

Senate Armed Services Committee
Advance Policy Questions for Marc Berkowitz
Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Space Policy

Duties and Qualifications

Section 955 of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) created the position of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy (ASD(SP)) whose principal duty “shall be the overall supervision of policy of the Department of Defense for space warfighting.”

1. What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the ASD(SP)?

My understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of War for Space Policy (ASW(SP)) are based on the U.S. Code, regulations, and prior experience. Statutorily, as noted, the ASW(SP) provides overall supervision of the Department’s policy for space warfighting, under 10, U.S.C. § 138(5). The position’s responsibilities also include analysis, planning, formulation, coordination, and oversight of the implementation of U.S. and Department of War (DoW) policy and guidance for the conduct of space and missile defense activities.

2. If confirmed, what additional duties and responsibilities do you expect the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) to prescribe for you, particularly in light of the lines of effort comprising the 2025 Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance?

I have not seen the 2025 Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance and am not aware of any additional duties and responsibilities that would be prescribed by the USW(P) but would be prepared to assume additional ones that are compatible with the core responsibilities and duties of the position.

3. What background, experience, and expertise do you possess that qualify you to serve as the ASD(SP), including in each of the following areas:

- **Development of internationally-applicable space policy, rules, and normative behaviors in space.**
- **The national security space policy process.**
- **The relationship of space to crisis and conflict escalation dynamics.**
- **Oversight of missile defense policy.**

I believe my background , experience, and expertise make me uniquely qualified to serve as the ASW(SP). Throughout my 45-year career, I have worked on national defense, foreign intelligence, and foreign policy matters. I have devoted the majority of my career to sustaining the United States's position as the world's leading spacefaring nation as well as protecting and advancing our national interests.

I served in directly relevant and increasingly responsible positions in both the public and private sectors. In particular, I served from the end of the Cold War to the Global War on Terror as an executive in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) responsible for the analysis, planning, formulation, coordination, and oversight of the implementation of U.S. and Department of Defense (DoD) policy and guidance for the conduct of space activities. I received numerous awards, including the Department's highest civilian award – the DoD Distinguished Civilian Service Award with Oak Leaf Cluster – for my accomplishments. I was also a special government employee, senior advisor, and consultant to the DoD and Intelligence Community.

As a policy analyst, intelligence analyst, independent consultant, and advisor in the private sector, I assessed U.S., European, Russian, and Chinese space, strategic forces, and missile defense policies, strategies, doctrines, plans, military research and development (R&D) and acquisition programs, and operational activities. In addition, I formulated strategy, developed strategic plans, and led multi-domain systems engineering, architecture, and operations analyses as an executive at a leading aerospace and defense corporation.

With regard to internationally-applicable space policy, rules, and normative behaviors, I helped formulate and oversaw the implementation of U.S. and DoD policy and guidance as well as led or participated in bilateral and multilateral consultations and negotiations with numerous nations on international agreements, regulations, and proposals with allies, international partners, and such other countries as China and Russia. This included international agreements which established the policy and legal frameworks for defense and civil space cooperation.

Moreover, I served as the focal point within DoD for all policy matters regarding space activities, including interagency development and coordination of national policy, directed the development and coordination of policies, plans, and positions within DoD and with other U.S. Government (USG) departments and agencies, managed the preparation and coordination of policy analyses, options, and recommendations for consideration within DoD and by the USG, represented OSD in and chaired internal DoD as well as interagency deliberations of space policy issues, and represented the DoD and the USG in international negotiations and consultations related to space matters.

With respect to the relationship of space to crisis and conflict escalation dynamics, I supported policy reviews of campaign, contingency, and military operational plans involving space activities. In addition, I took part in war games, simulations, and exercises as well as served as a senior advisor to numerous U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy,

National Reconnaissance Office, and Intelligence Community space war games that explored crises, conflicts, and escalation dynamics involving a variety of scenarios.

Finally, I was responsible for oversight of missile defense-related policy matters including space-based indications and warning, missile warning and defense, nuclear detonation detection, and attack assessment as well as shared early warning with allies and friends. I also served in policy and intelligence analysis positions which examined strategic and theater missile defense issues. In addition, my experience in both the public and private sectors provided knowledge of the defense industrial base and U.S. space and missile defense development and acquisition programs.

My intellectual preparation for the position includes having written about and lecturing on topics under the ASW(SP)'s purview. My education focused on strategic studies, international relations, and Russian area studies. In addition, I have considerable experience engaging with the USG's Executive and Legislative Branches, foreign governments, international organizations, and domestic and international aerospace and defense enterprises, as well as traveled widely preparing me for the departmental, interagency, congressional, and international aspects of the position. Finally, I have held a security clearance for nearly my entire adult life, attesting to my trustworthiness.

4. What leadership and management experience do you possess that you would apply to your service as ASD(SP), if confirmed?

I have extensive leadership and management experience derived from serving in executive positions in both the public and private sectors over the course of my career that would be applicable to my service as ASW(SP). This includes my prior experience serving as the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Space Policy and Director of Space Policy in OSD as well as the Director of Space Studies and Vice President for Strategic Planning in private enterprises discussed in answering Question 3. It also includes leading and managing two successful small business enterprises as President or Managing Partner. These activities included leading and managing diverse groups of political appointees, career senior executives, civil servants, uniformed military officers, intelligence officers, diplomats, policy and intelligence analysts, scientists, technologists, and engineers.

Major Challenges and Priorities

5. What major challenges do you expect to confront as ASD(SP), if confirmed?

If confirmed, I would expect to confront two major challenges as ASW(SP). First is the challenge of addressing national security policy issues, in coordination with the DoW Components and other stakeholders, and overseeing their implementation to enable the Department to urgently and effectively deal with the pace, scope, and nuance of foreign space, counterspace, and missile threats. Second, and related, is the challenge of addressing national policy issues, in coordination with other federal departments and agencies, and overseeing their implementation to sustain the United States position as the

world's leading spacefaring nation. Resolving such issues would enhance America's ability to utilize space power, along with other elements of national power, as an instrument of statecraft.

6. If confirmed, what plans would you implement to address each of these challenges?

If confirmed, I would plan to work closely with stakeholders in the Executive Branch and Congress to do everything I can to assure that U.S. space and missile defense forces are prepared to deter aggression, defend the homeland and, if necessary, prevail in conflict.

7. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish for your tenure in office?

If confirmed, my top priorities would be to: (1) sustain America's position as the world's leader in space activities that contribute to U.S. national security and counter foreign efforts to erode our historic advantages in the space domain; (2) enable creation and operation of the Golden Dome for America comprehensive homeland missile defense; and, (3) strengthen U.S. space and missile defense forces to restore deterrence, achieve peace through strength, or, if necessary, prevail in conflict.

8. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you recommend to ensure effective policy coordination on strategic deterrence and defense matters with the newly-created Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological Defense Policy and Programs?

I am not in position to give a fully informed answer to this important question but understand that Congress established the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological Defense Policy and Programs (ASW(ND-CBD)) position in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to realign policy, guidance, and oversight responsibilities. If confirmed, I would intend to work closely with the ASW(ND-CBD) to ensure effective policy coordination on strategic deterrence and defense matters related to space and missile defense.

Civilian Control of the Military

9. Congress created the position of ASD(SP) to ensure civilian oversight of the newest military service, the U.S. Space Force, and the newly created U.S. Space Command. What are your views on the purposes underpinning creation of the position of the ASD(SP) and how would you effectuate those purposes, if confirmed?

I appreciate Congress establishing the position of ASW(SP) to ensure civilian oversight of the U.S. Space Force (USSF) and U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM). My understanding is that the purposes underpinning creation of the position were to elevate space matters within the Department and ensure overall supervision of policy for space

warfighting as well as effective policy, guidance, and oversight of the Department's conduct of space activities in response to changes in the threat environment.

If confirmed, I would intend to effectuate those purposes by establishing close working relationships with the USSF and USSPACECOM, reviewing and updating, as appropriate, the Department's policy, guidance, and strategy to normalize space activities and oversee their implementation (for example, as chair of the Space Warfighting Activities Group and member of the Space Acquisition Council) to enable the USSF and USSPACECOM to conduct effective space and missile defense activities.

10. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure that your tenure as ASD(SP) epitomizes the fundamental requirement for civilian control of the Armed Forces embedded in the U.S. Constitution and other laws?

Civilian control of the military is a fundamental principle of our constitutional republic. I have worked with the U.S. armed forces throughout my career and have profound respect for their commitment, sacrifice, knowledge, and experience. I understand the roles of civilian officials to ensure control and provide oversight as well as the roles of our armed forces to deter or, if necessary, fight and win our nations' wars. If confirmed, I would elicit and listen actively to military advice, engage in open and respectful deliberations on space and missile defense matters, and ensure that U.S. space and missile defense forces are employed as instruments of statecraft to achieve national policy objectives.

Advances by Russia and China in Space

11. What is your assessment of China's technological advances in space activities in the last 10 years? What threats does China pose—now and in the future—to the ability of the United States to use space as part of our national security posture?

I am not in position to give a fully informed answer to this important question not having access to the most recent intelligence but believe that China is the pacing threat and has made significant technological advancements in space activities over the past decade through substantial investments in indigenous capabilities as well as espionage, intellectual property theft, and foreign materials acquisition. This has enabled China to field and operate a variety of space, counterspace, and other capabilities which could be employed for hostile purposes.

12. What is your assessment of Russia's technological advances in space activities in the last 10 years? What threats does Russia pose—now and in the future—to the ability of the United States to use space as part of our national security posture?

I am not in position to give a fully informed answer to this important question not having access to the most recent intelligence but believe that Russia has managed economic constraints and technological challenges to maintain a robust space program through prioritization of investments in military space capabilities, circumvention of sanctions,

espionage, intellectual property theft, and foreign materials acquisition. This has enabled Russia to field and operate a variety of space, counterspace, and other capabilities which could be employed for hostile purposes.

13. In your view, what other countries or groups are advancing technologically in space? How do each of these countries or groups affect the ability of the United States to use space as part of our national security posture and why?

I am not in position to give a fully informed answer to this important question not having access to the most recent intelligence but believe that many more countries are advancing technologically in space. This could provide opportunities for international space cooperation with allies and international partners to increase their contributions to burden sharing and thereby strengthen deterrence, collective security, or mutual defense. In addition, the technological advances of other states, such as North Korea and Iran, as well as non-nation state actors able to access Third Party space capabilities, could enable them to use space for hostile purposes or deliberately interfere with U.S. space systems.

Norms of Behavior in Space

14. Please explain your views on the “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies” as it pertains to the Department of Defense.

The United States is a party to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST), the foundation of the international outer space legal regime. My understanding is that the OST pertains to the Department, among other things, by establishing that: space is not subject to appropriation by claim of sovereignty, use, or occupation; states’ inherent right to self-defense extend to space; nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction may not be placed into orbit, installed on celestial bodies, or stationed in space; and testing any kind of weapons, establishing military bases, and conducting military maneuvers on celestial bodies are prohibited.

Russia and China have proposed additional treaties, resolutions and rules of behavior related to space through the U.N. Conference on Disarmament.

15. What is your understanding of these recent proposals and what is your view of how each would affect the United States and its national security interests in space?

Russia and China jointly proposed a multilateral Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). My understanding is that their recent space-related diplomatic activities focus on persuading UN members to concentrate on the proposed PPWT. While diplomacy is an instrument to protect and advance U.S. interests and it would be imprudent to rule out any option which might enhance U.S. national security, I am

opposed to the PPWT and skeptical about space arms control. Any space arms control agreement must be effective, equitable, verifiable, and in the U.S. national interest.

A Department of Defense memorandum, dated July 7, 2021 outlined the Department's tenets of responsible behavior in space as to the following key objectives:

- **Operate in, from, to, and through space with due regard to others and in a professional manner.**
- **Limit the generation of long-lived debris.**
- **Avoid the creation of harmful interference.**
- **Maintain safe separation and safe trajectory.**
- **Communicate and make notifications to enhance the safety and stability of the domain.**

16. What are your views on each of these objectives? Please explain your answers.

My view is that the tenets of responsible behavior in space outlined in the Department's 2021 memorandum restated norms or best practices largely already observed by the United States and other spacefaring nations (with the notable exceptions of China and Russia) for space flight safety and space environmental sustainability. Such international norms may help to draw clear distinctions between non-aggressive and aggressive behavior. They may also help to prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and misunderstandings arising from provocative or ambiguous behaviors.

However, norms primarily have utility in peacetime; they will not provide protection in crisis and conflict. Establishing international norms of responsible space behavior is a laudable goal, but norms reflect rather than create states' interests in avoiding conflict. When those interests no longer coincide, compliance with norms cannot be assumed.

17. What is your view on the nature and scope of the U.S. responsibility to protect Space as a "global common"?

My view is that freedom of access to and use of space is a long-standing U.S. vital national interest and the USG is responsible for the common defense of the nation and its citizens as well as supporting defense commitments to allies.

Oversight of National Security Operations in Space

18. If confirmed, you would be the principal civilian official responsible for oversight of the Department's operations in space. Please describe your vision of the relationship and specific oversight duties of the ASD(SP) with respect to each the following organizations:

- **The U.S. Space Command;**
- **The U.S. Space Force;**

- **Space activities with the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security; and**
- **Space activities with the intelligence community, and in particular the National Reconnaissance Office.**

My view is that the ASW(SP) is responsible for overall supervision of the Department's policy for space warfighting as well as policy, guidance, and oversight of space and missile defense activities. I understand that the SecWar's authorities under Title 10 and Title 50 with respect to national security space activities are mutually supporting rather than mutually exclusive with the Director of National Intelligence's (DNI) authorities. Consequently, if confirmed, I would intend to perform oversight responsibilities in accordance with and derived from the SecWar's authorities and guidance as well as interagency agreements. I would also intend to establish and maintain close working relationships with stakeholders among the DoW Components and Intelligence Community elements, including the:

- USSPACECOM on matters affecting the Command's ability to plan and execute military operations in space, deliver space capabilities to joint and combined forces, and defend U.S. national interests in the space domain.
- Department of the Air Force and USSF on matters affecting the Military Department's and Service's ability to organize, train, and equip space forces and present them to USSPACECOM and other combatant commands.
- Under Secretary of War for Intelligence and Security on policy, guidance, and oversight of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, counterintelligence, and security matters related to space and missile defense.
- Office of the DNI and other IC elements on space and missile defense matters, alignment of DoW and IC space efforts, and intelligence support for DoW space and missile defense activities.
- NRO on matters affecting the DoW Agency and IC element's ability to conduct overhead reconnaissance and related data-processing for collection of intelligence and information to support DoW needs.

Space Deterrence and Classification of National Security Space Information

In order for space deterrence to be effective, the adversary must subjectively balance the cost penalties for actions taken. However, most national security space programs are classified and information about them withheld from public disclosure.

- 19. Do you believe the balance between space deterrence and withholding national security space information from public disclosure needs to be adjusted? Please explain your answer.**

I am not currently in a position to give a fully informed answer to this important question not having access to all classified national security space information but believe the Department's space programs and activities must be properly classified to safeguard critical scientific and technological advances, weapons systems and military equipment, intelligence sources and methods, and military plans, forces, systems, capabilities, and operations. The DoW Components must also be able to develop space doctrine, operational art, tactics, techniques, and procedures, educate, train, and exercise military forces, as well as plan and employ space assets for deterrence as well as joint and combined operations.

For deterrence to function, among other things, threatened consequences must be credible. Credibility is a function of both capability and political will. While pre-war and intra-war deterrence require overt capability disclosed to communicate the credibility of threats, latent threats can also contribute to deterrence effect.

20. If you believe this balance needs to be adjusted, what specific actions would you take to effectuate that belief, if confirmed?

If confirmed, I would review policy and guidance for the classification of DoW space activities, in coordination with all stakeholders, to ensure they are properly classified.

In response to section 1611 of the FY 2020 NDAA, the Department of Defense issued a report entitled, "Report on Deterrence in Space" in January 2021. According to that report, "Depending upon an adversary's reliance on space, and on other factors, in-kind response to threats against adversary space and counterspace systems may be of limited utility in some situations, and response options in other domains may be more appropriate and effective. The United States draws upon the sum of its military capabilities as part of our broader U.S. deterrence posture for the space domain as it does in all domains."

21. Do you agree with this statement?

The pertinent issue is war or peace—not war or peace *in space*. The President and SecWar must have a range of options to deter the threat or use of force in all domains. This includes options to respond to aggression at a time, place, manner, and domain of our choosing.

22. In what types of scenarios would you expect this statement to apply?

I am not currently in a position to give a fully informed answer to this important question and do not want to speculate about hypotheticals but believe the President and SecWar must have a range of options to deter the threat or use of force, including options to respond to aggression at a time, place, manner, and domain of our choosing.

23. If confirmed, what are your views as to whether such a cross domain response can increase or decrease escalation dynamics in a conflict? Please explain your answer.

Depending on the scenario, contingency, and adversary, cross-domain responses to aggression could either increase or decrease escalation dynamics in a conflict. Consequently, if confirmed, I would work to ensure the President and SecWar have a range of options to deter the threat or use of force, including options to respond to aggression at a time, place, manner, and domain of our choosing, and control escalation.

24. Do you ascribe to the assertion of “first mover advantage” in space and if so, how does that effect deterrence in Space, in your view?

The physics of spaceflight and the characteristics of the domain could provide a first mover advantage in space. Rivals have made space a warfighting domain. Consequently, my view is that the U.S. Armed Forces must be able to deny an adversary freedom of action in space for hostile purposes and prevail in contested, degraded, and operationally limited conditions.

25. How would you, if confirmed, overcome the “first mover advantage” in Space?

If confirmed, I would analyze, plan, formulate, and coordinate policy, guidance, and strategy as well as oversee its execution by the DoW Components to urgently strengthen deterrence by acquiring, fielding, and operating military capabilities to make a first strike in space impracticable and counterproductive in order to discourage an adversary from initiating aggression.

International Security Space Cooperation

Many U.S. allies and NATO partners are now developing national security space doctrine.

26. If confirmed, how would you coordinate and integrate the efforts of our allies and NATO countries to deter adversarial actions in space by other nations?

Allies and international partners with shared values and interests are a U.S. competitive advantage. An increasing number of our allies and partners have indigenous space technology, know how, capabilities, and resources. Consequently, international cooperation may present an opportunity to enhance deterrence as well as collective security or mutual defense.

If confirmed, I would work with stakeholders in the Executive Branch and Congress, as appropriate, to pursue international security space cooperation through bilateral and multilateral engagements in order to increase allied burden sharing, align and integrate allied and partner space efforts, strengthen political and security ties, and enhance interoperability.

Use of commercial space systems for DOD needs

Commercial space systems have become an integral part of the Department's use of space because they can offer lower cost and innovative approaches than the government can achieve by itself. However, little is known about over reliance on commercial systems for critical defense functions such as ballistic missile warning or the transmission of nuclear action messages. In particular, it is not clear whether these commercial space systems would be deemed "combatants" in a time of conflict.

27. In your view, how should DOD balance taking advantage of commercial innovation and lowering the cost of space operations, while ensuring the Department does not become over-reliant on non-governmental entities for the performance of critical defense functions?

The vitality of the commercial space sector is a U.S. competitive advantage. The Department seeks to leverage commercial space capabilities to enhance the capability, capacity, robustness, and resilience of our space force structure and posture. It would be imprudent, however, to increase reliance or dependence upon commercial space capabilities without managing and mitigating associated risks. Moreover, it may be neither possible nor prudent to employ commercial solutions for all military space missions, functions, and tasks. If confirmed, I would collaborate with stakeholders to understand, manage, and mitigate risks associated with the employment of commercial space capabilities to meet the Department's needs.

Assured Access to Space

The policy of ensuring that there is more than one commercial provider of space launch services is the cornerstone of DOD's objective of Assured Access to Space.

28. What are your views on the current level of competition in the commercial launch industry?

The United States is currently the world's leader in the commercial launch services market. This is largely a result of U.S. companies' provision of reliable and affordable launch services to commercial and government customers. Ensuring that multiple U.S. launch service providers can continue to efficiently launch, conduct missions in space, and reenter U.S. airspace is critical to maintaining our competitiveness in that market as well as U.S. economic growth and national security. I strongly support the President's Executive Order on Enabling Competition in the Commercial Space Industry to enable a competitive launch marketplace, increase commercial space launch cadence and novel space activities, and reform regulatory barriers to commercial launch and recovery.

29. Do you think there is adequate launch infrastructure for the projected NSSL manifest over the next several years?

I am not currently in a position to provide a fully informed answer to this important question but am concerned about the capacity of our launch infrastructure. Increasing demand reflects the growth of space activities and our industry's competitiveness in the

international commercial launch market. If confirmed, I would work with stakeholders in the Executive Branch and Congress to modernize our launch infrastructure in order to meet the projected NSSL manifest and other U.S. space sectors' needs in the coming years.

Consolidation of DOD Space Activities

Congress created the U.S. Space Force, in part to address the extant ad hoc integration of space activities across the DOD, and between DOD and the Intelligence Community, that often led to unhealthy one-upmanship and in some cases the over-classification of essential information.

30. Do you believe consolidating and integrating space activities is important to the space mission of the DOD? If so, please provide some specific examples of space activities as to which you perceive consolidation and integration of activities would be particularly beneficial.

I am not currently in a position to provide a fully informed answer to this important question not having access to all classified national security space information but as the Department pursues acquisition reform, among other things, to improve its ability to deliver and integrate space capabilities with discipline at the speed of relevance, I believe it is prudent to consider what, if any, changes might be warranted to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of space acquisition programs. In that regard, I believe the Department should determine how to apply proven acquisition models and best practices to improve capability, resilience, agility, and affordability.

31. Do you believe there are activities in which consolidation would be counterproductive? Please explain your answer.

I am not currently in a position to provide a fully informed answer to this important question not having access to all classified national security space information but any significant change from the status quo would take time to implement and might risk creating distractions or disrupting ongoing space acquisition programs. Given the threat environment, it would be necessary to first do no harm and weigh the consequences of either action or inaction for the efficiency and effectiveness of space acquisition programs.

Integration of Space with Cyber Space and Nuclear Escalation

Space is an integral element of our nuclear deterrent and national missile defense capability through its early warning and communications satellites. Space and cyber space are considered enabling elements of the United States' overall strategic posture and are complimentary domains of operations where early phases of escalation dynamics can occur relative to nuclear deterrence. A thorough understanding of nuclear deterrence and its modernization, cyber operations, and missile defense are considered essential to performing the duties of the ASD(SP).

32. What are your views on the relationship between space, cyber space, and nuclear escalation in the context of our Nation's strategic posture?

I am not currently in a position to give a fully informed answer to this question not having access to all relevant classified information but believe that space, cyber space, and nuclear deterrence are closely related. Space and cyber systems support the planning and execution of deterrence and response operations by enabling missile defense, targeting of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, indications, warning, detection, and assessment of nuclear attacks, and worldwide command, control, and communications among national leaders, military commanders, and the nuclear triad. Actions in space thus could impact escalation dynamics related to nuclear deterrence. If confirmed, I would work with my counterparts in DoW to align space policies and programs to support nuclear deterrence.

33. How does modernization of U.S. nuclear capabilities relate to the functions of the ASD(SP), in your view?

I am not currently in a position to give a fully informed answer to this question not having access to all relevant classified information but understand that space systems support the planning and execution of deterrence and response operations. If confirmed, I would work with my counterparts in the DoW to align policies and modernize programs related to nuclear deterrence.

Strategic Deterrence and Space

United States nuclear forces are the bedrock of our nation's defense, underpin our most critical alliances, and have deterred nuclear aggression and great power conflict for more than 70 years. Unfortunately, long deferred investments have left us with systems nearing the end of their useful lives. These capabilities must be updated to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent.

34. Do you agree with the assessment of past Secretaries of Defense that nuclear deterrence is DOD's highest priority mission and that modernizing our nation's nuclear forces, including space-based nuclear detonation detection, missile warning, and command and control, is a critical national security priority?

I agree with Secretary Hegseth that nuclear deterrence is a top priority for the nation and is critical to defending the homeland. Space systems are critical enablers of our nuclear deterrent and I agree that it is vitally important to continue modernization of space systems supporting strategic deterrence and response operations.

35. What is your understanding of how Russia, China, and North Korea have expanded or modernized their nuclear force capabilities, particularly their development of new types of weapons? In your view, do these capabilities pose an increasing threat to the United States and its allies?

I agree with Secretary Hegseth that China, Russia, and North Korea have significantly expanded and modernized their nuclear force capabilities. These improvements include advances in warheads, delivery systems, and command and control systems which pose an increasingly severe threat to the United States, our allies, and partners.

36. In your view, are U.S. space-based capabilities for nuclear detonation detection, missile warning and tracking, and command and control, sufficient to support Department of Defense deterrence objectives?

I am not currently in a position to give a fully informed answer to this question not having access to all relevant classified information; however, if confirmed, I would review current and planned DoW space capabilities to ensure they can support the Department's deterrence objectives.

Missile Defense

Rapidly growing Russian, Chinese, North Korean, and Iranian missile arsenals are outpacing United States' capabilities for defeating these threats to the homeland, allies, and U.S. forces abroad.

37. If confirmed, what would be your priorities for U.S. missile defense capabilities for the homeland?

My understanding of the President's Executive Order on the Iron [Golden] Dome for America is that the Department is directed to address the threat of attack by ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles and other advanced aerial threats which remain the most catastrophic threat facing the nation. If confirmed, I would prioritize: (1) development and maintenance of a comprehensive, new-generation homeland missile defense; (2) deterrence and defense of U.S. citizens and critical infrastructures against foreign attack on the U.S. homeland with such weapons; and (3) defense of U.S. retaliatory capabilities.

38. In your view, are the roles and responsibilities for Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) appropriately assigned across the Military Services and Defense Agencies?

I am not currently in a position to give a fully informed answer to this question. It is an important issue and, if confirmed, I would be prepared to provide an answer.

Current U.S. missile defense policy is focused on deterring North Korea and Iran while reserving our nuclear deterrent against missile threats from Russia and China. However, there are growing calls to reevaluate this policy given the changes in the global threat environment, including the 2023 Strategic Posture Commission, which recommended construction of a homeland integrated air and missile defense architecture.

39. What are your views on this policy, especially in light of Russia's recent statements and actions in Ukraine, as well as China's and North Korea's ongoing expansion of their respective nuclear and missile forces?

The global missile threat environment has changed significantly with the expansion of foreign nuclear arsenals with advanced warheads, delivery systems, and command and control systems. Consequently, my view is that U.S. missile defense policy should be reviewed and updated, in accordance with the President's Executive Order on the Iron [Golden] Dome for America, to provide a comprehensive, next-generation homeland missile defense against ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles and other advanced aerial threats to provide for the common defense of the Nation and our citizens.

40. If confirmed, how would you ensure the Military Services make the investments required to fulfill their IAMD responsibilities, including for base defense? How would you ensure effective integration of the Services' current capabilities, as well as of the capabilities each is separately developing?

If confirmed, I would participate in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process, including advising the SecWar, through the USW(P), on DoW program and budget priorities and issues for space and missile defense. In addition, I would collaborate with stakeholders and provide oversight to ensure effective integration of homeland missile defense capabilities.

41. The United States is currently developing a missile defense architecture to better support the protection of U.S. citizens and forces on Guam, however this effort has been plagued by uneven funding and an unclear management structure for aligning the various lines of effort. What is your understanding of the status of this effort, and its operational importance to the U.S. in the Western Pacific?

I am not currently in a position to give a fully informed answer to this question but it is my understanding that the effort to develop and deploy a missile defense architecture to defend U.S. citizens and forces on Guam is one of the Department's top operational priorities in the Indo-Pacific. If confirmed, I would work with all stakeholders to address issues related to the Guam missile defense architecture.

42. What is your understanding of the conceptual relationship between the missile defense architecture for Guam and the Golden Dome for America initiative?

I am not currently in a position to give a fully informed answer to this question but I understand that both the Guam missile defense architecture and Golden Dome for America initiative are important programs. If confirmed, I would work with all stakeholders to ensure the success of both of those programs.

Over the past several years, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of unmanned aerial systems operating, both lawfully and unlawfully, in U.S. airspace domestically and over American military installations overseas.

43. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure the Department appropriately prioritizes and resources detection and defeat capabilities for UAS that pose a threat to U.S. military assets?

I am not currently in a position to give a fully informed answer to this question but I understand the importance of detection and defeat capabilities for UAS that pose a threat to U.S. military assets. If confirmed, I would work with all stakeholders to prioritize resources appropriately for such capabilities.

44. If confirmed, will you commit to working with Congress and the interagency to better clarify U.S. government roles and responsibilities for detecting, tracking, and if necessary, defeating, UAS within U.S. airspace?

Yes.

Policy to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction

The office for which you have been nominated will exercise primary strategy, policy and oversight responsibility for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD)—nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.

45. What do you believe are the principal challenges for this mission relating to CWMD, and if confirmed, what would be your priorities for reviewing and updating DOD's strategy and policy in this domain?

My understanding is that Congress established the ASW(ND-CBD) position in the FY25 NDAA to realign policy, guidance, and oversight responsibilities for CWMD.

46. If confirmed, how would you integrate the Intelligence Community into the CWMD mission?

See the answer to Question 45.

47. What is your understanding of the role of your office in regard to technology security matters related to multilateral arms control, export control, and nonproliferation, and with which other DOD Components would you integrate your efforts in this regard, if confirmed?

See the answer to Question 45.

The August 2016 revision of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) transferred the mission for synchronizing global DOD operations for countering WMD from U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) to U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM).

48. What is your understanding of SOCOM's responsibilities for synchronizing global DOD operations for countering WMD?

See the answer to Question 45.

49. What is your understanding of the oversight responsibilities of the office for which you have been nominated with regard to this mission change and how should those responsibilities integrate with those of the ASD(SOLIC), in your view?

See the answer to Question 45.

50. Against which threats and in which regions of the world do you perceive the U.S. should focus its CWMD efforts?

See the answer to Question 45.

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

51. If confirmed, what would be your role in implementing and overseeing the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program?

My understanding is that Congress established the ASW(ND-CBD) position in the FY25 NDAA to realign policy, guidance, and oversight responsibilities for CWMD which includes the CTR program.

52. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend to the CTR Program, including changes in legislative authorities, programs, and funding?

See the answer to Question 51.

53. What is your vision for the evolution of the CTR program as it transitions away from Russia to countries outside the former Soviet Union?

See the answer to Question 51.

54. In your view, what should be the relationship between the CTR Program and DOD's Chemical and Biological Defense Program, with regard to a focus on reducing biological threats?

See the answer to Question 51.

55. For years, the CTR program has been working with host nations and their scientists to safely and securely operate high containment facilities handling dangerous pathogens.

See the answer to Question 51.

56. What are your views on the progress being made by this effort?

See the answer to Question 51.

57. How could the CTR program's work in this regard be integrated into a whole-of-government approach to a national biodefense strategy?

See the answer to Question 51.

58. If confirmed, how would you integrate your efforts vis-à-vis the CTR program with the work of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs?

See the answer to Question 51.

Proliferation Security Initiative

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an international effort to identify and interdict WMD and related materials.

59. If confirmed, would you recommend that the PSI program be discontinued, sustained, or enhanced? Please explain your answer.

My understanding is that Congress established the ASW(ND-CBD) position in the FY25 NDAA to realign policy, guidance, and oversight responsibilities for CWMD which includes the PSI program.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

60. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes.

61. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be

requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes.

62. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes.

63. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes.

64. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes.

65. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes.

66. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes.