

Advance Questions for Admiral James A. Winnefeld, Jr., USN
Nominee for the Position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Defense Reforms

Previously you have answered the Committee’s policy questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in connection with your nomination to be Commander of United States Northern Command.

Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of these reforms changed since you testified before the Committee at your most recent confirmation hearing?

No. I have served in various joint capacities throughout my naval career and witnessed first-hand the tremendous advancements this landmark legislation has created, not only among our Nation’s military and civilian leadership, but as a whole within the joint services and interagency environment. As such, I do not see a need to change the provisions of this legislation.

In your previous response to a question concerning whether you saw a need for modifications of Goldwater-Nichols in light of the changing environment, you indicated that you would “take a hard look at ways U.S. Northern Command does business to determine if changes in the legislation are warranted.”

In light of your experience as Commander of United States Northern Command do you see any need for modifications to Goldwater-Nichols? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

I do not believe changes to Goldwater-Nichols are necessary at this time. However, if confirmed, I will remain alert to opportunities or shortcomings that might indicate that changes to the legislation are warranted.

Duties and Qualifications

What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties and functions of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as set forth in section 154 of title 10, United States Code, and in regulations of the Department of Defense pertaining to functions of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

None at this time.

What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform the duties of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

It has been my honor to serve for thirty-three years in a diverse set of positions that I believe have prepared me to serve as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have experience on the Joint Staff and Navy staff; served as a joint, combined, and combatant commander; and have worked closely with Congress on a variety of issues. My technical background should be useful in my role, if confirmed, as the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. As the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff, I gained insight into the conduct of joint, combined, and international operations. In my current position as Commander of U.S. Northern Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command, I command forces in the execution of homeland defense and civil support operations. In this position, I have seen first-hand the importance of the Total Force in defending our nation's interests at home and abroad.

Is there anything that you need to do to better prepare yourself to perform the duties of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Although there are always opportunities for additional learning in advance of assuming a new position, I feel well prepared to serve as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Relationships

Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the following officials:

The Secretary of Defense

The Vice Chairman performs the duties assigned to him and other such duties as may be assigned by the Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as the Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or until the absence or disability ceases. These duties would include providing military advice to the Secretary of Defense. The Vice Chairman may also provide the Secretary of Defense advice upon the Secretary's request in his capacity as a military adviser.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense has been delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense on any matters upon which the Secretary is authorized to act. As such, the relationship of the Vice Chairman with the Deputy Secretary is similar to that with the Secretary.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Vice Chairman performs the duties assigned to him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such other duties as assigned by the Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. When there is a vacancy in the office of the Chairman, or during

the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases. If confirmed, I look forward to a close working relationship with the Chairman.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L))

Title 10, United States Code and current DOD directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisers to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional areas. With particular regard to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), the Vice Chairman serves on many deliberative panels focused on resource decisions, including the Deputies Advisory Working Group as its Vice Chair and as Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. If confirmed, I look forward to working very closely with the USD(AT&L) on continuing improvements to the requirements process and providing senior-level focus on key acquisition programs.

The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (USD(C))

I recognize the importance of the Vice Chairman working closely with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) in appropriately managing and providing oversight of the budgetary and fiscal processes of the Joint Staff required to achieve the budgetary goals prescribed by the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P))

With regard to the duties of the Vice Chairman as they relate to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), the Vice Chairman co-chairs the Policy and Strategy Committee, serves as a member of the Counter-proliferation Council, represents military interest in Interagency Affairs, and provides oversight and direction on behalf of the Chairman in areas such as use allocation and use of military forces. The Vice Chairman and USD(P) serve together on the Deputies Committee. If confirmed, I plan to have frequent interaction with the USD(P).

The other Under Secretaries of Defense

Within their assigned areas, Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions and interact frequently with the Joint Staff. They may issue instructions and directive-type memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. These instructions and directives are applicable to all DOD components. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to commanders of the unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Under Secretaries of Defense.

The Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation

Title 10, United States Code, and current DOD directives establish the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation as a principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and other senior officials of the DOD on cost assessment and program evaluation. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the Director under the auspices of the Vice Chairman's resourcing and requirements functions, as well as benefitting from the extensive and independent analysis provided by the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office towards making informed resourcing decisions.

The Assistant Secretaries of Defense

With the exception of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Public Affairs, Legislative Affairs, and for Networks and Information Integration, all Assistant Secretaries of Defense are subordinate to one of the Under Secretaries of Defense. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to commanders of unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Assistant Secretaries in a manner similar to that of working with the Under Secretaries.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments

Title 10, United States Code, Section 165 provides that, subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority of the combatant commanders, the Secretaries of Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of forces assigned to unified and specified commands.

The Chairman, or Vice Chairman when directed or when acting as the Chairman, advises the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which program recommendations and budget proposals of the Military Departments conform with priorities in strategic plans and with the requirements of the combatant commanders. The Vice Chairman has numerous interactions with the Service Secretaries in the various management forums within the Department. Finally, in his role as the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the Vice Chairman has considerable interaction with the Service Secretaries' acquisition staffs. If confirmed, I look forward to a close and productive working relationship with the Service Secretaries and their staffs.

The Chiefs of Staff of the Services

The service chiefs serve two significant roles. First, they are responsible for the organization, manning, training, and equipping of their respective services. Without the full support and cooperation of the service chiefs, no combatant commander can be ensured of the readiness of his assigned forces for missions directed by the President and Secretary of Defense. Second, as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they are advisors to the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense as the senior uniformed leaders of their

respective Services. The service vice chiefs play a key role on the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, chaired by the Vice Chairman. If confirmed, I will work closely with the service chiefs and their vice chiefs to fulfill the combatant commanders' warfighting and operational requirements and on other relevant policy matters.

The Combatant Commanders

The combatant commanders fight our wars and conduct military operations around the world. The Chairman provides a vital link between the combatant commanders and other elements of the Department of Defense and, as directed by the President, may serve as the means of communication between the combatant commanders and the President or Secretary of Defense. When there is a vacancy in the office of Chairman or in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman when interacting with the combatant commanders. Having served as a combatant commander, I have clear insight into the capabilities and limitations of combatant command staffs. If confirmed, I will work closely with the combatant commanders to enable their warfighting capabilities and provide other support as required.

Major Challenges and Problems

What are the major challenges that you see facing the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

The principal challenge I will face, if confirmed, will be in assisting the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in formulating their recommendations to the President regarding balancing the national *security* imperative of regaining our fiscal solvency against the national *defense* imperatives of winning our current fights and maintaining our ability to deter or defeat a broad spectrum of potential threats to our nation's vital and important interests.

Our most important near term task is to ensure our servicemen and women deployed and in combat overseas—and their families and those who return wounded, ill, or injured—are supported to the best of our ability as a nation.

The spectrum of potential threats against which we must defend within an increasingly constrained budget environment includes:

- Violent extremism, which is the only threat that currently possesses both the capability and active intent to harm the United States and our allies and friends;
- Regional instability, including the uncertainty caused by recent turmoil in the Arab world, that could threaten the United States' or allies' vital or important interests or that poses a grave threat of human disaster;
- Self-alienated nations whose leaders view acquisition of weapons of mass destruction as an insurance policy for preserving their status and increasing their regional influence;

- Powerful states, to include those with strategic offensive capability, that could threaten the survival or vital interests of the United States or our allies;
- The growing threat of cyber attack against defense or civilian infrastructure posed by individuals and nations;
- Transnational criminal organizations that produce serious corrosive effects within the United States and among our friends and allies; and
- The constant threat of natural and man-made disasters.

We must also work to ensure the American people maintain their connection to and support for our Armed Forces.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary, the Chairman, the other Joint Chiefs, the combatant commanders, and other key national security officials to ensure our national defense remains strong by:

- Ensuring our servicemen and women in combat are fully and properly supported;
- Making appropriate recommendations when the use of U.S. military force is being contemplated;
- Contributing to policy discussions regarding the trajectories of threat capabilities and capacities, their implications for U.S. vital and important interests, and the relative priority, cost, posture, and temporal aspects of ensuring U.S. capabilities and capacities are able to defeat them;
- Continuing ongoing efforts to improve the requirements system—ensuring the combatant commanders are properly represented therein, among other imperatives—as well as ensuring the system is well-synchronized with budgeting and acquisition processes;
- Continuing the search for greater efficiency and effectiveness in the way we do business within the Department;
- Working collegially within the U.S. interagency to synchronize our efforts to advance the security interests of our nation;
- Strengthening our relationships with our allies and friends; and
- Ensuring our families and wounded warriors are properly cared for.

As always, the national security leadership will need to make difficult choices. Thus, I intend to contribute to the collaborative and collegial approach that will be required—among what I view to be an exceptional group of Joint Chiefs, combatant commanders, and other stakeholders in the Executive Branch and Congress—to accomplish these difficult tasks in an increasingly constrained budget environment.

Joint Requirements Oversight Council

As the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if confirmed, you would be the chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The JROC has the responsibility to review and validate Service requirements.

Are there any recommendations that you would make to modify the JROC or its authority or the requirements process?

If confirmed, I will continue on the current trend in line with recent changes to the Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act of empowering the combatant commanders in providing the warfighter a clear voice in the requirements process. Additionally, I would continue to streamline the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) to provide more informed decision-making of the JROC. Currently there are two requirements processes: Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) and JCIDS. The JUONs process provides the warfighter in combat a quick way to procure a system that prevents loss of life and critical mission failure due to direct enemy action. JCIDS is utilized for all other Joint acquisition systems—both long-term large and near-term small programs use the same requirements process. I believe we need to develop a system that better addresses the continuum of requirements and acquisition programs. It is my understanding that such a system is currently being designed, and if confirmed, I will continue that effort.

During the confirmation of General Cartwright for the position of Vice Chairman, the committee asked him a variety of questions about problems, challenges, and recommendations for improvements in the requirements process and the workings of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). General Cartwright emphasized his view of the importance of enhancing the role of the combatant commanders in the JROC beyond what was mandated in the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009. Specifically, he recommended that the combatant commanders become members of the JROC, along with representatives from the offices of USD (P), USD (AT&L), and USD(C). He also suggested that the Vice Chairman be authorized to delegate authority to functional combatant commanders to approve certain specific types of requirements. Section 841 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 makes changes to the JROC authorizing statute, based on General Cartwright's recommendations.

What are your views on General Cartwright's specific recommendations?

I fully support General Cartwright's specific recommendations that have been written into section 841 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011.

What are your views on the changes made by section 841?

As a currently-serving combatant commander, I am pleased with General Cartwright's recommendations that were written into section 841 to empower the combatant commanders in the requirements process. If confirmed, I will investigate whether there is

even more we can do in this regard, subject to the capacity and expertise of the combatant commander staffs to participate.

What is your understanding of the status of proposed guidance to implement the changes made by section 841?

My understanding is that these changes have been fully implemented. On 26 April 2011, I sat on the JROC as a voting member specifically for an Initial Capability Document briefing in which my combatant command had specific interest.

What are your views on the proposed guidance?

The combatant commander now has a clear voice in the requirements process with his vote on the JROC, though I acknowledge that it is not always easy for combatant commanders to participate. Also, adding the additional advisors to the JROC provides a wide breadth of expertise and experience. However, I believe we must continue to pursue ways to further include combatant commanders in the requirements process.

General Cartwright was also asked about the role of the requirements process in the acquisition process after requirements have been initially approved and a program begins engineering and manufacturing development. General Cartwright noted that in 2007, the JROC established what he called a “trip-wire” process to “bring troubled programs back to the JROC for a review and to consider performance trade-offs to mitigate further cost growth and/or schedule delays before the program faced a Nunn-McCurdy review.”

To your knowledge, has this review mechanism been regularly employed on large programs that have experienced significant cost growth and schedule delays?

Yes, the first “trip-wire” review was conducted in 2007 and this mechanism has been used regularly for several defense programs. I personally observed, while attending a JROC meeting as the USNORTHCOM Commander, this process in action in scrutinizing a troubled program. If confirmed, I will continue this practice.

Has the JROC altered requirements, either for performance or procurement quantities, as a result of such reviews?

My understanding is that the “trip-wire” review forces an assessment of the relationship between requirements and program cost drivers, allowing the JROC to weigh the cost benefit of reducing a requirement to control cost growth. It is a maturing process as cited in a recent GAO report. My understanding is that a recent example where the JROC altered requirements is the Joint Tactical Radio System.

WSARA required the Secretary of Defense to ensure that trade-off analyses are conducted on cost, schedule, and performance as part of the requirements development and approval process. Such analyses enhance the Department’s

understanding of what performance factors are the critical ones driving costs and schedules.

In your view does the Joint Staff have the operations research expertise to determine where the cost “knees in the curve” lie for weapons systems performance?

Currently the Joint Staff relies on CAPE as an advisor to the JROC for their operations research expertise to determine where the cost “knees in the curve” lie for weapons systems performance. The Joint Staff then utilizes that data to determine proper tradeoffs regarding Key Performance Parameters. The ongoing review of JCIDS is addressing this and will provide recommendations on increased Joint Staff analytical expertise on cost, schedule, and performance considerations.

In your view has the Department effectively integrated the operations research and cost estimating resources across the Joint Staff, the Office of Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation, and the Office of the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to conduct these trade-off analyses?

It is my understanding that synergistic staffing between the Joint Staff, OSD CAPE, and OSD AT&L has been effective.

What is your view of the modifications to the JROC process made by the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009?

Implementation of a “trip-wire” process helps inform the JROC of critical cost growth of Major Defense Acquisition Programs. This enables the JROC to properly inform the Secretary of Defense of potential Critical Breaches. When there is a breach, these programs must report to the JROC for validation and to review program cost, schedule and performance. I fully support these modifications, which have been codified into the JROC process.

What additional steps do you believe that Congress or the Department should take to ensure that trade-offs between cost, schedule, and performance objectives for major weapon systems are made at an appropriately early point in the acquisition process?

It is my observation that the Department is already moving to make assessments of cost, performance, and technical readiness of weapon systems earlier in the acquisition process. I believe that the JROC should work to synchronize its decision points to better inform the acquisition milestone decisions. One course being considered is for the JROC to review Analysis of Alternatives from major defense acquisition programs and provide advice to the milestone decision authority in support of milestone A. This also addresses a key recommendation made in a recent GAO report.

Are there any other recommendations that you would make to modify the JROC or its authority or the requirements process?

I believe the changes in the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 captured several positive changes to the JROC and should be allowed to mature for a period of time to assess the implementation of those changes. If confirmed, I will remain alert to opportunities to improve this process.

How would you assess the effectiveness of the JROC in the DOD acquisition process?

I believe the JROC is an effective partner with OSD in the acquisition process. Through participation in many common forums, such as the Defense Acquisition Board and the Deputies Advisory Working Group, JROC members are able to identify disconnects early and make the necessary course corrections.

What is your vision for the role and priorities of the JROC in the future?

First and foremost, if confirmed, I will continue to ensure the warfighter's voice is heard and supported in the requirements process. Additionally, as we move into a period where it appears there will be great downward pressure on the defense budget, I believe the JROC and joint requirements process will need to play a key role in prioritizing what capabilities are most important to the Department. This will enable the JROC to make informed decisions to ensure the Department's most important warfighting capabilities remain intact. I also believe we must do a better job of controlling requirements creep within programs, and that tight synchronization between requirements, budgeting, and acquisition will become even more important in the coming years.

Do you believe the JROC process is sufficient to understand and identify where there are opportunities for multi-service collaboration or where programs could or should be modified to take advantage of related acquisition programs?

Recent implementations of the Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act have provided a broader look into current programs and future collaboration, not only among services but between combatant commands. There is always room for improvement, but generally I believe the JROC is effective in ensuring collaboration among the major stakeholders.

What principles guide your approach to inviting, and helping ensure the sufficient participation of other stakeholders in the JROC?

I believe transparency and honesty are crucial to the effective determination of joint requirements in order to meet warfighter needs. If confirmed, I will fully support the recommendations made by General Cartwright, to include advice from any organization with a stake in the requirements being validated.

Joint Capabilities Integration and Development Systems (JCIDS)

There have been longstanding concerns about the lack of flexibility and responsiveness within DOD's complex process of addressing the needs of the warfighters. Recently, GAO reported that the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) has evolved to provide many opportunities for Combatant Commanders to express their capability gaps, but that Combatant Commanders are frustrated with the lengthy, staff intensive advisory process that results in investments driven by service priorities.

As a combatant commander, what is your perspective on the responsiveness of the JCIDS process in addressing joint capabilities needs?

JCIDS is a deliberate requirements process, designed to be analytical to ensure service proposals are aligned with Joint Concepts of Operations and strategic guidance. It is also designed to ensure the Department complies with applicable laws by fully supporting acquisition and budgetary processes.

As CONOPS and missions have rapidly evolved to support the current security environment, and as acquisition and budget processes were adjusted to be more responsive to urgent warfighter needs, a parallel requirements process (supporting acquisition of Joint Urgent Operational Needs, or JUONs) was created to ensure joint needs were met in the short term (preventing loss of life or mission failure).

I have experienced frustration as a combatant commander in being caught between these two processes. However, the Joint Staff in this case proved to be very responsive in accelerating the JCIDS process to meet my needs, though final resolution of my requirement is pending. And as stated above, the Joint Staff, with inputs from all combatant commands and services, continues to make adjustments to both processes based on inputs from users, lessons learned, and changes in law, to ensure responsiveness to critical joint capabilities needs. I believe the ongoing JCIDS review will provide solid recommendations to improve the responsiveness and decision support to the JROC, COCOMs, Services, and Defense Agencies.

What level of involvement in the joint requirements process and the JROC do you believe is appropriate for the combatant commands (COCOMs)?

COCOMs continue to play an important role in the requirements process. They have always been able to act as a Sponsor, identifying capability gaps for consideration by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) for validation. COCOMs have always had an open invitation to attend and participate in any JROC meeting, to ensure their equity was considered on any subject.

Since the changes mandated by the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act, and the changes in the structure of the JROC mandated by the 2011 National Defense Authorization Act, the COCOMs' role on the JROC is now equivalent to that of a

Service. Because of this, the COCOM voice is able to be heard in all levels of the joint requirements process. The expansion of the COCOM role, and the active participation of COCOM commanders in the JROC, is completely appropriate, and I applaud the work General Cartwright has done to bring this to fruition.

However, I believe the COCOMs still have work to do to grow into this role, as their limited capacity and expertise, as well as limited senior officer bandwidth, makes it challenging to fully participate in this process. If confirmed, I will search for ways to not only provide the rule set that permits COCOM participation, but to provide the means for them to do it. I believe this is the next step in improving this process.

Section 862 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 directs the Government Accountability Office to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of designating a COCOM to provide a Joint Evaluation Task Force to participate in the development of a material solution for a new requirements document.

Do you think that such a Joint Evaluation Task Force would improve the dialogue between COCOMs and the services' acquisition communities? Why or why not?

I believe that the current requirements process already provides a mechanism for Joint dialogue between COCOMs and acquisition communities. The challenge is not in establishing a process, it is in enabling COCOMs to participate in it. My concern is that establishment of a Joint Evaluation Task Force may result in an additional layer of coordination and staffing between the existing requirements and acquisition processes, further delaying the identification of capability gaps and the subsequent fielding of systems addressing those gaps.

What additional steps do you think need to be taken to improve coordination and better integrate the warfighters into a requirements development process that is controlled by the services?

The process known as the Senior Warfighter Forum (SWarF), led by the Combatant Command (COCOM) Vice Commanders, provides a consolidated COCOM voice in prioritizing the attributes of capability needs in identified mission areas. An additional step that is being recommended as part of the ongoing JCIDS review is to formalize the SWarF process to better inform JROC decision-making to further integrate and coordinate requirements efforts of services and COCOMs.

As Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Cartwright directed the Joint Staff to begin an effort to overhaul the JCIDS process to make it more responsive to warfighter needs, have a stronger voice, and to develop a methodology for setting investment priorities across the Department.

Do you think that JCIDS needs to be changed? If so, what are your views on the how it could be improved to make the process more responsive to users' needs while efficiently investing resources in a fiscally constrained budget environment?

Yes, JCIDS continues to change as the agencies that support it (services, combatant commands, Joint Staff), and that it supports (acquisition and budgeting) continue to evolve. The work that has been going on since last summer has produced several significant recommendations to revise the joint requirements process. These recommendations take into account recent efficiencies gained by the disestablishment of U.S. Joint Forces Command, the Joint Staff J-6, and the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Network Integration and Information (ASD/NII), as well as the changes ongoing in the acquisition community with the revision of the DOD Directive 5000.02.

The fundamental idea behind JCIDS--that is, to assist the JROC in identifying and assessing joint military capability needs--will not change. The process used by the Joint Staff, and the content of the submissions, will move away from a document-centric toward a data-centric model, with more time spent on analysis of the risks associated with cost, schedule, and performance considerations to meet the urgency of the requirement. Staffing time and redundancy will be significantly reduced. It will also enable the JROC to make a better informed decision on the validation and prioritization of joint military requirements.

How do you envision your role, if confirmed, as the Chairman of the JROC?

The Vice Chairman, as JROC Chairman, co-chairman of the Deputies Advisory Working Group (DAWG), and a member of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), is the only person who sits at the intersection of both requirements and acquisition processes at the executive level. The JROC controls the requirements process through exercise of their validation authority. The JROC Chairman, therefore, must ensure the needs of the warfighter are met within the fiscal constraints placed on the Department.

What are your thoughts on the need for a joint force model to guide the development of requirements by each of the services and the fielding of capabilities?

Our move from threat-based planning to capabilities-based planning has enabled a joint assessment of capabilities that are interoperable and supportable across the joint force. Requirements are based on strategic guidance, which is constantly being revised to meet the current and anticipated threat. Services, as the principal sponsors of requirement submissions, identify capability gaps that are aligned with strategic guidance. The current capabilities-based planning model is sound, yet is it prudent that we continue to review the model to ensure our highest priority joint military requirements are being fielded to meet the needs of our joint force.

The requirements development process is not a stand-alone process, but instead is required to work collaboratively with the acquisition and budgeting processes.

What steps are needed to better align the requirements development process with the acquisition and budgeting processes to make for a more efficient and effective process for delivering capabilities?

It is my understanding that the ongoing JCIDS review evaluated several areas for improvement, and the Joint Staff has been working together with the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OSD/AT&L) to implement these improvements.

The implementation of expanded requirements manager certification training, through courses designed and conducted by the Defense Acquisition University, ensures responsible managers from both the requirements and acquisition communities have a common understanding of the needs of both processes, an awareness of the touch points between the two communities, and can work together effectively.

The move to a data-centric requirements generation model, partly facilitated by the creation of Capability Development Tracking and Management software, was mandated on 30 June of this year. This has the potential to provide acquisition communities greater visibility of requirements earlier in the process.

Another recommendation from the JCIDS review is for Joint Staff requirements experts to advise the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (OSD/CAPE) and the OSD AT&L by conducting a Joint Staff review of the results of the Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) to better inform the Milestone "A" acquisition decision. This will facilitate a better competitive prototyping strategy and allow a joint assessment of AOA results prior to the establishment of key performance parameters (KPP).

How soon do you anticipate that reforms to the JCIDS could be implemented?

It is my understanding that some improvements to JCIDS have already been implemented and final recommendations will be approved in the coming months. We anticipate implementation of major reforms by the end of this year.

Do you anticipate that the drawdown of U.S. combat forces in Iraq and Afghanistan will affect efforts to overhaul the system, and if so, how?

I do not anticipate that changes in existing force deployment levels will significantly affect the reforms to the joint military requirements process.

Acquisition Reform and Acquisition Management

What is your view of the changes made by the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009?

I fully support the changes made in the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act, and if confirmed, will work to implement any necessary changes in the requirements process.

What role have you played, and do you expect to play, if confirmed, in the implementation of that Act?

I have played no direct role in the Act's implementation in the billets I have held since its passage. However, I have read the Act and fully support it—if confirmed, I will work within the authority vested in the Chairman of the JROC to implement any changes to the requirements process necessary to support implementation of the Act.

What role, if any, do you believe the JROC should play in the oversight and management of acquisition programs after requirements have been established?

I believe the JROC should continue to monitor acquisition program execution to identify areas where requirements may drive cost growth and schedule delays. The JROC should play a key role in determining the appropriate balance between the performance of weapons systems and the resources needed to develop and procure them.

What role if, any, do you believe the JROC should play in reviewing the progress of major defense acquisition programs or other acquisition programs?

I believe the JROC should continue to review the progress of major defense acquisition programs and other programs of joint interest to fulfill its role in achieving appropriate balance between capability, schedule, and cost.

Do you see a need for any change in the role of the Chairman or the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the requirements determination, resource allocation, or acquisition management processes?

Not at this time.

What is your view of the role played by Configuration Steering Boards in preventing cost growth due to requirements creep?

I believe the Configuration Steering Boards are still maturing, but are increasingly providing a forum that promotes control of requirements and cost growth.

What do you see as the proper relationship between Configuration Steering Boards and the JROC in managing requirements for acquisition programs?

In my view, when the Configuration Steering Board recommends adjusting requirements in order to mitigate cost or schedule growth, the requirements community should consider the impact of the adjustment and provide guidance in support of the recommendations that balances the priority of the requirement with the program cost and schedule.

What is your view of the Nunn-McCurdy requirements for Major Defense Acquisition Programs that fail to meet cost, schedule, and performance objectives?

I support the Nunn-McCurdy requirements. I believe they force the Department to take a critical look at poor performing programs and reassess the path to achieving valid warfighter needs.

What do you see as the proper relationship between the JROC and those DOD officials charged with implementing the Nunn-McCurdy requirements?

I believe the role of the JROC as military advisor to the Milestone Decision Authority is appropriate when assessing Nunn-McCurdy breaches.

Urgent Needs Processes

Section 804 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 requires the Department of Defense to develop a comprehensive approach for managing all of its various urgent needs processes that would, among other things, define roles, responsibilities, and authorities, and designate a senior-level focal point for urgent needs.

Do you agree that the DOD should develop DOD-wide guidance that better defines roles, responsibilities, and authorities and designates a senior-level focal point for urgent needs?

Yes, and I am aware that efforts are underway to address those concerns. The Department has recently made positive steps in addressing Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) with the establishment of the Warfighter Senior Integration Group (SIG) co-chaired by the USD (AT&L) and the Joint Staff J3. This group is providing a streamlined and tightly integrated approach to expedite the resolution of issues associated with rapid fielding to include requirements, funding, acquisition, sustainment, and performance. The JUONs process has been very successful in recent years in providing much needed capability to our warfighters, and the process is continuously being improved.

In your view, what specific steps should the Department take to better manage the joint urgent needs process?

I believe the Department should continue to streamline the urgent needs process to quickly respond to urgent needs. Establishment of the SIG is a positive step and Joint Staff refinements to the validation process will continue to enhance the Department's support to the warfighter.

I also believe we should continue to build a process that bridges the gap between urgent needs and the formal Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process. Many requirements are not urgent enough to require the full court press of a Joint Urgent

Operational Needs process, but should be subject to the same process that establishes requirements for and procures a large weapons system.

What is your sense of where the DOD might consolidate urgent needs entities and/or processes and how cost savings could be achieved through such consolidation?

I believe that the Warfighter Senior Integration Group (SIG) has the potential to become DOD's permanent oversight body of Urgent Operational Needs. This has potential for significant cost savings since the SIG can monitor the services and various agencies to minimize the duplication of effort on urgent needs.

Do you believe that the Joint Staff should take steps to integrate the Joint Urgent Needs process with the individual services' processes? If so, please explain?

I believe it is important that the distinction between Service Urgent Operational Needs (UONs) and Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) remain in place so that the combatant commander has an effective channel to ensure Joint warfighter needs are promptly addressed. Execution of Service UONs and JUONs are already largely an integrated process as, both requirements generally flow to directorates with the requisite expertise to resolve all urgent needs.

Nuclear Weapons Council

If confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you would serve as a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council.

What would your priorities be for the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC)?

Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal is a key priority in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), central to the responsibilities of the NWC. If confirmed, I will work with the members to review the NWC work plan and execute it in accordance with the President's guidance in the NPR.

I will also work with the members of the NWC to pursue sound Stockpile Management for extending the life of U.S. nuclear weapons, ensuring a safe, secure, and effective deterrent.

Additionally, I will work with NWC members to ensure the modernization of our aging nuclear facilities and investment in human capital, to enable a substantial reduction to the number of nuclear weapons that need to be retained as a hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise, to accelerate dismantlement of retired warheads, and to improve our understanding of foreign nuclear weapons activities.

What changes if any would you recommend to the organization, structure, or function of the NWC?

USC Title 10 Section 179 sets forth the organization, structure and function of the NWC. I have no recommendations at this time. However, if confirmed, I will work with the NWC chairman and members to assess the organization, structure and function of the NWC, and where warranted, provide recommendations for change to increase effectiveness and value in support of the nuclear mission for national security.

Legislative Gaps in Defense Support to Civil Authorities

The Department continues to lack statutory authority to order Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps Reserve personnel to active duty in order to provide support in response to a natural disaster. Despite determined efforts by you, as Commander, U.S. Northern Command, and the Council of Governors to address concerns of State governors about operational control of Federal forces during naturally causes emergencies, no resolution that would facilitate a legislative change has been achieved.

From a contingency planning perspective, how necessary, in your view, is modification of title 10, U.S. Code, to allow reservists involuntarily to be called to active duty to respond to natural disasters?

I believe it is important for DOD to be able to plan for and access Title 10 Federal Reserve capabilities to ensure adequate speed, capability, and capacity in responding to natural disasters in support of the American people. Title 10 Federal Reserve Forces possess significant capabilities to mitigate the effects of major disasters or emergencies, whether natural or manmade. Federal Reserve forces are geographically dispersed throughout the nation and are often located closer to the incident site than active duty forces. A high percentage of skill sets and capabilities needed during response to natural disaster is contained in the Federal Reserves.

What is the current status of negotiations with State Governors, and what unresolved issues remain that stand in the way of an agreement?

In the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress recommended that the Department of Defense (DOD) "engage with the community of governors to work out an understanding of unity of effort during domestic terrorist events and public emergencies." The President established a Council of Governors in 2010 to address this and other issues. The Council has already made important progress in approving a concept that provides dual chains of command to ensure unity of effort in response to disasters.

Proposed legislation to address access to the Federal Reserve forces has been a priority topic of discussion in the Council over the past year. The members of the Council have worked hard to ensure we get the language right. Based upon the 17 July 2011 Council of Governors meeting that I attended in Salt Lake City, I believe there are no more unresolved issues. My understanding is that there is now full concurrence among the Council, the Department of Homeland Security, and the

DOD for the National Governors Association regarding language to recommend to the Congress for inclusion in the FY12 NDAA.

If confirmed, what role, if any, would you play in ensuring the Department addresses what is clearly a significant vulnerability?

If confirmed, I look forward to the opportunity to continue to support the Council of Governors and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs as they finalize work on a legislative proposal to gain access to Federal Reserve Forces for domestic incidents that can increase the speed of response and deliver necessary capabilities to our citizens in need. I believe we are close to positive resolution of this matter.

Homosexual Conduct Policy

The “Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010,” enacted on December 22, 2010, provides for the repeal of the current Department of Defense policy concerning homosexuality in the Armed Forces, to be effective 60 days after the Secretary of Defense has received the Department of Defense 's comprehensive review on the implementation of such repeal, and the President, Secretary, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff certify to the congressional defense committees that they have considered the report and proposed plan of action, that the Department of Defense has prepared the necessary policies and regulations to exercise the discretion provided by such repeal, and that implementation of such policies and regulations is consistent with the standards of military readiness and effectiveness, unit cohesion, and military recruiting and retention.

What is your view on repealing the current Department of Defense policy?

I support repeal of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy in the manner that the repeal has been crafted. I believe the Armed Forces are prepared to implement the repeal of 10 U.S.C. 654, consistent with the Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-321). I have expressed to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in writing that USNORTHCOM is prepared for implementation.

What effect do you anticipate the repeal will have on readiness and discipline in the Armed Forces?

We have the policy and regulations needed for implementation, consistent with standards of military readiness, military effectiveness, unit cohesion, and recruiting and retention. I am confident that we are ready now to affect repeal while sustaining military effectiveness, even in our current conflicts.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response

The Department has in recent years developed comprehensive policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and response to incidents of sexual assaults, including providing appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault. However, numerous incidents of sexual misconduct involving military personnel in combat areas of operation and at home stations are still being reported. Victims and their advocates claim that they are victimized twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and then by unresponsive or inadequate treatment for the victim. Despite the leaders' commitment to "zero tolerance," the view is held by some that the Department has not done enough to provide the resources and policies needed to prevent sexual assaults.

Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting, to be effective?

I believe current policies and programs designed to address sexual assault have allowed the Department to both care for victims and hold offenders accountable. That said, I believe that, until no sexual assaults occur within our forces, we should continue to look for ways to improve the system.

What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in which confidential reporting procedure has been put into operation?

I am not personally aware of any problems in the implementation of the restricted reporting option. Confidential reporting allows victims who wish to remain anonymous to obtain the support they need following an assault. I will remain alert and receptive to reported flaws in the program and support taking prompt action to improve the system.

What is your view of the steps the Services (including the reserve components) have taken to prevent and respond to sexual assaults in combat zones, including assaults against contractor personnel and assaults by foreign nationals?

No sexual assault is acceptable anywhere in our armed forces, whether deployed or not. I believe the services have procedures in place to address the challenges of preventing and responding to sexual assaults in an operational environment to include working with host governments and our international partners. Every effort is made to take care of all victims and hold offenders accountable. However, as I stated above, until no sexual assaults occur within our armed forces, we should continue to look for ways to improve prevention and response.

What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources the Services have in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?

Our investigators and first responders are well trained. All services recently enhanced their resources for investigating and prosecuting sexual assault cases.

What do you see as the most difficult problems commanders must contend with in holding assailants accountable for their acts?

I believe building and maintaining victim confidence to assist in the investigation can often be difficult for commanders trying to take appropriate command action against assailants. Commanders are also frequently confronted with the challenge that alleged sexual assaults are also often accompanied by other lesser misconduct on the part of both the victim and the alleged assailant that is easier to prove than sexual assault.

If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure senior level direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond to sexual assaults?

Senior leadership focus on this important topic is critical. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Chiefs to monitor progress in eradicating sexual assault in the military.

Active-Duty End Strength

Former Secretary of Defense Gates announced this year that the Army would reduce its end strength by 22,000 through FY 2013, including 7,400 in FY 2012. This end strength was part of the temporary increase authorized in 2009 and was intended to more fully fill out the existing force structure. Beginning in FY 2015, depending on conditions on the ground, the Army and Marine Corps plan to reduce their permanent end strength and force structure by 27,000 soldiers and at least 15,000 marines, respectively.

Does the foregoing statement accurately reflect current planning?

The statement appears to be consistent with remarks made by Secretary Gates. It is also my understanding that the Army and the Marine Corps need a bit more time to confirm these projected personnel numbers and the timeframe for their implementation, particularly for the out-years.

How would you describe the risk in adhering to these reductions?

Given current trends in Iraq and Afghanistan, including reduced demand for ground forces in Iraq, the risk is manageable, but dynamic. This process will require careful monitoring and potential management flexibility during the drawdown.

Can the Army accelerate to 2012 more of its planned reduction in its temporary overstrength?

Though I currently do not have the information I need in order to reach a firm conclusion, I believe it would be difficult to accelerate a reduction in ground forces prior to concluding the Afghan campaign. Accelerated reductions would likely increase the stress on the force and could introduce unacceptable risk to other combatant commands that

have ground force requirements. If confirmed, I will pay close attention to the pace at which force structure changes are planned for our ground forces.

What are the assumptions regarding “conditions on the ground” that will allow for the planned reductions beginning in 2015 to occur on time?

In general, I would expect such a decision to depend to a significant degree on our assessment of progress against security objectives in specific theaters and the elements of key strategic decisions regarding potential future contingencies as 2015 approaches. I would solicit the advice of our combatant commanders and DOD’s senior military and civilian leaders to inform my recommendations on such decisions.

The Navy and Air Force, while not currently facing the same level of planned reductions in their active duty end strengths in the coming years, are concerned about exceeding their end strength authorizations due to higher than expected retention. Consequently, both services are seeking force management tools that require Congressional authorization and relying on involuntary separations to reduce their forces.

What tools do the Department and Services need to get down to authorized strengths by the end of this fiscal year, and which of these require Congressional authorization?

I understand that some of the authorities used during previous force reductions have expired or are expiring soon. The DOD is seeking to renew these authorities and is requesting new legislation to size and shape the force. My view is that the DOD should make maximum use of voluntary authorities; however, great care should be taken to ensure those who leave are not going to be needed in the near term. If confirmed, I will study this issue closely and rely on the advice of both civilian and military professionals within the DOD.

Reserve Components as an Operational Reserve

What is your understanding and assessment of the Reserve Components as an operational reserve, as opposed to its long-standing traditional role as a strategic reserve?

Sustained engagement in combat operations has transformed the Reserve Components of our Armed Forces from a purely strategic force to one that also provides operational, full-spectrum capabilities to the Nation. Repeated combat deployments, as well as peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and homeland defense missions, have produced a force more operationally capable and experienced than any time in our Nation’s history. Given sufficient predictability of the “next” deployment, the vast majority of Reserve Component forces and capabilities can be accessed systematically long into the future. National Guard and Reserve members expect to deploy periodically to meet the Nation’s security needs, and all have volunteered to remain a part of the force with this “new

normal.” This operational force is a direct result of the substantial investment in resourcing commitments and the personal sacrifice of members, their families, and their civilian employers. I expect that as budget pressures tighten, the Reserve Component role will evolve along with that of the Active Component in a strategy-driven process, which could alter the current shape of the Reserve Component in ways not yet clearly understood.

In your view, what are the major challenges to maintaining and enhancing the National Guard and Reserves as a relevant and capable operational reserve?

Two key challenges that come to mind are access to the Reserve Components and sustained funding for their operation. Since 9/11, the Department has relied on the provisions of the Presidential Declaration of National Emergency to gain involuntary access to the Reserve Components. As you know, this declaration must be extended annually for the provisions to remain in effect. The Reserve Component is no longer considered a solely strategic capability to call upon in a national emergency. Therefore, to ensure continued access, I understand that DOD is working with the Armed Services Committees within the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act to enable and facilitate periodic and recurring use by granting the Secretaries limited mobilization authority for up to 365 days for non-named contingency operations. This would better satisfy Joint Force Commanders’ requirements.

In addition to access, and depending on available resources, the Department will need to program sufficient resources to use the Reserve Component on a predictable and periodic basis to meet requirements, preserve readiness gains, avoid snapping back to a purely strategic reserve, and capitalize on cost efficiencies inherent in Reserve Component employment. As an operationally experienced and capable force, requiring only a small portion of defense funds, the Reserve Components can provide solid solutions to the significant fiscal challenges our military and our Nation face.

What are your views about the optimal employment in generating forces for combat missions of the National Guard and Reserve?

We’ve seen a significant change in Reserve Component use over the past twenty years and have developed a Total Force—Active, National Guard and Reserve—to meet sustained combatant commander requirements around the globe. This evolution, combined with the current era of conflict and the broad range of security challenges on the horizon requires us to make smart decisions about Total Force capabilities and capacities to make sure we have the forces needed to defend and advance our national interests. To that end, the Secretary of Defense directed a Reserve Component Front End Assessment that will inform the 2013 Program Budget Review and should be completed in September. I would want to read that assessment before making any firm commitments. I believe those findings, combined with recommendations articulated in the Department’s *Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component*, will present and shape optimum mix and employment models for our Total Force.

In your view, should homeland defense or other global or domestic civil support missions be assigned exclusively to the National Guard?

No, I believe each component of the Total Force—Active, Guard or Reserve—has an important, layered, and interdependent role in the successful execution of homeland defense and civil support missions.

National Guard

What is your understanding and assessment of changes in the global and domestic roles and mission of the Army National Guard, the Air National Guard, and the National Guard Bureau?

The roles of the Army National Guard, Air National Guard, and the National Guard Bureau in domestic missions have not changed over the last few years. The National Guard continues to be the first military response to a community-based event. Meanwhile, the National Guard has performed exceptionally well in our conflicts overseas during the past ten years, and is a combat-seasoned force.

If confirmed, I look forward to participating in the discussion of how the National Guard will evolve its dual role of supporting domestic missions while remaining a relevant contributor to global missions in support of an evolving national military strategy.

What is your assessment of the effect, if any, of increasing the grade of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to General (O-10)?

From my experience as Commander, USNORTHCOM, I believe elevating the grade of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) to the rank of General has proven to be the right decision. In my current capacity, I have benefitted from being able to interact with a four-star officer leading the NGB, and we have formed a solid partnership. The National Guard is an indispensable component of the operational military and the Chief serves as a bridge for the states to the federal government and the active components of the military.

In your view, should there be a requirement that the position of Commander, U.S. Northern Command or Commander, U.S. Army North, the Army component commander, be filled only by a National Guard officer? Please explain.

While I absolutely welcome the possibility that a National Guard officer could be assigned to either position, I do not believe there should be a mandated requirement for either position to be filled by a National Guard officer. I believe the best-qualified officer, regardless of status as Active, Guard or Reserve, should be selected as Commander, U.S. Northern Command and Commander, U.S. Army North.

In your opinion, should the Chief of the National Guard Bureau be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

I have developed a strong relationship with--and am a big believer in--America's National Guard and I would, if confirmed, give such a change the serious consideration it deserves. Although, like the Commandant of the Coast Guard, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau already attends most meetings of the JCS, I do see potential advantages to this initiative, to include bringing his unique insights more formally into this forum. However, before making such a recommendation, I would want to gain a better understanding of its implications, to include: what it means for the rest of the Reserve Component and whether they would feel disempowered, how it would affect the existing balance on the Joint Chiefs or would be redundant, whether other organizations with a Title 10 role would subsequently require full membership, the potential implication that the National Guard would evolve into separate services, and other implications of which I may not yet be aware.

What steps need to be taken, in your view, to ensure that a “deep bench” of National Guard general officers is continually being developed?

I believe there should be more joint education and training opportunities for National Guard general officers. Additionally, I am encouraged by the Air Force's recent elevation of the 1st Air Force/Air Forces Northern Commander position to three stars and filling it with an Air Guard officer. I support reestablishing the 3-star position of Vice Chief of the National Guard in order to develop National Guard lieutenant generals for promotion. As Commander of United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), I have benefitted by having National Guard officers assigned to my headquarters, which has surely contributed to their development, and I would encourage expansion of this program. The program under which we temporarily bring National Guard general officers into NORAD and USNORTHCOM headquarters to fill in for active duty officers attending the CAPSTONE senior officer course has been a major success. If confirmed, I will continue to seek opportunities to grow and develop our bench of National Guard officers.

Women in the Military

In the past year, the Navy has opened on submarines to women, the Marine Corps has expanded opportunities for women in intelligence specialties, and the Army is reviewing its assignment policy for female soldiers. The issue of the appropriate role of women in the armed forces is a matter of continuing interest to Congress and the American public.

Do you believe additional warfare specialties currently closed to women members should be opened for by women?

I have always believed in opening the door to additional roles for women in the Services. Current policies provide the Department of Defense sufficient flexibility under current law to make changes to assignment policy for women. I believe the services should

continue to assess their combat needs in order to make those determinations and notify Congress accordingly as required by statute (10 U.S.C., §652 and/or §6035).

Do you believe any changes in the current policy regarding women in combat are needed or warranted?

It is my understanding that the Department's policies and practices that restrict assigning female members are being reviewed at this time as mandated by Section 535 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. I would want to have access to the facts from that review before making a recommendation.

Rising Costs of Medical Care

In testimony presented to Congress in February 2009, the Assistant Director of the Congressional Budget Office asserted that “medical funding accounts for more than one-third of the growth projected for operations and support funding between 2009 and 2026.” In April 2009, then Secretary of Defense Gates told an audience at Maxwell Air Force Base that “health care is eating the Department alive.”

What is your assessment of the long-term impact of rising medical costs on future Department of Defense plans?

The continuing cost growth trend will pose a greater problem for the Department the longer it remains unresolved. Rising costs of medical care will require the Department to balance the costs of the healthcare system against risks in warfighting capability. This may either require increased strategic and military risk or the acceptance of changes in the system of healthcare.

If confirmed, I will help to ensure the health care system is flexible, efficient, and cost-effective to meet the requirements of the Military Departments, services, and combatant commanders to achieve our military objectives. I will also consider the critical importance of the medical system for our people – military members, retirees, and their families.

If confirmed, I look forward to continuing our efforts with Congress and the Department of Defense to find effective ways to improve the cost-effectiveness of the Military Health System.

If confirmed, what actions would you initiate or recommend to mitigate the effect of such costs on the DOD top-line?

The rising cost of health care is clearly an issue we need to work and will require the close support of Congress. Based on my current position, I do not have any specific initiatives in mind at this time. However, if confirmed, I will support the Secretary of Defense as he works with both the health care leadership of the Department, the health care industry, and veterans groups to examine new ways to ensure military beneficiaries

are provided the highest quality care possible while managing cost growth. Although this may require some adjustments to the program, I will keep in mind the critical importance of the medical system for our people – military members, retirees, and their families. It is especially important that we provide the most advanced system of care possible in our combat theaters and provide for our forces who are returning with both “seen” and “unseen” combat injuries.

What reforms in infrastructure, benefits, or benefit management, if any, do you think should be examined in order to control the costs of military health care?

If confirmed, I will assist the Secretary of Defense, as he leads the Department’s ongoing effort to explore all possibilities to control the costs of military health care. This may include an analysis of benefit payment structures, organizations, systems, and policies for the military health system. I would also support a strong push for the potential long-term gains available through the promotion of healthy life styles and prevention among our beneficiaries to help reduce the demand for health services.

Personnel and Entitlement Costs

In addition to health care costs, personnel and related entitlement spending continues to grow and is becoming an ever increasing portion of the DOD budget. Secretary Panetta, in his confirmation process, advocated for a comprehensive review of military compensation, saying “everything must be on the table,” including military retirement.

Do you believe the time is right to begin discussing reform of military compensation and retirement benefits?

I agree with Secretary Panetta about the need to conduct a comprehensive review of military pay and benefits. I believe that it is possible to restructure our military pay and benefits in a way that continues to attract, support, and retain our men and women in uniform and their families while containing cost.

Other than reducing active duty and reserve end strength, what actions do you believe can be taken to control the rise in personnel costs and entitlement spending?

I understand that personnel-related costs represent a growing percentage of the DOD’s limited resources. I’m also concerned about the fact that our current military compensation system is deep-seated in structures established decades ago. To control the rise in personnel costs and entitlement spending, I believe it is appropriate to conduct a comprehensive review of the military pay and benefits structure to determine where costs can be contained. However, while I support a review of military pay and benefits, we must do so in a manner that supports and sustains the all volunteer force.

Military Retirement

The 10th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) proposed a new defined benefit retirement plan that more resembles the benefits available under the Federal Employee Retirement System than the current military retirement benefit. Many other studies have questioned the affordability, feasibility, and fairness of the current “cliff vesting” system.

While it is often said that the military retirement benefit encourages retention after the 10-year point, do you believe it provides any significant boost to recruitment? Do 17-18 year olds, in your experience, care about retirement benefits when deciding to enlist?

My understanding is that recruit surveys show retirement benefits are often not a driving factor to enlist for those who are 17-18 years old, but I believe it may be appropriate to review the military retirement system for needed changes and efficiencies that encourage retention and boost recruitment. I understand that the Defense Business Board is reviewing military retirement and I look forward to reviewing their proposed alternatives to the current military retirement system in order to make an informed recommendation, if confirmed.

How might the military retirement system be modernized to reflect the needs of a new generation of recruits, while easing the long-term retirement cost to the government?

There are many proposed alternatives to the current military retirement system. As General Cartwright has stated, changes these benefits tend to only impact on the Department’s budget requirements in the long term. Any changes should be carefully considered, as they will have far-reaching and long-lasting effects on our force. I have no specific suggestions to offer at this time, but if confirmed, will closely review, along with the rest of the Joint Chiefs, those proposals and their impact in order to make an informed recommendation.

Systems and Support for Wounded Warriors

Members who are or have been wounded and injured performing duties in Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and New Dawn deserve the highest priority from their for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from active duty when appropriate, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Despite the enactment of legislation and continuing emphasis, many challenges remain in both the active and reserve components in responding to the needs of wounded, ill, and injured members under current law and regulations.

What is your assessment of the progress made to date by the Department of Defense, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Services to improve the care, management, and transition of seriously ill and injured members and their families?

Since the institution of the Wounded, Ill and Injured, Senior Oversight Council in 2007, the DOD and VA have been working on multiple ways to improve the care, management, and transition of our wounded warriors and their families. The DOD has established Wounded Warrior Units and Program oversight offices through which individual and family medical, mental, and social-economical needs are addressed. I understand the DOD and VA have established several Centers of Excellence for development of diagnostic tools, treatment modalities, education, and training for care providers, wounded warriors, and family members to provide treatment for the multiple facets of injuries or illness our seriously wounded warriors face.

What are the strengths upon which continued progress should be based?

I have been advised that we should continue to expand upon the research and treatment baselines established both within the private medical research and healthcare sector (e.g. Johns-Hopkins University on TBI, Mayo Clinic on Biomechanics, University of Utah and University of Massachusetts on Limb Regeneration) and the Centers of Excellence which fall under the Defense Center of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury. These groups are making daily strides in providing the best level and quality of care to our Wounded Warriors and their families. If confirmed, I will continue to support their efforts and work to ensure that they receive the support (both financial and manpower) required for them to continue their important work

What are the weaknesses that need to be corrected?

One weakness is clinical case management through the period when members transition from the active force to DOD retiree or eligible veteran status. For example, a single electronic health record is needed, and is in development but is still not deployed. Additionally, the improvement of the transition process and tracking for wounded warriors with unseen psychological wounds is an area of special concern. We must strive for continued process improvement for our wounded warriors—if confirmed, I will work to coordinate with all stakeholders to develop systems and processes to close these gaps.

If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you would pursue to increase support for wounded members and their families, and to monitor their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life?

I would continue to capitalize on the many non-profit programs and organizations that fall within “the Sea of Goodwill.” There are hundreds of these organizations and programs that have come to the aide of the wounded warriors and their families to provide for everything from assistive devices (e.g. wheel chairs, house ramps), to conducting research on medical treatments, to providing direct economic aid. The Chairman’s Office of Warrior and Family Support has been at the forefront on coordinating with a number of these organizations, cataloging those which provide the best quality and quantity of assistance to our wounded warriors and their families. I will

also encourage continued work between the Federal and state governments on this important topic via the Council of Governors and other potential forums.

Studies conducted as a result of the revelations at WRAMC pointed to the need to reform the disability evaluation system (DES). A DES pilot program, and now an Integrated DES program, have been established to improve processing of members.

What is your assessment of the need to further streamline and improve the Integrated DES?

I agree with the need to streamline the current Integrated Disability Evaluation System. It is my understanding that earlier this year, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Veteran's Administration established an IDES Tiger Team. Since May, the Tiger Team initiated a reform program and has set in motion a campaign plan to reduce the IDES total process time. The goal is to eventually reduce the IDES total process time to 90 days or less. This will require close coordination with Congress for legislative change. This will reduce the total number of warriors in the evaluation process, thus reducing the overall cost to the system and the burden on our wounded warriors.

If confirmed, how will you address any need for change?

If confirmed, I will support current IDES reform initiatives as set forth by the Secretaries and, if necessary, make recommendations to ensure the appropriate levels of disability rating and compensation are provided our Wounded Warriors.

Suicide Prevention, High-Risk Behavior, and Mental Health Resources

The numbers of suicides in each of the services has increased in recent years. The Army released a report entitled "Army Health Promotion Risk Reduction Suicide Prevention" in June 2010 that analyzed the causes of its growing suicide rate and examined disturbing trends in drug use, disciplinary offenses, and high risk behaviors. In addition, mental health surveys conducted by the Army of Soldiers and Marines in theater document declines in individual morale and increases in mental health strain, especially among those who have experienced multiple deployments.

In your view, what role should the Joint Chiefs of Staff play in shaping policies to help prevent suicides both in garrison and in theater and to increase the resiliency of all members and their families?

The rising suicide rate amongst active duty personnel is deeply concerning. In response to the 2010 Department of Defense Task Force Report on Prevention of Suicide, the DOD is developing an action plan to address the 13 foundational and 76 targeted recommendations in the report. Expedient implementation and resourcing of the particular recommendations the services have identified as high priority would benefit

DOD commitment to reducing suicides. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with Congress, our military leaders, Veterans Affairs, and other Federal and civilian organizations to see that our members' and families' psychological health and mental health issues are addressed.

What is your understanding of the action taken in response to the June 2010 Army report, and the data in Chapter 3 (“The Lost Art of Leadership in Garrison”) in particular?

It is my understanding that the Army continues to evaluate and modify programs and services that are related to health promotion, risk reduction, and suicide prevention. Early identification of “high risk” behavior, such as substance abuse and behavior problems, should allow leaders to intervene early. I understand that the Army has engaged leaders at all levels to improve education and awareness of behavioral health issues and high-risk behaviors. The Army has increased behavioral health providers at the brigade level in active, National Guard, and Army Reserve units; required increased behavioral health screening before and after deployments; improved training for chaplains and suicide prevention coordinators; and improved training for primary care medical providers to identify and respond to behavioral health issues.

What actions, if any, should the Joint Chiefs of Staff take with respect to Army policies regarding detection of and response to illegal drug abuse?

On 1 November 2010, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined several initiatives to improve the detection and response to illegal drug abuse. The DOD Biological Testing Advisory Board, which has Army representation, has been working to jointly address the recommendations identified and to discuss additional actions that would be beneficial. However, I understand that funding remains a constraint to immediate implementation of identified improvements.

If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that sufficient mental health resources are available to members in theater, and to the members and their families upon return to home station?

Personal mental health issues cannot be ignored and, as an institution, the DOD must continue to directly address this issue. My understanding is that there are three areas that must be addressed to ensure sufficient resources are available to members and their families.

First, we must ensure that members are comfortable seeking treatment and using the resources that are available. A Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) will be issued soon to address this directly. This new instruction will positively affect command notification reducing the stigma associated with receiving mental health treatment. Second, we must continue working to develop additional and more effective mental health therapies. Third, we must ensure that we have the necessary resources available, including trained mental health professionals. We must continue to coordinate closely

with our VA and civilian counterparts to ensure consistent staffing of mental health professionals across the continuum of care.

Military Quality of Life

In January 2009, the Department published its second Quadrennial Quality of Life Review, which focused on the importance of key quality of life factors for military families, such as family support, child care, education, health care, and morale, welfare, and recreation services.

How do you perceive the relationship between military and family readiness and quality of life improvements and your own top priorities for the armed forces?

I expressed in a previous question that I will work closely with the Secretary and his staff, the Chairman, the other Joint Chiefs, and the combatant commanders to ensure our national defense remains strong by, among other things, ensuring our families and wounded warriors are cared for properly. We cannot protect this country unless we have healthy, personally-secure fighting men and women who are willing to put their lives on the line. A key component of this is ensuring we do everything possible and appropriate to meet their personal needs.

If confirmed, what further enhancements, if any, to military quality of life would you consider a priority in an era of intense downward pressure on budgets, and how do you envision working with the Services, combatant commanders, family advocacy groups, and Congress to achieve them?

I understand the importance of quality of life programs on the wellness of the total force. If confirmed, I will encourage proactive management of the key areas such as access to counseling, fitness opportunities, child care support and spouse employment opportunities. Though basic quality of items such as satisfaction with PCS moves are largely issues, I have a keen interest in ensuring they are looked after properly. I look forward to working with advocacy groups and Congress to efficiently close gaps and reduce overlaps in programs and to communicate effectively with families to ensure that they know how to access available support when they need it.

Family Support

Military members and their families in both the active and reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military leaders have warned of growing concerns among military families as a result of the stress of frequent deployments and the long separations that go with them.

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for members and their families, and, if confirmed, how would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced?

I believe family readiness is tethered to family resilience. It is the DOD's responsibility to ensure families are well prepared to meet the challenges that come with deployment and service. Through focusing on the psychological, social, financial, and educational well-being of military families, the DOD can continue to build family resilience. I understand that strides have been made in improving access to resources for families through such programs as Military One Source, and the Yellow Ribbon Program, but there is always room for improvement.

How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global rebasing, BRAC, deployments, and growth in end strength?

It is the DOD's responsibility to ensure that all available resources, including those in health care, education, and employment, are available to families at the required level and location. In order to accurately address the needs of these families in a changing environment, it is also critical to the DOD's success to build community partnerships between all Federal Agencies and with local governments, businesses, and non-profit organizations that are stakeholders in addressing the stressful aspects of military life. I also believe we need to encourage continued progress among individual states' legislative initiatives to ease recognition of professional accreditation of family members and support for various school programs transferring children. If confirmed, I will monitor the changing needs of our military families closely.

If confirmed, how would you ensure support to reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment and family readiness, as well as to active duty families who do not reside near a military installation?

DOD has a duty to ensure that every family has access to quality resources, regardless of location. These resources should provide information, access, referrals, and outreach to all military members and their families. This needs to be underwritten by a coordinated, community based network of care encompassing DOD, VA, state, local, non-profit and private providers. It is my understanding that DOD's Yellow Ribbon Program has been successful in addressing these needs. If confirmed, I will assess this program to ensure that it is properly focused and funded to address the issues faced by active duty, Guard, and Reserve members and their families.

If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to enhance family support?

I understand there are many excellent state programs that support members and their families. If confirmed, I would like to explore these further and see if they can be expanded across all states. If confirmed, I would encourage the implementation of flexible family support programs that meet the needs of our members and their families, whether they live on military installations, near military installations, or far from military installations

Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS)

In June 2002, the Department issued a directive to replace the current readiness reporting system, yet that replacement is yet to be fully operational.

What challenges still remain in the transition from the Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) to the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRSS) and what is the plan to fully implement DRSS?

It is my understanding that the transition from the Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) to the Defense Readiness Reporting System faces challenges associated with management, acquisition practices, definition of requirements, and testing. The transition is scheduled to be complete the end of Fiscal Year 2012. I also understand that as part of the DRRS governance structure, the Joint Staff is working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense Personnel and Readiness to develop an executable implementation plan, including milestones, performance goals and quantifiable, measurable validated requirements. On 6 June 2011, the DRRS was placed under OSD Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, and OSD Acquisition Test and Logistics Development Test and Evaluation oversight.

Have any delays or obstacles been attributed to technological maturity or changing requirements?

I understand the Joint Staff was informed by the DRRS Implementation Office (DIO) during normal governance processes of some technological challenges. These included challenges associated with the ability of the DRRS to connect to strategic command and control systems and connections within the DRRS enterprise. I also understand that changing requirements have also contributed to delays in the development of a long term DRRS program, and the transition from GSORTS. Additionally, since the originally planned Full Operational Capability (FOC) date of 2007, challenges remain with clearly defining measurable requirements. When combined with growing lists of requirements that still require prioritization or validation, efforts to develop executable plans have been delayed. Work continues to define FOC criteria, finalize dates for transition, and complete the accompanying implementation plan.

The Government Accountability Office has reported that significant shortfalls remain in the implementation of DRRS, stability of requirements, adequacy of testing, and overall management and oversight of the program.

What is your view on their findings?

I concur with the specified findings of the 2009 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report. I support the DRRS oversight related findings in GAO-11-256, "Military Readiness: Army and Marine Corps Reporting Provides Additional Data, but Actions Needed to Improve Consistency" report. Specifically, I believe steps are needed to achieve interoperability, oversight, and execution. Additionally, I concur with the GAO assessment that an independent program risk assessment is needed to improve program organization.

With respect to DRRS development and implementation, to what extent, if any, has the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Personnel & Readiness, worked or coordinated with the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and the Chief Information Officer of the Department of Defense?

I am aware of a report and corresponding memorandum produced for the defense committee as directed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. I understand the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering produced the report. I do not believe the September 2010 report, "Preliminary Technology Readiness Assessment Report on the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS)," and accompanying memorandum to the committee, "DRRS - Response to the Request Made on Page 111 of Senate Report 111-35" was coordinated with or endorsed by the Joint Staff. I am aware the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Networks and Information Integration/DOD Chief Information Officer coordinates with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Personnel & Readiness through participation in the DRRS governance process.

Air Force Tactical Aviation

As the head of the JROC, you would be responsible for overseeing the development and validation of requirements for major weapons systems. Some have raised concerns that many of the problems within the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program derive from growth in requirements.

Do you agree that this is a problem with the JSF program?

I understand that issues with the JSF program have been addressed through a deliberate requirements and acquisition review process, and that requirements growth has been an issue. A high level re-plan was approved in January 2011, and the program expects to deliver a fully-compliant weapon system. I am taking steps to gain in-depth familiarity with the JSF program, intend to give the program my close personal attention, and fully support continuing JROC reviews of the program.

What actions would you propose to take to prevent requirements growth on major weapons systems?

Requirements growth requires continued vigilance, which will be especially important in an increasingly constrained budget environment. If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize current checks and balances that are in place to include the "trip-wire" process and Configuration Steering Boards. Additionally, I understand that one of the core elements of the ongoing JCIDS review is to strengthen requirements synchronization with the acquisition process, which will serve to improve control of requirements growth.

If the JROC cannot control requirements growth on the largest acquisition program in the DOD portfolio, what prospect is there that the JROC could control requirements growth on any other major acquisition programs?

I fully acknowledge the Committee's concern regarding requirements growth. I have confidence that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council maintains adequate authorities and processes to manage requirements growth, and if confirmed I will continue General Cartwright's emphasis on imposing discipline on such growth.

At a hearing earlier this year, the Committee received testimony from senior DOD officials that there really is no alternative to continuing the JSF program.

What actions would you propose to take to prevent DOD from finding that future major acquisition programs that run into cost schedule or performance problems leaves us with no alternative but to continue the troubled programs?

I do not believe any program is too big to fail or should be fenced. That said, we need to work hard to ensure programs, including the JSF, are successfully executed. Process improvements resulting from the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act and JCIDS review should reduce the risk of similar circumstances in the future. If confirmed, I will work closely with my and OSD AT&L counterparts to properly manage current and future program development to balance cost, schedule, and performance in the best interest of the taxpayer.

Iraq Lessons Learned

What do you believe are the major lessons learned from the Iraq invasion and the ongoing effort to stabilize the country?

While there are other lessons to be sure, perhaps the most important lesson is that in executing a major contingency, we must remain prepared for the difficult work that occurs in the wake of major combat. This will manifest itself in two ways. First, in framing future strategic and force sizing constructs, we must account for the fact that conflicts are never as compact as predicted, and that the notion of rapidly swinging forces from one conflict to another must be viewed with healthy skepticism. Second, we must plan and train with our civilian counterparts and be prepared to operate effectively in all phases of conflict. That said, the military should also be prepared to undertake critical non-military tasks when civilian agencies cannot operate effectively, either due to the security environment or due to lack of capacity. Indeed, the need for greater capabilities and capacity in civilian agencies has been a recurring lesson for the entire U.S. government. Finally, we need to obtain better situational awareness of the underlying political, cultural, and economic drivers within a host nation to ensure our actions meet our objectives and not trigger unintended consequences.

What is your understanding and assessment, if any, of the Department's adaptations or changes in policy, programs, force structure, or operational concepts based upon the lessons learned?

The Iraq War has led to deep and far-reaching changes in all of the areas listed above. For example, counterinsurgency doctrine has been completely revised, culminating in the publication of Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24. Force structure changes include the development of the Advise and Assist Brigade. Additionally, the Department better understands that in Irregular Warfare, the strategic center of gravity is a population, and not necessarily a nation-state. The Department has demonstrated the ability to learn and adapt across Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy.

If confirmed, what additional changes, if any, would you propose making to policy, programs, force structure, or operating concepts based on the lessons of combat and stability operations in Iraq?

I understand that most of the lessons from Iraq are in the process of being integrated into DOD policy and doctrine. However, I do believe we need to be cautious in not over-correcting into a force that is exclusively prepared for an Iraq-type of conflict.

What is your understanding of the role of the Joint Staff in supporting and resourcing efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere to foster commitment to the "Rule of Law" as part of stability operations and doctrine?

The principle of respect for the rule of law is thoroughly embedded in our military forces and is reinforced throughout joint doctrine with regard to stability operations. Stability operations are a core military mission and our support to other U.S. Government agencies is a significant force multiplier. Indeed we recognize that it is often the establishment of the rule of law, and a security sector that can enforce it, that will permit the redeployment of the joint force when supporting a stabilization effort in a failed or failing state. Even in a non-combat theater, at United States Northern Command we maintain an extensive relationship with the Mexican military on human rights and the rule of law that, with the support of Congress, is fully supported by counternarcotics funding.

I understand that a portion of the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Operations and Maintenance budget has been designated to support continued strategic planning, programming, and interagency training for rule of law operations and that the Joint Staff recently assisted the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in gathering information to draft a rule of law report that soon will be delivered to Congress.

Drawdown in Iraq

Do you support the plan for the drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq consistent with the 2008 U.S-Iraq Security Agreement?

I support the current plan for the drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq in accordance with the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. It is important that we fulfill our obligations under this bilateral agreement and we are on track to complete the drawdown by December 31, 2011.

What is your assessment of the Department's planning for the withdrawal of troops and equipment out of Iraq consistent with the December 2011 deadline of the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement?

The drawdown of troops and equipment in Iraq is on track due to solid planning and the discipline, training, and dedication of our deployed forces. My understanding is that the Joint Staff closely tracks the progress of the drawdown on a daily basis. Since this process began in 2010 with the force reduction from 159,000 to 50,000 troops, we have closed hundreds of bases and outposts and turned them over to our Iraqi partners in better condition than we inherited them. Our logisticians have moved mountains of equipment. The plan is on time and on schedule for a complete withdrawal by the December 2011 deadline of the Security Agreement.

It's been reported that the Administration is considering options for a U.S. force to remain in Iraq beyond December 2011 should the Iraqi Government request the continuing presence of U.S. forces.

If a continuing U.S. troop presence in Iraq beyond the end of this year is requested by the Government of Iraq, would you support the deployment or retention of additional troops in Iraq beyond the present deadline for U.S. troop withdrawal?

If the Government of Iraq (GOI) requests the presence of U.S. forces beyond 2011, I will consider the missions the GOI is asking our forces to perform, the risks our forces will face, the willingness of the GOI to take action against militias and other extremist groups that could target U.S. forces, the benefit it might bring to Iraq and the U.S.-Iraq relationship, and the cost of the mission. If confirmed, and if these factors support retention of U.S. forces, I would make such a recommendation.

Lead Agency Transition in Iraq

Responsibility for lead U.S. agency in Iraq is scheduled to transition from the Department of Defense (DOD) to the Department of State (DOS) by October 2011. However, a May 2011 State Department Inspector General report found that progress in effectively transitioning to a civilian-led presence in Iraq is slipping in a number of key areas, including the establishment of the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq to manage the defense relationship between the U.S. Government and the Government of Iraq.

What is your assessment, if any, of the planning and progress in executing the transition from DOD to DOS? B. In your view, what are the sources of greatest risk to the current plan and the successful implementation of the transition?

My understanding is that the transition from the DOD and DOS is on track. The DOD, DOS, and other agencies and offices have undertaken unprecedented levels of coordination and planning for the transition in Iraq. We have an excellent working relationship with our State Department colleagues and are working together at all levels to achieve a successful transition. As one would expect with a transition of this scope and complexity, challenges exist, but it is my understanding that we are working together to overcome them and remain on schedule. Fully funding the State mission to its completion is vital to this effort.

If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend to the current plan or the implementation of transition?

The transition plan is solid, and my understanding is that we are on track to fully implement it. Normal operational challenges remain as we close bases and move personnel and equipment, but we anticipate no issues meeting the deadline in accordance with the transition plan. However, should the Iraqis request a continued US presence beyond 2011, I would want to be closely involved in subsequent planning efforts.

U.S.-Iraq Strategic Relationship

In your view, what will be the nature of our strategic relationship with Iraq after December 31, 2011?

Our stated goal has always been to establish a long term strategic partnership with Iraq. We support an Iraq that is sovereign and self-reliant; that has a just, representative and accountable government; that denies support and safe haven to terrorists; that is integrated into the global economy; and that contributes to regional peace and security. All these elements of our desired strategic relationship with Iraq were codified in the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement established between Iraq and the United States. If confirmed, it is my intention to closely monitor the status and progress of our relationship.

Afghanistan Strategy

Do you agree with President Obama's strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan announced at West Point in December 2009?

Yes.

On June 22, 2011 President Obama announced his decision to draw down 10,000 U.S. troops from Afghanistan by the end of this year and to withdraw the remaining 23,000 "surge" force by September 2012, for a total announced drawdown of 33,000.

Do you support the President's decision to begin reducing U.S. forces in July 2011? Why or why not?

While I have not been focused on the mission in Afghanistan while executing my duties at North American Aerospace Defense Command and United States Northern Command, it is my understanding that we have made significant gains as a result of deploying the surge force. This force increase has allowed us to arrest Taliban momentum, establish security in previously-held Taliban areas such as Central Helmand and Kandahar (areas of historic importance to the insurgency), and expand ANSF capacity and capability. It is my understanding that the theater and combatant commander have expressed that we can drawdown and continue to manage the risk, as long as we retain flexibility if circumstances on the ground change. Commencing the drawdown in July 2011 has the benefit of sending an important signal to the Afghan government that international support is not open-ended.

Do you support the President's decision regarding the size and pace of reductions in U.S. forces? Why or why not?

Yes. It is my understanding that this decision does not represent a change in our strategy—the ends, ways, means, and boundary conditions outlined for the mission in Afghanistan remain the same. It appears to me that we have reached a point in the campaign where a responsible drawdown in U.S. forces is possible. Once surge forces are removed, there will still be more than 68,000 U.S. troops and thousands of international forces in Afghanistan – not to mention the addition of some 70,000 Afghan forces that will join the fight during the next 15 months. At the same time, the international community has demonstrated its intention to support Afghanistan until at least 2014, and the U.S. and NATO are both discussing some form of long-term partnership relationship with Afghanistan.

Thus, I agree with the President's decision. If confirmed, I will remain abreast of conditions on the ground in Afghanistan and, should I determine the situation has changed, I will provide such advice to the Chairman and the Secretary.

Security Situation in Afghanistan

What is your assessment of the current security situation in Afghanistan?

It is my understanding that the security situation in Afghanistan continues to improve though, as General Petraeus has said, it is fragile and reversible. Insurgent momentum has been halted in most of the country and reversed in many key areas like Helmand and Kandahar. For example, May and June mark the first time since 2006 that insurgent attacks have decreased when compared to the same months the year prior. The enemy is resilient and retains lethal capacity as well as the ability to regenerate over time. However, even in the wake of recent attacks, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have also proven their resilience and it appears that they will continue to push forward for a secure and

stable Afghanistan. Our forces, partnering with the ANSF, should help to further pressure the enemy by degrading support networks and further reduce support for the enemy among the Afghan population. Nonetheless, numerous security challenges remain, and there will be tough fighting in the years ahead as we transition security to Afghan lead by the end of 2014.

Beginning of Transition of Security Responsibility

The transition of lead security responsibility to Afghan security forces is set to begin in mid-July, with the initial phase to be completed by the end of this year. In March President Karzai announced the first tranche of provinces and municipal districts designated for the transition of security responsibility to an Afghan lead. President Karzai has called for the transition of security responsibility throughout Afghanistan to be completed by 2014, and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) members endorsed this goal at the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010.

Do you support the decision to transition the lead security responsibility to the Afghan security forces in the areas announced by President Karzai beginning this month?

Yes, based on support from our commander on the ground.

In your view, how important is it to the counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan that the transition of security responsibility begin in July 2011?

Transitioning to Afghan-led security responsibility is the next step in our comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) effort in Afghanistan. It will not be easy, and there will likely be setbacks as well as progress. However, as we seek to eliminate safe havens from which al Qaeda or its affiliates can launch attacks against our homeland or our allies, the Afghan government must step up its ability to protect its people and move forward with actions to build a more stable, economically viable country in the future. We should remain committed to working with the Afghan government and our coalition partners in executing the transition phase of the NATO/ISAF comprehensive COIN strategy in order to transfer lead security responsibility to the Afghan government by the end of 2014.

What is your assessment of the capacity of the Afghan security forces to assume the lead for security in the areas designated for this initial round of transition?

I believe that the Afghans are prepared to assume the lead for security in the areas designated in the first tranche based on my understanding of the current size and capability of Afghan security forces. Afghan security forces are already in the lead in some places, such as Kabul and Panshir. It goes without saying that our support will be critical, especially in the early days of the transition, but the Afghan National Security Forces must step up, and these areas are a good place to start.

Building the Afghan National Security Forces

There are approximately 100,000 more Afghan soldiers and police now than there were in November 2009 and by September 2012 another 70,000 personnel will be added to the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). A new ANSF target end strength of 352,000 by 2012 is awaiting final approval by the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board.

In your view, is the target end strength level for the ANSF sufficient to provide security and stability in Afghanistan?

I believe the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police should be capable of achieving the lead for security by the end of 2014 if the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board approves the 352,000 ANSF target end-strength and if that end-strength is achieved.

What in your view are the greatest challenges to building the capacity of the ANSF to assume responsibility for Afghanistan's security?

I believe the primary challenges to ANSF capacity building are: building literacy, reducing attrition, developing leaders, eliminating insider threats, and provision of key enablers such as logistics, maintenance, and intelligence capability.

There remains a shortfall in the number of training personnel required for the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) and in the number of embedded training teams, the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) embedding with Afghan Army units and the Police OMLTs (POMLTs) embedding with Afghan Police units.

In your view, to what extent should U.S. forces be used to source the shortfall in NTM-A trainers?

Fielding professional and capable ANSF is critical to our long term success in Afghanistan. This is a priority for ISAF and NTM-A. U.S. personnel are currently filling numerous training and partnership requirements throughout Afghanistan. Our forces will continue to support the ANSF as required in order to achieve our mission objectives. This may require shifting US forces into positions to cover trainer shortfalls if required by the commanders in the field.

What more should be done to get NATO members and other coalition partners to meet the ISAF requirements for additional NTM-A trainers and OMLTs and POMLTs?

Training shortfalls are a long-standing issue best addressed by continued engagement with our partners by all elements of the U.S. government – including Congress – as well as by NATO/SHAPE HQ, HQ ISAF, and representatives of the NATO training mission.

Our allies and contributing nations with operational commitments are being encouraged to reinvest any combat troop reductions with trainers, as has recently occurred with our Canadian partners. Personnel with specialized skills such as police, logisticians, medical, and maintenance specialists are essential. We continue to work on filling all training requirements, while also developing more Afghan trainers, in order to realign coalition trainers.

A key component of efforts to build the capacity of Afghan security forces is partnering ANSF units together with ISAF units in the field.

In your view, how effective has partnering been in building the capacity of the Afghan Army and Afghan police?

Partnering is an essential component of building Afghan security force capacity in order to allow Afghans to assume the lead for security across the country by the end of 2014. It is my understanding that we have made significant strides with our baseline training while, at the same time, focusing on our partnership efforts. This has proven to be the most effective way of increasing Afghan capability, confidence, and professionalism in the field. Afghan units that are partnered with ISAF elements continue to develop more rapidly. Partnered units are more effective in the field, have a better understanding on how to sustain their forces and have fewer incidents of corruption.

Would you support moving to a partnership ratio of ISAF and ANSF forces below 1:1 (less than 1 ISAF soldier for every ANSF soldier) as the capability of Afghan security forces improves?

My understanding is that we intend to do this as we transition security responsibility. This is part of the process of building ANSF capacity and then putting them in the lead. Developing units will require greater partner support, while effective units will have less partner support. Balancing partner efforts increases their capacity. Partner ratios will change dramatically as we move to complete Afghan control. My understanding is that there are several units now below a 1:1 partner ratio, and there are increasingly more areas where Afghans are in the lead or operating independently.

Relationship between Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency

In your view, what is the proper relationship between counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan?

The mission in Afghanistan is to degrade, disrupt, and destroy Al Qaeda and to provide sufficient stability so that Afghanistan can never again become a safe haven for terrorists. As such, counterterrorism directly targets Al Qaeda networks themselves, including leadership, thereby addressing the first imperative. It also supports the counterinsurgency campaign, which in turn intends to eliminate the conditions in which Al Qaeda can exist. Special operations forces are vital in both roles.

Afghan Local Police/Village Stability Operations

Secretary Panetta and others have emphasized the importance of the Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police programs to the strategy in Afghanistan.

What has been the effect of these programs on rural Afghan populations and what has been the response from the Taliban?

My understanding is that the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program and Village Stability Operations (VSO) have had a measurable and positive effect on security in Afghanistan. Since the program's inception by Afghan Presidential decree in August 2010, ALP has grown to over 6,700 patrolmen operating at 44 validated sites. ALP is a means of extending legitimate security where ISAF forces are scarce or non-existent. VSO, of which ALP is a component, builds the connection between the village, the province, and the central government. The program is intended to jump-start local governance and also mobilize communities, a key condition for local populations to resist Taliban predation. The enemy has explicitly targeted VSO because they fear its effectiveness and ALP members have successfully fought off Taliban attacks in a number of recent incidents. The ALP program and VSO continue to grow, and Afghans across the country are eager for the program to come to their area.

Do you believe the availability of U.S. special operations teams is a limiting factor in expanding these programs to a point where they can have a strategic impact in Afghanistan?

My understanding is that the number of ALP and VSO sites we can establish in Afghanistan is limited by the availability of Special Operations teams. This is because Special Operations teams embed and live where VSO/ALP has been established. In order to expand the VSO/ALP program, Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) has operational control of two U.S. Army Infantry battalions. The deployment of these two battalions under CFSOCC-A control has allowed us to thicken the Special Operations forces and free up more special forces personnel for new ALP/VSO missions. We expect that this will allow us to continue to increase the ALP program, even as the number of Special Operations in Afghanistan remains fairly constant.

How do indirect approaches like Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police Programs compliment direct action counterterrorism missions within the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan?

I understand that the VSO/ALP program methodology includes full-time embedded partnership between Special Operations forces and local villagers. Local villagers have among the best insight into insurgent actors, intentions, and their support structures. Special Operations forces conducting VSO/ALP and those conducting precision strike operations habitually cooperate and share information. The combination of these two

efforts has had significant synergistic effects for the overall campaign and have made key areas of Afghanistan inhospitable to the Taliban and other insurgent groups.

Pakistan

The relationship between the United States and Pakistan has often been described as tumultuous. Recent reports indicate Pakistan has expelled approximately 90 out of 135 special operations personnel who were deployed there to train the Frontier Corps and other Pakistani security forces to fight al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other associated groups. Also the United States has announced that some aid to Pakistan's military will be suspended.

What is your assessment of the military-to-military relationship between the United States and Pakistan?

Militaries in general tend to respect the common ethos associated with serving their nations' interests through the profession of arms. This general appreciation applies to how we regard Pakistan's military: since 2001, they have incurred roughly 12,000 casualties (~3000 KIA, ~9000 WIA) fighting violent extremists. We respect their courage and commitment to the defense of their nation. Relationships ebb and flow based on a combination of national interests, communications, and events. It is no surprise that our relationship is undergoing a turbulent period at present. The Pakistan military leadership has concluded that, for a variety of reasons, we should reduce our footprint inside their country, and we will of course abide by their decision, which will result in withholding some related aid. But we take our Pakistani counterparts at their word that this footprint reduction is temporary in nature.

Even though this is a difficult partnership, it is an important one. We cannot afford to return to the days when there was no partnership at all and a generation of Pakistani officers grew up with no contact with the United States. This professional relationship will continue to evolve at the most senior levels in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, and along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border at the tactical and operational levels.

In your view does the presence of nuclear weapons in Pakistan and the security of these weapons have any effect on the military-to-military relationship between the United States and Pakistan and if so, how is that best addressed?

The fact that Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state that faces internal threats from extremist organizations makes it even more important to maintain a solid military to military relationship. Although the nature of the Pakistani state makes it unreasonable for us to expect routine access and perfect transparency, through military relationships we can offer perspectives on modernization, engagement with regional partners, and professionalism that will further develop our shared interests and shared approaches. From a DOD perspective, we have confidence in the caliber of officers Pakistan has charged with maintaining their strategic weapons systems. Should Pakistan desire, I believe we stand ready to support additional efforts to improve the security and safety of

their nuclear weapons, and I believe we would welcome increased engagement in this facet of the security arena.

Do you believe the current difficulties, including reported reductions in U.S. trainers, are temporary or lasting?

Difficulties and opportunities ebb and flow; we have a good measure of both right now. Certainly the reduction of our footprint and training capacity are one of the difficulties. No doubt we will continue to maintain some of the more constructive aspects of our relationship, and I believe the relationship will recover. I am unable to discern whether or when Pakistan will invite our Special Forces Trainers back in at the levels we believe would best benefit their efforts to counter violent extremists bent on overthrowing their government and threatening the United States and our allies. Nonetheless, we continue to have productive engagements in other venues, including coordination between units on both sides of the border.

In your assessment, how important is the U.S.-Pakistan military-to-military relationship to the success of our counterterrorism strategy?

U.S. strategic interests in Pakistan encompass both our relationship with Pakistan itself and Pakistan's role in the campaign against al Qaeda and its adherents and affiliates. Because our efforts in Afghanistan have eliminated it as a safe haven, Al Qaeda and other extremists use Pakistan as a base for the movement's overall ideology and to plot and prepare attacks against the United States and our Allies and partners. These safe havens also pose a major challenge to our campaign in Afghanistan. Pakistan's efforts in eliminating these safe havens are dependent in some measure on U.S. support, which implies the need for a strong military-to-military relationship. Their full commitment to this effort would mark a new era of deeper partnership in which we share the mission of defeating terrorists and extremists.

What is your assessment of U.S. programs to build the capacity of the Pakistan Army and the Pakistan Frontier Scouts to conduct counterinsurgency operations in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region, including train and equip programs under the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund?

Enabling the Pakistani Army and the Frontier Corps to eliminate extremist safe havens is the premise of our outreach through the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund, intended to add additional capability to Pakistani courage and competence that already exists. Pakistan's senior military and civil leaders must in turn demonstrate the willingness to aggressively take on this mission.

I understand that PCF-funded training, equipment, and infrastructure have produced some important initial results for the Frontier Scouts, Special Services Group, and other organizations involved. The quality of Pakistani Army and Frontier Corps units' tactical maneuver, communications, marksmanship, and intelligence have demonstrably

improved for participating small units. These programs have only begun to fully operate, and they remain vulnerable to disruptions of funding or access

In your view, to what extent does the Pakistan military recognize that militant extremists groups pose a threat to Pakistan’s own national security interests, including such groups as the Haqqani network, the Afghan Taliban operating in and around Quetta, and Lashkar-e-Taiba?

The Pakistani nation will always act in its own interests, which are often different from our own. Pakistan has viewed India itself and Indian (or any other nation’s) domination of Afghanistan as an existential threat, and has taken steps it believes are necessary to counter this threat, including developing nuclear weapons and nurturing extremist groups to fight proxy irregular warfare. That the Pakistani military benefits from presenting India as a threat, and that there are many in the military who sympathize with the extremist views of these groups, only reinforces this tendency. Moreover, these groups fought hard against the Soviets during their invasion of Afghanistan, and thus the military bears a certain loyalty to them. However, in both supporting and tolerating these groups, the Pakistani military has grabbed the tail of a tiger that they may or may not be able to control. Military and civilian leadership seem to have gained in recent years a greater appreciation for the costs and dangers of such tolerance. For that reason, Pakistan has increasingly proven ready to act against extremist groups that target their own government. We are working, with limited success, to convince our Pakistani partners that they must take externally-focused terror groups just as seriously as domestic terror groups, that in fact all such groups form a linked syndicate of sorts.

Cybersecurity

In a recent interview with Defense News, Admiral Mullen stated that “The single biggest existential threat that’s out there, I think, is cyber.”

Do you agree with Admiral Mullen and, if you do, do you believe this threat is receiving appropriate focus and resources within the Department of Defense?

I agree on both counts. Both state and non-state actors have or are developing the capability to severely impact both our national infrastructure and our ability to execute command and control and other military functions that have become dependent on cyber capability. It is a serious threat. Last year the Secretary of Defense created a new, sub-unified command, U.S. Cyber Command, to address this issue and help preserve the nation’s freedom of action in cyberspace. The launch of the Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace on 14 July 2011 is also a clear indicator that the Department is focused on the cyber threat. With the implementation of the strategy’s five strategic initiatives, the Department is focusing its resources both internally and externally to organize, train, and equip our forces to take full advantage of cyberspace’s potential; employ new defense operating concepts to protect DOD networks and systems; partner with other U.S. government departments and agencies and the private sector to enable a whole-of-government cybersecurity strategy; build robust relationships with

U.S. allies and international partners to strengthen collective cybersecurity; and leverage the nation's ingenuity through an exceptional cyber workforce and rapid technological innovation.

What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in the development of the Department of Defense's cybersecurity policy, strategy, and planning?

Our reliance on cyber capabilities, the many and varied threats, and the rapid rate of technological change all demand we shine a spotlight on defense of our information networks. If confirmed, I will advocate within the Department, and with federal agencies and Members of Congress, for appropriate policies and resources regarding cyberspace. Although the Department just released the Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, there is still a great deal of work to do, including placing greater focus on interagency relationships, authorities, and building flexible and responsive capabilities. We also need to protect our warfighting mission, strengthen and expand partnerships in the domain, build capability to conduct full-spectrum cyberspace operations, and develop processes to integrate cyberspace capabilities into combatant command operations and plans.

What do you believe is the appropriate role for U.S. Northern Command in providing support to civil authorities in the cyber domain in relation to U.S. Cyber Command?

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the lead federal agency for national cyber security policy and programs. As such, the DHS will manage and lead a fully-coordinated response to a significant cyber incident to minimize impact, restore operations, and reduce the risk of future occurrence of the event or events. Department of Defense (DOD) organizations may be asked to support the Federal cyber response, if military resources are needed to address the specific situation. U.S. Northern Command's (USNORTHCOM's) position is that U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and its subordinate sub-unified combatant command, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), should be in the lead for DOD support to civil authorities for the technical aspects of recovery from a cyber attack. USCYBERCOM and the DHS have established a strong relationship for exactly this purpose. USNORTHCOM's role would be in assisting the DHS in mitigating the physical effects of such an event. For example, if a cyber attack disables our nation's electrical grid for an extended period of time, the effects could be devastating. In such a situation, USNORTHCOM could provide transportation and other logistical support using military capabilities. USSTRATCOM, USNORTHCOM, and USCYBERCOM would coordinate closely throughout such an event.

Coordination with the Department of Homeland Security

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress established the Department of Homeland Security, and DOD established the U. S. Northern

Command and an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs.

What is your assessment of the current level of cooperation and coordination between DOD and DHS on homeland security matters, and what will be your goals in this regard if you are confirmed?

Cooperation and coordination between the DOD and the DHS is very strong and constantly improving. DOD staffs are tightly connected with the DHS and its component agencies through continued exchange of department representatives, to include DOD combatant commands and DHS headquarters and subordinate agencies. As the Commander of U.S. Northern Command, I have directly observed and benefitted from such cooperation, notably including close partnerships with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Customs and Border Protection, and the U.S. Coast Guard. There continues to be a significant increase in the overall collaboration in deliberate and crisis action planning, policy decisions, and applicable directives impacting homeland security matters. The many correlations in our mission sets demand this collaboration. If confirmed, I will help the DOD continue to mature and strengthen our relationship with the DHS through information sharing, exercises, operations, and planning.

What do you believe is the appropriate mechanism for DOD to respond to the needs of domestic agencies for DOD support – whether through new or modified programs within DOD or otherwise?

I believe the current Request For Assistance (RFA) mechanism for Federal agencies to obtain assistance from the DOD, through the exchange of Executive Secretary memoranda, is appropriate. The DOD has unique capabilities that have supported domestic agencies such as the U.S. Coast Guard and the Department of Interior for the Deep Water Horizon oil spill, Federal Emergency Management Agency for Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, and the National Interagency Fire Center for wildland forest fires. In domestic natural disasters, the DOD is always in support of a Primary Agency. If confirmed, I will continue to seek ways to respond more quickly and effectively to requests from our Federal partners, to include expanded use of pre-scripted mission assignments.

Combating Terrorism

The Administration recently released its National Strategy for Counterterrorism. This strategy highlights the need to maintain pressure on al Qaeda's core while building the capacity of partners to confront mutual threats. The strategy also underscores the need to augment efforts to counter threats from al Qaeda-linked threats "that continue to emerge from beyond its core safe haven in South Asia."

How do you view the Department's role under the new National Strategy for Counterterrorism?

DOD plays a significant role within the government-wide global fight against al-Qaeda (AQ) and its adherents primarily through partner nation capacity-building and enabling efforts, targeted counterterrorism CT operations, and countering violent extremist messaging. Building competent, professional and responsive CT forces that protect populations and strengthen the rule of law reinforces the legitimacy of partner governments, creates sustainable security, and reduces AQ's ability to establish safe havens. Targeted CT operations are focused on eliminating near-term threats, creating space and time to develop partner nation capacity, and supporting the development of sustainable host nation government institutions.

Do you believe the National Strategy for Counterterrorism modifies the Department's role in combating the threat posed by al Qaeda and affiliated groups?

The National Strategy for Counterterrorism further codifies the DOD's priorities and roles as part of the whole of government global counterterrorism CT approach. The new strategy is closely aligned with our existing priorities and does not significantly modify our ongoing efforts.

What do you believe is the appropriate role for the Department in countering threats from al Qaeda and affiliated groups outside of South Asia?

Building partner nation capacity and enabling partner forces is the primary role for the DOD in countering threats from al Qaeda (AQ) and affiliated groups. The DOD also conducts limited targeted counterterrorism (CT) operations as directed in order to eliminate imminent threats to the United States and U.S. interests and to create space and time for the very challenging development of enduring host nation solutions to CT problems. Building strong and enduring partnerships based upon shared understanding of the threat and common objectives is essential for success. The DOD also supports other efforts led by interagency partners, which focus on the development of better governance and supplying basic needs, thereby reducing the underlying causes that enable AQ to recruit from vulnerable populations.

Are there steps the Department should take to better coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other federal departments and agencies?

The level of interagency coordination that occurs in the global counterterrorism (CT) fight is greater than it has ever been, but must be continually emphasized and prioritized. To succeed at both the tactical and strategic levels, we must foster a rapid, coordinated, and effective CT effort that reflects the full capabilities and resources of our whole government. I will continually emphasize the need for transparency and interagency communication and prioritize the existing NSS-led CT planning and decision-making venues.

Special Operations Personnel Management

VADM McRaven, USN, Commander of Joint Special Operations Command, has argued that the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) should have greater influence on special operations personnel management issues including assignment, promotion, compensation, and retention of special operations forces. One proposal would modify section 167 of title 10, United States Code, to change the role of the USSOCOM Commander from “monitoring” the readiness of special operations personnel to “coordinating” with the services on personnel and manpower management policies that directly affect special operations forces.

What is your view about the authority of Commander, USSOCOM in this regard?

I support the coordination between USSOCOM and the services related to personnel issues. To improve this coordination, Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5100.01, "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components," was published in December 2010. Currently, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, Commander USSOCOM, is responsible for, and has the authority necessary to conduct, in addition to those specified, all affairs of command relating to special operations activities, including:

coordinate on Military Department and Military personnel management policy and plans as they relate to accessions, assignments, compensation, promotions, professional development, readiness, retention, sustainment, and training of all Special Operations Forces personnel. This coordination shall not interfere with the Title 10 authorities of the Military Departments or Military Services.

Special Operations Enabling Capabilities

The Commander USSOCOM has described the “non-availability” of enabling capabilities as USSOCOM’s “most vexing issue in the operational environment.” The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) sought to balance previously mandated growth in special operations forces with additional enabling capabilities.

What do you believe are the greatest shortages in enabling capabilities facing special operations forces?

In the recent past, rotary wing lift has been one of the special operations community’s biggest shortfalls. The Department is mitigating these shortages by growing SOF forces through FY15 by several thousand personnel and adding additional rotary wing units to SOF.

Do you believe additional enabling capabilities, beyond those mandated by the QDR, are required to support special operations forces?

It is my understanding that the services and USSOCOM are increasing enabling capabilities as mandated by the QDR. The Force Sufficiency Assessment should inform our senior leaders in deciding whether more enabling capabilities are needed.

Do you believe the process for special operations forces to request enabling capabilities from the services, when required, should be formalized? If so, how?

This process is formalized in the Global Force Management Board (GFMB) Force Allocation process. COCOMs submit their SOF and enabling capability rotational requirements annually through the GFMB. The COCOMs also submit their emergent SOF and enabling capability requirements as a request for forces (RFF) through the force allocation process.

Additionally, it is my understanding that USSOCOM is incorporating SOF-enabler requirements in the Strategic Analysis products, which support senior-leader force development decision-making, and the services are integrating SOF-enabler support into their Force Generation Models.

Special Operations Missions

In recent years, special operations forces have taken on an expanded role in a number of areas important to countering violent extremist organizations, including those related to information and military intelligence operations. Some have advocated significant changes to USSOCOM's title 10 missions to make them better reflect the activities special operations forces are carrying out around the world.

Do you believe any modifications to USSOCOM's title 10 missions are appropriate? If so, what modifications would you suggest?

I believe USSOCOM's Title 10 authorities are structured properly and that no modifications are required at this time.

Interagency Collaboration

The collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces, general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and agencies has played a significant role in the success of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in recent years. However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature.

What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from interagency collaboration on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere?

Information sharing, leveraging the strengths of interagency partners, and collaboration during the planning and execution of operations has led to increasingly successful results. Organizationally, the innovation of forming purpose-built task forces that draw upon expertise from among the interagency community has provided a high level of agility and efficiency in the conduct of civil-military operations. The practice of flattened, agile

communications, extensive senior leader involvement across the U.S. government and allies, and leveraging information dominance provided by these subject matter experts and their systems are among our key lessons learned.

How do you believe these efforts can be improved?

Preserving the lessons learned of the interagency task force in doctrinal publications, properly resourcing future task forces, continuing our efforts to raise the state of the art of intelligence and operations fusion, and applying the lessons learned in future challenges will be among the ways we continue to improve upon the many hard fought insights made during the last decade. Our ability to address future complex challenges through the application of faster, flatter interagency organizations will be key.

How can the lessons learned in recent years be captured in military doctrine and adopted as “best practices” for future contingency operations?

Codifying our work is key. I believe it is critical that doctrinal publications such as Joint Pub 3-08, “Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations” capture the best practices of these horizontal interagency teams.

Our centers of and joint excellence are charged with making changes institutional across the military, and they will do this by integrating doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) across all levels of command, from joint force commanders to component commands to the unit level.

Capabilities of Special Operations Forces and General Purpose Forces

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review called for increased counter insurgency, counterterrorism, and security force assistance capabilities within the general purpose forces. These missions have traditionally been within the purview of special operations forces.

What actions, if any, do you believe need to be taken in order to allow special operations and general purpose forces to successfully share these missions in the future?

I believe the 2010 QDR’s strategic shift toward expanding general purpose forces’ capabilities and capacity for these contingencies makes sense. The overall flexibility of our Armed Forces can be greatly improved by investing in key enablers within our conventional force, such as strengthening and expanding capabilities for security force assistance; increasing the availability of rotary-wing assets; expanding manned and unmanned aircraft systems for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; improving counter-improvised explosive device capabilities; and enhancing linguistic, cultural, counterinsurgency, and stability operations competency and capacity.

Are there certain mission areas that should be reserved for special operations forces only?

Special Operations Forces are a unique component of our U.S. Armed Forces that are trained to conduct operations in areas under enemy control or in politically-sensitive environments, including counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, and counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In such environments, Special Operations Forces provide a unique and essential capability.

Libya

Do you support the limited U.S. military mission in Libya?

Yes. We are operating in Libya as a part of an international coalition enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973. Our role is to support and assist our partners in preventing the mass killing of innocent civilians in Libya. The U.S. military provides unique capabilities to this effort such as electronic warfare; aerial refueling, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance support, and unmanned strike drones. In my view, we should maintain pressure until the goals agreed by NATO allies and partners are met.

Do you support broadening the military mission to include regime change?

The goal of our military effort, and the mandate of the UN resolution, is very clear: we are protecting the Libyan people. I believe the regime's attacks on its own people will continue unless Col Qadhafi relinquishes power, and that such attacks will dramatically increase if pressure is removed. To this end, while to my knowledge forced regime change is not specified in the military mission, this mission complements other instruments of power and will add significant pressure on Col Qadhafi over time to step down.

Do you believe the United States should provide arms and training to the Libyan rebels?

Since the purpose of our military action is grounded in UNSCR 1973, which specifies protection for the Libyan people in population centers like Benghazi from a massacre at the hands of Col Qadhafi's forces, any such assistance should be for that purpose. Because this is not a unique U.S. capability, and we are heavily engaged in other locations, I believe other countries should be the first to provide such assistance.

Arab Spring

The Arab Spring has changed – and will likely continue to change – the political and military dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa for many years to come. These changes may require the United States to adjust our military-to-military and

defense civilian relations engagements in this region.

In your personal view, what adjustments – if any – should be made to U.S. military-to-military and defense civilian relations in the region?

It is clear this is a moment of profound transformation and change in the Middle East and North Africa. People in this region seek greater individual rights, political reform, and economic opportunities. These calls for reform are gaining momentum across the region and are likely irreversible. Although we can expect instability as this region transforms, we have a unique opportunity to support these reform movements through our military relationships.

Military-to-military relationships offer important policy influence opportunities with our partners. We have very strong relationships with our military partners in the region, which has helped us keep pace with the transitions and to be in position to offer advice and assistance. A good example of this is our relationship with the Egyptian Military and their Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). Throughout the political transition in Egypt, we have kept in close contact with Field Marshall Tantawi (Minister of Defense), Lieutenant General Enan (Chief of Defense Forces) and other members of the SCAF. These personal relationships have allowed us to engage on behalf of the U.S. government and keep track of the events in Egypt.

Although our military relationships throughout the region are strong, these reform movements give us an opportunity to review our security cooperation and assistance policies to ensure they support and complement these democratic transitions. We are working closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and our combatant commands to review our programs and policies and ensure they help our partners continue to develop military forces that respect the rule of law and human rights.

Strategic Communications and Information Operations

Over the past decade, the Department of Defense has funded an increasing number of military information support operations and influence programs. While the Department does not have any separate budget documentation outlining its strategic communication activities, GAO reports that DOD “spent hundreds of millions of dollars each year” to support its information operations outreach activities. Many of these programs are in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but Military Information Support Teams (MISTs) from U.S. Special Operations Command are also deploying to U.S. embassies in countries of particular interest around the globe to bolster the efforts of the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development. Further, the geographic combatant commands – at the theater and regional level – are moving into this operational space.

What are your views on DOD’s military information support operations and influence programs?

DOD communication strategy and the unique capabilities of Military Information Support Operations play an important role in DOD communications efforts. I view Military Information Support Operations as traditional military activities that a global combatant commander uses to support Theater Security Cooperation and underpin the essential shaping operations required to support achievement of Theater Campaign Plan objectives, and (if needed) contingency operations in an area of hostilities. Influence programs and activities are one method by which the DOD can support U.S. foreign policy objectives. In a world dominated by information purveyors and consumers, information-related capabilities have grown significantly in importance. Through Military Information Support Operations, we have a tremendous opportunity to shape the environment in support of a broad range of activities to include security cooperation and deterrence efforts. At the same time, it is critical that such activities be conducted in a synchronized manner with other U.S. government departments.

What was your experience with these types of operations in your capacity as the Commander of U.S. Northern Command?

U.S. Northern Command uses multiple communication methods to reach audiences outside the borders of the United States that are within our area of responsibility. We have used web sites, magazines, personal engagements, and blogs as tools, and have worked hard to improve internal DOD (and to some extent, external) understanding of the best ways, including the most appropriate messages, to communicate publicly about our partnership with Mexico, in particular. These operations are vital tools for enhancing mil-to-mil relationships and achieving our Theater Campaign Plan goals. Of course, these have to be well integrated with other U.S. agencies, the Country Teams, and neighboring global combatant commands to ensure a whole-of-government effort.

In your view, are DOD's programs adequately integrated into overall U.S. foreign policy activities?

Every effort is made to integrate DOD programs into U.S. foreign policy activities. A "whole-of-government" approach is critical in achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives. The DOD's information and influence activities support DOD policy guidance and military objectives established by a theater's combatant commander. Activities conducted outside areas of hostility are often led by and always coordinated with our interagency partners. Activities conducted inside areas of hostility are similarly coordinated when they touch other activities of the USG or other activities of partner nations.

In 2005, al-Qaeda's Ayman al-Zawahiri declared that "We are in a battle, and more than half of it is taking place in the battlefield of the media." Last year, a non-partisan study highlighted the lack of a U.S. strategy to counter radical ideologies that foment violence.

In your view, what are the appropriate roles of DOD, the Intelligence Community

(IC), and the State Department in information operations to counter violent extremist ideology?

Ultimately, it is our collective actions that send the strongest messages to populations across the globe regarding radical ideologies and extremist groups. However, the DOD also works closely with the CIA, the Department of State (principally its Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications), and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), in an interagency effort to coordinate programs and deconflict activities aimed at delegitimizing radical extremist ideology and its messages. The respective roles of all government departments and agencies involved in this campaign are defined by their legal authorities, institutional functions, and operational capabilities. The DOD's global presence and outreach opportunities enable it to engage with local populations and develop relationships with credible interlocutors to counter the messaging and discredit the appeal of violent extremist movements.

In your view, what is the most effective means to counter radical ideologies that foment violence?

I believe that the most effective means to counter radical extremist rhetoric is through delegitimizing the leaders and ideology behind it to the point that these movements collapse under the weight of their own contradictory messages and actions. This is a war of ideas and ideals, and optimally moderating ideas are communicated by local voices. Our activity in this area must be persistent and long-term, focused foremost on clearly communicating our strategic narrative – our national interests, values, and policies – through both words and actions. An essential component of this effort is an adaptive communication framework that enables leaders at all levels to send coherent messages through credible messengers to key audiences using mediums that resonate at the right time. Our overarching objective is to truthfully and consistently demonstrate the efficacy of our policies and values, influencing our intended audiences to challenge and ultimately reject the sociopathic inducement to terrorism and violence that radical Islamist ideologies propagate.

Defense Secretary Gates launched the Minerva Program in 2009 to develop deeper social, cultural, and behavioral expertise for policy and strategy purposes in the Middle East and the Far East. What do you believe this program contributes to broader DOD and U.S. Government efforts to counter violent extremist groups and their ideologies?

Although I've not had an opportunity to be closely associated with the Minerva program, I fully endorse the imperative of understanding the perceptions, attitudes, ethnic identities, religious beliefs, and predispositions of the audiences we seek to reach. Indeed, in my role as the USNORTHCOM Commander, I have found that our efforts with Mexico have benefitted in proportion to the degree to which we understand Mexican outlooks and sensitivities. The same applies in other parts of the world. Commanders and leaders at all levels need to appreciate not only how radical Islamist ideology and its messages resonate with its intended audiences, but how their own words and actions are

processed through foreign cultural receptors. Our ability to effectively challenge the legitimacy of violent extremist groups depends on our appeal to the core interests and values of our target audiences, and that requires an in-depth understanding of their perspectives.

East Africa – al Qaeda and al Shabaab

Somalia is a failed state with a weak government unable to project either power or stability or to provide basic services to its people. Somalia is also a training and operations hub for al Shabaab and other violent extremists; pirates operating in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Peninsula; illicit traffickers of weapons, humans, and drugs; and remnants of the al Qaeda East Africa cell that was responsible for the destruction of our embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in August of 1998.

What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda and al Shabaab to the U.S. and Western interests in East Africa and to the U.S. homeland?

I anticipate al-Shabaab is planning to conduct attacks against U.S. interests in East Africa. I also expect the May death of al-Qaeda emir Usama bin Ladin increased al-Shabaab's planning against U.S. targets in East Africa, despite its primary focus on internal Somali issues, which include repelling a regionally-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) offensive. I further expect al-Qaeda associated al-Shabaab foreign-fighters will continue planning attacks against U.S. and Western targets. I remain concerned that individuals who successfully travel to Somalia and receive training from al-Shabaab could become further radicalized and return to the United States to conduct operations without al-Shabaab's guidance

What is your understanding of DOD's role in countering the threat posed by al Qaeda in East Africa and al Shabaab?

Al Qaeda has clearly set their sights on this region as potential safe haven from which to plan and to train for future attacks both within and outside the region. I am increasingly concerned about as well as about Al Qaeda's growing influence on and near the Arabian peninsula, including Al Shabab's growing ties to Al Qaeda and its trans-regional ambitions.

As we do elsewhere, we have provided—and congressional support will continue to provide—assistance to regional partner nation forces to counter threats from violent extremists in East Africa. DoD assists these efforts in concert with interagency partners, by focusing our approach on populations, security capacity, and basic human needs. Some of that support is also aimed directly at improving counter-terrorism capabilities. I cannot get into the specifics about operations we are supporting, but the work remains critical to our goal of disrupting and dismantling Al Qaeda and their affiliates, and is having a significant impact on the terror network's leadership, planning and resourcing efforts.

What is your understanding of DOD's supporting role to other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government in this region?

The DOD supports other U.S. department and agency efforts in the region, such as the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) through the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti. The CJTF-HOA's mission in the East Africa region is to build partner nation capacity in order to promote regional stability, prevent conflict, and protect U.S. and coalition interests. These activities directly support each country team's objective of good partner nation governance by focusing on improving its security institutions' professionalism and commitment to human security. As part of the overall "3-D" whole-of-government approach—Diplomacy, Development, and Defense—the CJTF-HOA's role is a long-term commitment to regional stability through population-centric activities that strengthen both internal and international counter-violent extremist organization relationships.

What changes, if any, would you recommend to DOD's current role in East Africa?

I believe we must view Somalia from a regional East Africa perspective, not least because most of the U.S. government's traditional security cooperation tools are restricted from being used in Somalia. I understand that the Department of Defense is reviewing the status of Joint Task Forces to determine if any should transition to more permanent Joint Interagency Task Forces. In addition, U.S. Africa Command is looking at how best to direct our military efforts in the region to work in concert with our interagency partners. The ultimate goal is a strategy under which security assistance, capacity building, cooperation with regional partners, and counter-terrorism actions are fully integrated to provide security and stability in East Africa.

Yemen and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

A number of senior U.S. officials have indicated the most significant threat to the U.S. homeland currently emanates from Yemen.

What is your assessment of the current U.S. strategy in Yemen and what is your understanding of the role of DOD within that strategy?

The current strategy in Yemen, as outlined in the State Department's FY2011 Mission Strategic Plan, remains our best option for achieving a stable Yemen, one in which violent extremists cannot operate. The near-term goal of containing and degrading al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), while pursuing long term initiatives to create a stable Yemen that can provide internal security, remain valid.

The DOD's role within this strategy is two-fold. First and foremost, U.S. Central Command works with interagency partners to build Yemen's counterterrorism (CT) capacity and enhance CT partnerships. Separately, select elements work with the Yemeni government to disrupt near-term threats to the US homeland. This effort is intended to

provide time and space for the Yemeni security forces to increase their effectiveness and eventually eliminate Yemen as an al-Qaeda safe haven.

Given the ongoing political upheaval and splintering of the military in Yemen, what are your views on the U.S. continuing to provide security assistance – most significantly DOD section 1206 funding – to Yemeni counterterrorism forces?

My understanding is that, given the growing AQAP presence in Yemen, its threat to the homeland, the ongoing unrest that has already weakened the Yemeni government and the economy and allowed AQAP to expand its influence, we continue to closely evaluate our security assistance programs in Yemen – particularly those provided under Section 1206. The Republic of Yemen Government currently remains a critical partner in the war against al-Qa’ida, and we remain particularly alert to the continued and growing threat to the Homeland from AQAP. I understand that we believe the likelihood of continued counterterrorism cooperation with the Yemeni government will remain high during and after any future political transitions, but are prepared to reevaluate our partnership as necessary to address the changing military situation.

Department of Defense Counternarcotics Activities

On an annual basis, DOD’s counternarcotics (CN) program expends approximately \$1.5 billion to support the Department’s CN operations, building the capacity of certain foreign governments around the globe, and analyzing intelligence on CN-related matters. In a recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, GAO found that DOD “does not have an effective performance measurement system to track the progress of its counternarcotics activities.” This is the second such finding relating by GAO to DOD CN in the last decade.

What is your assessment of the DOD CN program?

Drug trafficking and associated organized crime are a multi-dimensional threat to the United States. In addition to the impact on our nation’s public health and economy, drug trafficking and other forms of transnational organized crime provide a funding source for terrorists and insurgents, undermine legitimate government institutions, and contribute to international instability.

As the Commander of U.S. Northern Command, I have had the opportunity to work with the DOD’s interagency and foreign partners to ensure that our counternarcotics programs achieved positive results that were aligned with the goals of the National Security Strategy and the National Drug Control Strategy. If confirmed, I look forward to applying my experience in North America to the global DOD counternarcotics program.

In your personal view, should DOD continue to play a role in stemming the flow of illegal narcotics?

Based on my experience, confronting this issue requires that all agencies work closely together to confront the flow of illicit narcotics. This whole-of-government approach has been critically important to the progress we have made since the 1980s and should continue. While the effort should largely be led by law enforcement, the DOD has unique capabilities to bring to bear to this important effort. Moreover, the DOD's existing partnerships with countries throughout the world can help support U.S. government efforts to confront this problem.

In your position as the Commander of U.S. Northern Command, what was your assessment of the DOD CN program as it related to Mexico and the Caribbean?

The DOD CN program is critical to the success of U.S. Northern Command efforts in both Mexico and the Caribbean. Resourcing has improved over the last year, which has considerably improved our ability to assist our Mexican partners in their struggle against transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). Mexican security organizations are gradually transforming from a force principally focused on natural disasters into one able to integrate intelligence and operations in support of law enforcement operations that fully respect human rights and the rule of law. Counternarcotics funding is a key enabler of that effort. Recognizing that the threat posed by TCOs extends well beyond drugs, and that there are complex challenges associated with defeating them, future increased collaboration with mission partners and adequate resourcing are essential.

In your position as the Commander of U.S. Northern Command, were there any activities that you had hoped to be able to conduct using DOD CN funding, but were not able to do and that you, if confirmed, would recommend DOD seek the authority to conduct?

Current authorities are appropriate and sufficient for successful execution of the U.S. Northern Command counternarcotics mission and the support we provide to our mission partners. Should I be confirmed, and should my view change based on the evolution of our relationship with regional partners or the perspectives I gain as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will work with the Committee to suggest potential improvements.

International Peacekeeping Contributions

In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on July 29, 2009, Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, stated that the United States “is willing to consider directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers, civilian police, and other civilian personnel—including more women I should note—to UN peacekeeping operations.”

What is your view on whether the U.S. should contribute more military personnel to both staff positions and military observers in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations?

In my previous duty as director for Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff, I had the privilege of concurrently serving as senior member of the U.S. delegation to the U.N. Military Staff Committee. In that role, I gained a first-hand appreciation of the valuable contributions our members make in support of U.N. peacekeeping missions. Keeping in mind our continuing troop commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, I believe the United States can and should consider assigning a modest number of additional personnel to peacekeeping missions. Even in small numbers, U.S. members make a special contribution to these activities by virtue of their experience, training, and special skills.

What are the advantages and disadvantages of contributing additional military personnel to U.N. operations?

Some of the compelling benefits of providing U.S. personnel to these missions include:

- Delivering combat-tested expertise in logistics, intelligence, planning, and other key military functions where they are most needed;
- Providing our members with valuable experience in working shoulder to shoulder with international troops—a critical skill at the heart of our operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere;
- Sending an unmistakable signal that the United States values UN peacekeeping operations—and because they are far more cost-effective than unilateral American interventions;

Among potential disadvantages, I would cite our significant troop commitments to Iraq and Afghanistan, which take priority and continue to subject our force to stress. I would also point out that, in some cases, U.S. personnel on the ground are not what a U.N. mission most needs. Local sensitivities will sometimes lead us to contribute to peacekeeping in other, less visible ways.

If confirmed, would you support identifying methods through which the DOD personnel system could be more responsive to requests for personnel support from multilateral institutions like the United Nations?

The personnel management systems of our armed services do not perfectly align with the needs of multinational organizations like the United Nations. If confirmed, I would explore alternate mechanisms to respond to the requests of these institutions within the demands of our ongoing operations elsewhere in the world. In particular, we should examine how our Reserve Components, whose personnel have recently delivered specialized, hard-to-find skills to Iraq and Afghanistan with such distinction, can make a greater contribution in this area.

Global Peace Operations Initiative

The Global Peace Operations Initiative was established after the 2004 G8 Sea Island Summit to address growing gaps in international peace operations. In most cases, DOD plays a supporting role in the implementation of this train and equip program.

What is your understanding and assessment of this program?

GPOI is an important part of our government's strategy to build the capabilities of U.S. partners in peacekeeping operations. Through comparatively small investments in training and equipment, we can help those countries that want to contribute to peacekeeping operations. Over 80,000 military personnel have been trained under GPOI since 2005—a significant achievement. I also consider GPOI to be a strong example of the results we obtain when the Departments of State and Defense collaborate to promote our nation's security.

Would you support additional DOD contributions – in the form of U.S. military trainers – to support this program?

From my perspective, GPOI has been successful in building partnership capacity because of its flexibility. The program has given our combatant commanders the freedom to tailor assistance to the specific needs of individual partners. If confirmed, I would consider recommending provision of additional military trainers under the GPOI program subject to the demands of our other operations overseas.

Counter Threat Finance

A number of officials in DOD and the IC have called for investing significantly more resources in identifying and tracking the flow of money associated with terrorist networks and illicit trafficking.

What are your views on the role of DOD in counter threat finance activities?

Terrorists, drug and weapons traffickers, and other adversaries rely heavily on legal and illegal funding sources to support their activities, which routinely work against U.S. interests. It is critical to engage all U.S. Government tools to track and halt the flow of money associated with these organizations. It is my understanding that the DOD has capability to identify and disrupt our adversaries' finances while working with our interagency counterparts both in countering terrorism and illicit trafficking. Counter Threat Finance is a cost-effective measure because both licit and illicit finances are often exposed through Western banking and customs processes and are subsequently vulnerable to interdiction, sanctions, and other law enforcement action. The DOD is not the U.S. Government lead agency in counter threat finance but, it plays a supportive role by working with other departments and agencies—and with partner nations—to counter our adversaries' ability to use global financial networks.

In your view, should DOD seek to expand its support to other U.S. Government departments and agencies conducting counter threat finance activities?

Recent DOD efficiencies decisions directed the creation of a Joint Threat Finance Intelligence Office to consolidate the counter threat finance intelligence functions resident in the Department, and this new office is expected to be operational in Fiscal

Year 2012 under the direction of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Although this effort does not seek to expand the DOD's role in CTF, it is my opinion that it streamlines the DOD's efforts with the intent of improving support to other U.S. Departments and agencies.

Transnational criminal organizations in Central America and Mexico are having a debilitating impact on the ability of our foreign partners to govern their nations and provide opportunities for their people.

Do you think expanded Counter Threat Finance activities in this region would be beneficial? If so, what role – if any – should DOD play in those activities?

Expanding the scope and scale of counter threat finance activities in the Central and North American regions would be beneficial, and the Department of Defense (DOD) has a strong supporting role in those activities. USNORTHCOM and USSOUTHCOM are helping to shape and leverage unique capabilities in support of our foreign and domestic mission partners. Rather than attempting to conduct this mission in isolation, the correct approach is to understand the unique intelligence analysis capability that the DOD can bring to this effort and then leverage it in support of other lead agencies, such as the Treasury Department. This will enable all stakeholders to achieve unity of effort in gaining leverage against potentially significant transnational criminal organization vulnerability.

Central America and Mexico

During a recent Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, the Commander of SOUTHCOM and you – in your capacity as the Commander of U.S. Northern Command – discussed the increasingly dangerous region along the northern and southern borders of Mexico and the devastating impact transnational criminal organizations are having on the people and security of southern Mexico, Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, and El Salvador. The U.S. has increased its assistance in this region, but – to date – the Department of Defense has had only a small role.

What are your views on the threats posed by transnational criminal organizations in this region?

The corrosive effects of transnational criminal organization (TCO)-fostered drug abuse are taking an increasingly severe toll on our economy and our human capital. The presence of TCO distribution networks in many of our cities increases the scale and complexity of gang activity in our urban areas. The pervasive activity and influence of TCOs among our friends and neighbors in North and Central America are directly and negatively impacting their prosperity and security—to include increased violence, decreased real economic activity, and increased drug abuse—which carries its own indirect impact on the United States. The TCOs are vicious in the extreme, better-armed than many police forces, very well-financed, diversified, and increasingly adaptable and sophisticated in their methods. Their criminality extends far beyond drugs to extortion,

robbery, kidnapping, trafficking in firearms and persons, and many other illegal activities. Currently, TCOs are using military grade equipment and tactics, including sophisticated assault weapons, sniper rifles, grenades, aircraft, improvised armored vehicles, and even submarines to move illegal drugs.

What is your assessment of DOD's current activities in Mexico and Central America?

I believe that DOD's current activities in Mexico and Central America are having a positive impact. The scope and depth of our military-to-military relationships with most regional nations, including Mexico, have reached unprecedented levels. While continuing to emphasize the importance of the sovereignty of regional nations, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and U.S. Southern Command have dramatically increased senior level interactions, subject matter expert exchanges, human rights training, mobile training teams, intelligence support, and exercises. Within the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility, while Mexico deserves great credit for its own work, we are beginning to see the positive effects of our support, to include more Mexican emphasis on intelligence-operations fusion, greater tactical proficiency, jointness, and willingness to work with interagency partners. These nations' security forces are often out-gunned by the transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), but they are making progress on all fronts in their ability to confront the serious threat of TCOs.

What changes, if any, would you recommend to DOD's current activities in this region?

I believe we need to further tighten the already-close cooperation among U.S. government agencies, to include a willingness to expose regional militaries—beginning with Mexico—to more of the lessons learned and capabilities we have used overseas in the past decade. In so doing, we need to continually reinforce the need to fully respect the sovereignty of our partner nations. We should also support in any way we can the parallel activities that fall under other departments' missions, such as strengthening justice institutions and building strong and resilient communities. Counter threat finance is an area we could better exploit to disrupt the funding streams fueling the transnational criminal organizations. Finally, I have always believed we are better able to support observance of human rights by building close partnerships with our partners' forces. Our activities in supporting human rights training have been highly successful and I would support more engagements of this type as requested by partner nations, and more freedom to interact with nations that have troubled histories in human rights.

If DOD expands its activities in Mexico and Central America, where – in your view – can U.S. assistance have the greatest impact?

The greatest Department of Defense impact will be felt in increasing regional militaries' ability to conduct effective intelligence-driven operations—that are fully meshed with law enforcement and that respect human rights and democratic ideals—against the transnational criminal organizations. This will involve assisting them in improving their

ability to integrate intelligence and operations at the highest levels of proficiency while fully respecting their sovereignty in the process.

What is your assessment of the current situation along the border of the United States and Mexico?

I believe we have made significant progress in securing our southwest border over the past couple years. As a nation, we have joined forces with our Mexican partners in dedicating increased manpower, technology, and infrastructure to counter the corrosive effects of transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and we are seeing positive results. Seizures of contraband (illicit drugs, weapons, and bulk cash) have risen, illegal immigration attempts have decreased, and crime rates in southwest border communities have remained steady or dropped in recent years. In spite of this progress, I remain concerned about TCO-related violence in Mexico and the potential for spillover violence in the United States. If confirmed, my intent is to continue the Department of Defense's strong support of our law enforcement partners to enhance their efforts to make the southwest border even more secure.

What changes, if any, would you recommend to the Department's support to civilian agencies operating along the southern border?

Department of Defense (DOD) support to civilian agencies operating along the U.S. southern border has a long history of collaboration and is on the rise as U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and our Federal partners seek additional opportunities to partner. Through Joint Task Force North, USNORTHCOM provides a wide array of training, assistance, and resources to support our partner agencies' efforts. USNORTHCOM has made progress over the past year through closer collaboration at senior leadership levels (to include our first-ever staff talks with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) senior leadership), increased agency presence (including CBP, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Drug Enforcement Administration and others) in USNORTHCOM headquarters, increased agency participation in planning, exposure to CBP of tactics and techniques the DOD has accumulated overseas, and direct provision of support. If confirmed, I will emphasize the need to understand partner agency plans, priorities, and concerns to aid the DOD in identifying areas where we can provide additional support to these agencies within DOD's authorities and capabilities.

U.S. Assistance to Colombia

Since fiscal year 2000, the United States has provided more than \$7 billion to support Colombia's efforts to counter the threat of narcotics and various insurgent groups.

In light of budget conditions, do you believe more significant reductions in U.S. security assistance to Colombia are advisable?

A significant reduction in U.S. assistance to Colombia would be ill-advised at this critical juncture of Colombia's fight against transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and insurgent groups. Unquestionably, Colombia has made great strides, enabled by U.S. assistance, in its effort against TCOs and the illicit drug trades that feeds them. However, the Colombians have not defeated this threat. Any precipitous drop beyond the U.S. and Colombia coordinated and synchronized glide path reductions in our assistance is likely to inhibit achievement of a final negotiated settlement.

Iran

What options do you believe are available to the United States to counter Iran's growing influence in the Middle East region?

Nearly every source of instability or other challenge in the Middle East—including support for terrorism, threats to the internal stability of regional nations, weapons proliferation, mischief in Iraq and Afghanistan, and overt and covert threats to Israel—may be traced in some manner back to Iran. We should encourage Iran to take its rightful place in the international community as a force for peace, stability, and prosperity in the Middle East. Until that occurs, however, every element of national and international power should be brought to bear to pressure Iran to change its behavior. Among other possible actions, these elements include:

- Diplomacy to maintain international resolve and overcome objections from both major states and non-aligned nations to taking firmer action, as well as continued attempts to engage Iran in responsible dialogue;
- Economic sanctions to place greater pressure on all sectors of Iran's government;
- Financial sanctions on individuals within Iran who support activity such as weapons proliferation, terrorist activity, and support for groups that target U.S. forces;
- Intelligence sharing to bring Iran's activities into sharper focus;
- Coherent information strategies to expose Iran's destabilizing behavior to the world at large;
- Law enforcement to curtail criminal activity on the part of Iranian surrogates and proxies;
- Close cooperation with regional militaries to ensure Iran is aware that aggression will be met by a capable and coherent response;
- Continued presence of U.S. forces in the region to bolster our partners and deter Iran from taking irresponsible action.

Do you believe that a protracted deployment of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, beyond 2014, would increase, decrease or have no effect on Iran's influence in the region?

I do not believe a protracted U.S. deployment in Afghanistan after 2014 would measurably change Iran's influence in the region. Because such a deployment would serve as an irritant to Iran, that nation would support any group in Afghanistan that resists U.S. presence, but this influence would not likely extend far beyond Afghanistan. Should Afghanistan achieve greater stability, it is possible that Iran's influence could slightly

decrease. On the other hand, Iran could claim some sympathy within the region under the banner of U.S. occupation.

In your view, does Iran pose a near term military threat to the United States by way of either its missile program or its nuclear program?

Iran openly states its intent to use its missile program as a deterrent against the U.S as well as Israel and other regional nations. Iranian research, development, and testing continues for short and medium-range missiles, along with its pursuit of an anti-ship ballistic missile capability. These systems pose a near-term threat to U.S. forces in the Middle East, including in the Arabian Gulf region, as well as a threat to our vital interests in the region.

In the near- to mid-term, Iranian space program advancements include dual-use technologies that can be applied to development of long-range ballistic missiles that could carry a nuclear warhead. Iran also continues to pursue activities to improve its ability acquire nuclear weapons. Iran continues to enrich uranium at the Natanz facility in violation of UN Security Council resolutions, and has announced its intent to build additional enrichment facilities. In June, Iran announced it would triple its production of 20% uranium enrichment at the previously covert Qom enrichment facility by the end of this summer. Additionally, the IAEA continues to assert that Iran has not provided sufficient answers to the possible military dimensions of their nuclear program.

If you believe either of these programs pose a near term threat, what in your view are the best ways to address such a threat?

For the near term, we should deter Iran by continuing robust regional security cooperation efforts in the Middle East region, to include assistance and cooperation efforts with the Gulf States, Iraq, Israel, Saudi Arabia and other allies and partners. This would include continuing our commitment to air and ballistic missile defenses, shared early warning systems, counterterrorism, and counter-piracy programs, as well as programs to build partner capacity and protect critical infrastructure. Iran should have no doubt that we are committed to regional stability—we should thus maintain presence in the region to reassure our partners and persuade Iran that aggressive actions will come with a high cost.

An Iran with a nuclear weapon is extremely destabilizing and could precipitate a nuclear arms race in the region. I support the current U.S. position--that we cannot accept Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon. We should maintain a robust international consensus using all elements of power, including robust sanctions and targeting the finances of those involved in Iran's nuclear program, to place pressure on Iran to reject its nuclear program and its other destabilizing activities.

Other than nuclear or missile programs what are your concerns, if any, about Iran?

Malicious Iranian activities throughout the region include the use of proxies to extend Iranian influence into sovereign nations by providing increasingly sophisticated weapons, training, and finance. We are concerned Iran's activities will negatively impact stability and erode the regional economy. It is important to maintain and strengthen our relationships with our regional partners and allies by continuing to build their security capacity.

Additionally, Iran supports Shia militant groups whose attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq are increasing in frequency, scope, and lethality. Asaib Ahl al-haqq's recent attack (15 June 2011) is an example of increased lethality based on Iranian technological partnerships.

Meanwhile, Iranian mischief elsewhere in the region continues. They have supported the Taliban with weapons shipments to enable Taliban attacks against U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. Iranian support to Lebanese Hizballah and Syria directly counters U.S. interests regionally and threatens Israel. Finally, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy has the ability to threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. In Iran's recent Noble Prophet 6 exercises, Iran publicly stated that their intent was to demonstrate the ability to attack U.S. naval forces with anti-ship missiles.

U.S. Relations with Russia

U.S. relations with Russia, although previously strained over a variety of issues, have recently improved in some areas.

If confirmed do you believe that there are any opportunities to improve relations through military to military programs, or other actions that you would recommend be taken?

We have already taken many positive steps to improve military-to-military relations between the United States and the Russian Federation, and we will continue to pursue improved relations in the future. Following the creation of the Military Cooperation Working Group in January 2010, we held several joint exercises, exchanges, and working group meetings to improve cooperation and transparency between our two countries. To illustrate, during 2010, USNORTHCOM and NORAD held a joint field training exercise that demonstrated the ability of our forces to work together against airborne terrorist activities (VIGILANT EAGLE 2010). In my view, we have more work to do in order to make these types of exchanges more a matter of routine and less transactional. However, I look forward to continued exchanges and dialogue between the United States and Russia, which will help formulate and reinforce the trust and respect necessary to promote continued cooperation and increased transparency between our two nations.

In January of this year you indicated that you would like to open a dialogue with Russian military officials and that you would welcome the opportunity to host a Russian counterpart.

If confirmed would you still welcome dialogue with your Russian counterpart?

Yes. As the USNORTHCOM Commander, I have hosted several Russian delegations, and I strongly believe such exchanges can improve our communications and understanding and enhance our mutual security. Although there is no direct counterpart to the Vice Chairman's position on the Russian General Staff, I welcome engagement on behalf of the Chairman with the Chief of the General Staff and with other members of the General Staff.

What issues do you consider to be most important to address?

We have made great strides over the last year on improving the formal lines of communication between the U.S. and Russian militaries. Our communications must remain candid and constructive to ensure continued cooperation in areas such as the Northern Distribution Network in support of the Afghanistan effort and to close gaps in mutual understanding in areas such as missile defense. We should continue to cooperate on combating terrorism and piracy, and there is room for discussions regarding cyber security. Perhaps most importantly, we should make greater strides in establishing routine contact between many different levels of our military forces, as such contacts build trust and confidence and grow future leaders who will be on a familiar basis with their partners. However, this will require greater willingness on the part of the Russian Federation Armed Forces to allow such communication.

Integration of Space Programs

What is your view on the need to institute a more integrated approach to both the military and intelligence sides of the space community?

I agree with the need to better integrate military and intelligence space capabilities. Members of both communities participate in a number of joint forums and I believe that progress is being made. We are jointly developing programs, and at senior levels have very integral relationships. However, when the needs of either side diverge to the extent that solutions impose impractical cost on the government, consideration should be given to potential independent, but complimentary solutions.

Space Program Management

In many instances the military and intelligence space programs have experienced technical, budget, and schedule difficulties. In some instances these difficulties can be traced to problems with establishing realistic, clear, requirements and then maintaining control over the integrity of the requirements once established. If confirmed as chairman of the JROC you will be involved in determining these requirements.

How in your view can or should the space systems requirements process be improved?

If confirmed, I will ensure that space system requirements process improvements are considered within the context of the Joint Capability Integration and Development Systems (JCIDS) process review in collaboration with the Director of National Intelligence.

In general, space programs take many years to move from conception to launch. The result is that the technology in the satellites is significantly outdated by the time the satellites are launched and operational, which in turn, can lead to a decision to terminate a program early, and look to a newer technology. This vicious cycle results in significantly increased costs for space systems as sunk costs are never fully amortized.

How in your view can this cycle be addressed?

I believe shorter cycle times from concept to launch that are based on less complex system requirements can provide more frequent opportunities to infuse technology as it is determined to be mature enough for operational use.

Space Cooperation

Do you support arms control limitations on space capabilities?

I support the principles outlined in the 2010 National Space Policy, which states that the United States will pursue bilateral and multilateral transparency and confidence-building measures to encourage responsible actions in, and the peaceful use of, space. We should only consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures if they are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the national security of the United States and its allies.

Would you support the United States signing the so-called European Union Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities?

I understand that the Department is currently evaluating the European Union's proposed international Code of Conduct for Outer Space as a pragmatic first set of guidelines for safe activities in space. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing this evaluation and considering appropriate steps to establish rules of the road for space operations.

Operationally Responsive Space

Do you support the concept of operationally responsive small satellites and what do you see as the most promising opportunities for small satellites?

The concept of providing operationally responsive space capabilities to address emergent warfighter needs when existing capabilities cannot is sound. I understand that the recent launch of the first "ORS" satellite is a good first step along the road to low cost, responsive space capabilities.

Do you believe that smaller less complicated less expensive satellites can play a role in providing resiliency or redundancy for space systems?

I believe smaller, simpler, lower cost satellites can certainly play a role in providing resiliency for space systems. The specific role will depend on the priority of the mission, the state of technology, and the cost. The potential benefits include better availability of capability for the warfighter, and a more stable industrial base.

Prompt Global Strike

The DOD is currently working on technologies that if successful could lead to the decision to develop and deploy conventional, non-nuclear, prompt global strike capability.

Do you believe that a prompt global strike capability should be developed and deployed?

I believe DOD should continue to study and test technologies relevant to Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) capabilities, with an eye towards future acquisition. Affordable CPGS weapons would provide the nation with a unique capability to strike time-sensitive targets without using nuclear weapons, so that distant, heretofore inaccessible locations will no longer provide sanctuary to adversaries.

If your answer to the previous question is yes, what is your vision of the capability that should be developed for prompt global strike and the types of targets that would underpin the need to develop the capability?

Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) systems could be useful in scenarios involving regional adversaries considering an imminent attack using weapons of mass destruction or against high-priority non-state adversaries. More broadly, CPGS may be the only system available in situations where a fleeting, serious threat was located in a region not readily accessible by other means. Fielding this capability strengthens deterrence by providing a credible means of responding to potential threats without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Weapons

If confirmed you would become a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council, and work closely with the National Nuclear Security Administration and its Stockpile Stewardship Program.

What, in your view, are the longer-term Stockpile Stewardship Program goals and what are the key elements that should be addressed from a DOD perspective?

Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program with the aim of creating the computational capabilities and experimental tools needed to allow for the continued

certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable without the need for nuclear weapons testing. The Secretaries of Defense and Energy are statutorily required to certify annually to the Congress the continued safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.

It is my understanding that stockpile stewardship is effective; today's stockpile has been certified and does not require further nuclear testing. But the stockpile is aging. I understand that there are challenges in identifying and remedying the effects of aging on the stockpile. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the Department of Energy to maintain the critical skills, capabilities, and infrastructure needed to ensure the safety, reliability, and security of the stockpile, within a constrained budget environment.

In your view is the Stockpile Stewardship Program providing the tools to ensure the safety, reliability, and security of the nuclear weapons stockpile without testing and if not what tools are needed?

If confirmed, I would continue to study options for ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of nuclear warheads on a case-by-case basis, consistent with the congressionally mandated Stockpile Management Program. It is important that the full range of life extension programs be considered to include: refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads, and replacement of nuclear components.

Do you believe the Administration's 1251 report sets forth an appropriate road map for the modernization of the nuclear weapons complex and the strategic delivery systems?

I do believe the Administration's 1251 report details the right roadmap for ensuring the future safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear stockpile and associated delivery platforms as well as for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex. The 1251 report details a strong commitment to the nuclear mission and is an important element of assurance that the U.S. deterrent remains strong.

Do you agree that the full funding of the President's plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, commonly referred to as the 1251 report, is a critical national security priority?

I agree that the full funding of the 1251 report is a critical national security priority. As stated by Secretary Gates and Secretary Chu in their joint 1251 transmittal letter to Chairman Levin, "...an increase of \$4.1 billion in the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) budget highlights the Administration's strong commitment to the long-term effort to maintain the safety, security, and effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent and the NNSA infrastructure that supports it. We look forward to continuing the modernization and sustainment of our nuclear weapons delivery systems, stockpile, and infrastructure."

Prior to completing this modernization effort do you believe it would be prudent to consider reductions below New START Treaty limits for either the deployed or nondeployed stockpile of nuclear weapons?

It is my understanding that the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Report stated that we would pursue additional reductions in strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons with Russia, and a key aspect of implementing the 2010 NPR, as with previous such reviews, is conducting follow-on analysis. In determining U.S. objectives in future negotiations with Russia, our subsequent analysis will consider multiple factors in the effort to secure an outcome that best advances U.S. objectives for reductions in the numbers of deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons, both strategic and non-strategic, in a manner that supports the President's commitment to strengthen deterrence of potential regional adversaries, strategic stability with Russia and China, and assurance of our Allies and partners. I believe that the status of the modernization effort will play a role in these deliberations.

Finally, the Senate noted in its resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the New START Treaty, and certified by the administration, that we must seek to initiate negotiations with Russia on a new arms control agreement by February 2012.

If confirmed, as we complete follow-on analysis required by the NPR, I will support the Department's continuing assessment of the proper force size and capabilities required for an effective nuclear deterrent.

Without the construction of the Chemical and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) Facility at Los Alamos and the Uranium Production Facility (UPF) at Y-12 and the other elements associated with the robust plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, do you believe reductions to the strategic hedge would be prudent?

Without CMRR, UPF, and other elements to modernize the nuclear weapons complex, the U.S. will not have sufficient infrastructure or capability to sustain the nuclear stockpile, nor will it have the capability to address a critical failure in a weapon type. Without the ability to correct deficiencies and failures, no matter how remote, careful analysis and the potential acceptance of risk would be required to enable or accept reductions in the strategic hedge.

Without construction of CMRR, the Nuclear Weapons Enterprise will not have essential tools to manufacture or assess the special nuclear materials required to produce or rebuild pits and other components. Aging facilities, long past their useful life and already partially condemned, cannot be sustained to meet ongoing requirements for the U.S. nuclear stockpile. CMRR is an important key to sustaining the U.S. nuclear stockpile and enabling reductions to the strategic hedge.

UPF at Y-12 is also key to the ability of NNSA and the National Security Laboratories to sustain the existing U.S. nuclear stockpile and provide capability to rebuild secondaries

as long as a nuclear stockpile is required. As at Los Alamos, aging facilities, long past their useful life and already partially condemned, cannot be sustained to meet ongoing requirements for the U.S. nuclear stockpile. UPF is essential to sustaining the U.S. nuclear stockpile and enabling reductions to the strategic hedge.

New START Treaty and Future Reductions

Earlier this year the New START Treaty entered into force. Under the terms of the treaty both sides have 7 years to come into compliance with the treaty.

Do you believe that there is any opportunity to come into compliance in less than 7 years and what would be the conditions under which such compliance could be achieved?

The Treaty requires both Parties to ensure their strategic offensive forces are at levels within the Treaty's three central limits seven years after entry into force, which will occur on February 5, 2018. The DOD is undertaking efforts to ensure we will comply with our Treaty obligations. For instance, to date, all B-1B bombers have been converted to conventional use and all Minuteman II ICBM launchers have been eliminated or converted into Minuteman III ICBM launchers, thereby removing these formerly accountable items from being counted under the Treaty's central limits.

Do you believe that reductions in the total number of warheads, both reserve and operationally deployed, is feasible prior to the expiration of the New START Treaty and, if so, under what conditions?

The Article II central limit of 1,550 warheads applies only to warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers. Seven years after entry into force (February 5, 2018), the New START Treaty requires both State Parties to ensure total numbers of deployed strategic warheads are within this central limit. The DOD is undertaking efforts to ensure the United States will comply with our Treaty obligations.

The New START Treaty does not address non-deployed strategic nuclear warheads, e.g., nuclear warheads in the U.S. stockpile. Thus, any reductions in these weapons would be subject to a different analytical process that would consider stockpile reliability, modernization of our nuclear infrastructure, and other factors.

Nuclear Triad Modernization

Under the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the Administration has committed to begin modernization of each leg of the nuclear triad including development of new nuclear cruise missiles and extending the life of nuclear weapons. This process will continue over the next 30 years and longer, and will be very expensive.

If confirmed, would you agree to review the requirements and cost of these initiatives, identify any opportunities for cost savings, and report back to the committee on a periodic basis if you identify such opportunities?

Yes, this will fall under my responsibilities, if confirmed, as Vice Chairman, and I would be pleased to report any opportunities for cost savings to the Committee.

Nuclear Policy

Do you support President Obama's vision for a world without nuclear weapons?

I share the President's vision to "seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons." I also share the President's commitment to a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent capability as long as nuclear weapons exist.

Do you believe this goal is a viable near and or long term strategic strategy for the United States?

The President recognized, and I agree, that such an ambitious goal could not be reached quickly and perhaps, as he said, not in his lifetime. He also pledged that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal, both to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America's security commitments.

A commitment to a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent means sustaining our nuclear deterrent through life extension programs for warheads and modernization of delivery systems. I believe that providing necessary resources for nuclear modernization should be a national strategic priority.

When considered in total, I believe this is a viable long-term strategy.

In a recent speech at the Carnegie Endowment the President's National Security Advisor stated that the administration is currently "making preparations for the next round of nuclear reductions" and that the Department of Defense will "review our strategic requirements and develop options for further reductions in our current nuclear stockpile." He continued by stating that in meeting these objectives, the White House will direct DOD to consider "potential changes in targeting requirements and alert postures."

Do you believe the United States should pursue further reductions? Please explain why or why not.

I believe the United States should carefully consider future reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons--deployed and non-deployed, strategic and non-strategic. Ideally, U.S. reductions would be associated with reductions in Russian nuclear forces, and they should continue to support U.S. commitments to stability, deterrence, and assurance.

Any reductions in these weapons should consider non-Russian threats, stockpile reliability and other factors in addition to the status of any planned or ongoing negotiations with Russia.

Do you believe it would be prudent for the United States to pursue unilateral nuclear reductions? Please explain why or why not.

I believe the size and composition of Russia's nuclear forces will remain a significant factor in determining how much and how fast the United States is prepared to reduce its forces; therefore, we should place importance on Russia joining us as we move to lower levels.

Any future reductions must continue to strengthen deterrence of potential regional adversaries, strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia and China, and assurance of our allies and partners.

Do you believe changes to well-established nuclear targeting requirements could negatively impact our ability to assure our allies, to discourage other countries from seeking strategic equivalence with the United States in nuclear weapons, and hedge against future threats and uncertainties?

I believe the United States is committed to maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent and reinforcing regional security architectures and that we will continue to reassure our allies and partners worldwide of our security commitments to them. I have observed that no significant changes to such DOD policies occur without thorough analysis and review. National Security Advisor Donilon has stated the next round of nuclear reductions will be accompanied by such a review to include targeting policy. If confirmed, I look forward to participating in this review.

Future Technologies

During the Cold War, the DOD pursued three key technologies to offset the numerical superiority of Soviet conventional forces: precision guided munitions, stealth technology, and satellite-based navigation. These three technologies have given U.S. forces unparalleled superiority until now. Our technology edge, however, in these areas is beginning to erode.

What do you think are key technologies that DOD should be pursuing in order to maintain a technological edge?

The Department recently published seven strategic Science and Technology (S&T) priorities. I believe focusing efforts in these areas are key to maintaining a technological edge. These priorities include:

- Data to Decisions to reduce cycle time and manpower needs
- Engineering Resilient Systems for agile manufacturing of trusted and assured systems
- Cyber Science and technology for effective cyber capabilities

- Electronic Warfare and Protection to protect across the electro-magnetic spectrum
- Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Autonomy for reliable and safe autonomous systems
- Human Systems to enhance human machine interfaces

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

Do you support U. S. accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea?

Yes, I strongly support U. S. accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as the best possible means for maximizing the rights of our armed forces to move freely through and over the world's oceans. I believe that joining the Convention will strengthen our military's ability to conduct operations.

How would you answer the critics of the Convention who assert that accession is not in the national security interests of the United States?

Accession to the Convention would more permanently secure the global mobility rights that are of vital importance to ongoing and future national security operations and humanitarian assistance missions. From the right of unimpeded transit passage through straits used for international navigation, to reaffirming the sovereign immunity of our warships, to providing a framework for countering excessive claims of other states, to preserving the right to conduct military activities in exclusive economic zones, the Convention provides the stable and predictable legal regime we need to conduct our operations today and in the future. The Convention codifies fundamental benefits important to our operating forces as they train and fight, supports the operational maneuver space for combat and other operations of our warships and aircraft, and enhances our own maritime interests in our territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. Further, amendments made to the Convention in the 1990s satisfied many of the concerns that opponents have expressed.

Among the vital rights provided by the Convention that accession would place on a more secure footing are:

- Innocent Passage through territorial seas;
- Archipelagic sea lanes passage through island nations;
- Transit passage through, under and over international straits;
- Warship right of approach and visit; and
- Laying and maintaining of submarine cables.

For example, in the ongoing tensions over rights in the South China Sea, the United States is in a weaker position in both bilateral and multilateral discussion by not having ratified the treaty. As another example, absent joining the Convention, we will

lose the opportunity to influence key international decisions that will be made in the coming years regarding Arctic resource claims.

Accession would eliminate the need for the United States to assert that vital portions of the Convention addressing traditional uses of the oceans are reflective of customary international law. As the law of the sea continues to be developed, there is a need to lock in the Convention's provisions as a matter of treaty law while we still can as a bulwark against customary law drifting in a negative direction. Accession would give the United States a seat at the table as the world's nations deliberate the future direction of the law of the sea.

The Convention provides the only internationally-accepted process for nations to establish legal title to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from their coasts. Only by submitting its claim of an extended continental shelf to the Commission set up under the Convention can the U. S. guarantee international acceptance of its claim to an extended continental shelf off its coasts, including sovereign rights to potentially vast energy resources in the Arctic.

Finally, joining the Convention will enable us to shape the future evolution of the Law of the Sea Treaty by placing U.S. nominees in key positions within important bodies, including those currently interpreting the Convention.

Treatment of Detainees

The Constitution, laws, and treaty obligations of the United States prohibit the torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of persons held in U.S. custody.

If confirmed, will you take steps to ensure that all relevant Department of Defense directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures applicable to U.S. forces fully comply with the requirements of section 1403 of the Detainee Treatment Act and with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Yes.

Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Yes.

Ballistic Missile Defense

In September 2009, President Obama announced that he had accepted the unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of

Staff to pursue a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to missile defense in Europe. This approach is intended to defend all of Europe against existing and emerging threats from Iranian missiles, starting this year and increasing in capability with each of its four phases. Phase 4 of the European PAA is intended to provide a capability to defend against long-range missiles that could reach the United States, thus augmenting the existing homeland missile defense capability.

Do you support the Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense in Europe?

I support the President's policy on European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and, if confirmed, I will ensure DOD supports the program's full implementation.

In February 2010, the Defense Department issued its report on the first-ever comprehensive review of U.S. ballistic missile defense policy and strategy, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), as required by Congress. The BMDR established a number of policy priorities, including establishing defense against near-term regional missile threats as a top priority of missile defense plans, programs and capabilities. It also stated the policy of sustaining and enhancing the ability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system to defend the homeland against attack by a small number of long-range missiles by countries such as North Korea and Iran, and of hedging against future uncertainties.

Do you support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review?

I support the policies, strategies, and priorities as set forth in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review. If confirmed, I will implement the policy priorities of the BMDR, including sustaining and enhancing defense of the homeland, while increasing our capability against growing regional threats.

As the Commander of U.S. Northern Command, you are the combatant commander responsible for the operation of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system to defend the homeland against potential limited missile attacks from nations like North Korea and Iran. The most recent GMD flight test, in December 2010, failed, and the Missile Defense Agency is working to fully understand and correct the problem that caused that flight test failure.

Do you agree that it is essential to correct the problem that caused the December 2010 flight test failure, and to verify the success of that correction through extensive testing, including flight testing, before continuing production and delivery of additional Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicles for the GMD system?

Verifying and correcting the problems with the EKV's prior to continuing production is prudent and supports the Administration's policy to "fly before you buy" in order to improve reliability, confidence, and cost control of U.S. missile defense systems.

Do you support the continued modernization and sustainment of the GMD system?

Yes. The United States is currently protected against the threat of limited ICBM attack from states like North Korea and Iran. It is important that we maintain this advantage by continuing to improve the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system and ensuring we have adequate capacity to counter limited threats as they evolve.

The United States and NATO are seeking options to cooperate with Russia on missile defense. President Obama has announced that such cooperation would not limit U.S. or NATO missile defense capabilities.

Do you agree that such cooperation could enhance the security of the United States, NATO, and Russia against common missile threats from nations such as Iran?

Yes, cooperation with Russia would strengthen the effectiveness of U.S. and NATO missile defenses, as well as those of the Russian Federation. In this particular case, effective ballistic missile defenses devalue Iran's ballistic missile arsenal by reducing its confidence that an attack would be successful.

What do you believe would be the security benefits of such missile defense cooperation, and what types of cooperation do you believe would be beneficial?

Cooperation could offer tangible benefits to the United States, Europe, and Russia in the form of stronger protection against missile threats and a greater insight into our respective missile defense plans, which could strengthen strategic stability. As President Obama stated, this cooperation can happen "even as we have made clear that the system we intend to pursue with Russia will not be a joint system, and it will not in any way limit United States' or NATO's missile defense capabilities." Pursuing a broad agenda with Russia focused on shared early warning of missile launches, technical cooperation, operational cooperation and planning, and joint exercise would be beneficial cooperative efforts.

The Vice Chairman of the JCS is a member of the Missile Defense Executive Board, and the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. This gives the Vice Chairman a unique perspective on the oversight and management of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), including its requirements component.

Are there additional steps that you believe would make the BMDS more responsive to the operational needs of the combatant commanders, and are there additional steps that you believe would improve the requirements process for missile defense?

I believe that we must continue to involve the combatant commanders in the acquisition process to ensure that their operational needs are considered as we develop and field systems to support the joint warfighter. To that end, we continually review these processes to ensure that we are doing the best job that we can to support the warfighter. While recognizing that BMD systems developed by the Missile Defense Agency are not

subject to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the unique position of the Vice Chairman as a member of both the Missile Defense Executive Board and Joint Requirements Oversight Council provides the oversight to ensure that we are integrating all of the development and requirements of missile defense.

Future of NATO

In your view, what existing or new missions should be the focus of NATO's strategic efforts over the next five years?

The focus of NATO's strategic efforts should be to collectively secure our nations through collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. NATO must complete its current missions in Afghanistan, Libya, the Mediterranean, off the Horn of Africa, and in the Balkans. We must also maintain the flexibility to respond to emergent threats such as ballistic missiles, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and cyber attacks.

In your view, how should NATO proceed on the issue of further enlargement of the alliance over the next five years?

This is clearly a decision reserved for NATO Heads of State and Government. However, in accordance with Article 10 of the NATO Treaty, I believe that any Transatlantic State that is in a position to further the principles of the NATO Treaty and that is willing and able to contribute to the security of the NATO Atlantic area commensurate with its capacity should be favorably considered for NATO membership.

At a NATO Defense Ministers meeting in June, then-Secretary of Defense Gates warned that NATO was at risk of losing U.S. financial support for an alliance "on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense." He criticized the "significant shortcomings in NATO--in military capabilities, and in political will." He worried that NATO would turn into a "two-tiered alliance" consisting of "those willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of alliance commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership."

Do you share Secretary Gates' concerns regarding NATO capabilities? Why or why not?

Yes, I do share former Secretary Gate's concerns. Most Allies (due to limited resources made available to defense ministries) have been forced to make critical choices between spending money on transforming their militaries or on contributing to Alliance operations.

Many Allies have been able to strike a delicate balance between these two competing demands. However, it has resulted in an overall loss of effectiveness, which initially was minor but has now been compounded by time.

The current economic climate has added to this as all Allies envisage budget reductions. This lack of resources is the biggest threat to the Alliance's ability to accomplish its core missions.

What steps, if any, could or should NATO take, in your view, to reduce tensions with Russia?

I believe that NATO should continue to engage actively and positively with Russia on issues of mutual interest through the NATO Russia Council. This Council serves as a valuable forum not only to discuss issues on which we agree, but also to discuss issues on which we disagree. This engagement has facilitated NATO-Russia cooperation in numerous areas such as counter-piracy, combating-terrorism, non-proliferation, search and rescue at sea, and disaster response. The continuation of this type of cooperation is important not only from a military perspective, but it remains an essential means by which to enhance transparency and therefore avoid or reduce tensions.

What is your view of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? If confirmed, would you advocate ratification of the Treaty?

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is an important tool that will help counter nuclear proliferation. An in-force CTBT would limit the development of more advanced and destructive nuclear weapons and inhibit the ability of non-nuclear weapons states from developing their own programs. I understand that it has been assessed that CTBT would have no impact on U.S. military confidence in its nuclear stockpile. If confirmed, I would support ratification of the CTBT with adequate safeguards regarding stockpile stewardship and verification.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.