

Senate Armed Services Committee
Advance Policy Questions for General Tod D. Wolters, USAF
Nominee for Appointment to the Position of Commander,
United States European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Duties

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR)?

The Commander, U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) issues authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out U.S. military operations and activities conducted within the command's Area of Responsibility (AOR). This AOR includes 51 independent states in Europe, the Caucasus and Israel. In addition, the commander is responsible for the health, welfare and security of the approximately 64,000 service members and their families deployed within the AOR.

The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) carries out roles and missions assigned by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and directed by the Military Committee (MC). SACEUR commands all NATO military operations, is responsible for strategic military planning, identifies and requests the required forces to execute Alliance missions, and conducts strategic engagement and partnership building. In conjunction with Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation (SACT), SACEUR executes combined and joint training and exercises and conducts strategic analysis to identify and prioritize NATO's capability shortfalls.

In light of these duties and functions what qualifications, qualities, and characteristics would you bring to this position, if confirmed?

In my current role as Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, Air Forces Africa and Allied Air Command, I've been afforded the opportunity to command forces that directly support USEUCOM, U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and NATO military operations. My responsibilities in this capacity include organizing, training and equipping ready forces, as well as commanding and controlling air component forces to ensure strategic access, deter adversaries and compete across the conflict spectrum. Previous experiences as the Joint Staff Director for Operations and tours commanding NATO and U.S. forces in Afghanistan laid bare the necessity for close coordination between the Joint Staff, the Services, and the Combatant Commands, as well as the importance of cultivating and sustaining strong ties with our allies and partners. The commands I'm currently honored to lead aim to foster a culture that values trust, training and teamwork. Along with bringing these characteristics to the next position, if confirmed, each day I will give maximum effort and strive to be the credible, humble and approachable commander the men and women I serve with deserve.

Do you believe there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of Commander, EUCOM/SACEUR?

Yes. If confirmed, I intend to meet regularly with fellow combatant commanders and leaders from across the Joint Staff, the Military Services and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to strengthen cooperative efforts throughout the Department to advance U.S. interests in the USEUCOM AOR. I will also invest in relationships across the U.S. government, in particular the Department of State, to ensure USEUCOM's activities are aligned with our whole of government effort to advance U.S. interests in the region. Furthermore, I will endeavor to fortify the Trans-Atlantic Alliance by cultivating and sustaining professional working relationships with European Chiefs of Defense and Defense Ministers, the North Atlantic Council leadership and the Chairman of the Military Committee among others. Finally, I intend to meet regularly with Congressional leadership and with the oversight committees that support the pursuit of U.S. interests in the Euro-Atlantic region. I recognize that Congress's support is essential for USEUCOM to carry out its mission.

Chain of Command and Relationships

Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Section 163(a) of title 10 further provides that the President may direct communications to combatant commanders through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Do you believe that these provisions facilitate a clear and effective chain of command?

Yes. Subject to direction from the President, the Commander, USEUCOM performs duties under the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council and Secretary of Defense. As is custom and traditional practice, if confirmed, I would communicate with the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In your view, do these provisions enhance or degrade civilian control of the military?

Enhance. Our civilian leaders have a central and final voice on all issues at the center of U.S. defense and national security policy. Civilian control of the military is clearly established by the Constitution of the United States, the National Security Act of 1947, and Title 10 U.S. Code. The military's subordination to civilian leadership is faithfully upheld by the men and women of the U.S. military who, on a daily basis, support and defend those foundational ideas and documents. This is our utmost responsibility as members of the U.S. armed forces.

Are there circumstances in which you believe it is appropriate for U.S. military forces to be under the operational command or control of an authority other than the chain of command established under title 10, United States Code?

During multi-national operations nations typically retain a National Command Element to exercise national Operational Control (OPCON) over its forces to ensure national caveats, such as differing Rules of Engagement, are complied with. There may be circumstances where it is appropriate for U.S. forces operate under tactical control (TACON) of allied/coalition Command and Control (C2), but OPCON of U.S. forces should not be relinquished outside the chain of command established under U.S. law.

The law and traditional practice establish important relationships between the Commander EUCOM/SACEUR and other senior officials of the DOD, the U.S. Government, and NATO. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, EUCOM/SACEUR, to each of the following officials:

The Secretary of Defense

The Commander, USEUCOM, reports to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and through the Secretary of Defense to the President of the United States. The Secretary of Defense exercises authority over the Armed Forces of the United States assigned to the USEUCOM AOR through the USEUCOM Commander. The USEUCOM Commander exercises command authority over assigned forces and is directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of the Command.

The Under Secretaries of Defense

The Under Secretaries of Defense perform key roles, defined in part by statute, at the direction of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, in the execution of the responsibilities of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. As is custom and traditional practice, if confirmed, I would communicate with the Under Secretaries through or in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Vice Chairman in his absence.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The ASD(ISA) is the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and the Secretary of Defense for international security strategy and policy on issues of DoD interest relating to the nations and international organizations of Europe (including NATO), the Middle East, and Africa, their governments and defense establishments, and for oversight of security cooperation programs, including Foreign Military Sales, in these regions. As is custom and traditional practice, if confirmed, I would communicate with the ASD(ISA) through or in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict

The ASD(SO/LIC) is the principal staff assistant and civilian advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and the Secretary of Defense for special operations (SO) and low intensity conflict (LIC) matters. The ASD(SO/LIC) principal duty supervises SO and LIC activities within the Department of Defense, including oversight of Combatant Commands' readiness to conduct SO. As is custom and traditional practice, if confirmed, I would communicate with the ASD(SOLIC) through or in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, as appropriate, in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Chairman functions under the authority, direction, and control of the President and Secretary of Defense. The Chairman transmits communications between the President and Secretary of Defense and the USEUCOM Commander, and oversees the activities of the USEUCOM Commander as directed by the Secretary of Defense. As the principal military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman is a key conduit between the Combatant Commander, Interagency, and the Service Chiefs. The USEUCOM Commander informs the Chairman on significant issues pertaining to NATO and the USEUCOM AOR. The Commander regularly communicates with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Vice Chairman in his absence. These officers are not in the chain of command.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Service Chiefs

The secretaries of the military departments are responsible for administration and support of forces that are assigned or attached to the combatant commands. The Commander, USEUCOM coordinates with the secretaries, who exercise ADCON through their respective Service Components, to ensure their responsibilities to organize, train and equip U.S. forces for USEUCOM are met. The Commander, USEUCOM communicates and coordinates with the service chiefs to support their responsibility to organize, train and equip U.S. forces for the combatant commands. Close coordination with the service chiefs is paramount to the successful execution of USEUCOM's mission and, if confirmed, I will work closely with the service chiefs to articulate and prioritize the command's requirements, ensure effective employment of the services' capabilities and be a good steward of our limited Joint resources.

The Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command

The Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is responsible for the administration and support of Special Operations Forces (SOF) assigned or attached to USEUCOM. The Commander, USEUCOM maintains close relationships with all combatant commanders and closely coordinates with the Commander, USSOCOM for all SOF related issues and operations in the USEUCOM AOR.

The other Combatant Commanders

The Commander, USEUCOM maintains close relationships with all other combatant commanders that are critical to the execution of the National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy and respective theater strategies. Healthy cross combatant command relationships are characterized by mutual support, frequent contact, and productive exchanges of information and ideas. The importance of globally synchronized combatant commands has never been more important as the threats we face are becoming increasingly trans-regional in nature.

U.S. Chiefs of Mission in the EUCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR)

There is no formal relationship between the USEUCOM Commander and the U.S. Chiefs of Mission. However, if confirmed, I would pursue close working relationships with U.S. Chiefs of Mission in the USEUCOM AOR to bolster unity of effort between the U.S. military and other U.S. government activities in the region. The Commander, USEUCOM is supported by a Civilian Deputy Commander, a career Foreign Service Officer, who helps facilitate communication between USEUCOM, the Chiefs of Mission across the AOR, and the State Department.

U.S. Senior Defense Officials/Defense Attachés (SDO/DATT) in the EUCOM AOR

If confirmed I would ensure the SDO/DATTs assigned to the U.S. Embassies in the USEUCOM AOR remain in close coordination with USEUCOM to facilitate their role as principal military advisor to the respective chief of mission. The officers in these key positions are critical to achieving the unity of effort required to advance U.S. interests in the region, especially in the countries where USEUCOM does not maintain large numbers of military forces.

The NATO Secretary General

SACEUR frequently communicates directly with the Secretary General to carry out the assigned roles and missions appointed by the North Atlantic Council. NATO's Secretary General is appointed by the 29 Alliance Heads of State; his principal duty is to chair the North Atlantic Council, the Alliance's principal decision making body.

Commander, NATO Resolute Support, Afghanistan / Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan

The Commander, USEUCOM has no formal relationship with the Commander, Resolute Support. However, SACEUR exercises command authority over the Commander, Resolute Support through the Commander, Joint Forces Command Brunssum in the Netherlands.

The Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation

Each of NATO's strategic commanders, SACEUR and SACT, carry out roles and missions assigned to them by the North Atlantic Council. SACEUR and SACT work closely to pursue transformative military capabilities for NATO and to ensure effective interoperability exists to execute Allied Command Operations.

The North Atlantic Council

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is NATO's principal policy and decision making body. SACEUR carries out roles and missions assigned by the NAC.

The U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council

There is no direct command relationship between the U.S. Permanent Representative to the NAC and the Commander, USEUCOM or to SACEUR. The U.S. Permanent Representative is one of NAC's 29 members; the NAC provides direction to NATO military authorities, including SACEUR. The Commander, USEUCOM coordinates with the U.S. Permanent Representative to the NAC on matters of mutual interest, such as U.S. military operations and security cooperation activities that are aligned with both U.S. and NATO interests.

Major Challenges

In your view, what are the major challenges and problems you would confront if confirmed as the next Commander, EUCOM/SACEUR?

Deterring Russian aggression and supporting NATO's defense of the Euro Atlantic area remain the most significant challenges facing USEUCOM. These complex and interrelated challenges require coordination with other U.S. Government Agencies, Combatant Commands, allies and partners in Europe. Russia's "malign influence campaign" seeks to confound our coordination efforts and weaken the Alliance's integrity. While the Russia challenge is USEUCOM's most demanding task, the command's commitment to assist in the defense of Israel requires significant attention and resources.

What plans do you have for addressing each of these challenges, if confirmed?

Establishing credible deterrence to Russian aggression is a collective Alliance responsibility. NATO requires forces that are ready, capable, aligned, and interoperable to achieve its aims of deterring conflict and defending our shared commitment to a rules based Euro-Atlantic area. To achieve these goals, Allied Nations should procure high-end, multi-mission military capabilities that contribute to Europe's defense. I will support coordinated diplomatic initiatives to that end. In addition, USEUCOM and NATO training and military exercises should be further integrated to enhance the 29 Allied Nation's alignment and transparency. Finally, Russia's "malign influence campaign"

seeks to create and exploit fissures in Western societies and institutions, aiming to undermine NATO's solidarity. I intend to leverage USEUCOMs Interagency and military-to-military connections across the AOR to better align our combined efforts to counter Russian malign influence.

USEUCOM's strong relationship with the Israeli Defense Force remains critical to influencing stability in the Levant. Close coordination with USCENTCOM in all activities associated with Israel will enhance the required stability.

Recognizing that challenges, anticipated and unforeseen, will drive your priorities to a substantial degree, if confirmed, what other priorities, beyond those associated with the major challenges you identified above, would you set for your tenure as Commander, EUCOM/SACEUR?

Transnational terrorists and criminal organizations continue to threaten stability and security in the USEUCOM AOR. These often interrelated groups exploit ongoing migrant flows from the Middle East and North Africa to further their own ends.

Chinese influence in the USEUCOM AOR is a growing concern. Most of China's current activities in the USEUCOM AOR are economic in nature; however, close coordination with USAFRICOM and USPACOM are required to maintain awareness of China's increasing trans-regional influence.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to focus your Command's efforts on each of these priorities?

To address trans-regional threats that span the conflict spectrum, continued integration with DOD efforts to address global requirements is essential. Synchronized efforts by the combatant commands, overseen by OSD and the Joint Staff are crucial to our future success. We will continue to work closely with Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (R&E) and the Joint Staff to streamline the development and fielding of warfighting capabilities and concepts.

The Joint Staff and OSD initiatives for Joint Global Exercises and Wargames is an important endeavor and we intend to align USEUCOM with those efforts. The goal is an adaptive learning method to support accelerated joint-concept and threat-informed capability development. This construct will strengthen USEUCOM exercises, such as AUSTERE CHALLENGE, by creating a stronger, iterative feedback loop, enabling our commands to be more responsive in dynamic and complex threat environments.

Lastly, we will continue advocating for resourcing solutions to address emerging requirements such as: enhanced and expanded Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR); anti-submarine and undersea warfare; Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD); hypersonics; cyber operations and a secure, resilient Information Technology theater infrastructure.

National Defense Strategy

The 2018 NDS moved beyond the “two-war construct” that has guided defense strategy, capability development, and investment for the past three decades, and refocused DOD on a “2 + 3 framework”. That framework prioritizes “great power competition and conflict” with China and Russia as the primary challenges with which the United States must contend, together with deterring and countering rogue regimes such as North Korea and Iran. Finally the framework emphasizes the defeat of terrorist threats to the U.S., while consolidating gains in Iraq and Afghanistan, and moving to a “more resource sustainable” approach to counterterrorism.

What does successful implementation of the 2018 NDS look like in the EUCOM AOR? What are the changes, trends, and/or events that would be indicators of effective NDS implementation with respect to the EUCOM AOR and strategic competition with Russia?

Successful implementation of the NDS in the USEUCOM AOR requires a combat-credible U.S. and Allied posture, NATO members committed to upholding responsibilities, more resilient partners and, ultimately, a Russian government that adheres to the rules-based international order. Our current U.S. and Allied posture is capable of deterring and denying adversary aggression against sovereign NATO territory. As our NATO Allies increase defense and modernization spending, our combined capabilities and posture will become even more interoperable, ready and lethal. As we regain the Alliance’s conventional overmatch, we must also be postured to proactively mitigate Russia’s irregular “malign influence campaign” that would seek to undermine NATO security short of traditional armed conflict. Indications our strategy is succeeding with regards to Russia could include: abandoning efforts to fracture NATO, reduced opposition to Euro-Atlantic integration, decreased evidence of malign influence and military or economic coercion, and Russia demonstrates respect for international norms of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and democratic processes of neighboring states.

Given your experience in the EUCOM AOR, where do you see the greatest need for change in the Joint Force in order to adjust to the realities of strategic competition with Russia?

Successful strategic competition with Russia requires a multi-domain, global, whole-of-government approach. Our Joint Force must improve its ability to rapidly deploy and effectively interoperate with allies and partners in contested environments. Enhanced capabilities are needed to simultaneously compete and win across multiple domains. Our Joint Force must be prepared to counter threats posed by rapid technological advancements such as quantum computing, artificial intelligence, robotics, directed energy and hypersonics.

How does the Department of Defense’s “dynamic force employment” concept affect decisions about potential increases in forward-stationed forces in the EUCOM AOR?

Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) complements USEUCOM’s permanent, forward-

stationed forces; balancing the two is an effective way to increase combat capability while minimizing costs. Permanent forces are critical to our enduring deterrence posture. They are familiar with the region, habitually train with allies and partners, and are ready to respond rapidly in the event of a crisis. DFE provides episodic presence of additional, rapidly-deployable forces that bolster USEUCOM's combat capability, operational flexibility and deterrent posture. These limited-duration deployments allow a more balanced global force posture while increasing readiness and interoperability.

The NDS references “expanding the competitive space.”

What does “expanding the competitive space” mean for competition with Russia? What are the resources and authorities EUCOM possesses to support this line of effort? Given your experience in the EUCOM AOR, what is your assessment of U.S. progress to date in “expanding the competitive space?”

Expanding the competitive space requires a whole-of-government approach to align instruments of national power and harness the contributions of allies and partners to synchronize effects across all domains. EUCOM's resources to support this approach include embedded liaisons from other agencies and departments, allied and partner exchange officers, and Offices of Defense Cooperation within countries across the AOR. The U.S. has demonstrated progress in granting the authorities required to compete in these non-traditional spaces. Continuing this momentum will likely include expanding Cyber, SOF and information operations authorities and capabilities.

The NDS requires the U.S. military to become more lethal, resilient, agile, and ready.

Given your experience in the EUCOM AOR, what changes do you believe are necessary to make U.S. forces in EUCOM more lethal? Specifically, how do ensure our forces have the capability and capacity to strike enemy maneuver forces without the all-domain dominance we enjoyed in the past?

Improved Russian capabilities that challenge U.S. advantages across all domains have reduced our relative competitive margin, however, we still possess the ability to strike enemy maneuver forces. Robust training combined with certain new capabilities are required to preserve USEUCOM's lethality going forward. These include: enhanced ISR capacity; expanded theater anti-submarine and undersea warfare capability and capacity; increased IAMD capacity, acquisition of critical munitions; increased presence through DFE of 5th Generation fighters; investment in hypersonic weapons systems; and a resilient Information Technology infrastructure.

Given your experience in the EUCOM AOR, what changes do you believe are necessary to make U.S. forces in EUCOM more resilient? Specifically, how do we enable our forces to operate from our bases and other infrastructure—even under sustained attack?

Effective indications and warnings are foundational to any military campaign. Pursuing robust IAMD capabilities and capacity is a specific example of USEUCOM mitigating

risk to forces, basing and infrastructure. Another example is the European Contingency Air Operations Set (ECAOS) that enables dispersed air operations which are inherently resilient. Finally, instilling effective mission command allows tactical level forces to survive, innovate and win – even under sustained attack.

Given your experience in the EUCOM AOR, what changes do you believe are necessary to make U.S. forces in EUCOM more agile?

The cyber domain poses an opportunity for U.S. forces to increase agility within the USEUCOM AOR. Russian actors are adept at exploiting vulnerabilities in cyberspace that provide asymmetric opportunities to mitigate U.S. and Allied conventional advantages. Nefarious activities within the cyber domain create effects at light speed, requiring similar speed and agility to compete. USEUCOM must continue collaborative efforts with organizations such as U.S. Cyber Command and NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence to improve training, rapidly disseminate best practices and facilitate information-sharing across the AOR.

Given your experience in the EUCOM AOR, what changes do you believe are necessary to make U.S. forces in EUCOM more ready? Specifically, how do we focus U.S. forces in Europe on being prepared and ready for the high-end fight, rather than an overly broad set of missions?

Increased readiness for the high-end fight requires appropriate capabilities combined with focused training and exercises. The resultant increased interoperability is key to leveraging the partner and Allied capabilities required to compete and win in a contested environment. Additionally, improving training ranges across the AOR will enhance U.S. and Allied training opportunities and increase readiness for the high-end fight.

Given your current knowledge of EUCOM programs, do you believe the Command's resources and authorities are aligned in a manner consistent with NDS priorities and U.S. strategic objectives?

It is my understanding that USEUCOM's authorities are sufficient to enable implementation of the NDS in coordination with our interagency partners. Continued and predictable funding, including the European Defense Initiative, greatly enhances USEUCOM's ability to pursue priorities outlined in the NDS. Additionally, enhanced burden sharing efforts are improving available resources in the USEUCOM AOR.

In your view, what does a "more resource sustainable approach" to counterterrorism mean for EUCOM?

Pursuant to the National Strategy for Counterterrorism, and to combat what has become a more complex and geographically dispersed terrorist threat, the U.S. will prioritize integrated actions and resources against those terrorists that have both the intent and the capability to attack the U.S. and our interests abroad. Counterterrorism efforts in USEUCOM, as elsewhere, must be properly balanced across all instruments of national

power and include the efforts of traditional and non-traditional partners. While the U.S. must retain the ability to strike at terrorism around the globe, non-military tools – such as law enforcement, intelligence, diplomacy, financial measures, stabilization, development, prevention, intervention, and reintegration programs – will help prevent and counter terrorism. USEUCOM will benefit by increasing its focus on developing domestic and foreign partners’ non-military counterterrorism capabilities. USEUCOM should continuously monitor and assess its effectiveness and adjust its operations accordingly.

If confirmed, how would you seek to balance the requirements for increased emphasis on great power competition Russia with countering violent extremism in the EUCOM AOR?

Increase alignment and transparency at the NATO, partner and ally levels in Air, Land, Sea, Space and Cyber. The alignment and transparency must focus on achieving effects to deter Russia and counter international terror groups. These activities must embrace a “whole-of-nation” approach.

European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)

Do you believe EUCOM could fully perform its mission to deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression in Europe, in the absence of the funding provided by EDI?

No, a reduction to the EDI funding would add operational risk and delay our ability to set the theater with a combat-credible force to deter Russia.

How important has EDI been for improving EUCOM’s warfighting capabilities?

Since its inception in Fiscal Year 2015, the European Deterrence Initiative provided significant funding sources enabling USEUCOM’s and its Service Components’ ability to respond to a dynamic European security environment.

\In your view, what role does military construction—a significant component of EDI—play in posturing EUCOM to deter Russian aggression? Explain your answer.

Access to sufficient infrastructure at key locations is essential to support military activities and operations. The investment of resources to improve infrastructure and facilities throughout the European theater provides allies, partners and potential adversaries a clear indication of the United States’ long-term commitment to Europe. The various planned improvements support military readiness in the region, support various activities and events, and improve theater Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSO&I) capabilities.

In December 2018, the Department of Defense Inspector General issued a report critical of the U.S. Air Force Europe’s efforts to procure and store Deployable Air Base kits at airfields across Europe, a principal effort of EDI. The Inspector General found that a lack of coordination between EUCOM, U.S. Air Force Europe, and the Air Force precluded the development of an achievable plan for procurement and storage of the kits.

What is your view of the Air Force effort to procure and store EDI-funded Deployable Air Base kits at airfields across Europe?

Deployable Air Base System-Facilities, Equipment, and Vehicles (DABS-FEV) prepositioning is a critical element of Setting the Theater in Europe. DABS-FEV Kit purchasing and procurement started in 2018 and will continue through 2024 with the first DABS-FEV Kit complete estimated in 2023. USAFE-AFAFRICA is working directly with Air Force Material Command (AFMC) to prioritize and track procurement efforts. The first MILCON storage projects are in the planning and design phase and efforts are underway to secure interim storage and expand existing capacity in theater until MILCON projects are complete.

Do you agree with each of the Inspector General’s findings and recommendations? Why or why not?

I agree with the DoD IG assessment as our experts worked closely with the Department of Defense Inspector General team to identify program areas for improvement. USAFE-AFAFRICA is coordinating with Headquarters Air Force (HAF) and AFMC to implement the remaining open recommendations identified in the report.

Do you believe that the recommendations for EUCOM and U.S. Air Force Europe have been addressed properly? Why or why not? If not, what will you do specifically to address concerns that remain with regard to the procurement and storage of the kits?

We are working with HAF/A4 and AFMC to close out the remaining open recommendation for designating a single program manager. DoD IG indicated they will close this recommendation once they receive an updated HAF/A4 Air Force Instruction 25-101 (War Reserve Material Program) identifying the program manager requirement and a copy of a program appointment memorandum identifying the individual responsible for the Deployable Air Base Kits program and detailed role and responsibilities of all organizations associated with the program.

U.S. Capabilities and Force Posture in Europe

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 5, 2019, General Scaparrotti stated, “I am not comfortable yet with the deterrent posture that we have in Europe in support of the National Defense Strategy.”

Given your knowledge of and experience in the EUCOM AOR, do you agree with General Scaparrotti’s assessment that the deterrent posture in Europe is not yet sufficient to support the 2018 NDS?

In light of Russia's modernizing increasingly aggressive force posture, I concur with GEN Scaparrotti’s recommendation of augmenting our assigned and rotational forces to enhance our deterrent posture. I also agree with further investments that enhance

European logistical infrastructure and capacity to support rapid deployment of multi-domain U.S. forces in Europe.

In your assessment, given your experience in the EUCOM AOR, what capability and/or capacity shortfalls in the current Joint Force present the most significant challenge to addressing the threats in EUCOM?

The most significant Joint Force shortfalls in the USEUCOM AOR are Theater Anti-Submarine Warfare (TASW), 5th Generation fighters, and Joint Fires. The critical resources and capabilities required to make USEUCOM more lethal include enhanced ISR capability and capacity, expanded theater anti-submarine and undersea warfare capability and capacity; increased lower and upper tier missile defense capability, and acquisition and allocation of critical munitions.

In your assessment, given your experience in the EUCOM AOR, does the United States have sufficient air and missile defense capability and capacity to defend critical infrastructure, such as command and control locations and air bases, against cruise missile attack? What do you perceive as the areas of highest risk?

Adversaries are aggressively developing and fielding advanced air and missile capabilities with increased capacity, representing a threat to NATO and partner nations within the USEUCOM AOR. With NATO and partner support, USEUCOM has Land, Air, and Maritime capabilities to defend against missile threats. However, NATO and USEUCOM require a credible, Integrated Air and Missile Defense capability, to include a robust command and control architecture capable of creating a fully integrated air and missile threat picture able to transition from peace through crisis to conflict. This will enable effective operations against combined attacks involving aircraft, cruise and ballistic missiles, and hypersonic vehicles.

How do you view the relative value of permanent versus rotational forces in the EUCOM AOR? How does that relative value change for different kinds of units/formations?

Permanent forces allow for a consistent relationship to be fostered with the Host Nations militaries and the U.S. counterparts. Additionally, permanent forces can focus on a particular mission set within the USEUCOM AOR. This focus comes at a cost as permanently stationed forces are more provocative strategically than rotational forces. Moving forces in and out of the European Theater exercises our JRSO&I processes and enhances our flexibility and agility to react to threats across the globe. Some units need to be in the USEUCOM AOR in steady state, prior to a conflict, therefore the relative value will change on a case-by-case basis.

If confirmed, what specific enhancements would you make to U.S. capabilities and force posture in Europe to support the NDS more effectively?

If confirmed, I would focus on Theater Anti-Submarine Warfare (TASW), Joint Fires - consisting of increased lower and upper tier missile defense capability, and the buildup of

infrastructure to support JRSO&I. Additionally, I would continue to pursue the allocation of additional programmed guided missile destroyers, procurement and positioning of the resources necessary to enable the European Contingency Air Operations Set (ECAOS) concept, and enhancement of ISR capabilities and capacity.

Nuclear Posture

In your view, what role does the U.S. strategic nuclear triad play in the security of the EUCOM AOR?

The U.S. strategic triad reinforces the robust and resilient nature of the U.S. nuclear enterprise in Europe. All operations and activities within the USEUCOM AOR are underpinned by our nuclear posture and our nation's steadfast commitment to provide a credible, reliable and secure nuclear deterrent.

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reiterated the centrality of U.S. nuclear posture to extended deterrence in Europe, and listed a number of areas for improved cooperation with NATO allies: enhancing readiness and survivability of NATO dual-capable aircraft, replacing aging systems promptly, improving readiness and training, and improving NATO nuclear command, control, and communications.

Do you support the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review and its recommendations?

Yes. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reiterated the centrality of the U.S. nuclear posture to extended deterrence in Europe and cited areas for improved cooperation with our NATO Allies. Notable recommendations included: enhancing readiness and survivability of NATO dual-capable aircraft, replacing aging systems promptly, bolstering readiness and training, as well as improving NATO nuclear command, control, and communications.

If confirmed, what steps you would undertake to address the above goals with NATO allies?

If confirmed, our focus would be to enhance communications, transparency and alignment with the appropriate NATO nations. Achieving interoperability with respect to dual-capable aircraft is critical as F-35 units gain operational status throughout the AOR. In addition, leveraging F-35 sensor capabilities will increase our command and control efficacy while bolstering our increasingly robust IAMD network.

Were the United States to adopt a nuclear "No First Use" policy, what effect would it have on U.S. extended deterrence in NATO, in your view?

Should the U.S. adopt a "No First Use" policy, we believe NATO would likely follow suit. Such a policy could embolden a nuclear peer competitor or adversary to escalate smaller, localized conflicts toward nuclear confrontation to gain concessions or drive a fait accompli scenario. A "No First Use" policy would limit our ability to deter.

Russia

In your view, what are the EUCOM and NATO activities most important to deterring Russian aggression and mitigating the threat to our NATO Allies and partners?

The readiness and posture of our conventional and nuclear forces, combined with our unified Alliance are the bedrock to deterring Russian aggression. Continued investment in defense spending across the Alliance underpins future deterrence by improving capabilities and increasing collective capacity. NATO's enhanced Forward Presence forces and their respective activities represent key elements of USEUCOM's deterrence strategy. Furthermore, improvements in our combined irregular warfare capabilities will further deter Russian aggression and shape their malign behavior to our advantage. Finally, robust exercises and training activities improve interoperability between U.S. and NATO forces, increasing readiness and bolstering deterrence.

What aspects of U.S. and NATO force posture do you assess as having the most significant deterrent effect on Russia?

Russia monitors the disposition and assessed readiness of U.S. and NATO forces. Combat forces perceived to be extremely capable, proficient and able to quickly close on an enemy across all domains represents the most significant deterrent effect on Russia.

Are United States policies and the associated authorities—as applicable to the EUCOM AOR—sufficient to counter Russia's influence, or are there additional measures we should be considering?

Existing policies and authorities provide the necessary means to enable a whole-of-government effort to counter and compete with Russian malign influence in the USEUCOM AOR.

Last year, Vladimir Putin discussed Russia's plans to develop a variety of new nuclear capabilities, including a new ICBM, an intercontinental hypersonic missile, a nuclear-powered cruise missile, and an undersea drone.

What is your assessment of these claims? Which of these capabilities poses the greatest risk to EUCOM, the United States, and western interests in general?

President Putin's public claims regarding the development of new nuclear delivery systems are likely true, but it's possible the precise capabilities and associated timelines are exaggerated. Obviously, nuclear weapons pose the greatest risk to U.S. citizens, our allies and interests abroad. If fielded, a hypersonic glide vehicle would be concerning as its speed poses a challenge to Integrated Air and Missile Defenses.

Given recent advances in Russian attack submarine capability, such as the deployment of the new Russian submarine *Severodvinsk*, what additional capabilities or capacity are most important to maintaining the U.S. advantage in undersea warfare in the EUCOM AOR?

A robust Theater Anti-Submarine Warfare (TASW) capability requires investment in the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS) that uses the Fixed Surveillance System (FSS), Fixed Distributed System (FDS), and the Advanced Deployable System (ADS). A robust presence of fast attack submarines, guided-missile cruisers and destroyers, and Maritime Reconnaissance and Patrol Aircraft are instrumental in maintaining U.S. advantages in undersea warfare.

The NDS specifically mentions Russia's robust anti-access, area denial capabilities (A2/AD) capabilities and the challenges they pose for U.S. forces.

In your assessment, does EUCOM currently have a mature joint concept of operations and the necessary capabilities in sufficient capacity to mitigate the challenge of Russian A2/AD capabilities? If not, what additional capabilities or capacity are required in the EUCOM AOR to ensure U.S. forces are able to achieve operational freedom of maneuver at decisive points?

USEUCOM possesses a mature joint concept of operations to mitigate the systems intended to contest the operating environment. Current capabilities exist to support the operations concept and USEUCOM's capacity will continue to increase with the addition of permanent and rotational 5th Generation fighter aircraft. Coupling U.S. capabilities with allies and partners makes us stronger, and to that end, we are continuously striving to improve our interoperability and alignment.

In the fall of 2018, the Russian Navy conducted a large maritime exercise in the Mediterranean Sea.

In your view, what are Russia's strategic goals in the Black Sea and in the Mediterranean?

Russia's strategic goals in the Black Sea are to maintain access to the Mediterranean Sea and facilitate homeland defense, while its presence in the Mediterranean Sea enables power projection. Russia's maritime activities in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean Sea are intended to challenge U.S. and allied operations and freedom of maneuver. Russia attempts to accomplish this by adding naval combatants to the Black Sea Fleet, including fielding long-range strike capable ships intended to defend Russia's southern approaches, and continuous naval rotations in the eastern Mediterranean.

Russian Hybrid Warfare

Countering Russian propaganda has proven difficult and the results of such effort are mixed at best.

In your assessment, does EUCOM currently have sufficient resources for countering Russia’s cyber-enabled information operations and other hybrid warfare operations? If not, what additional capabilities or capacity are required in the EUCOM AOR to effectively counter these Russian hybrid operations below the level of military conflict?

USEUCOM is expanding its online counter-propaganda efforts and continues to collaborate with USCYBERCOM to compete with Russia below the threshold of armed conflict. Additional military personnel specializing in information operations related disciplines would benefit the command in countering Russia’s “malign influence campaign.”

What is your assessment as to whether our counter-influence efforts to date are changing Putin’s behavior?

Deterrence of overt armed aggression against NATO appears to be holding, however, Russia continues to conduct indirect actions intended to undermine NATO unity. The degree to which our counter-influence efforts are impacting President Putin’s behavior is uncertain, however, evidence suggests our actions are taking effect. The firm Allied response to the Skripal nerve agent attack in the UK and the EU’s resolve to maintain sanctions on Russia for their illegal actions in Ukraine are consequences of Russia’s behavior.

What do you assess as key priorities for, and limitations on, the conduct of Information Operations against Russia in the EUCOM AOR?

Prioritizing a whole-of-government approach that leverages all elements of national power and optimizes authorities is key to conducting effective information operations to counter Russian malign influence. Additionally, aligning our messaging efforts with NATO, the European Union and individual partner nations increases our efficacy while mitigating limitations.

On March 5, 2019, General Scaparrotti testified that our efforts to counter Russian influence operations still lacked “effective unification across the interagency” and that the United States has yet to develop “a multi-faceted strategy to counter Russia.”

Do you agree with General Scaparrotti’s assessment in this regard?

We are making great strides in aligning our efforts across the interagency to counter Russian influence operations, but work remains to be done. The Global Campaign Plan for Russia directs several tasks to increase the Department of Defense’s interaction and information sharing enabling a whole-of-government and multi-domain approach to compete with Russia below the threshold of armed conflict.

Do you support a whole-of-government approach to countering Russian hybrid warfare against the United States? In your view, how important is it to invest in non-military tools of national power as part of a whole-of-government approach?

Yes. It is imperative that we embrace a whole-of-government approach to counter Russia. These efforts gain effectiveness when aligned with allies and partners. The Russian government demonstrated the ability to utilize its instruments of national power to achieve desired outcomes. Increased transparency and alignment will increase the speed at which the U.S. government competes in this space, allowing us to be proactive versus reactive.

How important is it that our campaign to counter Russian hybrid aggression be synchronized with the efforts of our allies and partners?

It is essential to synchronize efforts to counter Russian aggression with our allies and partners. Countering multi-domain activities below the threshold of armed conflict requires a whole-of-government approach that is most effective when aligned with similar allied approaches.

What is your assessment of NATO's readiness to detect, deter, and respond to attacks from adversaries in the cyber domain?

NATO has recently made gains in detecting, deterring and responding to cyber-attacks, but there is more work to be done. NATO maintains a Cyber Defense structure that protects over 100K users at approximately 60 locations. NATO's Computer Incident Response Capability Centre aims to prevent, detect, respond and recover from cyber incidents. Furthermore, NATO has established a Cyberspace Operations Center to coordinate and synchronize cyberspace operations. In short, NATO's cyber defense capabilities and capacity are improving, but continuous efforts will be required to reduce vulnerabilities across the Alliance.

Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) in EUCOM

What is your understanding of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy as it relates to the EUCOM AOR?

USEUCOM supports a whole-of-government approach to counter terrorism. USEUCOM, in coordination with U.S. interagency, implements the counterterrorism strategy by supporting and enabling European law enforcement through information sharing and building partner capacity.

How would you assess the effectiveness of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy and associated activities in addressing the threat posed by violent extremist organizations? What changes, if any, would you recommend?

The U.S. counterterrorism strategy is effective in addressing the threat posed by VEOs. Themes within the strategy that shape USEUCOM counterterrorism activities include: isolating terrorists from financial, material, and logistical support; modernizing and integrating a broader set of U.S. tools and authorities to counter terrorism and protect the

homeland; and strengthening the counterterrorism abilities of international partners.

Within the EUCOM AOR, what do you consider the highest counterterrorism priorities?

The ability to respond quickly and effectively to a known, immediate threat to the U.S. homeland, U.S. citizens and interests abroad, and our allies.

What is your assessment of the threat posed by Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other violent extremist organizations, to the EUCOM AOR, the U.S., and broader western interests?

The terrorist threat to Europe remains high despite a decline in attacks across Europe in the past two years. Four ISIS-enabled attacks occurred in 2018, a significant decrease from previous years. The ISIS threat is greatest in Turkey, France, Belgium, Germany and the UK. ISIS is particularly aggressive in Turkey where it directed multiple attacks against civilian targets and tourist locations. The group intends to expand its operational networks and they continue to call on sympathizers to conduct attacks in Europe. Al-Qa'ida intends to conduct attacks in the USEUCOM AOR but lacks the capability due to diminished leadership and resources.

Which VEOs do you find most concerning, and why?

ISIS-inspired attacks are the most concerning within USEUCOM's AOR. ISIS still possesses the influence to inspire terror attacks that impose significant psychological effects on our nation and our allies.

U.S. Commitment under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty

A cornerstone of the NATO Alliance is the principle of collective self-defense as codified in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

In your view, how important to U.S. strategic interests is the U.S. commitment to its obligations under Article 5?

Our commitment to Article 5 is paramount. The single Article 5 declaration occurred after 9/11 and the NDS clearly articulates the importance of strong alliances to respond to shared challenges. NATO is the "gold standard" of alliances and Article 5 represents the enduring commitment that binds our nations together.

How important to being able to meet Article 5 obligations is follow through on Article 3 which commits Allies to develop their "individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack"?

The two articles go hand in hand. Article 3 intends to ensure independent nations provide for their own defense as a precondition for collective defense. Throughout the Alliance's history, U.S. political leaders have stressed the need for allies to behave as if their

military is as important to them as it is to us. Like Article 5, Article 3 demonstrates a spirit of solidarity.

How is the ability to meet obligations under Article 5 and Article 3 related to NATO guidelines agreed to at the NATO Wales Summit in 2014 to invest 2% of Gross Domestic Product in Defense and 20% or more of their defense budgets in equipment, research and development?

Appropriate investment is essential to independent national defense and collective defense. These benchmarks ensure NATO is resourced to deter and defend against potential near-peer adversaries that threaten the Euro-Atlantic Alliance.

NATO Burden Sharing

At the Wales Summit in 2014, NATO allies committed to spending at least 2% of Gross Domestic Product on defense by 2024. Since 2016, NATO allies have spent an additional \$41 billion on defense. Looking forward, it is projected that defense spending will increase exponentially to \$100 billion by 2020 and \$350 billion by 2024.

Where have you seen the greatest progress on burden sharing in the NATO Alliance?

The NDS emphasizes the importance of a revitalized NATO to secure our vital national interests. NATO Allies shoulder our common defense burden through cash (defense spending), contributions (such as troop deployments) and critical capabilities (e.g. missile defense systems). Allies recently made considerable progress in these areas. In 2018, eight allies met the 2% threshold 10 more committed to do so by 2024. 15 allies already allocate at least 20% of their defense budgets to new equipment and 11 more committed to do so by 2024.

Not all NATO allies have put forward realistic plans to meet the “2 percent” goal by 2024.

Are you concerned about this? What, in your view, prevents these allies from making progress toward the 2 percent goal?

The 2% goal represents a reasonable expectation of investment by each nation towards the collective defense of all. Underperformance is concerning because it impacts the Alliance’s ability to achieving a credible deterrence and defense posture. Progression towards the spending goal is a result of each ally’s domestic political environment..

If confirmed, what steps would you take to encourage NATO allies to increase their defense spending and enhance their military capabilities so as to enable appropriate contributions to NATO operations?

If confirmed, I will continue the momentum towards Alliance reinforcement, readiness, and responsiveness. Clearly articulating the Alliance’s operational requirements will inform political leaders’ decisions to authorize additional defense investment. I also

intend to inform Allied investment through the development of Minimum Capability Requirements that drive NATO capability targets.

Although the “2 percent” goal is important, it is also critical that our allies invest in, and make actual warfighting capability available to the Alliance at the speed of strategic and operational relevance.

In your view, should the United States broaden the conversation to encourage burden sharing in the NATO Alliance at rates in excess of “2 percent”?

The agreed 2% of GDP goal for defense spending and the additional goal of spending at least 20% of defense investments on major equipment is reasonable, achievable, and sufficient to meet future Alliance operational needs.

In your assessment, what are some of the inefficiencies in defense spending across the NATO Alliance, and how can these best be addressed?

Spending inefficiencies can be addressed through the NATO Defense Planning Process which identifies capabilities required to meet Alliance needs then apportions capability target packages to allies to fulfill the requirements. The packages are distributed according to the principles of “fair burden and reasonable challenge” and each Ally is expected to deliver a set of capabilities commensurate with its size and force composition.

As part of the NATO Readiness Initiative, allies have committed to having 30 battalions, 30 air squadrons, and 30 naval combat vessels ready to use within 30 days.

Why is this initiative important? What are the components of a realistic plan to train, certify, and maintain the readiness of these units? If confirmed as Commander, EUCOM/SACEUR, how would you align the NATO Readiness Initiative with requirements to execute NATO Graduated Response Plans?

The NATO Readiness Initiative enhances deterrence by creating a “culture of readiness” within the Alliance. Readiness and deterrence go hand-in-hand. Readiness, combined with an “enabled theater” alters an adversary’s calculus in terms of the Alliance’s responsiveness and its ability to resupply.

If confirmed, I intend to align NRI forces with NATO’s Graduated Response Plans force requirements. NRI forces are essential to strengthening NATO’s deterrence and defense posture.

NATO-Russia and U.S. Relations

In your view, how important is the NATO-Russia Council?

The NATO-Russia Council is an important channel for dialogue with Russia that addresses concerns, increases predictability and reduces risks. This channel should complement and support U.S. government dialogue with Russia. The Council captures Allied positions on disagreements with Russia, such as Ukraine and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

Although NATO has formal mechanisms for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision, and joint action with Russia, it lacks the same level of engagement with Belarus.

What, in your view, is the potential value of increased NATO Alliance engagement with Belarus?

In the past three years, NATO and Belarus have engaged in an incremental widening of dialogue and practical cooperation. NATO should continue this careful and moderated approach in regards to future engagement with Belarus.

What do you believe are appropriate objectives for U.S.-Russia security relations?

The U.S. military should support strategic stability efforts that reduce the risk of military conflict with Russia. Key to this is a committed, credible and alliance-based military deterrent. Carefully managed and focused dialogue with Russia, through appropriate channels, is vital to mitigating the risk of unintended escalation.

Are there, in your view, any areas of common interest between the United States and Russia in the security sphere?

Russia is a great power and significant player in global affairs. Cooperation with Russia on areas of mutual interest is a key element of global security and stability. These areas include nuclear arms control, containing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, countering transnational threats such as terrorism and narcotics, managing escalation in the space and cyber domains, and partnering to end regional wars and provide post-conflict stability.

NATO Enlargement

In your view, is there a limit on the extent to which NATO can be enlarged while remaining an effective military organization capable of making decisions and acting in a timely fashion?

The Alliance's size is only one of many factors that drive decisions and timelines. The United States' support for NATO's Open Door policy is unwavering based on Article 10 of its founding treaty.

Is North Macedonia's accession into NATO important for U.S. national security interests? Explain your answer.

North Macedonia's accession into NATO as a reliable security partner and contributor advances U.S. national security interests in the region. North Macedonia is a contributor to UN and NATO operations. North Macedonia deployed more than 3,000 Soldiers to U.S. and NATO-led operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. They also initiated an ambitious program to modernize their armed forces and commit 2% of GDP to defense spending.

In your view, how should the United States and NATO proceed on the issue of NATO membership for Georgia?

At the 2008 Bucharest Summit, NATO Allies agreed Georgia and Ukraine would become NATO members in the future. In my view, we should let the NATO Accession Protocol run its course.

Georgia

What opportunities, if any, do you see for enhanced U.S. defense cooperation with Georgia, including the provision of defensive arms?

Georgia is a key U.S. partner in a strategically significant region. The U.S.-Georgia security relationship has steadily matured and the 2017 establishment of the Georgia Defense Readiness Program (GDRP) marked a milestone in our partnership. The GDRP helps Georgia field and sustain a credible, ready force that enhances their ability to defend their territorial integrity and interoperate with the U.S. and NATO forces. We support Georgia's defense modernization through the sale of defensive systems such as Javelin Anti-Tank systems.

NATO Reform

How will the new Joint Force Command for the Atlantic in Virginia and the Enabling Command in Germany help provide more credible deterrence in Europe?

In 2017, NATO declared the NATO Command Structure not fit for purpose. These two additional commands will enhance NATO's command structure and the defense of the Euro-Atlantic region by re-establishing links similar to those used during the Cold War period of great power competition.

If confirmed, how will you define and measure success for these new command structures?

If confirmed, NATO and USEUCOM exercises will continue to prioritize defeating near-peer competitors. Our ability to succeed despite the fog of day zero in any conflict is our greatest challenge and best measure of success. Our exercises must test these new command structures' ability to succeed in this challenging environment.

What recommendations for additional reforms should NATO consider to speed decision-making, improve the ability of the Alliance to realistically plan for contingencies, and generate forces at the speed of strategic and operational relevance?

Throughout his tenure as SACEUR, General Scaparrotti called for a “return to strategy.” NATO should embrace a more holistic approach beyond the scope of its current plans. Exercising the transition from baseline activities through crisis to conflict will challenge Alliance leadership and help us maintain strategic and operational relevance.

NATO—European Union (EU)

How would you characterize the NATO-EU relationship today?

The NATO-EU relationship is stronger today than it has been in decades. Both organizations agreed to 74 cooperative areas since the 2016 Warsaw Summit, including closer cooperation in countering hybrid threats, counterterrorism, information sharing, exercises, and crisis management.

What role does the EU play in ensuring that the United States and our NATO allies are able to deter and, if necessary, defeat Russian aggression?

The EU plays a critical role in securing the populations' and parliamentarians' buy-in for national expenditures necessary to deter and defeat Russian aggression. Also, strengthened border security and surveillance efforts by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX) provide additional early warning and situational awareness to our allies and partners in the region. Deterrence efforts are more impactful when EU and NATO efforts are synchronized.

What role does the EU play in countering Russian malign influence?

The EU plays an important role. EU sanctions are powerful diplomatic and economic tools that amplify U.S. and NATO efforts to counter Russia's malign influence. Ongoing EU-NATO coordination regarding cyber threats and the EU's 2018 Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats focus awareness, increases resilience and improves our collective response to Russian hybrid aggression.

What is your assessment of the EU's Permanent Structured Cooperation initiative? Do you perceive these projects are aligned with NATO objectives?

Currently, there are 34 PESCO projects that vary in scale, feasibility and applicability to NATO objectives. A model example of alignment is Belgium's simultaneous leadership of the PESCO project on Mine Counter Measures (MCM) and NATO's MCM Center of Excellence. This alignment leverages PESCO's access to subsidies from the European Defense Fund, and makes technology or doctrine developments available to the Alliance.

What is your assessment of the European Intervention Initiative (EI2)? What impact will this initiative have on NATO, in your opinion?

EI2 is a French effort to assemble a “coalition of the willing,” ready to respond to crises. The French have a particular interest in including the UK, which after Brexit, may no longer have access to other EU initiatives and battle groups. As with other European efforts, it is important to ensure that EI2’s mission does not overlap or detract from NATO, but rather offer opportunities for increased burden-sharing in Europe.

What is your assessment of the current debate in Europe about a “European army” or “army of the Europeans?” Does the fact that this discussion is, at times, framed as an alternative to a leading role for the United States in European security, give you any cause for concern?

The concept of a European Army reflects France’s vision for increased strategic autonomy. Given the already low public support for military spending, it is unlikely that a European Army will exist in the near to mid-term. This issue presents an opportunity for European leaders to build political will for investing in military capabilities that align with NATO, an organization with broad public support across the continent.

NATO-led Kosovo Force

The NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) includes approximately 650 U.S. service members. KFOR’s mission is to assist in maintaining a safe and secure environment in Kosovo, consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and to support the development of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF).

In your view, does KFOR remains an essential deterrent to instability in the Western Balkans?

Kosovo is a success story for NATO and the West, but its security environment remains fragile. KFOR ensures continued success by maintaining a safe and secure environment and, freedom of movement for all citizens of Kosovo. Its non-partial and professional presence promotes continued and needed dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina.

What do you see as the major challenges in the Western Balkans? What is EUCOM’s role in addressing these challenges?

U.S. and NATO regional engagements have helped the Western Balkans make significant progress towards peace, stability, and economic prosperity through greater Euro-Atlantic integration. Despite this progress, ethnic tensions, corruption, and malign external influences still threaten stability, and continued U.S. presence is necessary to strengthen allied and partner resistance to these threats.

DoD bolsters regional allies and partners through security cooperation and capacity building initiatives. Key to these initiatives is eliminating regional militaries’

dependence on Soviet legacy systems. We are leveraging security cooperation tools to modernize regional militaries with U.S.-origin and NATO interoperable equipment.

If confirmed as Commander, EUCOM/SACEUR, what would be your approach to assisting the development and transition of the KSF?

USEUCOM supports the development of the Kosovo Security Force according to their agreed upon 10-year transition program, conducted in close coordination with the U.S. and other NATO Allies. We encourage the KSF to maintain a multi-ethnic, professional force responsive to all the citizens of Kosovo.

NATO Special Operations Headquarters

The NATO Special Operations Forces Headquarters (NSHQ) was created in 2007 to enhance the capabilities of, and promote interoperability between, the special operations forces (SOF) of NATO member nations.

What role do you believe the NSHQ should play in future contingencies involving NATO SOF?

Enhancing capability, capacity and interoperability shall remain NSHQ's primary focus. NSHQ should continue to develop strategic and operational level Command and Control capabilities, and also support Alliance efforts to integrate irregular warfare and SOF capabilities into counter hybrid threat plans.

How do you believe the NSHQ can most effectively support NATO SOF capabilities and interoperability?

The NSHQ can increase capability and interoperability by setting capability targets, ensuring synergy in Command and Control arrangements, integrating common network platforms, and assuring SOF presence in critical areas.

What do you believe are the appropriate roles for EUCOM and U.S. Special Operations Command in providing guidance and resources to the NSHQ?

The USEUCOM Commander is the executive agent responsible for the NSHQ. Duties include coordinating with the Commander, USSOCOM to review and validate force structure requirements for U.S. support to the NSHQ. The Commander, USSOCOM provides military advice on capabilities that support allied and partner interoperability with U.S. forces for areas that fall within USSOCOM responsibilities. USSOCOM also provides doctrine, training, and equipment standards for special operations, irregular warfare, and security force assistance capabilities. USSOCOM promotes standardization policies and procedures for special operations equipment, and validates NSHQ's special operations requirements to ensure interoperability of equipment and forces.

Ukraine and the Black Sea Region

The Russian attack on Ukrainian ships in the Black Sea in November 2018 was a major escalation in Russia's war on Ukraine.

What is your assessment of Russia's intentions in its aggression against Ukraine in the Black Sea region?

Russia's aggression against Ukraine in the Black Sea region intends to legitimize its claim to Crimea, deter Ukraine from asserting its sovereign rights over territorial waters, and secure the Kerch Strait. Russia also seeks to complicate Ukraine's attempts at further westward integration through its continued leadership of anti-government forces in eastern Ukraine. Supporting these efforts, Russia also seeks to impose additional economic costs against Kyiv and isolate Ukraine's coastal region on the Sea of Azov.

What effect do you believe it has on Vladimir Putin's strategic calculus when Russia's aggressive acts are met by little or no response by the United States or its European allies and partners?

Little or no response by the United States or its allies to Russia's aggressive acts would embolden Putin to embrace higher-risk operations. Putin wants to destabilize the Euro-Atlantic link and "break out" of his perceived strategic encirclement. The United States is working closely with allies and partners to enhance regional security and Ukraine's capacity to defend itself, and to impose further costs on Russia for its continued aggressive actions. The U.S. remains steadfast in its support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, within its internationally recognized borders and territorial waters, and remains committed to ensuring freedom of navigation in the Black Sea. On March 15, 2019 the U.S. also joined the EU and Canada in announcing a package of sanctions in response to the Kerch attack. Our sanctions will target individuals involved in the attack, as well as entities that support Russia's naval capabilities, or operate illegally in Crimea.

What is your assessment of the longer-term effects of Russia's aggression against Ukraine on the security of NATO allies such as Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey?

Nations on the Black Sea each have unique security challenges and Russia's effects on each are not identical. The worst outcome for Russia's actions in Ukraine would be a divided response among allies. However, Putin's actions have invigorated allies to increase their vigilance toward Russian activities.

In your assessment, has Ukraine built trust with the United States and European partners through its responsible custody of Javelin anti-tank missiles?

Yes. The Ukrainian Armed Forces have adhered to the agreement for safe and responsible custody of Javelin Command Launch Units and anti-tank missiles. We have observed responsible accountability for these systems. USEUCOM continues to work

with the Ukrainian armed forces to stress the importance of accountability for U.S.-provided technology and systems.

In your assessment, should U.S. security assistance to Ukraine, including assistance provided under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, include a greater proportion of lethal aid?

We continue to assess available assistance options based on identified capability gaps. Due to its one-year appropriation, the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative funding is “challenged” to provide advanced lethal systems. We will continue to assess conditions on the ground and remain responsive to potential scenarios requiring additional lethal aid.

If confirmed, how would you recommend that DOD and EUCOM address Ukraine’s most pressing capability gaps?

We’ve now reached a point where Ukraine’s most pressing capability gaps require deliberate long-term planning to ensure complex systems are delivered in a rational, coordinated, and sustainable manner. This requires significant work with our allies and partners to ensure that efforts with Ukraine are complementary and enduring. Ukraine must also address internal legislative, institutional, and structural requirements to develop enduring capabilities.

What is your assessment of Ukraine’s progress on defense institution reform?

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Armed Forces have made tremendous progress in the past five years. USEUCOM’s counterparts in Ukraine’s MoD often lack appropriate authorities to implement required reforms. The MoD routinely requires Rada and Presidential action to authorize process changes in Ukraine’s military. The congressionally-mandated conditionality embedded in the USAI authority has been effective at incentivizing Ukrainian government action on U.S. priorities, such as the 2018 Law on National Security, the Law on Foreign Defense Procurements, and reform of the Command and Control doctrine of the Ukrainian military.

If confirmed, what specifically would you do to incentivize Ukraine to expedite its progress in defense reform?

If confirmed, we intend to use a combination of assistance conditionality, targeted capacity building, and advisory engagement to encourage Ukraine’s continued defense reform toward NATO interoperability. The U.S. government provided over \$1.3 billion in security assistance from 2014 to the present, providing significant leverage to encourage difficult reforms. We, along with our allies, partners and NATO Liaison Office in Kyiv, support a robust reform effort across several domains. We also support the U.S. senior advisor, LTG (ret) Keith Dayton, as a member of the Defense Reform Advisory Board.

U.S. Presence in Poland

What is your assessment of the geostrategic position of Poland in the context of defending NATO's eastern flank?

Poland is critical to NATO's defense of the eastern Flank, particularly in the Baltic region. Poland borders Belarus, Kaliningrad and Lithuania.

U.S. presence in Poland current includes nearly 5,000 U.S. forces? What is your assessment of the importance of the U.S. presence in Poland? In your view, what capabilities for a U.S. military presence in Poland are important for enhancing deterrence against Russia?

U.S. forces in Poland serve in the U.S.-led NATO Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) Battlegroup. Additionally, Poland hosts elements from the rotational Armored Brigade Combat Team. Our presence signals commitment to the Alliance and to Poland. In combination with three other eFP Battlegroups deployed in the Baltics, these formations have effectively deterred. To enhance deterrence against Russian aggression, we must add logistics and ISR resources to improve indications and warnings and facilitate reinforcement. We must augment Joint Fires and increase connectivity with Integrated Air and Missile Defense sensors.

U.S. Relations with Turkey

Do you believe Russia's annexation and militarization of Crimea, aggression in the Black Sea, support for the Assad regime, and increasing maritime presence in the Mediterranean run counter to Turkey's security interests?

Yes, these actions counter Turkish security interests. Turkey has consistently demonstrated its opposition to the militarization of the Black Sea through its role as guarantor of the Montreux Convention.

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 5, 2019, General Scaparrotti stated, that if Turkey accepts and establishes the Russian S-400 air defense system, "my best military advice would be that we don't then follow through with the F-35."

Given your experience as Commander, U.S. Air Force Europe, do you agree with General Scaparrotti's views in this regard?

Yes, if Turkey accepts and establishes the S-400 in country, we should not deliver the F-35.

European Phased Adaptive Approach

The United States is deploying the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) as its contribution to NATO missile defense capability.

Do you believe that EPAA will provide the capability needed to protect U.S. forces in Europe and our NATO Allies against existing and emerging Iranian missile threats?

The U.S. has assured our NATO Allies that EPAA will be capable of providing full coverage of NATO European territory against the threat of ballistic missiles from the Middle East. As the U.S. national force contribution to NATO's Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Standing Defense Plan, EPAA forces provide the foundation of NATO ballistic Missile defense (BMD). As Iran continues their missile development, the U.S. European Command, with support from the Missile Defense Agency, works closely with our allies to ensure the capabilities provided by EPAA remain effective against current and emerging Russian and Iranian threats.

In your opinion, is there a need to assess defense capabilities of the U.S. in Europe as well as those of NATO Allies and partners against a Russian ballistic missile threat?

As we look beyond EPAA, our goal is to build an Integrated Air and Missile Defense architecture including U.S., Allied and Partner capabilities to defend sovereign airspace and national assets against any air or missile threats from outside Europe or NATO territory. In accordance with the Missile Defense Review (MDR), assessments conducted alongside our allies and partners must ensure that any such architecture is effective against current and future advanced air and missile threats. The U.S. is encouraging NATO Allies to improve their missile defense capabilities by investing in interceptors and sensors, expanding data sharing and integration, and taking other steps to counter existing and projected ballistic and cruise missile threats.

NATO Commitments to Afghanistan

At the NATO Summit in Brussels in July 2018, NATO members affirmed their commitment to ensuring “long-term security and stability in Afghanistan,” noting that regional actors—specifically Pakistan, Iran, and Russia—have and “important role to play in support of peace and stabilization.” NATO members also pledged to extend their “financial sustainment of the Afghan forces through 2024” and “to fill staffing shortfalls, especially in priority areas.” In addition, NATO agreed to increase support for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) “train, advise, and assist” mission, to continue the financial sustainment of the ANDSF, and to strengthen NATO’s partnership with Afghanistan.

What are the major challenges you foresee, if confirmed as the next Commander, EUCOM/SACEUR, in implementing the commitments to stability and security in Afghanistan?

Supporting the ongoing Train, Advise, and Assist mission in Afghanistan remains paramount. The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces continue to work to take responsibility for Afghanistan's security, but continue to rely on TAA from the coalition.

What, if anything, can NATO do to encourage Russia, Iran, and Pakistan to assist in “supporting peace and stabilization” in Afghanistan?

It will be difficult for NATO to influence Russian cooperation. Russia desires a Central Asia devoid of Western influences that is stable enough to act as a buffer for Russian territory. Moscow views Central Asia as its sphere of influence and is wary of external influences. Pakistan is a nuclear power that sits at the nexus of Russian, Chinese, Indian, American and European geopolitical interests. Similarly, Iran's interests in Afghanistan diverge with the RSM mission; Iran wants to hedge against Western influence in Afghanistan. The NATO/U.S. and Pakistan military-to-military relationship is strong. We share an important strategic relationship with opportunities for continued collaboration on near border counter-terrorism and near border counter-narcotics. Afghanistan's neighbors can reduce manpower and financial support to groups working against Afghan peace and stability through focused law enforcement activities within their borders.

Building and Sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces

According to recent Resolute Support data, the ANDSF is still at only 87.7% of its authorized strength and continues to suffer from high casualty and desertion rates. The Afghan government funds only roughly ten percent of the overall security budget, a number that has remained static for several years despite a commitment at the NATO summit in 2014 to transition all of the security budget to Afghanistan by 2024. The NATO-led Resolute Support mission continues to operate with one central hub in Kabul and Bagram, and four spokes in Mazar-e Sharif, Herat, Kandahar, and Laghman.

In your view, how does maintaining NATO and/or U.S. presence in areas outside of Kabul and Bagram contribute to the success of NATO's train-advise-assist mission and the U.S. counterterrorism mission?

The United States' vital national interest in Afghanistan is to prevent terrorist groups from using Afghan soil to plan and execute attacks against the U.S. homeland, U.S. citizens and/or our interests and allies abroad. With our Resolute Support allies and partners, we accomplish this by countering threats posed by al-Qa'ida and ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K) and building the capabilities of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). NATO and the United States provide critical training and support to the Afghan government and operations outside Kabul/Bagram provide advising directly at the point of need. Local presence increases the effectiveness and timeliness of NATO advising while providing an avenue to assess and validate NATO efforts.

In your assessment, are the current target end strengths for the ANA and ANP sufficient to enable Afghan security forces to project security and stability throughout Afghanistan in 2019 and beyond?

My understanding is that Commander, Resolute Support is reviewing the ANDSF force structure and will make recommendations to the Secretary and the Chairman through USCENTCOM that optimize force size, mix and roles to address projected future security conditions taking into account long-term affordability and sustainability of the force as well as potential future U.S. funding requirements.

Given the sizeable attrition rates and current and projected Afghan government revenues, are such force numbers feasible and sustainable?

My understanding is that Commander, Resolute Support is reviewing the ANDSF force structure and will make recommendations to the Secretary and the Chairman through USCENTCOM that optimize force size, mix and roles to address projected future security conditions taking into account long-term affordability and sustainability of the force as well as potential future U.S. funding requirements.

What can be done to reduce the attrition rate of Afghan security forces?

My understanding is that Commander, Resolute Support is reviewing the ANDSF force structure and will make recommendations to the Secretary and the Chairman through USCENTCOM that optimize force size, mix and roles to address projected future security conditions taking into account long-term affordability and sustainability of the force as well as potential future U.S. funding requirements.

What is your understanding regarding current assumptions for the size of the Afghan security forces through 2019 and beyond?

My understanding is that Commander, Resolute Support is reviewing the ANDSF force structure and will make recommendations to the Secretary and the Chairman through USCENTCOM that optimize force size, mix and roles to address projected future security conditions taking into account long-term affordability and sustainability of the force as well as potential future U.S. funding requirements.

At the meeting of NATO defense ministers in November 2017, Resolute Support Mission troop-contributing members increased the number of troops deployed from 13,000 to 16,000.

Do you believe that NATO has dedicated a sufficient number of troops to enable the Resolute Support Mission to meet its Afghan force training objectives?

NATO's current force posture supporting Resolute Support is appropriate given the existing conditions. The force consists of approximately 17,000 troops from 39 NATO Allies and partners.

What is your assessment of the risks involved with the train, advise, and assist mission and what steps can and should be taken, in your view, to mitigate those risks?

Afghanistan remains a dangerous operating environment. To develop an ANDSF capable of functioning with minimal external support, Resolute Support forces must continue their train, advise and assist mission in the near term; maintaining the capability to advise ANDSF units at the point of need is required to accomplish this. To mitigate risk to the coalition forces advising ANDSF units, Resolute Support vets the partner units/organizations, provides security and over-watch for key engagements. Ultimately, building a more capable ANDSF is the best way to mitigate risk to force. However, the operations tempo necessitates Afghan forces stay engaged on the front lines which limits reconstitution and training opportunities that are critical for building ANDSF capability.

Prevention of and Response to Sexual Assault

In your view, are the policies, programs, and training that DOD and the Military Services have put in place to prevent sexual assault and respond to sexual assault when it does occur, adequate and effective?

One sexual assault is one too many; we must improve our efforts to prevent this terrible crime. To that end, the Military Services are continually adjusting their sexual assault prevention and response programs. These programs provide oversight and are intended to provide effective training and the appropriate resources to respond to incidents and allegations of sexual assault. There is more work to be done.

What is your assessment of EUCOM's sexual assault prevention and response program?

It is my understanding that USEUCOM has a robust sexual assault prevention program and, if confirmed, that will continue. The chain of command plays a vital role in every aspect of the command climate and maintenance of good order and discipline, ensuring sexual harassment and sexual assault are not tolerated. Commanders at all levels are expected to promote an environment of dignity and respect that is free from unlawful discrimination, sexual harassment, and sexual assault, and commanders are accountable for the command climate they foster.

What is your view of the necessity of affording a victim both restricted and unrestricted options to report a sexual assault?

Sexual assault victims should be afforded every support available, including the opportunity to elect whether to file both restricted and unrestricted reports. These options provide victims a personal choice, and a much greater voice, ensuring the victim's safety and support while also ensuring chain of command awareness of a crime. In units with healthy command climates, restricted reports are less frequent, reflecting a trust in leadership.

What is your assessment of the potential impact, if any, of proposals to remove from military Commanders, case disposition authority over felony violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, including sexual assaults?

Inherent in command authority is the responsibility to ensure good order and discipline. Commanders' legal authority to dispose of misconduct is a vital part of their moral authority to command effectively and provide for the welfare of their personnel. Removing the responsibility and authority to dispose of felony UCMJ violations, including sexual assault crimes, runs counter to the expectations our government and nation place on our commanders and potentially disrupts a commander's ability to enforce good order and discipline. Disposition decisions are best made by commanders who are properly advised by their judge advocates. Commanders, advised by trained and qualified legal advisors, ensure their disposition decisions are both fair and just, and they are in the best position to take action that is appropriate for both offenders and victims of crime.

What is your assessment of the Department's implementation of protections against retaliation (including reprisal; social ostracism; and acts of cruelty, oppression, and maltreatment) for reporting sexual assault?

The Joint Force is steadfast in protecting from retaliation those service members who report sexual assault. The Department of Defense and Military Services are continuing to develop policies and procedures that appropriately implement the retaliation-related notification, training, and reporting requirements required by NDAA FYs 2016, 2017 and 2018 to protect those who report sexual assault.

What is your understanding of the "continuum of harm" in the context of sexual harassment and sexual assault and their effects on the readiness of military units?

It is my understanding that the Department has several overarching efforts to address unwanted sexual behaviors across the continuum of harm, including developing an overarching prevention strategy. Maintaining a culture void of all conditions related to sexual harassment and assault should always be the goal. If confirmed, I will continue to enforce the Department's policy to effectively employ ready units.

What is your view of the role of the chain of command in maintaining a command climate in which sexual harassment and sexual assault are not tolerated?

The chain of command sets the tone in every aspect of command climate and maintenance of good order and discipline. Commanders at all levels are expected to promote an environment of dignity and respect, free from unlawful discrimination, sexual harassment, and sexual assault. Commanders are accountable for the command climate they foster.

In your view, do military and civilian leaders in EUCOM have the training, authorities, and resources needed to hold subordinate commanders and supervisors accountable for the

prevention of and response to sexual harassment and sexual assault? If not, what additional training, authorities, or resources to you believe are needed, and why?

It is my understanding that USEUCOM investigative and prosecutorial training, authorities, and resources are adequate. Criminal investigative agencies prioritize sexual assault cases and thoroughly investigate all allegations of sexual assault. With increased training and specialization, both investigators and prosecutors are becoming increasingly skilled in dealing with these types of complex cases.

What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to address the problem of sexual assaults in EUCOM?

If confirmed, I will lead from the front by continually reinforcing and prioritizing sexual assault awareness, prevention and response at all levels. I will articulate the necessity for commanders to foster healthy command climates that value trust and teamwork, while providing effective training to address this terrible crime. Commanders and leaders at all levels will be required to promote environments that “exhaust all efforts possible” to end sexual assaults.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Yes, if confirmed.

Do you agree, if confirmed, and when asked before this committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate committees of Congress to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the position of the Administration?

Yes, if confirmed.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner?

Yes, if confirmed.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for

any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you?

Yes, if confirmed.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided?

Yes, if confirmed.

Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request?

Yes, if confirmed.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee?

Yes, if confirmed.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress?

Yes, if confirmed.