

Senate Armed Services Committee
Advance Policy Questions for General Jacqueline D. Van Ovost, USAF,
Nominee to be Commander, U.S. Transportation Command

Duties and Qualifications

1. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command?

The Commander, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), is responsible for providing air, land, and sea transportation for the DOD, in peace, crisis and war. USTRANSCOM executes through three component commands and two subordinate commands to accomplish this mission: Air Mobility Command (AMC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), as well as the Joint Transportation Reserve Unit (JTRU) and the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC). The Commander is assigned five responsibilities in the Unified Command Plan (UCP), to include: Mobility Joint Force Provider, DOD single manager for transportation, Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise planning and operations, DOD Single Manager for Patient Movement, and the Joint Enabling Capabilities provider.

2. What background and experience do you possess that qualify you to perform these duties?

Beyond my experience commanding mobility units at multiple levels and staff experience at USTRANSCOM headquarters, I was the Director for Mobility Forces in CENTCOM, coordinating with the Combatant Command, Services, and USTRANSCOM, to ensure the Commander's operational scheme of maneuver was supported across the theater. My time on the Joint Staff as the Deputy Director for Europe, NATO, and Russia Plans and Policy, then subsequently the Vice Director of the Joint Staff, provided in-depth knowledge and experience with the National Defense Strategy, roles of the Services, Combatant Commanders, the Chairman, and the Secretary of Defense to create and execute globally integrated plans and comprehensive policies that achieve national interests.

My subsequent time as the Director of the Air Staff provided the experience of balancing service responsibilities to organize, train and equip ready forces for today and tomorrow, with meeting the demands of the Combatant Commander as they fulfill National Defense Strategy requirements today. This position directly led to my selection as Commander, Air Mobility Command, the Air Component of USTRANSCOM.

3. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command?

As the current USTRANSCOM Air Component Commander, I am aware of the breadth of USTRANSCOM's worldwide responsibilities. If confirmed, I will engage with all of USTRANSCOM's component commands, DoD agencies, and commercial partners to ensure I

fully understand the range of challenges they face in order to accomplish USTRANSCOM's crucial mission.

Relationships

If confirmed, what will be your relationship with:

4. The Secretary of Defense

The Commander, USTRANSCOM, performs his or her duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The USTRANSCOM Commander is responsible directly to the Secretary of Defense to carry out the command's missions.

5. The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense has the authority to act for the Secretary of Defense when serving as his designated representative in the Secretary's absence. As such, the USTRANSCOM Commander will report to and through the Deputy Secretary when serving in that capacity.

6. The Under Secretaries of Defense

Under Secretaries of Defense coordinate and exchange information with DOD components, including Combatant Commands, which have collateral or related functions. In practice, this coordination and exchange is normally routed through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment provides logistics policy for the Department. If confirmed as a Combatant Commander, I look forward to continuing these relationships.

7. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

As specified in Title 10, U.S.C., the Chairman is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. The Chairman is not, by law, in the chain of command, which runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense to each Combatant Commander. In his or her role as the Global Integrator, however, the CJCS plays an important role in a full range of security matters on behalf of the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will keep the Chairman fully informed regarding USTRANSCOM matters.

8. The Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs

Each Service Secretary is responsible for equipping, training, and maintaining ready forces belonging to that Military Department. Close coordination with each Service Secretary providing forces to USTRANSCOM is essential to ensure the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) remains ready to meet national security requirements. In addition, USTRANSCOM is responsible to deliver service-provided forces to Combatant Commanders. If

confirmed as the Commander USTRANSCOM, I will continue my predecessors' productive dialogue with the Service Chiefs and the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard.

9. The other Combatant Commanders

As one of four UCP-designated Combatant Commands with Transregional responsibilities, USTRANSCOM's primary mission is to support each of the Combatant Commanders in accomplishing the responsibilities assigned to them in the UCP. Given the complexity of today's security environment, it is essential all the Combatant Commanders work together to execute U.S. national security policy. If confirmed, I will continue to build upon the trust and mutual support my predecessors have fostered with the other Combatant Commanders.

10. The Director of the Defense Logistics Agency

The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) manages the global supply chain for the DOD, other Federal agencies, and partner and allied nations. USTRANSCOM maintains a strong strategic partnership with DLA. USTRANSCOM includes the DLA Director in our periodic Component Commanders conferences, and if confirmed I have every intention of continuing to bolster this relationship. USTRANSCOM and DLA have ongoing transformational efforts to improve the JDDE operational outcomes and lay the groundwork for data-related initiatives.

Major Challenges and Priorities

11. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Commander, U.S. Transportation Command?

USTRANSCOM is a warfighting combatant command that enables the projection and sustainment of combat power at a time and place of our Nation's choosing. As the character of logistics evolves, we increasingly face direct challenges across all domains, particularly in areas of previously unmatched superiority - including our global logistics capability. Accordingly, the Command's major challenges are maintaining warfighting readiness and modernizing the DoD's transportation assets. The sealift and aerial refueling fleets are aging, demanding recapitalized fleets capable of operating in contested environments. Additionally, we must maintain a competitive edge with our adversaries in the cyber domain. Command and control is an essential element of our warfighting framework, necessitating steady focus on cyber assurance and improved cyber security. If confirmed as the next USTRANSCOM Commander, I will ensure the JDDE remains capable of projecting decisive military power while preserving the ability to command and control global mobility operations.

12. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

If confirmed, I will work with my fellow Combatant Commanders, Service Chiefs, Defense Agencies, Joint Staff and OSD partners to assess risks and collaboratively develop mitigation strategies. My near-term challenge will be dealing with the ever-growing number of cyber adversaries. I will continue the Command's efforts to pursue several initiatives in cyber resiliency and digital modernization, as well as partner with the commercial sector to improve

JDDE cyber security. Fortunately, for sealift, there is a recapitalization plan in place to acquire used sealift vessels over the next 10 years; and I will ensure we continue partnering with the Navy to ensure we have the necessary Congressional authorities. As the Air Mobility Command Commander, I am familiar with the aerial refueling challenges, and I support the USAF's plan to release KC-46 interim capability for select missions, while carefully managing legacy tanker retirements and securing additional Reserve man-days to meet day-to-day and crisis requirements.

National Defense Strategy (NDS)

The 2018 NDS prioritized the “long-term, strategic competition” with revisionist powers China and Russia as the primary challenge with which the United States must contend, while also recognizing the need to deter and counter rogue regimes like North Korea and Iran and move to a more resource sustainable approach to counterterrorism.

13. In your view, what, if any, changes should be considered in reshaping the NDS, taking into account developments since 2018?

USTRANSCOM has made recommendations to the team preparing the forthcoming NDS, and most of those inputs can only be shared in a classified environment. As Secretary Austin has written and spoken, the need for an integrated approach to deterrence should be an important concept shaping the future NDS and the Nation's approach to either potential near peer threats such as China or Russia or rogue regimes like North Korea and Iran. I recommend that even though the 2018 NDS specified Resilient and Agile Logistics as a key competitive advantage for the United States, the future NDS should more directly address the very real deterrent effect logistics formations and investments have through their demonstrated ability to project and sustain US power to any point on the globe at a time and place of our choosing. That can take the form of delivering a combat brigade or pallets of vaccine doses. Recent cyberattacks on the Colonial Pipeline or supply chain entities clearly demonstrate that our ability to project power can and (we expect) will be disrupted and contested. The future NDS should prioritize investments in strategic mobility assets, changes in operating concepts and investments in our allies and partners. Those investments speak directly to President Biden's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance requirement, “to defend access to the global commons, including freedom of navigation and overflight rights, under international law.” Therefore, to reiterate, the 2021 NDS should expand upon logistics, strategic mobility, and the access, basing and overflight agreements that are the foundation for our ability to achieve the Nation's security objectives. Consequently, we should ensure the NDS recognizes the importance of logistics requirements and challenges to the Department's ability to successfully achieve the objectives of the NDS.

14. What capabilities do you believe the Joint Force needs from the U.S. Transportation Command to prevail in competition with great power adversaries?

Our ability to rapidly move forces transoceanic distances is a strategic comparative advantage, providing a wide range of options in support of the National Defense Strategy while creating multiple dilemmas for our adversaries. Should deterrence fail, USTRANSCOM delivers two capabilities for DoD: #1, an immediate force tonight, and #2, a decisive force when needed.

USTRANSCOM's responsibility to the Secretary of Defense is global power projection and the ability to prioritize limited resources to the highest strategic priority, shifting temporally and spatially across the globe to meet the highest national security objective.

The NDS's Global Operating Model and Dynamic Force Employment concepts emphasize sustaining capabilities for major combat, while "providing options for proactive and scalable employment of the Joint Force."

15. How do you intend to work with the services to implement these concepts while balancing the need to rebuild readiness?

USTRANSCOM will continue to work with military Service Departments to address air refueling, airlift, and sealift readiness concerns, to provide the capabilities needed to support a modernized Global Operating Model while enabling concepts such as Dynamic Force Employment (DFE). We will continue to fully support and are actively engaged with the Joint Staff, fellow combatant commands, and the Services in developing the emerging Joint Warfighting Concept and its supporting concepts, especially the Joint Concept for Contested Logistics.

USTRANSCOM's ability to project and sustain military forces is inextricably linked to commercial industry, which provides critical transportation capacity and access to global networks to meet requirements in both the competition phase and times of crisis. We can and do leverage commercial industry creating space for our organic capabilities to train and rebuild readiness, while maintaining our ability to support the Joint Force.

As part of its focus on near peer competitors, the NDS disputes the decades-long assumption that the U.S. military will have uncontested access to international airspace and sea lanes. Given this new threat:

16. What areas of operations will be more challenging for the joint distribution and deployment enterprise, and what would you do, if confirmed, to mitigate those challenges?

As accurately described in the NDS, the U.S. military no longer has assured access to international airspace and sea lanes. Beyond the physical challenges in our "fight to get to the fight," supply chains are neither robust nor resilient, presenting dilemmas across the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise in sustainment operations for all commodities, particularly with liquid energy. Additionally, USTRANSCOM's partnerships with commercial entities that use unclassified information systems add to the challenge of ensuring reliable communication, command, and control systems required to effectively lead global distribution and sustainment operations across the JDDE.

I will work with DLA, the Services, fellow Combatant Commands, and commercial partners to attain the agreements and resolutions necessary to reduce these vulnerabilities while preserving our ability to project and sustain military power globally. I will leverage existing DoD forums to develop cross functional solutions and action plans, as well as engage in well-established associations with our air, sea, and surface industry partners to address specific challenges related

to our commercial associates. Finally, I will work with the JDDE to ensure solutions are developed, scrutinized, and prioritized using all available tools at my disposal including, but not limited to, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and Integrated Priority List (IPL).

17. Do these challenges require the services to generate more capabilities to deal with anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environments, where we could face greater enemy mine or ISR capabilities?

DoD is in the process of modifying the way we think about mobility operations to better understand the investment trades required to preserve our ability to project military power globally. All the Services are pursuing multiple different capabilities to combat persistent, multi-domain A2/AD challenges, to include adversary mine and ISR capabilities, within the future operating environment. If confirmed, I am fully committed to work across the Department and with the Services to continue this important effort.

Contested Logistics

Over the last several years, DOD and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) have conducted or sponsored several studies on contested mobility and logistics which have resulted in more than 50 recommendations. However, the GAO found that DOD has failed to implement many of these recommendations. As a result, DOD and INDOPACOM may be missing an opportunity to leverage existing knowledge on mobility challenges in contested environments and increase resilience for major conflicts as envisioned in the National Defense Strategy.

18. In your opinion, what are the highest priorities and key challenges that DOD must address in a contested logistics environment in a potential conflict with China and Russia? Please identify which of those challenges are unique to either China or Russia and which are common to both.

Long, contested lines of communications and the tyranny of distance in the Indo-Pacific region create dilemmas that will require the integration of logistics planning across all warfighting functions to support the Joint war fight. Common to both China and Russia, the growth in demand from increasingly dispersed operations, increasingly complex and lethal kinetic platforms, and extended adversary anti-access/area denial capabilities place immediate stressors on the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise to support forward forces immediately, as we rapidly build capacity to deploy a decisive force.

Strategic lift (sea and air) assets and the ability to dynamically command and control those assets remain critical when looking at both great power challenges. Strategic lift allows us to present a sizeable Joint Force at scale around the globe. Additionally, air refueling is a key enabler that allows this enterprise to rapidly deploy fighters and bombers, as well as support the employment of those combat aircraft across strategic distances.

Ongoing recapitalization efforts remain crucial to this enterprise. We need to sustain efforts to recapitalize our sealift fleet to improve our readiness and capacity to project the Joint Force. The KC-46 is another key investment to recapitalize the aging AR fleet. However, even when the 179th KC-46 is delivered, there will still be 300 KC-135s at 67 plus years of age. Investments in air refueling will remain necessary. In addition to recapitalization efforts, we must also continue to invest in the readiness and maintenance of some of our older platforms. We have a great relationship with the Navy and the Air Force and are extremely appreciative of their efforts to enhance spending for readiness.

Finally, intratheater lift (airlift and sealift) is also critical to sustain and support the force to meet volume and time-sensitive requirements for cargo, passengers, and fuel. This is especially the case in the Indo-Pacific region. As captured in both the Mobility Capability Requirements Study and Fuel Tanker Vessel Study recently provided to Congress, the Department must continue efforts to identify the types and mix of intratheater air and sealift assets needed to successfully support and sustain operations in the future operating environment.

19. What capability and/or capacity shortfalls in the current Joint Force present the most significant challenge to supporting U.S. Transportation Command operations in these contested environments?

The full capacity of the JDDE relies upon timely access to the Reserve Components and emergency preparedness programs like the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) that leverage commercial industry augmentation. The FY20 NDAA directed a Mobility Capability Requirements Study (MCRS) to assess the adequacy of the JDDE's capacity relative to the current NDS. The study assessed the demands associated with the National Defense Strategy and factored the implications of contested environments on degraded mobility outputs. I have reviewed the findings and recommendations of the recently released MCRS and Fuel Tanker Vessel Study, and if confirmed, I will work with the Joint community to implement appropriate recommendations from the study.

20. Which programs, in your assessment, are the highest priorities for mitigating current and emerging warfighting capability and/or capacity shortfalls in the Joint Force?

The recently completed Mobility Capability Requirements Study (MCRS) and Fuel Tanker Vessel Studies provide a great roadmap for challenges facing USTRANSCOM as the Department looks at the future Joint Operating Environment. If confirmed, I'm committed to review and implement recommendations stemming from the studies while also conducting my own review and assessment of the JDDE to ensure the DOD mobility enterprise is prepared to meet current and future requirements consistent with the Joint Operating Environment described in the NDS. In my current role as the Commander, Air Mobility Command, I am aware these priorities may include enhanced cyber mission assurance, improving command and control capabilities, while also sustaining key ongoing recapitalization efforts, like air refueling and sealift recapitalization. Finally, as captured in both recently completed studies, the Department must work to identify the right type and mix of intra-theater (sea and air) capabilities for the future operating environment.

Given the “tyranny of distance” in the Pacific, there are significant challenges specifically related to energy requirements in a contested environment, which could be mitigated by making targeted investments and operational energy improvements to both military platforms and installations.

21. If confirmed, what role would you take to reduce contested logistics vulnerabilities in INDOPACOM and elsewhere, and what specific operational energy improvements do you envision pursuing?

USTRANSCOM recently completed the Fuel Tanker Vessel Study to address the department's ability to meet future combatant commander deployment and sustainment requirements. The study considered both U.S. flagged and foreign flagged capacity to ensure enough capacity exists to meet NDS requirements. The study also considered contested environment impacts likely to be encountered in future operations. The study concluded that there is insufficient US Flag tanker capacity to meet NDS requirements. DoD will have an enduring need for foreign flag tanker augmentation. However, the mission, location, and timing of some fuel delivery requirements drives the need for U.S. flag tankers. Though there is sufficient friendly foreign flag capacity, there is substantial risk to mission associated with a heavy reliance on foreign flag tankers, particularly for intra-theater missions within a contested environment. The analysis clearly demonstrated the need for a Tanker Security Program in addition to identifying several other solutions. These solutions, working together, are important steps toward a comprehensive strategy to increase U.S. flag tanker capacity, to reduce the risk of reliance on foreign flag tankers for the most important fuel missions, and to ensure the DoD has sufficient tanker capabilities to meet NDS objectives.

Experience in Managing Logistics Operations

You have most recently served as the Commander of the Air Mobility Command, the air component of the U.S. Transportation Command.

22. What steps do you believe you need to take to achieve a more complete understanding of the logistics operations of the other component commands of U.S. Transportation Command?

As the current Air Component Commander, and having served as a staff officer in USTRANSCOM, I am familiar with the logistics operations of the component commands and the capabilities they bring to bear to accomplish the global mission. If confirmed, I will engage with the USTRANSCOM components and subordinate command, as well as sister agencies and commercial partners to enhance my understanding of the capability and challenges they face in their execution of that global mission.

Civil Reserve Air Fleet

The military services rely heavily on the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) to supplement organic airlift in order to meet the U.S. Transportation Command's wartime and peacetime transportation requirements.

23. What is your assessment of the CRAF's ability to meet requirements to transport any equipment, materials, or commodities for U.S. military operations or to respond to a humanitarian disaster?

Today, the CRAF program is fully subscribed with 26 carriers to meet anticipated DOD needs by guaranteeing wartime commitment through assured peacetime business. They are well positioned to support humanitarian assistance, military operations, and peacetime missions. It should be noted, regardless of the mission profile, employment of CRAF capabilities requires a permissive environment. If confirmed, I will continue to work with our CRAF partners to ensure they remain committed and ready to support DOD requirements when needed.

24. How much should we be relying on CRAF to meet our peacetime and wartime airlift requirements?

Consistent with our National Airlift Policy, CRAF is designed to leverage the commercial air carrier industry to provide capability beyond that available in the organic military airlift fleet. In peacetime, our reliance should be consistent with the requirement to maintain the proficiency and operational readiness of the organic military requirement, while ensuring the capability of our commercial partners to meet approved requirements for military airlift in wartime. I believe the DOD must strike a balance between commercial airlift and the organic fleet to ensure our military crews are trained, proficient and postured to meet the requirements outlined in the Mobility Capability Requirements Study for NDAA FY20. This study provides DOD leadership with the analysis required to effectively manage the DOD's reliance on commercial augmentation without negatively impacting the military force.

25. What changes, if any, do you think need to be made to CRAF—authorities, requirements, composition—to ensure that CRAF can continue to meet our needs?

I greatly appreciate how USTRANSCOM and Air Mobility Command continuously assess all facets of the CRAF program to ensure it meets our needs and supports the NDS. In doing so, USTRANSCOM recently concluded the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2020 (MCRS 20). Although MCRS 20 found current CRAF subscription levels provide sufficient capacity to meet passenger and cargo requirements above the capacity of the organic mobility fleet, it is worth exploring the potential to enhance the CONUS aeromedical evacuation component of CRAF to reduce stress on organic theater airlift and meet NDS requirements. If confirmed, I am committed to further exploring this essential capability.

Sealift

When the United States goes to war, U.S. Transportation Command moves approximately 90% of its cargo requirements with the strategic sealift fleet, which consists of government-owned ships augmented by the commercial U.S.-flagged fleet.

26. What is your assessment of current and planned organic strategic sealift capacity?

Department of Defense mobility studies over the past two decades have validated the requirement for approximately 20 million square feet of Roll-on/Roll-off (RO/RO) sealift capacity. The U.S. Navy organic fleet provides approximately three-fourths of the capacity, and the remainder is sourced commercially through the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA). Over the next 10 years, 33 of 50 USN RO/RO vessels, which deliver the surge force, will retire. The readiness of this aging fleet is USTRANSCOM's number one readiness concern. I support OSD and Navy's plan to recapitalize the fleet by purchasing used commercial ships to improve readiness to meet the National Defense Strategy. A long-term, stable procurement strategy will ensure we maintain sufficient capacity to deploy the force.

27. What do you believe is the appropriate mix of new construction, used ship purchasing, and service life extensions that the Department should employ in the Ready Reserve Force recapitalization plan?

I defer to the U.S. Navy within the context of their Service responsibilities to retain a viable surge sealift capacity to deliver the decisive force. The Navy's plan to purchase used ships is an appropriate, cost-effective approach for the organic fleet, and includes significant work for the U.S. industrial base to convert/upgrade the used ships in U.S. shipyards. The health of the ship construction and repair base is essential to our national interests, and the Navy must ensure its overall shipbuilding program is sufficient to maintain the U.S. shipyard capacity.

28. What is your view of the importance of maintaining U.S.-flagged vessels to participate in strategic sealift, including through the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement and Maritime Security Program?

The U.S. has long been a maritime nation. I believe it is critically important to maintain a viable U.S. flagged sealift capability to support DoD needs. The vessels within the VISA provide the Department assured access to commercial capacity, providing approximately twenty-five percent of the Department's Joint Force deployment capacity, and the majority of its sustainment capacity. Additionally, the Maritime Security Program (MSP) provides a fleet that is actively plying our deep-sea international trades, supporting National Economic Prosperity, while meeting national defense and other security requirements. These U.S.-flagged commercial sealift programs employ a pool of trained and ready U.S. Merchant Mariners needed to crew the U.S. Navy organic fleet when it transitions from reduced operating status to fully operational status.

29. What is your assessment of the adequacy of the current and qualified, licensed merchant mariner population who would be available to crew strategic sealift vessels to meet surge and protracted U.S. Transportation Command requirements?

In accordance with Presidential Directives and National Policy, USTRANSCOM relies on the Maritime Administration to determine whether adequate manpower is available to support the operation of reserve ships during a crisis. The current Department of Transportation/Maritime Administration estimates there are sufficient Mariners to activate the surge fleet but would be

challenged to concurrently sustain both the organic and commercial fleets through a crew rotation. Any additional decrement to U.S. Merchant Mariner availability increases the risk to our ability to surge the fleet.

Global Household Goods Contract

For more than two years, U.S. Transportation Command has attempted to consolidate its Global Household Goods Contract (GHC) into a single prime contractor that would oversee close to 1,000 subcontractors in charge of moving service members and their families. U.S. Transportation Command contends this was done due to poor customer service and outcomes under the current model. In 2020, the GAO upheld numerous protests against U.S. Transportation Command awarding of the Global Household Goods contract citing that it violated federal procurement law. U.S. Transportation Command stated that the GHC would represent the “best value” for DOD and service members when cost and performance are considered, yet according to reports, the winning bid was billions more over the life of the contract. The contract is now being re-competed with an award due in September of 2021.

30. What is your current assessment of the existing household goods program? Do you believe a new system is needed, and do you believe U.S. Transportation Command approach is the best path forward?

The Defense Personal Property Enterprise exists for one purpose and one purpose only: to provide quality moving and storage services to DOD and Coast Guard personnel and their families. As these families have correctly highlighted over the last several years, the Department faltered on this mission. I assess the existing household goods program as incapable of consistently generating the quality capacity DOD personnel and their families deserve or the accountability Congress demands.

I believe change is required in order to keep faith with military families, I believe the Department of Defense has a thoughtful, deliberate strategy to improve the relocation process, and I believe the reform efforts USTRANSCOM is leading on behalf of DOD—to include the Global Household Goods Contract (GHC)—will deliver credible improvements to military families.

In the existing household goods program, each of DOD’s 39 Regional Shipping Offices award business to over 900 Transportation Service Providers on a shipment-by-shipment basis. The transactional nature of our relationship with a disparate confederation of suppliers prevents us from capitalizing on existing capacity, limits industry investment in generating additional capacity, and inhibits us from incorporating modern capabilities (to include the convenient technology we take for granted in every aspect of our personal lives) into the Defense Personal Property Program. And because DOD does not have a formal contract with any of these providers, the Department cannot hold them accountable for performance failures in a meaningful way. This fragmented approach generates the friction, frustration, and opacity many military families endure during the relocation process.

The GHC is an opportunity to raise the standard for DOD families, attract additional quality capacity to the program, and introduce a level of accountability absent in today's program.

I am confident in the approach because it has been transparent, involved broad collaboration across the Department's Personnel and Logistics communities, and incorporated industry input. Additionally, I appreciate that it is just as focused on improving the Department's own internal management framework as it is improving the level of service from commercial providers.

What resonates with me most, though, is the Department's focus on relocating *people* and addressing perennial family pain-points and not simply focusing on *moving their things*.

31. If confirmed, would you continue the awarding of a new GHC prime contractor with the current scheduled September award date?

Yes, but only after rigorous reviews are conducted to ensure the recommendations GAO made in its protest decision were implemented and (as was done ahead of the previous award) after receiving concurrence from the Services. I understand the earliest the contract will be awarded is October 2021.

Changing the conditions within which industry operates is required: to improve access to and management of quality capacity to meet DOD's peak demand; to improve communication throughout the process; to deliver modern, digital management tools to DOD customers; to improve the claims process in the event of loss, damage, or inconvenience; and to enable the Department to affix the accountability and responsibility lacking in today's program. The Global Households Goods Contract delivers that change.

I concur with the 'Best Value' acquisition strategy rather than awarding to the lowest price, technically acceptable bidder. That said, I understand the reports referenced in the introductory paragraph to be incorrect. As directed by the 2020 Consolidated Appropriations Act, USTRANSCOM submitted a cost report detailing the projected savings by Military Department to the Defense Committees on 22 April 2020. This cost report (based on rates submitted by the initial GHC awardee) projected savings of \$210M across the FYDP when compared to what DOD pays under the current program. I commit to updating this cost report and submitting it to the Defense Committees before awarding a new contract.

Additionally, and just as GEN Lyons has done, I commit to continuing the transparency and close coordination with each of the Defense Committee staffs on the full range of issues involving the Defense Personal Property Program.

32. Not a question.

33. There have been press reports of shortages of movers in areas with a high military population. Families are getting their PCS orders cancelled at the last minute. Does this post-pandemic labor shortage change the way you would think about handling the GHC?

I believe the labor shortages further highlight the inherent flaws in relying on a fractured, transactional process to manage the critical business of relocating military families around the globe. If anything, the impacts of the labor shortages (things like families being stranded at the curb or being served by an incompetent crew) underscore the necessity of entering in to a multi-year contractual relationship to 1) provide industry with the confidence and rationale to invest in capacity and relationships with trusted suppliers to meet DOD's demand and, 2) provide DOD with meaningful avenues of accountability, which is lacking in the existing program.

34. If confirmed, what will you do to provide transparency and information to families planning moves?

Communication can make or break the relocation experience for DOD personnel and their families. The Department must deliver accurate and timely information directly to families planning moves. Simple, relevant, easily accessible products must clearly outline what customers can expect during the process and the business rules in place to protect them. We must be similarly clear on who they can call for help when things go wrong.

Recent surveys highlight the need for more comprehensive information in a central location. I will continue the partnership USTRANSCOM established with OSD P&R to leverage the *Military OneSource* platform as the authoritative source for DP3-related information. Providing a 'single source of truth' will reduce the likelihood of families finding out-of-date or conflicting instructions when searching for information and eliminate customer confusion on where to turn to find the requisite information to conduct successful moves.

I will also prioritize the work to develop simple, standard products and deliver them directly to DP3 customers. The Department must evolve beyond static brochures and capitalize on modern communication channels to present customers with the 'right' information when they need it. Recent surveys highlight the need for simple, modern tutorials explaining the relocation process.

While each service has made improvements to their 'Help Desks,' I do see value in establishing a Department-wide Help Desk staffed with professional customer service representatives that are available 24x7 to address the full range of relocation issues (such as housing, reporting timelines, travel) as opposed to simply answering personal property questions.

Further, I commit to publishing DP3 metrics on publicly-available websites. The Government Accountability Office's sensible recommendation to develop DP3-related metrics will provide DOD leaders with a clear assessment of the program's performance; making these metrics available to all DP3 stakeholders is a critical component in delivering on the Department's commitment to transparency.

Finally, I will continue to invest time and resources into hosting the Personal Property Relocation Advisory Panel (PPRAP) and meeting with the Service-appointed Family Advocates to identify and solve relocation problems for military families.

Cybersecurity

Most of the critical communications and operations of the Defense Department can be conducted over the classified internet service of the Department, which is not connected to the public internet and is therefore much more protected against eavesdropping, espionage, and/or disruption by computer network attacks. U.S. Transportation Command, however, must communicate over the unclassified internet with many private-sector entities that are essential to the Defense Department's force generation and deployment operations in the transportation and shipping industries in particular.

35. What actions do you plan to take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Department reduces the risk of cyber intrusions that would affect U.S. Transportation Command's operations?

As the USTRANSCOM Air Component Commander, I know that USTRANSCOM has made significant advancements to reduce the risk of cyber intrusions. If confirmed, I will continue to make cyber mission assurance a top priority for the Command and ensure we make the appropriate investments to protect Command and Control / Information Technology systems and infrastructure that are most consequential to mission success. My focus areas will include adopting security best practices, increasing the emphasis on improving the cybersecurity posture of our most critical systems, and partnering with the Department to continue progress on implementing the new information security framework, known as Zero Trust. With USTRANSCOM's mission inextricably linked to our commercial industry partners, I will continue to evolve the Command's cybersecurity contract language, so it remains aligned with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) cybersecurity framework and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) cybersecurity requirements. In addition, I will work with the Department to ensure USTRANSCOM has sufficient resiliency and capacity across the JDDE to operate in a contested cyber environment. If confirmed, I look forward to evolving the strong relationship USTRANSCOM already has with USCYBERCOM and other stakeholders to advance the Department's capabilities to reduce the risk of cyber intrusions to preserve USTRANSCOM's ability to meet our national security objectives.

36. Do you believe that the current posture of U.S. Transportation Command and the Department is sufficient to deal with adversaries in cyberspace?

The posture of USTRANSCOM and the Department is likely insufficient to deal with a well-resourced, capable, and determined nation-state adversary. Therefore, we must continue to improve our ability to protect against, detect, and respond to increasingly sophisticated adversary actions that exploit vulnerabilities. The recent malicious cyber campaigns against the Nation's public and private sector highlight the increasing threat to U.S. national security. For USTRANSCOM, cyber vulnerabilities present risk to strategic logistics as adversaries continue to demonstrate the willingness and capability to target both military and associated commercial industry partners. In this rapidly changing environment, the Department continues to improve the resilience of military networks and implement defensive measures that make it harder for malicious cyber actors to successfully compromise networks. If confirmed, I will continue the focus on cyber mission assurance and look forward to building upon existing relationships with USCYBERCOM, DHS, and other key stakeholders to mitigate the operational impact of any adversary actions.

37. What do you believe are the critical needs of U.S. Transportation Command for operating in the presence of cybersecurity threats?

Cyberspace is a warfighting domain in which capable adversaries continuously attempt to degrade our Nation's ability to project the Joint Force globally. The JDDE, which includes a wide range of commercial dependencies, represents a large cyber-attack surface for potential adversaries. For USTRANSCOM to operate in the presence of cybersecurity threats, it must continue efforts to develop a deeper understanding of adversary capabilities and intentions, as well as an understanding of the cyber terrain most consequential to mission success and the associated vulnerabilities. I'm aware that over the past year the Command has significantly improved its understanding of both the threat and key cyber terrain, and if confirmed I'll continue to focus on advancing these efforts. USTRANSCOM must also continue to invest in technologies and the right cyber talent to modernize Information Technology capabilities and defend critical cyber infrastructure, that will in turn enable mission execution in the face of a persistent cyber threat. With USTRANSCOM's mission inextricably linked to our commercial industry partners, it's also critical that the Command continue to revise existing cybersecurity contract language to remain aligned with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) cybersecurity framework and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) cybersecurity requirements. Furthermore, the Command needs to ensure it retains sufficient operational resiliency across the JDDE to enable continued operations in a contested cyber environment. If confirmed, I will continuously work to ensure these needs are met.

38. How important is it that U.S. Transportation Command be aware of cyber intrusions by advanced persistent threat (APT) actors into the networks of airlines, shippers, and other defense contractors that enable the Command's operations?

Commercial industry partners make up a significant portion of USTRANSCOM's capacity. As such, it is extremely important to be aware of APT intrusions into their networks so the command can rapidly assess potential impacts to global operations and take response actions to mitigate the risk to mission. It is also important for us to examine what occurred during the intrusion so we're able to apply lessons learned.

39. When U.S. Transportation Command becomes aware of an APT intrusion into an operationally critical contractor, what steps should the Command take to determine whether operational plans should be adjusted to mitigate the risk of the intrusion affecting military operations?

Prior to changing an operational plan, USTRANSCOM would execute a mission risk assessment process to consider appropriate operational and technical mitigation actions based on the threat, vulnerabilities, and potential mission impact. That risk assessment involves identification (step 1), assessment (step 2), risk management and monitoring (step 3), and reporting (step 4). The outcome of the assessment is to determine the impact or potential impact to the Command's mission, identify mitigation actions, determine whether operational plans should be adjusted, and then take the appropriate actions to implement and increase opportunity for mission success. The mitigation steps are generally a broad-scope, collaborative effort across government, industry, and the international community in some situations. The Defense Transportation

System has enough modal and nodal resiliency that often we do not need to adjust operational plans. If confirmed, I will work to ensure USTRANSCOM continues to maintain sufficient resiliency and capacity across the JDDE to mitigate risks.

Relationship with the Military Departments

U.S. Transportation Command relies on the services to make strategic acquisition planning decisions, such as the KC-46 tanker for refueling and the Rough Terrain Container Handler for port loading.

40. How is U.S. Transportation Command involved in this process, and do you believe the Command's needs are sufficiently taken into account?

Yes, Department processes provide multiple venues for USTRANSCOM to voice Joint Force requirements and identify challenges facing this enterprise in relation to the National Defense Strategy. As a Combatant Command, USTRANSCOM is responsible to define the joint deployment capability and capacity requirements to meet the National Defense Strategy. The Mobility Capability Requirements Study and Fuel Tanker Vessel Study are recently completed products that inform the Department and Congress on how well postured the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise is with respect to meeting global demands.

The Services are responsible to provide a trained and ready capability consistent with war plans. If confirmed, I am committed to working closely with the military departments to ensure there is a common understanding of capability requirements and potential risk associated with investments or lack thereof.

41. Should the service force providers change their equipment or units to field better capability to conduct logistics operations in contested environments? If so, how?

Yes, and I believe the Services are on the path to modifying their equipment and force constructs in recognition of the challenges of the changing contested battlespace. USTRANSCOM has worked diligently with the Joint Staff and the Services to highlight the impact of rising operational demands on a historically underfunded logistics enterprise. For example, it has been an active partner with the Joint Staff and the Services in developing the Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) and associated Supporting Concepts, specifically the Joint Concept for Contested Logistics (JCCL). These family of concepts will guide investment and divestment decisions for the Department to design and develop a more lethal future Joint Force, capable of conducting assured logistics operations across persistently contested environments.

Additionally, emerging Service-level concepts like the Air Force's "Agile Combat Employment," the Army's "Multi-Domain Operations," and the Navy/Marine Corps' emphasis on distributed maritime operations are providing the impetus for relooking at how we would organize and fight against capable peer adversaries. These new concepts all envision a future Joint Force able to employ more lean and agile units in a distributed construct, reducing target profiles and providing dilemmas to adversary targeting efforts. I should point out; however, these concepts levy increased requirements on the JDDE. It is also widely understood adversaries

continue to study, and plan against our comparative advantage in logistics and mobility operations. Recent global war-games and simulations are increasingly highlighting adversary abilities to degrade our power projection capabilities under persistent, all-domain attack. If confirmed, I will continue to leverage the Command's technology transfer authorities, and research and development funding to assist the Services and fellow Combatant Commands in exploring, testing, and transitioning advanced capabilities that will enhance global deployment, distribution, and sustainment operations to meet these challenges.

It is widely understood logistics underpins the success of the Joint Force. If confirmed, I will continue to collaborate, as the coordinator of the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise, with the Services, other Combatant Commands and the Department to address capability gaps and prioritize investments to enable future logistics and transportation functions, supporting Joint Force operations in contested environments.

U.S. Transportation Command is the only Combatant Command that sets aircraft requirements by total aircraft instead of via primary mission aircraft inventory (PMAI).

42. Do you believe that the Combatant Commanders should determine total fleet sizes for the services or should they advocate for specific requirements for their assigned and apportioned forces? Why or why not?

I support the department's current budget process, which is designed to balance risk and resources with involvement of all relevant stakeholders – to include the Combatant Commands. It is true that for USTRANSCOM, global transportation capacity is a critical element of our warfighting framework and directly impacts the success of our power projection capability; from a Program Review perspective, I think it is most prudent for our command to think in terms of total fleet inventories, as I believe that allows us to most rapidly respond within an ever-changing global environment. It also allows force providers the flexibility to best manage their respective fleets to meet global requirements.

Peacetime-Wartime Logistics Management

Our transportation and logistics systems have been significantly altered over time to reduce organic military air and sealift capacity and to rely instead on commercial aircraft and sealift as well as commercial supply chains to deliver spare parts to deployed forces. This was done to reduce costs and increase buying power and flexibility for the military.

43. Is there increased risk from this approach? If so, what is the nature of that increased risk?

Our commercial providers are both a strength and potential vulnerability. There is inherent risk regarding the level of responsiveness in relying on U.S. industry partners to meet wartime deployment and sustainment requirements when these companies are engaged daily in domestic and international commerce moving people and goods across the globe. That risk is mitigated by maintaining a balance of organic and commercial capabilities within the portfolio. Additionally,

commercial providers help mitigate geographic access challenges by leveraging existing intermodal networks to deliver military materiel.

44. How should U.S. Transportation Command plan for dealing with the risk inherent in such operations (e.g., providing equipment and logistics to deployed forces thousands of miles away in potential combat zones)?

The recently completed Mobility Capability Requirements Study 2020 (MCRS-20) and Fuel Tanker Vessel Study addressed the department's ability to meet future combatant commander deployment and sustainment requirements. As in past studies, these two studies considered both organic and commercial capabilities to ensure outside capacity exists to meet war plan requirements. These studies also considered the impact of contested environments on the mobility enterprise.

USTRANSCOM's warfighting framework outlines the overarching elements USTRANSCOM constantly assesses in reviewing plans and the global strategic environment. First, our global posture, which includes the nodes and routes critical to the execution of mobility operations is foundational to be able to deliver the Joint Force around the globe. Second, our transportation (organic and commercial) and air refueling capacity, to include the readiness of those forces, enables the deployment of a winning force at the time of need. Finally, the ability to command and control those forces around the globe and integrate with other commands and key warfighting elements is essential to the successful execution of this Command's mission. In sum, by maintaining favorable global posture, sufficient transportation capacity, and the ability to C2 global mobility operations, DOD retains the ability to project immediate and surge forces required to compete, deter, respond and win in order to meet U.S. strategic objectives.

USTRANSCOM will continue to work with OSD, the Joint Staff, Services, and the Combatant Commands to assess operating environments and the ability of the enterprise (organic and commercial) to meet Joint Force demands.

45. How would the nature of the relationship between U.S. Transportation Command and commercial partners change in a wartime environment?

TRANSCOM is inextricably linked to our commercial partners, they are an integral part of providing global assets and capability to support military operations anywhere in the world. The relationships with commercial partners are nurtured by regular engagements in peacetime to ensure lasting support in wartime. As history has shown, the relationship with our commercial partners strengthens in wartime. In the buildups for both Operation Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom, our airlift partners in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet program answered the call to activate and provide additional capacity to meet defense requirements. Similarly, commercial sealift capacity in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan overwhelmingly provided the vast majority of sustainment cargo capability during those conflicts. If confirmed, I will continue to work with our commercial partners to ensure the business relationships remain solid and continue to support DOD requirements.

46. If confirmed, how do you plan to find the appropriate balance for logistics capacity between commercial and military logistics systems?

Today, our ability to project military power is inextricably linked to commercial industry. It is important to strike the right balance between commercial capabilities such that DOD is not overly dependent on commercial capability for mission success. The FY20 NDAA Mobility Capability and Requirements Study (MCRS-20) includes an assessment of the reliance on commercial transportation capacity in support of joint deployment requirements. Future operations in contested environments will require greater effort to ensure we minimize the threats our commercial providers face when transporting military cargo and personnel in non-permissive (wartime) environments. If confirmed, I will work with commercial industry, Department of Transportation, and other stakeholders to ensure commercial capacity is sufficient and appropriate to meet future demands.

The military relies on an extensive network of logistics facilities overseas to support our deployed forces. These overseas depots enable our deployed forces to remain on station longer without having to be supported directly from CONUS. These depots are in host nations, which are U.S. friends and allies.

47. What is your assessment of the resiliency of these overseas depots, particularly in places near ongoing political instability?

USTRANSCOM does not own or operate overseas depots. However, as lead for the JDDE, USTRANSCOM does collaborate closely with Geographic Combatant Commands, Military Services, DLA, and other strategic partners to develop and maintain an agile, secure and resilient distribution network to support and sustain overseas depots. We constantly monitor the operational environment and respond to challenges, as appropriate, with the use of alternate distribution routes and logistics nodes to ensure the continued viability of those depots.

Emerging Technology

U.S. Transportation Command's uniquely complex and data-heavy mission could present an opportunity to take greater advantage of emerging technology like data analytics or machine learning.

48. How do you believe U.S. Transportation Command can most effectively leverage emerging technology for improved performance?

I am aware that USTRANSCOM is working towards better leveraging today's advanced computing power through incremental steps with key data initiatives. Acknowledging the criticality of data, a key USTRANSCOM initiative is to develop and implement a cloud-based data architecture to ingest, manage, and govern JDDE data. This will provide the required data foundation to exploit advanced analytics, artificial intelligence, and machine learning. If confirmed, I will continue to support future efforts such as this to enable USTRANSCOM to advance decision making in support of the warfighter throughout the spectrum of conflict.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response

The Department of Defense has developed comprehensive policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and response to incidents of sexual assaults, including providing appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault.

49. What is your view of the steps taken to prevent and respond to sexual assaults in U.S. Transportation Command, including assaults by and against U.S. civilian and contractor personnel?

Sexual assault is destructive and undercuts our ability to keep a mission-focused, ready force. We are committed to preventing this crime, encouraging increased reporting, caring for victims, and holding offenders appropriately accountable. From what I understand, the steps taken by the U.S. Transportation Command have been thorough and successful. I further believe U.S. Transportation Command has policies, structures, and leadership committed to upholding an environment of respect, trust, and dignity to maintain a safe and healthy Command. If confirmed, I will continuously review the program to ensure it remains effective.

50. What is your view of the adequacy of U.S. Transportation Command policies and procedures to protect victims of sexual assault from retaliation for reporting the assault?

Retaliation is an offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and should not be tolerated. I believe USTRANSCOM has been following Department of Defense sexual assault prevention and response policies, procedures and applicable laws. However, I know more work remains to be done to prevent and respond to sexual harassment and sexual assault, including retaliation against individuals who report sexual assault, within the DOD and I remain committed to this improvement journey.

51. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources in place in U.S. Transportation Command to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?

USTRANSCOM and their partners work together to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault. They also train the entire force annually in the concept of bystander intervention. This training reinforces to all service members that they owe their fellow service members a duty to step in and stop situations that could escalate into unwelcome sexual activity. However, more work remains to be done to prevent and respond to sexual harassment and sexual assault within the DOD. If confirmed, I will continue to focus on all aspects of sexual assault and harassment, including training, education and accountability, to ensure that all U.S. Transportation Command members serve in a climate of dignity, respect, and inclusion.

52. What is your view of the willingness and ability of military leaders to hold service members accountable for sexual misconduct?

In my personal experience, commanders demonstrated a willingness to hold service members accountable for sexual misconduct. Having had the privilege of serving in the United States Air Force for more than 30 years, at many duty stations, and with the Joint Force, I have been able to observe many different military leaders of all services with varied backgrounds. Over the course of those years, we have made significant progress in building and maintaining a fighting force that is representative of all Americans. The key to maintaining the strength of that force is providing an environment where those who engage in wrongdoing, no matter the offense, are held accountable. A military leader's responsibility is not only to ensure the health and safety of those under their command, but also to hold accountable those who commit misconduct, including sexual misconduct. Military leaders must understand both ends of this spectrum and remain equally committed to undertaking actions that ensure success.

53. What is your understanding of the adequacy of the resources and programs in U.S. Transportation Command to provide victims of sexual assault the medical, psychological, and legal help they need?

The health and welfare of the victim is and will continue to be the foremost priority. U.S. Transportation Command teams with partner commands to provide preventive training and the full spectrum of response, medical services, and legal support to victims of sexual assault. While I cannot judge the adequacy of care and legal support in every case, if concerns are brought to my attention, I will take immediate action to address, if confirmed.

54. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in providing necessary support to the victims of sexual assault?

Prevention, response and support of military members who are a victim of sexual assault or harassment is a leadership issue. A military leader is responsible for the health and safety of those under their command. Anyone who is the victim of sexual assault must have the full support of their chain of command and feel safe in coming forward, not only to seek justice but to seek any care they may need. If confirmed, I will continue to hold leaders and commanders accountable for prevention, response and support to victims of sexual assault.

55. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults have occurred?

Sexual assault prevention and response programs are Commander's programs, thus the chain of command is vital to creating an inclusive and supportive command culture. It is the role of the chain of command to make it clear, not just in words but in actions, that crimes including sexual assault will not be tolerated and to establish a safe environment for victims. Current authority granted to commanders allows them to hold accountable not only those who are the perpetrators of sexual assault but also those who engage in other crimes and misconduct that we often see when allegations of sexual assault are reported. If confirmed, I am fully committed to creating an inclusive command culture where members are treated with value, dignity and respect.

56. What is your assessment of the potential impact, if any, of proposals to remove disposition authority from military commanders over felony-level violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, including sexual assault?

The Uniform Code of Military Justice exists to provide justice and to maintain good order and discipline, both of which directly contribute to unit cohesion and military effectiveness in combat. I have not studied in-depth the implications of removing all disposition authorities from the military commanders over felony-level violations to clearly understand impacts, positive or negative. Given the criticality of Commander authority on and off the battlefield, we must thoughtfully understand the effects these changes would have on readiness, mission accomplishment, good order and discipline, and trust.

The Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military recommended, and Secretary Austin endorsed, that an independent prosecution authority, rather than military commanders, should decide whether to pursue criminal charges in sexual assault and related cases. I am supportive of effective solutions to combatting the scourge of sexual assault, and I am looking forward to reviewing the Secretary's implementation plan.

57. Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on restricted reporting, to be effective?

Several years ago, the Department instituted restricted and unrestricted reporting options for victims of sexual assault. These options allowed victims to choose when to report and whether to pursue a criminal investigation. I believe that the reporting options, if properly implemented and followed, are effective and allow the victims to get needed and deserved support services in any case.

58. If confirmed, what actions will you take to reassess current policies, procedures, and programs and to ensure senior level direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond to sexual assaults in U.S. Transportation Command?

If confirmed, I am committed to take all actions necessary to ensure current policies, procedures and programs as well as senior level direction and oversight efforts are complied with, and effective to prevent and respond to sexual assaults in U.S. Transportation Command. In my current assignment and in past assignments, I have met with the military experts and those charged with special responsibilities in these areas including the Inspector General, Sexual Assault Response Coordinator, Victims' Advocates, Judge Advocates, and others. If given the privilege to serve as Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, I will continue to rely upon these experts and ensure they have unfettered access to myself and all senior leaders to continuously strive towards a workplace safe from the scourge of sexual assault.

59. What methods for monitoring overall trends and gauging the sufficiency of component commanders' efforts in preventing and responding to incidents of sexual assault do you consider appropriate and intend to implement as U.S. Transportation Command Commander?

Component Commanders, as commanders do at every level, set the standards and require our Joint Force professionals to meet them, including establishing the foundation of military discipline, while ensuring victims receive care, and holding perpetrators accountable. If confirmed, I will work with each of the Component Commanders to gain feedback on sexual assault and harassment trends, and program performance and effectiveness, to gauge the sufficiency of their efforts.

Relations with Congress

60. What are your views on the state of U.S. Transportation Command's relationship with the Senate Armed Services Committee in particular, and with Congress in general?

USTRANSCOM has established a good working relationship with the Committee and Congress in general. I am confident the command is responsive to Congress' requests and aggressively works to meet any suspense set by Congress, whether it be for requests for information, briefings, office calls, or hearings.

61. If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a productive and mutually beneficial relationship between Congress and U.S. Transportation Command?

If confirmed, I will continue the current working relationships already maintained by USTRANSCOM. I will make myself available to Congress, provide my personal view when asked, and ensure we continue to strive to meet any and all deadlines established by Congress on requests to USTRANSCOM.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, reports, records (including documents and electronic communications) and other information from the Department.

62. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes

63. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records (including documents and electronic communications), and other information as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes

64. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes

65. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes

66. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes

67. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes

68. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes