

Senate Armed Services Committee
Advance Policy Questions for Vice Admiral Richard A. Correll, USN
Nominee to be Commander, United States Strategic Command

Duties

- 1. What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM)?**

The Commander, USSTRATCOM creates plans and conducts operations to deter strategic attacks against the United States and our allies through a safe, secure, effective, and credible global combat capability and, when directed, is ready to prevail in conflict. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) assigns USSTRATCOM six specific responsibilities: Strategic Deterrence; Nuclear Operations; Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications; Global Strike; Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations; and Missile Threat Assessment. These diverse responsibilities are strategic in nature, global in scope, and intertwined with Joint Force capabilities, the interagency process, and a whole-of-government approach.

- 2. What background and experience do you possess that qualify you to perform the duties and responsibilities of the Commander, STRATCOM?**

With over 39 years of dedicated military service, including significant command experience within the Navy and Joint Force, I possess a deep and comprehensive understanding of strategic operations. My career has provided extensive operational experience with nuclear forces, SSBNs, and culminated most recently in my role as Deputy Commander, U.S. Strategic Command.

Serving this Nation has been a profound privilege and the possibility of continuing that service is an honor. I am keenly aware of the complexities inherent in the position, and should I be confirmed, will meet them with unwavering dedication.

- 3. Given the lines of effort set forth in the 2025 Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance (INDSG), what other duties do you anticipate the President or the Secretary of Defense might prescribe for you, if confirmed?**

At present, I am unaware of any other duties the President or the Secretary may assign to Commander, USSTRATCOM.

- 4. In your view, are there other roles or responsibilities that should be assigned to the Commander, STRATCOM?**

If confirmed, I will carry out my Unified Command Plan-assigned responsibilities, assess the command's mission effectiveness, and provide any recommendations, as appropriate, regarding USSTRATCOM roles and responsibilities.

5. Do you believe that there are any steps you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of the Commander, STRATCOM?

I do not believe additional steps are needed at this time. However, if confirmed, I will work with the Secretary, the Chairman, the other Combatant Commanders, USSTRATCOM Service component commanders, and other senior military and civilian officials to ensure all actions are taken to deliver mission success.

6. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure that your tenure as Commander, STRATCOM, epitomizes the fundamental requirement for civilian control of the Armed Forces embedded in the U.S. Constitution and other laws?

Civilian control of the Armed Forces is an essential principle founded in the Constitution and applicable laws, and it is the core of the American civil-military dynamic. If confirmed, I will fully support civilian leadership by providing my military advice and perspective.

Chain of Command and Relationships

Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Section 163(a) of title 10 further provides that the President may direct communications to combatant commanders through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

7. Do you believe that these provisions facilitate a clear and effective chain of command?

Yes.

8. In your view, do these provisions properly effectuate civilian control of the military? Please explain your answer.

Yes, the current chain of command is effective. If confirmed, I commit to maintain the chain of command and provide my military advice on all related matters to effectuate lawful orders as directed.

9. Are there circumstances in which you believe it is appropriate for U.S. military forces to be under the operational command or control of an authority other than the chain of command established under title 10, U.S. Code?

No, I am not aware of any law which allows the U.S. military to operate outside of the chain of command as established under Title 10, U.S. Code.

10. In your view, what factors should be considered in making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the President for the use of strategic forces and capabilities?

It is difficult to be precise as the unique circumstances of a given situation will shape and highlight the relevant factors. Notwithstanding, such factors will likely include the President's national security objectives, the posturing of the strategic force, the consequences of employing vice not employing strategic forces, and the anticipated effects of this decision on the vital interests of the United States, its allies and partners. Any such recommendation would only be considered after considering all relevant factors and would be consistent with the Law of Armed Conflict.

The law and traditional practice establish important relationships between the Commander, STRATCOM, and other senior officials of the DOD and the U.S. Government. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, STRATCOM, to each of the following officials:

11. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the highest-ranking officer in the Armed Forces and is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and Secretary Hegseth. Among other things, the Chairman, as the global integrator, advises the Secretary on the allocation and transfer of forces to address trans-regional, all-domain, and multi-functional challenges. Though the Chairman does not exercise command over any military force, he assists the President and the Secretary in providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces. Communications between the President or the Secretary and the Combatant Commanders are transmitted through the Chairman, unless otherwise directed. If confirmed, I will communicate my requirements as Commander and will fully support the Chairman in his roles.

The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff performs such duties prescribed for him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such other duties as prescribed by the Chairman. The Vice Chairman is by law the second ranking member of the Armed Forces and acts for the Chairman in his absence or disability.

Furthermore, the Vice Chairman co-chairs the Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO) Executive Committee (EXCOM), of which CDRUSSTRATCOM is a member. As an EMSO EXCOM member, I would continue to support all matters concerning EMSO and electromagnetic warfare, to include coordination, oversight, harmonization, and advisement through the forum to Secretary Hegseth, the Deputy Secretary, and the Management Action Group of the Deputy Secretary.

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Chairman and the Vice Chairman, keeping them informed on all matters for which I am responsible as Commander, USSTRATCOM.

12. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment

The Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment performs a vital responsibility to the Secretary, overseeing the complex and interconnected domains of acquisition, logistics, readiness, and the health of our defense industrial base. This office is central to ensuring our warfighters have what they need, when they need it, to execute their missions. From the USSTRATCOM perspective, the Under Secretary's role is critical in both sustaining our current operational forces and driving the essential nuclear modernization program forward. The Under Secretary also chairs the Nuclear Weapons Council, a forum where the Commander, USSTRATCOM as a statutory member helps make critical decisions on nuclear weapons enterprise issues. If confirmed, I will remain committed to maintaining a strong partnership with the Under Secretary, collaborating

closely on all matters pertinent to USSTRATCOM's mission and the Nation's strategic security.

The Under Secretary co-chairs the Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO) Executive Committee (EXCOM), of which Commander, USSTRATCOM is a member. If confirmed, I would continue to support all matters concerning EMSO and electromagnetic warfare, to include coordination, oversight, harmonization, and advisement through the forum to Secretary Hegseth, the Deputy Secretary, and the Management Action Group of the Deputy Secretary.

Finally, if confirmed, I am prepared to work closely with the Under Secretary in his critical role as the Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) Capability Portfolio Manager and NC3 Principal Staff Assistant. Our priority must be to champion effective, modernized NC3 capabilities, ensuring we maintain a decisive strategic advantage.

13. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

The Under Secretary for Policy is the principal advisor to Secretary for defense policy. Among other things, the Under Secretary leads the development, implementation, and coordination of national security policy including the National Defense Strategy and nuclear weapons employment guidance. The Under Secretary ensures the integration of defense policies and plans to achieve desired objectives and strengthens relationships and defense cooperation with the United States, our allies, and partners. These policies, along with other national-level direction, guide USSTRATCOM strategic planning and operations. If confirmed, I will support the Under Secretary in all roles as described above.

14. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering

The Under Secretary for Research and Engineering is the principal staff advisor on all research, engineering, and technology development activities and programs in the Department. The Under Secretary also serves as the Department's chief technology officer with the mission of advancing technology and innovation for the defense enterprise, to include advancing those capabilities supporting USSTRATCOM's assigned mission areas.

In addition, the Under Secretary has the oversight lead for critical capabilities managed by defense agencies and field activities with whom USSTRATCOM regularly interacts, including the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Missile Defense Agency, and the Defense Science and Innovation Board offices. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Under Secretary on all matters specific to USSTRATCOM.

15. The Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration

By law, the Department of Energy's Under Secretary for Nuclear Security also serves as the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration. The Administrator is responsible for all programs and activities that maintain and enhance the safety, reliability, and performance of the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. In addition, the Administrator serves as a principal on the Nuclear Weapons Council and executes duties important to USSTRATCOM, while remaining independent of the Department's operational control. If confirmed, I will confer regularly and work closely with the Administrator.

16. The Commander, U.S. Northern Command

Commander, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) is responsible for homeland defense, which is closely tied to USSTRATCOM's strategic deterrence, nuclear operations, and global strike responsibilities. The Commander, USNORTHCOM, is also the Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), which conducts aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning in the defense of North America. The USSTRATCOM and USNORTHCOM/NORAD teams are already working closely on Golden Dome for America's (GDA) critical requirements, including access to the electromagnetic spectrum, which directly informs the intertwined success of homeland defense. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Commander, USNORTHCOM, to strengthen strategic deterrence, homeland defense, and assurance of our allies and partners.

17. The Commander, U.S. Space Command

Commander, U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) is responsible for the planning and execution of global offensive and defensive space operations as directed. Commander, USSPACECOM is the Global Sensor Manager, the Global Satellite Communications Operations Manager, and conducts trans-regional missile defense planning and operations support.

USSPACECOM provides vital space capabilities to USSTRATCOM in support of its assigned missions. The multi-domain sensing and command and control enabled by access to the electromagnetic spectrum are afforded through USSPACECOM daily operations. These operations underpin the ability for USSTRATCOM to project power globally while optimizing lethality. The USSTRATCOM and USSPACECOM teams are working closely on GDA's critical requirements including Integrated Threat Warning Attack Assessment (ITW/AA). If confirmed, I will continue the close collaboration with Commander, USSPACECOM, in matters affecting both Commands, our Nation, and our allies and partners.

18. The Commander, U.S. European Command

Commander, U.S. European Command's (USEUCOM) mission in the European area of responsibility is to secure and defend the United States and its allies and partners. In light of the strategic implications of the Russian aggression in Ukraine, this is a vitally important and critical endeavor. USEUCOM is also responsible for U.S. nuclear weapons forward deployed to Europe in support of NATO security, which represent a key element of our deterrent. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Commander, USEUCOM, to achieve mission success and to strengthen strategic deterrence for our Nation and extended deterrence/assurance for our allies and partners.

19. The Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command's (USINDOPACOM) mission is to secure and defend the United States and its allies, and partners in the Indo-Pacific area of responsibility (AOR). Commander, USINDOPACOM has an extensive AOR with a growing number of strategic challenges, including China's rapid military expansion and homeland defense. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Commander, USINDOPACOM, to achieve mission success and to strengthen strategic deterrence for our Nation and extended deterrence/assurance for our allies and partners.

20. The Direct Reporting Program Manager for Golden Dome for America

Per Executive Order 14186, the Golden Dome for America (GDA) Direct Reporting Program Manager (DRPM) is responsible to "deliver a next-generation missile defense shield to defend its citizens and critical infrastructure against any foreign aerial attack on the U.S. homeland and guarantees a second-strike capability." If confirmed, I look forward to working with the GDA DRPM to ensure missile defense is effective against the developing and increasingly complex missile threats, to guarantee second-strike capability, and to strengthen strategic deterrence.

The GDA DRPM is also responsible for developing a layered defense of the homeland against ballistic, hypersonic, and other advanced aerial attacks. To achieve this, the DRPM collaborates closely with USSTRATCOM, USNORTHCOM, and USSPACECOM to define the architecture, scope, and spectrum access requirements of the Golden Dome program. This direct reporting structure ensures that the DRPM has significant influence on the allocation of resources, including funding, personnel, and equipment. Furthermore, the DRPM works in concert with other USSTRATCOM directorates and components to guarantee interoperability and synergy with existing defense capabilities. If confirmed, I will work closely with DRPM to achieve mission success and to strengthen deterrence for our Nation and our allies and partners.

21. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical and Biological Defense Policy and Programs

The Assistant Secretary is the principal civilian adviser to Secretary Hegseth on nuclear deterrence policies, operations, and associated programs within the senior management of the Department of Defense. The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological Defense Policy and Programs leads departmental efforts to ensure a safe, secure, and effective U.S. nuclear deterrent and serves as the Staff Director of the Nuclear Weapons Council. The Assistant Secretary facilitates U.S. efforts to sustain and modernize the nuclear deterrent and recapitalize the nuclear enterprise while simultaneously developing capabilities to counter chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats and respond to and manage the consequences of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) effects. In addition, the Assistant Secretary is responsible for interagency coordination and international engagement on CWMD policy and strategy while supporting and enabling allies and partners to enhance deterrence and counter WMD proliferation. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Assistant Secretary on matters related to the USSTRATCOM portfolio.

22. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities

The Assistant Secretary for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities is the principal advisor to Secretary Hegseth, the Deputy Secretary, and Under Secretary for Policy on national security issues, defense strategy, and the capabilities, force, and contingency plans necessary to implement the interim National Defense Strategy.

The Assistant Secretary supports the Secretary and Deputy Secretary in providing the Department with guidance to align resources, activities, and capabilities with national security and defense strategy goals, which influences USSTRATCOM's force posture, planning, and operations. The Assistant Secretary reviews campaign and contingency plans, major force deployments and military operational plans, and evaluates force capabilities. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Assistant Secretary on matters related to the USSTRATCOM portfolio.

23. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy

The Assistant Secretary for Space Policy is responsible for the overall supervision of Department policy for space warfighting and missile defense and defeat. The Assistant Secretary formulates Department policy and guidance on space and missile defense forces, systems, and their employment; space and missile defense-related international agreements; the integration of space and missile defense capabilities into operational plans; and space and missile defense cooperation with foreign governments. The Assistant Secretary is also responsible for interagency policy deliberations and

international dialogues related to space and missile defense. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Assistant Secretary on matters related to integrated deterrence, space control, electromagnetic warfare, and other missions, as appropriate, within the USSTRATCOM portfolio.

Major Challenges

24. In your view, what are the major challenges you would confront if confirmed as the Commander, STRATCOM?

The Nation and its allies face increasing threats to our vital interests that risk crisis or conflict with multiple nuclear-armed aggressors in a complex and dynamic security environment. More than nuclear, China and Russia maintain strategic non-nuclear capabilities that can cause catastrophic destruction. The major challenge facing USSTRATCOM is not just addressing each of these threat actors individually but addressing them comprehensively should their alignment result in coordinated aggression.

China has embarked on an ambitious expansion, modernization, and diversification of its conventional and nuclear warfighting capabilities. The Russian Federation continues to modernize and diversify its arsenal, further complicating deterrence. Regional actors, such as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) present additional threats.

Maintaining the momentum of delivering the modernization Program of Record is a challenge for an as yet undetermined amount of time. A further challenge is the imperative to maintain readiness across an increasingly aging nuclear force during the modernization period. If confirmed, I will continue existing efforts to employ a safe, secure, effective, and credible strategic deterrent force that is ready to decisively respond if directed.

As the operational lead for the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) enterprise, I will continue to provide JEMSO support to the CCMDs; maintain, assess, and support Joint Force readiness; standardize JEMSO education; and report JEMSO deficiencies, operational risk, and capability requirements to CJCS. This area of emphasis requires a department-wide unified approach to ensure understanding of critical spectrum requirements and foundational level competencies are developed and implemented across the Joint Force to meet the challenges of the evolving nature of warfare.

25. What plans do you have for addressing each of these challenges, if confirmed?

If confirmed, I will continue to be a strong advocate for our Nation's strategic forces to ensure our nuclear deterrent remains foundational to our defense strategy and our extended deterrence commitments to allies and partners. I will prioritize and continue the Command's ongoing efforts to modify deterrence strategies to account for the unique challenges of today's security environment. We must sustain and modernize our strategic nuclear forces, NC3, and weapons infrastructure to maintain a viable, flexible, and full-spectrum strategic deterrence force against existing and future threats. I will remain committed to sustaining the

legacy triad while the Department urgently develops and deploys the multi-generational, decades-long modernization of all three legs of the nuclear deterrent.

Likewise, if confirmed, I will ensure USSTRATCOM continues to revise plans and operations while integrating nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities in all domains. I will work with the Secretary Hegseth, the Joint Staff, and other Combatant Commands to enhance operational planning, training and exercising for this mission.

Furthermore, in alignment with the UCP, if confirmed, I will provide oversight and direction for USSTRATCOM personnel as the EMS Enterprise Lead to ensure they have the tools and resources required to address these major challenges and the remaining tasks of the EMS Superiority Implementation Plan.

Nuclear Policy

United States nuclear forces are the bedrock of our nation's defense, underpin our most critical alliances, and have deterred nuclear aggression and great power conflict for more than 70 years. Unfortunately, long deferred investments have left us with systems nearing the end of their useful lives. These capabilities must be updated to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent.

- 26. Do you agree with the assessment of past Secretaries of Defense that nuclear deterrence is DOD's highest priority mission and that modernizing our nation's nuclear forces is a critical national security priority?**

Yes. Nuclear deterrence is the cornerstone of our national security and underpins the Department's efforts to defend the homeland and deter aggression around the world. Peace through strength cannot be achieved without safe, secure, effective, and credible nuclear capabilities. To provide this, the Nation must continue prioritizing the modernization of all three legs of the nuclear triad, NC3, and nuclear weapons infrastructure.

- 27. What is your understanding of how Russia, China, and North Korea have expanded and/or modernized their nuclear force capabilities? In your view, do these capabilities pose an increasing threat to the United States and its allies?**

Russia, China, and North Korea are all expanding and modernizing their nuclear force capabilities, to include ICBMs, and developing advanced hypersonic weapons. Additionally, Russia and China are developing or have already fielded new SSBNs with SLBMs, strategic bombers, and novel weapons meant to defeat U.S. missile defense systems. These nations have all prioritized investments for nuclear forces and military industrial capabilities needed to support these programs.

Each of these nations constitute a credible threat to the United States and our allies and partners today. The efforts of these nations to modernize, expand, and develop new nuclear capabilities will increase the threat as these advanced weapon systems are fielded.

- 28. What are the strategic implications of the rapid modernization of Chinese nuclear weapons that are set to potentially triple by 2030, and what approach should the United States take to address those implications, in your view?**

China's ambitious expansion, modernization, and diversification of its nuclear forces has heightened the need for a fully modernized, flexible, full-spectrum strategic deterrence force. China remains focused on developing capabilities to dissuade, deter, or defeat

third-party intervention in the Indo-Pacific region. China believes these new capabilities offset existing U.S. and allies missile defense systems, which may affect their nuclear strike calculus, especially if state survival is at risk. It has undertaken structural reforms and introduced new military doctrine to strengthen joint operations and is testing joint capabilities in and beyond the First Island Chain.

The President has repeatedly called on China to engage in arms control negotiations and has been clear about the great importance of mitigating the risk of nuclear conflict. China's refusal to participate in arms control or risk reduction measures is destabilizing for the entire world. I stand ready to support any such discussions that transpire.

We should continue to revise our plans and operations including integrating nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities in all domains across the spectrum of conflict. This will convey to China that the United States will not be deterred from defending our interests or those of our allies and partners, and should deterrence fail, having a combat ready force to achieve the President's objectives.

We must continue modernizing our strategic forces by recapitalizing the triad, NC3, weapons complex, and supporting infrastructure to maintain a viable, flexible, and full-spectrum strategic deterrence force ready to pace the threat. Our deterrence will only strengthen as we transition to these new systems.

USSTRATCOM, the Department, and other government agencies continuously assess the geopolitical environment and evaluate potential future survivable, flexible, and responsible capabilities to enhance deterrence, assurance, and if deterrence fails, to achieve U.S. objectives. If confirmed, I fully intend to support this endeavor.

Each administration typically conducts a review of defense policies and strategy in the process of developing a new National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy. Given how fundamental nuclear deterrence has been to U.S. defense strategy since the advent of the technology, examinations of nuclear policies are typically a crucial aspect of these efforts.

29. If confirmed, what do you believe would be your role in the development of an updated National Defense Strategy?

If confirmed, consistent with my UCP responsibilities, my role is to provide military advice on the development of an updated NDS issues that impact the USSTRATCOM portfolio.

30. If confirmed, what do you believe would be your role in the conduct of a new Nuclear Posture Review?

If confirmed, consistent with my UCP responsibilities, my role is to provide military advice on the nuclear policy issues that impact the USSTRATCOM portfolio. USSTRATCOM is uniquely positioned to provide detailed analysis and assessments to support the Department.

31. Do you believe our current deterrence policy and force structure effectively accounts for two near peer nuclear competitors? If not, do you believe the U.S. will require additional capabilities, a numerically larger force than exists today, or a combination of both?

Today, the United States faces one of the most unprecedented strategic environments in our Nation's history. USSTRATCOM, and the Department, continually assess the ability of our strategic forces to fulfill their roles. We must continue to ensure a safe, secure, effective, and credible nuclear force structure that provides central (homeland) and theater (regional) deterrence. This includes kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities that deliver strategic effects to either deny adversary benefits or impose costs. Our force posture should include a diversity of platforms and weapons systems that provide additional range, flexibility, survivability and strategic ambiguity regarding conventional or nuclear capabilities.

If confirmed, I will continue to support Department efforts to assess the strategic force posture and make recommendations when appropriate.

32. What deterrence and/or employment policy changes, if any, do you believe are required to adapt to the changing strategic threat environment?

The current Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance provides the necessary guidance and direction regarding strengthening homeland defense, deterring Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific, while empowering allies and partners to lead efforts against other threats. I look forward to the pending release of the National Defense Strategy. If confirmed, I will vigorously implement the updated strategy while providing military advice when appropriate.

33. What is your assessment of our regional and extended deterrent capabilities in Europe and Asia and our allies views on them?

I believe we need to strengthen our ability to deter theater nuclear escalation to complement our conventional force posture and presence in key theaters. With respect to NATO, U.S. strategic nuclear forces and forward-deployed nuclear weapons provide an

essential political and military link between Europe and North America. In the Indo-Pacific, our allies and partners rely on our extended deterrent but believe our ability to deter theater nuclear escalation should be enhanced.

If confirmed, I will ensure USSTRATCOM continues its supporting role to the Department in identifying ways to strengthen regional nuclear deterrence, to include engaging with our allies via NATO, the Nuclear Consultative Group (ROK), Extended Deterrence Dialogues (Japan), Strategic Policy Dialogues (Australia), and U.S./U.K. Staff Talks. These events, coupled with campaign operations such as bomber task force deployments, SSBN port visits, and key leader engagements, have reinforced Allied views of U.S. extended deterrence commitments. U.S. completion of our nuclear modernization efforts will reinforce these perceptions.

34. What are your views on the value of U.S. nuclear extended deterrence assurances as a component of our nonproliferation efforts, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region?

Modern, flexible, and credible U.S. nuclear forces are key to assuring allies and partners that the United States is committed and capable of deterring the range of strategic threats they face. This contributes to U.S. non-proliferation goals by convincing allies and partners they do not need to pursue their own nuclear capabilities, therefore allowing them to fully focus on enhancing their conventional capabilities. U.S. alliances represent a critical part of the U.S. approach to pursuing security and advancing stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

35. Do you believe the U.S. should work to further deepen cooperation on nuclear operations and policy with allies in the Indo-Pacific region to offset increased dangers from China's, Russia's, and North Korea's rapidly expanding arsenals and increasingly aggressive behaviors?

Yes. Our network of allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific is an asymmetric advantage our adversaries cannot match. Increasing our proficiency to integrate and operate with them will increase our warfighting advantage. This becomes critically important as we pursue burden sharing opportunities.

Successive Nuclear Posture Reviews have concluded that the adoption of a nuclear "No First Use" (NFU) or "sole purpose" policy by the United States is not advisable.

36. Do you believe a NFU or sole purpose policy would be appropriate for the United States, and what do you believe would be the implications of such policies on the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence commitments to our allies?

No. Implementing a “No First Use” or “sole purpose” policy would have a deleterious effect on strategic deterrence and our extended deterrence commitments to our allies and partners. A “No First Use” or “sole purpose” policy would eliminate a necessary degree of ambiguity that contributes to deterrence of large-scale conventional, chemical/biological, and other non-nuclear strategic attacks. Either of these policies would clearly signal to allies, partners, and adversaries, that the United States will be constrained in responding to threats against Allied/partner sovereignty and vital national interests allies and partners that can no longer count on the U.S. extended deterrent as the ultimate defense of their territorial integrity may seek to develop their own nuclear weapons, thereby increasing nuclear weapons proliferation. A strategy of calculated ambiguity, which is supported by our allies, is the most effective way to deter Russia, China, North Korea, or other nuclear armed adversaries.

A core tenet of U.S. nuclear strategy since the Cold War has been that only the President of the United States can authorize or terminate the use of U.S. nuclear weapons. This principle is based on preserving civilian control of military forces and ensuring that the United States maintains the ability to respond in a timely manner to strategic attacks. However, there have been periodic calls to revise this policy in order to constrain presidential authority to direct the employment of nuclear weapons.

- 37. Do you believe the president should be the sole authority for authorizing and terminating the use of U.S. nuclear weapons?**

Yes.

Force Sustainment and Modernization

The 2023 Strategic Posture Commission concluded that the U.S. should expedite its ongoing nuclear force modernization activities, modify its strategic nuclear force structure to account for the rapid growth of China’s nuclear forces and the unprecedented need to deter two nuclear-armed peer adversaries, and urgently develop additional theater range nuclear options.

38. Do you agree with the recommendations of the commission regarding U.S. nuclear forces?

Yes. The United States must deliver on the nuclear modernization program – and expedite whenever possible – while continuing to sustain legacy systems to ensure there are no gaps in capabilities during the transition from legacy to modern systems. The unprecedented security environment that we are facing further underscores the need for a flexible, efficient, and adaptable nuclear posture that can be appropriately tailored to respond to a range of potential threats and scenarios, should deterrence fail. Additionally, USSTRATCOM has submitted several Initial Capabilities Documents that describes the capability requirements for different elements of U.S. nuclear forces. SLCM-N and other theater nuclear capabilities are needed to enhance the ability of the Joint Force to deter adversaries and provide options to the President to achieve our objectives.

39. Do you agree that a triad of land, air, and sea based nuclear delivery platforms is consistent with an effective deterrent posture in an era of great power competition with Russia and China?

Yes, each leg of the nuclear triad and related NC3 systems provide unique and complementary attributes that collectively ensure that no adversary ever believes it could launch a strategic attack that would eliminate the ability of the United States to respond and inflict unacceptable damage.

The overwhelming majority of U.S. nuclear forces have been extended decades beyond their intended design lives and are nearing the end of their utility. These capabilities must be updated over the next 20 years if the United States is to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent.

40. What is your understanding of the condition of existing Department of Defense nuclear forces?

Our nuclear forces are safe, secure, effective, and credible today. However, they are

operating well beyond their intended service lives. Modernizing our strategic nuclear deterrent capabilities across the triad and its supporting infrastructure is critical to maintaining strategic deterrence against existing and future threats. We must also continue to sustain our legacy systems in order to ensure there are no gaps in capabilities during the transition from legacy to modern systems.

41. What is your understanding of the state of the nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) system?

Our NC3 systems remain assured, reliable, resilient, and credible across the full spectrum of conflict. NC3 enterprise modernization and next generation efforts will ensure continued resiliency, reliability, and availability of the NC3 network at all times and under all conditions. These efforts are strategically aligned with and integrated alongside the modernization of the three legs of the nuclear triad, ensuring a robust and reliable strategic command and control capability for the future.

42. If confirmed, do you commit to support full funding for efforts to comprehensively modernize the nation's nuclear deterrence forces, including supplemental capabilities like the sea-launched cruise missile, and accelerate such programs wherever possible?

Yes.

43. Are the multiple components of the nuclear modernization plan appropriately sequenced and scoped to meet the operational needs of the STRATCOM commander?

The nuclear modernization program of record (Sentinel ICBM, Columbia-class SSBN, D5 Life Extension II, LRSO, and B-21 Raider bomber) was designed to replace aging legacy systems to ensure the continuity of U.S. strategic deterrence capabilities. Equally as important, we must ensure there are no gaps in capabilities during the transition from legacy to modern systems. However, modernization efforts of this scale have not occurred in nearly 40 years. Consequently, our supporting infrastructure, production capabilities, and defense industrial base have significantly atrophied. If confirmed, I will closely monitor these programs and continue to work with my colleagues on the Nuclear Weapons Council to ensure they remain aligned with USSTRATCOM's mission and operational requirements.

- 44. In your view, are there other nuclear capabilities or posture adjustments that should be considered to enhance the deterrence of Russia, China, and North Korea, particularly given the pace of expansion in their respective nuclear arsenals?**

Yes. Given the changes in the security environment since the program of record was architected, we continuously assess whether our policies, strategies, force posture, force size, and capabilities must be adjusted to address the threat. We must remain committed to full-scale nuclear modernization including NC3, fielding hard and deeply buried target weapons, pursuing hypersonic weapons, integrating conventional and nuclear capabilities, and developing supplemental capabilities to enhance our theater nuclear forces.

Multiple independent commissions, including congressional commissions on the National Defense Strategy, Reforms to the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE), and the Strategic Posture of the United States have highlighted that U.S. defense investments are inadequate for addressing the international security threats facing the United States. These conclusions have been echoed by many members of Congress. In its July 2024 report, the Commission on the National Defense Strategy recommended that Congress provide real growth for defense spending, at an annual average rate of three to five percent above inflation.

- 45. Do you agree that sustained real growth in the defense budget of at least 3 to 5 percent is necessary to meet global security challenges without incurring significant additional risk?**

Yes. USSTRATCOM follows a disciplined and balanced approach when participating in the Department's annual budget process to align requirements, resources, and policy. To effectively sustain and modernize the nuclear enterprise, the budget must keep pace with economic drivers like inflation and supply chain challenges. We must accurately assess our strategic forces and clearly articulate places where additional funding is necessary to mitigate risk in achieving strategic deterrence and conducting nuclear operations.

The Department of Defense projects that over the planned period of modernization, the sustainment, operations, and modernization of U.S. nuclear forces will account for approximately 6-7 percent of the defense budget.

- 46. Do you believe this is an appropriate level of spending for this mission considering the rapidly expanding arsenals of China, Russia, and North Korea and their increasing military collaboration?**

Yes. As a once in every other generation responsibility, 6-7% of the entire defense budget is a modest percentage when measured against the catastrophic consequences of

a major war or nuclear war. This is a cost that America cannot afford to ignore – America can afford survival.

47. If confirmed, by what standards would you measure the adequacy of the defense budget as pertaining to the sustainment, operations, and modernization of the U.S. nuclear deterrent?

If confirmed, I will use a disciplined and balanced approach when providing my assessment of the Department's budget. Alignment of policy and requirements to resources are the key measures I would use to determine if the budget is enough to effectively sustain and modernize the nuclear enterprise.

STRATCOM Readiness

- 48. How would you assess STRATCOM's current readiness to execute the command's operational concepts and plans?**

As the current USSTRATCOM Deputy Commander, I see firsthand how ready and capable the command is. I can unequivocally state that USSTRATCOM is ready and able to execute the mission at any time. While we face challenges associated with aging weapon systems, the forces across the nuclear enterprise are postured to execute our plans. If confirmed, I will continue to assess our readiness to identify any areas where further adjustments are needed.

- 49. What is your assessment of the risk that STRATCOM has accepted in recent decades in regard to its readiness to execute operational concepts and plans?**

USSTRATCOM faces increasing risks in our ability to execute while we continue to modernize our force. Technical advances in adversary delivery systems combined with challenges associated with continued aging of our systems require our full attention. It remains critical that we finish modernizing the programs of record while adequately sustaining legacy forces as we transition to newer systems.

- 50. If confirmed, how would you address any gaps or shortfalls in STRATCOM's ability to meet the demands placed on it and the operational concepts and plans that implement the strategy especially with respect to the growing non-strategic arsenal of Russia and the rise of China's nuclear deterrent?**

The evolving strategic landscape requires constant evaluation of our capabilities to ensure any gaps are addressed early and mitigated before manifesting. If confirmed, I will continuously evaluate the USSTRATCOM portfolio to identify potential capability gaps and will advocate with the department. The Department, Services, components, and DOE to address those gaps. The modernized nuclear delivery systems are vital but are only part of the need, as warhead modernization and production must continue as well. Finally, it is imperative to recruit, train, and retain the right personnel to operate the systems.

- 51. Do you support reducing the alert level of the deployed intercontinental ballistic missile force? Why or why not?**

No, maintaining the current alert levels for deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) is critical. The ICBM force remains the most responsive and geographically dispersed component of our nuclear triad, providing a reliable and highly available deterrent that complicates adversary plans to attack the United States. Fortified by an

ironclad NC3 system ensuring direct presidential communication, ICBMs significantly raise the threshold for any adversary contemplating a counterforce strike against the United States, effectively deterring any such action short of a full-scale attack on our homeland.

Air Force Global Strike Command provides two legs of the triad, the majority of NC3 systems, as well as the operation and sustainment of the fleet of E-4B National Airborne Operations Center aircraft. All of these systems are simultaneously undergoing a once-in-a-generation modernization that will take decades to finish. The Command itself was born and evolved over time from series of high-profile mishaps in neglecting the Air Force nuclear mission.

- 52. In your view, how important is it that the Command's organization remains stable and responsible for organizing, training and equipping its forces as well as overseeing its modernization to meet readiness and operational needs?**

I highly value USSTRATCOM Navy and Air Force components to organize, train, equip, and operate the Nation's nuclear forces and capabilities to support the USSTRATCOM mission. Their efforts, oversight, and technical expertise are indispensable during this multi-generational, decades-long modernization of our nuclear deterrent, including all three legs of the triad and critical NC3 systems. Likewise, USSTRATCOM Navy and Air Force components are vital for the sustainment of legacy nuclear systems. Furthermore, as we modernize our capabilities, our Service components must operate credible Navy and Air Force nuclear forces to ensure USSTRATCOM is always postured to deter strategic attacks against the United States, our allies and partners.

Air Force Global Strike Command is essential to maintaining the effectiveness of the nuclear triad. Currently, the Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command is USSTRATCOM's single point of contact for two-thirds of our nuclear triad and 68% of our Nuclear Command and Control systems. The sheer magnitude and scope of the modernization efforts within the Global Strike portfolio require consistent leadership and oversight to ensure all our modernization efforts are synchronized and capable of meeting the nation's needs, and Air Force Global Strike Command has that oversight. The ability to communicate directly with a single Commander for Air Force strategic systems provides a distinct advantage toward meeting both readiness and operational needs across the world.

STRATCOM Organization and Missions

STRATCOM's missions have shifted substantially over the last five years, with the establishment of U.S. Space Command and U.S. Cyber Command and the transfer of the combatting weapons of mass destruction mission to U.S. Special Operations Command.

- 53. Do you believe that the current organization structure of STRATCOM is the most effective means for carrying out its mission?**

Yes. If confirmed, I will regularly review our performance and continuously assess opportunities where USSTRATCOM could become more efficient and effective based on ongoing threat assessments.

- 54. If confirmed, what innovative ideas would you consider providing to the Secretary of Defense regarding STRATCOM missions, organization, and operations?**

If confirmed, I would continue supporting efforts across the Department, interagency, industry, and academia to rapidly develop and field innovative technologies for the Joint Force; we must innovate at a faster pace than our adversaries. Collaboration will accelerate the fielding of these next-generation systems from research labs to the warfighters. As the threat environment evolves, I would continue to provide my military advice while leveraging data advantage for decision advantage.

- 55. What are your views on transferring STRATCOM's missile defense mission to SPACECOM?**

The Department must streamline command and control and eliminate any perceived seams in missions such as missile defense and space domain awareness. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing our close collaboration with Commander, USSPACECOM, in matters affecting both Commands, the Nation, and our allies and partners. The protection of our fielded forces from air and missile threats remains a critical responsibility of USSTRATCOM and coordination on this effort is vital to strengthening strategic deterrence.

- 56. What is STRATCOM's long-term role with respect to conventional prompt strike systems as compared to other combatant commands such as U.S. Indo-Pacific Command or U.S. European Command?**

To maintain strategic deterrence and fulfill USSTRATCOM's global strike mission, highly responsive, non-nuclear options are required. Conventional hypersonic strike weapons would directly address distant, defended, and time-critical threats without escalating to nuclear use. These weapons enhance the deterrent effect of the nuclear triad by providing mission planners with a wider range of conventional options across all

phases of conflict. This expanded toolkit enables us to encourage restraint, control escalation, and, if necessary, enhance the effectiveness of our overall strategic posture.

57. Do you believe STRATCOM should continue to be responsible for electronic warfare or should it be transferred to another combatant command or as a Chairman's Directed Activity?

Yes. The 2022 UCP, as modified in June 2025, clearly delineates the responsibilities of Commander, USSTRATCOM to include the role as operational lead for the EMS enterprise, of which electromagnetic warfare is a core pillar. As mandated by congressionally directed actions, Title 10 authorities, and Secretary Hegseth's memoranda, I believe the decision to assign Commander, USSTRATCOM as the EMS enterprise lead continues to be positively validated on a daily basis. The Joint EMSO Center (JEC), established in 2023, has proven to be a critical enabler to all combatant commands, their components, allies and partners, and Joint Staff. The JEC has been instrumental in the doctrinal paradigm shift to incorporate EMSO into operations writ large. This includes educating the Joint Force on the importance of access to the EMS, both in design of systems and operational practices.

58. If confirmed, what role would you establish for yourself in coordinating with the Commander, SPACECOM, to advocate for space programs critical to missile defense, missile warning, and nuclear capabilities?

If confirmed, I will continue close collaboration with Commander, USSPACECOM, advocating for the seamless integration of space capabilities across all domains to support USSTRATCOM's core mission areas: strategic deterrence, nuclear operations (including missile warning, nuclear detonation detection, protected communications, NC3 modernization, and GDA), and global strike to ensure the Nation maintains a robust strategic deterrent.

Additionally, if confirmed, my responsibility for the JEMSO portfolio will position me to effectively champion the necessary spectrum resources for space programs, ensuring their continued operational effectiveness in partnership with Commander, USSPACECOM.

STRATCOM retains responsibility for the integrity of the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) System. Yet, U.S. Space Command has assumed responsibility for the ground and space sensors, the Missile Warning Center, and the Combatant Commander's Integrated Command and Control System, which fuses the data from these sensors.

59. Specifically, what would you do, if confirmed, to ensure that these ITW/AA elements of the missile warning mission are not lost or degraded between STRATCOM and SPACECOM?

USSTRATCOM continues to work with Combatant Commands, Services, and Agencies to posture U.S. forces while working to field responsive, persistent, resilient, and cost-effective sensor capabilities able to detect, characterize, track, and engage current and projected threats. USSTRATCOM also supports improvements in early warning, identification, tracking, discrimination, and attribution for the range of air and missile threats to the homeland and our strategic forces.

If confirmed, I would continue to work directly with Commander, USSPACECOM to advocate for critical ITW/AA capabilities vital to USSTRATCOM's strategic deterrence mission and its ability to counter evolving threats. Furthermore, as the Department NC3 Enterprise Lead, I would maintain rigorous oversight to ensure the integrity of all relevant systems, including operational certification, system integration, comprehensive end-to-end testing, and advocating for proper resourcing to support the ITW/AA system.

60. What long-term role do you see for non-traditional ITW/AA sensors as part of a missile warning architecture?

Optimizing existing ITW/AA capabilities through the integration of non-traditional sensors is a mission critical and cost-effective way to enhance our national security. By leveraging real-time data from a wider range of sources, we can improve the accuracy and relevance of threat warnings, allowing for a more precise understanding of potential risks to the homeland, deployed forces, and allies for the long-term. This ensures Combatant Commanders have the most comprehensive information possible to advise national leadership on appropriate courses of action.

Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications

61. What is your understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the NC3 Enterprise Center?

The NC3 Enterprise Center (NEC) is the Department's focal point to oversee and manage the NC3 enterprise ensuring the President has assured Nuclear Command and Control under all conditions and threat environments. The NEC partners with enterprise stakeholders to deliver full mission readiness through data-driven, risk-informed operations while directing the development and delivery of threat-relevant, next-generation NC3 enterprise capabilities to support nuclear deterrence operations and national security objectives. Day-to-day NEC activities include oversight and management of NC3 operations, systems engineering and integration, security and protection, and development of requirements for Next Generation systems.

62. How will you address the inherent challenge associated with housing a systems engineering and architecture organization within a warfighting combatant command?

If confirmed, I would ensure NC3 operations, requirements, and systems engineering and integration functions are fully integrated to ensure Presidential communications. I would also continue recent NEC efforts to fully integrate current operations, requirements, and modernization and next generation efforts leveraging and supporting USSTRATCOM's warfighting capabilities. Additionally, the NEC coordinates closely with the CIO National Leadership Command Capability (NLCC) Management Office engineering and architecture team to ensure the full scope of NLCC systems (NC3, COOP/COG, Senior Leader Communications) remain fully integrated.

63. What is your understanding of the relationship between the NC3 Enterprise Center and the Military Services that procure, operate, and maintain various NC3 systems?

The NC3 Enterprise Center works by, with, and through the Services and Combat Support Agencies to execute the NC3 mission. The Services and Combat Support Agencies (CSAs) retain their responsibility for providing the NC3 capabilities essential for executing NC2 operations. As NC3 Enterprise Lead, pending confirmation, I will provide the Services and CSAs with comprehensive NC3 enterprise guidance, encompassing operations, requirements, and engineering standards, and I will advocate for capabilities.

- 64. How would disagreement between STRATCOM and the Air Force or Navy on the utility of a particular NC3 system be resolved, in your view? How does the new organization differ from the prior Combatant Command-Service relationship?**

Gap identification, requirements, and NC3 capability development responsibilities previously dispersed throughout the Department have been consolidated under the NC3 Enterprise Lead (NEL), providing a more focused effort.

Through regular and consistent coordination in multiple ongoing forums, the NC3 Enterprise Center leadership has been able to come to consensus on the utility of particular systems. When there is a need to raise the discussion, as the NEL, I have the ability to bring the topic to the Council on National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications Systems (CONLC3S) and ultimately to the Deputy Secretary for decision.

- 65. What is your understanding of the relationship between the NC3 Enterprise Center and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, given its role as the NC3 Capability Portfolio Manager?**

Today, A&S and NEC have forged a robust relationship and together lead the NC3 Enterprise through its modernization and next generation capability requirements. Current NEC and the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment have established a close and collaborative working relationship to advocate for assured, resilient, and reliable NC3 systems. This relationship enables the Under Secretary to effectively function as the NC3 Capability Portfolio Manager and NC3 Principal Staff Assistant, overseeing resources and acquisition. This relationship also enables the NEC to provide vital data and expertise in operations management, enterprise requirements, and next generation development to assess programmatic risks and analyze current and future enterprise capabilities.

- 66. What is your understanding of the relationship between the NC3 Enterprise Center and the Defense Information Systems Agency?**

Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), a Combat Support Agency, plays a vital role in managing essential NC3 infrastructure programs. Additionally, in his role as Commander, Defense Cyber Defense Center (DCDC), the Director provides cybersecurity defenses for the NC3 enterprise to include sensing and monitoring. The NC3 Enterprise Lead provides overarching requirements, engineering standards, operational doctrines, and planning guidance to DISA that directly informs their systems development, resource planning, reporting, and engineering processes to ensure a unified and resilient NC3 system.

67. What is your understanding of the continued role of the Council on National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications Systems as it relates to STRATCOM and the NC3 Enterprise Center?

The Council provides oversight and coordination for the National Leadership Command Capability (NLCC) Enterprise, encompassing NC3, Continuity of Operations /Continuity of Government (COOP/COG) and senior leader communications (SLC). It prioritizes resources and resolves competing interests within the NLCC. The NC3 Enterprise Lead acts as the representative and advocates for NC3 stakeholders before the Council

68. In your view, is the NC3 Enterprise Center authorized the appropriate number of people, in the appropriate occupational specialties and skill sets, to accomplish its mission?

Consistent with Secretary Hegseth's direction on workforce optimization, the NEC recently streamlined the organization to increase efficiencies and re-orient specialties and skillsets to key mission priorities. The effectiveness of this change is targeted for re-evaluation within two years.

69. If confirmed, how would you use your new role to advocate for the modernization of NC3 systems?

NC3 modernization is a top priority of the Department. If confirmed, I will leverage the authorities of CDRUSSTRATCOM and NC3 Enterprise Lead to explore all possible technologies, techniques, and methods to ensure continued resiliency, reliability, and availability of the NC3 network at all times and under all conditions. I will also collaborate with the Joint Staff, Services, Office of the Under Secretary (R&E), Office of the Under Secretary (A&S), CIO, and other stakeholders to execute NC3 modernization requirements and expedite the delivery of threat-based NC3 capabilities, enabling our Triad's effectiveness. As the triad modernizes, the foundational and integral piece is NC3 modernization.

70. Do you believe the NC3 Enterprise Center should have a limited systems acquisition capability or demonstration or validation of concepts that normally would not be undertaken by the services?

No, I don't believe the NC3 Enterprise Center should have limited systems acquisition authority or capability. The NEC is working with the Department to increase its oversight role on prioritizing next generation technologies, demonstrations, and experimentations supporting NC3.

71. What is your unclassified assessment of NC3 centers for cybersecurity of the NC3 system?

The overall confidence assessment of the NC3 Enterprise to conduct the NC2 mission remains high. However, as we focus on modernizing the nuclear triad, the modernization of the NC3 and the cybersecurity of those systems cannot be an afterthought. Tremendous strides to bolster NC3 cyber security have been made over the last two years thanks in part to funding Congress has dedicated specifically for this purpose. If confirmed, I will continue to prioritize NC3 cybersecurity efforts and advocate for continued resources in order to outpace adversary attempts to leverage cyber as a means of degrading or disrupting the NC3 Enterprise.

Nuclear Weapons Council

If confirmed, you would become a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council, together with the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy, Acquisition and Sustainment, and Research and Engineering; and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration.

72. If confirmed, what would be your priorities for the Nuclear Weapons Council?

If confirmed, I will support the Nuclear Weapons Council's (NWC) statutory responsibilities and efforts to maintain a safe, secure, effective, and credible nuclear capability for the Nation. The Nation now faces a convergence of simultaneous modernization efforts across triad delivery platforms, weapons, infrastructure, and underpinning NC3 systems. If confirmed, my priority will be to advocate for increased capability, flexibility, and adaptability in modernization efforts and a collective urgency to deliver major programs on schedule.

73. In your view, what challenges does the Nuclear Weapons Council face over the next four years, and what would you do to address these challenges?

There are comprehensive modernization requirements across the nuclear weapons enterprise addressing aging nuclear weapons and delivery systems, re-establishing critical nuclear infrastructure and production capabilities, as well as the need to sustain legacy systems until their replacements are fielded. If confirmed, I look forward to participating in synchronizing these programs to ensure the United States continues to maintain safe, secure, effective, and credible nuclear deterrent.

74. In your view, has the Nuclear Weapons Council served to effectively coordinate budget and program development between DOD components and the National Nuclear Security Administration? If not, how do you believe this coordination could be improved?

Yes. If confirmed, as a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council, I will support its statutory responsibility to ensure resources are aligned with current and projected requirements for the nuclear deterrent.

STRATCOM is an integral part of the annual certification process for the safety, security, and effectiveness of U.S. nuclear weapons.

75. Would you recommend any changes in STRACOM's role in the annual certification process, or the process generally?

At this time, I have no recommendations for change. If confirmed, pursuant to title 50 U.S.C, section 2525, I will ensure USSTRATCOM's annual assessments continue to reflect accurate and thorough analysis regarding the safety, reliability, performance, and military effectiveness of our nuclear capabilities. This process has proven to be an effective tool for identifying stockpile issues of concern for the Nuclear Weapons Council.

National Nuclear Security Administration

The NNSA is responsible for maintaining the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile and meeting military requirements for nuclear weapons, which are established through the interagency NWC. NNSA's principal challenge over the next 20 years is to rebuild the Cold War-era U.S. nuclear weapons infrastructure into a responsive and resilient enterprise.

- 76. What is your understanding of the condition of NNSA's existing nuclear weapons development, sustainment, and manufacturing capabilities and the associated infrastructure?**

As I understand, NNSA's capabilities and infrastructure are sufficient to sustain today's nuclear weapon stockpile. However, there are many key infrastructure shortfalls for meeting Program of Record plans for stockpile modernization. While NNSA is making progress in re-establishing critical processes for producing weapons, increasing production capacity, and reducing risks from infrastructure failures, much work remains to be done. Successful execution of their infrastructure modernization programs will require continuing, long-term funding and support.

- 77. Do you support the recapitalization of the NNSA's capabilities to design, manufacture, and sustain an effective nuclear weapons stockpile?**

Yes, I support NNSA's plans to meet near and long-term stockpile modernization production requirements. Recapitalization is a multi-decade effort requiring stable sustained funding and support to successfully support USSTRATCOM requirements. If confirmed, as a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council, I will support its statutory responsibility to ensure resources are aligned with current and projected requirements for the nuclear deterrent.

Specifically, what are your views on:

- 78. The Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility at the Savannah River Site;**

When Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility comes online it will provide a second site for producing pits for the stockpile. Its capabilities, coupled with ongoing efforts at Los Alamos Plutonium Facility 4, will be critical for increasing the capacity needed to meet nuclear modernization and future stockpile requirements.

- 79. Plutonium Facility 4 at Los Alamos National Laboratory;**

This site is making progress in re-establishing pit production capability for the stockpile. Its efforts, coupled with plans to execute pit production at the Savannah River Site, are

critical to ensure we have the capabilities required to field the nuclear force we believe we will need to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent.

80. The Uranium Processing and Lithium Processing Facilities and modernization of depleted uranium component manufacturing at the Y-12 National Security Complex;

NNSA is making progress among its numerous infrastructure modernization efforts. The current facilities for uranium and lithium processing, among others, are from the Manhattan Project and Cold War era and are operating well past their design lives. The processing capabilities for uranium and lithium are critical elements of weapon production and must continue to be prioritized.

81. The KCNext Project at the Kansas City National Security Campus;

This project is critical to expanding capacity for producing non-nuclear components.

82. The various recapitalization projects, including the establishment of a high explosives manufacturing capability, at the Pantex Plant; and

For a number of reasons (tight specifications, relatively small quantities, etc.), obtaining required quantities of HE (especially insensitive HE) is a challenge faced by weapon modernization programs. NNSA is currently working on two major construction projects that will support high explosives capabilities.

83. The reestablishment of an unobligated domestic uranium enrichment capability?

I understand this capability is critical to future naval propulsion, weapon components, and material production.

84. How do you intend to ensure the health of the specialized industrial base needed to produce certain components of the delivery systems currently being modernized?

If confirmed, I anticipate this will be a continuing challenge addressed through Nuclear Weapon Council responsibilities.

85. At current levels, do you believe the NNSA is appropriately staffed and resourced to deliver the capabilities required to meet DOD military and presidentially established deterrence requirements?

If confirmed, I look forward to working more closely with NNSA through the Nuclear Weapons Council to ensure it is appropriately resourced to provide the nuclear deterrent we believe we will need.

- 86. If not, what are your views on how the use of DOD authorities and access to the Defense Industrial Base might assist NNSA in the execution of its missions?**

If confirmed, I look forward to working more closely with NNSA through the Nuclear Weapons Council to ensure it is appropriately resourced to provide the nuclear deterrent we believe we will need.

- 87. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure the NWC and the interagency robustly support annual budgets that prioritize the modernization and sustainment of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile?**

I understand the NWC has a statutory responsibility to annually review the plans and budget of DOE/NNSA and to determine if the plans and budget are adequate to meet DoD requirements. If confirmed, I will ensure the NWC continues to meet its statutory obligations.

- 88. Have you reviewed the elements of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, and do you support it?**

I am aware of and support the Stockpile Stewardship Program specified in 50 U.S. Code §2521. It is my understanding that the Stockpile Stewardship Program has developed the science and tools necessary to certify the nuclear weapons stockpile without the need for full-scale nuclear weapons testing.

- 89. In your view, are there any additional capabilities that the Stockpile Stewardship Program should develop?**

Not at this time.

- 90. As materials and designs age, what is your opinion on whether modeling, simulation, and experimentation will continue to suffice in place of underground testing in ensuring the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile?**

If confirmed, I look forward to more in depth briefings on the Stockpile Stewardship Program and how we can use it to ensure a credible nuclear deterrent for decades to come.

- 91. If the technical conclusions and data from the Stockpile Stewardship Program could no longer confidently support the annual certification of the stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable, what would your recommendation be?**

Confidence in the safety, security, and reliability of our stockpile is essential to ensure a credible nuclear deterrent. If confirmed, I am committed to working with other members

of the Nuclear Weapons Council and the leaders across the nuclear security enterprise to understand the assessments and conclusions of the annual stockpile certification and, if needed, provide recommendations along with my own to the Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries of Defense and Energy.

Nuclear Enterprise Review

In 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Hagel directed a comprehensive review of the DOD nuclear enterprise in response to adverse incidents involving U.S. nuclear forces and their senior leadership. The report included recommendations to address management of personnel, attend to security requirements, increase senior leader attention, promote culture change, and numerous other concerns. The monitoring of the implementation of corrective actions has been transferred from OSD back to the Services. If confirmed, you will be arguably the most visible advocate for the service members responsible for executing STRATCOM's mission.

92. In your view, are the Military Services maintaining appropriate focus on implementing the corrective actions required by the Nuclear Enterprise Review?

Yes. I believe the Services took appropriate action and closed those findings at the time. As we continue to modernize all facets of the nuclear deterrent concurrent with full sustainment of fielded systems, it is critical that we do not lose momentum and maintain focus on the fielding of a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent now and into the future. If confirmed, I will continue to be USSTRATCOM's strongest advocate for the service members and capability requirements to execute USSTRATCOM's mission.

93. What progress has been made to date to correct the deficiencies identified by the Hagel review?

The Deputy Secretary chaired Nuclear Deterrence Enterprise Review Group tracked completion of tasks identified by Honorable Hagel's comprehensive review. In 2022, the Nuclear Deputy's Management Action Group took over responsibility of tracking NDERG actions and I look forward to working with the Deputy Secretary and NNSA Administrator to maintain these senior leader reviews when the next nuclear decision forum is established. Progress has been made modernizing critical NC3 systems like the Survivable Airborne Operations Center and Evolved Strategic SATCOM. However, if confirmed, in partnership with the Under Secretary (A&S) and our NC3 stakeholders, I will maintain focus on driving NC3 modernization to ensure continued resiliency, reliability, and availability of the NC3 network at all times and under all conditions.

94. What are the most important tasks that remain to be done, in your view?

We must maintain a ready force for future challenges and prioritize the timely deployment of modernized Triad capabilities and robust Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) capabilities. This requires consistent advocacy and active leadership engagement at all levels to deliver capabilities on operational timelines.

95. If confirmed, how would you ensure that attention and focus on the morale and welfare of the service members executing and supporting STRATCOM's mission is maintained?

The morale and welfare of the Service members and civilian personnel executing the nuclear mission is not just a peripheral concern, but a fundamental imperative. The unwavering commitment and dedication demanded by this critical nuclear deterrent mission are directly dependent on the well-being and support provided to the individuals entrusted with its execution. If confirmed, I am committed to engaging all elements of the nuclear enterprise to foster a supportive and productive environment where our personnel can thrive as a critical component of our mission success.

Relationship with the Geographic Combatant Commands

96. If confirmed how should STRATCOM work with U.S. European Command (EUCOM) to deter Russia and the threat of non-strategic nuclear weapons with respect to NATO and our European allies?

If confirmed, I will ensure USSTRATCOM continues to work closely with USEUCOM to implement the Department's strategy. The employment of any nuclear weapon would have strategic implications and deterring its use is of the utmost importance to the Nation. Further, the United States forward deployed nuclear weapons in Europe are critical to NATO's nuclear deterrence. If confirmed, I will maintain the strong relationship between organizations and will continue to work to integrate our plans, share concepts and operations, as well as advocate for the capabilities required to effectively defend the homeland and enhance the security of the United States and our allies and partners in Europe.

If confirmed, as the Commander of USSTRATCOM and as the operational lead for the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) enterprise, I will provide EMSO support to all combatant commands to enhance deterrence efforts and to prevail in conflict. The array of lessons learned in the Ukraine conflict underpins the necessity for dominance in the electromagnetic spectrum and the criticality of such capabilities.

97. If confirmed, how should STRATCOM work with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) to achieve similar objectives with regard to China and the U.S.'s Pacific allies?

If confirmed, I will ensure USSTRATCOM continues to work closely with USINDOPACOM to implement the Department's strategy. The employment of any nuclear weapon would have strategic implications and deterring its use is of the utmost importance to the Nation. If confirmed, I will maintain the strong relationship between organizations and will continue to work to integrate our plans, share concepts and operations, as well as advocate for the capabilities required to effectively defend the homeland and enhance the security of the United States and our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.

If confirmed, as the Commander of USSTRATCOM and as the operational lead for the electromagnetic spectrum, I will provide electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO) support to all combatant commands to achieve the Department's efforts. Assured spectrum access and denial of adversary spectrum access is critical to expanded maneuver, force posturing, and maintaining optimum lethality of key critical assets when afforded our choosing.

98. More broadly, if confirmed, how will you work with the Commanders of both EUCOM and INDOPACOM to enable theater nuclear planning capabilities?

If confirmed, I intend to work aggressively to implement the Interim National Defense Strategic Defense Guidance and the pending National Defense Strategy. With regards to planning, I will work closely with my fellow Combatant Commanders to focus efforts integrating and synchronizing Combatant Command campaign plans, as well as the contingency plans that involve nuclear planning to achieve national objectives.

Missile Defense

99. What is your understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the STRATCOM commander related to missile defense?

In 2023, USSTRATCOM missile defense responsibilities were transferred to USSPACECOM. If confirmed, I will continue to support USSPACECOM as the command responsible for trans-regional missile defense, USNORTHCOM as the command primarily responsible for Homeland Defense, and the Golden Dome for America Direct Reporting Program Manager, to develop and deploy missile defense to enhance strategic deterrence.

100. If confirmed, what role would you anticipate playing in representing the views and advocating for the needs of the Combatant Commanders for missile defense capabilities, and how do you believe the warfighter perspective should inform the U.S. missile defense program?

The Unified Command Plan assigns the missile defense mission to USSPACECOM and directs Commander, USSTRATCOM, to advocate for missile defenses to maintain U.S. strategic deterrence. USSTRATCOM will support this through the collaborative Warfighter Involvement Process, providing critical warfighter perspective. USSTRATCOM advocates for capabilities working closely with USSPACECOM. If confirmed, I look forward to working with USSPACECOM in the operational employment of missile defense systems and space sensors to defend the Homeland and our allies.

The United States enjoys a measure of protection against ballistic missile threats from rogue nations like North Korea and Iran, but the threat from Russian and Chinese ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles against U.S. forces, allies, and the U.S. homeland continues to grow.

101. What are your views on the relationship between missile defense and nuclear deterrence?

Missile defense and nuclear deterrence are separate, but both are critical elements of strategic deterrence. Nuclear deterrence is foundational to deterring strategic attacks to include the use of nuclear weapons against the United States and our allies and partners via the threat of imposing intolerable costs. Missile defense, designed to deny adversary benefits, diminishes adversary confidence that a missile attack against the United States, our allies, or partners will be successful.

Golden Dome for America is intended to provide a robust, credible layered missile defense system. That, paired with our conventional and nuclear forces, will enhance the Nation's competence in deterring strategic attacks, deny benefits, and impose costs against any potential adversary.

102. If confirmed as Commander, STRATCOM, what priorities would you recommend for U.S. missile defense capabilities for the homeland?

U.S. Northern Command retains responsibility for protection of the homeland; however, there are a number of capabilities that are inherently critical to both defense of the homeland and strategic deterrence. The ability to find, fix, track, and characterize inbound weapons must be a priority, especially in today's modern environment where we face threats from multiple capable actors. Persistent, cost-effective sensors that provide situational awareness to warfighters via a robust and survivable command and control network are required to defend the homeland against a wide range of existing and evolving future threats. If confirmed, I will work with the Commander, USNORTHCOM and the GDA DRPM to establish a robust homeland defense capability that will enhance our strategic deterrence.

Electronic Warfare and Spectrum Operations

STRATCOM is the designated combatant command for synchronizing electronic warfare, as well as for ensuring the warfighter has adequate spectrum resources to conduct operations.

103. What are the major issues associated with joint electronic warfare operations, in your view?

Assured access to navigate within electromagnetic spectrums (EMS) over the past few decades make a case. Domestically, the EMS is more constrained than ever, limiting the Joint Force's ability to test and train for the future fight. The Department has taken initial steps, including developing the EMS Superiority Strategy and doctrinally shifting operational focus to Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO), in order to gain and maintain superiority in a contested and congested electromagnetic operational environment. Joint electromagnetic warfare is rebuilding capability and force structure, but we need to move faster. There is still much to do with regard to bringing a truly integrated Joint Force. Building unitary and dedicated Department EMS operations governance will meet Secretary intent and result in bringing optimum capabilities to the warfighter in the most expeditious fashion. The challenges of educating the Joint Force, to include senior leaders, on how to properly integrate JEMSO remain a top concern. USSTRATCOM's Joint EMSO Center (JEC), established in 2023, has become a pillar of the Department's ability to tackle these challenges.

104. In your view, should STRATCOM be responsible for synchronizing non-kinetic fires for the geographic combatant commanders? If so, how should STRATCOM accomplish this mission?

No. The affected Combatant Commander and the provider of the non-kinetic fires should have synchronization responsibilities. Through examination of candidate doctrine and current planning processes for operations under the lens of Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO), conclusions reached thus far indicate that the bifurcation of kinetic and non-kinetic fires planning does not further probability of weapons effectiveness nor mission success. In fact, it risks the opposite outcome. A shift to fully integrated kinetic and non-kinetic fires planning is required for the high-end fight in order to preserve Joint capabilities and degrade adversary capabilities. Ultimately, the affected Combatant Commander has the best resources and situational awareness to accomplish this integration.

105. Do you believe the Department has adequate simulation capability to test joint electronic warfare operations?

No, and we see this issue pop up regularly. Due to the congested nature of the electromagnetic spectrum, the ability to conduct open-air testing is constrained. There are few ranges where advanced electromagnetic warfare testing can take place, and these locations are often forced to stop testing due to unintended interference. These challenges also impact the way the Joint Force trains. Despite renewed emphasis and efforts to fund and fix such testing, the Department's simulation capability is still limited. Past departmental initiatives such as the Electronic Warfare Infrastructure Improvement Plan are being fielded on our test and training ranges. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is investigating closed-loop simulation, which may provide the capability needed to conduct such simulations. The complexity of testing the ever increasing integrated and meshed sensors and weapons systems the Joint Force demands require modular open systems approach-enabled lab environments. Coupled with agile software, digital twins, and replicative systems, these environments can then maximize pre-fielded testing, best capitalizing return on investment while protecting operational security.

106. Do you believe the Department has adequate exercise capability to train the joint force electronic warfare threats and operations?

No. As demonstrated in recent exercises, deficiencies continue to be repeated, which range from the lack of the availability of high-end training equipment to the infrequency of training opportunities across the force. Training deficiencies, coupled with shortcomings in blue force capabilities, contribute to the force's inability to maintain previous EMS advantages. Additionally, free-air ranges are atrophying in both size and transmission authorization. Alternate methods to train the force to operate in a contested and complex EMS throughout all domains must be explored. While live, virtual, and constructive approaches are able to mitigate some of these gaps in training, they cannot fully capture the true fog, friction, and realism of warfare down to the tactical level. Based on cost-benefit analysis these solutions must be adopted from a modular open systems approach in order to best capitalize return on investment.

107. Do you believe that DOD has adequately integrated electronic warfare operations into its operational plans?

No. While we are making progress in advancing Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO), including electromagnetic warfare, across the Department, there is still much work to be done. Integrating EMS into our operational plans requires understanding how EMS operations impact all weapons and systems and is a critical component of the EMS Superiority Strategy Implementation Plan. Spectrum-dependent systems are the norm now, and how these systems are employed must be carefully planned to account for any countermeasures' effect. The successful launch of the

Electromagnetic Battle Management-Joint (EMBM-J) software application is a major milestone in this effort, enabling combatant command JEMSO cells to align with Joint operational planning processes. Sophisticated planning and risk analysis afforded by this primary tool will serve as the primary enabler to tangibly interleave JEMSO in operational plans.

108. What are the major spectrum issues facing DOD with regard to its ability to conduct operations?

The spectrum is increasingly constrained by commercial use, limiting the Department's ability to conduct operations against rapidly evolving threats. Wherever possible, we must achieve a balance to advance innovative new virtual approaches that enhance joint electromagnetic warfare testing and training without dependence on open-air spectrum access, such as closed-loop injection and live, virtual, and constructive applications.

As a Nation, we must prioritize novel and creative ways of sharing spectrum while maintaining reliable and secure uses for the Department. We must continue rapid technology development on advanced spectrum coexistence capabilities, efforts formerly referred to as dynamic spectrum sharing.

The Department must take a whole-of-government approach to shape and influence international spectrum regulations, protecting warfighter equities as well as space- and spectrum-dependent systems critical to our national security. The Department's advocacy efforts in World Radiocommunications Conference (WRC) preparations are critical to accomplishing this. WRC-27, being held in Shanghai, poses security challenges potentially limiting U.S. participation and influence over regulations that impact warfighter operations.

Additionally, EMS operators in coordination with the intelligence community are currently unable to provide the warfighter with a fully informed depiction of the electromagnetic environment due to certain information limitations, institutional stovepipes. USSTRATCOM is working these issues through a multi-directorate collaborative software development path to build an automated and AI-ready capability to bridge some of these gaps.

109. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to ensure that the Department continues to have access to the spectrum necessary to train and conduct operations?

If confirmed, I would continue to advocate on behalf of the Department for spectrum access, including microwave, infrared, and ultraviolet bands for training and operations.

The EMS is the fabric through which our Joint Force communicates, our weapons systems are enabled, and our kill webs are finished.

If confirmed, I will make every effort to consolidate departmental efforts to maintain and retain electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) superiority. This will require joint collaboration on requirements for future EMS/electromagnetic warfare capabilities. I would also work alongside the Services to leverage and develop capabilities that are interoperable across the Department, which will maximize return on investment through shared wins.

Evaluating and addressing the impacts of private sector spectrum competition is critical to the Departments training and operations. Developing an analytical capability to rapidly assess potential impacts to programs from EMS auctions must be a priority. Additionally, I will continue to engage with other federal agencies to advocate for required spectrum to ensure the Department can operate without interference. I will advocate across the Department to ensure spectrum access to meet its EMS requirements-based needs. JEMSO underpins every military domain, across all Joint Functions, and throughout the entire range of military operations.

DOD Senior Official Education and Training

- 110. In your view, do a sufficient number of General/Flag officers and members of the Senior Executive Services (SES) have the advanced training, academic degrees, and expertise in scientific and technical disciplines needed to lead the future joint force and the scientific/technical civilian workforce?**

Yes. As the threat advances, the future fight will become increasingly technologically complex using interconnected multi-domain architectures, data-based tools, and other advanced capabilities. We must continue to foster the development of senior leaders with insights into the advantages and limitations of these military technologies, such as is the case with Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations and Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning. If confirmed, I will work tirelessly to foster the development of tech-savvy senior leaders.

- 111. Are the career paths for General/Flag officers and SES officials with technical skills sufficient to ensure that DOD and its Components can develop capability performance requirements that will counter rapidly changing technological threats, execute complex acquisition programs, and make informed investment decisions? If not, what would you do to address this deficiency, if confirmed?**

Yes. If confirmed, I will work with the Department, Joint Staff, Services, and other stakeholders to ensure senior leaders continue to receive the training, advice, assistance, and opportunities they need to continue to do so. We must continue to evolve as industry, technology, our adversaries, and the character of warfare evolve.

- 112. In your view do current General/Flag officer and SES assignment policies incentivize highly qualified senior leaders to serve in scientific and technical programs? If not, what changes do you believe are necessary to incentivize qualified senior leaders to seek assignment to such positions and duties?**

Yes. The Services assess officers with STEM degrees and then provide continual critical thinking and professional leadership development at key increments throughout their careers. While we develop senior civilians in a similar manner, we also have the added flexibility to hire some of our SES talent based on unique STEM skills and continue to provide executive leadership education and training courses targeted towards strategic executive competencies. As warfare evolves, we must maintain relevant career development, placement, and progression for our valued technical leaders. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary Hegseth, Joint Staff, and other Department stakeholders to ensure our assignment policies continue to incentivize military and civilian executive talent with challenging assignments, developmental opportunities, and key recognition for their significant and lasting contributions to the Department's mission.

- 113. Are you satisfied that OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Military Services have in place sufficient training and resources to provide General/Flag officers and members of the SES the training, advice, and assistance they need to “play the ethical midfield”? Please explain your answer.**

Yes. Sufficient training and resources are in place to provide senior military and civilian leaders the training, advice, and assistance they need to “play the ethical midfield.” The ability to make ethical decisions is identified as a specific Desired Leader Attribute for leaders throughout the military and is foundational to all Joint and Service developmental efforts.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

- 114. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer yes or no.**

Yes.

- 115. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.**

Yes.

- 116. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.**

Yes.

- 117. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer yes or no.**

Yes.

- 118. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.**

Yes.

- 119. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer yes or no.**

Yes.

- 120. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer yes or no.**

Yes.