfliction across the DoD and IC to meet warfighting needs.

**52. In your view, would operational advantages accrue to our military forces if operations tasking National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) satellites were closely integrated with DOD airborne intelligence collection and targeting operations? Please explain your answer.**

**Answer:** The Intelligence Community provides timely, and relevant intelligence to United States Space Command that enables the Command to execute our UCP responsibilities. I would defer to the Secretary of Defense on how to best organize the elements of the Intelligence Community to support the warfighter, including the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

**53. What are your views and long-term vision of tactically responsive space?**

**Answer:** USSPACECOM's top priority is delivering space-based capabilities to warfighters around the globe in the face of the threats now arrayed against us. The needs of all Joint warfighters will always be paramount as we work to improve the delivery of those capabilities and protect and defend them against threats.

**The NRO is the only defense intelligence agency that is not designated as a combat support agency (CSA) as defined in the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. Historically, the NRO has asserted that it should not be designated as a CSA because it does not make operational decisions regarding the satellites that it builds and controls. In NRO's view, others, principally its Intelligence Community mission partners NSA and NGA, both of which are designated as CSAs, are responsible for determining the requirements that guide NRO satellite designs and the operational tasking of deployed**

satellites. However, there exists a class of operational decisions for which the NRO Director is responsible. In situations in which U.S. satellites are under attack or threatened with the same, the NRO Director has the authority to make operational decisions regarding space control.

**54. In your view, what should be the relationship between the Commander, U.S. Space Command, and the Director of the NRO when responding to hostile acts or evidence of hostile intent that threaten or could threaten DOD and NRO space assets?**

**Answer:** USSPACECOM and the NRO have developed Loki's Gambit, an exercise specifically designed to develop vignettes which test the two organizations current roles, responsibilities, and authorities to ensure a seamless relationship at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. This has paid dividends in establishing and codifying processes at the National Space Defense Center (NSDC) as well as coordination between the two headquarters. Much like our role with the other Combatant Commands, we have seen vignettes which require a myriad of supported/supporting relationships and we continue to work through each to ensure synergistic operations.

**55. Do you agree with maintaining separation between the NRO and the U.S. Space Force?**

**Answer:** I do. I believe maintaining distinction between military operations and intelligence activities is appropriate. The current division of National ISR acquisition and operations conducted by NRO and defense acquisition and operations conducted by the Services and USSPACECOM respectively ensures each organization maintains focus on their respective mission set.

**56. Are there any conditions or circumstances, in your view, in which NRO and space operations forces should be integrated, going forward?**

**Answer:** We have co-located USSPACECOM and NRO protect and defend operations today in a unity of effort construct at the National Space Defense Center (NSDC) at Schriever Space Force Base. It has become a model for integrated protect and defend operations between USSPACECOM, the NRO, and USSF. At the NSDC, we coordinate, collaborate, and deconflict operations and support program protections to ensure all these organizations meet protect and defend mission requirements as an integrated team.

**57. Would it be advisable, in your view, for the Commander, U.S. Space Command, to be in the chain of command for the tasking of NRO satellites in conflict situations, as a means of rationalizing space command and control in support of U.S. military forces?**

**Answer:** Though our current unity of effort construct with the NRO at the NSDC, we have shared plans, procedures, and tactics for protecting and defending our space capabilities together. This allows us to act in a unified manner even during higher states of readiness.

**58. In your view, would it be feasible and advisable to apply the model in which the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, serves also as the Director of NSA and reports to**

**the DNI on national intelligence operations, to the Commander, U.S. Space Command, in order to grant authority to control the tasking of national intelligence space assets in support of military forces in combat?**

**Answer:** I do not believe this is necessary at this time. Policies, directives, and processes continue to assure our military forces in combat will obtain the necessary tasking of national intelligence space assets for support in combat.

### **Space Operations Joint Force Provider to other Combatant Commands**

**If confirmed as Commander, U.S. Space Command, you will be charged with providing trained and ready Joint space operations forces to other Combatant Commands. If confirmed, what would be your approach to executing each of following responsibilities:**

**59. Identifying and recommending global Joint sourcing solutions to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in coordination with the military Services and other combatant commands.**

**Answer:** If confirmed, I will follow the existing Global Force Management process and work with the supported combatant commands and Services to ensure the priorities and weight of effort are best suited to the supported commander. USSPACECOM has made tremendous strides aligning Service presented forces to supported commanders identifying risks, trade-offs, and opportunities for employment of space capabilities. If confirmed, I will advocate and integrate with other combatant commands determining the best courses of action for global Joint sourcing solutions.

**60. Inculcating in space operations forces across all military Services and in the active and reserve components a warfighting culture and ethos.**

**Answer:** USSPACECOM has made significant progress in developing the warfighting spirit within the command. If confirmed, I will build on those efforts, leveraging the efforts by the military Services to grow that warfighting culture. Space is a warfighting domain and requires a warfighting mentality by the men and women charged with defending it.

**61. Embedding at each combatant command staff a space planning cell, consistent with SPACECOM's overall responsibilities under the UCP.**

**Answer:** USSPACECOM's Joint Integrated Space Teams (JIST) are designed to provide space operational expertise to all combatant commands enabling the integration of space operations into combatant command operational planning. The JIST support intelligence, planning, and executing, through education, integration, advocacy, and communication of all space-related activities that pertain to USSPACECOM UCP-assigned roles and responsibilities. JIST intelligence professionals link the USSPACECOM J2 and Joint Intelligence Operations Center to the other combatant commands.

**62. Establishing enterprise-wide standards for the training and readiness of space operations forces across all military Services and in the active and reserve components.**

**Answer:** USSPACECOM J7 has drafted training tasks and learning outcomes for all DoD non-space personnel at various levels of responsibility, ranging from our most junior enlisted troops to senior flag and general officers. Once approved, these tasks will be provided to the Services for inclusion in their common task training programs.

**63. Validating space operations forces are fully trained and interoperable with other forces.**

**Answer:** Recently, USSPACECOM moved the J7 directorate from the J3 directorate and assigned a general officer directly responsible for these efforts. This was the right move as the command started to reach its directed end strength. If confirmed, I will ensure the J7 is providing the most robust training possible to supplement Service-provided education and remain flexible to the changes in the operating environment. As required, our training will also include coalition forces ensuring a more lethal and ready Combined force.

**64. Conducting and supporting Joint exercises, experiments, and war games.**

**Answer:** With the changes in the strategic threat environment, if confirmed, I will continue to prioritize the integration of counterspace scenarios into exercises to ensure the Joint Force is ready to protect and defend its space Area of Responsibility. This requires the CDR to simultaneously be the supported and supporting commander. To adequately exercise the duality of this position, and fully exercise the physical and cognitive actions required to defend the space AOR, USSPACECOM established its own Tier-1 Exercise series, APOLLO GRIFFIN. USSPACECOM's first Tier-1 exercise campaign will commence with a scaled-down event in FY24, preceding a full event in FY25. Additionally, the command will continue to participate in other CCMD and Allied exercises, Joint Wargames and Experimentation events to continue to strengthen our Joint and Combined interoperability as well as evaluate our force design considerations.

**65. Developing recommendations for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding strategy; doctrine; concepts of operation; tactics; and tactics, techniques, and procedures for the Joint employment of space operations forces and space capabilities.**

**Answer:** Continue advancing the institutionalization of the space domain across Joint Force processes to bring space into planning processes early and often. This will ensure that space requirements are captured and integrated from the onset to inform critical analyses and decision-making considerations. USSPACECOM continues to infuse space equities and representation in applicable Joint Staff forums, ensuring that fellow combatant commands, the Joint Staff, and OSD understand the underpinning that space-based and space-enabling capabilities provide across Joint Force activities. USSPACECOM's approach to developing doctrine is two-fold. As a member of the Joint Doctrine Development Community, USSPACECOM ensures space is appropriately represented in all Joint Publications.

**Equipping Space Operations Forces and Providing Space Operations Capabilities**

**Part and parcel of DOD's enhanced approach to the domain of space, the Department has established the Space Development Agency (SDA). In testimony before this Committee, DOD officials reinforced that the first and most important task assigned to the SDA is to develop, in cooperation with the space industry, a highly distributed and resilient space layer to support military targeting operations. In 2018, the NRO published a document stating:**

**“NRO provides the nation’s unified space-based ISR overhead architecture, addressing the needs of both national and tactical users. The nation does not need a competing and duplicative set of capabilities from what is currently being provided and developed to address these needs. Setting up a competing, tactically-focused ISR overhead architecture will cause budgetary and congressional issues for both DOD and IC, and should be avoided. Splitting the national overhead architecture into capabilities that focus on IC customers vs. DOD customers will create a seam where a seam does not exist today—all will lose in this proposed end-state. The nation is better off with a national agency chartered to develop intelligence capabilities that are operated/orchestrated as an architecture to support both IC and DOD missions.”**

**66. Do you share the view that neither the SDA nor the Space Rapid Capabilities Office should be engaged in acquiring and fielding satellites that provide tactical support to military operations?**

**Answer:** While these organizations are not assigned to USSPACECOM, I think that SDA and the SpRCO should be engaged in acquiring and fielding satellites as long they deliver rapidly-developed, and effective systems for warfighting, to include providing tactical support to military operations.

**67. Should NRO be the only organization in the U.S. Government with the mission of acquiring satellites capable of collecting intelligence from space? Please explain your answer.**

**Answer:** The NRO has proven itself to be the world’s premier provider of ISR from space, and they have developed deep expertise in the acquisition of ISR satellites. As ISR from space continues to grow and evolve, we should be open to other organizations leading acquisition efforts which provide ISR from space when required. This should be done in full collaboration with the NRO to deconflict efforts, leverage best of breed capabilities, and take advantage of organizational strengths among the various acquisition organizations.

**68. In your view is there an appropriate role for the SDA in providing a highly distributed and resilient space layer to support military targeting operational requirements?**

**Answer:** Yes, and I look forward to the delivery of the current systems being developed by the SDA.

**69. Do you perceive any advantages to establishing the SDA as the defense organization charged to focus on tactical space capability speed to market by leveraging commercial technologies and products?**

**Answer:** There are advantages in leveraging commercial technologies and products; however, this must also be balanced with operational needs, data sharing requirements/constraints, data assurance (open architectures), and technological advances with the business models of the commercial partners. Many of the Services and agencies that develop space capabilities are charged with the responsibility to bring tactical space capability by leveraging commercial technologies and products at speed. Additionally, all acquisition organizations should be taking advantage of leveraging commercial technologies and products to improve the speed and cost of capability development efforts.

**70. In addition to sharing technology, how could the capabilities vested in the NRO and the SDA be employed to rationalize and harmonize the efforts of both organizations?**

**Answer:** If confirmed, I will continue to support the efforts of the Program Integration Council (of which USSPACECOM is a member) which brings together all the acquisition organizations (to include the NRO and SDA) providing capability in support of United States Space Command and the national security space enterprise, to ensure the programs being delivered by these various organizations integrate together to improve the combat effectiveness and resiliency of our systems.

**71. As regards the SDA's role in equipping space operations forces and providing innovative capabilities and capacity for space operations, how would you propose to solve, in short order, the long-standing problems associated with overly bureaucratic and late-to-need systems and processes for identifying requirements for, and developing, procuring, and fielding space warfighting capabilities?**

**Answer:** I think SDA needs to continue to operate under their authorities to rapidly field current technologies to stay ahead of our competitors. To field space warfighting capabilities on time, we need to hold our contractors and acquisition centers accountable, while ensuring requirements creep does not affect delivery of weapon systems. Continued legislative reforms coupled with a number of internal DOD reforms to the requirements and acquisition processes, are putting us on the right trajectory to speed development and fielding of critical space capabilities.

**Science, Technology, and Innovation**

**U.S. superiority in key areas of innovation is decreasing or has disappeared, while our competitors are engaging in aggressive military modernization and advanced weaponry development. DOD has identified ten key areas—space among them—in which investment to develop next generation operational capabilities is imperative. Much of the**

**innovation in these technologies that could prove suitable for national defense purposes is occurring outside of the traditional defense industry.**

**72. What do you see as the most significant challenges, to include technical, organizational, or cultural challenges, to U.S. development of technologies key to dominance in space, or gaining access to such technologies from the commercial marketplace?**

**Answer:** DoD acquisitions processes have traditionally been slow to integrate new technology into program of record activities due either to funding limitations or concerns with mission assurance. Prioritizing R&D funding and recognizing that U.S. space capabilities will be aggressively targeted by our competitors, we must shift our focus from solely maximizing capability on orbit and prioritize R&D resources to equally maximize survivability of those capabilities. Key force enhancement technology remains a focus, to provide space-based force-multiplier capabilities to warfighters in all domains. Now we must also address our expanded mission and necessary competitive viability, and therefore expect increased focus in defending the space domain and providing for the freedom of action in space.

**73. In your view, has DoD properly integrated and synchronized investments in technologies key to space across all its components?**

**Answer:** The DoD strategically prioritizes its investments in capabilities, platforms and other vital technologies based on the needs of components and urgency of their missions.

**74. How has DOD prioritized limited research and development (R&D) funding across key areas of space-related technology? Specifically, in your view, where is DOD either increasing, or decreasing, its focus and funding?**

**Answer:** In this rapidly developing era of competition, it is important that we have the ability to direct R&D funds and efforts critical to developing the right space technologies at the right time. Additionally, US Space Command is collaborating with the other CCMDs and Services on numerous Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTD) and Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve (RDER). These valuable programs award short term funding for critical experiments in S&T using federally funded R&D centers.

**75. In your view, how is the Department balancing space-related revolutionary capability advancements compared to “quick win” incremental improvements that can be rapidly fielded?**

**Answer:** By engaging private industry for commercial off the shelf solutions and simultaneously working experimentation projects, DoD is always moving forward to maintain a technological advantage. Utilizing DoD programs such as the Accelerate the Procurement and Fielding of Innovative Technologies (APFIT), USSPACEOM encourages expeditious transition of technologies from development into production and is working to accelerate the fielding of those technologies to the warfighter.

**76. In your view, how can the Department better integrate the operational experience of the warfighter into the R&D process? Are there appropriate places to interject warfighter input into the interaction between the DOD research and engineering community and the private sector?**

**Answer:** It is vital warfighters, requirement generators, and acquisition organizations collaborate early and often in the development of new capabilities. If confirmed, I will maximize this engagement through the Program Integration Council, the Space Acquisition Council, the Space Rapid Capabilities Office's Board of Directors, and other existing forums.

**77. If confirmed, how would you leverage experimentation and prototyping opportunities for new technologies and concepts that might be beneficial for the space enterprise, or better support specific Service or CCMD roles in Joint operations?**

**Answer:** USSPACECOM must continue to support rapid prototyping and development to expedite the integration of new technology into DoD space operations at a pace which exceeds that of our potential adversaries. We need to leverage front-end, low-cost, higher-risk prototyping and experimentation to buy down overall enterprise risk, refine capability requirements, and progress at a competitively viable pace.

**Commercial technology often surpasses the innovative edge once held by the military and the Intelligence Community in the domain of space. Industry is rapidly expanding into space, and may eclipse the capabilities of our national security satellites in both technology and ability to reconstitute in space.**

**78. Do you believe it wise for DoD to take advantage of these commercial developments? Why or why not?**

**Answer:** Yes, we must take advantage of the capabilities American industry brings to us in space. The accelerating commercialization of space presents new and significant opportunities across the Joint Force. Partnering with commercial entities enables USSPACECOM to adapt faster, innovate more reliably, integrate cutting-edge technology on an accelerated timeline, bolster space architecture resilience, develop a better understanding of the space domain, expedite decision making, and devise economical solutions to strategic problems.

**79. What is your understanding of the efforts DoD is making to identify space-relevant new technologies developed commercially and apply them to military and national security purposes?**

**Answer:** DoD seeks to accelerate space-relevant technology development across the commercial space enterprise through numerous innovative programs, to include the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) and AFWERX/SpaceWERX. These programs allow for DoD requirements advocacy and investment opportunities that help steer the commercial space enterprise towards filling select DoD capability gaps.

**80. If confirmed, how will you ensure that commercial technology is appropriately incorporated into SPACECOM mission execution at acceptable risk levels? What are the challenges that you perceive to increasing collaboration between the private sector and DOD?**

**Answer:** At all times, we will encourage the Services and other acquisition organizations to first look to buy existing commercial capabilities when it can meet our requirements, then look to exploit available commercial technologies for military purposes, and finally, to build military-unique systems only when required. American industry is an asymmetric advantage for the United States and USSPACECOM.

**81. In your view, what steps must DOD take to protect and strengthen our National Security Innovation Base both to promote space-related innovation and to ensure that critical information is protected?**

**Answer:** DoD seeks to identify common cyber security standards for commercial space capabilities within the NSIB in order to protect and strengthen critical information. If confirmed, I will work with the Services and other acquisition organizations to encourage them to include sufficient cyber defense language in their contracts with commercial industry.

**The national security space community has begun to blend the use of traditional spacecraft and new flexible small satellites to provide improved mission support to users.**

**82. In your view, how can SPACECOM exploit commercial launch and other less expensive launch options to allow for more rapid replenishment and on-orbit employment of vital warfighting systems, while minimizing the risk of mission failure?**

**Answer:** USSPACECOM relies on the Space Force to launch the capabilities needed for employment in the space AOR. Given the remarkable string of successes we have seen over the past couple of decades in national security launch, I have full faith in the Space Force's efforts to continue to onboard new launch providers who may offer reduced costs. Further, if confirmed, I will continue USSPACECOM's efforts to work with the Space Force on responsive launch demonstrations as we work to operationalize a responsive launch capability.

**One of the main objectives of the defense research enterprise is to develop advanced technologies that will benefit the warfighter. In this regard, it is critical that advancements quickly transition from the development phase to testing and evaluation, and ultimately into a program of record in order to deploy the capability to the warfighter.**

**83. What challenges do you perceive to effectively transitioning technologies development from research programs into programs of record?**

**Answer:** Timing and funding – USSPACECOM must work with the Services, CCMDs and other transition partners to better align POM requirements during important milestones in technology development and throughout the program's lifecycle. It is vital that new programs of record are delivered as "fully burdened" programs with all the DOTMLP-F considerations

funded, to include sufficient test and training ranges which will allow the Services to demonstrate the effectiveness of their new systems before they are fielded and presented to USSPACECOM.

**84. If confirmed, what specific steps will you take to ensure that the DoD space enterprise is quickly and directly benefitting from research being performed across the defense research enterprise?**

**Answer:** USSPACECOM will execute a robust communication strategy between the Services, CCMDs and DoD S&T organizations to prioritize R&D funding and bolster inter-Service efforts. I will also work with the military Services, developers, acquirers, commercial partners and the Intelligence Community to ensure we're seeking the right capabilities and systems that enhance the readiness and lethality of our space systems. I will work with all appropriate stakeholders to ensure we're defining and relaying the warfighting requirements that will keep our nation ahead of the threat.

**85. How do you see the laboratory facilities across the DoD research enterprise contributing to DOD's goals for developing technology for the warfighter?**

**Answer:** USSPACECOM will continue to collaborate on numerous Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTD) and Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve (RDER) with the other CCMDs and Services, awarding short-term funding for critical experiments in S&T using federally funded R&D centers and labs.

**86. Do you think these in-house R&D facilities are keeping pace with the needs of the Department? If not, what do you think could be done to improve our ability to modernize R&D infrastructure?**

**Answer:** I do not have sufficient personal information about the labs to answer this question at this time. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the committee on any concerns I may develop about DoD's in-house R&D facilities and laboratories.

## **China**

**87. What is your assessment of the strategic objectives of China in space?**

**Answer:** The PRC has a grand strategy for economic and military dominance in the space domain that extends for decades as a national priority; the PRC aims to be a global space leader by 2030. Over the past two decades, the PRC has worked to develop capabilities and advanced technologies to erode core U.S. military advantages such as power projection and rapid global space-enabled fires. Its military is actively integrating advanced space and counterspace systems into multi-domain warfighting strategies to position themselves as space powers and create improved balance of power dynamics in their near abroad as well as globally.

**88. In what ways, if any, do China's strategic objectives in space conflict with U.S. strategic**

## **objectives?**

**Answer:** The PRC has a grand strategy for economic and military dominance in the space domain that extends for decades as a national priority; the PRC aims to be a global space leader by 2030. Over the past two decades, the PRC has worked to develop capabilities and advanced technologies to erode core U.S. military advantages such as power projection and rapid global space-enabled fires. Its military is actively integrating advanced space and counterspace systems into multi-domain warfighting strategies to position themselves as space powers and create improved balance of power dynamics in their near abroad as well as globally.

Conversely, the U.S. promotes space activities that can be conducted in a responsible, peaceful, and sustainable manner. Because space capabilities, both government and commercial, enable the entire American way of life from our economy to how we enable our Joint Force, the PRC's commitment to both economic and military dominance in space along with development of counter-space capabilities place the entire U.S. system at risk.

### **89. To what extent do you view China's activities related to the space domain as a threat or challenge to U.S. national security interests?**

**Answer:** The PRC is working to match or exceed U.S. capabilities in space to gain the military, economic, and prestige benefits that the U.S. has accrued from space leadership. The PRC continues to strengthen its military space capabilities, investing in space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), satellite communication, and navigation. It is also improving satellite meteorology, human spaceflight, and robotic space exploration. The PLA owns and operates about half of the world's space based ISR systems. These capabilities support the PLA's ability to monitor, track, and target U.S. and Allied forces worldwide. In July 2021, the PRC conducted the first fractional orbital bombardment system test with a hypersonic glide vehicle that circumnavigated the Earth, starting from and returning to China. This demonstrated the greatest distance flown and the longest flight time (~100+ minutes) of any Chinese land attack weapon system to date.

### **90. In your view, which Chinese initiatives and capabilities pose the greatest risk to U.S. space-related capabilities and assets? Please explain your answer?**

**Answer:** The rapid advancement and proliferation of the PRC's counterspace capabilities, and efforts to integrate those capabilities into their Joint military operations, presents a significant risk to U.S. space-related capabilities and assets. In just the last decade, the PRC has doubled its launches per year, and significantly increased the number of satellites in orbit. They have developed and tested multiple ASAT missiles and space-based robotic arm technology that is able to destroy or manipulate satellites. The PRC has also developed multiple jammers to deny satellite communications and our Global Positioning System. These counterspace capabilities have the potential to target other space-based capabilities that support both military power and civilian life. The wide array of tools being developed by the PRC could be utilized to hinder U.S. military response to a conflict, target U.S. civilian infrastructure, and hold U.S. and Allied space assets in multiple orbits at risk.

**91. In your view, are U.S. policies and associated authorities, as applicable to space operations and assets, sufficient to counter China’s activities and influence, or are there additional measures we should be considering? What role should SPACECOM play in this regard?**

**Answer:** I support the policies and authorities outlined in the Defense Space Strategy and other relevant strategic document. USSPACECOM leads the Department’s effort countering China’s malign activities and influence in the space domain. Similar to other Combatant Commands, USSPACECOM has a Secretary of Defense-approved Operational Plan which identifies the authorities required to execute that plan. USSPACECOM’s role is to identify and advocate for authorities required to execute its responsibilities as stipulated in its OPLAN. If I am confirmed and additional authorities are needed to meet USSPACECOM UCP responsibilities, I would pursue those additional authorities with the Secretary to ensure USSPACECOM has the ability to counter China’s activities if required.

**92. Which additional capabilities will be most important to maintaining the U.S. advantage over China in space, in your view?**

**Answer:** We must deliver space-enabling capabilities to the Joint warfighter for all our UCP missions and this requires both resilient systems and the ability to impose costs and hold the PRC systems at risk. This includes on-orbit, link, and ground segments, exploiting commercial capabilities like artificial intelligence, data analytics, and advanced computing. We must invest in and continue to develop offensive and defensive space control capabilities, along with the associated command and control architecture that will enable us to achieve and sustain space superiority throughout the spectrum of conflict. Finally, we need to continue to reform our acquisition processes to make them more agile and risk tolerant.

Finally, as the PRC pursues space technologies that can provide them strategic advantages in space, we cannot overestimate the importance of attracting and retaining the most talented people our nation can offer--those who can out-think and out-perform the competition.

## **Russia**

**93. What is your assessment of the strategic objectives of Russia in space?**

**Answer:** Russia sees space as integral to winning modern wars and seeks to better incorporate space operations and counterspace capabilities. According to President Putin, “Russia must maintain its status as a leading nuclear and space power.” Russia’s likely strategic objective in space is to negate perceived U.S. military dominance in space while maximizing Moscow’s declining resources to regain a leading position in space.

**94. In your view, in what ways, if any, do Russia’s strategic objectives conflict with U.S. strategic objectives?**

**Answer:** Russia sees space as integral to winning modern wars and seeks to better incorporate space operations and counterspace capabilities. According to President Putin, “Russia must

maintain its status as a leading nuclear and space power.” Russia’s likely strategic objective in space is to negate perceived U.S. military dominance in space while maximizing Moscow’s declining resources to regain a leading position in the space domain.

Conversely, the U.S. promotes space activities that can be conducted in a responsible, peaceful, and sustainable manner.

**95. To what extent do you view Russia’s activities related to the space domain as a threat or challenge to U.S. national security interests?**

**Answer:** Russian military doctrine clearly articulates that Russia views space as a warfighting domain and that achieving supremacy in space will be a decisive factor in winning future conflicts. Russia perceives the U.S. dependence on space as our Achilles’ heel, which can be exploited to achieve Russian conflict objectives. Russia is therefore pursuing counterspace systems to neutralized or deny U.S. space-based services, both military and commercial, as a means of offsetting a perceived U.S. military advantage

**96. In your view, which Russian initiatives and capabilities poses the greatest risk to U.S. space-related capabilities and assets? Please explain your answer?**

**Answer:** Russia seeks to deny US advantages in space, and as a result the Kremlin will seek ways to strengthen its counterspace programs. In the near-term, Russian electronic warfare and cyber capabilities represent the greatest threat to US systems in terms of scope and scale. Beyond that, Russian introduction of developmental ASAT systems present an additional kinetic threat. In the longer term, there are a number of developmental (or aspirational) systems such as “inspector” satellites that could increase the reach of Russian counterspace systems. All Russian counterspace program advances and developments are subject to delay due to systemic corruption and/or the effects of sanctions.

**97. In your view, are U.S. policies and the associated authorities, as applicable to space operations and assets, sufficient to counter Russia’s activities and influence, or are there additional measures we should be considering? What role should SPACECOM play in this regard?**

**Answer:** I understand the policies and authorities as outlined in the published Defense Space Strategy and other relevant strategic documents are sufficient. The U.S. continues to be the best in space and, if confirmed, I will ensure USSPACECOM continues to lead the Department of Defense’s progress toward countering Russia’s activities and influence in the domain. USSPACECOM has a central role in the shared interest and responsibility of all space-faring nations to create the conditions for a safe, stable and operationally sustainable space environment. If I, as the confirmed USSPACECOM commander, determined additional authorities were required to confront a specific threat, I would follow department policies and engage with DoD leaders as needed.

**98. In your view, what types of activities are most important to deterring Russian aggression in space and mitigating any threat it may present?**

**Answer:** In my opinion, to deter Russian aggression in space, building a coalition of nations willing to hold Russia accountable for their actions in space will allow the U.S. to create collective cost imposition advantages over Russia by leveraging information sharing with Allies and partners. If Russian aggression in space presents a threat to critical U.S., Allied, or partners' space capabilities, USSPACECOM must have the authorities and capabilities to enable responses in operationally relevant timelines and negate Russian fait accomplis. Further, the U.S. and its Allies and partners can leverage commercial space assets to facilitate releasing information in the public sphere, generating visceral reactions and catalyzing collective responses that alter Kremlin cost-benefit analyses.

### **DOD Senior Official Education and Training**

**99. In your view, do a sufficient number of General/Flag officers and members of the Senior Executive Services (SES) have the advanced training, academic degrees, and expertise in scientific and technical disciplines needed to lead the future Joint Force and the scientific and technical civilian workforce?**

**Answer:** Yes, but we must be diligent to attract and retain the best talent possible into SES positions while promoting scientific and technical expertise in the Services to grow the General/Flag officers of the future. Equally important, we must maintain a robust training, education and experiential program to afford our leaders to keep pace with the evolving operational environment and technologies.

**100. In your experience, are the career paths for General/Flag officers and SES with technical skills sufficient to ensure that DOD and its components can develop capability performance requirements that will counter rapidly changing technological threats, execute complex acquisition programs, and make informed investment decisions? If not, what would you do to address this deficiency, if confirmed?**

**Answer:** Yes, in my experience, we have the right human capital in our GO/FO and SES ranks. However, I know that the Department continues to refine career paths by tailoring requirements to fit specific mission needs.

**101. In your view do current General/Flag officer and SES assignment policies incentivize highly qualified senior leaders to serve in scientific and technical programs? If not, what changes do you believe are necessary to incentivize qualified senior leaders to seek assignment to such positions and duties?**

**Answer:** I am not aware of any problems in this regard. The Services set their requirements for scientific and technical proficiencies for both General/Flag officers and SES leaders, and assign people with those capabilities where needed most.

**102. Are you satisfied that the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the military Services have in place sufficient training and resources to provide**

**General/Flag officers and members of the SES the training, advice, and assistance needed to meet ethical requirements? Please explain your answer.**

**Answer:** Yes, I am satisfied. The principles of ethical conduct [established by 5 C.F.R §2635.101 (B)] apply to every military and civilian employee of the federal government. The expectations are clear and training and resources are provided to address situations implicating ethics rules. Moreover, every organization I have been a part of has taken steps to hold General/Flag officers and SES personnel to the highest standards by continually reminding them of the rules and putting measures in place with their support staff to encourage direct identification of any potential violation of those rules either to the individuals or the IG.

### **Sexual Assault and Harassment Prevention and Response**

**Despite significant efforts by the Department and military Services over the past decade to enhance their prevention of, and response to, sexual assaults, including measures to care for victims and hold assailants accountable, the current data continues to show increasing prevalence of sexual assault and unwanted sexual conduct, primarily for female Service members aged 17 to 24. These findings echo reports this year of increases in the prevalence of sexual harassment and assault at the Military Service Academies.**

**103. Do you believe the policies, programs, and resources that the Department of Defense has put in place to prevent and respond to sexual assault, and to protect Service members who report sexual assault from retaliation, are working? If not, what else must be done?**

**Answer:** I understand that the decision to report sexual assault is compounded by the very real fear of retaliation. I am now, and always have been, committed to enforcing zero tolerance for sexual assault and will continue to support those who make the difficult decision to report sexual assault to ensure zero reprisal. The Department has improved its approach to prevention and response and current policies and programs have come with the resources to ensure victims have multiple avenues to seek assistance and or file a report of retaliation. It is vital we complete the implementation of these programs and ensure they are executed as designed.

**104. If confirmed, what specific role would you establish for yourself in preventing sexual harassment within SPACECOM, including within its civilian workforce?**

**Answer:** Sexual harassment and sexual assault are crimes, and they have no place in our military. As the Commander, United States Space Command, if confirmed, I will articulate that we will not tolerate sexual harassment and sexual assault, I will provide training opportunities to our personnel to prevent future instances of these crimes, and I will make available resources to those who have been the victims of these crimes so that they can get the care they need and also have their cases fully and impartially investigated. I will also work to eliminate the stigma victims of these crimes may feel which could prevent them from reporting these crimes.

**105. Do you perceive that you need additional authorities from Congress to improve upon existing programs to prevent sexual harassment and sexual assault?**

**Answer:** No, not at this time. However, if confirmed, I look forward to working with the Committee to secure additional authorities if needed.

### **Congressional Oversight**

**In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.**

**106.** Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer yes or no.

**Answer:** Yes.

**107.** Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.

**Answer:** Yes.

**108.** Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.

**Answer:** Yes.

**109.** Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer yes or no.

**Answer:** Yes.

**110.** Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.

Answer: Yes.

**111.** Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer yes or no.

Answer: Yes.

**112.** Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer yes or no.

Answer: Yes.