

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION  
FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR  
2014 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE  
PROGRAM**

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**TUESDAY, APRIL 9, 2013**

U.S. SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING  
THREATS AND CAPABILITIES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC.*

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND POLICIES  
WITH RESPECT TO EMERGING COUNTERTERRORISM  
THREATS**

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:24 p.m. in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Kay R. Hagan (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Hagan, Nelson, Fischer, McCain, and Blunt.

Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; and Robie I. Samanta Roy, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; and Thomas W. Goffus, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, Kathleen A. Kulenkampff, John L. Principato, and Lauren M. Gillis.

Committee members' assistants present: Jeff Fatora, assistant to Senator Nelson; Christopher Cannon, assistant to Senator Hagan; Christian Brose, assistant to Senator McCain; and Peter Schirtzinger, assistant to Senator Fischer.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KAY R. HAGAN,  
CHAIRMAN**

Senator HAGAN. The Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee will come to order, and my first official apology. I, for some reason, had it in my head this was at 2:30 instead of 2:15. So I do apologize.

Good afternoon, everybody, and thanks. Today the subcommittee welcomes Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security

Affairs Derek Chollet—thank you for being here—Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Mike Sheehan—thank you—and the Commander of Special Operations Command (SOCOM), Admiral Bill McRaven—thank you—for us to receive testimony on the Department of Defense (DOD) programs, policies, and operations with respect to countering emerging terrorism threats, in preparation for the committee's markup of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014. We look forward to your testimony today.

Since the subcommittee held a similar hearing last year, the global landscape has continued to evolve and the demands being placed on our Nation's military continue to morph as well. Assistant Secretary Chollet, the subcommittee requested your participation today because the most acute terrorism threats our Nation faces today are located in the geographic area for which you are responsible.

A few examples come to mind quickly. In Syria, the Al-Nusra Front, which is closely connected with al Qaeda in Iraq, has demonstrated remarkable strength over the past few months against the military and Mafia-like forces of President Assad and his inner circle. In Yemen, despite a number of notable counterterrorism (CT) successes by our Nation's CT professionals, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula continues to plan strikes against the United States and our interests. In Somalia, a massive investment by the international community in the African Union Peacekeeping Force, coupled with targeted training by U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) of deploying units, has paid dividends that may put the Somali people and their nascent national government on a path to a better future.

In North and West Africa, the political instability created by the Arab Spring, as well as the multilateral military intervention in Libya, has created a security vacuum in a vast region of the world where the reach of national government does not often extend beyond the major population centers. Al Qaeda's franchise in the region, al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, as well as a number of other local violent extremist groups, have seized on this instability and the availability of the weapons to undermine the governments in Mali and elsewhere.

I know the issues surrounding this region have consumed a great deal of attention for all three of our witnesses today and we look forward to hearing your views on the situation on the ground as well as the support the United States, that we are providing to regional and international efforts to combat this instability.

I also understand this situation serves as a good way to highlight some of the complex security assistance challenges that our defense professionals have sought to address in recent years. Secretary Sheehan and Admiral McRaven, I hope that you will also address these matters today.

Another issue which I know the full committee chairman and ranking member have focused on in recent years is the U.S. Support Mission to Central Africa efforts to remove the leadership of the Lord's Resistance Army from the battlefield. Given the recent coup in the Central African Republic, the subcommittee looks for-

ward to an update on this mission and the Department's plans for it in the coming months.

Admiral McRaven and Secretary Sheehan, over the past year the Department has placed an emphasis on innovative, low-cost, and small footprint approaches to achieve national security objectives. This describes one of the hallmarks of our SOF and the demand for those forces we know remain high.

While the residual threat from al Qaeda, fiscal realities facing the Department, and the sensitivity of many of our partners to a large or visible presence of U.S. military personnel will drive continued deployments of SOF for our CT operations and engagement activities designed to improve the capacity of foreign security forces to confront the mutual security challenges.

Upon taking command of SOCOM in August 2011, Admiral McRaven began developing your vision for the future of our SOF. One element of that vision is what you've referred to as "enhancing the global Special Operations network." I know that published reports indicate that you're seeking a series of changes to your command's authority and DOD policy, which we have discussed, that would give you more control over the deployment and utilization of SOF. In some cases these proposals have generated speculation, and please use today's hearing as an opportunity to provide specifics on what you are hoping to achieve and what changes you believe are necessary to enhance the effectiveness of the SOF in carrying out these assigned missions.

Secretaries Sheehan and Chollet, as the civilians with primary policy oversight the committee looks forward to hearing your thoughts on these issues.

On the issue of security assistance authorities, I hope all three of our witnesses will offer views on the authorities this subcommittee has helped provide to the Department to address the multitude of security issues our Nation confronts. These include the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), the targeted authorities for Yemen and the Horn of Africa, the Section 1208 authority, DOD's counternarcotics authority, and other issues that you would like to share your thoughts with us.

Recent news reports have also discussed U.S. CT operations, including those conducted using remotely piloted aircraft, or drones, and whether they preponderance of such operations should be conducted under Title 10 of DOD authorities. The public statement of several senior administration officials suggest that changes along these lines may be under consideration. So I hope you'll also provide testimony on that.

Before our witnesses provide brief opening remarks, I'll turn to Ranking Member Fischer for any opening remarks that she has to make.

Senator Fischer.

#### **STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER**

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Once again, this is our first official hearing. I would like to tell you what an honor and a pleasure it is to serve as the ranking member on your subcommittee.

I join you in welcoming our witnesses today and I thank them for their many years of service. Their testimony will play an important role in informing our efforts to craft the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014.

Over the last month the full committee has heard from many of our most respected civilian and military leaders regarding the threats within their respective areas of responsibilities. What was made abundantly clear from their testimony is that this country and our partners are facing a global security environment that is as complex and daunting as any time in our history.

Terrorists and other illicit networks are increasingly interconnected and are no longer confined to geographic boundaries. As you have stated previously, Admiral McRaven, there is no such thing as a local problem. While the security environment is becoming increasingly dynamic, I worry that our strategy to confront these threats is struggling to keep pace. What I hope to gain from our hearing today is a better understanding of what threats cause our witnesses the greatest concern and whether current strategy, resourcing, and legal authorities are sufficient to meet those threats. More simply, how do we most effectively address the growing threats to this country and our interests around the world, particularly in a time of growing budgetary uncertainty?

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Ranking Member Fischer.

I want to recognize our witnesses. First, Secretary Sheehan, if you could give your opening statement, and then Secretary Chollet and then Admiral McRaven.

Secretary Sheehan.

**STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT AND INTERDEPENDENT CAPABILITIES**

Mr. SHEEHAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Senator Hagan, and thank you, Senator Fischer, as well. Thank you for the opportunity to speak today from the Department about our emerging CT threats. I've provided a longer statement for the record that will address many of the issues both of you raised in your opening comments, but I also touch upon them in my opening remarks as well.

Today I'd like to talk about the evolving threat of al Qaeda and its affiliates, our counterterrorism efforts, and a few words about the role of SOF in our strategy. As you mentioned, Senator Hagan, the Secretary of Defense and the President announced in our new defense strategy that we're going to develop innovative, low-cost, and small footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives. The Secretary of Defense also stated that the task of training, advising, and partnering with foreign military and security forces has moved from the periphery to become a critical skill set across our armed services. I would add that for SOF this has always been one of our quintessential missions.

Today we shall expand upon our defense strategy and discuss how in the context of the dynamic threat posed by al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, how our CT effort is progressing. In the past year alone, we've already seen this strategy begin to take shape

and have some success, particularly in Somalia and in Yemen. I'll come back to those.

But before I talk about the strategy, a few words about the threat as I see it. In the past 10 years we've had enormous success against al Qaeda, particularly in their ability to strike our Homeland and other strategic interests abroad, and it's important to recognize this success and understand what has been responsible for that success.

However, al Qaeda's core threat to our Homeland continues to evolve and emanate around the world. But I will say that I still consider the main threat from al Qaeda from its two traditional strongholds, in the mountainous area between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the AFPAK region, number one, and second from its other traditional stronghold in Yemen. Those remain the most traditional and to me still the most important threats for al Qaeda, direct threats for our Homeland today, those two, even as al Qaeda morphs and seeks to find sanctuaries in other parts of the world, and we'll talk about those.

Right now al Qaeda has begun to take advantage of uncontrolled space in other parts of the world. Now, we mentioned Somalia and we've had some great success there. That's perhaps the third area after AFPAK and Yemen, then Somalia. Then the two most emerging areas that we all know of and that you mentioned in your opening remarks, Senator Hagan, is North Africa, West Africa, and of course Syria. In both cases, al Qaeda has taken advantage of ungoverned space and moved into both those areas to begin to establish its networks.

In North Africa they were able to join with a local Touareg rebellion, then eject that leadership of that rebellion and take over a large part of Mali, and we know the story of the French pushing them back since last January.

In Syria the Al-Nusra Front, an al Qaeda of Iraq affiliate, another al Qaeda affiliate, has also taken advantage of the ungoverned space in the war in Syria to establish a foothold there, and it continues to operate, primarily with its efforts against the Assad regime.

Let me take a few words to talk about our strategy against al Qaeda around the world. First I want to say a few words about direct action. Our direction—

Senator HAGAN. Secretary Sheehan, one other comment is let's make them pretty brief, because what my plan is is to be in here until 3:20 p.m.

Mr. SHEEHAN. Okay. I was planning on 5 minutes.

Senator HAGAN. Okay, that's fine. Then we'll go to the closed session and have another hearing.

Mr. SHEEHAN. All right.

Senator HAGAN. That's fine.

Mr. SHEEHAN. I'll go through this briefly.

We use several components of our strategy. One is the direct action or the lethal action. We've become very proficient at that in the Special Operations community, and it helps us target the key leadership and networks of al Qaeda. As you're aware, the President has made clear that he wants to continue to engage Congress and assure not only that our targeting, detention, and prosecution

of terrorists remain consistent with our laws and systems of checks and balances, but our efforts are even more transparent with the American people and the world.

The second component of our strategy is security force assistance. This is our building partners' capacity. You asked—I'll make a few comments about some of the instruments that Congress has provided to us particularly since September 11, 2001, to give us tools to do that. Section 1206, the train-and-equip, and section 1207, particularly for Yemen and East Africa, have been fundamental for us building the capacity in Yemen and in Eastern Africa, where we have had success rolling back al Qaeda's sanctuary over the past year.

A year ago if I testified from here I would have been talking about al Qaeda controlling massive swaths of territory in Yemen and massive swaths of territory in Somalia. In both cases they've been rolled back. The programs that you've provided us with those authorities were central to that.

We have a new experimental program, the GSCF, a pilot program, that is also assisting us in building capacity around the world and I can talk a little bit about later and our evaluation of that.

Section 1208, although not a building capacity program per se, is also fundamental for our ability to work with surrogates to pursue our interests in operational aspects of CT. But we're increasingly using it as well to develop partner elite units that also become very operationally important to us in North Africa and other parts of the world.

In the future I think it's extremely important, Senator Hagan, that we look to codify those authorities that have been provided to DOD, provide those multi-year authorities, make them permanent and make sure the funding streams and authorities are clear.

I want to spend a few minutes talking about denying sanctuary. When I was following al Qaeda prior to September 11, we learned then that you cannot allow al Qaeda to have sanctuary with impunity. What we try to do whenever al Qaeda has sanctuary is try to either work with the host country or, if they're not capable, increasingly now we're working with multinational forces to deny al Qaeda sanctuary.

In Yemen, where we had a capable country leadership with the new leadership of Hadi, we're working with the Yemenis to roll back al Qaeda in Yemen. In Somalia, where we didn't have a functioning government, we've worked with the African Union and a United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operation and have successfully ejected al Shabaab, the al Qaeda affiliate, out of the major cities in Somalia. In Mali right now, the French have pushed the al Qaeda Islamic Magheb (AQIM) out of the major cities in north Mali, and we're working to create a U.N. operation to follow that so the French can focus on the high-value targets and eventually turn over that security to the host country.

That's really what we're trying to do with our strategy, is turn it back over to the host country and local forces. We can assist them, but really the responsibility for ensuring the security of their sovereign territory is their national responsibility. That is the future and those tools that I just talked about and you mentioned,

Senator Hagan, are absolutely fundamental for our ability to do that. We're looking at modifying those and coming up with some new ideas that Admiral McRaven and we have presented that we think will even better our ability to pursue those objectives.

Let me conclude by saying that after a decade of great success in pounding al Qaeda leadership, typically in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but around the world, harassing them with partners and by ourselves, we've had success against the al Qaeda organization. We need to continue to be adaptive and flexible in order to continue to have that success and make sure we have the proper authorities, the proper funding. I believe we can do that together, and I look forward to continuing the discussion of how we do that in the rest of this session.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Chollet.

**STATEMENT OF HON. DEREK H. CHOLLET, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS**

Mr. CHOLLET. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Fischer, distinguished members of the subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to join this hearing to speak about how today's emerging CT threats impact our defense relationships in Africa and the Middle East and what we are doing to build strong partners in these critical regions.

The dramatic events of the past 2 years throughout the Middle East and Africa offer both opportunities and challenges as we work to combat al Qaeda and associated threats. On the positive side, these developments hold great promise for people long denied freedom, dignity, and opportunity. Ultimately, we believe that democratic transitions will discredit violent extremists, provide a more enduring foundation for stability and cooperation, and better align our values and our interests.

We are also aware of the significant risks inherent in such historic change. In particular, al Qaeda and other extremist organizations are seeking to exploit the resulting uncertainty to establish new operating environments in ungoverned or poorly governed spaces. In order to mitigate these risks, DOD is strengthening our military-to-military relationships with partners, working to enable effective local capacity, and supporting international and regional responses to terrorist and extremist threats.

In all of these efforts, we are working closely with our allies in the regions as well as Europe to leverage our collective capabilities, especially as we adjust to the new realities of more austere budgets.

In the interest of time, I'll briefly comment on four countries in particular, several of which you've mentioned, Madam Chairman, in your opening statement, and I'll look forward to your questions.

First in Yemen. As part of a "whole-of-government" approach to combatting al Qaeda Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), DOD is providing training and equipment to Yemeni security forces to build capacity and to conduct counterterrorism operations. Also, in concert with our European Union (EU) and Jordanian partners, we are providing advice to the Yemeni military as it reorganizes under a sin-

gle chain of command under President Hadi. A unified professional Yemeni military will be more effective in the fight against AQAP and will contribute to greater political stability.

Second, we remain supportive of Libya's transition in the aftermath of the Benghazi attacks and seek to assist the Government of Libya as it strives to secure its borders, control its various militias, and counter violent extremists. DOD is willing and able to expand cooperation with the Libyan armed forces, but we are challenged by a heightened security threat and a diminished personnel presence at our embassy in Tripoli. As the security situation improves and the Libyans are better positioned to provide funding to support their armed forces modernization, we hope that our relationship will expand.

Third, in Mali we are very concerned about the instability and the risk—instability in Mali and the risk it poses to regional stability and our interests in the region. We share, as Secretary Sheehan has pointed out, we share the French goals to shrink the AQIM safe haven, to contribute to the restoration of Malian territorial integrity, and to set the enabling conditions for elections.

Since soon after the French forces entered Mali in January, the United States has been supporting them in critical ways through intelligence-sharing, airlift, and aerial refueling, to enable their operations. While there is no consideration of putting U.S. combat forces on the ground in Mali, we continue to support Mali's neighbors through training and assistance to counter regional threats.

Finally but perhaps most troubling, we are keenly focused on events in Syria and the suffering of the Syrian people and the impact on regional stability generally. As President Obama said last month during his visit to Israel and Jordan, we are very concerned about Syria becoming an enclave for extremism, which is why we're working with the international community to help accelerate a viable political transition and helping the Syrian opposition be more cohesive and capable.

The United States is the single largest humanitarian donor to the Syrian people and is working closely with partners like Jordan and Turkey to help deal with the significant humanitarian and security challenges they face as a result of this conflict.

Madam Chairman, Senator Fischer, the situation in Syria along with that in Yemen, Mali, Libya, and elsewhere, serves as a stark reminder that, as Secretary Hagel said last week in his speech at the National Defense University, "The world remains combustible and complex." That's why, especially in these fiscally challenging times, we will continue to rely upon the leadership of this subcommittee and the full committee and Congress as a whole in supporting the Department and our men and women in uniform to defend our interests.

Thank you again and I look forward to your questions.

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Sheehan and Mr. Chollet follows:]

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN  
AND HON. DEREK H. CHOLLET

Madam Chairman, Senator Fischer, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee: thank you for the opportunity to speak about how we, at the Department of Defense, are addressing today's emerging counterterrorism threats.



While the past decade has been marked by two major wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have not lost sight of the more pervasive and immediate threat of terrorism, especially from al Qaeda and its affiliate networks. To combat this widespread and evolving threat, we have engaged with willing nations around the world, building their capabilities and strengthening our partnerships with them. We have also leveraged a whole-of-government approach, characterized by diplomatic, economic, intelligence, law enforcement, informational, financial, and military instruments. In doing so, and with support from many of you in this room today, we have protected the American people.

In January 2012, the President and the Secretary of Defense released new defense strategic guidance, which emphasized the need to rebalance towards Asia/Pacific, while retaining our focus on counterterrorism and irregular warfare capabilities. Specifically, it stated that “our [CT] efforts will become more widely distributed and will be characterized by a mix of direct action and security force assistance,” and that we will “continue to build and sustain tailored capabilities appropriate for [CT] and irregular warfare.”

Today we wish to expand upon our defense strategy and discuss how—in the context of the dynamic threat posed by al Qaeda and other terrorist groups—our CT efforts are progressing. We will also speak to the role of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the context of this new defense strategy.

Only 1 year into the strategy, we are already witnessing its impact, particularly in Somalia and Yemen. For example, in Yemen we’ve taken key leaders off the battlefield and Yemeni security forces have pushed them out of safe havens in the South. We are not about to claim victory; however, we have made significant progress in achieving our objectives and greatly diminishing the al Qaeda network’s ability to recruit, train and launch effective attacks in the 12 years since September 11.

We’d like to talk first about the persistent and evolving threat from al Qaeda and its affiliates.

#### THE THREAT

Al Qaeda is significantly diminished in some theaters but still a persistent threat. Core al Qaeda’s leaders are still based in the mountainous region between Afghanistan and Pakistan. As we wind down U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan, we cannot lose focus on this area. But al Qaeda and its affiliates are also evolving to exploit opportunities and fragile environments in Africa and the Middle East brought on by the unrest there over the last several years.

Outside the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, Yemen has been a safe haven for al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Yemen remains a place where terrorists aspire to attack the United States and our allies, and AQAP is bent on using violence to disrupt the ongoing political transition there.

In the Horn of Africa, al Qaeda commenced its global terrorist campaigns with attacks against U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998. Today East Africa-based al Qaeda associates are closely intertwined with al-Shabaab, which itself aspires to establish a Taliban-like Islamic State and launch regional and transnational terrorist attacks. Most of the key East Africa-based al Qaeda and al-Shabaab leaders have been removed from the battlefield. Despite the incredible progress in Somalia over the past few years, including the establishment of the first elected government in decades, some remnants of al Qaeda remain and are seeking to regroup.

Meanwhile, outside of their traditional strongholds, al Qaeda and other extremist organizations are adapting and regenerating in ungoverned or poorly governed spaces, carving out new sanctuaries, and threatening our overseas interests and those of our regional partners. In particular, they are taking advantage of the instability and turmoil resulting from the Arab Awakening, in places like Syria and Libya. We saw the dangers manifest through this combination of extremism and weak governance at our diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, where we lost an Ambassador and three other Americans; in Algeria, during the attack by a Mali-based terrorist group on the British Petroleum facility at In Amenas; in Nigeria, where al Qaeda affiliates have kidnapped and executed western hostages and bombed the U.N. Headquarters in Abuja; and in northern Mali, where al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its allies were expanding their control over some population centers until the French and regional partner forces—many of them trained and supported by the United States—intervened to counter the terrorists and reverse their momentum.

In North and West Africa, AQIM is exploiting volatility in the region and a lack of state control over significant swaths of territory to establish new operating envi-

ronments. Weapons from Libya and money from kidnappings and illicit trafficking are enabling al Qaeda activity that stretches from the Mediterranean to Mali and down to Nigeria. We rely on an indirect approach in the region, building the capacity of partner states to counter shared threats. Limited government capacity and frequent political instability—such as coups d'états—pose challenges to our efforts. But such challenges make a regional approach even more critical and are why we are working with a wide range of partners, including the United Nations and regional security organizations, to counter these threats.

In Syria, during an almost 2-year-long violent uprising to depose President Assad, al Qaeda in Iraq's (AQI) network in Syria—operating under the moniker al-Nusrah Front—has sought to portray itself as part of the legitimate Syrian opposition. Al-Nusrah Front is, in fact, an attempt by AQI to hijack the struggles of the Syrian people for its own malign purposes—attempting to establish an al Qaeda-governed state in the region.

The threat is also metastasizing. New groups, many with links to al Qaeda, are beginning to develop, such as Ahrar al Sham in Syria, Muhammad Jamal Group in Egypt, Ansar al Sharia in Libya and Tunisia, Tawhid Wal Jihad in West Africa in Mali, as well as Boko Haram in Nigeria. Although many of their operatives are focused on local targets and goals, many of these organizations have external operations agendas and can be expected to turn to international targeting if left unopposed. In some cases, as groups become entrenched, they begin to establish more sophisticated training camps. Although these camps do not match the scale witnessed in pre-September 11 Afghanistan, they are specialized, mobile, and attractive to new recruits. Some of these camps provide advanced explosive training and tradecraft, radicalize personnel, and are a means to provide funding and weapons, which when combined, enables them to become a strategic threat. It is also critical to enable effective local capacity before the threats grow too large for local security forces to manage.

We have learned from experiences in Libya and Algeria that these groups will take advantage of U.S. engagement and interests in fragile and conflict-affected areas to target our citizens. These opportunistic attacks can be challenging to predict and costly when executed. As we saw in the case of Algeria, these groups could target industrial or humanitarian compounds and threaten U.S. personnel and interests. This has reinforced our need to strengthen our relationships with regional partners to advance our common security objectives.

Development of persistent relationships with capable units in host nations is critical so that we can ensure agile and capable responses to a range of contingencies. SOF and other forces focused on security force assistance are skilled at taking country-specific approaches and seeking opportunities to establish critical operational and intelligence relationships needed to: (1) maintain constant pressure on al Qaeda-affiliated groups; and (2) ultimately defeat them. As we examine indicators and trends shaping our future security environment, regional specialization and the ability to operate independently in austere and denied areas will enable enhanced security for U.S. overseas personnel, facilities, and interests.

#### ELEMENTS OF A COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY

We cannot allow al Qaeda to benefit from sanctuary with impunity, as they did in Afghanistan during the 1990s. To attack al Qaeda and diminish its influence, we must continue to employ a unique range of tools and activities. Along those lines and as mentioned earlier, the New Defense Strategy describes the requirement for a mix of direct action and security force assistance.

#### DIRECT ACTION

The high-profile success stories of the last decade have often resulted from direct action precision strikes and raids, which have disrupted some attack plans and degraded elements of al Qaeda. But we cannot rely solely on precision strikes to defeat enemy networks and foster stability—these operations buy us time but do not provide a lasting solution. Ultimately, the decisive battle to defeat these groups must be fought—and won—“by, with, and through” host nation efforts.

We must now transition to a period with partners in the lead but we will always reserve the right to defend ourselves. For this reason, we must retain high end capabilities to deploy and strike swiftly and precisely anywhere in the world.

#### SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

The effort to build the capabilities of partner nations' special operations forces can serve two purposes: (1) to deny space and sanctuary and (2) to develop partner capability to conduct specialized missions, including direct action against key terrorist

group leaders but also elite capabilities to respond to a range of contingencies and threats as they emerge.

Helping our foreign partners to provide for their own security and contribute to regional stability is an investment that pays immediate and long-term dividends by reducing the need for costlier U.S. interventions in response to turmoil in regions critical to U.S. interests. These activities are a cost-effective way to strengthen our national security posture by building lasting relationships and alliances with partner nations. Efforts to build partners' capacity to conduct their own operations against terrorist threats are a fundamental aspect of our strategy. Capable partners mitigate the burden on U.S. forces and serve as the basis for future cooperation, improved U.S. access, and combined operations.

Security Force Assistance is often conducted by our special operations forces, whose history and proficiency at working "by, with, and through" partner forces makes them our provider of choice for this mission. SOF operate through persistent engagement in key countries, which generates "operational context." Operational context is the thorough understanding and, in fact, expertise that is uniquely gained through multiple visits to the same areas. This includes understanding local culture, society, language, economy, history and politics. In short, SOF operators have valuable insights on the physical and human terrain of their areas, which allow them to be more precise and therefore successful in their enabling activities.

Beyond Afghanistan, SOF have been deployed to dozens of countries across the globe, conducting low-visibility, highly-sensitive missions that are putting pressure on and constraining the ability of the al Qaeda network to plan, train, and prepare for terrorist attacks.

There is nothing new about this mission, for the United States or for our SOF. Prior to September 11, U.S. SOF were working around the world to train, equip, advise, and assist host nation forces to combat threats to security and U.S. interests.

For example, in Colombia, U.S. Army Special Forces trained and assisted host-nation forces to combat the drug smuggling and violence instigated by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). The successful rescue of three U.S. hostages in 2009 marked the culmination of 2 decades of persistent SOF efforts to build Colombian SOF capabilities. Now, we are encouraged to see that Colombia is in turn providing justice sector and security force assistance of their own to other U.S. partner nations across the Americas and in Africa.

More recently, SOF have played a key role in places like the Philippines, where their decade-long engagement has yielded more capable partner forces that have made significant progress countering terrorism. The ongoing relationship between SOF and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) strengthened when SOF deployed in 2002 to act in a non-combat role to advise and assist the AFP in operations against the Abu Sayyaf Group, a terrorist entity taking advantage of safe havens in the southern Philippines. The units first engaged with local residents to learn their basic needs. This allowed U.S. SOF to then work with the AFP to address grievances in the community, severing their ties with the terrorist groups. As SOF trained and advised the AFP personnel, they helped coordinate security efforts and interagency—sometimes international—programs to address key issues such as water, medical care, transportation, and education.

Currently, our CT cooperation with the Yemenis has placed unprecedented pressure on AQAP, and we continue to support the development of Yemeni capacity to conduct intelligence-driven CT operations in a manner that respects human rights and makes every effort to avoid civilian casualties.

In North and West Africa, we are providing support to the French in their efforts to degrade the capacity of AQIM. We have moved assets and provided intelligence to enable the French to effectively prevent AQIM, its off-shoots, and allied insurgents from advancing farther south into Mali. These efforts illustrate that partners in the lead can include key allies, like France, as well as host nations such as Niger and Chad.

In Somalia, the United States works through the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). We have provided advising and assistance to AMISOM which has reduced al Shabaab's freedom of movement in south and central Somalia.

In order to conduct these security force assistance activities, SOF must leverage a wide variety of authorities available to the geographic combatant commands (GCCs). While many of these authorities contain valuable elements that enable our SOF to build capacities in key areas, we still face a pervasive management challenge matching various authorities and timelines in order to accomplish key missions can be burdensome even when individual programs are executed efficiently. Further, no authority exists that is specifically tailored to allow our SOF to rapidly

engage where necessary in order to build critical SOF capabilities during windows of opportunity that might be fleeting.

#### CURRENT SPECIAL OPERATIONS EFFORTS

Since September 11, a key mission of SOF and U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has focused on combating terrorism around the world, and that CT fight will not abate anytime soon. SOF will continue to work actively to deter, disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its associated forces and affiliates.

Section 1208, a valuable authority that allows us to enable and leverage willing partners to support SOF operations to combat terrorism, has produced significant and tangible operational effects that greatly impact our efforts to defeat al Qaeda. In today's amorphous global threat environment, it is more important than ever that the GCCs have this critical tool to rely on the access and placement that our forces cannot attain unilaterally.

The need for persistent engagement around the globe and growth of mission requirements have resulted in an unprecedented growth in Special Operations Forces—in fact, the largest expansion of SOF personnel, force structure, budget and enablers since Vietnam.

This expansion will help support Admiral McRaven's vision of a global SOF network. This informal, global network of international Special Operations Forces will allow us to rapidly and persistently address regional contingencies and threats to our stability. This type of persistent engagement will develop trust, a common operating picture, and future cooperation operations against mutual threats. To develop this concept, we are excited to see the development and success of the supporting Theatre Special Operations Commands. These commands are present at each geographic combatant command and help manage the SOF elements in that area of responsibility. As we expand these Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC), we hope to better integrate SOF efforts across the areas of responsibility to ensure plans and strategy development as well as their expertise are available to the geographic combatant command I'd like to emphasize that our successes have come at a cost. The continuous deployments over the past decade have placed extraordinary operational requirements on Special Operators. For example, 85 percent of the force has been engaged as front-line warriors in Iraq and Afghanistan, and since 2001, we should not forget that more than 400 Special Operators have been killed and over 3,000 have been injured.

#### FUTURE OF COUNTERTERRORISM AND SOF

Relative to the aforementioned, new defense strategy, the Department of Defense will take a strategic approach to security cooperation and ensure we have comprehensive and integrated capabilities in key regions in order to confront critical security challenges.

Over the past decade, much of the strategic emphasis in security cooperation has rightly focused on supporting current operations and helping states address internal instability. As we draw down from a decade of large-scale conflict, we will place additional strategic emphasis on preparing our network of allies and partners to confront the evolving threat of al Qaeda and its affiliates.

To do this, we require security cooperation tools that are calibrated to optimally prepare the United States optimally to exploit emerging opportunities and counter potential threats—this means lowering the barriers to defense cooperation and being prepared to leverage opportunities rapidly with like-minded partners. To better combat al Qaeda, Congress has granted temporary authorities to the Department of Defense. Tools such as the section 1206 Global Train and Equip Program—an indispensable and proven authority; section 1203 Support to Yemen and East Africa; section 1208 Support of Military Operations by U.S. SOF to Combat Terrorism Program; and the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program are indispensable to maintain constant pressure on al Qaeda and its affiliates worldwide. We will also continue to work closely with the State Department and other departments and agencies to ensure that the Department of Defense's efforts are agile in responding to partners' needs while being implemented with effective oversight in a manner that reinforces overarching U.S. foreign policy goals.

As we evolve to respond to the new set of demands, we cannot afford to lose sight of what makes our force truly great—the SOF Operator. Here we must stick to our principles—namely the first SOF truth—that “Humans are more important than hardware.” There are two key attributes of the future SOF operator that will need to be sharpened: (1) regional specialization; and (2) the ability to operate independently in austere environments. Our best hedge against an uncertain future is a well-educated and highly trained special operator.

SOF were designed to conduct operations in hostile, denied or politically sensitive areas to achieve national objectives by unconventional means. Executing the new strategy will demand the same level of regional acumen that SOF has always pursued. To meet combatant commander requirements for foreign internal defense, security sector assistance and unconventional warfare, SOF will need to continue sharpening their proficiency in language and regional expertise so they are conversant with the cultural and military history of regions where they will be deploying.

Probably the single greatest thing we could do to prepare our SOF for the expanded mission set of the future operating environment is to manage SOF talent properly and in a way that incentivizes the "indirect action" career path for the SOF operator. There is a range of ways through which to accomplish this goal. A critical component of our effort to implement the new strategy will be working with SOCOM to develop appropriate Force Management practices to develop the SOF cadre needed in the future.

Equally important is our need to care for the SOF operator. This includes providing tailored services for post-deployment that consider the unique stresses a career in SOF places on one's family. Admiral McRaven has taken strong steps towards these objectives, and we fully support his initiatives.

#### CONCLUSION

We are confident that SOF will provide our national policy leaders a steady and established option to engage—consistent with our national and defense strategies—with a low footprint and a focus on enabling our partners.

Supporting and relying on these partner nation forces come with risk. We wish to close by discussing the difficult trade-offs that we, as policymakers, will face in the next decade.

The most evident risk is to the safety of our personnel. SOF are operating in dangerous locations against ruthless enemies where death or injury are real possibilities. We also risk being drawn into broader fights beyond our narrow CT objectives. We note: It is often difficult to draw the line between our CT objectives and regional, ethnic or sectarian fights wherein we have limited or no interest in becoming involved. There is always the risk of the proverbial "slippery slope"—a gradual increasing of U.S. commitment that outpaces our national interest. There is no easy answer and no easy formula for deciding where and at what level to engage. There are sometimes risks to not doing enough to support a fledgling state, confronted by robust international terrorist groups with access to external financing, weapons and fighters. We risk allowing terrorist threats to fester and grow until they directly threaten us.

We also risk association with poorly trained and undisciplined partners. Some have weak legal systems and demonstrate a poor history of respect for the rule of law. These partners may make mistakes—or operate in ways that we would not fully approve—which may tarnish our image, challenge our value sets, and—in some cases—force us to disengage. But these are the areas in which our SOF are required to work—not in countries with strong and mature defense establishments. Our challenge is two-fold: (1) to provide the capabilities to meet military challenges; and (2) to do so in a way that respects the rule of law and legitimate governments. Our SOF can and will pursue U.S. national interests in a collaborative way with key partners, helping to counter the evolving al Qaeda threat.

The Department of Defense is committed to working to build our SOF to be the best, most effective force we have and to countering emerging threats to the United States and its interests. As the United States faces an ever-more dynamic security environment and adaptive threats, such as global terrorism, we must develop and support our SOF community so that our next decade is even more effective than the last.

Madam Chairman, Senator Fischer, and members of the subcommittee, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you and testify on the Department's perspective on emerging counterterrorism threats. This concludes our statement.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you.

Admiral McRaven.

#### STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM H. McRAVEN, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Admiral McRAVEN. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Fischer, distinguished members of the committee: I appreciate the opportunity to come before you today and talk about the magnificent

work being accomplished around the globe by the men and women of SOCOM. I have submitted a formal statement and ask that it be included in the record.

Madam Chairman, this is my first opportunity to address this committee since I took command in the summer of 2011. Since that time, I'm proud to say that we have continued the great work initiated by my predecessor, Admiral Eric Olson. At the same time, we have adapted to the changing strategic and fiscal environment to keep SOF relevant now and in the future.

In Afghanistan, we established a new SOF command structure which brought the various NATO and SOF elements into alignment under a two-star headquarters. This has allowed us to have a common view of the enemy and synchronize our SOF to achieve a common end state. This change has made SOF even more effective than ever before. Partnered with our Afghan SOF, we have continued to attrite the enemy leadership while at the same time building and training Afghan security forces so that they can stand on their own against this determined threat.

Globally, SOF is in approximately 78 countries around the world helping to build partner capacity so that the host nations can deal with their own security problems. I recently returned from Colombia and the Philippines, where our long-term investment with their SOF has dramatically helped change the security situation in those countries. I believe that these efforts, that is building allied SOF capacity and capability, represent the best approach to dealing with some of the world's more complex security problems.

In support of the Secretary's defense strategic guidance, SOCOM is working to strengthen these international partnerships and to build lasting networks both formally and informally so that we or our allies can create a secure environment in unstable areas and, if necessary, react to emerging crises rapidly and effectively.

In all cases, those SOF deployed to foreign lands are working for the geographic combatant commander, with the approval of the chief of mission, and always in support of U.S. policy goals.

Finally, I have made caring for our force and their families my top priority. In the past year my command sergeant major and I have met with soldiers and their families from around the SOCOM enterprise. We have listened to their concerns and, with the support of the services, we are aggressively implementing programs and plans to help with the physical, mental, and spiritual wellbeing of the force. We have a professional and moral obligation to take care of our warriors and their families and we greatly appreciate the support of your committee and other members on the Hill in our efforts to take care of these men and women.

Thank you again for your commitment to the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines and civilians of DOD, and specifically to those great warriors who make up SOCOM. I look forward to taking your questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral McRaven follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY ADM WILLIAM H. MCRAVEN, USN

Madam Chairman and distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, thank you for this opportunity to address this subcommittee as the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM).

SOCOM is one of nine Unified Combatant Commands, yet it is distinct in that it exercises numerous Service, military department, and defense agency-like responsibilities. Under title 10 U.S.C., sections 164 and 167, it is my legal responsibility to organize, train, and equip my force; to build a strategy that supports the goals and objectives of the Defense Strategic Guidance; and to provide combat ready forces to the President and the Secretary of Defense to meet the challenges of today's security environment.

#### SOCOM STRATEGY—SOF 2020

In January 2012, the Secretary of Defense issued his Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) and the Chairman followed with his Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO). The DSG describes the Joint Force of the future as “agile, flexible, ready” and possessing global reach, thereby directing “the joint force to capitalize on networks and interdependency to maximize effectiveness in deterrence and evolving war.” Building on this imperative, the CCJO envisions a “globally postured Joint Force . . . that quickly combine[s] capabilities with itself and mission partners across domains, echelons, geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations.” Special Operations Forces are uniquely suited to implement the guidance outlined in these documents. Specifically, SOF are “rapidly deployable . . . have operational reach . . . [are] persistent . . . and do not constitute an irreversible policy commitment.” General Dempsey concluded his Capstone Document with the statement that military success in today's environment is “about building a stronger network to defeat the networks that confront us.”

We live in a world in which the threats have become increasingly networked and pose complex and dynamic risks to U.S. interests around the world. These networks are diversifying their activities, resulting in the convergence of threats that were once linear. In today's environment, this convergence can have explosive and destabilizing effects—there is no such thing as a local problem. In the words of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, “Extremist networks squeezed in one country migrate to others. Terrorist propaganda from a cell in Yemen can incite attacks as far away as Detroit or Delhi. A flu virus in Macao can become an epidemic in Miami. Technology and globalization have made our countries and our communities interdependent and interconnected. Today's threats have become so complex, fast-moving, and cross-cutting that no one nation could ever hope to solve them alone.”

To address these problems, we must adopt a global perspective. With SOF deployed in over 75 countries on a daily basis, I can provide a global view of the problem and help link and synchronize global effects across geographic boundaries. However, as the SOCOM Commander, with some unique exceptions, I do not command and control any forces in combat or crisis. I am a “supporting commander” to the geographic combatant commanders and the Chiefs of Mission (COMs). It is my job to provide them the best Special Operations Force in the world. It is their job, to employ those forces in support of U.S. policy. Special Operations Forces do nothing, absolutely nothing, without the approval of the President, the Secretary of Defense, the geographic combatant commanders and the Chiefs of Mission—nothing. To best serve the interest of the GCCs and the Chiefs of Mission, SOCOM is developing a plan to enhance its already global force by networking with our U.S. interagency counterparts, and our foreign allies and partners around the globe. We aim to provide GCCs and Chiefs of Mission with improved special operations capacity and are aligning structures, processes, and authorities that enable the network.

#### THE GLOBAL SOF NETWORK

Given strategic guidance, increasing fiscal constraints, and the networked and dispersed nature of conflict, SOF will play an increasingly critical role in the Joint Force of the future. Although SOF usually only garner attention for high-stakes raids and rescues, direct action missions are only a small part of what we do, albeit a very important part. SOCOM will continue to ensure our Nation has the best precision strike force in the world. We will not let up on that front. However, I'd like to emphasize that, in fact, on any given day SOF are working with our allies around the world, helping build indigenous special operations capacity so that our partners can effectively deal with the threat of violent extremist groups, insurgents, and narco-terrorists—themselves. Indeed, SOF focuses intently on building partner capacity and security force assistance so that local and regional threats do not become global and thus more costly—both in blood and treasure.

Accordingly, with the support of the GCCs and Chiefs of Mission, SOCOM is enhancing its global network of SOF to support our interagency and international partners in order to gain expanded situational awareness of emerging threats and opportunities. The network enables small, persistent presence in critical locations,

and facilitates engagement where necessary or appropriate—all under the authority of the GCC and COM.

Through civil-military support elements and support to public diplomacy, SOF directly support interagency efforts to counter violent extremist ideology and diminish the drivers of violence that al Qaeda and other terrorists exploit. These efforts to prevent terrorist radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization are critical to defeating this dangerous ideology in the future; neither we nor our partners can kill our way to victory in this fight. These efforts require continuity and perseverance. Episodic engagement is inefficient and has the potential to create animosity due to unmet expectations by the governments and populations we are trying to support. Over the long-run, these proactive activities reduce strategic risk, protect American lives, and reduce the need for expensive response to terrorist attacks.

To this end, using already programmed force structure, SOCOM is methodically enhancing the capabilities of the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) based on a multi-year deliberate process supported by detailed analysis and war gaming. The goal is to increase the capacity and capabilities of the TSOC and their assigned forces to the GCCs to conduct full spectrum special operations—ranging from building partner capacity (particularly in austere, high-risk or sensitive environments) to irregular warfare and counterterrorism.

In partnership with the GCCs, COM, TSOCs, other U.S. Government agencies and partner nations, SOCOM is working to develop opportunities to improve our partnership with regional Special Operations Forces. This approach was very successful in NATO, with the establishment of the NATO SOF Headquarters which allowed U.S. and partner nations to share information, improve interoperability and, when necessary, work together abroad. While the NATO construct is unique in the world, we believe there are other low-key opportunities that may present themselves in other regions of the world.

In addition to the SOF capacity inherent in all GCCs through the TSOCs, SOCOM also employs Special Operations Liaison Officers (SOLOs) in key U.S. embassies around the world. SOLOs are in-country SOF advisors to the U.S. Country Team. They advise and assist partner nation SOF and help to synchronize activities with the host nation. Currently, there are SOLOs in Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, Jordan, Poland, Colombia, France, Turkey, Kenya, and Italy.

Similarly, as part of the global SOF network here at home, one- to three-person Special Operations Support Teams (SOSTs) work with our interagency partners in the National Capital Region (NCR). They comprise the SOF liaison network that assists in synchronizing DOD planning for training, exercises, and operations. Currently, we have SOSTs working within 19 U.S. Government departments and agencies.

Given the importance of interagency collaboration, SOCOM is placing greater emphasis on its presence in the NCR to better support coordination and decision making with interagency partners. Thus, SOCOM began to consolidate its presence in the NCR in early 2012. This is not a duplication of effort. We are focused instead on consolidating SOCOM elements in the Washington, DC, region under the leadership of the SOCOM Vice Commander—who resides in Washington. Specifically, SOCOM–NCR ensures that the perspectives and capabilities of interagency and international mission partners are incorporated into all phases of SOF planning efforts. The SOCOM NCR also conducts outreach to academia, non-governmental organizations, industry and other private sector organizations to get their perspective on complex issues affecting SOF.

At the SOCOM headquarters in Tampa, the staff will serve as the focal point for coordinating information that supports SOCOM warfighters. It is here that SOCOM will maintain the global perspective on all SOF activities in support of the GCCs and U.S. Chiefs of Mission. As such, SOCOM will support operations, intelligence, logistics, planning, communications, and provide critical information to enable forward deployed SOF to meet mission requirements. SOCOM will monitor SOF supporting campaigns, ensure that the Command is satisfying GCC theater requirements, maintain the global common operating picture for the SOF network, and monitor the readiness and availability of all U.S. SOF capabilities. The entire network will be enabled by the existing communications infrastructure. However, communication and information sharing must facilitate interconnectedness beyond the U.S.-only realm, and improve partner-nation capacity, interagency coordination, and stakeholder situational awareness by providing information technology infrastructure and communications services to unite U.S. and partner-nation SOF, plus other mission partners. This communications infrastructure will leverage existing networks and systems to avoid duplication of effort.

As a whole, the SOF network represents a way to improve the support to the GCCs and Chiefs of Mission and to empower a global effort with capable allies and



partners. Recognizing that we have much to learn from each other, working with partner SOF will build mutual trust, foster enduring relationships, and provide new opportunities to affect shared challenges.

To this end, the SECDEF's authority to support foreign forces, irregular forces, and groups or individuals who support or facilitate ongoing military operations to combat terrorism—namely section 1208 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005—remains critical to Special Operations. The drawdown of forces in Afghanistan will not diminish the need for 1208 authority. In fact, GCCs' demand for 1208 authority has increased, and the authority's utility is recognized as mission essential in winning their current fight.

#### PRESERVE THE FORCE AND FAMILIES

A SOF Universal Truth is that “people are more important than hardware.” We recognize that none of the efforts described in preceding paragraphs are possible without having the dedicated, professional SOF warriors to bring them to fruition. Hence, it is imperative that we do all that we can to preserve the force and care for their families. Therefore, to lessen the strain, we are seeking improvements in the predictability of SOF schedules—training, education, deployment, and rest.

SOCOM must ensure our SOF warriors and their families are properly cared for and that we work to help them reduce the stress they face related to high operational tempos. Difficulty also occurs as forces reconnect and reintegrate into garrison and family activities. DOD provides preventive and responsive counseling, medical, psychological, and rehabilitative care to institutionalize the resiliency of our SOF warriors and their families.

Everyone in the fight has been significantly changed by their experiences. Providing the treatment our troops need and reducing the stigma associated with asking for help is a top priority for all SOCOM leaders. For our servicemembers and their families, we are implementing programs identified as best practices and aggressively institutionalizing education for our Chaplains and Mental Health professionals to emphasize prevention-oriented care. Through human performance improvement, readiness, and spiritual growth, we hope to preserve our forces for the duration of their careers. Recognizing that the readiness of many of our servicemembers is inextricably tied to the well-being and happiness of their families, we have sought to bolster the care afforded to them. Additionally, to increase the predictability of servicemembers' time, SOCOM will redouble our efforts to reach out to families by opening up communication channels at all levels of the command through innovative use of varied media. We are committed to sustaining our force and families and will not break faith with our SOF family.

Maximizing SOF readiness also requires an enhanced capacity to anticipate and proactively preserve and manage the future force. I am implementing an enterprise-wide PERSTEMPO capability that will provide commanders increased visibility, fidelity, and ability to manage SOF readiness down to the individual servicemember level. Once fully implemented throughout the command by fiscal year 2014, SOF commanders from the O-5 level and above will have a near real-time common operating picture of SOF readiness. This new capability further enhances commanders' force management decision making, improves the quality of life for the SOF force, and offers promise for maximizing force readiness through improved recruitment, retention, and protection of investments in SOF personnel and the resources that enable them.

#### ACQUISITION EXCELLENCE

Mobility, lethality, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and survivability remain critical SOF enablers for the full spectrum of SOF operations. SOCOM's unique acquisition authorities remain critical to meeting the rapid, information sensitive and operationally peculiar demands of Special Operations. Specifically, SOCOM employs rapid and tailored acquisition strategies to modify Service-common equipment, enhance commercial items, or—when required—develop, procure and field SOF-peculiar equipment and services to respond to global requirements.

SOCOM will continue its emphasis on equipping SOF operators as a system. Development, procurement and fielding of the SOF individual equipment system (i.e. individual protection, visual augmentation systems, weapons and sights) needs to suit the wide variety of SOF tasks and environments. The Tactical Combat Casualty Care system and use of Freeze Dried Plasma will combine to help care for wounded operators in remote and challenging environments, often at great distance from primary care facilities.

To meet the wide range of SOF missions, SOCOM employs platforms that are both versatile and agile. For example, current acquisition efforts focus on equipping

both manned and unmanned fixed wing assets with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities suitable for diverse global requirements. The Non-Standard Aviation fleet of aircraft supports SOF intra-theater mobility, Aviation Foreign Internal Defense, and manned ISR. The SOF fleet of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA)—ranging from the manportable RQ-20A Puma to the medium altitude MQ-9 Reaper—provides essential ISR capabilities and cutting edge sensor and communication technologies. SOCOM's ability to efficiently modify service common ISR assets with capabilities such as high definition (HD) full motion video (FMV) provides game-changing, operational effects at relatively small investment. SOCOM is continuing to execute programs to modernize its rotary wing and maritime mobility fleets, replacing legacy equipment such as the MH-60 K/L, Mark V Naval Special Warfare Rigid Hull Inflatable boat, and SEAL Delivery Vehicle in the coming years. On the ground, SOCOM will maintain a family of special operations tactical combat vehicles with customizable, mission-specific payloads. A nonstandard commercial vehicle capability enables SOF operators to maintain a low profile among indigenous populations while providing necessary mobility and protection.

Global SOF rely on the SOF Information Environment (SIE) to achieve full operational potential. Within the SIE, SOCOM will continue to incorporate a SOF Deployable Node (SDN), a family of Wide Band SATCOM systems, and increased access to SIE voice, data and video services to deployed headquarters and operational elements. Simultaneously, SOCOM will continue its efforts to downsize system profiles and footprint through engineering efficiencies of common and scalable components amongst SDN variants, provide SIE access to tactical wireless users through SDN, and focus current efforts on providing SIE access to maritime and ground mobility platforms.

SOCOM's Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate continues to pursue technology innovation, and utilizes a Special Operations Advanced Technology collaborative process for SOF-centric, S&T development. This process allows better synchronization of SOF-related technology initiatives with the Department of Defense (DOD) and other government agencies to leverage external capital opportunities that address SOF capability gaps. S&T's near-term technology development efforts are focused on providing SOF operators with all-digital, multi-spectral visual augmentation systems and advanced novel materials to improve protection and survivability for personnel and platforms.

#### RESPONSIBLE RESOURCING AND SERVICE SUPPORT

Despite an increase in operational commitments over the last decade, we have been able to sustain our obligation to appropriately organize, train, and equip the warriors from whom we ask so much. We are aware of current budget uncertainties, and are therefore committed to only prudent use of resources provided to us by the taxpayers. I am committed to exercising common-sense steps to cost-cutting and cost-avoidance. The Command has begun to restructure and realign resources to support the SOF 2020 vision which reflects the Nation's strategic priorities. Currently, we are able to execute the vision I have outlined in this document without any increase in either civilian or military manpower outside of current programmed growth or additional funding. I will continue to manage cost-growth in acquisition programs, and implement requirements of the combatant commanders, Executive order mandates, and DOD auditability guidance.

SOCOM has successfully used the Rapid Acquisition Authority to source a validated Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance activities. SOCOM will rely more heavily on this authority within the future fiscal environment.

The Command's ability to execute rapid acquisition of its materiel and service programs is essential to deliver and field critical requirements and new technologies. SOCOM's capacity to maintain a competitive advantage on the battlefield depends on out-thinking and outpacing the enemy in speed, technology, equipment, and maneuverability. SOF capabilities are directly related to investments we make through our procurement budget.

SOCOM, like the Services, has seen an extraordinary increase in operational tempo. Through advanced technologies, the battlefield has become smaller, highlighting a need for continued interoperability among the Services and SOF. SOF's reliance on the Services for institutional training, installation services and support—particularly in forward deployed locations where SOF can only sustain itself for short periods of time—remains critical. The Services' support for SOF's global persistent presence and annual deployments to over 100 countries is both vital and very much appreciated.

## CONCLUSION

Budget uncertainties which face the DOD and SOCOM are of great concern in fiscal year 2013. The SOF network, as a vital tool to support the President and the Secretary of Defense's national defense strategy, seeks a strong and flexible global network of SOF, U.S. Government partners, and partner nations. We are working tirelessly to provide SOF capabilities and capacity to GCCs and Chiefs of Mission; capabilities and capacities that are supported by the required structures, processes, and authorities necessary for success. In the immediate future, and as stated by Chairman Dempsey, the "Joint Force 2020 must protect . . . against threats that routinely span regional boundaries." Notably, as presented by former Secretary Clinton at the International Special Operations Forces Week in May of last year, "Special Operations Forces exemplify the ethic of smart power—fast and flexible, constantly adapting, learning new languages and cultures, dedicated to forming partnerships where we can work together." Your support will ensure SOCOM's continued ability to successfully address the most challenging security demands of our Nation.

Senator HAGAN. I want to thank all three witnesses for your service to our country. So I thank you very much.

Admiral McRaven, I'm very pleased to hear about the attention being paid to the families, especially from a physical, mental, and obviously spiritual. I think that's key to have our SOF working like they do. Obviously, the families are very important.

What I'd like to do is have a round of 8-minute questions and then we can—I would like to go to the closed session around 3:20 p.m. if we can.

I want to ask a question to the panel on Syria. A common refrain of administration officials testifying before Congress is that our intelligence community does not know enough about the Syrian opposition to make sound decisions about which, if any, elements the United States should support. However, in recent weeks reports have emerged that there are some elements in the southern region of the country that are moderate in their views and in their intentions. So if the three of you could address: Do you agree that the United States should provide additional support to elements in Syria that share our views and interests? What is the relationship between the Al-Nusra Front, a Sunni extremist group in Syria, and the al Qaeda in Iraq, and do these groups provide support to each other? Then to what extent is there a risk that the violence in Syria will spill across the border into western Iraq and strengthen al Qaeda in Iraq? Secretary Sheehan, if you could start.

Mr. SHEEHAN. Thank you. Actually, Senator, I think I'll defer to start to Assistant Secretary Chollet, who's our lead on this issue.

Senator HAGAN. Okay.

Mr. SHEEHAN. I'll take a first crack. Senator, it's an excellent question. In terms of a picture of the opposition, and we can get into some of this in more detail perhaps in the closed session in terms of the intel picture, but as you suggest in your question, it is a mosaic, the opposition. There are, depending on who you ask and on what day, there are at least 10s, if not over 100, different pockets of the opposition.

We are working closely with the opposition. It's an effort that our State Department colleagues have been in the lead on with the Syrian Opposition Council and the Syrian Military Committee. As Secretary Kerry announced several weeks ago, we are in the process of providing them more support. We've provided them a significant amount of support thus far, over \$100 million, and we're in the process of fulfilling that commitment. It's mainly been on the

political side, on the civilian side, in training civilians and helping them get better governance capacity, in helping their communications abilities.

But the decision that was announced several weeks ago was that we would provide nonlethal assistance to the armed opposition and we're in the process of implementing that commitment. That's mainly in the form of medical supplies and food assistance right now.

But every day we learn more about the opposition. I believe today or tomorrow in London Secretary Kerry will be meeting with members of the opposition at a G-8 Ministerial meeting, but on the margins of that he'll be meeting with them. So we every day learn more, and we not only do it in our own contacts, but working with our close partners in Jordan and Turkey in particular, who have a lot of contacts with the Syrian opposition.

So I think that there are folks we can work with. We're very concerned about Al-Nusra, as you mentioned. They clearly do not wish us well, and what we have seen is that, although they have been in some cases effective on the battlefield, they are also losing the hearts and minds of many of the Syrian people as they seek to impose their rather rigid ideological views on the Syrian people. So we believe that there is an opportunity, with our support and the rest of the international community's support to the opposition that we are working with, to build up the opposition that we want to see achieve a Syria that is inclusive, that is tolerant, and that allows the Syrian people to meet their aspirations.

I'll just comment briefly on the spillover because you asked about spillover. It's something that we are keenly focused on, primarily mainly with our partners in Jordan and Turkey because of the significant refugee problems that both countries face. In Jordan there is up to 500,000 refugees. It's about 10 percent of the Jordanian population right now. So we work very closely with those countries to help alleviate their immediate refugee concerns, but also work with them as they're thinking through what steps would be necessary to ensure their stability when the situation gets worse on the ground.

Senator HAGAN. Admiral McRaven.

Admiral MCRAVEN. Ma'am, I'm not sure there's much I can add to that in this forum. I'm certainly—I'd be more than happy to talk to you in a little bit more detail in the closed session on what we're doing.

Mr. SHEEHAN. The same thing, Senator Hagan.

Senator HAGAN. I've also heard that the refugees in Jordan are up at 600,000 and they're talking about before the end of the summer perhaps going to a million, 1.2 million. I don't know what those numbers are, but they certainly seem to be aggressive, individuals moving quickly into Jordan. Obviously, looking at the size of Jordan, the complications that come with that, too.

Secretary Sheehan, I know you spoke about the situation in Mali. What I'd like to know too is what is your assessment of the French operation, and then the strength of AQIM, and whether the U.S. support to the operation will continue, the status and capability of the forces that are deploying to the region?

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, Madam Chairman.

Senator HAGAN. Actually, Secretary Chollet, too.

Mr. SHEEHAN. I think the French operation was absolutely excellent. They moved very quickly to the region on January 11 when the AQIM moved south of the Niger River and quickly started descending upon the capital in Bamako, which caught pretty much everybody by surprise, perhaps even AQIM itself. I don't think they expected to go that far that quickly.

The French reacted very fast. They got forces in there very quickly and very rapidly pushed AQIM back across the Niger River and took control of the major cities, Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal and others up north, pushing AQIM back up into the desert, up into the mountainous area bordering on Algeria, and some others may have squirted into the eastern and western countries. But mainly they're still hanging out in remote parts of Mali.

So the French were very successful. Now they're shifting their focus to tracking down these individuals and trying to eliminate them from the battlefield. So I think it's been a very good operation. They understand as well as we understand that much of al Qaeda's leadership has escaped. They have not been killed or captured. But they have disrupted this very threatening sanctuary that they had established between mid-summer last year and January of this year. That was something that could not stand and we're very grateful for the French taking the lead to doing that.

Senator HAGAN. Let me ask you one question on that, too. What in your view is the impact of the restrictions, statutory and policy restrictions, that prohibit the United States from engaging the armed forces of Mali?

Mr. SHEEHAN. I think right now, Madam Chairman, that right now we don't need the Malian army per se. The French are working with the Malian army in the north, helping them to take on their security responsibilities, and it's a very weak army, notwithstanding all the aid that we provided them over the last 5 years or so. It's an organization, because of the coup and because of Captain Sanogo and his thugs that are still hanging around the margins of this army, it remains to be seen how it will evolve and develop into a professional force.

The EU has taken on the mission of retraining and reprofessionalizing them. We have policy restrictions against that, and I think the EU is starting to move in that direction and we'll see over time how well the Malian army is able to coalesce and get its act together. It remains very much to be seen.

In the short term, the next answer after the French will be a U.N.-authorized mission coming out of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) mission which really hasn't been really up to the task. With U.N. blue-hatted mission being contemplated in the Security Council now, that type of force should be able to take back those cities and allow the French to focus its force in the future on the high-value targets.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you.

I tell you, I'm going to move to Senator Fischer for her questions. Thank you.

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

I have a question for all three of you gentlemen. Some observers have criticized the United States because they think we are in too many places. When we're looking at defense budget cuts, with sequestration, and with the economy in the shape it's in, how do you go about answering those charges that the United States may be spread too thin? How would you prioritize where we need to be?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, ma'am, thank you. I'm not sure I think we are spread too thin. Right now, on any day of the year you will find SOF in somewhere between 70 and 90 countries around the world. Some of these are onesies and twosies and some of them are 100 or thousands, as is the case of Afghanistan.

I think we have to define and really decide early on what we think our U.S. policy is vis a vis building partner capacity in our relationships with other nations. We, SOCOM, provide a very cost-effective, small footprint, culturally sensitive, language-trained force that can work with a number of these nations to build their capacity to deal with their own problems. I think this is really the thrust, as Secretary Sheehan mentioned early on, the thrust of what we in the SOF community provide, is an ability to help other nations deal with their own problems before we have to surge additional forces in to help them, to help them out.

So I guess it depends on where our U.S. interests lie and that really—in my case, I defer to the policymakers on that.

Senator FISCHER. I guess I would ask you about those tools. Before you gentlemen comment, if I could ask you, Admiral, about the tools that the Secretary mentioned. 1206, it's, I've been told, a slow plan approval process, and so it's difficult to have implementation happen quickly. Is that an issue when trying to work with our partners and you're looking at 2 years down the road to get a plan implemented?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Ma'am, I won't talk specifically to 1206, but I will tell you that we have a large number of authorities. In order for us to really build a long-term plan and have a long-term engagement with any nation, invariably we have to piecemeal these authorities together.

So whether it's 1206 or 1208 or the JSET authorities or the GSCF, all of these as we try to look out and say, if you want to build a professional military over the next 5 years, how do you develop a plan to do that, well, the only way we can develop a plan right now is on a year-by-year basis. There are some limitations in the authorities we have, and as you mentioned in some cases there are delays in the process that make some of that problematic.

Again, I wouldn't focus just on 1206. I think we can improve the process on all of our authorities to make us more agile in dealing with other countries.

Senator FISCHER. Do our troops have enough time to rest?

Admiral MCRAVEN. I think they do now, and certainly they will more so as we—

Senator FISCHER. What's their deployment schedule? Can you speak to that?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, ma'am, I can. It depends on their military operational specialty, their MOS, as we refer to it. In some cases you have these very high demand, low density MOSs, so folks that are in kind of high demand at every location, but we don't

have a whole lot of them. So in those cases you see some of those folks that are almost on back to back rotations. In a lot of cases it is they're forward for a period of time and they're back for .8. So we say one to .8, which is really unacceptable, and we work hard to try and mitigate that as best we can.

Where we're driving to is to make sure that we can get to a one to two or, better yet, a one to three rotation, so that the folks back home have time to spend with their families. It gets back to preserving the force and the families to make sure that they are resilient and that we can improve their physical health, their mental health, and their spiritual health, not necessarily religious but broader spiritual health, so that they are energized when they go back downrange.

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Admiral.

Would you two gentlemen like to address the prioritization process and also how you view using these tools, whether it's 1206, 1207, or 1208?

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, Senator Fischer, I would like to talk about 1206 and some of the others. First of all, I would like to thank Congress for its wisdom to provide these authorities post-September 11. 1206, 1207, 1208 did not exist prior to September 11. Without those authorities—they're not perfect, but without those authorities I don't think we would have had the success we've had globally going against al Qaeda networks.

1206—if I look at security assistance on a spectrum, on one end I'd put FMF, the Cold War, foreign military sales programs to provide to a country F-16s, ships, big equipment. It's the slowest. It's the most politically sensitive. It's more of a political-military relationship and big items, very slow.

On the other end in terms of speed and agility is section 1208, not a security assistance program, but a program where we work at DOD—normally those plans are written up by Special Operations staffs in the geographic combatant commands, go rapidly through DOD, through the chief of mission for approval, and through Washington much quicker. We can turn those around very quickly.

In between is 1206 and then 1207 or GSCF. The faster it is—when the State Department has the lead and both State and DOD have to concur and coordinate, it just takes a lot longer to do. When it's a DOD lead and the State Department only coordinates on it, it goes quicker. That's really the bottom line. It's just a matter of process. We're getting better. The State Department works—

Senator FISCHER. Does that process need to be changed then in order for it to respond more quickly to the issues that are out there?

Mr. SHEEHAN. I think it's a fair question, Senator. Part of it is the State Department and DOD committed to each other to make it work faster. However, I would opine in this committee that I believe that our legislative proposal, 171, that's one of Admiral McRaven's important proposals for a SOF network, and other changes that we've made that provide more of a DOD lead in this authority, would make things more rapid, yet preserve the State

Department's role in approving at the chief of mission level and concurring at the Washington level on all of these programs.

But I think that those type of adjustments to these programs would enable us to have more rapid and effective programs to do the type of partnership-building that we've talked about on this panel.

Mr. CHOLLET. I'll just add in the brief time left that I concur completely with what Secretary Sheehan said just on the process issues. Just going back to kind of the core of your question of are we stretched too thin and how we prioritize, I think one of the reasons why the Secretary in the new defense strategy has put a premium on building partner capacity also working with others is that we can leverage the capabilities that we uniquely have and better enable those to work with us or in some cases carry the primary burden.

I think Mali is actually a pretty good example of that, where the French have stepped up in a big way to take some pretty serious action. We have supported them with refueling and with logistics and with some intel support, but they are carrying the lion's share of the burden.

Now we and them and our other European allies are working with regional players to try to beef up the African forces so that over time, under a U.N. helmet authorization, a U.N. blue helmet, they can go forward and this can be an African-led effort in Mali.

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, gentlemen.

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Senator HAGAN. Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. Madam Chairman, I have a number of questions, but they need to be done in a closed session because of classification.

I would in the open session just ask you about the fact that a British study found that newer converts to Islam were in much higher percentages being the ones that were being recruited as U.S. citizens into terrorist groups. Any comment on that in this session?

Mr. SHEEHAN. Senator, I've spent about the last 15 years trying to study al Qaeda and what makes an operative. There is a phenomenon I've often noticed, and some of this was picked up in this study, of the second generation type of adherent, who may be newly radicalized, may be more receptive to becoming operationalized by the organization. So the British study talks a little bit to that. We have seen that in the past, but I'm not sure I would say that this is an overwhelming trend. I think that it's a little bit too simplistic.

Having said that, when I was at NYPD working with the Metropolitan Police in London, we both tracked that phenomenon of the newly recruited either second generation British or second generation American citizen and how they were radicalized by these extremist groups. So it's an issue that domestic folks, FBI, and local police, are very much aware of in terms of the radicalization process for those folks.

Senator NELSON. Is this radicalization in the United Kingdom?

Mr. SHEEHAN. In the United Kingdom and in the United States.

Senator NELSON. And the United States?



Mr. SHEEHAN. Oh, absolutely. Globally.

Senator NELSON. Did you find in the study a difference between the radicalization in the United Kingdom and in the United States?

Mr. SHEEHAN. I would say that we saw a lot of parallels. But the United Kingdom had some differences that actually showed the strength of the American system. In the United Kingdom, they found that their communities were more isolated than in the United States. The United States has an incredible capacity to accept minorities, particularly New York City. If you drive through Queens and Brooklyn, on every corner you see a different minority, but they are very well assimilated. In the United Kingdom they had more ghetto-ized immigrant communities, and we talked to them extensively about that issue.

Senator NELSON. That's one of the great strengths of our country, is that we assimilate people.

Thank you, Madam Chairman. I look forward to this classified session.

Senator HAGAN. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.

I guess my first question for the three witnesses: Is the tide of war receding? Mr. Chollet?

Mr. CHOLLET. I think it's changing.

Senator MCCAIN. I'm asking if it's receding.

Mr. CHOLLET. I think clearly we pulled back from Iraq. We are on the pathway out of Afghanistan.

Senator MCCAIN. How did things turn out there? Pretty good?

Mr. CHOLLET. I think Iraq is more stable today than many thought several years ago.

Senator MCCAIN. Really? You really think that?

Mr. CHOLLET. I do.

Senator MCCAIN. You're uninformed.

Mr. Sheehan, is the tide of war receding?

Mr. SHEEHAN. There's no question in my mind in terms of al Qaeda and its affiliates, my principal threat, that we have pounded al Qaeda's strategic capability over the last 11 years and we continue to do so relentlessly in their primary sanctuaries. I would footnote that by saying that al Qaeda has shown some resiliency and potential to reestablish strategic capability in a few years, but has yet to do so.

Senator MCCAIN. A few areas, Mr. Sheehan?

Mr. SHEEHAN. They have yet to demonstrate strategic capability in those new areas as of yet—as of yet, none.

Senator MCCAIN. Libya?

Mr. SHEEHAN. None.

Senator MCCAIN. None?

Mr. SHEEHAN. Very little. As a matter of fact, there have been no strategic attacks—

Senator MCCAIN. I just came from Libya, Mr. Sheehan.

That's patently false. That is a false statement.

How about Mali? Do you think that they're going to be able to reconstitute themselves once the French leave?

Mr. SHEEHAN. Senator, I've been studying al Qaeda for 15 years—

Senator MCCAIN. So have I, Mr. Sheehan.

Mr. SHEEHAN.—and I know exactly what it takes for them—  
 Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Sheehan, I have too. I'm asking you a question, and do you believe that once the French are leaving do you think that al Qaeda will reconstitute itself in Mali?

Mr. SHEEHAN. They will attempt to reconstitute themselves.

Senator MCCAIN. Do you think they will, since the people, and Africa Command, have no logistics capability whatsoever?

Mr. SHEEHAN. First of all, they haven't been totally defeated yet, so the question will be—

Senator MCCAIN. But the French are leaving.

Mr. SHEEHAN. They are leaving.

Senator MCCAIN. Yes.

Mr. SHEEHAN. We'll see whether AQIM will be able to establish a strategic capability from there over the years ahead.

Senator MCCAIN. Did you happen to notice today that al Qaeda in Iraq and al Qaeda in Syria have announced their joint partnership?

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, I did, Senator, and we've been tracking that relationship. It's a very close relationship they've had for quite a long time.

Senator MCCAIN. I see. In Syria is there an increasing radicalization and penetration and increasing influence by al Qaeda?

Mr. SHEEHAN. We are very concerned about Al-Nusra group, which is an al Qaeda affiliate.

Senator MCCAIN. I'd like to have an answer to the question. It's a pretty straightforward question. Is al Qaeda gaining traction and significant influence in Syria? It's a pretty straightforward question.

Mr. SHEEHAN. I would say that marginally, yes.

Senator MCCAIN. Marginally—

Mr. SHEEHAN. It depends on how you measure it.

Senator MCCAIN. Marginally al Qaeda is gaining more and more influence in Syria? Marginally?

Mr. SHEEHAN. When I measure al Qaeda in terms of its threat to the United States, I measure its strategic threat.

Senator MCCAIN. The question I asked was: Is al Qaeda gaining more and more influence and control in Syria?

Mr. SHEEHAN. Al-Nusra threat is increasing its capability in Syria.

Senator MCCAIN. Now, did you recommend or is it your personal opinion we should provide arms to the Syrian resistance?

Mr. SHEEHAN. That's not part of the discussion here.

Senator MCCAIN. Did you, in your confirmation hearings, agree that when asked for your personal opinion, that you would respond with your personal opinion?

Mr. SHEEHAN. I'm not sure I was asked about that.

Senator MCCAIN. You're not sure? You didn't pay attention at your confirmation hearings?

Mr. SHEEHAN. I was not asked that, Senator. If I discussed that kind of policy deliberation I would want to do it in a closed session.

Senator MCCAIN. The American people should not know how officials of our DOD feel about an issue of slaughter of 70,000 or more people and millions of refugees.

Well, let me ask this: Do you believe that there's a great risk of both Libya—of both Jordan and Lebanon being destabilized with the present course of events as they are proceeding?

Mr. SHEEHAN. That's not something I track as much, ask Mr. Chollet.

Senator MCCAIN. Okay. Mr. Chollet?

Mr. CHOLLET. Yes, I'm worried about that.

Senator MCCAIN. Would you say that over the last 2 years that there has been greater and greater influence by jihadists and radical Islamic forces in Syria?

Mr. CHOLLET. Over the last 2 years?

Senator MCCAIN. Yes.

Mr. CHOLLET. Yes.

Senator MCCAIN. As regards to Libya, do you think that we are providing sufficient assistance to the Libyans which they can pay for in the form of border security, in the form of training and equipping their military so that they can gain more control over their country, particularly in the eastern part?

Mr. CHOLLET. Senator, I stated previously that we fully support doing more for Libya. Frankly, we were doing more before the unfortunate events of last September. There's a certain logistical reality which you're well aware of from having been there so often, that we don't have a very big footprint in the country right now, for good reason, for security reasons.

So some of the good programs that we were doing, for example, to try to build up their ministry of defense, some of the mentoring that we were doing on the civilian side, have stopped dead in their tracks really in the last 9 months. So those are programs we hope to build back up. Border security has to be a huge priority. Libya is a country the size of Alaska and it has borders that have been ungoverned for many years. We need to do more about that, no doubt about it.

Senator MCCAIN. Having just returned from Libya, I can assure you that the Libyan Government finds nothing but frustration in dealing with this administration. They can pay for these things, but as many issues have been raised in ways not to assist as, and it isn't all the United States' fault, but it clearly is, and the situation in Libya is clearly the result of the "light footprint" that was part of our policy after the fall of Qadafi.

I'd like to go back to Mali a second. Do you have confidence that when the French leave that the situation will not deteriorate back to a situation that basically is the same as before the French intervened?

Mr. CHOLLET. I have some confidence, not high confidence. We're in the early stages of this story here. The French want to get out by July. The U.N. wants to stand up a force by July. Ensuring that that force is capable to deal with the security threats, because once the French leave the Malian army's not going to be in a position to backfill. So that's why we'll work through the U.N. to get a viable peacekeeping force in there and to work to help train up the Africans as best we can.

I think we have a shot, but I wouldn't say that it's high confidence.

Senator MCCAIN. Having met with that African force who would be there either under the aegis of the African group or the U.N., I hope that you're aware they have no logistics capability. They have no C-130s, they have no helicopters, they have no way of getting around a country the size of Texas.

But you're hopeful that they'll be able to take over?

Mr. CHOLLET. I am hopeful, but I don't think we're there yet, and that's why we have to work hard over the next 2 months with our partners, 2 months and beyond, to ensure that as the French stand down that we have a sufficient force able to backfill to ensure that the gains, the significant gains, of the last 2 months don't get lost.

Senator MCCAIN. In 60 days I find it hard to envision that we would train pilots and provide them with helicopters and C-130s and the equipment, not to mention the ground equipment that's necessary for them to be a viable force. They themselves told me that they are not capable, not because of manpower, but because there's not a single C-130. One of the airplanes they had they crashed on the runway.

Mr. SHEEHAN. Senator, if I could comment on the situation in Mali, right now the ECOWAS force there, AFISMA, is not capable at all. What you saw there, and you're accurately portraying it, is a completely incapable force. That has to change. What will change over the next few months if we're able to work it through the Security Council is a U.N. blue-helmeted operation, which does have logistics capability, which does have LH-1000s that can bring logistical support to it.

What we need to do in Africa, in Mali, is similar to what we have done in Somalia: Not ask the international force to do too much. In Somalia, we were successful in organizing and helping support a U.N. force, AMISOM, that was capable of kicking al Shabaab out of Mogadishu and out of Kismayo, Ugandans in Mogadishu, the Kenyans in Kismayo, the Ethiopians in the north.

Now, granted those are much more capable forces than we might be able to cobble together for Mali. But we do have a model where if we use a U.N.-supported logistical force and keep the mission reasonable, in other words, those forces for the U.N. mission in Mali won't be asked to take over all of Mali. They'll be asked to maintain control of the cities now occupied by the French, Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal.

In terms of chasing AQIM out of the mountains and going after its leadership and the remnant as they try to reconstitute themselves, that is going to be a job for a much more capable force. The U.N. cannot do that and we shouldn't expect them to do that. That will be up to the French, perhaps with our support, or other specialized units, perhaps the Algerians if we can convince them to become more engaged, and we're working with them, that we can track down the al Qaeda leadership with much more capable CT forces.

The U.N. will have a much more modest goal and we think, based on our experience in Somalia, a God-forsaken place 2 years ago, we might be able to achieve some modest objectives in Mali with that operation.

Senator MCCAIN. You might.

I thank you, Madam Chairman. My time has expired.

The fact is the reality on the ground is that arms and people are flowing freely all across North Africa, many of them coming into Syria, a surprising number of Tunisians. The situation continues to become more radicalized in Syria as 80,000 or more people have been massacred while we sit by and watch and figure out reasons why we can't intervene. We are going to pay a very, very, very heavy price.

You ought to go to a refugee camp some time, both of you, and meet the people there, and the woman who says: "See all these children; they will take revenge on those who failed to help them, who failed to help."

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. It's been disastrous.

I thank you, Madam Chairman, for interrupting me.

Senator HAGAN. We are now going to ask any Senators who wish to have other questions to submit them for the record, and then we will move this. The closed session will be in Senate Security, room SVC-217. Thank you, this open hearing is now adjourned.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KAY R. HAGAN

##### SECURITY FORCES ASSISTANCE

1. Senator HAGAN. Admiral McRaven, it has been reported that you are seeking new authorities that would allow you to spend up to \$25 million in U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) operation and maintenance funds each year to train, equip, and advise partner nation security forces. How would you define the strategic objectives that this partner capacity building authority would be intended to serve?

Admiral McRAVEN. Since my testimony on April 9, I have had numerous meaningful engagements with colleagues throughout the Department of State (DOS). Together, we are relooking the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) and attempting to identify broader authorities in that fund that will help meet Special Operations Forces (SOF) requirements. DOS has been very responsive and it is my hope that we can move forward together.

That said, the primary objective is to develop SOF partners better capable of detecting and dealing with local and regional threats before they threaten U.S. vital interests or require more costly U.S. Government action. The secondary goal is to ensure theater special operations commands are fully capable of detecting leading indicators of conflict and instability, and able to offer national security decision-makers timely mitigation options during crises.

2. Senator HAGAN. Admiral McRaven, what deficiencies in existing security force assistance authorities—including both Department of Defense (DOD) and DOS authorities—do you believe this new authority would address?

Admiral McRAVEN. Since my testimony on April 9, I have had numerous meaningful engagements with colleagues throughout DOS. Together, we are relooking the GSCF and attempting to identify broader authorities in that fund that will help meet SOF requirements. DOS has been very responsive and it is my hope that we can move forward together.

However, the following reflects my position prior to the recent meetings with DOS officials on the question of deficiencies in existing security force assistance authorities.

Both section 1206 and GSCF were purpose-built to respond to emerging opportunities and threats. Therefore, they leave Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) without reliable authority and/or resources to implement their Chief-of-Mission-approved regional engagement plans. TSOCs would benefit from a comprehensive authority that will help national security decisionmakers detect and potentially mitigate emerging threats and instability before they require the use of more reactive authorities like 1206 or GSCF.

Additionally, the current slate of foreign military assistance authorities leaves TSOCs unable to plan or implement their unique strategies for theater SOF engagement with any budgetary certainty. Accordingly, as they develop their plans for partner engagement activities, TSOCs are left to patch together several authorities

(almost universally intended for different purposes), resulting in limited effectiveness due to legal, policy, and regulatory constraints.

3. Senator HAGAN. Admiral McRaven, do you believe current DOD and DOS authorities could be modified to achieve your objectives?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, since my testimony on April 9, I have had numerous meaningful engagements with colleagues throughout DOS. Together, we are relooking the GSCF and attempting to identify broader authorities in that fund that will help meet SOF requirements. DOS has been very responsive and it is my hope that we can move forward together.

4. Senator HAGAN. Admiral McRaven, security force assistance has traditionally been the responsibility of DOS. Do you believe such an authority for the DOD should be subject to the concurrence of the Secretary of State, in addition to the relevant ambassador and geographic combatant commander? Why or why not?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes. Unless specifically directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, U.S. SOF do not deploy or operate in a country without the approval of the respective Chief(s) of Mission and combatant commanders. SOCOM sees value in the Secretaries of Defense and State jointly formulating an annual list of pre-approved countries where such activities could be undertaken. Subsequent approvals activities in these countries could be delegated to the assistant secretary level. In cases of disagreement, the Departments could elevate respective cases for more senior level reviews, to include the Secretaries of State and Defense.

5. Senator HAGAN. Admiral McRaven, how would you ensure adequate oversight and approval by appropriate civilian officials, including the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, Ambassadors, and Congress?

Admiral MCRAVEN. As I've stated in my earlier responses, since my testimony on April 9, I have had numerous meaningful engagements with colleagues throughout DOS. Together, we are relooking the GSCF and attempting to identify broader authorities in that fund that will help meet SOF requirements. DOS has been very responsive and it is my hope that we can move forward together.

That said, U.S. SOF do not do anything anywhere in the world without the concurrence of the respective Chief(s) of Mission and combatant commander(s). SOCOM sees value in the Secretaries of Defense and State jointly formulating an annual list of pre-approved countries where such activities could be undertaken. In cases of disagreement, the Departments could elevate respective cases for more senior level reviews, to include the Secretaries of State and Defense.

Congressional oversight should mirror the oversight Congress exercises over SOCOM for authorities such as 1208.

6. Senator HAGAN. Secretary Sheehan and Secretary Chollet, what role would your offices have in approving and overseeing activities conducted under an authority like the one proposed by Admiral McRaven?

Mr. SHEEHAN. As with other authorities managed by SOCOM, we would ensure application of the authority supports capacity-building needs necessary to respond to near-term contingencies and foster persistent relationships with our SOF partners. We would establish oversight and implementation policies to ensure the execution of the authority focuses on DOD and national security objectives, is adequately coordinated with the relevant interagency partners, is fully compliant with the law, and that programs are regularly assessed and evaluated.

Mr. CHOLLET. If enacted, the authority proposed by Admiral McRaven, Commander, SOCOM, as with other authorities used by SOCOM, would be managed within Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy through the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC), which would establish oversight and implementation policies. As a regionally focused component, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA) would work closely with SO/LIC to provide a regional perspective to ensure that implementation focused on national security objectives as determined by the Secretary of Defense, and in coordination with the relevant interagency partners.

#### ACQUISITION AUTHORITIES

7. Senator HAGAN. Secretary Sheehan, SOCOM is unique within DOD as the only unified command with acquisition authorities and funding. Further, the Commander of SOCOM is the only uniformed commander with a subordinate senior acquisition

executive. Given your Service Secretary-like responsibilities, how do you exercise oversight of SOCOM's development and acquisition programs?

Secretary SHEEHAN. My staff and I provide policy and resource guidance, as well as appropriate advice, to the Commander, SOCOM in order to implement Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy priorities. I participate in SOCOM's monthly Decision Roundtable meeting that oversees program and resource guidance and decisions. My staff participates in the Special Operations Capabilities Requirements Evaluation Board that validates SOCOM's requirements. My staff also participates in budget and acquisition review processes at SOCOM and within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), along with congressional budget justification.

My office also provides senior policy oversight to resolve special operations acquisition issues, and adjudicates resourcing and acquisition differences between SOCOM and the Services. As the lead Defense official for SOF acquisition matters, I represent SOF acquisition interests within DOD and before Congress. My office directs and provides policy oversight to special operations technology development programs that address priority mission areas to meet other departmental, inter-agency, and international capability needs.

My staff also participates with OSD(AT&L) in the biannual SOF Acquisition Summits.

8. Senator HAGAN. Admiral McRaven, given current fiscal challenges, how do you ensure SOCOM requirements are adequately vetted and balanced against available resources before moving forward with an acquisition program?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Current fiscal challenges have reinforced SOCOM's requirements (e.g., capability) vetting process; the resourcing segment of SOCOM's Strategic Planning Process; and SOCOM's acquisition process. Our SOCOM staff conducts rigorous analysis of all SOF requests along with a determination of cost, schedule, and performance risk to planned acquisition initiatives. We do this through a rigorous internal process administered by the J8 and chaired by the Vice Commander. The Requirements Evaluation Board provides a final holistic review and assessment of SOCOM capabilities, particularly regarding the integration of materiel, force structure, manpower, and military construction considerations.

Validated requirements compete for limited MFP-11 funding in the annual Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and Budget Estimate Submission. The POM submission aligns with Defense Strategy, allocates and synchronizes resources over the Future Years Defense Program and sets conditions for effective and efficient budgeting and execution.

Once funding is approved, the Command's Acquisition Executive (AE) and Chief Financial Officer execute the appropriated funds at the direction of the Commander in accordance with appropriate regulations and guidance. For acquisition programs, the AE provides guidance and direction to all acquisition program managers to promote agility, responsiveness, and transparency to the SOF enterprise.

#### GLOBAL EMPLOYMENT ORDER

9. Senator HAGAN. Admiral McRaven, it has been reported that you are seeking new authorities that would allow you to more rapidly move SOF between geographic combatant commands—outside of the traditional request for forces process managed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If true, why do you believe such an authority is necessary?

Admiral MCRAVEN. When I took command of SOCOM in 2011, I initiated a rigorous, deliberate, and comprehensive assessment of SOF. It has been informed by the National Security Strategy, the Defense Strategic Guidance, and the Chairman's Capstone Concept for Joint Operations. As a result, in response to changes in the global security environment and in line with national guidance, SOCOM is developing a more agile and flexible force, ready to address future security challenges, primarily through the provision of greater SOF support to the geographic combatant commanders.

This vision for the future of SOF will be achieved through normal DOD processes. To that end, on April 19, 2013, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a planning order (PLANORD) that directs SOCOM to develop a campaign plan that "persistently aligns SOF capability and provides SOF support to the geographic combatant commanders' steady-state requirements and national objectives. The results of the planning process must increase requisite flexibility and responsiveness of SOF, alone and in conjunction with general purpose forces, for crises and theater-shaping activities for full-spectrum operations. This plan will not supersede the global force

management process. To the maximum extent possible, [it will] utilize existing processes to support identified requirements.”

My staff, in conjunction with appropriate stakeholders (to include the geographic combatant commands, Theater Special Operations Commands, Military Services, other defense agencies, and the interagency) is currently developing a comprehensive campaign plan to respond to the Chairman’s PLANORD. My intent is for this plan to identify future SOF requirements for all geographic combatant commands; posture the SOF enterprise to fulfill these requirements to the greatest extent possible; and outline the necessary authorities that will enable SOF to meet theater and national objectives.

10. Senator HAGAN. Admiral McRaven, how would you ensure adequate oversight and approval by appropriate civilian officials, including the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, ambassadors, and Congress?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Building upon my response to Question #9, the SOCOM plan to provide a more flexible and agile force to the geographic combatant commands is aligned with national guidance and will be achieved through normal DOD and interagency processes. Additionally, it is worth reiterating that unless specifically directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, SOF do not deploy or operate in a country without the approval of the U.S. Chief of Mission. All SOF missions require interagency coordination.

11. Senator HAGAN. Admiral McRaven, if a geographic combatant commander, the Joint Staff, an ambassador, or another relevant official disagrees with a planned movement of SOF, how would such an objection be registered and adjudicated?

Admiral MCRAVEN. I have no intention to command and control SOF in the geographic combatant commanders’ areas of responsibility. As I stated in my response to Question #9, my vision for the future of SOF will be achieved through normal DOD processes. My staff, in conjunction with relevant stakeholders (to include the geographic combatant commands, Theater Special Operations Commands, Military Services, other defense agencies, and the interagency), is currently developing a comprehensive campaign plan to identify future SOF requirements for all geographic combatant commands; posture the SOF enterprise to fulfill these requirements to the greatest extent possible; and outline the necessary authorities that will enable SOF to meet theater and national objectives. The content of this plan is currently in development with our partners both in DOD and with the interagency. However, as directed by the Joint Staff, SOCOM’s plan will “increase requisite flexibility and responsiveness of SOF” but “will not supersede the global force management process.”

12. Senator HAGAN. Admiral McRaven, would such an authority only apply to forces engaged in training and other engagement activities with partner nation forces or could it also apply to special operators equipped for combat operations or conducting combat operations?

Admiral MCRAVEN. The Global Employment Order would only apply to training and other engagement activities. Any activities related to combat would have to go through the Secretary of Defense for his approval.

Building upon my previous responses, it is also worth reiterating that unless specifically directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, SOF do not deploy or operate in a country without the approval of the U.S. Chief of Mission. All SOF missions require interagency coordination and I have no intention to command and control SOF in the geographic combatant commanders’ areas of responsibility.

My vision for the future of SOF will be achieved through normal DOD processes. My staff, in conjunction with relevant stakeholders, is currently developing a comprehensive campaign plan to identify future SOF requirements for all geographic combatant commands; posture the SOF enterprise to fulfill these requirements to the greatest extent possible; and outline the necessary authorities that will enable SOF to meet theater and national objectives. The content of this plan is currently in development with our partners both in Department and with the interagency. However, SOCOM’s plan will “increase requisite flexibility and responsiveness of SOF” but “will not supersede the global force management process.”

13. Senator HAGAN. Secretary Sheehan, what role would you have in reviewing and approving the redeployment of SOF, considering your Service Secretary-like responsibilities for SOCOM?

Secretary SHEEHAN. My office will work closely with Headquarters, SOCOM to develop the concept for posturing, deploying, and employing SOF best to meet geographic combatant commanders’ requirements and National Strategic Objectives.



As with all SOF-related orders, I review and provide my recommendation to the Secretary of Defense for the deployment and redeployment of SOF. At present there is no specific global employment order. SOF posture and deployment will continue to utilize existing posture and global force management processes. The employment aspects remain under the purview of the geographical combatant commander except when otherwise ordered by the Secretary of Defense.

#### REGIONAL SPECIAL OPERATIONS COORDINATION CENTERS

14. Senator HAGAN. Admiral McRaven, you have spoken frequently about the need to build a Global Special Operations Network which includes partner nation SOF. One element of your plan to achieve such a network has been described as a series of Regional Special Operations Coordination Centers (RSCC), modeled on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Special Operations Headquarters created in 2007, to strengthen partnerships and improve the capacity of partner forces. How would such coordination centers work in other regions where a multilateral framework, like NATO, doesn't exist?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Ideally, RSCCs will be nested under an appropriate pre-existing multinational framework (like NATO), but they need not be. Even if such a framework does not exist, the RSCC will bring together an international grouping of like-minded partners interested in implementing regional solutions to regional problems and thus increasing regional interoperability. Every RSCC will be built to suit its region and will operate under a mutually agreed charter and/or Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) framework. The charter will detail the common objectives, structure, and workings of the RSCC. Each partner nation will have a role in the RSCC organization but will be responsible to its national chain of command. In the case of the U.S. personnel, they will report to the Theater Special Operations Command.

15. Senator HAGAN. Admiral McRaven, wouldn't special operations-specific coordination centers duplicate other existing regional coordination centers run by the geographic combatant commands and the DOS?

Admiral MCRAVEN. I do not believe RSCCs would be duplicative efforts. First and foremost, they would focus on coordination, education, and training of partner nation SOF and SOF-like organizations. No matter the country of origin, SOF warriors share a unique personality, skill set, and approach to their profession. The RSCC would serve as a platform for the development of enduring relationships among our partners based on trust, increased interoperability, commonality of interests, and reciprocal respect. As I've said before, you cannot surge trust among partners at the time of crisis. That is simply too late. We must build understanding, relationships, and interoperability consistently and over the long-term.

Second, what would be unique about the RSCCs is that they would be set up in such a way that our partners will have "skin in the game" by contributing leadership, funding, staff, and other resources. They would not be U.S. organizations, but truly multi-national.

Third, RSCCs would fill the current void of operational-level training and education. The RSCC would be geared toward the advancement of mid- to senior-level officers and noncommissioned officers, to include their government/civilian counterparts. This mid-level training and education program better prepares students for senior leadership positions and advanced international graduate-level education programs.

16. Senator HAGAN. Admiral McRaven, how would the locations of these centers be determined—especially considering the risk of upsetting partners who are not selected and sensitivities of many countries to a visible presence of SOCOM personnel?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Each geographic combatant command would have the lead responsibility for DOD input into site selection and engagement with regional partners. Further socialization would be required with DOD offices, DOS regional bureaus, Chiefs of Mission, other interagency organizations, and multinational stakeholders to provide a comprehensive analysis of RSCC participant and location options. Preference would be given to a host nation that is located within the specified region and promotes maximum regional participation. Where feasible, the RSCC would be nested under a suitable pre-existing multinational framework or security cooperation agreement or arrangement, but this is not essential.

17. Senator HAGAN. Admiral McRaven, how would such coordination centers be funded and manned and would you need new legislative authorities to create them?

Admiral MCRAVEN. In the projected fiscal year 2014 budget submission to Congress, the allotment for RSCCs is \$14,725,000. These funds support the planning, development, socialization, and implementation efforts for RSCCs in the U.S. Pacific Command and the U.S. Southern Command areas of responsibility. This includes the determination and creation of area-specific training and education requirements as well as collaboration with subject matter experts for coordination and support to multiple interagencies and ministries of defense for organizational specific planning efforts. Also included are planning, researching, resourcing, and sponsoring of education events including the development of a SOF course catalog for global and regionally specific training. Additionally, HQs SOCOM will incur costs related to manpower, planning, and coordination in support of this effort.

SOCOM will provide manning to RSCCs from within its ranks, transferring positions and personnel as necessary. As they evolve, RSCC staffs will also include partner nation personnel.

Currently, SOCOM is working across DOD to determine the current authorities that exist to enable RSCC activities. If existing authorities are not sufficient, we will explore new legislative authorities with our interagency and congressional colleagues.

#### NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION

18. Senator HAGAN. Admiral McRaven, I understand you have been working to establish the SOCOM–National Capital Region (NCR) office with the intent of consolidating various SOCOM elements in Washington, DC, under the SOCOM Vice Commander to eliminate redundancies and provide interagency partners with a focal point for coordination on issues with special operations equities. However, the recently passed Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2013 prohibits further spending on this effort until additional justification is given to the congressional defense committees. I understand a significant portion of the funds spent on this effort to date have been used to hire contract personnel. Why do you believe such an office is necessary?

Admiral MCRAVEN. In compliance with the explanatory report language accompanying House Resolution 933, the Department of Defense, Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, SOCOM is currently writing a report to Congress to address questions such as the one above. Upon completion of the report, copies will be distributed to all concerned parties to increase understanding and respond to the questions initially posed by Members of Congress. In the interim, please see “SOF 2020: You Can’s Surge Trust”. This document explains the SOCOM vision for a Global SOF Network, and the role of the SOCOM–NCR office within it.

19. Senator HAGAN. Admiral McRaven, will this new office be created within SOCOM’s current resourcing and manpower levels, including contractors?

Admiral MCRAVEN. The SOCOM–NCR will be comprised of the extant Interagency Partnership Program (IAPP), the SOCOM Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction-Terrorism Support Program (SCSP), and DC-based J39 elements. Pursuant to receiving a Secretary of Defense relocation waiver under section 8018 of H.R. 933, interagency coordination functions formerly performed by the Interagency Task Force (IATF) at the headquarters will be transferred to the SOCOM–NCR, and the IATF will be disestablished. This initiative is intended to be a resource-neutral internal reorganization, ensuring there is no duplication of effort within the Command. We are requesting no new manpower growth to establish the SOCOM–NCR.

20. Senator HAGAN. Admiral McRaven, how is SOCOM responding to the requirements of the Defense Appropriations Bill?

Admiral MCRAVEN. SOCOM is in full compliance with the Joint Explanatory report language regarding the SOCOM–NCR initiative. The language prohibits using fiscal year 2013 funds until a Secretary of Defense waiver and report is submitted to the congressional committees. Prior to the fiscal year 2013 appropriation, we were in Phase I (Initial Concept Implementation). After passage of the Appropriation Bill, we worked with the House Appropriations Committee-Defense staff and moved the initiative back to Phase 0 (Administrative Planning and Concept Development). Phase 0 can be maintained until the approval and reporting requirements of the fiscal year 2013 appropriation language is met. Resources in the fiscal year 2014 budget submission is funded at the Phase 0 level.

SOCOM–NCR activities during Phase 0:

- (1) Completing documentation relevant to the submission of a Secretary of Defense waiver and the report to Congress (section 8018 of H.R. 933).
- (2) Providing management, guidance, and operational direction to the SOCOM Special Operations Support Teams (SOST), which operates within SOCOM's IAPP.
- (3) Continuing to harmonize with the activities associated to SOCOM elements in the NCR. All of these activities are being coordinated under the leadership of the SOCOM Vice Commander.

21. Senator HAGAN. Secretary Sheehan, do you support the creation of this new office, and if so, what will be its relationship with your office?

Secretary SHEEHAN. I endorse the concept of an enhanced and consolidated SOCOM presence in the NCR and look forward to working with the Commander, SOCOM to continue to develop and refine this initiative. I believe the SOCOM–NCR presence will effectively consolidate SOF functions currently executed in the NCR and serves to deepen relationships and collaboration with key interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and non-governmental mission partners.

My office will continue direct communication and cooperation with SOCOM to provide policy and resource guidance and advice. I also envision a close relationship with SOCOM–NCR personnel to ensure accuracy and consistency in the communication of SOCOM initiatives based on Department-wide priorities and strategy.

#### SUDAN

22. Senator HAGAN. Secretary Chollet, over the past year, public reports have suggested that the Government of Sudan has been increasingly working with Iran and non-state violent extremists to facilitate the flow of weapons into Gaza, and has supported the flow of foreign fighters to North Africa. What is your assessment of the threat posed by Sudan and their ongoing support to international terrorism?

Secretary CHOLLET. We are committed to working with our partners in the region to prevent the flow of weapons into Gaza. Iranian attempts to export weapons are violations of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1747 (2007) (which was strengthened with additional implementation provisions in UNSCR 1929 (2010)) and a threat to regional stability.

As you are aware, the United States has longstanding concerns about Sudan's approach to security issues in the broader region. In our engagements with the Government of Sudan, we continue to express our deep concern about its approach to international and domestic security issues, including its approach to the conflicts in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, continued denial of humanitarian access to civilians affected by ongoing conflicts, human trafficking, human rights violations, and other governance challenges. Sudan remains on the U.S. State Sponsors of Terrorism list, and U.S. policy toward Sudan has not changed.

#### QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOE MANCHIN III

##### ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES

23. Senator MANCHIN. Secretary Sheehan and Secretary Chollet, during the hearing you both mentioned that we have had some success in rolling back al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia as a result of our train, equip, and advise programs. Can you briefly describe the nature of our training, equipping, and advising efforts in Yemen and Somalia and the approximate cost of each during fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013?

Secretary SHEEHAN. DOD works closely with the Yemeni Government, Government of Somalia, and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to counter the respective terrorist threats posed by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al Qaeda-aligned elements of al-Shabaab.

Section 1206 "Global Train and Equip" and section 1207(n) "Global Security Contingency Fund" authorities have been used to train and equip Yemeni forces engaged in driving AQAP from its safe havens in Yemen, and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) has been instrumental in the reorganization of the Yemeni military. In fiscal year 2012, we provided \$37.5 million in training and equipment under section 1206 and \$75 million under section 1207(n). Section 1206 programs provided equipment to increase the tactical effectiveness of Yemen SOF. Section 1207(n) programs provided equipment and training to enhance the ability of Yemen's MOI counterterrorism forces to conduct operations against AQAP.

Section 1206 and section 1207(n) authorities have also been instrumental in giving AMISOM and regional forces the capabilities and effectiveness to drive al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and other strongholds. In fiscal year 2012, the United States also provided \$18.8 million in assistance under section 1206 to Uganda and Burundi for deployments in support of AMISOM. On April 10, 2013, DOD also notified Congress of its intent to provide an additional \$27.6 million in section 1206 support to Kenya and Uganda. We provided \$41.3 million in training and equipment under section 1207(n) to Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, and Uganda. The purpose of the fiscal year 2012 assistance is to improve the tactical effectiveness, operational reach, and survivability of these partner nation forces conducting counterterrorism operations either on their own or as part of AMISOM in Somalia. The fiscal year 2013 programs will improve intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to support AMISOM's expansion out of Mogadishu.

In addition to DOD's efforts to build Yemeni capacity to conduct counterterrorism operations, the DOD, in concert with our European and Jordanian partners, is providing advice to the Yemeni military as it reorganizes under a unified chain of command under President Hadi. A unified, professional Yemeni military will be more effective in the fight against AQAP, and it will contribute to greater political stability. The Department's advisory support for the reorganization began in May 2012 and is funded by a \$643,560 FMF case.

Secretary CHOLLET. DOD works closely with the Yemeni Government to counter the terrorist threat posed by AQAP, the most active and dangerous affiliate of al Qaeda today. DOD also works with the Government of Somalia and the AMISOM to counter the terrorist threat posed by al Qaeda and al Qaeda-aligned elements of al-Shabaab. Our train, advise, and equip programs are one of the key reasons that we have been successful in countering al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia. Section 1206 and section 1207(n) authority has been used to train and equip Yemeni forces engaged in driving AQAP from its safe haven in Yemen, and FMF has been instrumental in the reorganization of the Yemeni military. Section 1206 and section 1207(n) authority has been instrumental in giving AMISOM and regional forces the capabilities and effectiveness to drive al-Shabaab from Mogadishu, Merka, and other historical strongholds.

In fiscal year 2012, we provided \$37.5 million in training and equipment under the section 1206 global train counterterrorism capacity-building authority and \$75 million under section 1207(n), the transitional authority provided by the GSCF legislation made available to support Yemen Ministry of Interior (MOI) counterterrorism forces. Section 1206 programs provided equipment to increase the tactical effectiveness of Yemen SOF. Section 1207(n) programs provided equipment and training to enhance the ability of Yemen's MOI counterterrorism forces to conduct operations against AQAP.

In fiscal year 2012, the United States also provided \$18.8 million in assistance under section 1206 to Uganda and Burundi for deployments in support of AMISOM. On April 10, 2013, DOD notified Congress of its intent to provide an additional \$27.6 million in section 1206 support to Kenya and Uganda. The United States also provided \$41.3 million in training and equipment under section 1207(n), made available to support East African countries, including Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, and Uganda. The purpose of the fiscal year 2012 assistance is to improve the tactical effectiveness, operational reach, and survivability of these partner nation forces conducting counterterrorism operations either on their own or as part of AMISOM in Somalia. If executed, the fiscal year 2013 programs will improve operational and tactical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to support AMISOM's expansion out of Mogadishu.

In addition to DOD's efforts to build Yemeni capacity to conduct counterterrorism operations, the DOD, in concert with our European and Jordanian partners, is providing advice to the Yemeni military as it reorganizes under a unified chain of command under President Hadi. A unified, professional Yemeni military will be more effective in the fight against AQAP, and it will contribute to greater political stability. The Department's advisory support for the reorganization began in May 2012 and is funded by a \$643,560 FMF case.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DEB FISCHER

GLOBAL SECURITY CONTINGENCY FUND

24. Senator FISCHER. Admiral McRaven, Secretary Sheehan, and Secretary Chollet, 2 years ago, at the request of Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates, Congress created the GSCF—a joint program between DOS and DOD to utilize security

assistance to address national priorities. However, I understand that since its creation, the GSCF has experienced issues, including a cumbersome implementation process and diverging priorities between DOS and DOD. Is the GSCF working as intended and if not, do you believe modifications should be made to the GSCF to get it back on track?

Admiral MCRAVEN. GSCF was not intended to be an authority to meet the peculiar requirements of SOF, so it is beyond the scope of my purview to opine as to whether it is working as intended. Since my testimony on April 9, I have had numerous meaningful engagements with colleagues throughout the DOS. Together, we are relooking the GSCF and attempting to identify broader authorities in that fund that will help meet SOF requirements. DOS has been very responsive and it is my hope that we can move forward together.

Mr. SHEEHAN. Standing up the GSCF has been challenging. This authority differs from others in the extent of joint planning and shared responsibility for both funding and execution. We have had to develop processes and procedures to plan, notify, and execute the programs, as well as addressing the logistics of transferring funds into GSCF.

The GSCF is a new model for interagency collaboration that requires developing new processes. We recognize that it takes time to establish and operationalize new funding structures between two agencies with different legal authorities and funds management processes and procedures. DOD and DOS have made much progress on these and other GSCF issues. DOD remains committed to GSCF as an integrated tool to address foreign policy and national security interests.

Mr. CHOLLET. From a regional perspective, GSCF's objective—to provide the legal authority for DOD and DOS to implement policy that enhances strategic effects with partner nations on emergent needs—is laudable. The first year has been challenging, but many of the difficulties are due to divergent views between the Departments' respective authorizing and appropriating committees on how this new authority should be implemented.

As an OSD regional bureau, we jointly chair, with the DOS's regional bureaus, the Policy Steering Group to ensure that GSCF projects are coordinated with the relevant interagency partners. DOD and DOS agree on priority projects. Challenges largely relate to implementation, as no other authority requires the same extent of joint planning and shared responsibility on funding and execution.

The GSCF is a new model for interagency collaboration that requires new processes, which are still being created and validated. As we complete staffing and notification of the first set of GSCF proposals, we assess that clarifying the meaning of the terms “training,” “mentoring,” and “advising” will allow for a more streamlined approval process going forward.

DOD remains committed to the GSCF as a tool to address foreign policy and national security interests. We welcome your continued support and oversight as we move forward.

25. Senator FISCHER. Admiral McRaven, Secretary Sheehan, and Secretary Chollet, in what ways should the authority be revised to make it more manageable and effective?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Since my testimony on April 9, I have had numerous meaningful engagements with colleagues throughout DOS. Together, we are relooking the GSCF and attempting to identify broader authorities in that fund that will help meet SOF requirements. DOS has been very responsive and it is my hope that we can move forward together.

In partnership with DOS, we would like to enhance GSCF flexibility in order to shift funding within and between cases. As circumstances change, and efficiencies are found during case implementation, such flexibility to move funds will be critical to successful outcomes.

Mr. SHEEHAN. DOD formally submitted a legislative proposal to streamlining congressional notification requirements and allow DOD funds to be transferred from all operation and maintenance accounts for GSCF programs.

DOD recommends a single congressional notification per project that covers transfer of funds into the GSCF account and intent to implement activities using those funds. The current requirement of notifying congressional committees of funds transfer, and separately of the intent to initiate activities, is duplicative. The combined notification would contain detailed information (e.g., name of country, source of funds, justification, implementation plan with milestones, budget, timeline, completion date). It would also fulfill the requirements in section 8004 of the DOS, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2012; section 8069 of the DOD Appropriations Act, 2012; and section 8068 of the DOD Appropriations Act, 2013.

Additionally, DOD would like to expand the source of transferred funds to the broader Operation and Maintenance account to allow the Secretary of Defense more latitude to prioritize amongst competing budget requirements.

Mr. CHOLLET. From a regional perspective, International Security Affairs supports a legislative proposal that aims to make the GSCF more effective by streamlining congressional notification requirements, and allowing DOD funds to be transferred from any Operation and Maintenance account, not just the Defense-wide account. DOD would like to expand the source of transferred funds to the broader Operation and Maintenance account to allow the Secretary of Defense more latitude to prioritize among competing budget requirements.

26. Senator FISCHER. Admiral McRaven, Secretary Sheehan, and Secretary Chollet, do you believe the fiscal year 2014 budget request of \$75 million for the GSCF will be sufficient to meet DOD plans?

Admiral McRAVEN. I will defer that answer to Secretary Sheehan, as the SOF carve-out is not expected to repeat in 2014.

Mr. SHEEHAN. It is too early to tell whether our \$75 million request for GSCF will be sufficient to cover DOD's share of the fiscal year 2014 GSCF projects. The amount requested is comparable to the amount transferred in fiscal year 2012 and projected to be transferred in fiscal year 2013 to complete the first six GSCF projects.

Mr. CHOLLET. It is too early to tell whether the \$75 million request for GSCF will be sufficient to cover DOD's share of the fiscal year 2014 GSCF projects. From a regional perspective, there will likely be no shortage of proposals competing for the allocated GSCF funds based on emerging security challenges.

27. Senator FISCHER. Admiral McRaven, Secretary Sheehan, and Secretary Chollet, will DOD continue its policy of including a SOF carve-out in the GSCF, and if so, what level of funding do you plan to allocate to the SOF carve-out?

Admiral McRAVEN. SOCOM has been told that the SOF carve-out was a single year experiment and will not be repeated in 2014. We will assess the results of the 2013 carve-out to drive our approach beyond 2014.

Mr. SHEEHAN. The SOF carve-out projects are the result a decision by both Departments' senior leadership to explore the suitability of the GSCF authority to address a set of small-scale, operationally-driven requirements to meet SOF capacity-building needs. This allows for important capacity-building tools, such as advising and mentoring and small-scale construction critical to SOF-to-SOF engagement, that complement or otherwise facilitate effective employment of the larger-scale training or equipment delivered.

The statutory requirement for joint approval of both country designations and assistance plans by both the Secretaries of Defense and State, when combined with a lack of dedicated appropriation, effectively narrows the Departments' focus to projects that are national-level priorities that sufficiently justify the transfer of funds away from other accounts.

Mr. CHOLLET. International Security Affairs is not responsible for allocating SOF carve-out funding, but is supportive of the requests that have been submitted to date by SOCOM and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for countries in ISA's area of responsibility.

#### SECURITY ASSISTANCE AUTHORITIES

28. Senator FISCHER. Secretary Sheehan, in your testimony, you referenced "legislative proposal 171." Can you describe this proposal?

Mr. SHEEHAN. My testimony was intended to highlight a set of security sector assistance requirements that current authorities may not adequately address. For example, SOF should have the ability to build a network of capable, willing SOF partners able to respond to near-term contingencies and share the burden of global responsibility to address an array of security challenges. This would enable persistent engagement with foreign SOF and prioritized SOF-to-SOF engagement with our foreign partners. The global security environment demands a flexible, agile security assistance authority that can be both proactive and reactive. Likewise, the ability to work by, with, and through partners with greater placement and access is crucial to preventing crises and responding to near-term contingencies. In the immediate future, we are working closely with the DOS to identify ways to satisfy some of these requirements.

29. Senator FISCHER. Secretary Sheehan, has this proposal been shared with DOS, and if so, what changes has DOS requested be made to your proposal?

Mr. SHEEHAN. We consult with our colleagues in the DOS in a range of circumstances to develop future proposals that would establish essential capacity-building tools to respond to near-term contingencies and foster critical SOF-to-SOF relationships to address a range of national security challenges; and identify ways to satisfy some of these requirements through existing programs and within existing authorities.

30. Senator FISCHER. Admiral McRaven and Secretary Sheehan, both of you testified on the importance of being able to provide security assistance in a rapid and responsive manner. What impact does a lengthy approval process impose on the efficacy of security assistance missions?

Admiral MCRAVEN. In short, we're unable to react to the changing conditions and/or take advantage of opportunities as they present themselves.

Persistent instability can most effectively be countered by maintaining a persistent presence that anticipates and mitigates volatile situations, but can also respond should a crisis occur. A streamlined and expedited process to enable GSCF-type missions is critical to address emerging security threats in a dynamic and complex strategic environment, and ultimately serves to prevent larger military operations of a reactive nature.

Mr. SHEEHAN. The authorities Congress provided since September 11, 2001, (e.g., section 1206, section 1207), have been instrumental in our fight against al Qaeda. These authorities, however, do not necessarily provide DOD with the full complement of tools required to rapidly respond to evolving terrorist threats and instability challenges that we will face for the foreseeable future. Contracting and procurement challenges, and our general inability to work with Non-Ministry of Defense partners, continue to hinder our responsiveness. More agile, flexible authorities would also allow us to exploit fleeting opportunities to provide assistance to our partners.

[Whereupon, at 3:22 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]