

Senate Armed Services Committee
Advance Policy Questions for Lieutenant General Douglas Schiess, U.S. Space Force
Nominee for Appointment to be Chief of Space Operations of the Space Force

Duties

Section 9082 of title 10, United States Code, describes the duties and functions of the Chief of Space Operations of the Space Force.

What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the Chief of Space Operations of the Space Force?

Response: The Chief of Space Operations (CSO), acting under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Air Force, is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping the United States Space Force to provide combat-ready space forces to the Joint Force. In that capacity, the CSO is responsible for the health, discipline, readiness, modernization, and professional development of the Service; for presenting integrated force design recommendations for space systems of the Armed Forces; and for ensuring Guardians have the systems, training, infrastructure, and leadership required to defend U.S. interests in, from, and to space. Further, as part of the responsibilities to equip the force, the CSO assists the Secretary of the Air Force to perform certain acquisition-related functions, as described in 10 USC 3104; if confirmed, I will execute these authorities as part of my core responsibilities, and will do so in appropriate partnership with the Department of the Air Force Secretariat and other acquisition elements of the Department of War.

As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CSO also provides independent military advice through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, the Secretary of War, and Congress. If confirmed, I would approach those duties with fidelity to the Constitution, respect for civilian control, a commitment to apolitical military advice, and a clear focus on providing combat-credible space forces to deter aggression and, if necessary, prevail in conflict.

What background and experience, including joint duty assignments, do you possess that you believe qualify you to perform these duties?

Response: My qualifications to serve as the third Chief of Space Operations are built upon the education, training, and operational experiences I have collected over a 34-year career focused on military operations. I have served in operational, staff, and command tours at multiple echelons that have prepared me to lead and serve Guardians while four (4) staff tours at the Pentagon have developed my understanding of DoW corporate processes and prepared me to work with Congress, the White House, the Office of the Secretary of War leadership, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I served in joint assignments under US Central Command and US Space Command and also participated in

multinational operations giving me experience in coalition and international partnerships. Most importantly, for the last year I have served in the Office of the Chief of Space Operations (the Space Staff) as the Deputy Chief of Space Operations for Operations where I have been responsible for space operations, logistics and sustainment, training and readiness. In this role, I have developed and implemented the Service's foundational processes, policies and organizational constructs. In my current role I have also served as the USSF's Operations Deputy to the CSO for all Joint Staff matters. Those assignments have reinforced a central lesson: space power is no longer a supporting afterthought. It is a warfighting requirement that must be designed, trained, exercised, and resourced with the same seriousness as every other domain. If confirmed, I am committed to enhancing US Space Force partnerships within the Department of the Air Force as well as with the other services, joint staffs and OSW teammates.

Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of the Chief of Space Operations of the Space Force, particularly in regard to serving as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in performing certain acquisition-related functions?

Response: Yes. If confirmed, I will continuously seek to enhance my ability to perform the duties of the Chief of Space Operations to the level our Guardians deserve, and our nation demands. In my current position as Deputy Chief of Space Operations for Operations in the Space Staff, I am familiar with Service-level resourcing and acquisition efforts; however, an expanded understanding of Space Force acquisition issues will enhance my ability to serve as CSO. If confirmed, my initial efforts will focus on the integration between force employment and force deployment that are beyond the scope of my current responsibilities. My focus would be on three areas: first, ensuring force design is tightly connected to acquisition programs, operational plans and combatant command requirements; second, ensuring requirements decisions are informed by realistic threat timelines and fielding speed; and third, ensuring that my military advice as a Joint Chief is integrated, candid, and grounded in operational consequences. In order to properly represent Guardians across the DoW, I will also prioritize developing personal working relationships with the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the other Service chiefs, the Combatant Commanders, and OSW leadership. Finally, I will place a high priority on expanding my relationships with members of Congress and their staffs, as I believe it is vital to have mutual trust, respect and open communications between us if we are going to collectively ensure the effectiveness of the US Space Force.

If confirmed, what innovative ideas would you consider providing to the Secretary of the Air Force for enhancing the organization, training, and equipping of the Space Force?

Response: If confirmed, I would recommend that the Space Force continue building a warfighting Service organized around lethality, mission effectiveness, speed, and accountability. That would include simplifying command relationships where possible, strengthening field command responsibility for readiness, maturing the presentation of space forces to combatant commanders, and using Combat Forces Command,

STARCOM, and the service components to align training, force generation, and operational demand.

For training, I would focus on realistic contested-domain training, live-virtual-constructive environments, and mission ready crews. I believe the Space Force must be able to combine operators (space, cyber and intelligence), acquisition professionals, and industry partners into high-performing teams that can out-learn and out-field our adversaries.

For equipping, I would work with the Secretary of the Air Force to continue the USSF efforts to enhance our acquisition workforce to meet the service needs to include the organization efforts for our Portfolio Acquisition Executive offices. I additionally would focus on launch infrastructure growth and resiliency to support our increasing demand for launch capability. I would ensure we continue to build our testing enterprise to ensure we can rapidly bring new capabilities to operational acceptance and presentation to combatant commands. If confirmed, this work would include cross agency work with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and our industry partners to align priorities and investments to support National Security Objectives.

What are your goals, if confirmed, for the transformation of the Space Force to meet new and emerging threats?

Response: If confirmed, my goals would be to field combat-ready forces, build and retain elite Guardian talent, and deliver space superiority as a core requirement for joint warfighting. That means continuing the transformation of the Space Force from the pre-Service organization historically optimized to provide exquisite space support into a warfighting Service able to protect friendly space capabilities, deny adversary use of space-enabled attack, and provide the President and Secretary of War with independent military options across the spectrum of conflict.

I believe this transformation requires resilient architectures; credible space control capabilities able to be employed across the spectrum of conflict; modern missile warning and tracking; protected and proliferated SATCOM; resilient PNT; space domain awareness to include cislunar; cyber and electromagnetic protection; operationally relevant test and training infrastructure; and the right force size to turn advanced systems into combat power. If confirmed, I will continually look for innovative ways to engage with mission partners to strengthen Space Force combat capability.

Section 9082(d)(4) of title 10 provides that (subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Air Force), that the Chief of the Space Force shall “exercise supervision, consistent with the authority assigned to commanders of unified or specified combatant commands under chapter 6 of this title [10], over such of the members and organizations of the Space Force as the Secretary determines;”

What is your understanding of which members and organizations of the Space Force the Secretary of the Air Force has directed the Chief of Space Operations to exercise supervision and what is the scope of such supervision?

Response: The Secretary of the Air Force has directed the Chief of Space Operations to exercise supervision over the Office of the Chief of Space Operations (Space Staff) and the Space Force's field commands. The scope of that supervision is exercised under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Air Force and includes oversight of Service-level processes for organizing, training, equipping, resourcing, developing, sustaining, and presenting combat-ready space forces. It also includes oversight of force design, readiness, personnel development, programming and budgeting, doctrine, test and training, and ensuring decisions approved by the Secretary are carried into effect. This supervision enables the Chief of Space Operations to ensure the health and readiness of the Service, but it does not confer operational command authority.

For Space Force members and organizations assigned to a combatant command, the combatant commander retains the authorities provided by law. The Chief of Space Operations' supervision is limited to carrying out the Secretary's administrative control responsibilities and ensuring those forces are properly organized, trained, equipped, sustained, and resourced to execute the missions assigned by the combatant commander. If confirmed, I would exercise that supervision through clear standards, disciplined readiness processes, and accountability across the Space Staff and field commands, while fully respecting the statutory authorities of combatant commanders.

If confirmed, how would you exercise meaningful supervision of such members and organizations, while ensuring compatibility with the authorities of the combatant commanders?

Response: If confirmed, I would exercise supervision under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Air Force through clear standards, disciplined readiness and resource processes, and accountability across the Space Staff and field commands. My focus would be ensuring Space Force organizations are properly organized, trained, equipped, sustained, and prepared to present combat-ready forces to the combatant commands. That supervision would include readiness assessments, force design, personnel development, resourcing, sustainment, test and training, and ensuring that approved Department priorities are translated into action at the unit level.

I would fully respect the statutory authorities of combatant commanders. For Space Force members and organizations assigned to a combatant command, my role would not be to direct their operational employment. Rather, I would carry out the Secretary's administrative control responsibilities, monitor readiness and support requirements, and ensure those forces have the Guardians, capabilities, infrastructure, and sustainment necessary to execute the missions directed by the combatant commander. This distinction between Service supervision and combatant command authority is essential to preserving

unity of command while ensuring operational forces remain ready and properly supported.

If confirmed, I would maintain regular engagement with combatant commanders, Space Force service components, and field command leaders to understand operational requirements, identify readiness gaps, and resolve issues that fall within Service authorities. Where requirements, resources, or timelines are not aligned, I would provide the Secretary and combatant commanders with a candid assessment of the resulting risk and recommend actions to reduce it.

If confirmed, what duties and responsibilities would you assign to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Space Force?

Response: If confirmed, I would work with the Secretary of the Air Force to assign the Vice Chief responsibilities that ensure the mechanics of the Service operate effectively. I would expect the Vice Chief to help lead Space Staff processes, oversee readiness and force generation management, guide budget and programming decisions, synchronize personnel and talent initiatives, and ensure that decisions made at headquarters translate into action at field commands and units. I would also rely on the Vice Chief to help integrate the Space Force with the Joint Staff, the Department of the Air Force, combatant commands, and Congress, and to drive execution discipline on the priorities I establish with the Secretary.

2026 National Defense Strategy

The 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS) prioritizes (1) defending the homeland; (2) deterring China in the Indo-Pacific through strength, not confrontation; (3) increasing burden sharing between the U.S. and Allies and partners and (4) supercharging the industrial base.

In your view, does the 2026 NDS accurately assess the current strategic environment, including prioritization of the most critical and enduring threats to the national security of the United States and its allies? Please explain your answer.

Response: The National Defense Strategy correctly specifies and prioritizes the Department's missions for the strategic environment we face. The Strategy is clear-eyed and realistic about the threats to our Nation, and it rightly prioritizes defending the homeland and identifies deterring aggression from the People's Republic of China and the People's Liberation Army as the Department's pacing challenge. Space is a crucial aspect to achieving both objectives and underpins the success of the overall Joint fight—the homeland cannot be defended, and no aggressor can be deterred, without assured access to space, freedom of maneuver in space, and freedom of action in space that protects and enables the Joint Force across all domains. The Space Force's investments are tightly aligned with the National Defense Strategy's priorities and lines of effort which showcase the need for the Space Force to grow. Investing in capabilities provides the President with

options to protect the Nation and the Joint Force and deter and, if necessary, defeat adversaries on multiple fronts.

In your view, does the 2026 NDS correctly specify and prioritize DOD missions in the context of the current strategic environment?

Response: The National Defense Strategy correctly specifies and prioritizes the Department's missions for the strategic environment we face. The Strategy is clear-eyed and realistic about the threats to our Nation, and it rightly prioritizes defending the homeland and identifies deterring aggression from the People's Republic of China and the People's Liberation Army as the Department's pacing challenge.

Space underpins or is central to every mission the Strategy prioritizes: defending the homeland, deterring the pacing challenge, enabling effective burden-sharing, and revitalizing the defense industrial base. None can be achieved without assured access to, freedom of maneuver through, and freedom of action in space that protect and enable the Joint Force across all domains. This is why space superiority is the formative purpose of the Space Force: to ensure freedom of action in space for our forces while denying the same to our adversaries. Space superiority is a prerequisite to Joint Force success. If confirmed, I will organize, train, and equip the Space Force to deliver that space superiority, fielding resilient forces that set the military conditions for deterrence and provide the President and combatant commanders with credible, decisive military options from a position of strength. This is peace through strength applied to the space domain, and I would welcome the opportunity to discuss the specific threats and our response in greater detail in a classified session.

In your view, does the 2026 NDS specify the correct set of capabilities by which the United States can achieve its security objectives in the face of ongoing competition and potential conflict with China and Russia? What do you perceive as the areas of greatest risk?

Response: Yes, the National Defense Strategy identifies the correct threats and sets the right priorities for the space domain, and it is broadly supportive of the forces and capabilities the Space Force brings to the Joint Force to compete, deter, and prevail in conflict.

Space underwrites what the Strategy envisions for our highest-priority objectives. The homeland defense mission depends on assured missile warning and tracking, resilient communications, and space-based sensing. The Strategy's direction to ensure the Joint Force can conduct devastating strikes against any target in the world, including from the U.S. homeland, is only possible with support from credible and capable space forces. Space-based capabilities defeat the tyranny of distance. They are the connective tissue of the long-range kill chains that make timely and effective global strike possible.

However, delivering these effects in a contested domain requires more than support to the Joint Force, it requires the ability to fight for and secure the space domain itself. That is

the purpose of space control: the offensive and defensive operations we conduct to achieve and maintain space superiority. Space superiority is the objective; space control is how we fight for it. This is why space control is inseparable from the Nation's ability to project power and defend the homeland.

Regarding risk, my greatest concern is the pace at which China and Russia are fielding space and counterspace capabilities in growing numbers and at a speed that challenges our ability to keep our strategic advantage. We must be clear-eyed and realistic. Our adversaries are fielding dense, resilient networks of satellites and other platforms for military purposes, and they are increasingly capable of degrading and denying the space capabilities on which our Joint Force depend. Russia has demonstrated both the capability and the resolve to contest control of the space domain in its conflict with Ukraine while China has conducted technological demonstrations of its own capabilities and its will to use them. If we do not match this pace by fielding capable, resilient space forces faster than the threat, we risk ceding the initiative and losing the first engagement in a conflict that extends to space. To mitigate this risk, we must field resilient space forces at speed and scale, develop the right operational concepts, and train our Guardians for that fight now.

If confirmed, I welcome the opportunity to discuss the specific capabilities and threats in greater detail in a classified session.

In your view, how does space and the mission of the Space Force integrate into the NDS?

Response: The mission of the Space Force is to “secure our Nation’s interests in, from, and to space.” The Service achieves this mission and supports the Joint Force by advancing each line of effort articulated in the National Defense Strategy (NDS) through deliberate, doctrine-informed action. The NDS is our roadmap to success on behalf of the President and the American people. The Space Force is defending the homeland by delivering missile warning and missile tracking capabilities in support of Golden Dome for America and maintaining space domain awareness to support timely and actionable decision making. The Space Force is deterring China in the Pacific through strength rather than confrontation by fielding proliferated, defendable constellations and space control capabilities designed to deny an adversary first-mover advantage. Credible warfighting readiness achieved through realistic training, exercises, and combat-ready Guardians is the surest means of deterring conflict while providing the President with operational flexibility and agility. The Space Force is prioritizing American interests through burden-sharing, deepening combined operations, expanding data-sharing arrangements, and integrating allied capabilities into shared operational architectures. Finally, we are supercharging the Nation’s defense industrial base by leveraging commercial innovation at speed and scale to integrate commercial solutions to accelerate capability delivery, expand surge capacity, and reinforce a robust, competitive American space industrial base.

In light of the lines of effort set forth in the 2026 NDS, what other military duties do you anticipate the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the Air Force would assign to you, if confirmed?

Response: If confirmed, my foundational statutory responsibility will be what is assigned by Congress in Title 10, United States Code for the organizing, training, and equipping of our Space Force Guardians to ensure they are ready to protect U.S. and allied interests in space. The 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS) makes it clear that space is a critical warfighting domain essential to every element of our national defense. In light of the NDS lines of effort, if confirmed, I anticipate the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Air Force would assign me several critical, complementary duties:

- Driving Joint and All-Domain Integration: I expect to be tasked with ensuring that Space Force capabilities are seamlessly integrated into Joint warfighting concepts and all-domain command and control architectures. Space superiority is a prerequisite for Joint Force success, and interoperability between Services is key to effectively deterring aggression.
- Accelerating Resilient Space Architectures: A core tenet of the NDS is building a resilient and combat ready Joint Force. I anticipate clear directives from the Secretary to accelerate our transition away from legacy systems and toward a resilient space architecture. As the Force Design Architect for Space Systems, my duty will be to ensure space-based capabilities in the Joint Force can withstand, fight through, and recover from adversary attacks. We will also work with our partners in the other services to ensure that their investment in space are additive to the Joint Force's combat effectiveness and eliminate duplicative investments.
- Deepening Allied and Commercial Partnerships: Deterrence is inherently collaborative. I expect to be assigned duties to aggressively expand our partnerships by deepening interoperability and burden-sharing with our international allies and by leveraging the rapid innovation of the commercial space sector. These partnerships are a strategic advantage our adversaries cannot match.
- I anticipate working closely with the space industrial base to support each of these expanded responsibilities. New approaches to requirements, acquisitions, and operating arrangements call for a more robust and competitive industry.

Major Challenges and Priorities

If confirmed, what is your vision for the Space Force of today? Of the future?

Response: The role of the first CSO was to stand up the Service and set us on a great direction. The second CSO transformed the Space Force into a true warfighting Service. Now, given the criticality of domain for the United States and the ability of our adversaries to contest it, I believe the Space Force must integrate at scale into the Joint Force. This means we must quickly and dramatically grow the people, systems, and

infrastructure that allow us to deliver capabilities to the Joint Force; defend our capabilities to enable the Joint Force to project power; and protect the Joint / Combined Force from space-enabled targeting. If confirmed, I will work every day to fulfil this vision for the Space Force.

The Space Force of the future must be a combat-credible warfighting Service that can gain and maintain space superiority while integrating at scale into the Joint Force. It must develop Guardians who understand joint operational problems, have infrastructure that can sustain combat operations through attack, and capabilities that connect directly to joint command-and-control, targeting, missile defense, nuclear command and control, and all-domain maneuver. The Space Force must ensure we are built to deter aggression across the space domain and provide a multitude of options for the President if any future adversary decides to oppose US national objectives. Additionally, the Space Force must be looking to the future and ensure we are ahead of any potential adversaries trying to gain a strategic foothold, for instance mission growth into cislunar.

What is your vision for how the other armed services and the Space Force will work with each other?

Response: My vision is for the Space Force and the other Armed Services to operate as an integrated Joint Force from the beginning of planning through execution, rather than treating space as a separate supporting function added late in the process. The Space Force should understand the operational problems faced by the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force and design, train, and present space forces that directly support their requirements. In turn, the other Services must plan and train to operate both with assured access to space capabilities and when those capabilities are contested or degraded.

If confirmed, I would deepen that integration through common operational concepts, joint exercises and wargames, interoperable data and command-and-control architectures, and embedded Space Force planners and operators. I would also work closely with the other Service Chiefs to ensure space requirements are incorporated early into doctrine, acquisition, training, and operational planning. The goal is to integrate Space Force Guardians, infrastructure, and capabilities at the scale required by combatant commanders so that space power is inseparable from how the Joint Force fights.

What do you consider to be the most significant challenges you will face if confirmed to be the Chief of Space Operations?

Response: The most significant challenge is balancing urgent readiness for a contested space domain today with the modernization required to win tomorrow. Our adversaries are fielding counterspace capabilities at a rapidly increasing pace that are designed to hold U.S. and allied satellites at risk, while also building space-enabled kill chains to threaten our Joint Force. The Space Force must respond to that challenge by bringing on new capabilities at an even greater pace, educating and training our Guardians for the future, and building the infrastructure and facilities needed to ensure we can achieve Space Superiority at the time and place of our choosing.

What plans do you have for addressing each of these challenges, if confirmed?

Response: If confirmed, I would build off the foundation established by previous CSOs to ensure the nation maintains its advantage in space. First, I would strengthen readiness through advanced training, realistic exercises, and test infrastructure to ensure the most technically proficient and capable warfighting Guardians. Second I would focus on accelerating modernized, resilient, proliferated, defendable, and scalable architectures to integrate into the Joint Force. Third, I would strengthen partnerships with combatant commands, the intelligence community, other Services, allies, commercial providers, and Congress. I would measure progress by whether our Guardians, infrastructure, and capabilities are becoming more integrated into joint plans, exercises, and operations at the scale required by combatant commanders. This will require the normalization of the space domain into the Joint Planning Process and ensuring we have the equivalent ability to present forces as any other domain and service. Additionally, domain awareness is a precondition to achieving space superiority. We therefore need to measure our efforts to sense the domain much like other services have awareness in their domains.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to focus Space Force efforts on addressing each of these challenges, and on what timeline?

Response: If confirmed, I would initially conduct a comprehensive review of readiness, force presentation, modernization, infrastructure, and acquisition priorities. That review would identify the most consequential operational risks, determine where existing plans are not keeping pace with emerging threats, and establish measurable priorities for the Service.

Within the first year, I would focus on improving immediate combat readiness. For Guardians, that would include increasing realistic training, expanding participation in joint exercises, improving advanced education, and ensuring units have sufficient repetitions against representative threats. I would prioritize operational test and training capacity, resilient command-and-control systems, launch and range infrastructure, and facilities required to generate and sustain forces through conflict. I would work with the Secretary of the Air Force to align force design, acquisition, sustainment, and operational acceptance for new systems.

Over the long term, I would seek to field greater capacity in resilient, proliferated, defendable, and scalable architectures; strengthen space domain awareness and command and control; improve the Service's ability to gain and maintain space superiority; and expand integration with joint targeting, missile warning, missile defense, communications, positioning, navigation and timing, and all-domain operations. I would also institutionalize the presentation of space forces to combatant commanders and ensure space requirements are incorporated into joint planning, force development, exercises, and operational assessments on the same basis as the other warfighting domains.

Space has traditionally been fragmented across the Department of Defense and the intelligence community. The congressional intent of creating a Space Force is to consolidate space operations of the armed services under one service.

What is your assessment of this consolidation of other service programs and personnel and what outstanding issues remain?

Response: The Congressional intent behind the creation of the United States Space Force was clear: to eliminate fragmentation, build a unified repository of space expertise, and present a single, cohesive Service to ensure the Joint Force has the offensive and defensive space effects it needs in all phases of competition and conflict. Over the initial years of the Space Force's existence, the Space Force made historic strides toward that vision, but critical work remains. My overall assessment is that the consolidation of other service space programs has been highly successful and is already delivering operational synergies:

- As the Force Design Architect for Space Systems, the CSO now presents coordinated, resilient space force design recommendations directly to the Secretary of War, managing capability planning across the Joint Force.
- For the first time in the Department of War's history, we consolidated all military satellite communication functions under a single service.
- Integrating the Space Development Agency as a direct reporting unit has successfully accelerated our shift toward proliferated low-Earth orbit (pLEO) architectures, proving we can build and field capabilities rapidly.

These integrations demonstrate that a single Service, laser focused on the space domain, can optimize personnel, speed up decision cycles, and eliminate redundant acquisition pipelines. Despite these successes, several critical issues must be addressed to fulfill the original intent of Congress:

- We must ensure that we are not merely sustaining legacy platforms to the detriment of funding the resilient, next-generation systems required to fight and win against peer adversaries. The recent budget increases that Congress authorized will go a long way toward this transformation.
- As we build or integrate new systems, we must budget and burden for the complete lifecycle. This means ensuring every new program explicitly includes funding and planning for operational facilities, training staff, simulators for advanced readiness, and appropriate intelligence support from day one.

What is your assessment of the integration of operations with the intelligence community whose authorities and funding are outlined in title 50 of the United States Code?

Response: Since the Space Force Intelligence Enterprise's addition to the Intelligence Community in January of 2021, we have made significant progress in collaboration, cooperation, and support from Intelligence Community elements for the space domain. Highlights of that progress include the collaboration between the Space Force and Defense Intelligence Agency to transfer Space Domain Awareness missions and capabilities; training and tradecraft support from the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; cryptologic integration and training and mission delegation from the National Security Agency; and continued close mission integration and collaboration with the National Reconnaissance Office. At the policy level, both the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Office of the Under Secretary of War for Intelligence and Security have fully incorporated the Space Force into their respective processes, to ensure space intelligence requirements and operational perspectives are represented alongside those of other Services and domains.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

What is your assessment of the authorities of, and process by which, members of the Joint Chiefs (other than the Chairman) provide military advice and opinions to the President, National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and civilian leadership of the Department of Defense?

Response: In my current capacity as Deputy Chief of Space Operations for Operations, I am the CSO's Operations Deputy (OPSDEP) supporting his role as a Joint Chief and work with the other Service OPSDEPs. I also oversee Space Staff processes that help prepare the CSO to serve as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Based on these specific roles, my assessment is that these processes promote a thorough evaluation of the relevant issues and ensure all viewpoints, positions, rationales and opinions are represented to national leadership. I take seriously my role in supporting the best military advice development process. If confirmed, I will offer my best military advice to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of War, the President and Congress when I am a part of the deliberative process.

If confirmed, would you have any hesitation in providing your best military advice to the President, National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, and civilian leadership of the Department of Defense, even when your advice and opinions might differ from those of the Chairman or the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Response: No, I would have no hesitation in providing my best military advice. If confirmed, I will provide my best military advice, even when that advice differs from the views of the Chairman, other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of War, President, or other leaders. I believe this is a fundamental responsibility of a Service Chief and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Functions of the Space Force

Section 9081 of title 10, United States Code mandates that the Space Force be organized, trained and equipped to “(1) provide freedom of operation for the United States in, from, and to space; (2) conduct space operations; and (3) protect the interests of the United States in space.”

Please describe in your own words your understanding of each of these three functions.

Response: First, I believe providing freedom of operation for the United States in, from, and to space, is the Space Force's most fundamental charge—ensuring that our Nation retains unimpeded access to, and use of, the space domain. "To space" means assured access, our ability to get satellites and capabilities on orbit through resilient launch and range enterprises. "In space" means the ability to maneuver and operate our systems on orbit without denial or degradation by an adversary. And "from space" means preserving the space-enabled capabilities (e.g., position, navigation, and timing; communications; missile warning; and intelligence) that the Joint Force and our nation depend upon every single day. In short, this function is about guaranteeing that neither an adversary's actions nor a contested environment can lock the United States out of a domain that undergirds our economy, our national defense, and our daily life.

Second, conducting space operations is the day-to-day and warfighting execution of our mission—the "how" of what our Guardians do. It encompasses the full range of activities: launching and commanding our systems; maintaining space domain awareness so we can see and understand what is happening across a vast and increasingly congested domain; delivering combat-relevant effects to the Joint Force; and, when necessary, employing space control capabilities to protect our forces. Conducting space operations means we are not merely a support enterprise; we are an operational Service that plans, trains, and executes military operations in and through space as an integral part of the joint fight.

Third, protecting the interests of the United States in space is our responsibility to defend what matters to the Nation in the space domain—both our military capabilities and the broader national and economic interests that space now serves. This means defending our own architectures against a growing array of counterspace threats, deterring aggression through demonstrated readiness and resilience, and promoting responsible, safe, and professional behavior, so that space remains safe, secure, and accessible. As the President and Secretary of War may further direct, it may extend to safeguarding the commercial and allied capabilities woven into our shared architecture. Protecting our interests is ultimately about ensuring that the advantages the United States derives from space, advantages that touch every American, are preserved for this generation and the next.

I believe, taken together, these three functions define why the Space Force exists: to secure the domain, to operate within it with responsibility and excellence, and to defend our nation's enduring interests there.

Space as a Warfighting Domain

Space is often described as “congested and contested.” Please describe your views of this statement and whether you consider space a warfighting domain.

Response: Yes, space is congested. Orbits around the Earth, particularly low earth orbit (LEO), are now populated with tens of thousands of active satellites and large amounts of orbital debris. Proliferated constellations launched by companies have placed thousands of satellites into LEO to provide global internet and communications. China is actively pursuing their own constellations which will require increased awareness of the domain and efficient communication with other space operators to reduce risk of collision and interference that comes from congestion.

Additionally, there are approximately 51,000 trackable pieces of artificial space debris (objects larger than 10 cm) currently orbiting Earth. This tracked population includes operational satellites, defunct satellites, used rocket boosters, and fragmentation debris. Specialists estimate that approximately one million pieces of debris 1 to 10 cm in size exist, largely untracked by current systems, and many more pieces that are even smaller. The problem of orbital debris is particularly pronounced in LEO, where most operational satellites and pieces of space debris reside.

Space is also a contested regime. It is a domain where nations actively vie for diplomatic, information, military, and economic advantage. Our adversaries have developed various counterspace technologies such as kinetic, directed energy, cyber, and electronic warfare – all which can be used to temporarily disable or permanently destroy space assets. Many space technologies are dual-use, meaning they can provide capabilities for beneficial uses or can be misapplied to do harm. These areas include remote sensing (such as imagery); position, navigation, and timing capabilities (e.g., Global Positioning System); and communications bandwidth functions that underpin the daily life of our society.

The Space Force continues to assert that space is indeed a warfighting domain. Military operations in, from, and to space are essential, requiring Guardians to be combat-ready and focused on achieving space superiority to protect both national interests and the Joint Force. I believe we must think of space as a warfighting domain rather than just a collection of support activities. If confirmed, I will work to ensure Guardians are warfighters capable of executing both offensive and defensive operations to deter adversaries.

Near Peer Adversaries

Please describe your assessment of the capabilities for China and Russia relative to section 9081 of 10 United States Code.

Response: I believe our adversary’s fielded and evolving weapons directly threaten the U.S. Space Force’s ability to meet its statutory mandate under 10 U.S.C. § 9081 to secure

United States freedom of operation in, from, and to space and protect national security interests.

China and Russia have actively fielded diverse, operational counterspace architectures while aggressively continuing to develop new capabilities designed to immediately challenge United States' access to and operations in space.

China, the pacing challenge, has already deployed—and continues to rapidly expand—an extensive array of space and counterspace systems across multiple phenomenologies, including ground-based lasers, electronic warfare jammers, and kinetic-kill missiles designed to deny our domain access in a conflict.

Russia maintains operational counterspace systems, including co-orbital weapons and ground-based jammers, while actively developing new threat vectors. Russia is also developing an ASAT capability using a satellite designed to carry a nuclear weapon. Such a capability could pose a threat to all satellites and to the space-enabled services the world depends on.

If confirmed, I will be happy to provide more details in a classified session.

Force Design Architect

Section 1064(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (P.L. 117-81) required the Secretary of Defense to designate the Chief of Space Operations as the Force Design Architect for space systems of the Armed Forces.

What is your interpretation of the Force Design Architect for space systems of the Armed Forces relative to section 9081 of 10 United States Code, space as a warfighting domain, and the abilities of near peer adversaries? Please explain your views in detail.

Response: The Force Design Architect for space systems is a critical responsibility, and it's one that if confirmed I will take seriously. Its fundamental purpose is to drive unity of effort across the Armed Forces for space modernization. That includes defining future architectures, establishing design priorities, and mapping dependencies regardless of which Service is acquiring or operating a given space system. That means the Force Design Architect must continuously evaluate all fielded and programmed Service space capabilities and compare them to Joint requirements, articulating a clear understanding of risk for national leadership. That's the real value of the role. It gives the Nation a focal point for the design of military space forces: a responsible authority that can define the overarching logic that shapes requirements, funding decisions, acquisition efforts, transition timelines, and risk trades across the enterprise. While the Force Design Architect has no authority over the development of other Services, it does provide a driving force to keep them aligned, to baseline their efforts, and to collaborate in pursuit of space superiority against any adversary anywhere at any time. Without this role, I think we would be hard pressed to maintain our advantage in space. The domain is

evolving rapidly every day, and it would be easy for one Service or another to act without understanding the bigger picture. It is the job of the Chief of Space Operations to paint that bigger picture, to communicate it to others, and to keep the Armed Services on track.

Do you support the Chief of Space Operations as the Force Design Architect for space systems of the Armed Forces? Please explain your views in detail.

Response: Yes, I do. For all the reasons that I laid out, I think the Nation needs a Force Design Architect for space systems. As for why it makes the most sense for the Chief of Space Operations to hold that role, the Space Force delivers and operates the vast majority of U.S. military space capability. From missile warning to satellite communications to positioning, navigating, and timing, it is the Space Force that spends every day monitoring the domain, executing the mission, and overcoming threats. More than that, the purpose of the Space Force is to achieve domain superiority in space. We are the ones predominantly responsible for arming US Space Command with the equipment and personnel they need to gain and maintain control. As such, not only does the Space Force best understand what is required to succeed militarily in space, it is also the Service that benefits most from a unified approach to operations in the domain. In other words, the Service Chief of the Space Force is both the individual that is best equipped to be the Force Design Architect as well as the individual who will be most invested in its outcomes.

What is your interpretation of the Space Force being the integrator for joint space requirements?

Response: Being the integrator for Joint space requirements means the Space Force is responsible for bringing together the operational needs of the Combatant Commands and the Services into a single, prioritized, and technically coherent set of space requirements.

As integrator, the Chief of Space Operations must collect and reconcile joint operational needs for space enabled capabilities (e.g., intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; positioning, navigation, and timing; communications; missile warning; and space domain awareness) and translate those needs into clear, testable, and verifiable requirements that can be used to guide acquisition and force design. This includes supporting our sister Service efforts to modernize their equipment, from munitions to ground terminals as we field new capabilities and technologies. Importantly, integration of space capabilities extends beyond just military systems; the Space Force takes an enterprise approach that integrates commercial, allied, and partner space capabilities to the greatest extent practicable.

This role does not replace the authority of other Services to define their own operational requirements, but it ensures that the requirements are integrated into a single, Joint framework that can be resourced and executed effectively when those requirements depend on space.

If confirmed, how will you coordinate the two roles designated as the Force Design Architect and the integrator for joint space requirements? Please explain your views with respect to the authorities of the other armed forces and the Office of the Secretary of Defense as outlined in the Secretary of Defense Memorandum dated August 17, 2022, designating the Chief of Space Operations as the Force Design architect for space systems of the Armed Forces. Please give an unclassified example.

Response: If confirmed, I will coordinate the roles of Force Design Architect (FDA) and integrator for joint space requirements as complementary responsibilities: one defines what the Joint Force needs in space, and the other designs how we deliver those capabilities through a threat informed architecture.

As integrator, the Chief of Space Operations (CSO) should gather, validate, and prioritize joint space requirements from Combatant Commands, the Services, and the Office of the Secretary of War (OSW). As FDA, the CSO should translate those requirements into architectural choices, capability roadmaps, and investment priorities. The CSO must work closely with the Services to ensure space capability designs reflect the Service's domain-specific needs. The CSO would also work with OSW to align resourcing, requirements, and policy.

An example that highlights the importance of alignment between the FDA and joint integration is the recent effort to modernize Narrowband Satellite Communications. While the Space Force launched and operationalized more capable and jam-resistant narrowband satellites, the appropriate user terminals (e.g., those used on Navy ships) faced delays. This led to continued investment in maintaining legacy systems for decades beyond their expected lifecycle, while the modern systems were limited by the availability of user terminals. Aligning Joint Force design with Joint integration would have mitigated this disconnect.

Another example is missile warning and tracking. Combatant Commands and the Services rely on timely, accurate missile warning. As integrator, the CSO would consolidate joint requirements for warning timelines, coverage, classification, and interoperability. As FDA, the CSO would design a resilient, proliferated architecture—potentially combining Geostationary, Medium, Low Earth Orbit, and allied systems—that meet the Service's requirements, account for near peer counterspace threats, and align with OSW acquisition and budget decisions.

If confirmed, I will respect the authorities of the other Services and OSW, consistent with the Secretary of War's August 17, 2022, memorandum, providing integrated, expert recommendations without supplanting Service or OSW decision authority.

Space Intelligence, Surveillances, and Reconnaissance

Many of the traditional Intelligence, Surveillances and Reconnaissance missions for ground and air targets that are currently performed by airborne platforms in support of a

combatant commander's operation are now in the process of moving to space-based platforms.

If confirmed, how will this mission of the Space Force be coordinated in terms of acquisition and operations with the intelligence community which falls under title 50 of the United States Code?

Response: Airborne ISR platforms operate under Title 10 authorities, and moving this sensing to space does not change the intent or authorities for these systems. If confirmed, I will work closely with my counterparts in the IC to ensure the Space Force acquires and operates ISR constellations in accordance with applicable laws and policies. These systems, like space-based moving target indication, are critical to executing the Joint Fight and, therefore, must be under the direct control of warfighting commands.

Acquisition

Section 9016(b)(6)(B)(i) of title 10, United States Code states that the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration shall “be responsible for and oversee all architecture and integration with respect to the acquisition of the space systems and programs of the armed forces, including in support of the Chief of Space Operations under section 9082 of [title 10, United States Code].” In addition, section 9021 of title 10, United States Code authorizes the duties of the Space Acquisition Council whose purpose is to “oversee, direct, and manage acquisition and integration space systems and programs of the armed forces in order to ensure integration across the national security space enterprise” of which, if confirmed, you will be a member.

Please describe how, if confirmed, the duties of a Force Design Architect for space systems of the Armed Forces will integrate with section 9016(b)(6)(B)(i) for the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration.

Response: My duty as the Force Design Architect, if confirmed, will be to define the operational needs of the Space Force and the joint force in the space domain providing a threat-informed and analytically rigorous architecture of the capabilities required for the Space Force and the Joint Force to win. This role is a direct and essential partnership with the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration (ASAF (SA&I)), who implements the necessary systems by developing and executing acquisition strategies to deliver those capabilities. This continuous, collaborative partnership ensures that the systems built are not only technically achievable, but also directly aligned with the warfighting needs.

Please describe, if confirmed, your role on the Space Acquisition Council, and as required by Section 1064(b) the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (P.L. 117-81) your duty as the Force Design Architect on the Space Acquisition Council.

Response: If confirmed, my role as the Force Design Architect will serve to provide operational requirements for the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, responsible for the acquisition of space systems. The CSO's Force Design Architect's responsibilities are critical to deliver U.S. military space capability across the Joint Force. By unifying key stakeholders, the Force Design Architect will establish a clear operational blueprint and deliver defined joint mission needs directly to the acquisition pipeline. This integration ensures a continuous and collaborative transition from concept to execution, enabling the acquisition authority to deliver the space systems needed to meet defined operational needs. If confirmed, I will be an integral part of the Space Acquisition Council and will work with ASAF(SA&I) to ensure that there are no gaps between the operational requirements needed to secure U.S. interests in, to, and from space, and the acquisition processes needed to deliver these systems.

If confirmed as Chief of Space Operations, how would you assist the Secretary of the Air Force in the performance of certain acquisition-related functions, while ensuring compatibility with the duties and responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (primarily established in sections 3104, 9013 and 9016 of title 10, United States Code)? Please give specific examples.

Response: If confirmed, I will support the ASAF (SA&I), as the Space Service Acquisition Executive, by serving as the validation and prioritization authority for military requirements within the Space Force, as well as assisting in defining the budget allocations necessary to develop the acquisition strategies and systems to field critical capabilities at the speed of need. Additionally, if confirmed, I will be responsible for recruiting and training military professionals to ensure the ASAF(S&I) has the appropriate workforce needed to execute acquisition strategies. For any cross-cutting initiatives involving the Joint Staff or the Air Force, I will provide this same support to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Under Secretary of War for Acquisition and Sustainment.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to improve each of the three aspects of the acquisition process—requirements, acquisition, and budgeting?

Response: If confirmed, I will support the full implementation of the Department of War's Warfighting Acquisition System and the acquisition reforms passed by Congress as part of the FY26 National Defense Authorization Act. I believe the alignment of requirements, acquisition, and budgeting into a unified, portfolio-based model is key to delivering integrated capabilities at the speed of relevance. For requirements, this means ensuring they are driven by a continuous, threat-informed Integrated Force Design process, which provides the architectural blueprint for warfighting needs. For acquisition, this means supporting the priorities of the ASAF (SA&I). For budgeting, my focus will be on ensuring funding resources are appropriately aligned to the Program Acquisition Executive portfolios, as well as creating a direct, traceable link from requirements to acquisition strategy and spending.

In confirmed, what actions would you propose, if any, to ensure that requirements are realistic, technically achievable, and prioritized?

Response: If confirmed, I will ensure requirements are realistic by enforcing a process where it is derived directly from a threat-informed and resource-informed Force Design. Technical achievability will be validated through early and continuous collaboration between operational staff and the acquisition community's technical experts. Finally, if confirmed, I will oversee the prioritization of all major requirements to ensure Service investments remain aligned with the most critical warfighting needs.

In confirmed, what specific measures would you recommend to control "requirements creep" in the defense acquisition system?

Response: If confirmed, I believe the most effective measure to control the "requirements creep" is to fully embrace the Warfighting Acquisition System and its ongoing shift from a program-centric model to the portfolio-based model. The program-centric model locks in static requirements baseline for a single program, which is inherently vulnerable to the "creep" as threats and technology evolve. The portfolio-based approach, which empowers Portfolio Acquisition Executives (PAEs), provides a more effective and disciplined solution. Instead of allowing new requirements to destabilize a single program, a PAE can make trades across their entire portfolio, or plan for the new need as a future, deliberate capability iteration. This new approach provides the flexibility to adapt while maintaining discipline within individual program execution.

If confirmed, how would you use your authority to arrest the exponential escalation in cost that, in recent history, has marked the acquisition life-cycle of Service platforms and weapons systems?

Response: While space acquisition authority belongs to the ASAF (SA&I), if confirmed, I will work with the ASAF (SA&I) and provide any military advice on program costs. I will also ensure as I perform the budget submission responsibilities of CSO, program costs will serve as foundational metrics for determining portfolio resource allocations. There is a responsibility to manage the defense budget wisely, therefore, by providing a clear and stable demand signal rooted in the force design, opportunities are created for competition and to give industry the confidence required to make investments in efficiency, ultimately driving down costs for the taxpayer.

In your view, in whom should accountability for large-scale acquisition failures and/or extraordinary cost overruns vest?

Response: Large-scale failures stem from complex, compounding risks and non-isolated points of failure. Maintaining an effective assessment system to understand early warning signs and keep schedules on track, is critical to executing programs within cost and schedule. Despite implementing safeguards, there will be programs that may still fall short of expectations. Meaningful accountability requires a commitment to learning from

mistakes and enforcing program management and contract performance discipline. It will require difficult decisions to be made in collaboration with stakeholders, which includes Congress in its important oversight function. If confirmed, I will support the ASAF (SA&I) priorities to ensure the health of the acquisition system, promote program management discipline, and implement reforms, where needed. I will also develop requirements and budget submissions that adequately account for program needs and mitigate potential schedule slip risks. I will also assist the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics as they hold acquisition program managers accountable for delivering on cost, on schedule, and on performance and ensure our requirements and test community provides them the support needed. I believe this will ensure all involved have clear authorities, stable requirements, and timely access to senior-level decisions.

Are there other roles or responsibilities in the acquisition process that should be assigned to the Chief of Space Operations and the other Service Chiefs, in your view?

Response: In my view, the current role of the Chief of Space Operations, as well as other Service Chiefs, is appropriate and supportive of the acquisition process. The statutory responsibility of the Service Chiefs to provide validated military requirements is critical to the acquisition process. As such, my primary focus would be on executing that core responsibility and providing the acquisition community with clear, stable, and prioritized requirements derived from the Force Design. Furthermore, I believe the Service Chief has a responsibility to partner with the acquisition community to support the professional development of acquirers, ensuring the training and developmental frameworks in place are creating professionals with an understanding of the operational environment our Guardians face.

Section 1802 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 required DOD to create portfolio acquisition executives (PAEs) to lead a portfolio of capabilities with authority for plans, budgets, and execution of programs assigned to the portfolio, including life-cycle management.

If confirmed, what organizational changes, if any, would you propose for the Space Force to implement portfolio acquisition executives?

Response: My understanding is that the Department is moving toward a portfolio-based model, and if confirmed, I will support that effort. I will work with the Secretary of the Air Force and the ASAF (SA&I) to ensure the implementation of Portfolio Acquisition Executives aligns with the Force Design. This allows the Space Force to manage capabilities as integrated portfolios rather than disparate programs, creating a more agile and effective enterprise that can deliver combat ready capabilities at speed.

Please describe your understanding of the transition of Program Acquisition Officer to Program Acquisition Executives, and give specific examples and hurdles in achieving the full transformation envisioned.

Response: My understanding is that the Warfighting Acquisition System's transition from a program-centric to a portfolio-centric model is a necessary evolution in defense acquisition and supported by acquisition reforms recently passed by Congress. A Program Executive Officer was focused on a narrow line of effort with limited authorities, whereas a Portfolio Acquisition Executive is empowered to make trades within a portfolio of programs to achieve a broader warfighting outcome. The primary hurdle is not organizational, but cultural. It will require developing leaders with the skill to manage broad outcomes, comfortable with taking calculated risks, and aligning internal Space Force processes to support this new model of execution, without overcomplicating the new approach.

The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) services the research needs of the Air Force and The Space Force under the concept of "Two Services, One Lab."

In your view, how well do you think that construct works for the Space Force?

Response: The 'One Lab, Two Services' model has proven effective in meeting the science and technology demands of both the Air Force and the Space Force. This construct enables the Space Force to maximize the return on decades of foundational investments in critical national infrastructure, while leveraging world-class subject matter expertise. Ultimately, this unified approach is a strategic necessity to fulfill multi-domain, Joint warfighting requirements that extend to, from, and through the space domain.

Do you have recommendations for how to improve that relationship?

Response: If confirmed, I look forward to learning how to improve this relationship to continuously push the boundaries of science to field technologies at speed in support of daily operations.

Space Force Weapon System Designation

As a title 10 armed service the Space Force is acquiring weapon systems different than other title 10 Services. This is evidenced by Space Force Instructions 13-604 for weapon systems life cycle management, and by 16-403 for weapon systems designation. Likewise CSO Note to Guardians #34, (C-Note #34) dated April 24, 2026, further refines the weapons systems process stating "don't let perfect be the enemy of the good". Please give acquisition examples of space warfighting weapon systems, the developmental and operational acceptance and the effect of "C-Note #34" on this process.

Response: C-Note #34's principle of "don't let perfect be the enemy of the good" reinforces the Department's Warfighting Acquisition System prioritization of speed and adaptability through the fielding of minimum viable products while improving capabilities using rapid, iterative development. This principle empowers our warfighters

to accept systems that meet critical, immediate warfighting needs even if minor technical or logistical deficiencies exist.

For example, the Space Force operationally accepted the Meadowlands in June 2026, a key component of the U.S. military's electromagnetic warfare architecture designed to detect, identify, and disrupt an adversary's communications system. Meadowlands features an open-architecture software system specifically designed to support rapid, flexible updates with future software modifications deployed directly to fielded units. Later this year, the first Weather System Follow-on-Microwave satellite is scheduled for full operational acceptance, following its initial operational milestone in April 2025. This system is part of the Space Force's hybrid weather monitoring architecture, designed to replace legacy systems and provide uninterrupted, mission-critical weather data to warfighters.

Acquisition of Specific Space Systems

The Space Force executes a wide range of acquisition efforts in space in order to support Combatant Command requirements, *synchronized* with ground systems and user terminals. If confirmed, please describe what you would consider to be the most serious issues with the following areas:

Missile Warning, Tracking, and Space Sensing

Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared Satellites

Response: Next-Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (Next-Gen OPIR) Satellites replace aging satellites and provide proven designs to continue the missile warning mission with worldwide coverage. If confirmed, I will ensure there is no lapse in capability during the critical pivot from the legacy Space-Based Infrared System to a future proliferated architecture. The Next-Gen OPIR program is the essential anchor for this transition, designed to provide resilient missile warning against advanced threats while the more affordable and resilient LEO and MEO layers are being fielded.

Proliferated constellations for missile tracking including non-ballistic missiles

Response: Proliferated constellations provide significant advantages in resiliency, persistence, survivability, and reduced warning timelines against increasingly sophisticated threats, including maneuvering and non-ballistic missiles. If confirmed, my focus would center on ensuring the Space Force has the appropriate resources to deliver an integrated, resilient operational missile tracking capability to the Joint Force. Space capabilities must be synchronized and compatible with ground systems, user terminals, battle management systems, and Service-specific fire control networks, a risk that can be mitigated with interoperable systems and open architectures. Satellites alone do not create military advantage; they must deliver timely, trusted data directly to the warfighter. It is also important to support the industrial base and the broader supplier ecosystem with the

correct requirements to indicate a steady demand signal, so industry knows how to adapt to sustain production at the scale required for proliferated architectures.

Space and Ground Weather

Response: Weather information is crucial to mission success for the Combatant Commands, and the Space Force is uniquely positioned to provide this information to the warfighter. A critical issue is that the Space Force will meet these needs by acquiring modernized weather systems while leveraging the nascent and growing commercial weather data industry. If confirmed, I will continue to collaborate with the ASAF (SA&I), as well as defense, civil, commercial, and international partners to ensure terrestrial and space environmental monitoring meets national security needs.

Nuclear Event detection on ground and in space

Response: The U.S. Nuclear Detonation Detection System program has multiple sensors on different satellites and will be going through a new round of sensor production and integration with new satellites in the future. Based on my experience, the most serious issue is to ensure programs have the correct requirements and budget allocations to deliver integrated payloads, and that the ground system upgrades are completed in time to support the launch of the new systems. If confirmed, I will ensure the space community is correctly postured to deliver the new systems.

Intelligence Reconnaissance, and Surveillance

Space Based Air and Ground Movement Target Indicator capabilities to support Combatant Commander requirements, including integration with Battle Management and Control

Response: If confirmed, I believe the Space-Based Moving Target Indicator (SB-MTI) Programs will be critical enablers in closing Long Range Kill Chains by tracking air, ground, and maritime targets. The biggest challenge in delivering SB-MTI is fusing global sensing system data into a coherent battlespace awareness picture with extremely low latency. SB-MTI will provide actionable information on adversary targets to the warfighters in highly contested environments through the Advanced Battle Management Systems, an integral part of Joint All-Domain Command and Control Concept to enable battle management functions.

GPS

GPS III, IIF

Response: Securing our Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) infrastructure against sophisticated electronic warfare is a critical national security imperative. Since any degradation of the GPS capability carries severe economic and military

consequences, the modernization of this enterprise cannot be delayed. To outpace the threat, it is important to rapidly field next-generation GPS IIF satellites and their advanced Regional Military Protection capabilities. If confirmed, I will ensure our space and ground segments are fully aligned to rapidly deliver these vital capabilities to global users. My focus will be on accelerating GPS IIF deployment while ensuring continuous constellation health and readiness

Military Grade User Equipment

Response: The responsibility for Military GPS User Equipment was transferred to the U.S. Air Force. If confirmed, I have full confidence that the Service has the necessary equipment for the Joint Force to take advantage of the modernized PNT capabilities provided by the Space Force.

Alternate Positioning Navigation and Timing

Response: Integrating alternative space-based PNT systems is vital to ensuring global mission resilience. It is important that there is continued collaboration between GPS modernization efforts and alternative PNT initiatives from all the Services to deliver seamless, redundant solutions. If confirmed, my priority will be work with all the Services and our acquisition and research organizations to ensure modernized GPS and alternate PNT capabilities are available to meet the stringent performance and security standards required by both our military and civilian operators.

SATCOM

Space Data Network

Response: Space Data Network (SDN) is a space-based architecture providing rapid, resilient global transport of critical warfighter data. SDN integrates the SDN Backbone, Space Development Agency's Tactical Communications layer, commercial, and Space Force-specific capabilities into a unified network across enclaves, systems, and users. SDN Backbone is a resilient, integrated, joint Space Force network architecture providing high-capacity, low-latency data transport. It is the core communications layer for multiple current and future military missions. Tactical Communications provides multi-band global communications access and persistent connectivity for warfighter missions and is a key component for the Joint All Domain Command and Control infrastructure, providing sensor-to-shooter connectivity and direct to platform tactical communications. If confirmed, I will work across the space enterprise to support this important architecture, as well as support integration into platforms across the Department.

Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellites and their follow-on constellation for strategic communications

Response: The Space Force is disaggregating the two SATCOM capabilities provided by the Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellites. The Protected Tactical mission, which enables warfighters to obtain SATCOM Services in close proximity to enemy jammers, will be supported by the Protected Tactical SATCOM Family of Systems. The Evolved Strategic SATCOM system will provide Protected Strategic SATCOM support (Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications) to the military's nuclear forces. If confirmed, I will work to ensure there are no gaps in capability as the Space Force develops and delivers new capabilities for the mission.

Family of Advanced Beyond Line of Sight Terminals and other strategic grade user terminals

Response: In December 2025, the Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T) - Command Post Terminal (CPT) transfer memo was signed and FAB-T CPT became an Air Force program of record. The FAB-T Force Element Terminal (FET) program was transferred from Space Force to the Air Force in November 2024.

Protected Tactical Enterprise Service and user terminals

Response: The integration of the Protected Tactical Enterprise Service (PTES) with tactical user terminals represents a vital leap in delivering jam-resistant, secure tactical SATCOM capabilities to the joint warfighter. If confirmed, my top priority for PTES will be to maintain synchronization between space, ground, and terminal segments to ensure Joint warfighters can fully leverage the system for contested operations near enemy jammers.

Absorbing the current fleet of the Army's Wide Band Gap satellites and their replacement

Response: The Space Force operates the Wideband Global SATCOM satellites and has control of payload operations. A remaining challenge is to transition the payload management training currently conducted by the Army and the sustainment of the wideband satellite capability. The plan to complete this transition is underway across the Department of the Air Force. If confirmed, I will ensure the planning to address this challenge enables an efficient and effective transition. Additionally, I will support the Space Force's transition from a GEO-focused wideband SATCOM solution to a more resilient and proliferated architecture which will deliver capabilities through a variety of military and commercial systems across multiple orbits.

Absorbing the Navy's Mobile User Objective System satellites and their replacement

Response:

The Space Force successfully assumed control of the Mobile User Objective System in 2022, and today, the space and ground segments are fully postured to deliver advanced

Wideband Code Division Multiple Access capabilities. If confirmed, I will partner with Department leadership, Service Acquisition Executives, and Service leaders to provide the resources necessary to accelerate a smooth, user terminal and network transition that meets the needs of our warfighters.

Assured Access to Space

National Security Space Launch phase III, lane 1 procurements

Response: If confirmed, I will encourage industry innovation and competition through NSSL Phase 3 Lane 1, thus maintaining and expanding the launch industrial base and the resiliency of the USSF launch capabilities. To date, the Space Force has on-ramped seven providers onto Lane 1 and will continue to hold annual opportunities for new entrants.

National Security Space Launch phase III, lane 2 procurements

Response: If confirmed, I will continue to work to mitigate schedule impacts resulting from ULA Vulcan launch vehicle delays to accelerate the delivery of critical capabilities to orbit. I will also work to ensure the availability of at least two families of space launch vehicles to guarantee uninterrupted, assured access to space for our critical national security payloads.

Tactical and Responsive Launch and replenishment of space-based assets

Response: If confirmed, the most critical issue I would address is expanding the scope of tactically responsive space to ensure we generate complete operational capabilities that respond to any on-orbit threats on a tactically relevant timeline. It is important for the Space Force to have end-to-end capabilities that include launch vehicles, satellites, ground systems, and operational concepts. Critically, this requires establishing rigorous upfront requirements that enable spacecraft to remain in storage for extended periods, paired with budgeting for on-going integration to drastically compress timelines. Most importantly, the Space Force must align these capabilities with the specific requirements of the Combatant Commanders, enabling a tangible and immediate response to potential adversary destabilizing actions in space.

Launch range management with respect to Lanes 1, 2, and emerging new launch providers and super-heavy lift vehicles.

Response: If confirmed, the most pressing issue I would address in launch range management is scaling to meet the unprecedented increase in launch tempo, as well as the exponential growth in commercial missions. Critical in this scaling, I will work to support the infrastructure to allow for the development and full utilization of Super-Heavy lift vehicles that will unlock new possibilities for the Space Force.

Battle Management, Command and Control, and Associated Ground Systems

Space Command and Control

Response: To modernize Space Command and Control (C2), the Space Force split the program into two core capabilities: Atlas for Space Domain Awareness (SDA) and Kronos for Battle Management and C2 (BMC2). If confirmed, I will ensure these systems have the correct requirements and sources to be resilient and integrate data seamlessly across all C2 nodes, building a shared understanding of the battlespace across echelons while taking full advantage of capabilities available or being developed by commercial companies. Cross-system data integration is the key enabling capability that will empower combat forces to act independently and rapidly execute Commander's intent.

Sensor agnostic integration for Space Domain Awareness

Response: I believe it is important to ensure all mission data is immediately discoverable and accessible, regardless of its source. The Space Force is working to achieve this by deploying automated data catalogs with AI-driven brokers. By overhauling the underlying data, transport, and network architectures, it enables seamless data movement across any environment directly to tactical applications. This modern pipeline allows the Space Force to rapidly onboard new intelligence feeds and resolve anomalies in real time to decisively support the warfighter. Additionally, the Space Force continues to build connectivity between Missile Defense Agency and Space Force sensors and data repositories to provide the most complete picture for the warfighter.

Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA), including the Combatant Commanders Integrated Command and Control System (CICCS) for assured missile warning as part of the NC3 system

Response: Continued modernization and improvement of integrated system of systems across the NC3 enterprise is necessary to deliver capability that meets the warfighter and National Command Authority's needs. Space Force's ground- and space-based sensors must provide indications and warnings more rapidly than ever before in support of ITW/AA requirements, and that requires faster tasking, data delivery, and "sense-making" of the integrated data to strengthen our NC3 system.

Integration of Space Force systems into the Joint All Domain Command and Control system.

Response: The Space Force's unique capabilities will be critical in enabling the Joint Force to realize the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) vision. If confirmed, and in coordination with the ASAF (SA&I), I will ensure the Space Force's requirements and contributions to the Department of the Air Force's Battle Network are aligned with JADC2 and effectively supporting Joint warfighter decision-making.

Space Domain Awareness and Space Control

Synchronization writ large between satellite and ground systems

Response: A highly capable satellite is operationally useless if warfighters cannot command and control it or rapidly exploit its data. If confirmed, I will work closely with the ASAF (SA&I) to maintain the focus on delivering ground systems before any space vehicle (SV) launch. It is critical that SV deployments synchronize with their required ground architecture, and it is important to continue to emphasize the fielding of fully integrated, end-to-end operational capabilities.

Procurement of Commercial Space Services

Procurement of commercial satellite communications services for other armed forces and combatant commands.

Response: The rapid growth of the commercial space sector offers a significant opportunity to deliver assured, resilient communications to other Services and the Combatant Commands, both faster and on a greater scale than ever before. With this incredible growth, it is important to maintain a balanced, risk-informed, and operationally grounded approach. The biggest risk area is the balance between transactional procurement of commercial capabilities from U.S. and Allied nations, which provides the opportunity to forge deeply integrated architectures with these providers, and the Combatant Commands and Armed Forces using them. Furthermore, the most serious issue is the gap between the global, rapid-innovation model of commercial industry and our traditional SATCOM systems that are purposefully siloed. To effectively support these users, terminals need to be flexible and robust, which allows access to commercial space services and meet global backhaul transport needs.

Additionally, enterprise planning capabilities need to account for commercial services and their ability to operate in a contested operational environment. Operators need the flexibility to dynamically transition between service providers in response to current operational needs and constraints. If confirmed, I will support leveraging the agility, innovation, and value of commercial systems to ensure reliable, resilient capability for our warfighters, without compromising critical national security missions.

Proliferation Warfighting Space Architecture,

Tranches 0-3, missile tracking, the relationship with the Space Data Network and Golden Dome for America.

Response: Tranches 0-3 represent the incremental deployment phases of the Space Development Agency's satellite architecture, primarily designed to continue the missile warning and tracking (MWT) mission with worldwide coverage. The Space Data Network (SDN) serves as the backbone for communication, enabling seamless integration of tracking data from MWT satellites into broader defense operations and rapid, resilient global data transport for the Joint Force. This integrated architecture supports Golden Dome for America's operational framework.

Recruiting, Training and Readiness

The Space Force is a relatively new service that is standing up a capability to recruit, train, and present a ready military force of guardians to the combatant commanders in order to support their operational plans. Please describe your views on the following:

The ability of the Space Force to achieve enlisted and officer recruiting goals.

Response: The Space Force's ability to meet its recruiting goals is a testament to our collaboration with our DAF partners, including both our Guardians in recruiting and those embedded within commissioning sources. In FY25, Space Force surpassed its Recruiting and Accession Goals with 819 enlisted recruits (103% of goal) and 289 officer accessions (101% of goal). The Space Force has already met its year-to-date FY26 recruiting targets. As of July 1, the Space Force has shipped 627 of the Service's 730 enlisted recruitment goal (83%) to Basic Military Training and has a pool of nearly 600 qualified applicants awaiting shipment. The Space Force has accessed 260 officers of the Service's 337 officer recruitment goal (77%) with a pool of 77 qualified applicants waiting to enter.

Our ability to meet growth targets is fundamentally dependent on continued collaboration and execution with the Air Force accession command and the United States Air Force Academy. To ensure success, as our requirements more than double heading into FY27, the Space Force needs the support of Congress through timely and sufficient appropriations so we may continue to offer targeted incentives and enhance Space Force awareness among our target audience. Additionally, continued Congressional support for Space Force brand awareness and marketing campaigns is essential to attracting the high-quality talent the Space Force needs and meeting our end strength targets.

The current and future readiness status of the force, including shortfalls of training guardians.

Response: The Space Force's primary challenges in readiness include advanced training, the ability to emulate peer threat environments, mission systems, and infrastructure. The Space Force must grow to secure our nation's interests in a contested space domain. Growth is needed to turn the advanced systems we are acquiring into credible combat power. Advanced systems are only as effective as the trained Guardians who operate them and the resilient infrastructure that supports them. The Space Force has enjoyed recruiting success. Space superiority mission requirements necessitate growing our force size and infrastructure over the next decade, whether it is new missions and systems that require new units, resiliency efforts for our current units, or right-sizing of our Space Force service support to the combatant commands.

The ability to assess readiness, including range training, of guardians in performing their mission consistent with section 117 of title 10 of the United States Code.

Response: USSF measured units use the Space Force Input tool to report Resource Readiness (including mission training and qualification) IAW section 117 of title 10 of the United States Code (Defense Readiness Reporting System is compliant with U.S. Code). Units that are designated Combat, Combat Support, Combat Service Support, or Other (Range Training) will assess Readiness. The service has expanded our readiness reporting criteria which now includes funded and unfunded authorizations to accurately capture manpower requirements based on the Chairman's guidance and intent. We have also tailored readiness reporting to support the Space Force Generation (SPAFORGEN) model, to help identify contextual concerns that may impact a unit's readiness. The quality of the assessment is based on the data received from the unit commanders or data received from an authoritative data source. If confirmed, I will stress to commanders at all levels to ensure readiness reporting provides quality information to ensure we understand all readiness factors.

The ability to assess full- and part-time Guardians transitioning into the Space Force from the Air National Guard and the Reserves.

Response: The Space Force is on-track to begin transfers of space-experienced Reservists to Space Force part-time work roles in July of 2026, with over 220 members currently in the transfer process. As I understand the current status, the Space Force does not currently have any part-time Guardians in Space Force operational units. As personnel are transitioning from the Air National Guard (ANG) and Reserves to USSF as full-time or part-time Guardians, they will accomplish and maintain the same training requirements required for mission qualification.

How do you characterize readiness in the Space Force?

Response: Readiness in the United States Space Force is no different than readiness in the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps – it requires continuous assessment of our equipment, training, maintenance, sustainment, logistics, infrastructure, and manpower. If confirmed, tracking readiness of the Space Force will be a high priority.

Please describe the role of the Chief of Space Operations in increasing readiness in the various missions in the Space Force.

Response: The Chief of Space Operations (CSO) implements guidance and intent that focuses on organizing, training, and equipping a warfighting force capable of achieving space superiority. Efforts such as Space Force Generation (SPAFORGEN), Service and Joint Exercises, Operational Test and Training Infrastructure (OTTI), and infrastructure modernization, enable the service to improve upon its resource and capability readiness. Additionally, the CSO prioritizes and delivers service readiness information to the Joint Staff and to Congress through the Joint Forces Readiness Review (JFRR), and the Semi-Annual Readiness Report to Congress (SRRC), respectively. As the Service has

established service components to support combatant commands, it is expanding readiness assessments to support current operations plans (OPLANs). This allows for the protection of the Joint Force from the rapid increase in space and space-enabled threats.

Support to Combatant Commands

The relationship as a force provider to the U.S. Space Command is unique compared to other combatant commands. Please explain how the Space Force delineates between a presenter of forces and their functions to the U.S. Space Command as compared to other combatant commands.

What are the key areas in which the Space Force must improve to provide the necessary capabilities and capacity to:

Response: The Space Force (USSF) is establishing service component commands as a critical step to normalizing the presentation of space forces and providing clarity of command relationships, roles, and responsibilities in the Joint Force and across all theaters. Activation of all Service components is planned by Fiscal Year 2030. To date the USSF has established eight service component commands. Service components are continuing to progress towards full manpower, robust command and control (C2) processes, necessary facilities, and support for non-USSF specialties.

The relationship as a force provider to U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) is unique compared to other combatant commands because the preponderance of space forces presented to USSPACECOM come from the USSF and make up a majority of forces assigned to USSPACECOM. The USSF Field Command, Combat Forces Command (CFC) generates, presents, and sustains combat-ready intelligence, cyber, space, and combat support forces. These forces are made available to all the combatant commands. Specifically, for USSPACECOM, our service component US Space Forces – Space (S4S) operates space forces to achieve combatant commander specific objectives. If confirmed, I will continue to work diligently with Congress to ensure resources are prioritized to effectively integrate Guardians into every Combatant Command.

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

Response: U.S. Space Forces-Pacific, activated in November 2022, is focused on deterring aggression in the theater. The key area for improvement is the rapid fielding of combat-credible, space-based sensing and targeting systems and electromagnetic warfare forces. If confirmed, I will prioritize these capabilities to directly support the joint force's long-range kill chains and ensure our service component is fully integrated with USPACOM's operational plans.

U.S. European Command

Response: U.S. Space Forces–Europe/Africa, activated in December 2023, addresses the persistent threat to Europe and the homeland from Russia. The key area for improvement

is ensuring robust resilience in a highly contested electromagnetic spectrum. If confirmed, I will ensure our component is prepared and ready to operate effectively in the European area of operations.

U.S. Central Command

Response: U.S. Space Forces-Central, activated in November 2022, is fully integrated into regional operations. Having made strides in electronic warfare and space-based ISR during operations like Midnight Hammer, the key area for improvement is scaling these capabilities against evolving regional threats. If confirmed, I will ensure our component is prepared and ready to help USCENTCOM maintain a definitive operational advantage.

U.S. Northern Command

Response: U.S. Space Forces-Northern, activated in January 2026, is foundational to supporting homeland defense and protecting our borders. To counter emerging aerospace threats, the key area for improvement is maturing sensor integration and orbital communications. If confirmed, I will work to deepen our partnership with the Missile Defense Agency and Direct Reporting Program Manager for Golden Dome as they field missile defense systems and advance critical space capabilities for USNORTHCOM.

U.S. Strategic Command

Response: The Space Force is actively building capacity to support USSTRATCOM's Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) Enterprise Center. Drawing on my experience with ICBM and MILSTAR operations, the key area for improvement is ensuring robust, survivable space architectures for the nuclear deterrence mission and NC3. If confirmed, I will prioritize the formal establishment of this service component to provide the fail-safe capabilities necessary for USSTRATCOM's vital mission.

U.S. Transportation Command

Response: With an Initial Mission Analysis Team actively engaged at Scott Air Force Base, the Space Force is identifying capabilities for a future USTRANSCOM service component. The key area for improvement is leveraging space for contested logistics, including the revolutionary potential of point-to-point delivery. If confirmed, I will expedite the establishment of this component to enhance global mobility and secure supply chains for the Joint Force.

U.S. Southern Command

Response: U.S. Space Forces-Southern, activated in December 2025, is tasked with closing critical coverage gaps across vast maritime and jungle transit zones. The key area for improvement is aggressively integrating commercial space-based Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), high-revisit tactical imagery, and specialized

tracking capabilities. If confirmed, I will prioritize these integrations to enable a decisive domain advantage in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility.

U.S. Cyber Command

Response: With an Initial Mission Analysis Team at Fort Meade, the Space Force is working to establish a USCYBERCOM service component. The key area for improvement is developing cyber operations to defend the unique Department of War Information Network, USSF systems and expand command-and-control capabilities. If confirmed, I will ensure the planning for our service component receives the priority and resources necessary to effectively integrate into USCYBERCOM operations.

U.S. Space Command

Response: U.S. Space Forces-Space, activated in December 2023, is at the heart of our space superiority mission. The key area for improvement is supporting the global command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) needs of the Joint Force and orbital warfare operations. If confirmed, I will prioritize fielding advanced orbital warfare and domain awareness capabilities.

U.S. Special Operations Command

Response: The USSF Special Operations Element recently conducted mission analysis to stand up a USSOCOM component. The key area for improvement is delivering space capabilities tailored to the demanding, austere environments in which special operations forces operate. If confirmed, I will work with USSOCOM and the Assistant Secretary of War for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict on the activation of U.S. Space Forces-Special Operations to enhance operator security, promote stability, and advance U.S. interests globally.

U.S. Africa Command

Response: U.S. Space Forces–Europe/Africa, activated in December 2023, supports operations in the African theater. The key area for improvement is deploying resilient, mobile, and transportable counter-space systems that meet USAFRICOM’s required timing and tempo. If confirmed, I will advance these specialized theater space capabilities to operate effectively in contested environments across the USAFRICOM area of responsibility.

Alliances and Partnerships

Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are crucial to U.S. success in competition and conflict against a great power.

If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to build strong international partnerships, overcome challenges to our partnerships, and exploit opportunities in international cooperation?

Response: If confirmed, I will strengthen alliances and partnerships as set out by our International Partnership Strategy. As authorized, I will put the equipment, procedures, and training in place to expand combined space operations, improving information sharing, increasing allied participation in exercises and wargames, developing common operational concepts, supporting interoperability standards, and identifying opportunities for burden-sharing in space domain awareness, satellite communication, launch, hosted payloads, mission data, and resilient architectures.

I would also work with allies, partners, OSW, and the State Department to ensure that all contribute meaningfully to deterrence, collective defense, and complementary operations.

Finally, I would work to strengthen bilateral relations, foster mutual understanding of security priorities, and increase collaboration opportunities through the Combined Space Operations initiative and by hosting the annual International Space Chiefs Summit.

How would you characterize your familiarity with international space leaders, forums, and processes? If confirmed, which leaders and forums would you focus your engagement with a view to advancing most effectively the national security interests of the Space Force?

Response: My familiarity with international space leaders, forums, and processes has been shaped by operational experience. As Commander of U.S. Space Forces – Space and the Combined Joint Force Space Component, and previously in the Combined Force Space Component Command, I had the opportunity to work regularly with allied space professionals and made allied integration part of the command's battle rhythm, incorporating Five Eyes partners, France, and Germany into recurring updates. Through these assignments, I have developed relationships with allied space leaders and a working familiarity with the mechanisms that underpin coalition spacepower, including the Combined Space Operations (CSpO) initiative, NATO's efforts to operationalize the space domain, and the processes that translate partnership into fielded capability. In my current role as Deputy Chief of Space Operations for Operations, I have continued engagements when opportunities arise through one-on-one discussions and space-specific symposiums.

If confirmed, I will focus my engagement where it most directly advances the Space Force's national security interests: continuing to build and deepen relationships with allied and partner space leaders, prioritizing those nations investing in real space capability and committed to operating alongside us; and engaging in the forums where coalition spacepower is matured, including CSpO, NATO, and recurring international Space Chiefs forums.

How will the Space Force participate within NATO and its developing space capabilities?

Response: NATO's interest in expanding its efforts in space has significantly increased over the past several years. I plan to support further development of that interest such as through the newly formed NATO Space Capabilities Group. We will also continue to work closely with and support the NATO Space Centre, specifically through our Europe and Africa component field command SPACEFOR-EURAF. Additionally, we are working both multilaterally and bilaterally with NATO partners to standardize training and education, information, and data sharing to ensure we all approach our mission of collective security with the same lens, and we will continue to expand this partnership as other nations in NATO develop their capabilities. We currently have a few Guardians assigned to NATO organizations to include the Space Centre.

How will the Space Force ensure that the correct levels of information are getting to and from allies that are integral to various missions of the Space Force?

Response: The Space Force treats allied integration as a core requirement—we aim to partner to win. While we effectively exchange intelligence today, particularly in Space Domain Awareness and through embedded Liaison Officers, historical overclassification remains a barrier to full integration. If confirmed, I will ensure our International Partnership Strategy develops strategies to break down these antiquated barriers by classifying information at the lowest appropriate level and championing forward-leaning space export policies and progressive foreign disclosure authorities. To operationalize this, I will leverage the CSpO Initiative to build resilient, shared architectures with a common technological baseline. Finally, I will use service exercises to physically test these data architectures; utilizing the Schriever Wargame to stress-test future intelligence-sharing policies, and SPACE FLAG to validate those solutions in real-time. This ensures we build the procedural muscle memory required for secure, seamless coalition integration before presenting ready forces to the combatant commands.

Norms of Space Behavior

Actions by other nations in space have direct consequences on the ability of the United States to execute freedom of movement and operations both in space and on the ground for civilian and national security means. One example includes destructive anti-satellite operations in November of 2021 by Russia, whose debris field affected the international space station causing it to maneuver and its astronauts to seek shelter in its return capsule as well as the ability to place weapons of mass destruction in space.

What are your views on international norms of behavior in space and how should the Space Force be part of a whole-of-government approach to negotiating and implementing such norms?

Response: Developing ideas for transparency and confidence-building measures and norms of responsible behavior can protect the outer space operational environment from

the intentional misuse of space-related capabilities. Such proposed measures can be designed to reduce the risk of miscalculation and misunderstanding.

Russia's destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile test in November 2021 created a persistent debris field that threatened human spaceflight and subsequently required the astronauts and cosmonauts in the International Space Station to take shelter from the debris created by this event. As such, the United States subsequently provided a number of proposals to include ideas such as "operating in, from, and to space in a safe and professional manner," and "limiting the creation of new space debris." Moreover, with regard to the placement of weapons of mass destruction in space, the United States advocated for an approach that promotes compliance with international law, which includes the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and its Article IV. Article IV prohibits the placement in orbit around the Earth of any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.

For future proposals, the Space Force should continue to contribute operational expertise through space-domain awareness, intelligence, attribution, threat assessments, and analysis of the operational consequences to inform such proposals. If confirmed, I would ensure the Space Force leads by example through both compliance with domestic and international law.

Integrated Air and Missile Defense / Golden Dome for America

What is your understanding of the purpose, mission, and scope of the Golden Dome for America?

Response: Golden Dome for America is intended to provide a next-generation, layered defense of the United States against a spectrum of aerial attacks from peer, near-peer, and rogue-state adversaries. Its purpose is to protect the American people, critical infrastructure, military forces, and the nation's secure second-strike capability while strengthening deterrence by reducing an adversary's confidence that an attack could achieve its objectives. I understand Golden Dome to be a system of systems rather than a single weapon. Its scope includes space-, ground-, sea-, and air-based sensors; resilient data transport; integrated battle management and command and control; kinetic interceptors; non-kinetic defeat capabilities; and defenses operating before launch and during all phases of flight. It is designed to integrate existing capabilities with new technologies and be fielded progressively, prioritizing the most consequential threats and operational risks.

What is your understanding of the Space Force's role in the development and fielding of the Golden Dome architecture?

Response: If confirmed, my principal responsibility will be to organize, train, and equip the space forces and capabilities required by the integrated architecture and present those to the appropriate combatant command. Those responsibilities include space-based missile warning and tracking, persistent custody of advanced threats, resilient data

transport, space-based interceptors, space domain awareness, protected command and control, launch support, and the Guardians and infrastructure necessary to operate and sustain those capabilities.

What is your understanding of U.S. strategic objectives and what role do you believe Golden Dome should play in supporting these objectives?

Response: U.S. strategic objectives include defending the homeland, deterring strategic attack, preserving a credible nuclear and conventional deterrent, preventing adversaries from coercing the United States or its allies, deterring China through strength, and maintaining a Joint Force capable of prevailing if deterrence fails. The 2026 National Defense Strategy places homeland defense at the forefront of the Department's priorities, alongside deterrence in the Pacific, increased allied burden-sharing, and modernization supported by a stronger defense industrial base. I understand Golden Dome supports these objectives by strengthening deterrence and resilience while providing national leaders with additional time and options during a crisis.

In your view, how should Golden Dome be sized, structured, and resourced to implement the National Defense Strategy and execute U.S. strategic objectives?

Response: Golden Dome should be sized, structured, and resourced against validated strategic objectives, intelligence assessments, operational requirements, and an informed understanding of acceptable risk. Those determinations should account for the evolving threat, the capabilities of existing systems, technical maturity, industrial capacity, lifecycle cost, and the need to sustain the architecture through conflict. If confirmed, I will support the Golden Dome Direct Reporting Program Manager as he determines the overall size, structure, investment balance, acquisition strategy, and fielding schedule.

What existing and emerging threats is Golden Dome intended to counter?

Response: The precise threat set, anticipated raid sizes, geographic priorities, countermeasures, and performance requirements are matters for the Golden Dome program, the intelligence community, combatant commanders, and Department leadership. If confirmed, I would ensure that Space Force threat assessments and force-design recommendations are timely, technically informed, and made available to the Direct Reporting Program Manager and other appropriate Department leaders.

In your view, is Golden Dome intended to provide a comprehensive missile defense for a particular geographic region, i.e., will all types of missile threats be addressed?

Response: The level of protection, geographic coverage, threat capacity, and prioritization of defended assets will depend on the architecture approved by Department leadership. If confirmed, my role as CSO would be to provide military advice on the contribution and limitations of assigned space capabilities and to ensure those capabilities are ready to perform as intended.

In your view, is Golden Dome intended to address non-missile airborne threats, such as unmanned systems, high-altitude balloons, or manned aircraft? If so, how do you envision Space Force supporting such an approach?

Response: Whether particular unmanned systems, high-altitude platforms, or manned aircraft fall within Golden Dome's requirements should be determined by the Direct Reporting Program Manager and Department leadership through the approved architecture and requirements process. The Space Force's potential contribution would principally involve capabilities uniquely or effectively provided from space, such as warning, tracking, characterization, resilient communications, positioning and timing, and transmission of data to the appropriate joint or homeland-defense commander. If confirmed, I will provide my best military advice to the Secretary, the Chairman, and the other Service chiefs during Joint Chiefs of Staff discussion. I would also ensure Space Force systems can provide timely and usable information to the Joint Force where directed, while respecting the responsibilities and authorities of NORAD, U.S. Northern Command, the other Services, and civil agencies.

In your view, what role should missile defeat technologies, such as directed energy, electronic warfare, and cyber operations – offensive and defensive, play in Golden Dome?

Response: The role of defeat technologies should be determined by the Golden Dome Direct Reporting Program Manager and Department leadership. If confirmed, I will provide my best military advice to the Secretary, the Chairman, and the other Service chiefs during Joint Chiefs of Staff discussion. I would also ensure the Space Force provides appropriate technical and operational expertise regarding space-related capabilities. I would also ensure that any assigned Space Force systems are protected against cyber and electromagnetic attack and that Guardians are trained to operate them in contested and degraded conditions.

What are your views on the technological feasibility and cost-effectiveness of developing and deploying a space-based interceptor layer for Golden Dome?

Response: I defer the feasibility and cost effectiveness to the Golden Dome Direct Reporting Program Manager and Department leadership. If confirmed, I will provide my best military advice to the DRPM and Department Leadership.

In your view, is there a risk tradeoff between focusing on boost-phase or midcourse intercept for a space-based interceptor layer? Do you believe one approach is more achievable than the other over the next decade, or should the Department pursue both simultaneously?

Response: The risk trade off determination belongs to the Direct Reporting Program Manager. If confirmed, I will provide my best military advice to the Secretary, the Chairman, and the other Service chiefs during Joint Chiefs of Staff discussion. I would also ensure the Space Force provides relevant expertise concerning orbital mechanics,

missile warning and tracking, fire-control-quality data, space command and control, launch, and operational sustainment. I would also ensure the Department receives a candid assessment of Space Force capacity and risk associated with each potential approach.

In your view, are there particular Space Force lines of effort for Golden Dome that could be executed concurrently? Which lines of effort would likely require a more sequential approach?

Response: I would defer to the Golden Dome Direct Reporting Program Manager and the Department's engineering, test, and acquisition leadership for the formal assessment of technology readiness, integration risk, schedule, and investment priority. If confirmed, I would provide my best military advice during these discussions and ensure the Space Force accurately characterizes the maturity and operational risk of its assigned systems. Efforts that expand or integrate existing capabilities such as missile warning and communications present lower risk than capabilities requiring entirely new intercept mechanisms or unprecedented levels of autonomous integration. However, even mature individual technologies may present risk when integrated into a complex, geographically distributed system of systems. Conversely, an emerging technology may prove operationally useful if it is introduced incrementally and supported by realistic testing.

What lines of effort do you consider readily executable with existing technology and low maturation risk and what lines of effort do you consider nascent technology requiring a high degree of maturation?

Response: I would defer to the Golden Dome Direct Reporting Program Manager and the Department's engineering, test, and acquisition leadership for the formal assessment of technology readiness, integration risk, schedule, and investment priority. If confirmed, I would provide my best military advice during these discussions and ensure the Space Force accurately characterizes the maturity and operational risk of its assigned systems.

How will you work with the Golden Dome Direct Reporting Program Manager, the other Military Services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Missile Defense Agency to support the development and integration of a battle management communication and control system that supports the Joint Force? In your view, what are the major issues with this system of systems integration?

Response: If confirmed, I would continue my close and transparent relationship with the Golden Dome Direct Reporting Program Manager and ensure the Space Force supports the architecture, technical standards, schedules, and integration decisions established through Department governance.

Do you believe the United States should take a more assertive posture in efforts to defeat potential threats from manifesting, i.e., increasing our use of "left-of-launch" capabilities to eliminate missiles prior to launch when warnings indicate the possibility?

Response: The policy and strategy for addressing any military threat, to include this example of “left-of-launch” missile threats, are informed by the advice of the Joint Chiefs, Chairman and Secretary of War to the President. The guidance and direction from the President and Secretary ensure the Department of War is always prepared to deter aggression while also providing the President the operational flexibility and agility to act in the best interest of our nation. If confirmed, I will provide my best military advice to, and work with the Secretary, the Chairman, and the other Service chiefs to incorporate Space Force capabilities to ensure the Joint Force can achieve objectives directed by the President.

Cyber

In 2023, the DOD released its latest Cyber Strategy, and an update is currently in progress.

What is your understanding of the input Space Force has had in that update process?

Response: Space Force is working with the Department to ensure Space Force interests are fully represented in the Department of War’s Cyber Strategy.

What actions will you take, if confirmed, to remediate any gaps between Space Force capacity and capability and Cyber Strategy goals?

Response: If confirmed, I would work with the Secretary of the Air Force to field cyber-resilient space architectures, credible space control capabilities able to be employed across the spectrum of conflict, and operationally relevant test and training infrastructure for cyberspace operations.

If approved, the Fiscal Year 2027 President’s Budget will provide the resources to address Space Force’s defensive cyberspace operations, cyber intelligence, and cybersecurity capability and capacity needs.

Are the size and capabilities of the Space Force components sufficient to meet current and future cyber and information warfare requirements?

Response: The Space Force needs highly trained and equipped Cyber Guardians to defend Department of War networks, and USSF systems and networks. Cyber Guardians need to prepare for emerging cyber threats, especially with the advancement of AI technologies. The Space Force will organize, train, and equip Guardians to provide expertise for the USSF and the Joint Force. This will require advanced cyber capabilities and training to ensure that Space Force cyber operators can remain ahead of our adversaries.

What is your view on the current definition of the Cyber Operational Forces? Are additional categories needed to support the Space Force?

Response: No, I do not think there is a need for additional categories to support Space Force. In the 24 Jun 2025 Memo, the Secretary of War defined a common framework for the entire Department to work toward. This memo evolved the previous categories to create a more comprehensive approach to cyberspace operations. For example, this memo reinforced that many cyber forces may be assigned to other Combatant Commands or Service-functions (e.g. acquisition).

Do you think the Space Force should be responsible for providing teams to the Cyber Mission Force?

Response: Currently, there is no requirement for the Space Force to provide Cyber Mission Force teams. The Space Force is designed to field combat-ready forces, build and retain elite Guardian talent, and deliver space superiority as a core requirement for joint warfighting. If confirmed, I look forward to addressing any potential future requirements with US Cyber Command, this committee and relevant stakeholders.

If confirmed, what would you do to enhance Space Force information dominance capabilities?

Response: Enhancing and accelerating the United States Space Force's capabilities within the Operations in the Information Environment (OIE) will elevate readiness and contribute to maximizing Joint Force lethality. To execute this rapidly and efficiently, USSF is leveraging existing Joint and Service training pipelines while pursuing dedicated funding for these critical capabilities. Strengthening OIE capabilities requires increasing trained professionals at all Field Commands (FLDCOMs), Direct Reporting Units and Component Field Commands (C-FLDCOMs). Looking to the future, if confirmed, a structural framework and the cultivation of specialized talent will greatly enhance USSF information dominance capabilities.

If confirmed, what would you do to improve military cybersecurity career pathways to meet the present and future needs of the Space Force and U.S. Cyber Command?

Response: If confirmed, I would focus on cultivating an elite cadre of Guardian cyber military professionals by maturing our talent management processes to meet the unique demands of the space domain and the broader joint warfighting community.

My efforts would center on three main lines of effort:

Strengthen Career Foundations: As Space Force manning increases, I would ensure military and civilian cyber professionals grow proportionally to meet current and emerging needs.

Enhance Advanced Training and Education: I would champion realistic, contested training and partner with industry and academia to keep Guardians at the cutting edge of cyber defense.

Deepen Joint Cyber Integration: I would work with relevant stakeholders including U.S. Cyber Command to align Space Force's cyber training with joint requirements, ensuring seamless integration and mutual operational support.

The space-cyber-special operations triad is seen as rising operational concept. What role do you see that triad playing on the battlespace, and if confirmed, what actions would you take to realize the potential of these relationships?

Response: Space-Cyber-Special Operations Forces (SOF) Triad is an emerging operational concept designed to counter peer and near-peer adversaries in competition and grey zones operations. As we stand up our Space Force Service Component to United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), this organization will plan, integrate, synchronize, and execute the delivery of space effects for Commander, USSOCOM, including integration of effects that are enhanced by our Service's ability to implement the concept of the space-cyber-special operations triad. If confirmed, I would continue to evaluate the concept with USSOCOM, this committee and relevant stakeholders.

Electronic Warfare (EW)

What is your vision for the future of Space Force EW capabilities?

Response: The Electromagnetic Spectrum, to include cyberspace, must be treated as key terrain. The future space operating environment will be dominated by directed energy, where adversaries blend electronic, cyber, and kinetic attacks to disrupt, deny, and degrade space capabilities. I expect our forces to survive and operate within an environment where adversaries actively attempt to gain a military edge. Electromagnetic Warfare (EW) will not be a standalone function. EW, Orbital Warfare (OW), and Cyberspace Warfare (CW) missions must integrate offensive and defensive space control capabilities to enable Joint Force maneuver and fires. The vision requires the USSF to invest in and field advanced technologies to maintain its edge in the EW domain. Ultimately, I believe EW will be fully integrated into a warfighting approach centered on campaigning and maneuver, rather than functioning only as a response to threats as they arise.

U.S. Strategic Command is the Joint Staff lead for ensuring the Joint Force can defend and conduct offensive EW strike operations. How has the Space Force integrated with STRATCOM to conduct Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations including the following:

The Joint Electromagnetic Warfare Center?

Response: Space Force and STRATCOM's Joint Electromagnetic Warfare Center (JEWEC) continue to engage on spectrum matters. Space Force has also begun coordination with STRATCOM to establish a future Space Force service component.

The Joint Navigation Warfare Center?

Response: The Space Force's U.S. Space Forces – Space Commander (S4S/CC) is dual-hatted as the Combined Joint Force Space Component Commander (C/JFSCC) for USSPACECOM. This dual-hatted Commander integrates the JNWC's PNT EMSO with Joint Force capabilities and threats alongside the service and within EMSO for USSPACECOM as a supporting combatant command.

The Joint Electromagnetic Readiness Center?

Response: The U.S. Space Force is deeply integrated with USSTRATCOM, specifically utilizing the Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Readiness Center (JERC) to establish joint readiness standards, conduct realistic electromagnetic operational training, and synchronize offensive and defensive space-based Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities into global combatant command plans.

The Defense Information Systems Agency?

Response: If confirmed, I would work with Department of War Chief Information Officer and Defense Information Systems Agency to share force design analysis to ensure space-based and terrestrial-based data transport architectures are resilient, protected, and interoperable. This end state will increase Joint Force's lethality, mission effectiveness, and speed.

The Development of the Electromagnetic Battle Management tool?

Response: If confirmed, I would continue the work Space Force has accomplished with senior leaders in Department of Air Force, U.S. Strategic Command, DISA, DoW Chief Information Officer and other stakeholders on classified efforts to modernize Electromagnetic Spectrum Battle Management to achieve superiority. I would ensure that Space Force electromagnetic battle management requirements are fully incorporated into the Department of the Air Force's Battle Network solution, the key interface with U.S. Strategic Command's Electromagnetic Battle Network efforts, to ensure smooth integration.

How will you work and integrate within the greater Air Force and Department's electronic warfare enterprise that involves ground, air and space?

Response: The United States Space Force has deeply integrated its capabilities with U.S. Strategic Command and the broader joint force to field, organize, and execute Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO). Presently, Electromagnetic Battle Management-Joint (EMBM-J) is a joint solution helping military commanders to visualize the

electronic battlefield, coordinate friendly communications to avoid interference, and reduce vulnerabilities to enemy jamming. Service components have observed EMBM-J in real-world use and appreciate its functionality and used it for operational purposes. If confirmed, I will aggressively pursue a unified Department of the Air Force and joint-service EW architecture that bridges the ground, air, and space domains.

Spectrum

Electromagnetic spectrum plays a critical role in many DOD missions and is integrally related to electronic warfare.

In what ways does the Space Force rely on spectrum to support warfighter requirements?

Response: The Space Force is fundamentally reliant on the electromagnetic spectrum to fulfill its core warfighter mandates:

- **Resilient Satellite Operations:** Guardians rely on secure radio frequencies to upload orbital maneuvers, monitor satellite health, and transmit payload instructions. If spectrum links are jammed, spacecraft become unguided and unresponsive.
- **Resilient Data Transport:** Real-time communications, beyond-line-of-sight targeting, and tactical missile tracking depend completely on high-bandwidth spectrum allocations
- **Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT):** GPS signals, which underpin everything from joint precision-guided munitions to civilian financial sectors, must be actively managed and defended against electromagnetic jamming and spoofing
- **Warning and Intelligence (ISR):** Space Force sensors monitor threat signatures (including radar and infrared emissions) across the spectrum to deliver early warning and tracking against threats including counterspace, ballistic missiles and hypersonic missiles.

In your view, which warfighter spectrum requirements will be essential to competing with Russia and China on a future battlefield?

Response: Overall, spectrum requirements that enable Joint All-Domain Operations and deny adversary long range kill webs will be essential in competing with Russia and China. Specific examples include:

Situational Awareness: Defending critical radar and optical frequencies from harmful interference and commercial encroachment is essential to detecting and tracking incoming threats including missiles, counter-space threats, and others.

Resilient, High-Capacity Data Transport: Joint All domain operations require secure spectrum throughput to push targeting data and intelligence directly to the tactical edge at machine speeds, outpacing adversary decision cycles.

Resilient Satellite Operations: protected command links are required to guarantee operations in highly contested environments.

Denial of Adversary Kill Webs: The Joint Force must aggressively disrupt the adversary's space-based sensor-to-shooter links. Robust electronic attack capabilities provide reversible denial of China and Russian targeting networks, blinding their long-range fires, and protecting the Joint Force.

Next year the U.S. will be participating in the World Radiocommunications Conference, hosted in Shanghai, China. There are several topics for this conference which have direct ties to Space Force equities.

If confirmed, how will you work with the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer to advocate for Space Force equities?

Response: If confirmed, I would work with the Department of War Chief Information Officer and other relevant stakeholders to advocate regarding Space Force equities, and inform the White House-led interagency process and the U.S. delegation's position on World Radiocommunications Conference (WRC-27) agenda items.

Technical Workforce

A significant challenge facing the Space Force today is a shortage of highly skilled data scientists; computer programmers; cyber; and other scientific, technical, and engineering talent to work at Defense laboratories and technical centers.

In your view, what are the pros and cons of having Space Force active duty military personnel trained and working as scientists, engineers, software coders, and in other technical positions across the Air Force's research, development, and acquisition enterprise?

Response: Integrating active-duty Space Force personnel into Requirements, Development, and Acquisition roles injects critical warfighter context and operational agility directly into technology development and it ensures our future acquisition leaders possess the technical baseline required to be "smart buyers" against pacing threats. However, the Space Force must pragmatically manage the inherent trade-offs. The commercial sector consistently outpaces our compensation models for elite STEM talent, and our traditional military rotation and promotion paradigms can disrupt long-term project continuity and inadvertently penalize deep specialization. If confirmed, I would address these challenges by championing a seamlessly blended military-civilian workforce. I would aggressively leverage the flexible personnel authorities provided by

Congress to ensure we can recruit, retain, and promote our top-tier talent where their expertise is most critical to the joint fight.

What are the pros and cons of employing Federal civilian employees in these fields, and what, in your view, is the optimum force mix of civilian, military, and contractor personnel?

Response: Federal civilian employees are essential to sustaining the Space Force's long-term technical advantage. They provide continuity, deep scientific and engineering expertise, and institutional knowledge that are critical to research, software development, cyber capabilities, systems engineering, and acquisition programs that often span decades. The Space Force has effective recruitment and development authorities to attract and develop highly-qualified technical talent. It is critical to maintain consistent and adequate funding to recruit, hire, develop, and retain these skilled professionals.

Military personnel provide the operational perspective needed to translate warfighter requirements into technical capabilities, while contractors offer specialized expertise and surge capacity where appropriate. The Space Force force mix is driven by mission requirements: military personnel perform inherently governmental and operational functions; civilians also perform inherently governmental functions and provide enduring technical expertise and continuity; and contractors supplement government capabilities by providing unique skills or additional capacity.

What shortfalls (both in numbers and technical disciplines) do you have in your technical workforce outside of the labs and acquisition workforce, for both military and civilian personnel?

Response: The Space Force anticipates growing its civilian workforce in FY27 and through the Future Years Defense Program to sustain a warfighting service built to achieve space superiority, pending the outcome of Congressional appropriations decisions. As we focus on growing the Space Force, we anticipate the need to hire aggressively to meet mission requirements and are working to attract highly technical talent across the broad range of professionals that enable the Space Force mission. We currently have below average fill rates in engineering and contracting occupations at 88% and 79% respectively.

The Space Force's principal military workforce challenge is developing experienced Guardians at the pace required to meet rapidly expanding mission demands. As the Nation's newest military service, the Space Force began with a small force structure and limited inventory of experienced personnel. Building expertise in space operations, cyber, software, intelligence, engineering, and other technical disciplines requires time and resources to recruit, train, educate, certify, and develop personnel through operational experience.

As the Space Force stands up new mission organizations and fields increasingly sophisticated capabilities, demand for technically proficient military personnel will test

the rate at which that expertise can be developed organically. Sustained and predictable end strength growth, sufficient accession and training capacity, and continued investment in advanced technical development are necessary to enable the Space Force to build and retain the highly-skilled military and civilian workforce required to meet current and future operational requirements.

Space Force Military End Strength

The Space Force has requested an end strength of 13,200 guardians for FY 2027.

This is an increase of roughly 2,800 Guardians from Fiscal Year 2026. Do you have any major concerns with the Space Force end strength target? If so, what are they, and how will you address them if confirmed?

Response: The FY2027 end strength request reflects the Space Force's assessed operational requirements and the trajectory necessary to build a combat-credible service capable of delivering decisive effects in the space domain. My primary concern is not the 2,800 Guardian growth requirement; it is ensuring that end strength growth is matched by the resources needed to recruit, train, equip, and sustain those Guardians so they can contribute effectively from day one.

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that growth remains disciplined, data-driven, and aligned with validated mission requirements, while providing Congress transparent assessments of risks, execution, and any adjustments needed to maintain readiness. Continued, predictable support for the Space Force's people and associated infrastructure will be essential to achieving the capabilities the Nation expects.

What is the appropriate mix of active, reserve component, and civilian employees in the Space Force? How will you review current proposals if confirmed?

Response: The Space Force continues to implement the FY24 NDAA authorization to build a Service without Component, offering both full-time and part-time service options for its military force. The optimal mix of uniformed Guardians (both full-time and part-time) and civilian employees is driven by mission requirements to ensure military personnel remain focused on operational warfighting functions while civilians provide technical expertise, continuity, and sustainment to enable long-term mission success. The Personnel Management Act provides the service with unprecedented flexibility to integrate Guardians serving in full- and part-time work roles into a single component, allowing us to retain highly skilled talent while increasing readiness and resilience. A key readiness priority is implementing this new model, which is designed to forego the use of Reserve component forces and instead build a flexible and agile force to meet mission requirements.

If confirmed, I will evaluate the current force mix through a mission-based lens to assess operational risk, readiness requirements, and workforce availability to align the

optimal workforce to deliver mission effects. My priority will be to preserve the Space Force's foundational model of a combat-credible military force, supported by a highly specialized civilian workforce and enabled by the flexible talent management authorities Congress has provided.

What additional force shaping authorities and tools does the Space Force need, in your view?

Response: I appreciate the civilian personnel flexibilities that we already have in place and intend to further leverage them, particularly as we grow the Space Force in the next several years. The biggest challenge facing the Space Force in shaping our civilian workforce is the intense competition for highly skilled technical talent, particularly where critical missions are concentrated in high-cost geographic regions. If confirmed, I will ensure the Space Force uses all statutory authorities authorized to offer competitive compensation and targeted incentives to recruit and retain the most critical talent.

I also appreciate the military personnel flexibilities that we already have in place and intend to further leverage them, particularly as we grow the Space Force in the next several years. If confirmed I will be seeking all options to access personnel via traditional and non-traditional pathways, whether through regular accessions, engagements with prior service individuals, as well as through direct accessions into mid- and higher-grades. I will also seek opportunities for interservice transfers and maximize the personnel flexibilities that the Space Force Personnel Management Act provides us to explore all avenues to access and retain talent. We will sustain our culture of performance and standards, but we will be using the personnel and talent management authorities and tools that provide flexibility to target unique skills and achieve steep growth simultaneously. As we do so, we may find there are other opportunities for engagement and growth, and we will engage with Congress for relevant authorities as necessary.

Space Force Reserve Component

In your view, does the Space Force have a role in supporting domestic civil support missions?

Response: The Space Force may support domestic civil authorities when directed and authorized, consistent with the Constitution, federal law, Department policy, and established Defense Support of Civil Authorities processes. Its role should be to support, not replace, civilian agencies and state, local, territorial, and tribal authorities. Space Force capabilities may contribute to domestic missions through satellite communications, positioning, navigation and timing, planning assistance, and technical expertise. These capabilities could help protect lives, maintain communications, improve situational awareness, and restore essential functions during natural disasters, national emergencies, or other significant incidents. If confirmed, I would ensure any Space Force support is legally reviewed, properly authorized, coordinated through the appropriate civilian and military authorities, and narrowly tailored to the mission.

What is your vision for the proposed full-time/part-time “Space Component?”

Response: My vision is to establish a personnel management system that best recruits, trains, and develops Guardians to deliver space capabilities to joint warfighters while providing Guardians more flexibility and agility in their careers. The unified, component-less system permits the Space Force to access, grow, and retain critical space talent needed to meet growing requirements and will maximize alignment to Service needs. It also provides opportunities for Guardians to continue military service in a part-time work role, materially contributing to the Space Force mission by enabling exchanges with industry while working in the private sector or pursuing advanced academic degrees.

What is the status of the Space Force’s ability to facilitate transfers or accessions into part-time service roles, and what barriers remain to making that model operational at scale? In particular, are personnel and pay systems currently capable of seamlessly managing movement between full-time and part-time statuses, or do administrative and IT limitations continue to constrain implementation of the proposed “Space Component” construct?

Response: The Space Force is on-track to begin transfers of space-experienced Reservists to Space Force part-time work roles in July of 2026, with over 220 members currently in the transfer process. Initially, the Space Force will utilize existing personnel and pay systems with minimal modifications to clearly identify Guardians in existing systems. A significant barrier to operating this model at-scale is the reliance on these legacy data systems. Current Air Force systems are disparate across active and reserve components, requiring extensive manual interventions which drive inefficiencies and constrain the seamless management of Guardians moving between full- and part-time statuses. While the Service has identified methods to mitigate the challenges posed by utilizing legacy systems, these workarounds are not practical or sustainable long-term and continued investment in the modernization of HR IT systems and automation of HR processes is essential for long-term sustainment and to enable the Space Force to leverage all the capabilities this flexible structure provides.

Space Force Recruiting and Retention

DOD studies indicate that only about 23% of today’s youth population is eligible for military service. Further, only a fraction of those who meet military accession standards are interested in serving.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that the Space Force maintains sufficiently high recruitment and retention standards?

Response: If confirmed, I would not lower standards to meet end strength. The Space Force depends on technical skill, judgment, trustworthiness, discipline, and the ability to operate in sensitive mission areas. I would continue to review and make appropriate changes to our entry standard (aptitude, moral, physical and medical) to ensure we are

recruiting highly qualified individuals. Maintaining high standards is essential to attracting, building, and retaining a capable, competent and combat-ready force. I will monitor retention trends and take prudent steps to ensure we have the necessary room within our authorized end strength to continue to recruit and access talent that will sustain us into the future and maintain force readiness. Finally, I would focus on expanding the qualified applicant pool through outreach, STEM engagement, clear career pathways, improved accession processes, and better retention of proven Guardians. If growth must proceed more slowly to preserve standards, I would provide that assessment candidly to the Secretary and Congress.

What steps will you undertake to ensure that the Space Force is a diverse and inclusive military service?

Response: Retention will depend on meaningful missions, professional growth, technical development, quality leadership, family programs, competitive incentives, and a culture that empowers Guardians. The Space Force must provide career paths that allow operators (space, cyber and intelligence), acquisition professionals and technical specialists to grow and contribute in a meaningful way. If confirmed, I will monitor retention trends and take prudent steps to ensure we have the necessary talent within our force and continue to recruit and access talent that will sustain us into the future and maintain force readiness.

What do you consider to be key to the Space Force's future success in retaining the best qualified personnel for continued service in positions of greater responsibility and leadership in the Space Force?

Response: Retention will depend on meaningful missions, professional growth, technical development, quality leadership, family programs, competitive incentives, and a culture that empowers Guardians. The Space Force must provide career paths that allow operators (space, cyber and intelligence) and acquisition professionals and technical specialists to grow and contribute in a meaningful way.

If confirmed, I will monitor retention trends and take prudent steps to ensure we have the necessary talent within our force and continue to recruit and access talent that will sustain us into the future and maintain force readiness.

What steps, if any, do you feel should be taken to ensure that current operational requirements and tempo do not adversely impact the overall recruiting, retention, readiness, and morale of guardians?

Response: The United States Space Force (USSF) must view readiness through the lens of how ready we are to gain and maintain space superiority, whether it be now, two weeks from now, a year from now, or ten years from now. The work we have done in previous years led to our ability to be ready to effectively integrate into the joint force and provide critical support to operations like MIDNIGHT HAMMER, Absolute Resolve, and Epic Fury. The efforts we are undertaking today will allow us to not only

sustain our readiness for similar operations, but to be ready to enable and support the Joint Force through a truly contested space domain.

If confirmed, I would prioritize programs that directly affect readiness and retention beyond normal training and exercises: housing, childcare, spouse employment support, healthcare access, mental health resources, fitness, youth programs, community support, financial readiness, and programs that help employed-in-place Guardians and families build connection at Space Force installations. Service morale, recruitment, and retention should not be viewed as peripheral. For a force that often executes no-fail missions from home station around the clock, community, resilience, and family support are part of operational readiness.

In your view, what effect do current recruiting standards—particularly DOD-wide criteria for tier-one recruits—have on recruit attrition and/or future success in the Space Force?

Response: DoW-wide Tier 1 recruiting standards are powerful and highly accurate predictors of lower recruit attrition and higher future success in the U.S. Space Force. These standards directly align with downstream mission success and long-term career viability resulting in over 90% of eligible Guardians reenlisting. Since the standup of the Space Force, 99% of Guardian enlistees have entered with a Tier 1 high school diploma with approximately 38% having a minimum of 15 college semester hours.

By preserving high enlistment benchmarks, the Space Force minimizes training pipeline dropouts, reduces unit-level disciplinary and administrative burdens, and guarantees that its force is composed of highly capable, technical specialists ready to secure the space domain.

Military Compensation

What is your assessment of the adequacy of military compensation?

Response: As stated in the 14th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC), our military compensation package is strongly competitive. The Department is in the process of a year-long campaign to educate our service members on their compensation package beyond their basic pay. I thank Congress and the Administration for their focus on the annual increases in pay to ensure service member compensation keeps pace with inflation and the authorities that they have provided us to target our most critical technical skillsets.

In your view, are there any unique challenges or issues within the Space Force with respect to military compensation?

Response: The Space Force is using the authorities for special and incentive pays provided by Congress to shrink the pay gap between industry and the service for our highly technical and sought-after skillsets. I am confident the way we are using these

pays, combined with the stability that the Department offers and the culture that the Space Force is establishing, will enable us to continue to meet our mission. Our greatest challenge is timely and sufficient appropriations as the Space Force is planning to double in size over the FYDP. Delays in appropriations or reduced budgets line items make us less competitive with industry and puts the services at risk of losing the incredible talent that we have invested in.

What recommendations would you have for controlling the rising cost of personnel?

Response: Competition for highly skilled technical talent is a significant driver of personnel costs, particularly where critical missions are concentrated in high-cost geographic regions. Rising costs of living in those areas further shape our ability to recruit and retain the civilian professionals needed to execute the mission. Accordingly, our focus is on managing Space Force's human capital through disciplined workforce planning, efficient organizational design, and the deliberate use of military, civilian, and contractor talent to maximize readiness and capability.

Non-Deployable Service Members

The Department has published DODI 1332.45, *Retention Determinations for Non-Deployable Service members*.

Do you agree that guardians who are non-deployable for more than 12 consecutive months should be subject either to separation from the Space Force or referral into the Disability Evaluation System?

Response: The Space Force supports the policy referring members non-deployable for 12 consecutive months to the Disability Evaluation System (DES) when the cause is medical. Space Force supports the authority of Service Secretaries to retain Service members who are non-deployable in excess of 12 consecutive months on a case-by-case basis, when determined in the best interest of the Service.

DODI 1332.45 provides that the Secretaries of the Military Departments may “retain . . . those service members whose period of non-deployability exceeds the 12 consecutive month limit . . . if determined to be in the best interest of the Military Service.”

In your view, under what circumstances might the retention of a guardian who has been non-deployable for more than 12 months be “in the best interest of the [Space Force]”?

Response: Due to the highly specialized and technical nature of the Space Force, there are several “best interest” criteria that might lead to the retention of a non-deployable Guardian. Four examples of these possible circumstances include: the Guardian is a subject matter expert in a critical, non-deployable billet and their loss would significantly degrade mission capability; the Guardian is expected to recover from a medical condition and return to deployable status within a reasonable period, but outside the 12 months; the

Guardian is within three years of retirement eligibility and has a long record of valuable service; and the Guardian's unique skills or experience are not readily available elsewhere in the force.

In your view, what percentage of guardians can be non-deployable at any given time without adversely affecting the readiness of the force to execute the NDS and associated operational plans?

Response: All Guardians must meet our standards for military service. A great deal of USSF capabilities are assigned to USSPACECOM and employed in place. Many of our Guardians do not have to deploy to provide warfighter effects. Guardian readiness, especially physical and mental readiness, is paramount to our ability to support the Joint Force and we hold our Guardians to high standards whether they are employed in place or deployed. Deployment requirements are often based on the need to operate in austere environments with resources different from what they find at home station. Depending on the reason for non-deployable status, we can provide support to our Guardians and their families while conducting 24-7 operations at home and in our communities. If someone were to be unable to deploy to a remote environment, the Space Force in many cases could still allow them to contribute to the joint fight while ensuring we have the necessary Guardians needed for our deployable missions.

Military Quality of Life

The Committee remains concerned about the sustainment of key quality of life programs for military families, such as family advocacy and parenting skills programs; childcare; spouse education and employment support; health care; and morale, welfare and recreation (MWR) services.

If confirmed, what quality of life and MWR programs would you consider a priority? How will the Space Force work with the Air Force and other military services to ensure MWR support for guardians and their families?

Response: MWR should not be viewed as peripheral. For a force that often executes no-fail missions from home station around the clock, community, resilience, and family support are part of operational readiness. From my experience, while there are many programs that are important in supporting our Guardians and their families, the highest priority QoL issues are related to housing, medical care, schools and childcare. Because the Space Force was established intentionally without organic support capabilities, we rely heavily on the Air Force to provide much of the supporting structure that takes care of our families. If confirmed, it will be my role to partner with the AF to ensure we take care of all our families, particularly in these high priority areas. My spouse and I have been huge advocates for military families over my entire career and we will continue that if confirmed.

Family Readiness and Support

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for guardians and their families?

Response: For Guardians, Airmen, and families across the Department of the Air Force, the most important family readiness issues is resiliency in a demanding and often stressful military environment. Military life can be inherently difficult and family readiness issues encompass various aspects of well-being for Guardians and their families. Easy access to affordable childcare, safe and reliable housing, reliable and timely access to healthcare, spouse employment, access to great schools and strong installation support networks are vital to increasing the resiliency for Guardians and their families. These issues affect whether servicemembers can focus on the mission and whether families can sustain a career of service. If confirmed, I would treat them as readiness issues, not simply quality of life issues. We must build programs that not only focus on retaining the servicemember, but also the family.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that the family readiness issues you identified are properly addressed and adequately resourced?

Response: The size of the Space Force provides an opportunity to have a higher degree of senior leader interaction and engagement with servicemembers and their families. If confirmed, I plan to conduct frequent visits to the field to see and hear for myself from the people most affected by our quality of life decisions. I will conduct town halls when possible to ensure I can receive feedback directly from servicemembers and their families. I will also leverage formal and informal feedback mechanisms and collect as much information as possible to assess for myself the effectiveness and suitability of the programs we establish or need to establish. I will ensure the Chief Master Sergeant of the Space Force knows this is a priority for that position to continually evaluate family readiness. I would then hold commanders accountable for knowing the condition of their formations and families, and for elevating issues that exceed local authority or resourcing. I would then work with the Secretary of the Air Force, installation commanders, the Department of the Air Force, and Congress to prioritize resources against those gaps.

In your view, what role do non-medical counseling services provided by DOD Military Family Life Counselors have in promoting the readiness of the force and family?

Response: DoW Military and Family Life Counselors (MFLCs) play a critical, proactive role in overall force readiness by providing immediate, stigma-free support for everyday life stressors before they escalate into clinical crises. By offering non-medical counseling tailored to the unique challenges of military life—such as deployments, relocations, and marital strain—MFLCs help build essential resilience within both Guardians and their dependents. Because this care is highly accessible within units, Military & Family Readiness Centers, Child Development Centers and Youth Programs without generating

a formal medical record, it significantly lowers the barrier for service members and families seeking help. Ultimately, by proactively ensuring our families are emotionally supported and resilient, MFLCs directly enable our Guardians to remain fully focused on their missions. I have seen the benefit of MFLCs to our force and families in many of my previous command positions.

The Committee often hears that active duty families have difficulty obtaining childcare on base and that there are thousands of military families on waitlists to receive care.

If confirmed, what specifically would you do to ensure Space Force families have access to high-quality child care at an appropriate cost?

Response: If confirmed, I would support a combination of near-term and long-term childcare solutions. Near term, I would look for ways to expand fee assistance, contracted care, extended-hour options where mission demands require it, staffing incentives, and partnerships with accredited providers. Long term, I would work closely with my Department counterparts to ensure installation childcare programs are well staffed and operating to maximize existing childcare spaces, utilize all available community based childcare options, and smartly invest in facilities to expand the number of childcare spaces where needed. I would also strongly advocate childcare access is considered in basing, personnel growth, and installation investment decisions, because childcare is a readiness requirement for many Space Force families.

How would you advocate for Space Force families to ensure that child care services are properly resourced?

Response: Supporting our Guardians and their families is a readiness imperative. The Space Force is committed to providing Guardians and their families with access to affordable, high-quality child care and family housing. If confirmed, I would work with the Department of the Air Force (DAF), the Department of War (DoW), and Congress to ensure Space Force childcare development centers continue to receive funding to execute necessary maintenance and repairs and expand capacity to meet demand.

I also support DAF and DoW programs that provide Guardians in-home childcare or financial assistance to help Guardians with the cost of off-base child care. If confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to partner with Congress to continue to provide these resources and programs to Guardians and their families.

In addition, if confirmed, I will continue to advocate for the Commanders' Key Support Program and Key Support Liaisons at our installations. These programs aid and connect Guardians and their families with resources to help navigate the challenges of military life and help build a sense of community. Programs like these are force multipliers and provide important assistance to enable Guardians to be employed-in-place at our installations. I have seen the benefits of this program for Guardians and their families in several of my previous command positions.

Support for Military Families with Special Needs

If confirmed, how would you ensure that a guardian with a special needs family member is relocated only to a new duty station at which the medical and educational services required by that family member are available?

Response: If confirmed, I will ensure the safety and support of our Space Force families by strictly enforcing the Department of the War's coordinated Family Member Travel Screening process before the finalization of assignment orders. I will direct personnel assignment teams to work in close synchronization with the gaining Military Treatment Facilities, School Liaisons, Department of War Education Activity, and other important stakeholders, to determine service availability for family members with medical and educational special needs. If a projected location is found lacking in these vital resources, I will utilize established policy pathways to immediately redirect or defer the assignment to a more suitable installation. Through this rigorous coordination, we will protect family needs and ensure our Guardians can remain fully focused on their missions.

If confirmed, what tools would you use to encourage guardians to enroll in the exceptional family member program (EFMP)?

Response: To encourage enrollment, if confirmed I will prioritize utilizing and promoting modernized digital platforms like the DAF Family Vector portal and the Department's "EFMP & Me" interactive checklists to provide Guardians with clear, transparent resources. I will also mobilize unit commanders and senior enlisted leaders to actively educate the force, highlighting EFMP as an enabling readiness tool rather than a career-limiting designation. Furthermore, I will advocate for streamlining the enrollment pipeline through automated health record screening to minimize administrative burdens on families during transitions. By reducing system friction and actively dismantling any stigma surrounding enrollment, we can build trust and ensure every eligible family receives the support they deserve.

If confirmed, what role would you establish for yourself in ensuring that Military Housing Privatization Initiative partners and military commanders consider the needs of service members with an exceptional family member in making assignments to privatized military housing?

Response: If confirmed, I will establish myself as a direct champion and oversight authority to ensure that both Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) partners and installation commanders prioritize the specific physical and accessibility needs of EFMP families proactively advocating for reasonable accommodations such as wheelchair ramps, central air conditioning, or single-story layouts. Furthermore, I will mandate clear communication channels and advocate for priority housing assignment policies so that families with exceptional needs face minimal administrative delays when relocating. By holding housing partners accountable and empowering local commanders, I will work to ensure that our service members and their families are provided with safe,

accessible, and supportive homes that meet their needs. I will stress the importance of this in our commander training programs.

Domestic Violence and Child Abuse in Military Families

What is your understanding of the extent of domestic violence and child abuse in the Department of the Air Force, and if confirmed, what actions would you take to address these issues within the Space Force?

Response: While the Department of the Air Force maintains a zero-tolerance policy, domestic violence and child abuse remain persistent challenges that degrade unit readiness and deeply harm military families. Addressing this issue through a prevention-focused, data-driven approach strengthens our accountability, targets risk factors such as operational, relationship and financial stress, and expands access to early intervention resources. My priority is clear: reduce harm before it occurs, protect our families, and ensure a resilient, ready force.

In your view, what more can the Department do to *prevent* child abuse and domestic and intimate partner violence?

Response: While maintaining a strong and effective response capability, the Department is equally focused on advancing proactive, upstream prevention efforts that address the root causes of household stress, such as financial instability, isolation, and transition-related anxiety. We can enhance prevention by expanding accessible, on-demand respite childcare and marital counseling resources, ensuring families have pressure-release valves before stressors escalate into crisis. Additionally, we must modernize our digital outreach and reporting tools to make support services highly visible, confidential, and easily navigable for both Guardians and their family members. By fostering stronger partnerships with community partners, we can create a more seamless safety net of protection and support surrounding our installations.

Do you believe that the Air Force Department's Family Advocacy Program strikes the right balance between healing families and holding individuals accountable for acts of domestic violence and child abuse?

Response: I believe the Family Advocacy Program (FAP) possesses a solid structural framework, but we must continuously review its execution to ensure that rehabilitative efforts never compromise victim safety or legal accountability. True balance requires a dual-track approach where clinical treatment and family counseling are paired with swift, transparent command and judicial action when abuse occurs. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that FAP processes are tightly integrated with the Military Justice System and the Office of Special Trial Counsel to guarantee objective, independent accountability for offenders. Ultimately, victim protection and safety must remain our absolute priority, and rehabilitation should only be pursued when it can be done without exposing family members to further risk.

Suicide Prevention

The number of suicides in each of the Services continues to concern the Committee.

If confirmed, specifically what would you do to maintain a strong focus on preventing suicides in the Space Force, including their family members?

Response: If confirmed, I will maintain an unrelenting focus on suicide prevention within the Space Force by treating mental fitness as a core pillar of operational readiness and actively dismantling the stigma of seeking help. I will champion the implementation of evidence-based, upstream prevention programs that equip Guardians, spouses, and children with peer-support skills, lethal means safety education, and healthy coping mechanisms. I will also ensure commanders are actively engaged in monitoring unit tempo, reducing burnout, and fostering highly connected communities where every Guardian and family member feels valued and supported.

Currently in place, the Space Force's Holistic Health Approach (HHA) program is an innovative, science-based approach to health and resilience. HHA emphasizes primary prevention skill-building to promote shared protective factors and optimize overall health, increase positive behaviors, and maintain a higher level of individual and unit readiness across all echelons of influence. A goal of HHA is to maintain the necessary balance of skill, physical endurance, and emotional stamina needed to carry out missions. HHA strategies are focused on strengthening resilience and help-seeking behavior. I will continue to bolster Space Force efforts to achieve and sustain optimal performance that also reinforces a decrease in suicide-related behavior.

If confirmed, specifically what more would you do to enhance the reporting and tracking of suicide among family members and dependents of guardians?

Response: To effectively prevent dependent suicides, we must continue improving our understanding of the factors that contribute to family member risk. If confirmed, I will work with the Department of War, Defense Health Agency, and appropriate stakeholders to improve visibility of available data, strengthen information sharing within existing authorities, and identify gaps in our current reporting processes. Enhanced understanding of trends and contributing factors will allow us to better tailor prevention efforts, provide support resources, and ensure our families have access to assistance before they reach a crisis point.

Audit

Why is it important for the Department of the Air Force to achieve a clean audit opinion?

Response: A clean audit opinion demonstrates accountability to Congress and the American people. It improves the quality of the financial, property, inventory, and systems data leaders need to make decisions about readiness, modernization, sustainment,

and risk. For the Space Force, auditability is also part of maturing as an independent Service. We must know what we own, what condition it is in, what it costs to sustain, and whether resources are producing the intended operational effect. As the Department of the Air Force seeks to achieve a singular, clean audit for the entirety of the Department, if confirmed, I will prioritize audit activities within the Space Force and ensure that we collaborate fully with all appropriate Department of the Air Force offices to ensure that the DAF has the information needed to achieve a singular, clean audit for the entirety of the Department.

Space Force General Officer (GO) Authorizations

What is the appropriate number of General Officers in the Space Force, and why?

Response: If confirmed, I will ensure the Space Force best utilizes the number of general officer headspace established in Title 10, U.S.C., sections 525 and 526. I commit to providing my best military advice to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of War for determining the appropriate number of Space Force General Officers. As the Space Force continues to mature, gains new missions, and integrates with the Joint Force, I recognize more General Officers may be required to ensure appropriate levels of leadership for Space Force missions, combatant commander requirements, the Joint Staff and national security priorities, and provide viable options for the President to consider for nomination to the Senate at the General Officer ranks.

In your view, does the Space Force have sufficient training and resources in place to provide its GOs with the training, advice, and assistance they need to avoid and address conflicts of interest, comply with travel regulations, and ensure that government resources—including employee time—are used only for official purposes? Please explain your answer.

Response: If confirmed, I commit to ensuring appropriate resources for Space Force General Officer training to uphold ethical and legal standards expected of General Officers. The Space Force currently leverages Department of the Air Force and Joint training and resources to deliver robust ethics training and development opportunities. These include training on compliance and appropriate use of government resources.

Adverse and Reportable Information

Incidents of misconduct or substandard performance, and the findings of Inspectors General and command-directed investigations are documented in various ways in each of the Military Services. Procedures for reviewing and forwarding adverse and reportable information for consideration in the promotion selection process, including consideration by the Senate where applicable, are set forth in title 10, United States Code, and in DOD Instruction 1320.4.

How is the Space Force ensuring compliance with the requirements of law and regulation regarding the investigation and review of adverse and reportable information in the context of both GO and below-GO promotion selection processes?

Response: The Space Force complies with the requirements set forth in law and policy for reviewing and forwarding adverse and reportable information for consideration in the promotion selection process. Records reviews before to and post-selection boards are completed by the Air Force Personnel Center and Judge Advocate to ensure adverse material is considered and maintained in records or removed, based upon criteria aligned with law, Department of War, and Department of the Air Force policy.

For promotions requiring Presidential nomination and Senate confirmation, the Space Force rigorously implements Department of War's strict reporting standards in DoDI 1320.04 by ensuring substantiated derogatory information is appropriately documented, screened by the Inspector General before and after the board, and reviewed by all board members to ensure only officers meeting the "exemplary conduct" standard are advanced for recommendation to the Secretary of the Air Force.

Do you believe current procedures and practices applicable to the Space Force concerning the review of records of officers pending the President's nomination for promotion or assignment are sufficient to enable fully-informed decisions by the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President?

Response: Yes, current procedures and practices concerning review of records of officers in both the promotion and assignments processes are sufficient to enable fully informed decisions by the Service and Defense leadership, up to the President. Officer's records provide a solid basis for assessing their skills, education, experience and their record of performance across the course of their careers, critical to both promotion and assignment processes and decisions. Officer performance on the job is and continues to be the best indicator of future promotion potential.

In your view, are these procedures and practices fair to the individual military officers proceeding through the promotion or assignment process? Please explain your answer.

Response: Yes, current procedures and practices are fair and ensure that the Service and service members have a credible, consistent, and effective approach for assessing officers as they serve and participate in both promotion and assignment processes. We aim to align Space Force needs with military personnel talents to maximize the capability, readiness, and potential of both the Service and our members. This is a critical aspect of our talent management approach contributing to the success of the mission today and as we look forward.

The Space Force has flexibilities in promotions, assignments processes, and policy levers to provide Guardians a voice in their career and talent development. There may be times where the needs-of-the-service must drive promotion and assignment decisions, but more often than not, Guardian desires and Service needs are in alignment. Above all, we ensure that we are investing in and retaining Guardians so career decisions are not solely driven by a point in time.

We also are on the cusp of transitioning into Space Force Personnel Management Act authorities, enabling additional promotion and assignment personnel flexibilities that will further benefit the service and our Guardians.

If confirmed, how will you ensure that the promotion process remains apolitical and focused on finding and promoting the best leaders?

Response: I am committed to my oath of office, the accomplishment of the mission of the Space Force, and the protection and defense of our great nation. If confirmed, I will ensure we comply with the law for our military to remain laser-focused on mission accomplishment, which requires attracting, developing, retaining, and promoting our best and most proven leaders.

Joint Officer Management

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (P.L. 114-328) modified the Joint Qualified Officer (JQO) system established by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in two significant ways. First, it broadened the statutory definition of “joint matters” to expand the types of positions for which an officer can receive joint duty credit. Further, it reduced from three years to two the minimum tour length required for joint duty credit.

What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the FY 2017 modifications to the JQO system?

Response: The revisions to the Joint Qualified Officer system have been beneficial and effective. They provide the services with the flexibility needed for more military members to gain critical joint experience and credit, while adjusted tour lengths allow us to tailor assignments—a capability that has been especially critical for the Space Force as we grow and develop our cadre of joint qualified members. Over the last several years, I have seen Guardians develop through this new approach and it has enhanced the Space Force’s ability to develop joint experienced warfighters.

In your view, are the requirements associated with becoming a JQO, and the link between attaining joint qualification and eligibility for promotion to general and flag officer rank, consistent with the operational and professional demands of Space Force officers?

Response: Joint qualification is important because the Space Force exists to support, enable and execute joint operations, and senior Space Force officers must understand

combatant command requirements. The link between joint qualification and senior leadership is consistent with the demands of the profession. We must ensure the joint qualification system recognizes meaningful joint space experience, operational integration with combatant commands, and the need for officers to build deep space expertise as well as broad joint perspective. We must continue to work to ensure Guardians are competitive for senior positions in combatant commands and the Joint Staff.

In your view, what additional modifications, if any, to JQO prerequisites are necessary to ensure that Space Force officers are able to attain both meaningful joint and Space Force-specific leadership experience and adequate professional development?

Response: Integration with the Joint Force is critical for the Space Force, and we will continue to develop officers through appropriate education and experience to ensure credible joint qualified officers. As the Space Force implements statutory requirements for officers to complete operations and acquisitions assignments, I am committed to developing officer career paths and secure the necessary authorities and resources to support Space Force joint qualified officer development.

Professional Military Education

What is your vision for PME in the Space Force?

Response: My vision for Professional Military Education (PME) in the Space Force is to build an agile, space-centric learning ecosystem at all appropriate classification levels that prepares officers and senior enlisted leaders to secure space superiority in highly contested, multi-domain environments. Rather than relying on legacy air-centric models, a Space Force PME system is designed to cultivate strategic thinkers and joint warfighters who can seamlessly integrate space domain and technical expertise with military judgment.

In your judgement, what is the most significant shortcoming of today's PME system?

Response: The most significant opportunity for today's PME system is the exciting transition toward full domain integration. While our educational foundations have historically served traditional domains well, the future lies in elevating space from a supporting capability into its own dynamic, highly contested warfighting domain. Today's PME systems must address the lack of space-focused content and proactively evolve beyond legacy frameworks in order to cultivate visionary leaders who are uniquely equipped for the rapid speed, advanced technical complexity, and strategic realities of modern space operations.

Do you believe that PME today creates adequate joint leaders? Why or why not?

Response: Our joint PME institutions provide a foundation for leadership, and we now have an extraordinary opportunity to elevate this system to meet the demands of modern conflict. To forge truly prepared joint leaders for tomorrow, we are actively transitioning toward full domain integration—ensuring that space is understood not merely as a supporting capability, but as a dynamic, highly contested warfighting domain.

By proactively expanding Guardian representation across all joint educational forums, we will enrich the joint force with deep space expertise, capabilities, and strategic insight. Furthermore, we are leading the modernization of our enlisted Joint PME. By focusing at all echelons on standardized, cutting-edge warfighting, strategic thinking, and leadership development, we are paving the way to cultivate a unified, highly capable joint team ready to secure multi-domain superiority.

If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to develop a Space Force PME system to ensure that it fosters the education and development of a cadre of strategic thinkers and planners with the intellectual acumen, military leadership proficiency, and sound judgment to lead the Joint Force in a globally integrated, multi-domain fight?

Response: The Space Force needs officers and senior enlisted leaders who can think strategically, command and lead effectively, communicate clearly, understand joint operations, and integrate technical expertise with military judgment. PME should also include wargaming, writing, decision exercises, and exposure to allies, industry, the intelligence community, and Congress. The Space Force has developed our initial PME courses for all levels and we will continue to develop them to meet the needs of the future Space Force and joint force. We must ensure the capacity to educate enough Guardians to have the largest pool of qualified Guardians for future opportunities. If confirmed, I will advocate for larger participation of Guardians in joint PME courses and will work towards developing correspondence courses for our officer PME courses in addition to our current in-residence courses.

What changes or reform would you recommend to the PME system to ensure that tomorrow's leaders have the tools necessary to ensure the Space Force is able to meet the national defense objectives of the future?

Response: The overarching objective is to transition from traditional domain-centric educational paradigms to a tailored system that prepares Joint All Domain Operations (JADO) critical thinkers capable of achieving space superiority focused on three core pillars: warfighting and technical mastery, joint and coalition integration, and educational agility and scale. To operationalize these goals, the Space Force should prioritize the following programmatic and structural changes in its PME system: acquire adequate facilities to ensure classified discussions and joint warfighting planning exercises, inject practical, threat-informed modules including wargaming, rigorous writing, and dynamic decision exercises; build mandatory PME blocks incorporating direct exposure to allies, commercial space industry partners, and the intelligence community; advocate for larger participation of Guardians in joint PME courses; introduce space superiority concepts

early in all joint service tracks; develop comprehensive correspondence courses for the officer PME track to expand access, alongside custom-tailored PME paths for noncommissioned officers; and expand overall educational capacity to build the largest possible pool of qualified Guardians prepared for future command and senior leadership opportunities.

Officer Personnel Management System Reforms

The John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (P.L. 115-232) contained several provisions to modernize the officer personnel management system.

How is the Space Force implementing these authorities today and to what effect?

Response: The authorities granted by the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2019 gave the Space Force more flexibility to better manage the officer corps. We've continued to develop and modernize our talent management tools and personnel management practices to build the force we need. The Personnel Management Act authorized in the FY24 NDAA provides critical legislative authorities the Space Force needs to more flexibly manage our military force, enhance military personnel readiness, improve quality of life and retention, and enable the Space Force to attract and retain talent to deliver unmatched space capabilities. If confirmed, I will ensure the Space Force remains focused on identifying innovative personnel management practices and policies to implement best practices in talent management.

In your view, does the Space Force need any additional authorities to modernize the management of military personnel?

Response: The Personnel Management Act authorized in the FY24 NDAA provides critical legislative authorities the Space Force needs to more flexibly manage our military force, enhance military personnel readiness, improve quality of life and retention, and enable the Space Force to attract and retain talent to deliver unmatched space capabilities.

Space Force Civilian Personnel Workforce

In your judgment, what is the biggest challenge facing the Space Force in effectively and efficiently managing its civilian workforce, and how would you address that challenge, if confirmed?

Response: The biggest challenge facing the Space Force in effectively and efficiently managing its civilian workforce is recruiting and retaining the specialized talent required to execute our mission. Competition for highly skilled technical talent, particularly where critical missions are concentrated in high-cost geographic regions, demand competitive compensation packages to allow the Space Force to outcompete private sector employers. Rising costs of living in those areas further shape our ability to recruit and retain the

civilian professionals needed to execute the mission. If confirmed, I will ensure the Space Force uses all statutory authorities authorized to offer competitive compensation and target incentives to recruit and retain the most critical talent.

How would you assess the adequacy of compensation and benefits for Department of Space Force civilian employees, the morale of the civilian workforce, and the Department's ability to recruit and retain the very best talent for civilian service, especially in light of a proposed pay freeze for civilian employees in this year's budget request?

Response: Our civilian workforce is engaged and motivated to perform their vital role in providing organizational knowledge and operational experience. Competition for highly skilled technical talent, particularly where critical missions are concentrated in high-cost geographic regions, demand competitive compensation packages to allow the Space Force to outcompete private sector employers. Rising costs of living in those areas further shape our ability to recruit and retain the civilian professionals needed to execute the mission.

How will the Space Force build and sustain requisite capacity and capability in its civilian workforce to meet national defense requirements over the next decade?

Response: The Space Force will build and sustain requisite capacity and capability in its civilian workforce by recruiting and retaining the critical talent required to execute our mission. Competition for highly skilled technical talent, particularly where critical missions are concentrated in high-cost geographic regions, demand competitive compensation packages to allow the Space Force to outcompete private sector employers. Rising costs of living in those areas further shape our ability to recruit and retain the civilian professionals needed to execute the mission. Intern pipelines and development roles to create talent pipelines will help build capacity and capability in our civilian workforce too. If confirmed, I will ensure the Space Force uses all statutory authorities authorized to offer competitive compensation and target incentives to recruit and retain the most critical talent.

In your view, how can DOD and its Components better utilize telework, and other alternative work arrangements, while maintaining supervisory and employee accountability for high quality performance and the appropriate use of official time?

Response: The Space Force currently integrates alternative work arrangements primarily to enhance operational continuity, ensuring our team remains resilient and mission-ready under any circumstances. We sustain high performance and the appropriate use of official time by aligning these flexibilities with clear, results-based performance plans and regular supervisory check-ins. This balanced approach allows us to leverage the practical benefits of modern work options while maintaining supervisory and employee accountability.

One long-standing special civilian personnel management program is the DOD Civilian Acquisition Workforce Personnel Demonstration Project (commonly known as AcqDemo). Originally implemented in 1999, AcqDemo provides tremendous flexibility in the compensation, hiring, and overall management of the DOD acquisition workforce. AcqDemo has been deemed a success by the Department and by the employees it covers, yet almost 20 years later, it remains a “temporary” authority.

In your view, are there sound reasons for transitioning AcqDemo to a permanent program?

Response: Making AcqDemo permanent would provide long-term stability for the Department of the Air Force’s acquisition workforce by preserving a proven personnel system that improves hiring speed, rewards employee contributions, retains critical talent, and gives leaders flexibility to meet evolving mission requirements. Permanent authority would also reduce uncertainty for employees and organizations, allowing continued investment in workforce development while maintaining accountability and merit-based personnel practices.

In your view, could the AcqDemo system be applied successfully—as it currently stands, or with modifications—to other civilian personnel functional communities?

Response: The AcqDemo system could be applied successfully across a broader range of functional communities. Seventy percent of the Space Force’s civilian workforce is part of the AcqDemo system today. However, it is one of seven personnel systems that manage our workforce of 5,040 civilians. No single system combines all hiring authorities and pay flexibilities.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

169. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer yes or no.

Response: Yes.

170. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and when asked before this committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate committees of Congress to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the position of the Administration? Please answer yes or no.

Response: Yes.

171. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.

Response: Yes.

172. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.

Response: Yes.

173. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer yes or no.

Response: Yes.

174. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.

Response: Yes.

175. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer yes or no.

Response: Yes.

176. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer yes or no.

Response: Yes.