THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

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OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. Before we begin, I want to take a moment to reflect on the tragedy in Boston. Thousands of people had gathered there yesterday accepting the physical and mental challenge of running a marathon. The city celebrated its annual Patriots Day holiday in remembrance of Boston’s role in our Nation’s founding.

Whoever was responsible for targeting that celebration, whatever their twisted motives, they will fail. America has demonstrated a remarkable resilience throughout its history and a firm determina-
tion to bring justice to those who target the innocent. The perpetrators of this attack will feel the full weight of that justice.

Every member of this committee, this Congress, and all of our people mourn the tragic loss of life. Our prayers go out to the victims and their families, and we hope for the swift recovery of those who are injured.

This morning, the committee hears from and welcomes General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, Commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, and Commander of U.S. Forces, Afghanistan. This is General Dunford’s first appearance before this committee since taking command of U.S. and coalition forces in early February.

General, it can be difficult for us and the American people to get the full picture of how things are progressing in Afghanistan as negative stories tend to get front-page coverage, while good news may not get covered at all. Based on my dozen or so visits to Afghanistan, most recently in January, it strikes me that there are real signs of progress. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) training mission has made significant strides in building the Afghan Security Forces (ASF) to its target level of 352,000 personnel. Afghan forces are already responsible for security in areas where 90 percent of Afghans live, and by later this spring, they are expected to take the security lead throughout all of Afghanistan with coalition forces shifting to a supporting role.

When Senator Jack Reed and I visited Regional Command East in January, we were told that in under 2 years, the ASF had gone from conducting less than 30 percent of operations in that region totally on their own—that is, without coalition forces present—to about 80 percent now.

Now, there are other signs of progress as well. For instance, under the Taliban rule, roughly 800,000 Afghan children were in school, and girls were denied an education. Now, more than 8 million students attend Afghan schools, and more than 40 percent of them are female. In 2001, Afghanistan had 20,000 teachers, all male. Today there are 200,000 teachers, including 60,000 women. The number of schools in Afghanistan has grown from 3,400 in 2001 to more than 16,000 today. More than 18 million Afghans now have telephone access compared to about 1 million in 2002.

Earlier this year, President Obama announced plans for drawing down 34,000 of the 66,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan by February 2014. This has been interpreted as meaning that the bulk of the forthcoming troop reductions will be put off until the end of this year. For several reasons, it would be better, in my view, to stick to the “steady pace approach” that the President at one point said he contemplated for those reductions. It would drive home to Afghans and the Taliban the success of the ASF, whose performance our commanders tell us has exceeded expectations.

Maintaining a steady pace of reductions would also send an important message to President Karzai. The Afghan president’s use of anti-coalition rhetoric, while possibly serving some domestic political purpose, shows an insensitivity to the sacrifices made by our troops and coalition forces over the last decade, and creates a chill on the idea of a long-term partnership.
It is in everyone’s interest to promptly set the conditions for any post-2014 partnership with Afghanistan. NATO defense ministers have already begun consideration of the size and mission for a post-2014 force in Afghanistan. One factor that will influence that decision is the size and capacity of the ASF. In this regard, the recent decision by NATO defense ministers to support maintaining the ASF at the current 352,000 level through 2018, rather than reducing the support to a level of 230,000 as previously planned, is the right thing to do. It sends an important signal of our continued commitment to a safe and secure Afghanistan, and may make it feasible for us to have a smaller U.S. and coalition presence after 2014.

The greatest challenge to Afghanistan’s security is not the Taliban, but the Pakistan base sanctuaries for militant extremists launching cross-border attacks into Afghanistan. Pakistan has said that it supports a stable and secure Afghanistan, but its actions belie its words. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship will not be normalized so long as those extremists’ safe havens exist on Pakistani territory.

Another large challenge to a stable Afghanistan are the continuing shortcomings of the Afghan Government in meeting the needs of the Afghan people and its lack of a willingness to fight corruption by government officials.

General, you have already demonstrated that you are carrying on the tradition of a highly-distinguished group of U.S. commanders in Afghanistan. You are right in that tradition. You are carrying it forward brilliantly. We look forward to your helping us understand how far the Afghans and the coalition have come and what remains to be done.

Senator Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I and all of the rest up here identify with your comments about the tragedy yesterday in Boston. It is very hard to believe that that happened.

Also, I thank you for commenting about, because very few people do it, the successes, the women who are voting, and getting all these good things that are happening. We don’t hear that often enough.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator INHOFE. As we discussed in my office last week, I have been to Afghanistan several times over the past decade, and I am greatly concerned that we will repeat the mistakes of Iraq and squander the enormous sacrifice of American lives and treasure by a precipitous withdrawal of forces at the end of 2014.

In Iraq, the Obama administration’s decision to abruptly withdraw U.S. troops in 2011 has resulted in the resurgence of al Qaeda, increasing sectarian violence, and a growing Iranian influence. The future of Iraq looks increasingly violent.

In Afghanistan, President Obama is making the same mistake of deciding on troop levels based on arbitrary timelines and without defining the underlying objectives, strategy, and mission. This is backwards. The strategy drives the troop requirements, not the other way around.
In my office last week, General Dunford and I discussed the need to have capability to support the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) and counterterrorism efforts in all regions of Afghanistan in an area four times the size of my State of Oklahoma. When making decisions about our mission in Afghanistan, the President should listen more to his professional military commanders on the front lines and less to the political advisors in the West Wing.

General Mattis told this committee that he recommends approximately 20,000 troops remain in Afghanistan after 2014. That would be about 13,600 U.S. troops, about half that many international forces. Our commanders tell me the mission should be to continue counterterrorism efforts and to train and advise ASF. For those missions across Afghanistan, they tell me that 8,000 to 12,000 troops is an unreasonable target. The fact that this administration has floated the idea of zero troops is patently irresponsible.

A force of only 10,000 will barely be able to protect itself and would likely result in ceding the city of Herat to Iranian authorities, which is a scary thought, and the city of Mazar-e-Sharif in the north to drug traffickers and warlords. On my frequent trips to Afghanistan, I have seen the progress improve professionalism of the ANSF. The increased ability of the Afghan forces to lead security operations gives me hope, but also makes clear that the job of training, advising, and assisting is far from complete.

The number and types of ANSF sustained past 2014 needs to match the security conditions on the ground. To be successful, they have to be able to maintain both the security and the confidence of the Afghan people.

I look forward to General Dunford’s recommendation on the number of Afghan forces that are needed in the post-2014 environment. From my previous discussions with General Allen, General Mattis, and General Dunford, it is obvious that the right level is closer to the 352,000 than it is to the 230,000, at least through 2018.

Although I am intently focused on the post-2014 security environment, I am mindful that the 2013 and 2014 fighting seasons are critical to setting conditions for success, and I worry that inadequate funding will erode the fighting capability of our troops on the front line. The President’s budget proposal last week fails to address the unprecedented resource challenges facing our military and will hurt the readiness of our military.

To preserve our foreign combat capabilities in places like Afghanistan and North Korea, the Navy is tying up carrier strike groups at the pier. The Air Force is grounding squadrons of combat aircraft, and the Army is cancelling brigade size combat training rotations. The effect of this deteriorating readiness will be felt by the fighting forces in 2014, the men and women we send into combat in Afghanistan next year. The President must set aside political posturing and get serious about working with Congress on the lasting solution to the challenges facing our military. The troops fighting for this Nation deserve nothing less.

I thank you very much, General Dunford, for all of your activity and your service. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.

General Dunford, welcome.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES-AFGHANISTAN

General DUNFORD. Good morning, Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you this morning and represent the men and women of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan. Thanks to your leadership and support, they are well-trained and well-equipped. Their extraordinary courage and performance reflects that support.

U.S. Forces-Afghanistan remains focused on denying safe haven in Afghanistan to the al Qaeda terrorists who attacked our Nation on September 11, and denying the Taliban, who harbored them, the ability to overthrow the Afghan Government. We recognize that our national interests in the region are served by a secure and stable Afghanistan at peace with its neighbors.

I appear before you this morning confident in the cardinal direction of the campaign. My confidence is based on the very real progress we have made since the surge of forces that began in late 2009, and that surge allowed us to move the campaign forward. The constant pressure we have exerted on the remnants of al Qaeda in Afghanistan has disrupted their ability to plan and conduct operations against the West.

Our coalition Afghan partner operations have pushed the Taliban away from the populated areas and prevented them from meeting their campaigns objectives in 2012. While they remain resilient, they are less of an existential threat to the Afghan Government than they were in 2011. Most significantly, our efforts since 2009 have provided the Afghan forces the time and space necessary to grow and assume the lead.

As the chairman mentioned, today the ANSF has recruited and fielded most of its authorized strength of 352,000. They are leading approximately 80 percent of all combat operations being conducted, and they have the lead security responsibility for territory where nearly 90 percent of the population lives. Later this spring, in line with the plan outlined at Lisbon and Chicago summits, Afghan forces will be in the lead for combat operations across the Nation.

Today’s hearing truly comes at an inflection point in the Afghan campaign, and there are many reasons to be optimistic. That said, there are several significant challenges we must overcome to meet our objectives.

Up to this point, it is fair to say we are focused on growing the size of the ANSF. We are now focused on improving the quality of the ANSF. In the months ahead, we will continue to focus on a wide range of issues to include leadership development, ministerial capacity, aviation, and the systems, processes, and institutions needed to sustain a modern professional force.

In the coming months, we will also need to address very real political and psychological factors that will affect the outcome of the campaign. With regard to political factors, we are at a point in the campaign where there is real tension between increasing aspirations of Afghan sovereignty and the reality of operations conducted in accordance with the U.N. Security Council mandate, the law of armed conflict, and the military technical agreement. Properly managing that tension is now a campaign imperative. The psycho-
logical aspect of the campaign is equally important right now. Psychology will influence the performance of the Afghan forces this summer and affect the critical elections of 2014.

We confront growing uncertainty in Afghanistan and in the region. Many Afghans have told me they no longer fear the Taliban as much as they fear what will happen after 2014. One Afghan described it as the Y2K effect. There is a growing sense that December 2014 is a cliff for the Afghan people. That dynamic must be addressed with a credible, compelling narrative of U.S. commitment. Absent confidence and the hope for a brighter future, Afghan leaders, the Afghan people, and regional actors will continue to hedge and plan for the worst case. The behavior associated with that mindset has the very real potential to undermine the campaign.

In closing, there is a great deal to be optimistic about at this point, but we are in the decisive phase of transition. The progress we have made to date provides real opportunity, but not inevitability. There will continue to be challenges that will test our will and endurance. But in the end, if we define winning as completing political and security transition while rendering al Qaeda operationally ineffective. If we define winning as setting the conditions for the Afghans to exploit the decade of opportunity that will begin in 2015, I firmly believe we can win.

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you this morning. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Dunford follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC

AFGHANISTAN: PROGRESS, OPPORTUNITIES, AND COMMITMENT

WHERE WE ARE—STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT

The conflict in Afghanistan has now shifted into a fundamentally new phase. For the past 11 years, the United States and our coalition allies have been leading combat operations. Now the Afghans are taking over, and ISAF is stepping back into a supporting role. The progress made by the ISAF-led surge over the past 3 years has put the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) in control of all Afghanistan’s major cities and 34 provincial capitals, and driven the insurgency away from the population. ISAF’s primary focus is now shifting from directly fighting the insurgency to supporting the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in their efforts to hold and expand these gains.

The progress made by the ANSF enabled President Obama and President Karzai to agree at the January Summit that Milestone 2013—Afghan security lead throughout the country—will be announced later this spring. This announcement will mark ISAF’s official transition to its supporting role: fully focused on training, advising, and assisting the ANSF. In fact, this transition has largely taken place. The ANSF are now leading the vast majority of operations countrywide. ISAF casualties are lower than they have been since 2008. The majority of ISAF bases have been transferred to the ANSF or closed, and construction is complete on the majority of ANSF bases. The United States will redeploy 34,000 troops by February 2014, and the ANSF have grown to nearly 352,000 personnel. Afghanistan’s populated areas are increasingly secure, and the ANSF have successfully maintained security gains in areas that have already been transitioned. Still, the ANSF will continue to need training, advising, and key combat support from ISAF, including close air support, logistics, and intelligence, through the end of the ISAF combat mission in December 2014.

However, security challenges remain. The insurgency’s sanctuaries in Pakistan, limited GIRoA institutional capacity, and endemic corruption remain the greatest impediments to long-term stability and sustainable security in Afghanistan. ISAF will continue to work with GIRoA to address its challenges in order to deliver effective governance to the Afghan people.
The ANSF are at the forefront of the fight and are now responsible for maintaining and expanding security in the face of the insurgency. Despite the early recognition that Afghan security would depend on indigenous security forces, building the ANSF lagged in the initial years after we forced the Taliban Government from power. In late 2009, a concerted effort to grow the ANSF was initiated with the goal of generating and fielding trained and equipped Afghan combat elements and getting them into the fight. Unit partnering between Afghan and ISAF forces—enabled by the U.S. troop surge ordered by President Obama—provided the ANSF the space to develop combat capabilities and leadership skills from the tactical level on up. GIRoA and ISAF deliberately focused first on ANSF growth (force size), followed by the development of enablers and the professionalization of the ranks. This decision was made with a full understanding that the ANSF, once built to size by 2012, would experience some initial shortfalls in equipment, logistics, personnel, and leadership—foreseeable challenges that would be overcome in the 2012–2014 period as Afghan knowledge, capacity, and experience increased.

Moving into the 2013 fighting season, the insurgency now confronts a combined ANSF and Afghanistan Local Police (ALP) force of over 350,000 personnel who have secured over 87 percent of Afghanistan’s population, and are leading 80 percent of all conventional operations. These forces are operating with growing confidence, improved leadership, warfighting capability, and a vision for the future. They are a source of security, confidence, and pride for the Afghan people—factors the insurgents must consider as their influence and effectiveness in Afghanistan wanes.

As of early 2013, most of our coalition partnerships with the ANSF have evolved into advise and assist relationships; these relationships are designed to provide tailored support and to continue increasing ANSF confidence and capabilities. Those advisory roles are designed to evolve and reduce over time until ANSF units can fully stand on their own in a sustainable manner.

The ANSF continue to improve at a steady pace with marked quality increases seen in units capable of conducting independent operations. Over the last year, only 1 of the 23 Afghan National Army (ANA) brigade headquarters was conducting independent operations. Today the ANA has 1 corps/division headquarters, 5 brigade headquarters, and 27 battalions (4 of the 27 are garrison support units) capable of operating independently. The growing ANA Special Operations Command (ANASOC) has also made strides towards becoming an independent and effective force—with the vast majority of ANA Special Operations Forces (SOF) missions, to include night operations, being Afghan-led.

Evidence of the ANSF’s growing capacity to conduct their own increasingly sophisticated operations can be seen in Laghman, Kabul, and Paktika provinces. Here, the ANSF have implemented the layered security concept that decreases vulnerabilities in any single arm of the force by leveraging the capabilities of the entire ANSF (e.g. ALP, ANASOF, ANA, Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), National Directorate of Security (NDS), etc.), providing security to the Afghan people with minimal assistance from the coalition. This “web” of enduring security starts locally, then spreads from the bottom up to the population centers, through the rural areas, and out to the borders.

Layered security consists of all ANSF elements having a defined role within an established network, each one responsible for a specific security operation’s focus defined geographically (Border, Village, District, Province), or by other objectives outlined in a security strategy. For example, a layered security operation might consist of the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) patrolling a population center and its highways, while the ABP provides an outer security layer by controlling border crossings. Simultaneously, the ANA conduct combat patrols and operations based on NDS intelligence providing a security layer in between the border and population center. Command, control, coordination and intelligence for the entire layered security operation is conducted at the Operational Coordination Center (OCC). The OCCs are designed to manage and disseminate information and intelligence proactively or in response to an incident, and laterally share information that enables rapid joint action at the provincial level and below. This integrated combination of information sharing, decision support, and the ability to direct operations makes it more difficult for criminals or insurgents to succeed. The Afghan ability to implement this layered security environment will increase once the Afghan Air Force (AAF) becomes fully capable. This ANSF collective effort is an example of how Afghans have taken responsibility for their own security and are making marked and sustainable progress on the ground.

In the last year, the coalition has begun transitioning districts and provinces in the east and south. There have been setbacks during these operations, as we ex-
pected in any transition as dramatic as the ones described above. But, the Afghans are learning from their mistakes and are pressing on to become increasingly independent and effective. This is a part of a larger story of resilience and resolution. Throughout last summer and fall, the ANSF fought increasingly on their own, with decreasing enabling support from U.S. and coalition forces. In Kandahar’s Zharey District, for example, we reduced U.S. troops from 3,500 to 300 last October. Afghan soldiers are now patrolling independently and attacks have not increased. We estimate that the number of Taliban fighters have fallen from 900 to 100. In neighboring Panjwai District, local villages have risen up against the Taliban and their harsh tactics. When they did, Afghan police quickly reinforced the villagers, enabling them to survive a Taliban counterattack.

In another branch of the ANSF, the Afghan Air Force’s (AAF) emerging capability was recently demonstrated in Regional Command (RC)-East, where winter flight missions were successfully conducted to resupply the ANSF at forward operating bases in Nuristan Province. In another example, the AAF provided direct support to the ABP mission to supply local villages and secure contested territory in RC–South. While many challenges remain, the progress across the ANSF has been genuine and is already creating a significant impact on both the physical and psychological aspects of the fight.

ANSF Challenges and Gaps in 2013

Having realized the initial goal of growing and equipping the ANSF into an organization that will be capable of assuming the lead security role, we have shifted emphasis to building capacity and fielding more complex and technologically advanced capabilities. ANSF progress towards advanced capabilities has been measured. Significant gaps in some ANSF capabilities persist. The ANSF will continue to require ISAF support in areas including battle command, intelligence fusion, logistics, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C–IED), surface fires, engineer and explosive ordnance, and aviation. Current ISAF support and the subsequent Resolute Support mission (the NATO post-2014 mission) force must take a tailored approach to provide train, advise, and assist support focused on very specific capabilities to maintain the current ANSF development trajectory.

The ANSF have made some progress in enablers such as logistics and they are increasingly taking responsibility for distribution, maintenance, ammunition management, fuel, and other classes of supply at the national and regional logistics nodes and institutions. ANSF intelligence capability has seen improvements. ANA Military Intelligence Companies with human intelligence, signals intelligence, and counterintelligence sections are currently integrated at the Corps level to support several ANSF mission sets. The Afghan Air Force is improving its ability to provide air support to the ANSF. These and other capabilities that need further development have been identified for inclusion in the current ISAF and subsequent Resolute Support mission sets. The AAF will require increased capability and capacity going into 2015 due to late equipment fielding, contracting problems, and personnel shortfalls. ISAF currently predicts that this gap will exist through 2016. Coalition advisors will continue working to build sufficient fixed-wing, rotary-wing, close-combat attack, and intelligence air platform capabilities.

While route clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capabilities continue to improve throughout the ANA, significant challenges exist for generating, training, and equipping EOD teams. The majority of ANSF casualties come from IEDs. As of February 2013, the ANA has only 59 validated EOD teams out of an authorized 230, and the ANP has
14 validated teams out of an authorized 88. This gap will likely endure through 2015 and beyond.

- ANSF personnel issues, like that of many militaries, are varied and range from shortages, literacy, retention, attrition, and desertion. The ANSF continue to suffer from noncommissioned officer (NCO) shortages. The ANA requires over 10,000 NCOs, while the ANP requires over 5,000. In the ANA, the core limitations in NCO generation remain the limited number of functionally literate applicants. Just as in many regional armies, the professionalization of the ANSF NCO corps has not yet occurred, with NCOs being underrepresented across the forces and lacking authorities required to effectively lead troops.

- Attrition within the ANA also continues to be a significant challenge, creating a burden on recruiting and training structures. The ANA's sustained high attrition rates remain a significant concern and threaten the growth and development of a professional, competent, and capable force. Vacancies are not always filled quickly or with properly trained personnel, presenting challenges for units at the operational level. Furthermore, attrition creates a burden on recruiting and training assets, increasing the overall cost of the force. The ANA attrition rate continues to exceed the monthly target rate of 1.4 percent; for the last year the monthly average was 2.7 percent per month. This attrition rate equates to the loss of around 5,000 personnel per month or 60,000 per annum. The ANA leadership tracks attrition data and the reasons most often cited for leaving the army are issues of leadership, family separation, leave, and operational tempo. Since many of the underlying issues with attrition pertain to leadership, Minister of Defense Mohammadi formed an Evaluation Commission to assess his commanders, and if need be, replace unsatisfactory leaders from battalion through corps levels.

**Mitigation Efforts into 2014**

In most battlefield enabler and functional areas, ANSF capabilities will never equal those of the coalition. But parity between coalition and Afghan forces is not necessary for the requirements of Afghan security, and is therefore not the right measure of Afghan capabilities. In most areas, the ANSF will do things differently than the coalition has done them. They will utilize different tools and techniques to achieve the same net effect. Indirect fires, for example, can be provided by mortars rather than close air support; CASEVAC can be accomplished by ground rather than air; and planning will be accomplished in an Afghan way. In some cases, too, the ANSF may simply choose not to do some things that they would have undertaken while partnered with us. But it is a mistake to discount organic Afghan capabilities and techniques because they do not meet Western standards—the ANSF have other advantages (local familiarity with the culture and terrain, in-depth understanding of their enemies tactics and techniques, ingenuity, etc.) that they can leverage to defeat the security challenges they face. These organic capabilities and methods will most often be sufficient to preserve their own confidence and that of the Afghan people. Where the ANSF lack sufficient independent capability, we will continue to provide security force assistance to close the gaps until such time as the Afghans are able to provide their own capacity and capabilities for themselves.

Although the ANSF are developing solutions to provide needed enabler capabilities, continued support will be required for the foreseeable future. We have developed a tailored plan to accelerate key enablers as a part of transition to help improve the future self-sufficiency of the ANSF to protect the Afghan population, manage violence, and contain the insurgency through sustained layered security operations. We anticipate most of these enablers to be fielded by the end of 2014 with capability development continuing through the Resolute Support mission.

**WHERE WE ARE—STATE OF THE INSURGENCY**

U.S. and coalition forces, working side by side with our Afghan partners, have reversed the insurgency's momentum and pushed insurgents out of population centers. By the end of last year's fighting season, the ANSF and ISAF had deprived the insurgents of key safe havens, command and control nodes, and support zones. They are now less capable, less popular, and less of a threat to the Afghan Government than a year ago.

Despite this degradation, safe havens in Afghanistan and sanctuaries in Pakistan continue to provide Taliban senior leadership some freedom of movement and freedom of action, facilitating the training of fighters, and the planning of operations. The Afghan Taliban and all its sub-groups, including the Haqqani Network, remain capable of conducting high profile attacks, though counterterrorism pressure has de-
graded this ability. However, the Taliban remain firm in their conviction that ISAF’s drawdown and perceived ANSF weakness, especially when supplemented with continued external support and with sanctuary in Pakistan that the Taliban exploit, will translate into a restoration of their pre-surge military capabilities and influence.

Sustained counterterrorism operations have also eliminated dozens of al Qaeda enablers and exerted pressure on al Qaeda personnel, restricting their movement to isolated areas of northeastern Afghanistan. Despite effective counterterrorism pressure on al Qaeda and its Taliban enablers, and on the small number of al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan, al Qaeda’s relationship with local Afghan Taliban remains intact.

CHALLENGES

Establishing a Constructive ANSF-Pakistan Military Relationship

The security, especially along the border, of Afghanistan and Pakistan is an interdependent issue that requires a cooperative effort between the two countries. The Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship has ebbed and flowed over time, but both nations acknowledge that stability in Afghanistan impacts Pakistan and vice versa. The unresolved border issues between Afghanistan and Pakistan are a historical source of friction between the two countries. Actions by both sides exacerbated this friction and contributed significantly to the loss of trust necessary for a meaningful relationship between each country’s military forces. Last fall, as a step toward improving this relationship, ISAF led the development of a Tripartite Border Standard Operating Procedure. This document is designed to improve cross border coordination between ISAF, the ANSF, and the Pakistan military. ISAF continues to work to improve the cooperation, participation and commitment of the Afghans and Pakistanis.

Recently the ANSF established a more robust Tripartite Joint Operations Center in Kabul, providing general officers on both sides with direct access to their respective Ministries. Ongoing Border Flag Meetings continue to address border issues and are key to develop and improve cross-border relations. While we see some initial progress, serious challenges remain. Our goal remains to develop the trust necessary between the two countries so that they will eventually be able to maintain a constructive bilateral military-to-military relationship.

Insider Threat

One tactic the insurgents use to sow distrust and attack our resolve is infiltration in friendly forces for the purposes of attacking from the inside, sometimes described as ‘Green on Blue’ or ‘Green on Green’ attacks. We recognize the insider attacks are a threat to Afghan and coalition forces and take this issue very seriously. ISAF is a learning, adaptive organization, and we have devoted a tremendous amount of time and energy to better understand this threat. Together, ISAF and the Afghan Government have undertaken numerous measures to reduce the risk of insider attacks, including improved vetting and screening, counterintelligence, and cultural awareness. We are constantly refining our approach.

Our actions are based upon the three pillars: Force Protection, Situational Awareness, and Counter-Intelligence (CI). Our Force Protection (FP) efforts include the assignment of a dedicated FP Officer to provide a daily risk assessment and adjust FPO measures as appropriate. We have also instituted guidance to employ Guardian Angels to prevent insider attacks or reduce the effects of these attacks. We have brought in outside support to provide Insider Threat Situational Awareness Training with mobile training teams. These teams provide a sophisticated understanding of Human Behavior Pattern Recognition Analysis, helping to identify predictive indicators of potential insider attacks. Our final pillar encompasses the expansion of our CI teams for both the coalition and Afghan National Army; we have accomplished this by employing additional resources from Allied Command Counter-Intelligence, while the Afghans have transferred CI personnel from the Ministry of Interior and National Directorate of Security over to the Afghan National Army.

Civilian Casualties

The protection of the Afghan population remains a top ISAF priority, and avoidance of civilian casualties is one of ISAF’s highest priorities. We have taken significant actions over the past year to minimize these tragic events. As a result, ISAF-caused civilian casualties have been reduced by almost half in comparing 2011 to 2012. These casualties are, rightly, a concern to the people and the President of Afghanistan. We are working with the GIRoA to further reduce ISAF-caused civilian casualties and maintain the trust and support of the Afghan Government and the Afghan people.
ISAF continues to work closely with its Afghan counterparts to ensure accurate and timely reporting of civilian casualties. Supporting security transition is the transfer of responsibility for civilian casualties avoidance and mitigation measures, procedures, and capabilities to the ANSF. In order to support effective protection of the Afghan population, in December the Ministry of Defense hosted its first Population Protection Conference to discuss and address these issues.

Lessons Learned

Detention Facility in Parwan

The transfer of the Detention Facility in Parwan to the Afghan Government reaffirmed Afghan sovereignty, while preserving our force protection requirements. Now known as the Afghan National Detention Facility-Parwan, the facility represents an emerging sense of sovereignty for the Afghan people, allowing them to assume responsibility for the detention and prosecution of detainees under the authority of the Afghan constitution. During the transfer ceremony, GIRoA officials highlighted their responsibilities for detention operations in accordance with the Afghan rule of law, due process, and international standards for the humane treatment of detainees. While the day represented a transfer of authority, there is still work in progress to transition the management functions of the facility. We still have an appropriate presence at the facility in support of Afghan forces. We will continue to train, advise, and assist the Detentions Operations Command, the Afghan Review Board process, and the Justice Center at Parwan as Afghanistan’s capability to operate independently fully develops.

We did not arrive at this juncture overnight; the original Memorandum of Understanding was signed on March 9, 2012, and it took a year of continued work at the facility to build sufficient Afghan capacity and capabilities to finalize the transfer of authority—that work continues as we mark another milestone in the transition of this mission. The Agreement that determined the final requirements for the transfer reaffirms our mutual commitment to the lawful and humane treatment of detainees, while ensuring proper protection of Afghan, U.S., and coalition forces. This transfer improved our strategic partnership with Afghanistan, sets the stage for increased cooperation in the broader transition framework, and fulfilled the pledges made by President Obama and President Karzai during their joint statement in January.

ISSUES

Elections in 2014

A peaceful and successful transition of the Afghan Presidency in 2014 will be a crucial step toward a confident, secure, and stable way ahead in Afghanistan. Elections must be seen to be inclusive, free, and fair to the Afghan people. A successful political transition is also a precondition for the continued flow of resources as described in the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework. Donor confidence and sustained flow of pledged funding are critical for continued progress in a stable Afghanistan. ISAF will support the ANSF as they provide security for the elections process.

Force Posture

As the Campaign transitions in the coming 20 months to the Resolute Support train, advise, and assist mission in support of the ANSF, we will also be redeploying U.S. forces to reach our 34K force structure by February 2014 and retrograde equipment. Following that, we will further redeploy forces to a level yet to be determined by the end of 2014. Although challenged by geography, weather, and occasional disruptions in the land routes, we can complete retrograde and redeployment of U.S. Forces from Afghanistan. We have sufficient transportation capacity to meet redeployment and retrograde requirements. The combined capabilities of the Multi-Modal (M/M) network, the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), and the Pakistan ground lines of communication (PAK GLOCs) provide redundant capabilities to meet our requirements.

U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) redeployment and retrograde operations began in 2012 with the recovery of surge forces. From January 2012 through March 2013, USFOR–A reduced force levels by 28 percent, reduced U.S. bases by 70 percent, reduced rolling stock equipment by 45 percent, and reduced non-rolling stock equipment and supplies by 26 percent. We are confident in our ability to successfully continue redeployment and retrograde operations through 2014 as we transition to the post-2014 mission.
Contractor Drawdown

In concert with our mission requirements and overall retrograde and base closure/transfer, we are responsibly drawing down the contractor footprint, both in terms of personnel and equipment. In August 2012, we stood up the Operational Contract Support Drawdown Cell, and tasked them with this specific mission, giving particular emphasis to applying lessons learned from Iraq. With this cell in place, we put our primary focus on the largest contracts in theater and are currently executing a plan that will yield a reduction in contractor personnel by approximately 25,000 (~25 percent) by the end of calendar year 2013. A combination of base closure and a further descoping of contract requirements will allow us to continue to reduce contractor footprint through calendar year 2014. We are also putting great emphasis on responsible disposition of contractor-managed government-owned equipment in theater. To make this happen, we are collaborating closely with Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Contract Management Agency, and other key stakeholders to ensure we have a fiscally responsible and logistically feasible plan for materiel reduction of this equipment. Over the next 21 months, this approach will result in a responsible contractor reduction that appropriately balances mission risk with our need for retrograde, base closure/transfer, and materiel reduction.

During this transition, commanders will move to more expeditionary standards and balance quality of life, safety, fiscal stewardship, and mission. For example, we will reduce our in-theater food stock by changing the meal cycle to two Meals Ready-to-Eat and two hot meals, we will reduce the use of non-tactical vehicles on our bases, and we will begin to descope the services provided to our soldiers and civilians such as contract laundry. We will continue to provide wireless internet services as long as possible which is important to the morale of our force and provides a vital link to their families.

STEWARDSHIP OF RESOURCES REMAINS A KEY TASK

Afghan Security Force Funds

A critical tool in our efforts to support the development of the ANSF has been the use of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) which provides the resources required to train, sustain, and equip a force of 352,000 Afghan soldiers and police as well as 30,000 Afghan local police. A combination of ongoing Department of Defense reviews, Department of Defense reprogramming, and congressional reallocation reduced the original fiscal year 2012 request from $12.8 billion to $9.2 billion. ASFF received $5.1 billion in fiscal year 2013 against a request of $5.7 billion. This reduction will result in the delay in deploying some needed enabling capabilities. The fiscal year 2013 budget shifted emphasis from building, equipping, and training to professionalizing and sustaining the force. It will include some key enabler builds as well as equipping and infrastructure requirements for the Afghan Air Forces and Special Operations Forces as they continue to build their capabilities.

Commander’s Emergency Response Program

The Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) remains important; although it will reduce as our forces reduce. Working collaboratively with the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction and the Army Audit Agency, we have made significant improvements in policy and execution that provided significant return on investment. In fiscal year 2012, ISAF was able to reduce CERP projects in both number and scale due to improving security conditions and a decreasing requirement for humanitarian relief and reconstruction. Even so, the right-sizing of this critical enabling program continued to emphasize small-scale, high-impact projects that delivered immediate assistance to the local population with 96 percent of the projects executed in fiscal year 2012 valued at less than $100,000 each and 90 percent under $10,000 each. CERP remains a critical tool for our commanders on the ground.

Military Construction

Despite a dynamic and evolving operational environment, ISAF and USFOR-A remain firmly committed to efficiently managing congressionally appropriated Military Construction (MILCON) funds to support our warfighters. By establishing a deliberate process to review, validate, and adapt this multi-billion dollar investment, the command ensured effective resource stewardship while providing the quality facilities needed by our troops. As a result, since 2011, we have recommended and received approval for the cancellation/descope of over 100 MILCON projects with an estimated cost avoidance/savings of nearly $1.3 billion.
Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund

Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF) is a Department of Defense funding source that uses 2-year funds for the execution of critical infrastructure projects in the power, water, transportation, and rule-of-law sectors. The projects are carefully selected, assessed, and coordinated with GIRoA, the U.S. Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development to ensure that they are both sustainable and congruent with Afghanistan’s future infrastructure priorities. AIF projects are critical to locking in stability gains and providing a foundation for internal economic growth that is less reliant on external aid. Nearly all AIF funds (99 percent) are spent in the east, south, and southwest areas of Afghanistan where they provide positive counter-insurgency effects in support of the ANSF and encourage long-term security and stability. In addition, 2-year funds enable USFOR–A to execute large, complex projects that were not possible with CERP. Most importantly, the AIF program serves as an effective counter to the insurgent narrative of abandonment.

WHAT WINNING LOOKS LIKE

Despite the remaining challenges, we can win in Afghanistan. The key elements of our success include:

- The transition of security responsibility to a confident, self-reliant and sustainable ANSF capable of protecting the population and securing a legitimate Afghan Government.
- An operationally ineffective al Qaeda deprived of a safe haven from which to plan and conduct operations outside the area.
- An acceptable political transition, defined by inclusive, free, fair elections and Afghan Government adherence to the Mutual Accountability Framework.
- A constructive ANSF-Pakistan military relationship.

We will have reached the end state of our combat operations when security conditions are set for the Afghan people to exploit a Decade of Opportunity. All of this is achievable—but it is not inevitable. Winning in Afghanistan will require us to remain focused on why we are there and firmly committed to achieving our objectives.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, General. We will follow the 8-minute rule this morning.

General, I made reference to the media characterization of events in Afghanistan. Recent news reports have described a number of high profile Taliban attacks that suggest a declining security situation in Afghanistan. A Taliban attack and a hostage standoff in Farah Province was said to “highlight the crumbling security situation” and the “deteriorating security situation” in that western province.

A Taliban assault on a remote outpost in eastern Afghanistan was said to be a “serious blow” to one of the Afghan army’s most elite units. The tragic death of a U.S. civilian advisor and five other Americans in an attack in southern Afghanistan was said to highlight the “escalating violence” associated with the Taliban’s attempt to regain momentum.

Could you tell us whether in your view those articles, those characterizations, taken together provide an accurate impression of the security situation in Afghanistan?

General DUNFORD. Mr. Chairman, in the aggregate, those incidents remind us that we are still at war, and there is still violence in Afghanistan. Having said that, it is important to note that 80 percent of the violence currently occurs where 20 percent of the population lives. By and large, the population in Afghanistan has been free from violence. The Talibani enemy have been pushed away from the populated areas.

Each of those incidents that you referred to was a separate incident. In Farah, as an example, we know that the enemy at this point is relying on high profile attacks, improvised explosive de-
VICES (IED), and assassination attempts in order to achieve their effect because they are unable to influence the population in the way that they were a short time ago.

The issue at the remote outpost that you referred to was frankly a breakdown in leadership. It had nothing to do with the capabilities of the ASF in the aggregate. In fact, what I was impressed with was that the Afghan leadership took immediate action against the leadership that were responsible for that particular incident. So what we see is increasingly ASF and the leadership in the ASF being held accountable when they fail to properly perform their duties. In this case, that is exactly what happened.

With regard to the tragic loss of life of our young Department of State (DOS) employee, that also indicates what the enemy is intent to do in order to erode our will. But in general terms, Mr. Chairman, what I would tell you is that that does not reflect the level of violence across the country at this time. The level of violence has significantly reduced over the past 2 years. As I mentioned, the surge had the desired effect, and, most importantly, not only has the violence been reduced in the populated areas, but that security is currently being provided by ASF largely and not coalition forces.

Chairman Levin. Thank you. General, do you support maintaining the ASF at the higher level of 352,000 through 2018 rather than reducing those forces to 230,000?

General Dunford. Mr. Chairman, I do support extending the 352,000. That decision has not been made and it is conditional on Afghan negotiations related to the bilateral security agreement (BSA) and our enduring presence in Afghanistan, but I would support that. It mitigates risk during the period of a transition. It mitigates risk during a period of what we project to be economic downturn. I think it provides that demonstrated commitment that you referred to in your opening remarks.

Chairman Levin. Thank you. General, do you support the President’s decision to draw down 34,000 of the 66,000 U.S. troops from Afghanistan by February 2014?

General Dunford. Mr. Chairman, I do support it. What is critical about the drawdown this year is that it allows us to stay engaged at the battalion or Kandak level with the ASF during their first summer in the lead. We have the flexibility to conduct the drawdown to allow us to stay engaged with our train, advise, and assist mission at the appropriate level this summer.

Chairman Levin. There was an article, General, in yesterday’s New York Times about the threats that are faced by many Afghans that spent the last 11 years, or part of the last 11 years, helping us in Afghanistan by interpreting so that we could proceed more effectively in Afghanistan. These interpreters are supposed to be protected by a visa program, which I remember very vividly that Senator Kennedy and many of us worked very hard to achieve.

Can you personally take whatever steps you are able to take to make sure that those visas are provided as contemplated by law?

General Dunford. Mr. Chairman, we owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to the interpreters that have supported us over the last 11 years. It is fair to say we could not have accomplished the mission without them, so I would fully support that.
What we are doing now on the ground is ensuring that their applications make it through the process, at least through the U.S. embassy, and come back here to Washington, DC. We are personally tracking those on an individual basis, in many cases, to ensure that those interpreters who most deserve to come to our country can do that. But I absolutely would support that.

Chairman Levin. Will you take whatever steps you can with DOS, beyond what you have already done, to tell them that it is really important to our security, and to what our security demands have been, that those visas be forthcoming?

General Dunford. I will do that, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. We will also be writing a letter to the DOS relative to that matter.

In terms of our relations with President Karzai, did we recently work out an agreement with President Karzai in a province where he said that our Special Operations Forces (SOF) would have to leave within 2 weeks? Did we get that straightened out so that, in fact, we worked out an acceptable agreement, a mutual agreement?

General Dunford. Mr. Chairman, we did. That was the Wardak Province. In February, President Karzai had directed that all U.S. Special Forces be removed from the province. That was as a result of allegations that proved to be unsubstantiated.

At the time President Karzai gave us that direction, I let the President know that that would be unacceptable both from a force protection perspective and from our ability to accomplish our objectives. He afforded us the opportunity to work with the Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior and come up with a transition plan for the Wardak Province. Since that time, we have removed U.S. Special Forces from one district inside of that province. There are nine districts in the province. We removed SOF from one of those districts, and we replaced them with effective ASF.

So in honesty, Mr. Chairman, what I told President Karzai when that was over, frankly that turned out to be a model for transition. We had broad guidance from President Karzai. We were able to work with the Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior to transition. It is exactly what is happening across the rest of the country. We are in the process of transitioning from provinces, and so this particular incident worked out. From my perspective, we have an effective solution.

Chairman Levin. I might just note that President Karzai made a statement, and it got huge publicity. But when the resolution was achieved by you and the Afghans, it got very little publicity. I am afraid that is too typical of what the media situation is here.

My final question is on Pakistan. You met with General Kayani, the chief of the Pakistan army staff, also with Afghan military leaders, I believe. It was a trilateral meeting. Can you tell us what your assessment is of Pakistan's current role as to whether they have in any way changed their behavior in terms of ending the safe havens that exist in Pakistan that have been used to attack our forces, Afghan forces?

General Dunford. Mr. Chairman, at this point I could only tell you that the rhetoric from Pakistan has changed. General Kayani has pledged cooperation. We have seen at the tactical level increased levels of cooperation since the fall. We did sign a trilateral,
tripartite border agreement between Afghanistan and the coalition and Pakistan in November. We have conducted an exchange of officers. I have a Pakistani liaison, flag officer, in my headquarters. We have several Pakistanis in our headquarters to deconflict border issues.

We have seen increased cooperation on the ground lines of communication as we have tried to move our equipment back and forth through Pakistan. General Kayani has pledged that we will meet with him on a monthly basis individually, and we also will have routine meetings at the trilateral level with Afghan leadership, as well as General Kayani.

So the rhetoric and the degree of our engagement has increased. We are still obviously concerned with the results, and I think there is still some time to see before we can make a judgment on that.

Chairman Levin. Would you give us an update by the end of May as to whether that rhetoric has been followed by any change in action? Could you give us that—just send us a report by the end of May?

General Dunford. I will do that, Mr. Chairman. Just so you know, President Karzai and I think it is significant. I proposed and he approved 2 weeks ago to have General Kayani and the senior leadership from Pakistan come to Kabul and attend a meeting hosted by us with the minister of defense from Afghanistan and the chief of the general staff from Afghanistan. This is a significant step forward. I will be able to report on that in May.

Our regular engagement with the Pakistani military leadership on a number of bilateral and trilateral issues (involving Afghan leaders) continues, and we have achieved some positive effects through those engagements. Most notably, our efforts to bring senior Afghan and Pakistani military officers together to discuss issues related to the contested border between the two countries have reduced tensions. In early May, a series of tri-lateral meetings prevented what may have become a more significant distraction—not only for the campaign in Afghanistan but for Pakistani security forces during that country's historic election of a new civilian government.

However, as yet, we have not witnessed a demonstrable shift in Pakistani willingness to address the persistent challenge of insurgent safe havens. This is undoubtedly, at least in part, to the domestic security requirements related to Pakistan's presidential elections and the military's focus on limiting violence and guaranteeing the population's right to participate in the democratic process. With a new government forming and preparing to take power, we will remain closely engaged with our Pakistani counterparts, encouraging them to follow through on their commitment to address threats to our mutual security. That said, there is a growing realization within the military leadership that insurgents and terrorists pose an increasing problem that destabilizes Pakistan. However currently, Pakistani efforts are focused only on the direct threat posed by Terik-e-Taliban.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Senator Inhofe.

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As I told you in my office, General Dunford, it is hard for me to believe that it has been 10 years since we started our active training of the Afghan National Army (ANA). The reason I am particularly sensitive to that is that this began with the Oklahoma 45th Infantry Brigade, their first duty over there, and I spent quite a bit of time there at that time. That is what kicked it off.

Then later on with the Kabul Military Training Center, that is so incredibly impressive. It is almost like you are looking at Fort Sill, and the resources they have and who has taken that over. On
any given day, there might be 10,000 ANA trainees crawling through the mud and busting down doors. That facility is now 20,000 acres, I think.

My concern is that, with the changes that we are talking about in this hearing today, is that going to negatively impact this real success? I think the chairman here talked about the great successes that we have had over there, and I agree with that. But one of the successes is in that training capability, and that particular center, you have spent a lot of time there, I am sure. Is that going to suffer at all with the changes that we are looking at now?

General DUNFORD. Sir, what is important, and I think you are alluding to the post-2014 presence, what is important I think when we look at post-2014 are a couple of factors. One is geography. I believe we need to be in the four corners of the country. Much of the training takes place at regional training centers, and it is important after 2014 that we continue to be at those regional training centers with an effective advise and assist effort.

The other is the level at which we advise and assist the Afghan forces. This summer as we go into the Afghan first summer in the lead, they will be advised and assisted at the selected battalion level, lieutenant colonel level, the Kandak level. As we get to the fall, we will lift off to the brigade level, and post-2014, current planning would be either at the brigade or the corps level, and that decision has not been made yet.

But in any event, we recognize that what you pointed out is critical, and that is we maintain a robust train, advise, and assist effort at the training center level. We would expect that to be at the institutional training center level in Kabul, as well as those four corners of Afghanistan at the regional training center. So from my perspective, what is really important is as we look at our enduring presence, it would be sufficient to address that particular function that you referred to.

Senator INHOFE. I have heard about some of the changes that perhaps we are going to make, maybe go into a regional level. But that facility is so impressive, I just want to make sure we are going to continue it at the level it is now. The number of people that are going through to sustain numbers that we talked about in this area so far, it is going to be necessary to do that. I am sure that you are equally impressed with the successes we have had at that Kabul military training center.

With the elections coming up, it is their constitution that causes Karzai to have to drop out, and we know there are many areas of the world where they have a constitutional prohibition that would require people to stop. Yousemeni comes to mind in Uganda. Has there been any talk at all of any kind of an effort on his behalf to be able to remain there? I understand there is not, but I just wanted to get that into the record.

General DUNFORD. Senator, there has not been any public discussion about that. In fact, in several meetings that I have attended, both one-on-one or with the Ambassador, with President Karzai, with Secretary Kerry and Secretary Hagel on each occasion, President Karzai has expressed his intent to stand down in April 2014. I also attended his address to parliament, somewhat equivalent to
our State of the Union, a month ago where he announced to the parliament that he also intended to step down on the April 5, 2014.

Senator INHOFE. I understand that. Is there any talk about who might succeed him?

General DUNFORD. Senator, there is a tremendous amount of political activity ongoing on in Afghanistan right now, but it would be difficult for me to select a favorite at this point.

Senator INHOFE. There is a history that when rogues are on their way out, they clean up their act. Have you seen a more positive Karzai than we have seen in the past?

General DUNFORD. Senator, over the past 2 months, we have worked through very difficult issues, President Karzai and I, and we have come in each case to an effective solution. So the relationship I have had on the ground over the last 2 months has been cooperative.

Senator INHOFE. I understand that when this takes place, when the change takes place, that our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activity is going to be dramatically reduced. I would ask you, first of all, is that really necessary, or do we have the resources to sustain it, and should we do that?

General DUNFORD. Senator, my perspective is I will need a sustained ISR effort post-2014. In fact, there is not a direct relationship between the numbers of forces on the ground and the ISR effort in that we cannot reduce ISR commensurate with the forces. In fact, at the time that we reduce forces, ISR actually becomes as important or more important.

Senator INHOFE. Yes, that was our thinking. We have talked about this in the past because they have had several things in the media that would reduce proportionally. You make a very good point that that actually could be better to increase the presence of ISR capability.

I think you have talked about, the chairman asked the question, and you answered the question about the 352,000 versus the 230,000. I agree with you. Is your feeling agreed with by General Mattis and by your other counterparts?

General DUNFORD. It is, Senator, but I think collectively we also agree that our support for 352,000 for any additional enabling support for the Afghans and our sustainability for the ASF post-2014 ought to be conditional. It ought to be conditional based on Afghan behavior, and so that is part of our calculus. But we believe that our interests will be best served by extending the 352,000 through 2018.

Senator INHOFE. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.

Senator Reed.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, General, for your service. I want to associate myself with the chairman’s remarks about the Boston Marathon. It is particularly poignant because it is not just a Boston tradition. It is a New England tradition, and so many Rhode Islanders participate. Obviously, our sympathy goes out to the victims and also our respect for the first responders and everyone who helped out. I know you have connections, too. Your father is a retired Boston police officer. So thank you for that service, too.
You talked about in your opening comments what success might look at in winning. Can you elaborate on that?

General DUNFORD. I can, Senator. For the last few years, many people have shied away from the using the word “win.” I personally have used that word since arriving in Afghanistan. My predecessor uses that word. I frankly think that when we are talking to 18-, 19-, 20-, 21-year-old soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, we ought to talk in those terms.

From my perspective, winning is achievable, and I described it briefly in my opening remarks. First of all, the transition to an ASF lead in affecting security transition in 2014 is an important component of winning. I think we have a plan that is in place to do that, and I think we can see through 2014 where the Afghans can successfully assume responsibility for security after 2014, given the projection we make about the security environment post-2014.

Another critical component of our winning would be supporting the political process that would lead to inclusive, fair, and free elections in 2014. Again, I think that is very achievable, and of course, remembering why we went there in the first place, an important component of our winning is to ensure that we deny sanctuary to al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and we contribute to regional stability where we have national interests.

Those three components are important. There are subcomponents to include our posturing to force and setting our counterterrorism posture post-2014, continuing to sustain the ASF post-2014. But if we do those three things—effect security transition, affect political transition, and deny al Qaeda sanctuary—I believe at the end of 2014, as we transition missions, as we change authorities, we can look at the families and the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines that have served over the last 11 years, and say we won because we provided then the Afghans the opportunity to seize the decade of opportunity that starts in 2015. It very much at that point is up to the Afghans to seize the opportunity that we provided them.

Senator REED. Thank you, sir. Let us focus on the ANSF and a comment that the chairman made. Often their successes are not as visible as their lapses and you are on the ground. The chairman and I were on the ground in January. We were impressed. Recently we have heard of commando operations in Anbar Province, which is 203rd Corps successfully operating, and Paktika Province.

It seems to me that the first measure is obviously protecting population centers, but then exerting control over the entire country. Can you give us your assessment right now of the capacity and capability, and maybe even some successes that have not been noted by the press?

General DUNFORD. Senator, I can. Like many members of the committee, I have had many visits to Afghanistan over the years. I can remember one visit in particular in 2008 in the Helmand Province. At that time, the ratio of Afghans to coalition partners, more properly, coalition to Afghans, was we had 10 U.S. marines to every 1 Afghan that was in the Helmand Province, as recently as 2008.

The ratio today, of course, across the country is there are 3 Afghans for every 1 member of the coalition that is serving right now, and we have talked about the statistics, the percentage of oper-
ations they conduct, the percentage of population they secure. Most impressive is they are actually conducting independent combined arms operations at the brigade and the corps level. That is with a minimal amount of advise and assist by coalition forces.

I'll be honest with you, Senator. Even as someone who is generally a glass-half-full individual, I could not have foreseen that in 2008. I think the progress that we have made since 2009 is nothing short of profound in terms of where they are on a day-to-day basis. What is really important to note is that when we go to Milestone 2013 this summer, and we talked about the transition, we are going to have inside of formations of 600 or 700 Afghans. We are going to have 16 or 17 members of the coalition in an advise and assist role. We will have thousands of Afghans providing security in each of the provinces—each of the 34 provinces in Afghanistan. We will have some few hundred members of the coalition providing advise and assist at that level, and then by exception, combat support, largely coastal air support, some planning, and some logistics capability.

So when we talk about what the Afghans are doing right now and when we talk about the security environment, although we formally go to transition at Milestone 2013 later this spring and summer, early summer, in fact, on the ground today we are at that point already where the Afghans have taken the lead. They are providing security for the Afghanistan people, and every day they improve a little bit.

Again, I would caveat by saying that this progress we have made from 2009 until today is largely quantity. They are out there. They are in a fight. At the battalion level and the brigade level, they are certainly very effective. But in order to sustain those gains, we still have challenges to ensure that at the institutional level, the logistics that we have to have—planning, programming, budgeting—those kinds of tasks are still the work that remains. But all that addresses the quality of the force, the quantity of the force, and their ability to take the fight to the enemy on a day-to-day basis is real, and it is on the ground today.

Senator REED. As the fighting season, which is critical this year, is underway already because of the weather conditions, the ANSF are planning very aggressive operations going forward this summer?

General DUNFORD. Senator, they have conducted the planning for operations this summer. This has been an Afghan-led process. I attended what they called the campaign synchronization conference about 6 or 7 weeks ago. I attended as a guest with the senior leadership from the coalition. It was led by the National Security Advisor, Minister of Defense, and Minister of Interior. They outlined their plan—Afghan plan—for the summer of 2013. Each one of the corps commanders and brigade commanders stepped up and briefed their plan. Over the course of 8 or 9 hours, they integrated their planning effort for the summer of 2013. So what we are seeing right now is very much an Afghan-led, Afghan-executed security plan for the summer of 2013.

Senator REED. Just a final question. The Afghan local police (ALP) have been a component. In fact, as we visited in January, touted by our military commanders on the ground as a real turning
point because it combines not just the military, but also a village, a local connection, a governmental capacity connection. Can you comment on the future of the ALP?

General Dunford. Senator, that has been a very successful program for the reasons you alluded to. Number one, the individuals in the ALP are closely vetted in conjunction with local leadership. Number two, it is part of the ANSF architecture the ALP work directly for district police.

In terms of clear, hold, and build, and counterinsurgency, it has proven to be the most effective hold force. Frankly, my assessment is less relevant than the assessment of the Taliban. We know from our intelligence that the most feared organization out there right now is ALP because the Taliban realize they cannot make inroads where we have effective local police in place. Again, it is that relationship between local leadership, the local people, and the ALP that has made this so effective.

We learned a lot over the last several years about properly vetting, and we put those proper vetting procedures in place. We have learned a lot over the years about proper chain of command and ensuring that there is oversight both from a logistics and a command and control perspective. They are fully plugged into, again, the Minister of Interior. More importantly, we are implementing what we call layered security in each one of the provinces. The ALP are inextricably linked to the overall concept of layered security in each one of the provinces.

Senator Reed. Thank you very much, sir. Thank you for your service.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome back, General.

First of all, in your written statement, you have “what winning looks like,” and you have four bullet points. One of them says, “an operationally ineffective al Qaeda deprived of its safe haven from which to plan and conduct operations outside the area.” Have you seen any change there?

General Dunford. Over the years I have, Senator.

Senator McCain. They do not have a safe haven anymore in Pakistan?

General Dunford. They have a safe haven inside of Afghanistan. In some areas, we are disrupting them, but they have a sanctuary in Pakistan.

Senator McCain. So have you seen any progress there, the safe haven they have in Pakistan?

General Dunford. The progress I have seen inside of Afghanistan first, Senator, has been that our——

Senator McCain. My question is Pakistan.

General Dunford. They have not been able to conduct effective operations, nor plan effective operations from Pakistan, Senator.

Senator McCain. They do not have a safe haven in Pakistan?

General Dunford. They are still physically there, Senator. They are not able to plan and conduct operations from there at this point.
Senator McCain. That is very interesting news. Today in a press clip it says, "Production of Opium by Afghans is Up Again." According to the Nation's top counter narcotics official, Afghanistan is already the world's largest producer of opium, and last year accounted for 75 percent of the world's opium supply. Is that of concern to you, General?

General Dunford. It is of concern, Senator. It is a destabilizing effect. It breeds a criminal element, and it also supports the Taliban.

Senator McCain. I thought one of our objectives back in 2001 was to eliminate opium as a crop of interest, a crop that would be so very important when now apparently, according to this news report, it might provide 75 to 90 percent of the world's supply.

General Dunford. Senator, in that area, our success has not been satisfactory.

Senator McCain. As we watch the situation unravel in Iraq because of our failure, among other things, but primarily because of our failure to leave a residual force there, we continue to hear mixed reports about the size of the force that would be left behind. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Dempsey, recently testified that a combined U.S.-NATO post-2014 force between 8,000 and 12,000 would be "a reasonable target." General Mattis, former Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) testified before this committee, reflecting the opinion of your predecessor was to keep 13,600 troops in Afghanistan, with several thousand additional NATO forces on top of that. What is your view, General? What is your number?

General Dunford. Senator, I am not going to give you a number. I am going to give you a range. My best military advice at this point is that we leave it as a range of numbers, and here are the reasons. Number one, I think we need to see how the Afghans do in their first summer in the lead, and make an assessment in November 2013. The other variables that need to be considered are how effective political transition is in 2014, and then the strategic landscape within which we expect to be operating post-2014, which addresses the strength of the enemy to include the Taliban, al Qaeda, as well as the cooperation of regional actors.

Senator McCain. So you have no number to tell this committee right now?

General Dunford. Senator, I have not provided my number to the President yet. We are still in the process of crafting our best military advice. But my strongest military advice is not to pin down a number right now because the number is——

Senator McCain. Do you not understand, General, that one of the reasons why we are having so much difficulty in some areas is because the Afghans do not know what our commitment is? They saw what happened in Iraq where we had a commitment. Do you not know that they want to know sooner or later what the American commitment is post-2014? Do you not understand how critical that is to them, because that is what they all tell me?

General Dunford. Senator, I do. I think the most important physical manifestation of our commitment is the signing of the BSA with a range of numbers and the level of commitment that we will provide post-2014. I have spoken to my Afghan counterparts.
I do not believe a specific number is anywhere near as important as an assured commitment in the context of the BSA, and knowing that we will provide the level of advise and assist in the counterterrorism effort necessary for post-2014.

Senator McCain. I cannot tell you how disappointed I am in your testimony, General, because they see what happened in Iraq. They see us withdrawing every place in the world. They see what is happening in Syria. They see a lack of commitment to the United States in Libya, for example, post-Gadhafi, and they know which way the wind is blowing.

For you to tell this committee that we will make that decision later on, they are making accommodation for United States departure right now. That is one of the reasons why we are seeing a lot of the difficulties that we are seeing. I strongly urge you to do what General Mattis said, and that is to give us an estimate of what the—General Mattis was not concerned—did not voice all the concerns that you just—and caveats that you just articulated. We know that the Afghans want to know what the size of our commitment is and what the size of the army that we will support is critical for their planning in the future.

So I strongly urge you to come up with a number to tell this committee and the American people. We have a responsibility as well. For you to say, we are just going to see how things turn out, it will determine the size of the post-2014 force, I believe is a tragic and terrible mistake for which we may pay a very heavy price.

I have no further questions.

General Dunford. Senator, can I comment on that?

Senator McCain. Sure.

General Dunford. Senator, to be clear, I did not say to leave it completely vague. We are today advising and assisting at the battalion level. We are going to lift off to the brigade level here this fall. The number of post-2014 is inextricably linked to the level that we believe we need to provide advise and assist post-2014——

Senator McCain. You are going to have to wait until 2014 to determine that?

General Dunford. We do not, Senator. What I suggested was that this is the Afghan's first summer in the lead. I believe this summer will be the bellwether for Afghan performance and in 2014 and beyond.

Senator McCain. General, Senator Graham and I, we talk to the Afghans all the time. They are not sure of what the U.S. commitment will be, and many of them are making various accommodations for a repeat of what happened in Iraq. That is why we got a specific number from General Mattis, but we somehow cannot get that from you. It is very disappointing.

I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Senator Udall is not here.

Senator Donnelly.

Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, in regards to the BSA, how does that stand, and what are the expectations on that?

General Dunford. Senator, the negotiations for the BSA are ongoing. The next meeting between the Afghans and the United
States is in the month of May. I think we are down to several issues that have to be addressed inside the negotiations.

My sense is that the Afghanistan people as a whole want the BSA, so I am optimistic that we will get it signed at some point. But there are some difficult issues that are being negotiated at this time.

Senator DONNELLY. Is there an understanding on the Afghan side that if we do not conclude a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), it is very difficult to leave our men and women there?

General DUNFORD. Senator, it is absolutely clear to the Afghans that we will not leave our men and women there without appropriate SOFA in the context of the BSA.

Senator DONNELLY. What kind of timing are you looking at to conclude that?

General DUNFORD. Initially, that was identified as being signed not later than November 2013. From my perspective, as soon as we can sign it, it would be helpful. It would address what Senator McCain spoke about a minute ago and something that we are dealing with, which is an environment of uncertainty. I believe that the commitment that would be manifest in that BSA would be helpful in addressing uncertainty.

Senator DONNELLY. How much control does Pakistan have over the Afghan Taliban?

General DUNFORD. I do not believe the Pakistanis have control over the Afghan Taliban. I do think that the Afghan Taliban, particularly the Haqqani network, has sanctuary inside of Pakistan, and they get support from individuals in Pakistan. But I do not believe anybody controls them.

Senator DONNELLY. Do you think the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is working with them?

General DUNFORD. There have been intelligence reports that link the ISI particularly to the Haqqani network.

Senator DONNELLY. What control does the Pakistan army have over the ISI, in your opinion?

General DUNFORD. Senator, I do not know. I do not know. I think they nominally, of course, work for General Kayani. General Kayani is a former Director of the ISI. My sense is that anything the ISI does is known by General Kayani, but I cannot confirm that.

Senator DONNELLY. Where do you see the primary source for the Afghan Taliban of the financial resources they receive, the military resources they receive? Where do you see that coming from?

General DUNFORD. A percentage of it comes from the drug trade, some probably 35 or 40 percent comes from the drug trade. Some money comes from taxes, illicit taxes that they get from Afghan people, and some money comes from external support from outside the region.

Senator DONNELLY. Now, when you look at the places that they go in Pakistan, the frontier areas, do you believe Pakistan, number one, has control over those areas; and, number two, can get control over those areas if they do not?

General DUNFORD. Senator, Pakistan does not have control over those areas right now. They have had over 15,000 killed or wounded in operations in that area over the past decade. They have had
hundreds killed or wounded just in the past several weeks as they have tried to gain control of regions in the Khyber agency against the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, or the Pakistan Taliban. So I think that is a clear indication that they cannot control their border area, and they cannot control the Taliban that are operating freely inside of that border area.

Senator DONNELLY. What do you see as a role for the Taliban, if any, in a future Afghan Government? As we transition out, as discussions are taking place, how do you envision that future Afghan Government? Obviously there are elections coming up, but how are we looking at the transition for the Afghan Government as we move forward?

General DUNFORD. Senator, DOS has the lead now on working on a reconciliation process and trying to bring together the Afghan Government as well as the Taliban. I do not have any insight today that would lead me to believe that the Taliban will be part of the political process in 2014.

At some point, this war will have to be resolved through political means. There will have to be some political accommodations made. But I do not have any indication to believe that that will be in the near term.

Senator DONNELLY. As we look at the Afghan citizens, and obviously there are different parts of the country that react in a different way based on where they are located. But when the different provinces and the provincial leaders are making their decisions, and the people in the towns are making their decisions, looking at post-2014, what do you think are the most important things they are looking for from the current Afghan Government, from the army, to provide them with some certainty that come the next night, the Taliban are not going to come back and cause havoc and turn their world upside down?

General DUNFORD. Senator, in addition to being secure and not having those illicit taxes collected, and not having the kind of oppression associated with the Taliban in the 1990s, one of the major concerns that young Afghans have today is jobs. Sixty percent of the population is 25-years-old or less, and so in addition to security and a stable environment and free from the oppression of the Taliban, they are also very concerned about the economy post-2014 and their ability to seek proper employment.

The good news the chairman has outlined is that we have 8 million that are in school today. The issue is that we raised expectations, and those expectations will have to be met with an economy that will support adequate jobs.

Senator DONNELLY. As we look towards the end of 2014, is there a detailed transition plan with DOS and with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for many of the projects that have been begun, many that are on the books? Where do those projects go as we look forward?

General DUNFORD. Senator, there is a very detailed transition process. We established a headquarters just to oversee transition. We are completely interlinked with USAID and the DOS, as well as other international organizations. Not only do we have a broad transition plan for every task and we have knocked that list down from some thousands to a handful of tasks now that still remain
to be worked out in terms of the detailed transition plan, but every project that is out there right now will have a detailed transition plan as well.

Senator DONNELLY. You mentioned before about security zones in the country, areas that are safer than others. As you look forward to the next year and then to 2014, what are the things that you are most concerned about that could go wrong?

General DUNFORD. We are going to transition the final tranche of areas over to the Afghans here this summer. That final tranche is on the eastern part of the country along the borders. That is where the most virulent strains of the insurgency are. That is where the most difficult challenges from a security perspective are. So as we deal with tranche five, that will be difficult.

My major concern is making sure that by the fall of 2013, we have created the perception in Afghanistan that supports the political process that will begin in earnest. We will have candidates announcing for elections in 2014, here this fall in 2013. We have talked about inclusive, free, and fair elections, so ensuring that we provide security in the areas of what are now some 7,000 polling stations is a primary focus that we have in conjunction with our Afghan counterparts.

Senator DONNELLY. That whole eastern region as you look forward to that, are there metrics that you look at and you go, “we have accomplished this by now, we have accomplished this by now, we are at this point.” Do you have a game-plan of by the end of 2013, here is where we hope to be in those provinces?

General DUNFORD. We do, Senator. We are in the process of what we call a geographical and functional gap analysis. As I alluded to earlier, we want to affect a concept known as layered security in each one of the provinces. Layered security is successful when you have everything from the ALP, to the Afghan uniform police, to the border police, and the ANA working together, coordinated by an operational coordination center and independent with advisors. So our metrics are very much based on the performance of the ANSF and their ability, with limited support, to provide security in each of the 34 provinces in Afghanistan. But as we have been discussing, the most difficult provinces will be those in the east.

Senator DONNELLY. General, thank you for your service.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.

Senator Sessions.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I, too, would like to express my sympathy for those who were lost in Boston. If it were to turn out to be that it was a terrorist al Qaeda connected operation, I think two things are important for us to remember. One is that perfect security is not possible. The United States is a great Nation. It is vulnerable, and we will always be vulnerable to some attacks. But the offensive approach in which we go after those who are organized and dedicated to attacking us is the right approach. It does reduce the amount of attacks that can occur, in my opinion.

General Dunford, I think you are what winning looks like, and your statement is a conclusion to this effort in Afghanistan that I can support. I think it is a reasonable and legitimate definition of success.
I am concerned, along with Senator McCain's comments, that success cannot be just removing our troops. After our men and women have given so much, this Nation has sacrificed treasure, and we have lost some of our finest in this combat. To not finish strong, to not end this effort in a way that gives us maximum opportunity for this kind of success would be a deep and great failure of our country.

Do you feel a commitment to those who have served, who committed themselves to this effort, and want to see a successful conclusion occur?

General Dunford. Senator, I feel an absolute commitment to the men and women who have sacrificed over the past 11 years and to the families of the fallen. That, frankly, is my motivation for performing my duties on a day-to-day basis.

Senator Sessions. You have told us you believe successful conclusion is possible.

General Dunford. Senator, I absolutely believe that the things I outlined in my statement and that I referred to a minute ago in terms of what winning looks like are absolutely achievable.

Senator Sessions. This is an important observation, but I am concerned, and I will follow up a little bit on what Senator McCain—the question he raised. I am looking at an April 2nd Bloomberg article. It goes on in some depth about our group of former U.S. officials who visited there, and they say that President Obama—I will quote the first sentence: "President Obama's failure to spell out his plans in Afghanistan is adding to the risk that some Afghans will start negotiating deals with the Taliban, according to former U.S. officials who visited the country," one of those being former Under Secretary of Defense, Michele Flournoy, who all of us know, was President Obama's appointee there.

Do you think that is a risk that is occurring?

General Dunford. Senator, I absolutely agree that today we are dealing with uncertainty that must be addressed, and that uncertainty has to be addressed by a clear commitment from the United States. What I was attempting to do earlier was allude to the fact that it is about more than a specific number. Our commitment post-2014 and support for the ASF, it is support for the political process, and it is advising and assisting in the counterterrorism effort. So it is an entire package that transcends the importance of any one number.

Senator Sessions. All right. I respect that. This is a quote from former Under Secretary of Defense Michele Flournoy: "In Afghanistan right now, there is a huge amount of anxiety about the scale and nature of U.S. commitment long term." Do you think there are actions that we can take to eliminate that huge amount of anxiety, and would that not help us be successful?

General Dunford. Senator, I absolutely believe there are things we can do, and I absolutely believe that the environment within which the Afghans will assume the lead this year, it is critical that we shape that environment with this idea of commitment.

I mentioned the BSA a minute ago. From my perspective, signing the BSA, of course that takes both the Afghans and the United States to agree on the modalities. But signing that will be a clear manifestation of our commitment post-2014. I do think that contin-
ued emphasis on the resources and the commitment we provide from an advise and assist in a counterterrorism perspective post-2014 is important. It cannot be one day we make a message and then allow it to go some months before we say it again.

I think a constant drumbeat of our commitment post-2014 is necessary to overcome the uncertainty that is very real and very counterproductive inside of Afghanistan right now.

Senator SESSIONS. This article notes that there is a historical paranoia in Afghanistan, the result of the previous abandonment of Afghanistan that allowed the Taliban to take over. Do you think that is an accurate assessment, that there is a sense of uncertainty and paranoia among the people?

General DUNFORD. Senator, I see evidence of that. I mentioned the age of Afghans. Even those Afghans who were not alive in 1992 talk about the beginnings of civil war in the 1990s and a desire not to return back to those days.

Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Flournoy went on to say that spelling out U.S. intentions, including how many troops will stay, would “reduce counterproductive hedging behavior on the part of various parties in Afghanistan and in the broader region.” Do you think that is a valuable observation?

General DUNFORD. I think providing a specific range of numbers right now with a demonstrated commitment at the level that we provide support would be helpful.

Senator SESSIONS. Are you aware that one White House advisor has said no troops may remain in Afghanistan?

General DUNFORD. Senator, I read that in the newspaper.

Senator SESSIONS. Would that create uncertainty in Afghanistan if that were thought to be a reasonable, or a potential policy of the United States?

General DUNFORD. Senator, having no forces and no presence post-2014, in my mind, would undermine our campaign success.

Senator SESSIONS. In this article, I just found it to be a pretty good summary of some of the difficult choices we are wrestling with and you are having to deal with. You are not the commander in chief. Ultimately, President Obama, the Commander in Chief, will decide how many troops are there. You will make a recommendation up through the chain, is that correct?

General DUNFORD. That is correct, Senator.

Senator SESSIONS. One of the things that was troubling to me is our Commander in Chief, President Obama, has been there 5 years, and we have troops on the ground in harm’s way right this minute. This is what Mr. Michael O’Hanlon, the defense analyst at Brookings, said in this article, April 2, one of the most consistent observers of our operations in Afghanistan and Iraq of anybody in America. From the beginning, he has been observing, commenting, and writing about it, and this is the liberal Brookings Institution. He says the absence of a clear message from Obama about the continuing U.S. presence in Afghanistan may be an indication—excuse me. He is not saying this. This is what the writer said: “The absence of a clear message may be an indication that the President has not made up his mind,” said Michael O’Hanlon, defense analyst at Brookings. “Obviously Obama was of two minds about keeping
U.S. troops in Iraq after the war ended there,’ O’Hanlon said. ‘He may have similar ambivalence in Afghanistan.’

So if the President is ambivalent about the future—I will not ask you to respond to that. I would just say if the President is ambivalent about the future, what will happen in Afghanistan? I will observe I think without a doubt it makes your job more difficult and makes success more difficult. We have to get our act together. I think we have to have a clear message.

I appreciate your firm view that success is possible. I think that should be the goal, and the goal should not be to meet some political vision of troop levels unconnected to the reality in Afghanistan.

Thank you for your service. We appreciate it, and all the men and women that serve with you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join in thanking you for your service over many years in the position you have now and many others, and the men and women who perform so courageously under your command. I want to thank you particularly for your very helpful and informative testimony here today, which is encouraging in many respects, but also sobering.

I find it sobering in two respects particularly. First of all, your reference to the continuing threat from IEDs, a problem that has bedeviled and perplexed and stymied our efforts in Afghanistan as well as Iraq over the years. I want to ask in particular whether you view there having been any progress in the Pakistani’s action against the flow of fertilizer and other bombmaking materials from their country into Afghanistan? Apparently the casualties and deaths and from IEDs are still the biggest single source of the threat in Afghanistan to life and limb there, both to our forces and to the ANA and ANSF. So I wonder if you could comment on whether the Pakistanis have been more cooperative and helpful?

General DUNFORD. Senator, I can, and this is another area where we have seen a lot of rhetoric exchanged over the last couple of months. We are now meeting with the Pakistanis specifically on the IED threat. They also recognize the threat of IEDs inside of Pakistan, which I think has heightened their concern.

The Joint IED Defeat Office has had some success in working with manufacturers in Pakistan to perhaps change the composition of the chemicals inside of the fertilizer that would make it less explosive, less likely to be used in IEDs. We have some increased cooperation at the border, but, Senator, I am not satisfied with the output of all those activities yet. We still see a large amount of ammonium nitrate moving back and forth from Pakistan into Afghanistan, and sadly that provides the materials for the preponderance of the IEDs that we are dealing with.

Largely, by the way, at this point, the effects of IEDs are being felt by the ASF even more than our forces today.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. My impression over the years from my first visit, and I have been three times and asked these questions every time I visited, is that there have been more words than action from the Pakistanis, and the continuing rhetoric, as you refer to it, over the years has produced less action than there should be.
General DUNFORD. Senator, I think it is fair to say there is less action than there should be, less action than there needs to be.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Let me then go to the second sobering part of your testimony, which refers to the attrition rates in the ANA, what you refer to as a significant challenge, quoting you. Is this problem solvable? Is the ANA going to be able to recruit and train the forces that it needs to contain and repel and conquer the Taliban?

General DUNFORD. Senator, I believe there is room to make a significant improvement in this attrition issue. I mentioned earlier that we had focused on growing the quantity of force over the last several years. The vetting process that is in place today is much better than the vetting process that we had in place a couple of years ago.

The other thing that gives me room for hope is there is a direct correlation between the attrition in the ANSF and leadership. Where we have seen effective Afghan leaders, we see low levels of attrition. Even though some of the factors are beyond leadership that have to be addressed, there is a direct correlation between leadership and attrition.

The minister of defense has recently directed a study be done of all lieutenant colonels and above in the ASF. They have completed that study and 30 general officers were recommended for relief from their duties; 55 additional general officers we recommended for retirement, that they hit retirement age.

Minister Mohammadi, the minister of defense, decentralized decisionmaking for personnel for captains and below, so we see some decentralization taking place to enhance accountability of leadership. These are the steps that I believe have to be taken. I am mindful of the challenges we have in the U.S. military when I came in as a platoon commander in the 1970s, and we had significant attrition in the U.S. Marine Corps at that time, and we had significant attrition in the U.S. Army. A big part of that was a function of leadership, and as leaders were held accountable and held to standard, we addressed that attrition problem.

I think a similar process can take place and is taking place in the ASF, but it is not something that will happen overnight. This idea of leadership development is a 2-, 3-, 5-year process, but we are moving in the right direction. The thing that I find most encouraging is that Afghan leadership are being held accountable today by the Afghan chain of command. When they fail to perform, they are being removed from their duties. When they fail to perform, they are being dismissed. I think that is a positive sign.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. That effort will really depend on the credibility and confidence and the integrity of the Afghan Government, will it not, in part, to assure that kind of leadership?

General DUNFORD. Over time, effective political transition is absolutely critical to security. They are inextricably linked, Senator.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Let me then go to the question of corruption in the Afghan Government, which affects the United States as well. I am very concerned with the contracts involving taxpayers’ dollars of the United States that may go to companies that, in effect, benefit our enemy. Senator Ayotte and I have helped to spear-
head efforts to improve that contracting law that will enable more effective prosecution of those kinds of corrupt contracts.

Do you have any observations about whether there have been improvements generally in corruption within the Afghan Government, and specifically relating to U.S. contracts for goods and services?

General DUNFORD. Senator, the National Defense Authorization Act in 2012 that allowed us to cease contracting with the enemy was extraordinarily helpful in that we had decisionmaking authority decentralized where if you had an indication that a contractor or a subcontractor was associated with the enemy, we could immediately stop that contract.

I read the recent Inspector General of Afghanistan’s report making some recommendations how to take that legislation further. Conceptually, I absolutely support that. It would expand that beyond the Department of Defense (DOD) so that other U.S. Government agencies can also have the same authorities that we have been given as a result of that very helpful legislation, and also to address a different level of contracts. In the past, there had been over $100,000, and this would bring it to a level below that.

So I do think we have had some improvement in that particular area as a result of that legislation. I think to continue to move in that same direction would be very helpful, Senator.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. One last question, and I have a lot more questions, but my time is about to expire. The chairman asked you, I believe, about the Afghan interpreters that were the subject of a recent piece in the New York Times. I am very concerned about providing the kinds of visas that are necessary often for the survival of these interpreters. I have talked to a number of our marines coming back, and they are concerned as well with the kind of service that these interpreters and others have provided that may endanger them, in fact, very severely so, their lives.

Do you have any observations about what we can do to improve that process?

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think raising the visibility is very important, and I would put a personal face on it. One of the individuals that is waiting for a visa, one of the individuals who has applied to come back to the United States for many years, was the interpreter that was with Sergeant Dakota Meyer the day he received the Congressional Medal of Honor. There is an individual who was part of that fight, fully supportive of the advisors who that day their lives were lost, or in the case of Sergeant Meyer, certainly threatened. There are many interpreters like those who have fought alongside of us, who have supported the mission. As I mentioned before, our success could not have been possible without them.

I think having visibility and recognition of their contribution, and facilitating their coming to our country through the bureaucratic process would be very helpful.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, General. Thank you for your service, and thank you to the men and women who are under your command.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal.

Senator Graham.
Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, General. I thank you and your staff for doing a very good job, an exceptional job, in difficult circumstances.

I would like to revisit an exchange you had with Senator McCain about the al Qaeda presence in the tribal regions. You said al Qaeda is still present on the Pakistan side of the border, but they are—how did you term it, “not as effective?” What did you say?

General DUNFORD. Senator, what I was trying to get at was I believe our operations, and of course, those not being conducted by U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, but it seems to me that there are operations being conducted in Pakistan that are disrupting al Qaeda in Pakistan.

Senator GRAHAM. Would you agree that having SOFs on the Afghan side of the border has been helpful?

General DUNFORD. It has been extraordinarily helpful, and we have had a disrupting effect on al Qaeda as a result of our SOFs in Afghanistan.

Senator GRAHAM. How many SOFs do we have in Afghanistan today?

General DUNFORD. Senator, I can give you that number, but I would prefer not to give it to you here.

Senator GRAHAM. Absolutely. But it is thousands I would suggest.

General DUNFORD. That is correct, Senator.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. One of the reasons that we have contained al Qaeda is that we have other agencies in the fight, but we have a lot of intelligence capability in that part of the country. Is that correct?

General DUNFORD. We do, Senator.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. We have the ability to strike in that part of the country as well. I guess my point is that when you look at a post-2014 force, it would be a very unwise move to take that infrastructure down. Do you agree with that?

General DUNFORD. I do agree with that, Senator.

Senator GRAHAM. So I want my colleagues to understand the infrastructure in place that diminishes al Qaeda’s effectiveness along the tribal regions inside of Pakistan is the direct result of infrastructure that we have in Afghanistan, as well as other agencies’ capabilities.

When you talk about winning, what would losing look like?

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think losing would look like Afghanistan devolving, Afghanistan returning to chaos, Afghanistan being a sanctuary for al Qaeda, the people of Afghanistan once again being subjected to the oppression of the Taliban in the 1990s, a sanctuary from which security and stability in Pakistan can be threatened. All those would be components of losing.

Senator GRAHAM. The ability of al Qaeda to regenerate would be greater under a losing scenario, is that correct?

General DUNFORD. I do not think there is any question about that, Senator.

Senator GRAHAM. If we were seen as losing in Afghanistan, it would be hard to convince the Iranians to change their behavior?

General DUNFORD. I think a credible outcome in Afghanistan certainly will influence those who would do harm.
Senator Graham. Okay. Now, when it comes to future hands to be played or cards to be played, the follow-on force, let us say for a moment there were no troops in 2014. We decided to pull out completely like we did in Iraq. What would your evaluation of the outcome be under that scenario?

General Dunford. I think if we did not have a presence post-2014 and we did not provide security assistance to the ANSF post-2014, it would be a question of time before they would devolve.

Senator Graham. So we would eventually lose all we have gained?

General Dunford. I believe that Afghanistan would be at great risk of instability if we would leave before 2014.

Senator Graham. Do you think that would be true if we had 2,000 troops left?

General Dunford. Senator, we would not be able to accomplish both of our missions. We have two missions. One is to deal with the terrorist threat, the other is to deal with security and stability, and to prevent the Taliban from coming back. It would be difficult to accomplish those missions at a force level of 2,000.

Senator Graham. One of the goals of this BSA is to solidify the relationship between the United States and Afghanistan for at least a 10-year period. Is that correct?

General Dunford. That is correct, Senator.

Senator Graham. People are evaluating what bets to make as I speak in Afghanistan and the region. The sooner that we can make this announcement in a bold way, the better off. Do you agree with that?

General Dunford. I do agree with that, Senator.

Senator Graham. Now, Senator Levin and I have been on the same sheet of music for a very long time about the size of the Afghan army. It is 352,000. As I understand, it costs us about $6.5 billion a year to maintain that force. Does that sound about right?

General Dunford. It is going to be $4.1 billion for the program of record. Increasing the program of record and sustaining past 352,000 is somewhere between $5 and $6 billion. So that is the aggregate cost of the force. Only a small part of that is what is the cost of the program of record to 352,000 through 2018.

Senator Graham. Okay. So what percentage do we pay?

General Dunford. Of the $4.1 billion program of record, our coalition partners pay $1.3 billion, the Afghans have pledged $500 million, and we pay the difference.

Senator Graham. The difference between 352,000 and, say, 230,000, is how much?

General Dunford. In any given year, it is somewhere between $400 and $600 million a year, Senator.

Senator Graham. The difference in capability, would you say, is significant between 352,000 and 230,000?

General Dunford. I think both from a capability and a psychology perspective, it would be significant.

Senator Graham. Do you believe it would be a wise investment for American taxpayers to continue to invest in the ANSF at 352,000?

General Dunford. I do, Senator.
Senator Graham. The more they have, the less they need us, is that correct? The more capable they are?

General Dunford. I absolutely think there is a relationship between our post-2014 presence and the capabilities and capacities of the Afghans.

Senator Graham. Now, when it comes to detention, we have just entered into a new agreement with the Afghan Government. Could you give us a 1-minute overview of that agreement?

General Dunford. Senator, we transferred authority for detention operations to the Afghans in March 2013. What that means is that now there will be a criminal process that affects detainees. We have an agreement to keep the enduring security threats that are in detention at this particular time, and future enduring security threats, and we also are partnered at the facility, the detention facility at Parwan, to ensure that we continue to have humane treatment, and that we have visibility of detainees post the transfer.

Senator Graham. Is it fair to say that we do not have a disposition planned for the third country nationals we hold at Parwan?

General Dunford. We still have custody and control of third country nationals, Senator, and I do not know what the plan is right now post-2014. It is part of a process that is ongoing.

Senator Graham. Some of these are definitely transnational terrorism—terrorists who have been in the fight for quite a while.

General Dunford. They are, Senator.

Senator Graham. Have drones helped the operations in Afghanistan?

General Dunford. Significantly, Senator. That is one of the ways that we put pressure on al Qaeda, as an example, but they are effective across all of our operations.

Senator Graham. Under the Rules of War, if you see an al Qaeda operative out in the open walking down the road and we get a good signature on this person, do we have to wait until they take up arms to fire, or can we shoot when we see them?

General Dunford. If they are designated, we do not have to wait until they take up arms, Senator.

Senator Graham. Which makes common sense. Do you agree with that?

General Dunford. I do, Senator.

Senator Graham. Now, as to the future of Afghanistan, you have Pakistan as a potential threat because of the safe havens. You have al Qaeda, the Taliban, and you have Afghan governance. The Government of Afghanistan in many ways is one of the enemies we are fighting here.

You indicated that the military will get better over time as leadership evolves and people are held more accountable. Do you believe that the corruption we see today in Afghanistan among different ministries and throughout the country can get better over time as these young people we have been mentoring take over in the future?

General Dunford. Senator, I believe it can get better, but the operative part of your phrase is “over time.”

Senator Graham. We are talking about a 10- or 15-year window in that regard.
General Dunford. We are talking a significant period of time. I think we are talking about this population now that is 25 years or less assuming positions of increased responsibility in the future.

Senator Graham. Do you believe it is a good investment on our part to stay partnered with these young people?

General Dunford. I think it is a critical investment, Senator.

Senator Graham. Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.

Senator King.

Senator King. General, thank you very much. It seems to me that what we are facing in Afghanistan, and particularly what the Afghanistan Government faces after 2014, amounts to a guerilla war. The doctrine of guerilla war, as I remember Mao Tse-Tung, was that the guerilla has to swim in the sea of the people or something to that effect.

How do the people of Afghanistan feel about this conflict? Can the Taliban and al Qaeda find a warm, hospitable sea to swim in, or are the people loyal to the government and what we have tried to accomplish?

General Dunford. Senator, there is no question in my mind that the Afghan people do not want to return to the oppression of the Taliban that was there in the 1990s. We have survey after survey that indicates that the Taliban are increasingly unpopular amongst the Afghan people. That has not yet made a direct correlation to support for the Afghan Government. So while they are absolutely opposed to the Taliban returning to power and they are absolutely opposed to what the Taliban stands for, they do not yet have the full confidence in the Government of Afghanistan to provide it full support.

Senator King. That might apply here. The people of America are not too crazy about Congress either. It is a different subject.

You were involved in Iraq, is that correct?

General Dunford. That is correct, Senator.

Senator King. What lessons do you take from Iraq, and particularly from the unwinding of our involvement in Iraq, that can be applied to this circumstance that we are now facing, ending our involvement in Afghanistan?

General Dunford. Senator, I think one of the most important lessons from Iraq is that we waited too late to work through the details of a BSA. In any event, we were unable to conclude the successful BSA.

We have started that process much earlier. That is why I have highlighted the BSA this morning. I think we have had a discussion about it. I think the key lesson learned is to ensure that we have a smooth transition post-2014, that we provide the Afghan people with our sense of commitment post-2014. We should view 2014 today, December 2014, as nothing more than a change in the mandate, in a change in the authorities, but a continuity of commitment post-2014. If we are able to do that, I think we will have internalized the most important lesson from our Iraq experience.

Senator King. So you think that essentially 2014 should be a seamless transition to a competent and sufficient Afghan force to essentially take over what we have been doing.
General DUNFORD. I do, Senator. What January 2015 ought to look like is we have completed political transition. We have completed security transition. But we are still there decisively in an advise and assist in a counterterrorism role under different authorities and now at the exact request of the Afghan people in the context of a BSA.

What will be different is we will not be under a United Nations (U.N.) mandate. We will not be under the law of armed conflict. We will not be under the military technical agreement. But we will still be there and be able to provide the requisite support both politically and from a security perspective.

Senator KING. You mentioned that the Afghan force is anticipated to be somewhere around 350,000. What are the estimates of the size of the Taliban or al Qaeda or the aggregate enemy group, if you will?

General DUNFORD. Senator, that is a question that frankly we ask all the time, and we do not know. There are some estimates that talk about 20,000 to 30,000 Taliban. But I think because you have such various levels of Taliban, those that are actually ideologically committed, Taliban senior leadership in Quetta is certainly different than day-to-day people who might fight on the ground that it is very difficult to capture a number when you talk about the Taliban.

Senator KING. I would suggest, therefore, given the small number, that the view of the people at large, as we discussed at the beginning, is going to be critical as to whether or not they can really gain any power in the situation. They are going to have to have the support of the public, would you not agree?

General DUNFORD. Senator, that is a question that frankly we ask all the time, and we do not know. There are some estimates that talk about 20,000 to 30,000 Taliban. But I think because you have such various levels of Taliban, those that are actually ideologically committed, Taliban senior leadership in Quetta is certainly different than day-to-day people who might fight on the ground that it is very difficult to capture a number when you talk about the Taliban.

Senator KING. I would suggest, therefore, given the small number, that the view of the people at large, as we discussed at the beginning, is going to be critical as to whether or not they can really gain any power in the situation. They are going to have to have the support of the public, would you not agree?

General DUNFORD. Senator, what gives me optimism and the reason why I am optimistic about the campaign is it is all about the ASF’s ability to provide security to the population, and every day we are improving in that particular area. That reduces the freedom of movement. That reduces the ability for the Taliban to influence the population.

I honestly believe—there used to be an expression that the Taliban have the time and we have the watches. I do not believe that is any longer the case. I think the Taliban are going to wake up at some point and they are going to realize this is not their father’s ANSF, and they are going to be unable to influence the population in the way that they have done in the past.

Senator KING. Let me change the subject for a minute. What is the situation on green on blue attacks? Has that declined? Do you feel that is under control? Does that indicate significant infiltration of the ASF?

General DUNFORD. Senator, that is one of the most insidious risks to the force, and in 2012, we had a significant challenge with insider attacks. As a result, we significantly improved our training. We added counterintelligence capability both in the coalition as well as inside the Afghan forces. We revised our tactics, techniques, and procedures, and we have a much more routine and effective dialogue with our Afghan partners to mitigate the risk of the insider attacks.

I will not for a second be complacent. Indications are that we have made some progress just based on numbers. We have had 3
in 2013; during that same period of time, we had 20 last year in 2012. But of the issues that keep me awake at night and the ones that I want to stay focused on, the insider threat is absolutely one of those.

It erodes trust between our coalition and our Afghan partners, and, more importantly, it erodes the will of the American people. I recognize that.

Senator KING. What is your analysis of the leadership of the Afghan force? That is important. The quality and character of the leadership is a crucial element to any enterprise success. You know these people, I presume, personally. Do you have confidence that these are strong and effective leaders?

General DUNFORD. Senator, I would characterize the Afghan leadership as improving. There are a number of leaders, and we are fortunate right now that both the Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior have fallen into this category. There are a number of leaders who have vision, that have commitment, that have strong leadership, and are taking appropriate action.

It is going to take time before we have the depth of leadership that we need to have across the forces, the consistency, the continuity of leadership. Where we see good leadership we see good units. Where we see deficient leadership, we have some challenges. That is one of our areas, again, as we focus on quality over the next couple of years, leadership development is really important, not only officers, but noncommissioned officers (NCO).

As an example, we are currently short 10,000 NCOs in the Army and about 6,000 in the police. Addressing that deficiency and developing those leaders is a key part of what we need to do over the next couple of years to make sure that our progress is sustained.

Senator KING. Are we going to maintain after 2014 any role at all in training—in leadership and that kind of professional development, if you will?

General DUNFORD. Absolutely, Senator. That really is probably the primary focus of our post-2014 contribution will be advising and assisting in the institutions where we grow NCOs, where we grow officers, and where we develop integrated combined arms capability. Among the more important tasks we have post-2014 is leadership development. That is the same for our coalition partners who will also contribute.

Senator KING. General, thank you very much for your service, and particularly for your service in this very difficult and important period.

General DUNFORD. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator King.

Senator Lee.

Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General, for joining us and for the service you provide to our country.

If the United States and Afghanistan reach an agreement to keep a U.S. troop presence in that country beyond 2014, what are some of the tangible goals that the United States would be looking for to achieve in that country? Is there a certain security metric, a certain measurable level of security we are hoping to reach? In other words, going along with that, what would it take for you to
be comfortable in saying that we would no longer at some point need a troop presence in Afghanistan?

General DUNFORD. Senator, the focus post-2014 is all about growing capabilities and capacities of the Afghans. Some of the remaining challenges, they started at the ministerial level. So Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior, they cannot manage a budget right now. As an example, last year the minister of defense only executed a very small percentage of the budget they actually had. It was not due to corruption, it was due to bureaucratic inefficiency. So growing the capabilities and capacities of the ministry are very important to be able to sustain our efforts.

By the same token, there are logistics issues, so having a logistics infrastructure in place, taking a sure distribution of supplies and parts all the way down to the lowest tactical level is an area that needs to continue to be worked on. I spoke about a minute ago, leadership development is also important.

So when I start to look at what we need to do past 2014, to be clear, our effort will not be to provide security inside of Afghanistan. Our effort will be to advise the ASF so that what we have done over the past several years is actually sustainable, and we will be able to measure that sustainability over time and gradually reduce our presence.

Senator LEE. You have the metrics in place to do that?

General DUNFORD. We do have the metrics in place, Senator, that both address where we have to be for proficiency at the ministerial level, as well as we have 14 functional areas that we evaluate in our tactical units that allow us to determine where they are and what support they may need to improve to take it to the next level.

Senator LEE. DOD is currently spending about $10 billion more conducting the war effort in Afghanistan this year than was estimated would be necessary. From what we understand, in order to make up for this underestimation, DOD will, of course, have to pull from other funds from its base budget, which is, of course, difficult because of the cuts we are facing as a result of sequestration and the other long-term spending limits imposed by the Budget Control Act of 2011.

I understand the problems with trying to budget and plan for a war a year in advance and how unforeseen costs can arise. At the same time, a $10 billion miscalculation is a little bit alarming, especially just given all the other pressures that we face in DOD.

So, General, can you explain to us how that underestimation occurred?

General DUNFORD. Senator, I am not aware that we inside of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan underestimated by $10 billion our requirements for this year. I can assure you that we have gone back and looked at every dollar that we are spending to make sure we are spending it to good effect. We have significantly reduced, in fact, particularly in the area of military construction, significantly reduced the money that we are spending in Afghanistan.

I will go back and take a look at where that projection came from and why we are in the position we are in right now. But that is not something I was aware of.
Senator LEE. Okay, we can follow up with that with you after this hearing. So let me talk about Pakistan for a minute because it is impossible to cover the gamut of issues that we face in Afghanistan without also discussing the influence of Pakistan and Pakistan's behavior.

We have spent billions of dollars in Pakistan since September 11th, 2001, for security and for economic assistance. But Pakistan, some would say, can at times seem to be more of an obstacle than a partner in the progress of the region, from closing the borders to NATO supplies, to the ties of the ISI to extremist groups, to the lack of cooperation in the hunt for Osama bin Laden, and to the imprisonment of Dr. Afridi for his assistance to the United States.

What is your personal assessment, General, of the relationship between the United States and Pakistan, and the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan moving forward?

General DUNFORD. Senator, in the first place, I think we would agree that we have vital national interests in Pakistan in the sense that the nexus between extremism and nuclear weapons would be catastrophic.

I personally have watched how we have dealt with Pakistan over the years. In the 1990s, we decided to isolate Pakistan as a result of the Pressler amendment, and then we stopped conducting military-to-military engagements. I now see the adverse effect of that policy that took place for over a decade because my generation of leaders does not have personal relationships with our Pakistani counterparts to work through some of these issues.

So I think there has to be balance. I think it is in our interest to have a strategic partnership with Pakistan, and we need to manage the relationship with the end in sight, which is that professional and deep strategic partnership over time, which of course today is something that needs work.

With regard to Afghanistan and Pakistan, my objective before transition in 2014 is to ensure that we have a constructive military-to-military relationship, between Afghanistan and Pakistan. It will absolutely be at the tactical level, but I think it can be a foundation for a deeper relationship over time. The relationship will take much effort.

I am optimistic because, as I mentioned earlier, General Kayani and his leaders, as well as Afghan leaders, will meet with me later this month. We do have a number of exchanges going on right now.

Senator LEE. So looking forward then to a post-2014 environment, do you believe these multibillion payments to Pakistan ought to continue regardless of whether, or to what extent, there is a continued American presence or a continued NATO troop presence in Afghanistan?

General DUNFORD. Senator, I believe we need to maintain a very constructive, effective relationship with Pakistan. We need to recognize the very real threat that Pakistan has inside of its own borders. From my perspective, we ought to do whatever it takes to ensure our vital national interests in that particular part of the world are protected.

Senator LEE. Okay. One of the things that I am always looking to in that kind of aid is whether or not it does serve the military purpose. You are saying we need to do whatever it takes to con-
continue that relationship. Are you saying that payments of that size and of that nature are what is going to be required in the long run?

General DUNFORD. Senator, I believe it is in our best interest to continue to develop the Pakistani army and to ensure that they can effectively deal with security within their borders. I would not tell you that every single program that we have in place right now is one we ought to sustain in the future. That is not something I pay particular attention to right now in my current duties, but I am absolutely adamant that we ought to maintain a close relationship with Pakistan and help them to develop the resources to be able to provide security.

Senator LEE. Your fear would be that if we were to cut all of that off abruptly, that we could end up in the same kind of dynamic that you are describing where the military-to-military relationships do not exist.

General DUNFORD. Senator, I believe that Pakistan has a very real threat inside their borders right now, and I do not believe that they can deal with that particular threat without external support.

Senator LEE. Okay. Thank you, General.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lee.

Senator Udall.

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, General. Thank you, of course, for being here and for your incredible sacrifice and service to our country.

Let me move right to the Afghan general elections in 2014. When we met, we agreed that it would be difficult to overstate the importance of those elections. In your assessment, what needs to happen between now and April 2014 to ensure that the elections are not only free and fair, but recognized to be free and fair by the Afghan public?

General DUNFORD. Senator, the first precondition for successful elections is obviously the security environment. So as I mentioned earlier, summer of 2013, from my perspective, is very important. We need to emerge from the summer of 2013 with security in those areas, particularly those areas that are important to the elections. We need to emerge from the summer of 2013 with the perception of security so that people want to participate in the elections.

I think one of the things that will determine whether they are viewed as free and fair is if they are inclusive. I imagine there are 7,000 polling stations, and we need to make sure that there is security such that people have access to those polling stations in April. So from a security perspective, that is very important.

The Minister of Interior has the lead on security. We are decisively engaged, and my intent is to provide whatever support the ANSF need us to provide to make sure the elections are successful in 2014.

Senator Udall. Let me move to the ALP. We talked about their important role, and you talked about how the Taliban sees that program. If my memory is right, you said that the ALP is one of the most significant issues that the Taliban will have to address in order to be successful. Do you still hold that view? To what extent does the ALP need to be funded and manned at high levels? Is the ALP a sustainable initiative as we draw down our coalition troops?
General DUNFORD. Senator, I absolutely continue to believe that the ALP is critical to our success. It is an important component in that layered security concept I spoke to earlier. For all the reasons I spoke about, I have confidence in their ability.

We have about 21,000 what they call guardians or member of the ALP today. There is planned growth for 30,000. The Minister of Interior has requested to grow that figure to 45,000. What I have asked my staff to do is review that in June or July this year to ensure that we do not look at the ALP other than in the full context of ASF and the effect that we are trying to achieve post-2014.

But I am a big believer in the ALP initiative. I believe it is one of the critical components of security post-2014. I believe it is sustainable, and it has Afghan ownership right now. In many cases, it is the Afghans who are identifying the areas where they want ALP to be established.

Senator UDALL. Yes, I do not think you could overstate or I could overstate the utility of local ownership in the sense that these police forces work for us, not for the coalition, not for anybody else, but for the local communities.

Let me move to the heavy responsibility you have, and that is that you are simultaneously preparing for this year’s fighting season and you are planning for troop reductions over the next 20 months. In your opening statement, you mentioned a range of capabilities and units that the ASF currently lack.

In that light, would you recommend that aviation assets, DOD support, and other capabilities be provided by our military after 2014? On a related note, will the U.S. Government civilian agencies be able to sustain their current levels of personnel and assistance without having a robust NATO military network in place?

General DUNFORD. Senator, there are certain capability gaps, and you highlighted the most important ones, and I would say the most important one would be close air support (CAS). So I would recommend where appropriate that we would provide CAS to the Afghans post-2014. We have seen several times recently where the absence of that kind of CAS created difficulties for Afghan forces, and we will not have addressed the capabilities of the Afghanistan air forces until 2015 or 2016. That is the program of record as it currently exists. So there will be a gap between 2014 in the full operational capability of the Afghan air force. When that gap exists, where it is important to sustain our success, I would recommend that we provide that support.

With regard to the civilian agencies, earlier I mentioned that I believe we should be in the four corners of Afghanistan post-2014. One of the reasons why I believe that is not only to provide the right level of advise and assist to our Afghan counterparts, but also to support the U.S. Government interagency. Ambassador Cunningham in Kabul and I have complete integration in terms of planning for post-2014. I understand what his requirements are from an embassy perspective, and they are part of our planning for post-2014.

Senator UDALL. I will not ask you to answer this question, but I think it is incumbent on all of us to think about the president’s, as in President Karzai’s, behaviors and comments at times about air support, about our SOFs and the like. We should consider what
his reaction will be to the continuation of CAS moving forward. I just make that comment.

Let me turn to sequestration, if I might. What are your concerns? To what extent will sequestration have a negative effect on the mission and the readiness of the troops that will rotate into that theater between now and 2014, and perhaps beyond?

General DUNFORD. Senator, you hit it exactly right. From my perspective, I have been told that sequestration will not affect the resources that we have available to our men and women on the ground inside of Afghanistan, and I believe that. My greatest concerns is that it will impact the readiness of those units who are at home station preparing to deploy to Afghanistan.

I think one of the great success stories over the last 10 years has been the quality training and equipping that we provided to our young men and women in uniform. Training today, there is no comparison to what training was earlier in my career. That is as a result of the support of Congress. That is as a result of leadership learning lessons over the last 10 years, and I think it is very important that we sustain that same high level of training in the coming years because we will still have people in harm’s way.

Senator UDALL. Let me move back to the Taliban and the threats that they present, but also the opportunity for the Afghan Government and for us. I think we share a concern that the Taliban could become viewed by the public as the best arbitrator in dispute resolutions. If the national government or even provincial officials are viewed as corrupt, then Afghans could be tempted to turn to the Taliban and their courts to resolve their problems. Then if you add into that the sense that the Afghan Government is a predatory actor that takes private land unfairly or without compensation, that provides the Taliban power and influence potentially.

Is it reasonable to expect that these types of practices which are counterproductive can be halted?

General DUNFORD. Senator, I believe it is not so much halting them as providing an alternative which would cause them to be irrelevant. I do believe that dispute resolution is a core function of subnational governance in Afghanistan, and it is one of the critical areas. The rule of law in general is one of the critical areas that the Afghans have to improve in order for our success to be sustainable in the future. There is no question about it.

Senator UDALL. General, again, thank you for your service. Thanks for making the long trip here from theater. I look forward to working with you as we move forward at this crucial point in time in our involvement in Afghanistan.

General DUNFORD. Thank you, Senator.

Senator UDALL. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Udall.

Senator Blunt.

Senator BLUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Your mic.

Senator BLUNT. Almost turned it on. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, General, for spending time with us today.

I want to follow up first on Senator Graham’s comments on the detention of somebody we capture, a third country national. My im-
pression is that there is really no plan as to what to do with them in the future.

General DUNFORD. Senator, we do not have a decision on what to do with them in the future. In fact, next week we have a team led by the Office of Secretary of Defense to come over and to work through this issue. This issue is not a new issue. It has been worked.

Senator BLUNT. Right.

General DUNFORD. I just do not have the decision about the disposition of those detainees as we approach 2014.

Senator BLUNT. What would be the risk of not agreeing to a plan for those detainees?

General DUNFORD. Senator, these are people that absolutely have to be kept behind bars, so we need a plan to detain these individuals, in most cases, on an enduring basis.

Senator BLUNT. Is it our view that the Afghans would not be the best people to be in charge of these detainees?

General DUNFORD. Senator, I do not know if that is a viable alternative right now. First of all, I do not know what the Afghan desire would be for those third country nationals or the legal framework within which the Afghans would be able to keep them.

The Afghans have moved to an evidence-based process now for detention operations. We, of course, use the Law of Armed Conflict framework. I am not sure that the Afghan process would allow us to keep those third country nationals detained beyond 2014. That is something we would have to take a very close look at.

Senator BLUNT. Okay, thank you. On the force, you mentioned about 350,000 Afghan forces. This would not be the police forces, but the other forces?

General DUNFORD. No, Senator, that is the aggregate of both the police and the army, less the ALP. So the 352,000 would be all the Afghan uniformed police, all the Afghan army, the border police, and then over and above that 352,000 right now is the ALP, which are approved for a level of 30,000.

Senator BLUNT. How big a problem does attrition continue to be?

General DUNFORD. Attrition in the Afghan army is a significant challenge. We have nearly 30 percent attrition. In the police, it is much better. It is at or above the goal of 15 to 16 percent. The local police is very low and so the army is the area where attrition is of greatest concern.

Senator BLUNT. Is it highest as you get closer to fighting season?

General DUNFORD. Senator, we have not seen a direct correlation between the fighting season and the attrition. We have seen a direct correlation between leadership and attrition.

Senator BLUNT. What size force as you contemplate us leaving—I guess I want two questions here. First, what size force do we have to leave to get people and equipment out successfully? Then second, what size force should we hope that the Afghans can maintain and sustain?

General DUNFORD. Senator, with regard to our equipment, there are really three aspects of closing down in Afghanistan. One is the retrograde of equipment that would come back here to the United States to reset our Services. The others are base closure and material reduction.
The equipment that is needed to reset our forces, we will get that equipment out by the end of 2014. We still in all likelihood will be closing out bases and reducing materials, that is, returning the ground to the way we found it, post-2014, and so we will need some element to be able to do that. Currently, the size of that element is 2,500 soldiers that help us with that. I expect we will need some similar organization post-2014. That is called from CENTCOM. It is a logistics unit that actually works in CENTCOM.

With regard to the Afghans, I think we now are looking at that 352,000 force being sustained through 2018 as being the best recommendation.

Senator BLUNT. What level of help will the Afghans need from outside to sustain a force that big?

General DUNFORD. In accordance with the Chicago Conference, Senator, through 2018, the vast majority of the money necessary to sustain that force is going to come from the United States and international partners.

Senator BLUNT. The vast majority of that money will come from outside?

General DUNFORD. Absolutely, of about $5 billion to sustain that force, the Afghans will pay approximately $500 million. So the preponderance of the resources necessary to sustain Afghan forces post-2014 would come from the international community and the United States.

Senator BLUNT. On removing our people from Afghanistan, at what point do you leave—at what point do the people that are there face real danger, and how many people do we need to leave there to safely get everything—the other people out?

General DUNFORD. Senator, there are a couple of things. One is that we will make that decision based on the security environment, based on the capabilities and capacities of the Afghans, who will provide the security environment within which we draw down. But as General Dempsey says, we are never going to ask 10 soldiers to do more than 10 soldiers’ worth of work. We will very much shrink the perimeter, figuratively speaking, in Afghanistan in a way that keeps protection first and foremost.

Senator BLUNT. One other question on facilities that we have there. You mentioned returning the situation back to the way it was before the facility was built. Do we have any kind of process we go through with the Afghans to decide if they would like things left there that otherwise are just of no value?

General DUNFORD. We do, Senator. We have a very detailed plan for Afghan infrastructure to sustain Afghan forces post-2014. Some of that infrastructure is being transitioned from coalition forces to Afghans, but all the infrastructure that is over and above their ability to sustain over time. We have a very detailed plan that links the infrastructure that the Afghans will maintain post-2014 with the resources we project will be available to sustain that infrastructure. We want to make sure there is a balance between the projected resources for sustainment and the numbers of facilities that the Afghans keep. So those facilities that cannot be sustained post-2014 are the ones I talked about that we would reduce back to the way we found it.
Senator BLUNT. Do we go beyond just the military use of those facilities to hospital, school, some other use? Do we have a checklist like that or not?

General DUNFORD. We do, Senator. In fact, that is led by the Afghan Government, the Minister of Finance. So if local governments want to have infrastructure, they submit a request up to the Minister of Finance. The Afghan Government is responsible for determining the sustainability of that, and then the Minister of Finance would come to us with a request for a specific piece of infrastructure to be maintained.

Senator BLUNT. Thank you, General. You have had a tough assignment, and it looks like to me it is not going to get a lot easier. I wish you well with it, you and those people you work with. Thank you for what you do for us.

Chairman LEVIN. Thanks, Senator.

Senator KAINE. Good morning, General Dunford. Thank you for appearing before us today. I want to ask about a couple of items starting with budgetary questions, and there have been a number already about sequester. I did a tour of Langley Air Force Base in Virginia a couple of weeks back, and we talked about this issue of the warfighter being protected in sequester. But I was surprised to find that many of the military personnel that maintain the F–22s are not defined as warfighters. So some of the sequester and budgetary issues are affecting their ability to maintain aircraft, and that is one of the factors that then leads to the step down of readiness of some of the F–22 units.

As you are—with 60,000 folks under your command in Afghanistan, while the warfighters may be protected, how does the sequester and some of the other budgetary challenges impinge upon your mission? In particular, I think about things about the retrograding of equipment. Is that something that is viewed as a core warfighting mission, or is that a part of the mission that is subject to some of these budgetary reductions?

General DUNFORD. Senator, all the functions that we are performing inside of Afghanistan to include retrograde are considered warfighting functions. So I have been assured by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that there will not be an adverse impact in those areas. But I think you highlighted a really important point, and that is units that are at home station, and I know from my previous assignment as the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, it is very difficult to say we will properly resource those units that are next to deploy and not support those who are not next to deploy. It is not that clean.

So as we start to see degradation of readiness at home station, there is absolutely no doubt that that degradation of readiness in home station will affect both units that are next to deploy as well as those not slated currently for deployment.

Senator KAINE. On the retrograding question, and there may have been a question asked about this before I came over from the Senate floor. But just talk about the current status of the relationship with Pakistan as it affects retrograding of equipment out of Afghanistan.
General DUNFORD. Senator, we just completed about 2 months of proofs of principle to move equipment from Afghanistan into Pakistan and through the Port of Karachi, as well as to move the backlogged equipment that has been there for almost a year from Pakistan into Afghanistan. In fact, we are largely clear of the backlog that was in Pakistan, moving it into Afghanistan.

We also have successfully completed those proofs of principle, and so we now will be looking over the next 45 to 60 days to actually maximize the movement across the ground lines of communication into Pakistan.

So at this point, it is moving in the right direction after a very long period of time where those ground lines of communication were not available. We are in a good place.

Senator Kaine. General, you had a good colloquy with Senator Lee that I was watching about Pakistan, about the importance of the relationship. I think many members of the committee and many Senators look at certain actions that the Pakistani Government with a lot of concern, the imprisonment of Dr. Afridi and others. At the same time, we also understand that Pakistan has lost as many people in the fight against terrorism, and al Qaeda, and the Taliban, and other elements as any of our allies.

You alluded to, but did not go too deeply into, the question of the nuclear arsenal in Pakistan. From a security standpoint, is not one of the main issues that the United States needs to worry about is an unstable Pakistan that could potentially jeopardize the security of the nuclear arsenal there. That is one of the reasons that we need to be so diligent in not distancing ourselves from Pakistan, but continuing to work to the greatest degree we can as partners for the ultimate security of that nuclear arsenal.

General DUNFORD. Senator, I believe we have common cause with the Pakistanis in that regard. I think they increasingly recognize the threat of extremism. We certainly have been dealing with that for some years. So, to the extent that I think we have at least an effective relationship in dealing with that extremist threat over the next couple of years, I think Pakistan's increased appreciation of the threat will be helpful in that regard.

Senator Kaine. General, you talked with Senator Graham a little bit about drones and the use of drones, and I would like to expand and go deeper into that question. There is a strong military rationale, and we have been able to use drones in a way that have provided us significant advantage in the military mission. Yet we also, as a body, as a military, as a Congress, weigh the effect of the drone program on the civilian populations in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Talk to us a little bit about the current state of affairs in Afghanistan in terms of how our drone program affects the civilian population's acceptance of our mission and whether it leads to additional violence against our troops.

General DUNFORD. Senator, we employ unmanned vehicles in Afghanistan. We have the same standard for proportionality and discrimination with those as we do with manned vehicles. So mitigation of civilian casualties is no different whether there is a pilot in the cockpit or not.
Before we would employ force in Afghanistan, we ensure that we have positive identification of target. We identify individuals with hostile intent, and we do a very clear assessment of the collateral damage that might be associated with a particular strike.

I am actually quite proud of our forces over the last 18 months in terms of all that we have done to mitigate the risk of civilian casualties. But I do not think there is a direct relationship between a method, a tool—which is what an unmanned vehicle is—and collateral damage or civilian casualties. I think it is the employment of that tool which is most important, and I think we are employing those tools in a way that mitigates the risk of civilian casualties.

Senator KAINE. General, even beyond civilian casualties, because I have a high degree of confidence that you are deploying the tool in that way to minimize collateral damage and civilian casualties. How about the civilian perception, the attitudes that the drone program brings about? Even if we are doing it perfectly, if it creates a great deal of controversy within the civilian community, that can make our challenge more difficult down the road. What is your perception of the Afghan civilian population’s understanding of the program as we implement it?

General DUNFORD. Inside of Afghanistan, Senator, I have not detected any concern by the average civilians over those vehicles. I think that is in large part because of the way we employ them. I would tell you that the Taliban are very concerned about those vehicles, and they talk about them all the time.

Senator KAINE. Let me move to another issue about the presidential elections. I think our presence post-2014 is designed to address two conflicting issues: first, that we are not an occupying force; but second, we are not going to abandon Afghanistan. Trying to meet both of those goals is challenging.

What do you think our recent announcements and policy in this country about post-2014 troop levels, what effect are they likely to have on the outcome of the 2014 presidential elections?

General DUNFORD. Senator, you are exactly right. The message of occupier and abandonment, while seemingly inconsistent, exists in the same space. I am optimistic that we can address this as we set the condition for the elections in 2014 in a couple of ways. One is the message of us as an occupier is actually not going to resonate as the Afghans assume the lead in 2013. What the Afghan people will see on a day-to-day basis is ASF providing security. So the message that the Taliban have had of us an occupier, or the Afghans being a tool of occupiers, I do not believe will resonate in 2013 as the Afghans take the lead.

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With regard to the message of abandonment, the BSA is a commitment post-2014 is a component. But what really is necessary is that the United States and the international community convey a credible, consistent, and comprehensive message of commitment post-2014. Together with that commitment and the Afghans in the lead, I think both the message of us an occupier and the message of us abandoning the Afghan people gets undermined. I think what you are alluding to is really important in that it is the information environment that will in large part determine the success of the elections in 2014. The messaging that we are talking about here is very important. A strong narrative of commitment
and a strong narrative of Afghans' credible, to the fore, in the lead for providing security, I believe is a critical component to success of the elections in 2014.

Senator Kaine. General Dunford, thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Kaine.

Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Dunford, thank you very much for your service and for taking on this very challenging job at such a critical time.

I want to go back to further discussion about the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan because I agree with your view of it. That is critical. Whatever we can do to help smooth that relationship and really foster it is very important.

Now, President Karzai has repeatedly accused Islamabad of trying to undermine the peace process between Afghanistan and the Taliban. Does Karzai's accusation have any substance to it? Can you update us on whether or not there is actually a reconciliation process underway?

General Dunford. Senator, I do not know if there is any credibility to President Karzai's statement about Pakistan undermining the peace process with the Taliban. The DOS, of course, is working very hard. The President has identified political reconciliation as one of his priorities; that is, President Obama. So, I know the DOS is working very hard to do that.

There is an office being opened in Doha. I think we are waiting now for the Taliban to meet their end of the bargain in terms of moving the process ahead. But that is not a process that I am deeply engaged in on a routine basis. From my perspective, my job is to set the conditions that would facilitate reconciliation; that is, the conditions on the ground.

But with regard to Afghanistan and Pakistan and President Karzai's comments, I think they merely highlight the very deep mistrust that currently exists and has historically existed between Pakistan and Afghanistan. I think what we have to do is, in our efforts to bring, especially in a military-to-military perspective, is if we can bring that relationship together in a constructive way and establish a foundation of trust, I think just like our Nation when we do military-to-military engagements, that can be the foundation of something deeper, some strategic partnership that would obviously take years to develop.

But I believe that that military-to-military bilateral relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan needs to be one of our objectives. It is—and I did not mention it earlier; I should have—one of the components I believe is critical to winning is affecting a constructive bilateral relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan so that tactical issues along the border area do not actually have an adverse strategic impact.

Senator Shaheen. One of the areas of tension, as you point out, has been that border. When I was there in 2011, we saw that very directly. One of the things that you talk about in your testimony is the effort to improve that cross border coordination with the tripartite border standard operating procedure, I think you called it.

Can you talk about whether that has actually improved as the result of that, and what the potential is to keep that going post-
2014 when obviously those border issues will continue because there is a basic disagreement about where the border—who controls what along the border.

General DUNFORD. Senator, I can. We did sign that agreement back in the fall, and as a result now, we have an exchange of information. In the event of cross border firing and so forth, that is very helpful.

I can give you a recent example. About 3 weeks ago, the Pakistanis began to do some construction on a border post that is in the border region. So it is disputed as to where exactly that border post is, whether it is in Afghan territory or Pakistani territory.

Initially, the Pakistanis brought forces up to the border point because of tensions. The Afghans indicated that they were not going to stand for that border post being approved, and their forces were given the authority to use force in the event that was necessary.

We used the tripartite process called border flags process to bring together senior Afghan leadership, senior Pakistan leadership, and coalition forces. We did that as recently as yesterday, again with the border flags meeting, that attempts to de-escalate the situation.

In this particular case, the issue is still out there. It is not permanently resolved, but over the last 3 weeks we have been able to de-escalate and manage the crisis as a result of this tripartite agreement.

What is most important is that we eventually migrate that to a bilateral relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan. But I actually think it is not only possible, it is happening right now, and I think both the leadership on the Pakistani side as well as the Afghan side recognize that tactical issues must be addressed at a tactical level and not allowed to bleed over into the strategic relationship. Even President Karzai has acknowledged that to me, and he is very supportive of a military-to-military relationship in order to address these disputes.

So, Senator, I think that while cautiously optimistic, I am optimistic that we are moving in the right direction.

Senator SHAHEEN. That is encouraging. You have talked a fair amount this morning about what our presence might look like post-2014. Can you talk about the commitment of our NATO partners after 2014, and how robust that might be, and whether there is agreement about what that presence should look like?

General DUNFORD. Senator, I attended the defense ministerial in Brussels in February, and at that time, the collective defense ministers agreed that they would contribute between 8,000 to 12,000 forces for post-2014. They gave that guidance for general planning to take place.

I think it is fair to say that our coalition partners are very much looking to see what the U.S. contribution will be post-2014 before making a commitment. Also in many cases, our coalition partners will need U.S. enabling support before they are able to commit. By enabling support, in most cases I mean specifically casualty evacuation, medical evacuation, post-2014, which they cannot provide, but would need that to be in place in order for them to be committed post-2014.
Senator SHAHEEN. Is there anything that we should be doing in the lead up to 2014 to provide those assurances to folks so that everybody is in agreement on what happens?

General DUNFORD. I do, Senator. I know that the President is deliberating now, but as he makes a decision about the basic framework—he already committed to President Karzai as recently as January that we would be there in some significant way post-2014. But as President Obama makes his specific decision, then I think it is going to be incumbent upon all of us at all levels to engage our coalition partners to ensure that we build the same effective coalition post-2014 that we have had over the past several years.

I think it is a huge success story the way we brought NATO together to accomplish the mission inside of Afghanistan. I think it is important that we maintain that same level of commitment for the alliance post-2014.

So I think in terms of sequencing, once the President makes his decision and certainly discusses that with his counterparts in the coalition, I think we will then start to see the coalition partners make their own decisions. But their ability to generate the political will to contribute post-2014 and do the budgetary planning necessary for post-2014 in large part rests with the U.S. decision and what our presence will be post-2014.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much. My time is up, but I should say, just offer my condolences. As a Boston native, I am sure you share the concern that we all felt yesterday looking at what happened at the Boston Marathon. So hopefully you did not have any family members who were affected.

General DUNFORD. No. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.

Senator Ayotte.

Senator AYOTTE. Hi, General.

General DUNFORD. Senator.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you so much for being here today and for your service to our country. We appreciate very much your leadership.

I wanted to ask, first of all, about the transfer of the detainees into Afghan control for the Parwan detention facility, and how is that going. Can you also tell me if we capture, for example, a target, in particular, a foreign national or a high value target, even who is an Afghan, that may have intelligence that is helpful to preventing future attacks. How do you we handle that situation in light of the detention transfer?

General DUNFORD. Senator, I can talk to you about the transfer. One of the last things I did before I left Afghanistan, and it was about 10 days after the transfer, I walked down to Parwan, spent about 4 hours on the ground with the leadership down there, and walked through each and every function that is being performed inside the facility to ensure that the partnership arrangement that we had with the Afghans protected our interests. I am satisfied right now that it does in the sense that we still have good control over the detainees, we have visibility, and we are in a position to ensure that there is humane treatment taking place inside of the facility.
With regard to future targets, a couple of things. One is we have a commitment by Afghanistan that they will not only keep in detention the enduring security threats that we have identified in the past, but any future enduring security threats would also be detained.

I would prefer to talk about the intelligence piece in a closed forum.

Senator Ayotte. Okay.

General Dunford. But I would tell you in this forum that I am satisfied that we will have appropriate access and intelligence sharing with the Afghans.

Senator Ayotte. Thank you, General. I appreciate that, and we can follow up in a more appropriate forum on the intelligence gathering.

You said that the enduring security threats, those that are detainees obviously that would continue to represent a threat, you are satisfied that the Afghans will maintain control of those individuals. So I think you and I both would want to avoid a Daqduq type situation. So, can you assure us that, how this agreement is with the Afghans, and to your satisfaction, that we will not have that kind of situation?

General Dunford. Senator, we have a commitment from President Karzai to President Obama that those individuals will be detained. What I have said to the Chairman and what I have said to the chain of command is that were Afghanistan not to meet their commitment, we would have real operational and policy issues to address at that particular time. I think it would change in some way the fundamental nature of our operations, and certainly change the nature of support that we might provide to Afghanistan in the future.

So what I am saying now is that we have an agreement with Afghanistan to keep those enduring security threats detained. Were they to violate that commitment, I am satisfied that that would be a significant change in our relationship, a significant change in the nature of operations, and we would have to deal with that at the time.

Senator Ayotte. Okay. Thank you, General. I wanted to follow up on the questions that Senator Blumenthal asked you about, and I appreciated your testimony. Senator Brown and I were original sponsors of the No Contracting With the Enemy provisions, and Senator Blumenthal and I had the opportunity to travel to Afghanistan in January together. As a result of that, we have introduced legislation called Never Contracting With the Enemy—to try to fill in some of the gaps to improve—we made significant progress with the No Contracting With the Enemy, but to fill in some of the gaps, including to drop the contract level from $100,000 to $20,000 as you had mentioned earlier.

But it is not just the DOD that is contracting. What other agencies are contracting in Afghanistan?

General Dunford. USAID, Senator. I think that, as you are describing the new legislation, it will be critical that not only DOD that has contracts, but the DOS, and, specific, USAID, which has a significant role in contracting in Afghanistan. They would have
the same authorities that we do; that is, do not contract with the enemy.

Senator AYOTTE. From your perspective, have we already been able to save taxpayers’ dollars with the No Contracting With the Enemy provisions?

General DUNFORD. Senator, we have been able to save taxpayers’ dollars, but, more importantly, we have been able to prevent those dollars from being in the hands of the enemy who would do us harm.

Senator AYOTTE. With our legislation that Senator Blumenthal raised to you, is this something you would endorse that we hopefully would get passed this year?

General DUNFORD. Senator, I would. I think anything that would keep resources out of the hands of the enemy would be a positive step. So far the legislation has been very effective both with subcontractors and contractors, and expanding that to include non-DOD organizations makes a lot of sense.

Senator AYOTTE. Great, thank you. Major General Longo was very helpful to us in helping us put together this legislation, so we are grateful certainly for his support as well. So thank you for that.

I wanted to ask you about the follow-on for us in 2014 and beyond. With each area of Afghanistan, thinking about the follow-on recommendations that you will make to the President, how important is it that we have a presence in all four regions of Afghanistan?

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think it is very important that we be in all four regions. From my perspective, it starts with, I think, the lowest level at which we should advise and assist post-2014 is at the Afghanistan corps level. They have six corps level headquarters, and they are in the four corners of the country.

I also think being in the four corners of the country will help us to better support the DOS mission. As I mentioned earlier, I am completely integrated with Ambassador Cunningham in terms of planning for U.S. presence post-2014. So I believe being in the four corners is going to be necessary for us to ensure that the gains that we have made with the Afghan forces are sustainable post-2014.

Senator AYOTTE. When we look at Iran and their role in Afghanistan, thinking particularly post-2014, what area of the country are you most worried about with respect to Iran in terms of having a presence?

General DUNFORD. It is in the west, Senator. It is in the Herat region, and we certainly see today evidence of malign Iranian influence. We certainly see today great effort made by Iran to control what goes on inside of Afghanistan.

I am happy to report that many of the resources have not fallen on fertile ground. They have tried to do things that they have been unsuccessful in doing. But they absolutely have great interest and influence in the western part of the country.

Senator AYOTTE. If we were not to have a presence or a sufficient presence in the western part of the country looking at our post-2014 posture, along with our NATO allies, what type of influence do you think Iran would have, and what do you think that they would do with that?
General DUNFORD. I think it is fair to say that they would have influence in the western part of the country. I think it is also fair to say if past is prologue, that that influence would be malign and could be destabilizing for Afghanistan.

Senator AYOTTE. How is it going in terms of negotiating the BSA?

General DUNFORD. Senator, the next meeting of the BSA is May. The last thing I did before I left was I met with Ambassador Hakimi, the Afghan Ambassador to the United States. He is the primary negotiator for Afghanistan. All I can say is that at least on the Afghan side, his sense was that things were moving in the right direction. He was positive that we would be able to sign the BSA. President Karzai has said the same thing to me.

There are two or three difficult issues that we are working through right now. They are non-negotiable from a U.S. perspective. So I think the team is working very hard to address that right now.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you very much, General. I appreciate your leadership and all of those that serve underneath you. You do an excellent job.

General DUNFORD. Thank you, Senator.

Senator AYOTTE. Thanks.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.

I just have a few additional questions, General. One is the use of the term “safe haven” and “sanctuary.” I have always used them interchangeably, and obviously you do not. At least I think that became obvious in some of your early conversation this morning. Can you explain to us the difference in your vocabulary between the two? Who has what where?

General DUNFORD. I can, Mr. Chairman. We use the term “safe haven” in an area from which we cannot get at the enemy or in an area within which the enemy has freedom of movement. Inside of Afghanistan, we use the term “safe haven.” “Sanctuary,” we use that with regard to Pakistan.

So when we talk about enemy safe havens, just so we are clear, inside the force. When we talk about enemy safe havens, we are talking about areas that are geographically within Afghanistan, and then obviously sanctuaries being those areas outside of Afghanistan.

Chairman LEVIN. I think there is some confusion about those terms. I will just talk about my mind. I will not talk about others, but I am confident that colleagues also have used the terms interchangeably, and that that may have led to some of the comments this morning. I am guessing on that because you said that—I believe you said that—I thought you were referring to the Taliban not having a sanctuary in Pakistan, but I think you would agree that the Taliban does have a sanctuary inside Pakistan. The Afghans—excuse me—the Afghan Taliban. Would you agree?

General DUNFORD. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. In the exchange earlier, I thought we were talking about al Qaeda.

Chairman LEVIN. Yes, and you may have been. I may have misheard it, but I think there was some real uncertainty, at least my staff also felt—I am not talking about your comments necessarily, but in the exchange, that there was some uncertainty as
to what was being referred to in Afghanistan because it is clear that there is a sanctuary for the Afghan Taliban inside of Pakistan. Is that correct?

General DUNFORD. Mr. Chairman, there is no doubt. There is also the Pakistani Taliban moving, in some cases, freely in the eastern part of Afghanistan and back into Pakistan.

Chairman LEVIN. All right. I think probably in the future, it would be wise for you to pin that down when talking to Members of Congress because I have heard it repeatedly used interchangeably. Again, I will just point to myself, not to others. I am not saying it is a mistake one way or the other, but it is used interchangeably by many colleagues, I believe, and it surely is myself. So I am going to try to be more accurate in the future, particularly when I am talking to one of our military leaders. But I think in the common ordinary sense of the word out in the public, that there has not been that distinction which has been made, and you should be aware of that if I am accurate, okay?

General DUNFORD. I will do that, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. I want to ask you about the time table for the decision as to the number of troops that would be there after 2014. I think that most of us, maybe all of us, agree that we need to have a credible commitment, the earlier the better. That is important, for the uncertainty that does exist in Afghanistan to be removed both in the eyes of the people, the government, that clearly want an ongoing presence that is credible. It is also important for the Taliban to understand there will be an ongoing, credible commitment from the United States.

As to the specific number of that, you have not made a—numerically what that commitment would amount to in terms of troops, you have not made your recommendation yet, and you have indicated today that there are a number of factors which can affect your judgment as to what that proper number or range would be. So far, am I right?

General DUNFORD. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. Now, the one issue, however, that, and you have spoken on this and I want to be real clear on, is that in your mind in making your recommendation, that it is essential that there be a BSA that protects whatever number of troops we have that are there, for instance. Another is on the sovereignty issue. We are very careful about protecting our troops that are in a foreign country so that they are not, if it is not appropriate, subject to the judicial arm of other countries if we do not think that it is appropriate for that to be the case, and under what circumstances will an American soldier or marine or whatever, be subject to foreign jurisdiction. We are very protective of our troops. Is that correct?

General DUNFORD. Mr. Chairman, that is absolutely correct.

Chairman LEVIN. That is set out in a BSA. It is supposed to be set forth, is that right?

General DUNFORD. That is exactly right, Mr. Chairman. In other countries, of course, it is the SOFA, and that really is a subset of the BSA.
Chairman Levin. All right. Whatever commitment that is made, in your judgment, should be conditional upon a working out of a BSA. Is that fair to say?

General Dunford. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. Any authority that we have to operate post-2014 would be within the framework of a BSA. As the U.N. mandate expires in December 2014, and the military technical agreement expires in 2014, our presence post-2014 would be based on the BSA that we make with the Afghan Government.

Chairman Levin. Not only would it be dependent on that authority, but my point is that whatever number we have could only be committed if we have a BSA. We need a BSA before troops are actually left there after 2014, is that correct?

General Dunford. That is exactly right.

Chairman Levin. So that whatever number, whether it is 8,000, 10,000, 12,000, 6,000, or 14,000, whatever the number is, is our share of the total number of troops there. That would only be accomplished if, in fact, there is a BSA between our two countries.

General Dunford. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Okay. Again, we all thank you very much for your service. You have really done a superb job there following a superb number of commanders that have preceded you. You are carrying out a very impressive tradition, and we commend you for it. We thank you for it and those who work with you.

General Dunford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. We will stand adjourned.

Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

2013 FIGHTING SEASON

1. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, this fighting season will have the Afghans in the lead for security operations with support from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). What are your strategic military objectives for the 2013 fighting season?

General Dunford. This will be the first fighting season with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in the lead across Afghanistan. In many parts of Afghanistan, the ANSF have been responsible for their own security for some time. Our objective is simple—we want the ANSF to be successful. We will help the ANSF achieve success by being a good supporting partner as they take charge of security at the national level. This will improve ANSF confidence in their own ability to stand against the insurgency and terrorism. This in turn will improve the confidence of the Afghan people in their government to deliver security across Afghanistan. Improved security delivered by the ANSF will set the conditions for successful Afghan presidential elections and the peaceful transfer of presidential power in Afghanistan for the first time in history. This will allow the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to transition from combat operations to a mission focused on train, advise, and assist of the ANSF.

2. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, how does the 2013 fighting season set the conditions for success in 2014 and beyond?

General Dunford. By the conclusion of fighting season 2013, the ANSF will have had their first full fighting season in the lead for security. The significance of a successful fighting season means a confident ANSF, one in which the people of Afghanistan can be proud. When the ANSF succeed in fighting season 2013, the people, the candidates, and most importantly, the political parties will feel secure about the elections process for 2014. The 2013 fighting season refines the narrative about the Taliban—they are losing and are progressively marginalized in their influence. An Afghan process owned by Afghans and delivered by the Taliban has been their strategic focus. Instead, the Afghans will have taken ownership of their own security and political process without them (unless they turn to reconciliation). The election,
the security institutions, and a government acceptable to the Afghan people all help set conditions for a sustainable Afghan future: each are related to successes during this fighting season.

3. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, in the draw down to 34,000 U.S. forces by February 2014, what will be the size of the international forces?

General DUNFORD. By February 2014, total requirements for ISAF forces will total 52,000 troops. Of that, 18,000 troop requirements have been identified for sourcing by the 49 other troop-contributing nations. Sourcing of these requirements will occur in June at the NATO Force Generation Conference and that will determine the final number of troops pledged against the campaign.

4. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, do you sense that our international partners are heading for the exits and how do you manage that issue?

General DUNFORD. I can emphatically state that our international partners are not heading for the exits. Much like the United States, they are managing force reductions in accordance with the decreased troop requirements as the ISAF campaign progresses and the capabilities of the ANSF increase. I actively engage with our international partners in conjunction with Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the NATO Senior Civilian Representative in a synchronized engagement plan to ensure that we send a common message about our current and future requirements to heads of state, ambassadors, and senior defense officials from all 50 nations in the coalition. The coalition remains solid in their commitment to the obligations of this mission.

2014 FIGHTING SEASON AND ELECTIONS

5. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, two major challenges for 2014 will be supporting the Afghan presidential elections in April 2014 and drawing down to the appropriate force size by the end of 2014. The smooth transition of power is critical to the democratic, peaceful, and secure future of Afghanistan. Will 34,000 U.S. troops and a commensurate number of allied and partner forces, in support of the ANSF, be enough to provide security for the Afghan elections in April 2014?

General DUNFORD. Based on our current estimates and plans, ISAF will require approximately 52,000 troops to support the ANSF in providing security throughout Afghanistan for the 2014 national elections. The 34,000 troops that the United States has provided and 18,000 troops that we have requested that Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe provide from the troop contributing nations is sufficient to complete this mission.

6. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, what are the critical military tasks after the April elections for the remainder of 2014 for your forces?

General DUNFORD. Assuming that the Afghan presidential elections go as planned, in April 2014, and the political transition is successful, then our critical tasks will remain supporting and enabling the ANSF to neutralize the threats. Our Special Operations Forces will continue to partner with their ANSF counterparts and we will continue to advise the security ministries at the corps and brigade levels. The decisive point of our post-election train, advise, and assist mission will remain at the brigade level. Other critical tasks will include a theater reserve and quick reaction force for our forces, the civil authorities we enable, and the international community.

POST-2014

7. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, what missions do you believe we should be performing in post-2014 Afghanistan to preserve the investment of American lives and treasure we have invested over the last decade?

General DUNFORD. We will conduct three missions in the post-2014 environment: train, advise, and assist at the brigade level and above; counterterrorism; and support to civil authority. We will be conducting the counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan for a few more years. In extremis support to civil authority will remain a part of planning in Afghanistan.

8. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, what is your professional opinion on whether it would be better to train at the brigade or the corps level post-2014?

General DUNFORD. Optimally, I believe that post-2014 we need to maintain a robust train, advise, and assist presence with all of the Afghan National Army (ANA)
corps and regional police commands. The decisive point for train, advise, and assist
to the ANSF is at the brigade level. We are exploring options for how best to con-
figure the NATO and U.S. force to best support the ANSF. We fully expect the Af-
ghan security institution leadership (Ministries of Defense and Interior) are contem-
plating Afghan military command and control constructs and may reorganize based
on their own lessons learned from the upcoming fighting season. In addition, we will
require the ability to reach out and conduct regular train, advise, and assist visits
to the ANA and the Afghan National Police (ANP) in order to monitor the effective
use of the international donor community’s continued investment in the ANSF.

9. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, if you had to make a recommendation at
this point in time, would your recommendation be to train at the brigade or at the
corps level?
General DUNFORD. The Afghans are making significant progress as they are
poised to take the lead for security during this fighting season. The Afghan units
engaged in the fight today are at varying levels of performance and have tailored
Security Force Assistance teams from the coalition from the corps down to the tac-
tical level. Some Afghans units are conducting successful un-partnered operations.
The performance of the Afghans during this fighting season will drive us to refine
our partnering model for the 2014 elections period and the 2014 fighting season.
The Afghans are also expected to reorganize their command and control structures
in both the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI). Those vari-
ables will drive how we partner with the Afghans in the post-2014 Resolute Support
Mission.

10. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, in your testimony, you said that your rec-
ommendation of required post-2014 troop levels would depend in a large part on the
performance of the Afghan forces in the 2014 fighting season. What are the key di-
ensions of their performance that you will use to determine the appropriate post-
2014 force size?
General DUNFORD. At the end of the fighting season in 2013, the most important
performance measure is the ability of the ANSF to be responsible for their own se-
curity at the national level. Specific areas I will look at this year will be proficiency
of ANSF leadership and unit training. I am also interested in the progress of devel-
oping command and control, logistics, and combined arms capabilities.

11. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, why is it important, from a security and
military perspective, for the United States to stay engaged post-2014 in all four re-
gions of Afghanistan?
General DUNFORD. Our efforts post-2014 will be regionally-based and focused on
the Afghan corps throughout the country. This will maintain the momentum
achieved by ISAF, align us with the Afghans security and military force lay down,
and build upon current coalition and coalition/Afghan relationships. The post-2014
military mission will conduct training, advising, and assisting with a focus at the
Afghan national and institutional level at the corps level. This will support the de-
velopment of a sustainable level of skills and capabilities which will enable the
ANSF at corps level to deal effectively with residual insurgent threats.

12. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, is it your sense that the Afghan Govern-
ment would object to 20,000 or more U.S. and international troops remaining in Af-
ghanistan after 2014 for training and assisting and counterterrorism?
General DUNFORD. No, although, I do believe that 20,000 is the top end of what
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) would probably find
acceptable in Afghanistan.

13. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, what are the risks if the residual U.S. force
size in Afghanistan is too low?
General DUNFORD. The post-2014 mission, under NATO authorities is predicated
on a role without combat. This portion of the mission is focused on continued train,
advice, and assist of the fielded Afghan forces and training institutions for both the
ANA and ANP. Additionally, a portion of the force will also be dedicated to improv-
ing capacity in the Afghan security institutions and the civilian oversight of the
military. These two NATO missions will be balanced by a coalition of the willing,
under U.S. leadership, focused on countering terrorism against transnational terrorists.
It is important to note, that a sufficient force must be dedicated against the train,
advice, and assist mission to ensure the ANSF deliver long-term security to Afghan-
istan, while the coalition of the willing with our Afghan partners ensure that
transnational terrorists do not take advantage of the mission shift to try and re-
establish their safe havens in Afghanistan. A too-small force will not allow a balanced effort between these interlinked missions.

14. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, what are the primary lessons learned from the drawdown in Iraq that you are attempting to apply in Afghanistan?

General DUNFORD. There are a number of lessons learned from Iraq that U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR–A) and the International Security Forces Afghanistan are applying now and will be over the course of the next 20 months with regards to retrograde activities. One of the primary lessons learned that I would like to highlight from the drawdown in Iraq is the need for a Single Logistics Command and Control (C2) system in theater. This lesson was applied in Afghanistan since the spring of last year and has been critical to the Combined Joint Operations Area (CJOA) and theater sustainment and retrograde processes. This concept basically placed the pre-2012 logistics command structure under the 1st Theater Sustainment Command (TSC).

The TSC has been able to bring strategic partners into the CJOA as a single point of contact linking them at the operational level. This did not happen in the Iraq drawdown causing inefficiencies. This also enabled U.S. Army Central Command to start to execute certain Army Forces tasks such as Class VII equipment management and asset visibility. With the proper enablers, the TSC can smooth out CJOA processes.

Single Logistics C2 must be integrated into corps operations, unlike Iraq, or we will lose the opportunity to “operationalize” both sustainment and retrograde. This is happening now and represents some improvements from our Iraq experiences. The lesson lies in our ability to codify the proper command and support relationship in order to ensure sustainment and retrograde are nested with the operational plan/execution.

DRUG TRAFFICKING

15. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, the United Nations says opium poppy cultivation will increase for a third year in a row and is heading for a record high and provides 75 percent of the global crop. What do you think will be the effect of the drawdown of both U.S. troops and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) presence in Afghanistan on the drug trade in Afghanistan?

General DUNFORD. The reduction of U.S. troops and DEA presence in Afghanistan will limit the ability to support certain Afghan-led counterdrug operations, especially in remote areas heavily influenced by the Taliban. However, DEA’s enduring mentoring and training mission, combined with continued international training, advice, and assistance from NATO after the ISAF mission, will ensure Afghan counterdrug forces have the ability to continue to operate in many areas of the country. As the recent arrest, conviction, and 20-year jail sentence by Afghan authorities of U.S. kingpin Haji Lal Jan Ishaqzai demonstrates, Afghan capability to locate and arrest dangerous narcotics traffickers has advanced significantly. Sustained mentorship and support to Afghanistan law enforcement will be necessary to prevent insurgents and criminal elements from evading law enforcement, threatening the population, and potentially allowing sanctuary for transnational terrorist groups.

16. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, will the Taliban receive a boost in funding from increased drug trafficking?

General DUNFORD. Yes. The Taliban profits from all aspects of the narcotics trade, but a key source of drug revenue for the insurgency is taxes levied on illegal opium poppy cultivation. While there are no official estimates yet for the size of the 2013 crop, there are indicators that this year’s poppy crop could be among the largest of the last decade. A larger opium crop will also generate more revenue for the insurgency from Taliban extortion of drug movement, processing, and trafficking networks. Furthermore, they have become more deeply involved in all aspects of narcotics trafficking and where they own the cycle from processing to export, as the recent kingpin designation of senior Taliban commander Naim Barich demonstrated.

PAKISTAN

17. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, as you have indicated, the stability of Afghanistan affects the stability of Pakistan and vice versa. What aspects of the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan are the most critical and what are the
indicators that would tell you the relationship is heading in the right direction versus wrong direction?

General Dunford. Pakistan and Afghanistan’s ability to engage consistently and constructively—both diplomatically and militarily—is critical to overcoming their mutual deep-seated mistrust and improving their relationship. An irritant in this relationship is the countries’ shared porous border and hostilities that arise when each nation attempts to protect sovereign territory—which is not clearly defined. ISAF has been working to mitigate this irritant in the relationship by facilitating engagement between the Pakistan and Afghanistan’s militaries, institutionalizing communications processes, and brokering a framework to manage military border incidents. Improvements in these areas would indicate the relationship is maturing; however, the countries are not yet independently able to manage cross-border disputes. Although progress is slow and fragile, Pakistan and Afghanistan have also held a number of bilateral and multilateral engagements which indicate the relationship is heading in the right direction, but there is more work to do. Of note is Afghan Minister of Defense Mohammadi’s February visit to Pakistan and a series of trilateral sessions hosted by United Kingdom Prime Minister Cameron which included President Karzai, Prime Minister Ashraf, and representatives from both Afghan and Pakistani political and security establishments.

18. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, what are the best roles or tasks for the United States to assist in the improvement of the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship?

General Dunford. I do not assess there will be a deep, strategic partnership between Afghanistan and Pakistan, but I am encouraged by the degree of coordination and cooperation that’s taken place at the military-to-military level, that improves in fits and starts. We would like to take the fundamental relationship we’re building in a trilateral fashion between the militaries, and use it as the underpinnings for a solid bilateral relationship between the Afghans and the Pakistanis by the end of 2014. We’ll continue to mature this effort over the next 20 months, with the understanding that there is distrust over such things as the border, but significant areas of potential agreement in other parts of their relationship such as training. The United States has significant influence with both nations and can continue to provide positive opportunities for each nation to deepen its trust of the other.

19. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, if Afghanistan is stable and security steadily improves, will that send more or less extremist/terrorist elements into Pakistan?

General Dunford. Even a stable and secure Afghanistan will have difficulty preventing terrorist and extremist elements from operating in some rural, rugged areas near the Pakistan border without continued counterterrorism pressure. Improvements in stability and security in Afghanistan would make it more difficult for these groups to operate and could force some extremists and terrorists to move to Pakistan.

20. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, in your professional military opinion, has our security assistance to Pakistan been effective at helping Pakistan and in reducing the flow of extremists and instability from Pakistan to Afghanistan?

General Dunford. U.S. security assistance programs are an important tool in building strong partnerships and equipping states with military capabilities to address their security requirements. Internal threats from extremism, coupled with a nuclear arsenal, make Pakistan a state wherein we have vital national interest.

In my opinion, our security assistance programs help us build a long-term strategic partnership with Pakistan. U.S. security assistance programs assist the Government of Pakistan in coping with extremism within their own borders and enhance security and stability. However, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is responsible for executing security assistance programs in Pakistan and can best assess the effectiveness of these programs.

21. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, what changes to our security assistance to Pakistan would improve regional stability?

General Dunford. Security assistance programs are critical in helping us build a long-term strategic partnership with Pakistan and providing capabilities to enhance security and stability. CENTCOM is responsible for executing security assistance programs in Pakistan and can best assess what specific capabilities might improve regional stability.
Political Uncertainty

22. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, you have indicated that many Afghans fear uncertainty about the future support of the United States and the international community more than they fear the Taliban. What specific U.S. actions or elements of U.S. policy do you consider most important to reducing the uncertainty which contributes to potential instability and the hedging of actors both within Afghanistan and in the region?

General DUNFORD. A clear and unambiguous commitment of U.S. and international support beyond 2014, such as a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) or a NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), would help reduce uncertainty and hedging by actors within Afghanistan and the region. There is anecdotal information now that Afghans, certainly the Afghan elite, are preparing for an uncertain future making plans to depart Afghanistan prior to the end of 2014. Afghanistan has a societal memory of the post-Soviet war period, when the international community turned their attention away from the country, and they fear a relapse to the fighting that defined that period.

We do not believe we can fully mitigate Afghan and regional hedging behavior, as it is rooted into the culture of a society that has seen over 35 years of warfare. However, international assurances—especially binding pledges or transparent announcements of post-2014 intentions—should help to mitigate hedging behavior.

23. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, sustainment of infrastructure programs and projects in Afghanistan is one of the key variables Congress will need to decide upon going forward. Which of the infrastructure programs and projects do you consider most important to sustain, and why?

General DUNFORD. The Department of Defense (DOD) through the use of Afghanistan Infrastructure Program (AIP) fund has been able to secure $400 million for fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012, and $325 million in fiscal year 2013, 2-year funds, by demonstrating the link between Department of State (DOS) investments with that of the GIRoA’s priorities. Those national priorities include infrastructure needs such as power, water, and transportation. USFOR-A and the U.S. Agency for International Development engage with the GIRoA at the local, provincial, and ministerial levels to synchronize project planning and execution with GIRoA priorities and assessment for sustainment as the leading indicators. The funding allocated by Congress promotes economic growth and agricultural yields, while connecting Afghans to services, civil society, and improved governance at all levels.

24. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, based on your interaction with the Afghan Government and conditions on the ground, which of the most important Afghan ministries are most capable and which require the most improvement to secure the peaceful future of Afghanistan?

General DUNFORD. The peaceful future of Afghanistan will rely on what the Afghan people want. The security conditions achieved in 2013 and an effective political transition in 2014 will allow Afghans to exploit the decade of opportunity. The focus of the post-2014 mission is all about growing capabilities and capacities of the Afghans. As I have said before, some of the remaining challenges we will have to deal with start at the ministerial level. There is no metric to determine “the most important” Afghan ministries. All 17 ministries of the Afghan Government are important for the Afghan people, whether it is the MOD, the MOI, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, or the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, to name a few—they are all important to their nation’s success. It is my view today that there are various levels of improvements needed across the board to secure the peaceful future of Afghanistan. We have the metrics in place that both address where we have to be for proficiency at the ministerial level, as well as 14 functional areas that we evaluate in our tactical units that allow us to determine where they are and what support they may need to improve to take it to the next level.

NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) employs the same capability milestone ratings to assess ministerial development. Additionally, NTM-A assesses ANSF institutional progress towards autonomous operations for ANSF training institutions, regional military hospitals, and logistics nodes. Both ministerial and institutional development is rated against the following capability milestones:

- 1A: Autonomous Operations
- 1B: Coalition Oversight
- 2A: Reduced Coalition Advising
- 2B: Regular Coalition Advising
- 3: Coalition Partnering
- 4: Initial Capability
25. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, what are the key elements you recommend should be a part of U.S. policy and policy implementation to fight the problem of corruption within the Afghan Government?

General Dunford. Holding the GIRoA to the terms of the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework is the key to ensuring the political will to fight corruption in Afghanistan. If you ask most people who are tracking the issue in Afghanistan how to curb high-level corruption, they will tell you: “by the International Community better controlling its own purse strings.” Donor countries must withhold funding to institutions and ministries that make little or no progress in fighting corruption. The Afghan system of having to pay for official positions seems to be a driving factor fueling corruption in the security forces. We recommend a systematic approach by donor nations to address the system of impunity and interference with the judicial system within GIRoA.

26. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, what should the U.S. role be in the Afghan reconciliation process?

General Dunford. The DOS has lead for reconciliation policies. From my perspective, the United States, through ISAF, needs to set the conditions on the ground that would facilitate the dialogue between the Afghan Government and the Taliban.

27. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, how has Congress been the most helpful to your efforts as a military commander in Afghanistan?

General Dunford. Congress has been extremely helpful in a number of ways. First, thanks to Congress’ leadership and support, the men and women of U.S. forces serving in Afghanistan today are well-trained and well-equipped. It is important that the fiscal commitments that permit such a premier fighting force are sustained in the future.

Second, Congress’ funding of the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) has been instrumental in building and equipping the ANSF. As a result of your support, the ANSF will shortly assume responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan. ASFF will continue to be vitally important to the ANSF in sustaining the very force we just helped build and to secure those gains for which we have paid so dearly.

Third, Congress’ passage of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 was effective in halting contracts to entities and individuals supporting an insurgency or opposing coalition forces.

TRANSPORT MISCALCULATIONS

28. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, at the April 10, 2013, news briefing on the defense budget, Under Secretary Robert Hale stated in answer to a question that costs in Afghanistan were $7 to $10 billion higher this year than what we anticipated. This is very troubling in any environment, but especially under the constraints that DOD is currently under. Can you verify if this is correct, and can you give a detailed account for such a massive underestimation?

General Dunford. The $7 to $10 billion shortfall range is correct. Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budgets are put together 1 to 2 years before execution; a difficult task given the uncertainties that exist in war. In the fiscal year 2013 OCO budget request, DOD estimated that many of the operating costs would decline proportionately with the reduction of troops. What we are seeing in actual execution is that many of these costs will not decline until bases are closed. In addition, DOD did not forecast the closure of the Pakistan ground lines of communication for such an extended period of time, so higher transportation costs arose from using more expensive means and routes. DOD also did not have a good estimate of the total equipment retrograde requirement. In late fiscal year 2012, CENTCOM stood up a Material Retrograde Element to manage the retrograde efforts and can now provide a better estimate of the retrograde requirement.

ARTICLE 60 MODIFICATIONS

29. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, we trust you to make decisions that may result in the loss of life in order to protect the Nation and accomplish the mission. Every day, commanders must make decisions to correct underperformers with training or education, and, when necessary, to discipline troops or possibly relieve commanders. Ultimately, our Nation charges them, and you, with the responsibility to establish cohesive, mission-ready combat units. While we trust you with our sons’ and daughters’ lives, the proposed modifications to Article 60 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) seem to suggest that we do not trust your discretion
when it comes to the UCMJ offenses. Do you, as a commander, consider the UCMJ as it is currently structured, to be a viable tool to help you maintain and enhance the cohesiveness and fighting capabilities of your combat units?

General DUNFORD. Yes. I believe the UCMJ, as currently structured, is important for commanders to maintain and enhance cohesiveness and fighting capabilities, and to maintain good order and discipline.

30. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, have you seen any evidence that commanders are abusing their discretion as the convening authority to adjust sentencing?

General DUNFORD. No. In my experience, commanders exercise their judicial responsibilities under the UCMJ very carefully and with deliberation for the interests of all personnel involved, including victims of offenses.

31. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, how would the proposed changes to the UCMJ impact your effectiveness as a commander?

General DUNFORD. I will continue to exercise my responsibilities as a Convening Authority as authorized under the UCMJ, with due consideration for all personnel involved.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

GREEN ON BLUE ATTACKS

32. Senator WICKER. General Dunford, over the span of the Afghan conflict there have been many instances of attacks by Afghan forces on U.S. and coalition personnel. A January 2013 Foreign Policy article noted that 52 coalition soldiers died as a result of 37 green on blue attacks in 2012. Despite improvements in the overall quality and capabilities of the ANA's personnel that you noted in your testimony, the data indicates that green on blue attacks escalated last year. As we continue to hand over security responsibilities to the Afghan Government, I am concerned that we may not fully understand the motivations and allegiances of our ANA counterparts. Are you seeing a similar trend developing this year with regard to green on blue attacks?

General DUNFORD. Because no single definitive countermeasure can prevent insider attacks, ISAF and the ANSF introduced a program of countermeasures, which applied collectively, are reducing the threat posed by insider attacks. These measures include strengthening the vetting processes for new recruits and those returning from extended leave; increasing the number and training for counterintelligence agents; and enhancing force protection for ISAF troops operating in small units or in remote areas.

Additionally, I am encouraged by the joint, integrated ISAF–ANSF approach and level of the Afghan Government’s commitment to reducing this mutual threat. For example, ISAF and ANSF established the three-star-led Insider Threat Action Group, which they co-chair, as well as the Joint Casualty Assessment Team, that investigates every incident in order to identify lessons and required actions for the future.

33. Senator WICKER. General Dunford, how many such attacks have occurred thus far in 2013?

General DUNFORD. From January 1 to April 16, 2013, there have been four green on blue attacks.

34. Senator WICKER. General Dunford, do you believe that the screening program for prospective Afghan military and police forces is sufficient?

General DUNFORD. The Afghans have established sound procedures for vetting ANSF personnel. The challenge is the quality of compliance with those standards and working through the high volume of personnel. The Afghan Government has significantly increased the number of counterintelligence personnel in the ANSF, in order to ensure that they have sufficient personnel with the appropriate training to ensure compliance with those standards. The Afghans understand that this is a threat both to us and to our relationship with them. This also affects the will of the coalition at the strategic level and erodes the trust between our forces. The coalition has also significantly increased the number of counterintelligence resources being provided in Afghanistan and developed additional measures to mitigate threats against our personnel.
35. Senator Wicker. General Dunford, are there additional capabilities that need to be made available to change the trend?

General Dunford. First and foremost, the insider threat is a force protection issue. ISAF has taken a comprehensive approach to the insider threat, both at home station in terms of enhanced training and additional measures that take place once forces are deployed to Afghanistan. There has also been a significant increase in the number of counterintelligence resources provided in Afghanistan, both on the part of the coalition as well as within the ANSF. This is starting to bear fruit as over 400 ANSF members have been arrested as a result of this increased scrutiny, and additional investigations continue. This critical issue is far from being solved, but progress is being made.

AFGHAN ARMORED VEHICLES

36. Senator Wicker. General Dunford, the Army intends to sign a sole source contract for 135 additional Mobile Strike Force Vehicles (MSFV) for Afghan Security Forces. The cost under this contract is estimated at $1.0 to $1.5 million per vehicle. With respect to our current fiscal challenges, the sole-source procurement of new vehicles appears less cost-effective than the upgrade and transfer of hundreds of existing Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles that are already in Afghanistan. Have you considered the upgrade and transfer of the in-country MRAP vehicles to the Afghans?

General Dunford. The initial decision to procure 488 MSFVs was made in fiscal year 2010 after market research determined that the MRAP variants did not meet the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC–A) operational requirements relating to an enclosed turret with day/night sight. In June 2012, an additional requirement of 135 MSFVs to outfit additional units was validated and implemented. The justification to sole-source the additional 135 MSFVs was based on the following factors:

- Maintaining fleet commonality to increase operational flexibility and reduce procurement, logistical, and training burdens.
- Preventing an unacceptable program delay which would severely and negatively impact the ANSF’s ability to maintain security and achieve dominant combat capability prior to the transition on December 31, 2014.
- Reducing substantive duplicate costs incurred by issuing a competitive solicitation. The estimated costs associated with competitive procurement would have exceeded $125 million and would not have been recovered through competition.

37. Senator Wicker. General Dunford, will you provide written justification for the sole-source contract for the MSFVs?

General Dunford. See attached Justification and Approval (J&A).
MEMORANDUM FOR HEAD OF CONTRACTING ACTIVITY, UNITED STATES ARMY TACOM LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT COMMAND (AMSTA-CG), 6501 EAST 11 MILE ROAD, WARREN, MI 48397

SUBJECT: Justification and Approval (J&A) for Mobile Strike Force Vehicles (Control Number: 2013-016)

1. I have approved the enclosed J&A and I am returning it for your implementation.

2. Retain the original copy of this memorandum in the contract file.

[Signature]
Senior Procurement Executive

CF:
SAAL-ZP (w/encl)
CCTA (w/encl)
CCTA-HTA-C (w/encl)
Mobile Strike Force Vehicles

Justification Review Document for Other than Full & Open Competition

Program/Equipment: Mobile Strike Force Vehicle (MSFV) for the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF)

Authority: 10 U.S.C. 2304 (c)(1) as implemented by FAR 6.302-1(e)(2)(i)(B).
"Only One Responsible Source and No Other Supplies or Services Will Satisfy Agency Requirements"

Amount: $114 Million

Prepared by:
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Date: 20 December 2012

Contracting Officer:
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Date Reviewed: 3 Jan 2013

Technical Representative:
Typed Name: William M. Bonnff Colonel, US Army Title: Project Manager Transportation Systems (P)

DSN: 786-4319
Date Reviewed: 2 Jan 2013

Requirements Representative:
Typed Name: Richard W. Dennis Brigadier General, UK Army Title: DCOM-Amy

DSN: 316-237-9283
Date Reviewed: 20 Jan 2013
Justification Review Document for Other than Full & Open Competition

Reviews: I have reviewed this justification and find it adequate to support other than full and open competition.

Product Director, Non-Standard Vehicles
Typed Name: TRACY MITCHELL
(DSN: 786-8864)
Signature: [Signature]
Date: 7 JAN 2013

Program Executive Officer, Combat Support & Combat Service Support
Typed Name: KEVIN M. FAHEY
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Date: 21 Jan 13

Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC)
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Date: 15 Jan 13

Alternate Competition Advocate
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(DSN: 786-6562)
Signature: [Signature]
Date: 25 Jan 13

Head of the Contracting Activity (HCA)
Typed Name: MICHAEL J. TERRY
Major General, US Army Commanding
Signature: [Signature]
Date: 14 Jan 2013
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
JUSTIFICATION AND APPROVAL
FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION

1. Contracting Agency: Army Contracting Command – Warren (ACC-WRN) is the contracting activity for this action.

2. Description of Action: Approval is being requested to award a new, Firm Fixed Price (FFP) standalone contract for the procurement of 135 Mobile Strike Force Vehicles (MSFVs) to support the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). The proposed contract will be awarded on a sole source basis to Textron Marine & Land Systems (TMLS), New Orleans, Louisiana, and will be funded with FY12 Afghanistan Security Forces Funds (ASFF). The estimated dollar value of this action is $114M.

3. Description of Supplies: This requirement is for 135 MSFVs. The MSFV is a 4X4 armored tactical vehicle which provides Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) - level 1.0 protection to the crew compartment, a weapons station, and an ammunition storage area. The primary mission of the MSFV is to support planned operations, such as area and convoy security, assaults resulting from actionable intelligence, route recon, and Special Forces missions. The MSFV also provides the ANSF with a deterrence force and quick reaction capability to defend against sudden enemy attacks.

The MSFV fleet is composed of three armored vehicle variants on a common platform. They include:

- MSFV with 40/50 Enclosed Turret (Model Number 156001)
- MSFV with Objective Gunner Protection Kit (OGPK) (Model Number 155001)
- MSFV Ambulance (Model Number 150001)

The ANSF requires 135 vehicles consisting of 60 MSFVs with Enclosed Turret, 68 MSFVs with OGPK, and 7 MSFV Ambulances. The ANSF requires vehicles that:

1. have enhanced survivability capabilities
2. are easy to operate and maintain
3. provide for target acquisition while driving
4. have standardization among variants which allows for low sustainment costs
5. have capabilities required in the vehicle platform for cross-country mobility on the rugged and mountainous terrain of Afghanistan
6. move rapidly for increased operational mobility

Additionally, the ANSF requires the OGPK and the 40/50 Enclosed Turret variant have ten-passenger occupancy and the 40/50 Enclosed Turret have day/night sight capability.

The MSFV is capable of maneuvering through rugged and mountainous terrain and through the narrow roads and pathways of Afghanistan. The MSFVs are capable of surviving traffic accidents, improvised explosive device detonations, direct fire and
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION

rocket propelled grenade attacks. It provides the ANSF with rapid mobility, quick
reaction capability, and increased combat power to fight against the Taliban throughout
the Area of Responsibility.

The MSFV variants required by the ANSF are not included in US Army inventory. The
US Army procures the M1117 and M1200 Armored Security Vehicle (ASV) variants
from TMLS. Compared to US Army ASV variants, the MSFV variants are extended 24
inches in length and approximately eight inches in inside height and have been tested to
MRAP level 1.0 protection. The US Army does not procure an ambulance variant from
TMLS.

4. Authority Cited: The statutory authority permitting other than full and open
competition for this effort is 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1), pursuant to FAR 6.302-1(a)(2)(ii)(B).
"Only One Responsible Source and No Other Supplies or Services Will Satisfy Agency
Requirements."

5. Reasons for Authority Cited:

Memorandum of Request (MOR) 12-E1A-207 was received from the Combined Security
Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) on 25 June 2012 for this requirement.
The MOR requests, by manufacturer part number, 135 additional MSFVs be procured to
support the ANSF. The requirement is for the same vehicles previously supplied and
cites commonality, familiarity, and an existing MSFV logistics support network as
reasons for requesting these specific vehicles.

a. Fleet Commonality: Fleet commonality increases operational flexibility and reduces
the procurement, logistical, and training burdens. Introducing a new system would
require the ANSF to logistically support another vehicle platform which would be very
burdensome on the fragile ANSF logistical infrastructure. Further, interoperability
between TMLS vehicles and those of another manufacturer would be extremely difficult
and costly to attain. Fielding different vehicle configurations would require the ANSF to
maintain additional training packages, spare part inventories, and special tools. The
ANSF has been trained to operate and repair multiple vehicles in a short timeframe
based on the universal platform and common characteristics of the MSFV variants and
their components. Using a new manufacturer's vehicle would require the ANSF to go
through additional training for a new system and retain multiple training packages and
vehicle system manuals, which could result in confusion amongst the operators and
procedural and operational mistakes in the field. Thus, not only is there the potential for
damage to the vehicle, there is a likelihood of danger to the ANSF soldiers if they are
not completely familiar with operation and maintenance of the vehicles. If the ANSF
cannot maintain and sustain its fleet of MSFVs, Coalition forces will not meet the 2014
drawdown deadline. Therefore, commonality, standardization, and normalization of the
MSFV variants provide for an economical and safe solution for ANSF security requirements.

b. Current Conditions: The drawdown and eventual withdrawal of Coalition forces from Afghanistan is predicated on the ANSF having the capability to provide for its own internal security and protect itself as a sovereign nation. Until the ANSF can demonstrate it possesses dominant combat capability over Taliban forces, the Coalition cannot place the responsibility of national security in the hands of the Afghan Army. Coalition forces intend to begin gradually withdrawing prior to December 2014, with the final turnover of security operations by the end of December 2014. Currently, Coalition forces provide the overwhelming majority of security to the ANSF through force projection and through the conduct of offensive operational missions. If the ANSF is not prepared to undertake security missions as the number of Coalition troops gradually decreases, a heavy burden will be placed on the remaining troops. The additional operational burden coupled with the unavailability of combat power (manpower and equipment) once provided by the withdrawing forces may lead to additional Coalition casualties (over 1,200 US service members have died in Afghanistan since 2010). A reduced troop and equipment presence also equates to a decreased capability for Coalition troops to provide internal security as they spread thin to cover all missions. This means Coalition troops will be more susceptible to “green on blue” attacks which have become increasingly frequent (up from two in 2007 to 37 in 2012).

c. Unacceptable Delay: If the MSFV requirement is competed, there would be unacceptable program delays, which would severely negatively impact the ANSF’s ability to maintain national security in Afghanistan and achieve dominant combat capability over Taliban forces by 31 December 2014. In addition, this would ultimately set back the timeline for the strategic withdrawal of Coalition forces from Afghanistan. A competitive Technical Data Package (TDP) is not available for this procurement because TMLS owns the TDP for the vehicle configurations and has refused to sell this to the U.S. Government on multiple occasions. Therefore, in order to award to any manufacturer other than TMLS, the Government would have to develop a competitive performance specification. Based on historical data captured under previous complex vehicle system procurements such as the Stryker and M1117 ASV, the Government estimates developing a competitive specification for each of the three variants would take approximately six months (two months per variant). Once the requirement was ready for competition, the Government estimates developing a competitive acquisition plan and making a competitive best value award would take approximately eight months, to include soliciting the requirement, evaluating offers, and selecting the successful company. Once award is made, the new contractor would be required to manufacture the three variants and undergo performance, reliability, and live fire testing, which would take an additional six months. Once the vehicle variants have successfully passed testing, the new contractor would be required to provide training to ANSF operators and maintainers, which would take an additional 18 months. Therefore,
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competing this requirement would take at least three years from start to finish. Thus, even if the competitive process commenced immediately, vehicles could not be fielded and effectively utilized until 2016, well beyond the Coalition’s 2014 drawdown deadline.

d. Duplication of Cost: Issuing a competitive solicitation would result in a substantial duplication of cost which is not expected to be recovered through competition. Prior to awarding Contract W55HZV-11-C-0114 on 21 January 2011 for the initial quantity of MSFVs and associated support, the Government determined, based on previous procurements of similar complexity, the costs associated with a competitive procurement would exceed $125M and would not be recovered through competition. Any potential new contractor would be required to design, manufacture, produce, test, and train the ANSF on the vehicles before a single vehicle could be fielded and utilized.

e. TMLS is the only known source with the knowledge and expertise to fulfill this requirement without adversely impacting cost, schedule, and continuity of the existing ANSF fleet. TMLS is the MSFV Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) as well as the configuration manager of the variants required by the ANSF and has supplied these vehicles and the associated support for prior ANSF requirements. Further, TMLS has already undergone and passed all requisite testing, including performance, reliability, and live fire testing and is in current production of the MSFVs to support the ANSF so there is no start up time required to begin producing this requirement. Moreover, TMLS has already developed and implemented operator and maintainer training programs. Therefore, not only is the ANSF familiar with the operation and maintenance of the TMLS MSFV based on this training, but no additional time would be required to develop or implement new operator and maintainer training procedures. Award to TMLS provides the unique advantage of commonality of parts among the variants and allows for uniform training and economies of scale received through a common parts supply. Finally, TMLS has experienced and knowledgeable personnel immediately on hand to continue to successfully produce these vehicles in a timely and cost effective manner as well as effectively and efficiently provide training to the ANSF.

6. Efforts to Obtain Competition: No known contractors are attempting to become viable sources for this requirement at this time. While other manufacturers produce similar vehicle systems, none meet all the ANSF requirements. Market research (detailed in Section 6 below) supports TMLS is the only practical source with the requisite system knowledge, experience, and proprietary design to meet the ANSF requirements. In addition, TMLS is the only source which has proven capabilities of meeting the needs of the ANSF, has the required logistical support in Afghanistan, and can meet the required delivery schedule. At the subcontracting level, TMLS will be required to competitively place purchase orders and contracts to maximize competition of components and parts. FAR 52.219-9 entitled “Competition in Subcontracting” will be incorporated into the resulting contract to maximize competition in subcontracting efforts. The contract will also include FAR Clause 52.219-9 entitled “Small Business
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Subcontracting Plan,* for promotion and utilization of small business concerns in subcontracting opportunities. During negotiations, positive subcontracting goals will be sought for all socio-economic/small business categories. No actions, other than those outlined above, have been taken to obtain competition for this requirement.

7. Actions to Increase Competition: The TDP has not and cannot be purchased by the Government. The latest request to purchase the TDP from TMLS was made via email on 13 August 2012. TMLS responded to this request in an email dated 14 August 2012 stating it would not sell the TDP to the Government. To protect the interest of the Government and to promote competition at the subcontract level, applicable Technical Data clauses, as required by DFARS 227.71, will be incorporated into the contract. There are no plans for future procurement of this system.

8. Market Research: After receiving correspondence from CSTC-A in March 2012 outlining this as a potential requirement, Product Director Allied Tactical Vehicles (PD ATV) conducted market research for this requirement during the period of March through June 2012, when the MCR was received. This assessment included internet searches, review of technical publications/catalogs, and review of other industry literature available online. The research indicated the limiting factors for obtaining competition for this procurement were the enclosed turret with daytime sight, 10 passenger occupancy and enhanced survivability protection requirements, as well as the commonality among the required variants. Market research revealed no other source capable of meeting all of these requirements. Ultimately, results from the PD ATV market assessment concluded the MSFV produced by TMLS is the only vehicle system capable of meeting all of the requirements of the ANSF.

9. Interested Sources: To date, one other source has written to express interest in the MSFV requirements. In a letter dated 11 May 2011, Oshkosh Defense proposed the M-1114 All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) platform as an alternate to the MSFV produced by TMLS. The proposed vehicle was subsequently evaluated by the Product Manager Armored Security Vehicle (PM ASV) engineering team. This evaluation determined the M-ATV does not meet the enclosed turret (MSPV Model 155001) or 10 passenger occupancy (MSPV Model 155001) requirements, which are critical performance requirements. Although Oshkosh indicated the M-ATV platform could be modified to possibly meet the ANSF requirements, it had not yet designed, manufactured or tested this hypothetical vehicle. Therefore, PM ASV determined additional time and costs required to modify and test an M-ATV variant which does not yet exist would cause the program to incur duplicative costs and unacceptable delays, resulting in our failure to meet the ANSF fielding schedule and ultimately delay the Coalition withdrawal effort.

This requirement will be synopsisized and posted on FedBizOpps website in accordance with FAR 5.201. Should additional sources respond to the synopsis, their proposals and/or capability statements will be evaluated by the requiring office.
10. Other Factors:

a. Procurement History: Contract W56H2V-11-C-0114 was awarded to TMLS as an Undesirable Contractual Action (UCA) on 21 January 2011 and definitized on 8 June 2012, in the total amount of $79.7M, to procure 18 test vehicles, associated test support, and test support packages. This award also included refurbishment of seven test vehicles, 41 production vehicles, field and sustainment tools, and spare parts. A J&A citing FAR 6.302-2, "Unusual and Compelling Urgency" was approved for this action by the Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC) on 15 December 2010.

On 26 May 2011, the contract was modified (P00004) to include a UCA for 240 production vehicles and options for 200 additional vehicles, training, Field Service Representative (FSR) support, field and sustainment tools, training aids, translation of manuals, and spare parts. All vehicle options have been exercised under this action. A J&A citing FAR 8.302-1, "Only One Responsible Source and No Other Supplies or Services Will Satisfy Agency Requirements" was approved for this action by the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (ASA(AL&T)) on 15 April 2011. On 26 July 2012, Work Directive 001, originally issued under Modification P00004, was modified (P00025) to include one year of on-the-job maintenance training for the ANSF. This effort provides practical hands-on training for the ANSF, reinforcing the classroom-based training and in identifying, validating, and sourcing components organic to the MSVs. This UCA was definitized on 28 September 2012 in the total amount of $452M.

b. Acquisition data availability: The US Government does not own the TDP for the MSFV. TMLS declined to sell the TDP to the Government on several occasions.

c. Subcontracting Competition: TMLS will be required to competitively price purchase orders and contracts to maximize competition of components and parts. TMLS currently has an approved subcontracting plan under existing contracts with ACC-WRN; however, because this is a new effort, a new subcontracting plan will be required. The contract will include FAR Clause 52.244-5 entitled, "Competition in Subcontracting," which requires the contractor to select subcontractors on a competitive basis to the maximum practical extent. The contract will also include FAR Clause 52.219-9 entitled, "Small Business Subcontracting Plan," for promotion and utilization of small business concerns in subcontracting opportunities. During negotiations, positive subcontracting goals will be sought for all socio-economic/small business categories.
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11. Technical Certification: I certify that the supporting data under my cognizance which are included in the justification are accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Name: William M. Burff
Colonel, US Army

Signature: [Signature]

Title: Project Manager
Transportation Systems

Date Reviewed: 2 Jan 2013

12. Requirement Certification: I certify that the supporting data under my cognizance which are included in the justification are accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Name: Richard W. Dennis

Signature: [Signature]

Title: Brigadier General, US Army
DCOM - Army

Date Reviewed: [Date]

13. Fair and Reasonable Cost Determination: I hereby determine that the anticipated cost to the Government for this contract action will be fair and reasonable. The Contractor’s proposal will be reviewed using cost analysis techniques and DCAA audit recommendations to discern whether the costs proposed are current and justifiable. The final negotiated agreement shall give full consideration to all contractual requirements, including delivery schedule, to support a determination of fair and reasonable prices for this effort. A certificate of current cost and pricing data is required.

Name: Craig A. Goeppe

Signature: [Signature]

Title: Contracting Officer

Date Reviewed: 3 Jan 2013

14. Contracting Officer Certification: I certify that this justification is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Name: Craig A. Goeppe

Signature: [Signature]

Title: Contracting Officer

Date Reviewed: 3 Jan 2013
CMO Control Number: 2013-018

APPROVAL

Based on the foregoing justification, I hereby approve the procurement of 135 Mobile Strike Force Vehicles from the Textron Marine & Land Systems, an operating unit of the Textron Systems corporation on an other than full and open competition basis pursuant to the authority of Title 10 United States Code Section 2304(c)(1) as implemented in Federal Acquisition Regulation 6.302-1(a)(2)(v)(B), "Only One Responsible Source and No Other Supplies or Services will Satisfy Agency Requirements." The approval of this procurement is subject to availability of funds, and provided that the services and property herein described have otherwise been authorized for acquisition. The total estimated value of this action is $114 million.

Date: FEB 1 2013

Signature: 

Heidi Shyu
Senior Procurement Executive
38. Senator Wicker. General Dunford, has ISAF or CENTCOM conducted a cost analysis that provides a side-by-side comparison of executing the sole-source contract for the MSFVs against upgrading and transferring the in-country MRAP vehicles to the Afghans?

General Dunford. Yes. The initial decision to procure 488 MSFVs was made in fiscal year 2010 after market research determined that the MRAP variants did not meet the CSTC–A’s operational requirements relating to an enclosed turret with day/night sight. In June 2012, an additional requirement of 135 MSFVs to outfit additional units was validated and implemented. The justification to sole-source the additional 135 MSFVs was based on the following:

- maintaining fleet commonality to increase operational flexibility and reduce procurement, logistical, and training burdens.
- preventing an unacceptable program delay which would severely and negatively impacted the ANSF’s ability to maintain security and achieve dominant combat capability prior to the transition on December 31, 2014.
- reducing substantive duplicate costs incurred by issuing a competitive solicitation. The estimated costs associated with competitive procurement would have exceeded $125 million and would not have been recovered through competition.

Additional rationale considered:

- The MSFV is distinguished by armored protection around both the occupants and the major automotive platform as opposed to the occupant-centric tactical vehicle protection provided to MRAPs, where the engine and transmission are more vulnerable to small arms and other attacks.
- The chosen way-ahead leverages the only known source (Textron Marine and Land Systems) with the knowledge and expertise to fulfill the requirement without adversely impacting the cost, schedule, and continuity of the existing ANSF fleet.

STATUS OF DR. SHAKEEL AFRIDI

39. Senator Wicker. General Dunford, there is no doubt that our operations against Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations rely upon assistance from foreign nationals who are willing to risk their lives to help us. It is widely understood that Dr. Shakeel Afridi played an important role in helping the United States determine the whereabouts of Osama Bin Laden. His bravery was rewarded by a 33-year jail sentence for treason. I am concerned that our failure to secure the release of Dr. Afridi will be seen by others as an indication that the risk of aiding the United States is too great, no matter how important the target. Can you provide me a status update on Dr. Afridi? If your office is unable to, would you request that your colleagues in CENTCOM provide me with this update?

General Dunford. The DOS is responsible for handling and working the details of Dr. Afridi’s situation and can better update you on his status.

40. Senator Wicker. General Dunford, are you aware of ongoing efforts by the United States to secure his freedom?

General Dunford. The DOS is responsible for handling and working the details of Dr. Afridi’s situation and can better update you on his status.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

41. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, Sergeant Bergdahl was captured by the Taliban on June 30, 2009, in Paktika province. Can you provide an update on Sergeant Bergdahl’s situation, as well as your efforts to find him and bring him home?

General Dunford. I can assure you that finding and rescuing Sergeant Bergdahl remains a top priority. The military effort to bring Sergeant Bergdahl home is as strong as it has ever been and there are many people, within DOD and throughout the U.S. Government, who are committed to this goal. This effort will not cease until it is successful and he is safely brought back to the United States and reunited with his family.
FAILURE IN AFGHANISTAN

42. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, if we rush to the exits or provide an insufficient force after 2014, what would failure in Afghanistan potentially look like?

General Dunford. A drawdown that is too hasty would pose risks to the viability of the Afghan Government. We would expect a resurgence in insurgent influence. Diminished access to resources would exacerbate tendencies to aggregate wealth, leading to intense competition and a probable return to factional fighting (renewed civil war) as powerbrokers—including insurgent commanders—sought to secure their positions and interests. The conflict between these groups would likely be protracted, as regional players would become entangled in providing calibrated support to groups deemed favorable to the interests of those regional actors. Government and powerbroker groups have already amassed the degree of resources required to extend a conflict for resources. We would likely see a refugee outpouring similar to the early 1980s, if renewed civil war hindered Afghans’ abilities to provide for their families. An increase in ungoverned spaces would allow hostile non-state actors the freedom to train and operate in Afghanistan.

43. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, if we fail in Afghanistan, what could be the impact on U.S. national security interests?

General Dunford. We came to Afghanistan as a result of September 11 to ensure that the Taliban did not harbor al Qaeda and al Qaeda didn’t have the space within which they could plan and conduct further operations against Western interests. We also wanted to preclude a resurgence of Taliban rule, which provided the opportunity to al Qaeda to operate from sanctuaries in Afghanistan. Those objectives are unchanged and continue to retain international support as evidenced by the 50-nation coalition created over the last decade. Failure in Afghanistan would provide an opportunity for al Qaeda and other extremist groups to reestablish safe havens from which to plan and conduct transnational terrorist acts. Furthermore, failure in Afghanistan would have detrimental effects on the stability of Pakistan, a country with nuclear weapons that is already battling a significant terrorist problem.

AFGHAN FIGHTING SEASON

44. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, do you have the forces and resources you need for this fighting season?

General Dunford. Yes, I have all the forces and resources that I require to support the ANSF as they take the security lead for the 2013 fighting season. ISAF will have approximately 97,000 troops during the upcoming fighting season. The troop requirements for this fighting season reflect a bottom-up developed plan that reflects the troop requirements as seen by subordinate commanders in support of the overall ISAF campaign plan and the subordinate commands’ seasonal orders framework. This plan was presented to and approved by Joint Forces Command-Brunssum and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe.

45. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, do you anticipate having to drawdown U.S. forces during the fighting season?

General Dunford. Our current planning does include significant troop reductions during the fighting season as we transition from the 68,000 to 34,000 U.S. forces in Afghanistan. In order to reduce turbulence, we will execute as many troop reductions as possible during already planned troop rotation periods. This is accomplished by not replacing troops as they reach the scheduled end of their deployments. Some of these troop rotations will occur during the fighting season.

46. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, do you believe you have the discretion to wait until after the fighting season concludes?

General Dunford. Yes. Based upon the guidance I have received from my chain of command, I believe I have the flexibility to manage the transition from the 68,000 force to the 34,000 force as I deem best supports the mission as long as I accomplish this transition by the February 12, 2014, date directed by the President in his State of the Union address.

47. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, what would be the dangers to our mission, and to our troops, if the plan was changed and you were forced to withdraw a significant number of troops during this fighting season?

General Dunford. An accelerated reduction of troops during the fighting season would jeopardize our ability to provide the support that our ANSF partners require
as they transition into the lead for national security for the first time during this campaign. This would also challenge our ability to maintain coalition cohesion as many of our international partners count on valuable enabler support that we provide, such as intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, route clearance, and medical evacuation.

An accelerated withdrawal would also increase our vulnerabilities to attack as it would challenge my ability to balance the flow of troop withdrawal with maintaining the capabilities required to secure our base camps and our lines of communication at a time when the enemy is at his strongest. Most importantly, though, would be the erosion in confidence within the ANSF, the GIRoA, the Afghan people, and within our coalition. This fighting season will be critical to establishing confidence in a positive future in Afghanistan.

48. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, if at any point this year or next year you feel that the pace of the drawdown is endangering our troops or the mission outcome, will you provide that professional military judgment not only to your chain of command, but also to this committee?

General Dunford. Yes.

49. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, how are your subordinate leaders going to manage the competing demands of conducting the mission while preparing to withdraw?

General Dunford. We have done a great deal of planning to examine the methodology for redeployment. This is not necessarily new, as we did reduce our force level from the height of the surge in 2012. As the ANSF take the lead for security across Afghanistan in the summer of 2013 and effectively counter the insurgency, the nature of our mission will change to a supporting role. We will still be supporting the ANSF this year in great enough numbers to ensure their success, but our mission demands will lessen and enable us to redeploy forces, balancing risk to mission and risk to force.

AFGHAN ELECTIONS

50. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, compared to previous elections, to what extent will U.S. and NATO forces be able to offer point and/or area security during key electoral processes—particularly on Election Day and during an extended election results aggregation period lasting several weeks?

General Dunford. We are going to do whatever we need to do to support the Afghan security forces in establishing an operational environment within which free, fair, and legitimate elections can take place. To have participatory elections, effective elections, elections that are accepted as legitimate, we’re going to have the right security environment to do that. Our focus as a coalition is to support the ANSF as they set the environment within which the elections take place. The ANSF are planning to provide layered security with a unity of effort during the elections period, integrating Afghan Local Police, Afghan Uniformed Police, ANA, and Afghan Special Forces. Confidence from a successful 2013 fighting season will set the conditions for successful presidential elections. ISAF’s role will be to support the ANSF and to be prepared to provide in extremis support to the international community, if required.

51. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, in the previous election, women candidates and candidates representing ethnic minorities had their election activities severely curtailed due to physical security concerns. What actions and support can the international forces offer in this regard?

General Dunford. We are going to do whatever we need to do to support the Afghan security forces in establishing an operational environment within which free, fair, and legitimate elections can take place. To have participatory elections, effective elections, elections that are accepted as legitimate, we’re going to have the right security environment to do that. Our focus as a coalition is to provide support, such as logistics and air support, if required, to the ANSF to ensure a secure environment within which legitimate elections can take place.

52. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, what about for other candidates, voters, and poll workers in insecure areas?

General Dunford. We are going to do whatever we need to do to support the Afghan security forces in establishing an operational environment within which free, fair, and legitimate elections can take place. To have participatory elections, effec-
tive elections, elections that are accepted as legitimate, we’re going to have the right security environment to do that. Our focus as a coalition is to provide support, such as logistics and air support, if required, to the ANSF to ensure a secure environment within which legitimate elections can take place.

53. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, some elements within the Afghan Security Forces contributed to electoral fraud and malpractice problems in 2009 and 2010. To a certain extent this was due to insufficient training on their roles and responsibilities during the electoral process, generally, and on Election Day, in particular. What is the U.S. military planning that will ensure the ANA, ANP, and Afghan Local Police are better prepared in 2014?

General Dunford. We have focused over the last few years on growing the quantity of the Afghan forces. Now that we have the quantity and the structure in place, we are focused on improving the quality of the force. When I look out at the security environment right now and the relative strength of the Taliban and the relative strength of the ANSF, I know they will be able to provide adequate security for the elections in 2014 with our support. Additionally, the Afghans have started the planning process to support the elections much earlier than in previous elections, nearly 14 months ahead, giving the ANSF more time to adequately prepare. The ISAF has also developed a supporting plan to ensure that ISAF is better prepared to support the ANSF in its security role for the 2014 elections. Credible ANSF stewardship is crucial to the successful completion of elections; their preparation will include training on proper procedures, actions, roles, and responsibilities in support of Afghanistan’s free, fair, and legitimate elections.

54. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, additionally, a significant amount of electoral fraud in 2010 was committed during counting and tabulation of results. The Independent Electoral Commission is currently contemplating moving the count from 6,000 polling centers to large provincial count centers. This means there would be large stationary targets counting ballots for weeks. Would international security forces and Afghan Security Forces be able to secure such vulnerable temporary compounds for such a length of time?

General Dunford. Yes. We are going to do whatever we need to do to support the Afghan security forces in establishing an operational environment within which free, fair, and legitimate elections can take place; this includes ensuring Afghan security forces and Afghan Security Forces be able to secure such vulnerable temporary compounds for such a length of time?

General Dunford. Yes. We are going to do whatever we need to do to support the Afghan security forces in establishing an operational environment within which free, fair, and legitimate elections can take place; this includes ensuring Afghan security forces will be capable of securing large temporary count centers during the election period. To have participatory elections, effective elections, elections that are accepted as legitimate, we’re going to have to have a secure environment. Our focus as a coalition is to provide support to the ANSF so they may ensure a secure environment within which the elections take place.

55. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, if there is a provincial count—what training would the military be able to provide, specifically on ballot security from polling station to counting centers?

General Dunford. Our focus as a coalition is to provide support, such as logistics and air support, if required, to the ANSF to ensure a secure environment within which legitimate elections can take place. The ANSF will provide the necessary security along lines of communication between polling stations and counting centers and are capable of conducting route security training to meet these requirements.

U.S. COMMITMENT

56. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, do some Afghans fear that the United States may abandon Afghanistan?

General Dunford. Abandonment is a key theme of the Taliban narrative. We do not believe wide segments of the Afghan population view the ISAF drawdown as abandonment. Afghans are uncertain about their future and that of Afghanistan. Perceptions of ISAF “abandonment” would likely derive from two primary anxieties: (1) deteriorating security conditions and increase of local violence as ISAF reduces its footprint; and (2) Afghanistan’s economic viability post-2014. We believe Afghans delink the ISAF drawdown and the provision of security; according to the Afghan National Quarterly Assessment Report, 80 percent of Afghans believe the government is the primary provider of security in Afghanistan. However, we believe Afghans are concerned about their future, and likely link fears of a precipitous drop in post-2014 international economic assistance with anxieties over “abandonment.”
57. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, what are the implications of those sentiments?

General Dunford. Although we believe the majority of Afghans harbor concerns about the post-2014 environment, potentially negative outcomes likely to trigger hedging behavior are too remote for most Afghans to pursue hedging measures now. At this juncture, non-elites are likely preserving their options, and their current hedging posture is best described as minimal or preliminary. Elite Afghans have greater access to information and resources with which to hedge. Accordingly, we have observed examples of elites hedging, but for most of the population, we assess conditions have not yet reached a point where Afghans feel they need to firmly commit to hedging strategies.

58. Senator Ayotte. General Dunford, how can we best convey an enduring U.S. commitment to the Afghan people?

General Dunford. Political reconciliation and elections remain our strategic priorities. We can support both processes and significantly change the dynamic for the 2013 fighting season with an expeditious signing of the U.S.-Afghan BSA and NATO SOFA. The BSA and NATO SOFA will form the cornerstone of our narrative. Timely completion of these international agreements, properly integrated with our transition to train, advise, and assist, will undermine the Taliban’s messages of abandonment and characterization of the coalition forces as occupiers. Today, a clear demonstration of our will, endurance, and commitment is required to advance the campaign. A reinvigorated and credible narrative in conjunction with Milestone 2013 will positively influence the strategic landscape both within Afghanistan and throughout the region. A consistent and clear coalition-Afghan narrative will set favorable conditions for the political process and enhance prospects of success for Afghans in their first fighting season in the lead.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MIKE LEE

AFGHANISTAN BUDGET UNDERESTIMATION

59. Senator Lee. General Dunford, at the April 10, 2013, news briefing on the defense budget, Under Secretary Robert Hale stated in answer to a question that costs in Afghanistan were $7 to $10 billion higher this year than what we anticipated. This is very troubling in any environment, but especially under the constraints that DOD is currently under. Can you verify if this is correct and give a detailed account for such a massive underestimation?

General Dunford. The $7 to $10 billion shortfall range is correct. OCO budgets are put together 1 to 2 years before execution; a difficult task given the uncertainties that exist in war. In the fiscal year 2013 OCO budget request, DOD estimated that many of the operating costs would decline proportionately with the reduction of troops. What we are seeing in actual execution is that many of these costs will not decline until bases are closed. In addition, DOD did not forecast the closure of the Pakistan ground lines of communication for such an extended period of time, so higher transportation costs arose from using more expensive means and routes. DOD also did not have a good estimate of the total equipment retrograde requirement. In late fiscal year 2012, CENTCOM stood up a Material Retrograde Element to manage the retrograde efforts and can now provide a better estimate of the retrograde requirement.

60. Senator Lee. General Dunford, as the United States and Afghanistan negotiate for a troops presence in the country, can we continue to expect similar miscalculations in the future as referenced in the question above?

General Dunford. I believe that as our force footprint is reduced and we enter into a more stable train, advise, and assist relationship with Afghanistan after 2014, budget fluctuations will become more predictable and less distinct in magnitude. I would also like to note that USFOR–A is committed to being a good steward of our citizens’ tax dollars. Within USFOR–A, for example, we have self-identified over $9 billion in cost savings and cost avoidance during fiscal years 2012 and 2013.

AFGHAN GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION

61. Senator Lee. General Dunford, a U.N. report in February stated that Afghanistan lost $3.9 billion in 2012 due to public sector corruption. That’s twice the economic revenue of the entire Afghan Government. The high level of corruption in Afghanistan poses a great problem for ISAF and the future of Afghanistan. What is
your assessment of the level of corruption at all levels of government in Afghanistan and the anti-corruption efforts of the Afghan Government?

General DUNFORD. I am convinced that corruption represents a strategic risk to Afghanistan and contributes to negative perceptions of the government by the Afghan people and donor nations. The climate of impunity, as well as a lack of control mechanisms, must be addressed in the coming years in order for the GIRoA to succeed and endure.

While conditions vary significantly by ministry or agency, I assess that there is corruption at differing levels of the Afghan Government. That said, certain GIRoA ministries are performing better than others. The February 2013 Transparency International Report assessed levels of corruption within the Afghan MOD as lower than in other ministries and better than in many other emerging nations.

[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the committee adjourned.]