Defense Reforms

The Senate Armed Services Committee has initiated an intensive review of the organization of the Department of Defense—both military and civilian, including the elements created by the Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, in order to enhance the effectiveness of the Department of Defense to execute the National Military Strategy in the 21st Century.

Based on your experiences as a senior officer, what challenges have you observed with the current organizational structure, with particular focus on warfighting capabilities, and what modifications, if any, do you think are necessary to the current organizational structure including any Goldwater Nichols Act provisions?

The Goldwater Nichols Act has played a significant role in forging the best military force in the world. However, given the multitude of global threats we face, threats that are multi-regional and multi-domain, I believe we should modify the current Goldwater Nichols construct to allow the military to seamlessly operate across geographic boundaries and more efficiently apportion forces.

Goldwater-Nichols has provided me with important developmental experiences in the Joint Community, particularly as a senior officer. I would support changes that make it easier to develop Joint-qualified officers:

- Eliminate JPME II. Officers learn in the joint environment while performing their duties; the school is no longer required.
- The 24 month requirement for Joint Qualification is acceptable in peace time, but joint experience in the deployed environment is intense, and we should consider qualification in less than 24 months.
- The positions which are coded “joint” for qualification are too restrictive today.

If confirmed, I look forward to continuing a dialogue with the Secretary and this committee on this important issue.

On 29 March 2016, General Dunford said: “Today we’re regionally focused. We rely on kind of what I describe as cooperation and collaboration between combatant commanders. We have supported and supporting relationships, and that’s all worked well for decades … And if you think about how I described the character of war, and you imagine the secretary of defense trying to make decisions in that environment, clearly I think we owe him better in terms of command and control, a better framework within which to make decisions in a timely manner based on the character of war we see today and, as importantly, a better process for the prioritization and allocation of
resources in real time….”

**In your view, what modifications to the Unified Command Plan, if any, would enhance the warfighting effectiveness of the Department of Defense?**

As suggested by Gen Dunford, the global nature of operations today requires modification to the authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant Commanders to operate with agility in the multi-regional, multi-domain and multi-functional environment prevalent today.

Also, I believe that Cyber Command should join the three existing functional Commands (USSOCOM, USSTRATCOM, & USTRANSCOM). This reorganization would consolidate the mission of our cyber forces and provide it with the proper resources to operate in an increasingly important and challenging domain.

**Duties**

**What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR)?**

The Commander of the U.S. European Command is responsible for giving authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out all U.S. military operations and activities across the 51 independent states in the European Command Area of Responsibility (AOR) in pursuit of U.S. national military objectives. This AOR includes all of Europe (including Turkey), the Caucasus Region, and Israel. The commander is also responsible for the health, welfare and security of the approximately 64,000 service members forward deployed within that AOR.

The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) carries out roles and missions assigned by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and directed by the Military Committee (MC).

Specific roles and duties include:

- Overall command of all NATO military operations regardless of geographic boundaries.
- Strategic planning to include military planning for the full range of Alliance missions and contributions to crisis management and effective defense of NATO territory and forces.
- Identifying and requesting forces for the full range of Alliance missions.
- Strategic Analysis: In conjunction with Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation (SAC-T), supports NATO’s Defense Planning Process and conducts strategic level analysis to identify and prioritize the type and scale of NATO’s critical capability shortfalls.
Operational Leadership: Executes military measures within the capability of the command to preserve or restore the security of NATO nations.

Transformation: Cooperates with SAC-T on integrating transformation efforts.

Crisis Management. Continually monitors and analyzes the international environment to anticipate crises, and where appropriate, take active steps to prevent them from becoming larger conflicts.

Strategic engagement and partnership building: Develops and participates in military-to-military exchanges and other cooperation activities with NATO partners.

In conjunction with SAC-T, conducts combined and joint training and exercises. This role will be critical to the implementation of the NATO connected forces initiative designed to maintain interoperable forces in the post ISAF environment.

Relationships

Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, EUCOM/NATO SACEUR, to the following:

The Secretary of Defense:

The Commander, EUCOM, reports to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and through the Secretary of Defense to the President of the United States. The Secretary of Defense exercises authority over the Armed Forces of the United States assigned to the EUCOM AOR through the EUCOM Commander. The EUCOM Commander exercises command authority over assigned forces and is directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of the Command.

The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

The Chairman functions under the authority, direction, and control of the President and Secretary of Defense. The Chairman transmits communications between the President and Secretary of Defense and the EUCOM Commander, as well as oversees the activities of the EUCOM Commander as directed by the Secretary of Defense. As the principal military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman is a key conduit between the Combatant Commander, Interagency, and Service Chiefs.

The EUCOM Commander keeps the Chairman informed on significant issues regarding NATO and the EUCOM theater of Operations. The Commander directly communicates with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a regular basis.

The Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs:
The Service Secretaries are responsible for administration and support of forces that are assigned or attached to the EUCOM Commander. The Secretaries fulfill their responsibilities by exercising administrative control (ADCON) through the Service Component Commands assigned to EUCOM.

The Service Chiefs are responsible for the organization, training, and equipping of the Services under Title 10, United States Code (USC). Their support is critical to meet readiness needs. The Service Chiefs also provide military advice to the President of the United States, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The EUCOM Commander coordinates with the Chiefs of Staff of the Services on matters related to manning, training, and equipping forces necessary to perform their roles and missions.

Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command:

The Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command is responsible for the administration and support of special operations forces assigned or attached to the EUCOM Commander in Special Operations Command Europe.

The respective U.S. Chiefs of Mission within the EUCOM AOR:

There is no formal relationship between the EUCOM Commander and the U.S. Chiefs of Mission. However, the EUCOM Commander works closely with the Chiefs of Mission, who represent the President, in their respective country, to ensure the military mission fits within the embassy’s diplomatic mission.

The respective U.S. Senior Defense Officials/Defense Attachés (SDO/DATT):

SDO/DATTs are assigned to their respective embassies and work for the embassy’s Chief of Mission. However, as military officers they work closely with EUCOM and are senior rated by the EUCOM Deputy Commander.

The NATO Secretary General:

The SACEUR directly communicates with the Secretary General on a regular basis while carrying out his assigned roles and missions that are appointed by the North Atlantic Council. The NATO Secretary General is appointed by the 28 Alliance Heads of State with the principal duty of chairing the North Atlantic Council, the principal decision making body of the Alliance.

Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Resolute Support, Afghanistan / Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan:

The EUCOM Commander has no formal relationship with the Commander, Resolute Support. The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe exercises command authority over the
Commander Resolute Support through the Commander, Joint Forces Command Brunssum in the Netherlands.

**The Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation:**

Both NATO’s Strategic Commanders, SACEUR and Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation (SAC-T), carry out roles and missions assigned to them by the North Atlantic Council. SACEUR and SAC-T work together to ensure the transformation of NATO’s military capabilities and interoperability in support of Allied Command Operations.

**The North Atlantic Council:**

The North Atlantic Council is the principal policy and decision making body of NATO. SACEUR carries out roles and missions assigned by the North Atlantic Council.

**The U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council:**

There is not a direct command relationship between the U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council and either the EUCOM Commander or the SACEUR. The North Atlantic Council provides direction to NATO military authorities and the U.S. Permanent Representative is one of 28 members of the North Atlantic Council. The EUCOM Commander works with the U.S. Permanent Representative on matters of mutual interest, such as EUCOM military operations and security cooperation activities that support U.S. objectives and military contributions to NATO.

**Major Challenges**

**In your view, what are the major challenges and problems you would confront if confirmed as the next Commander, EUCOM, and SACEUR?**

In my view, Europe faces numerous threats, conflicts and strategic challenges to its security environment, but I would highlight four specifically.

First, in the East and North, Europe faces a resurgent, aggressive Russia seeking to reestablish a leading role on the world stage. As Secretary Carter and members of this committee have emphasized, they are doing so by challenging international order when it serves their interests. Russia has, for example, used military force to violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, Georgia and others, like Moldova. They have also violated the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty with recent weapons development. Additionally, its military operations and increasing A2AD activities in Kaliningrad, the Black Sea, the eastern Mediterranean Sea, and in Syria aim to deny our access. And finally, Russia is seizing the initiative in the arctic with its militarization there.

Second, stemming from the Middle East and North Africa, terrorism is an immediate threat not only to NATO allies and partners but also to US citizens. Europe has endured 27 attacks
since 9-11, including the recent attacks in Paris and Brussels, with over 480 killed and 3250 wounded.

A third and related issue is the significant influx of migrants and refugees to Europe also from the Middle East and North Africa. The challenge stems from the conflicts and failed states in the Middle East and North Africa and from the terrorists, foreign fighters and criminals who exploit this crisis to undermine social cohesion and security in Europe. But there is also the economic, demographic and humanitarian aspects of this crisis which impact the social fabric of Europe.

Fourth, Israel continues to confront threats from Iran, who has recently conducted advanced missile tests, in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions, as well as from Lebanese Hezbollah, and from the expansion of Islamic extremism on its borders with Syria and the Sinai.

The President has requested approximately $610 billion for National Defense in Fiscal Year (FY) 2017, to include $523.9 billion in funding for the base budget for the Department of Defense and $58.8 billion for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). This funding level complies with the Bipartisan Budget Agreement passed by Congress in 2015; however, it is lower than what was projected in the 2016 Future Years Defense Program.

What is your assessment of the impact of potential reductions in the Defense budget on EUCOM’s operational planning, requests for forces, and operating budgets? If confirmed, how would you prioritize the use of available funds?

The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 provided relief in the near-term; however, sequestration reductions and the continuation of those reductions in the out years will negatively affect the Department’s ability to resource European Command requirements. These reductions come as the Department and European Command face the emergence of a capable and aggressive Russia, Iran’s malign influence, and an increasing terrorist threat.

Of note, I appreciate the Committee’s support of the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), which provides the funding to support the response to Russia.

With regard to prioritization, the European Command has developed a Theater Campaign Plan which organizes and aligns operations, activities and actions with resources. If confirmed, I’ll review this campaign plan, its priorities for resources, and my top priority – readiness of our forces.

In your opinion, does the growth of Russian military presence in the Black Sea and in the Eastern Mediterranean warrant a need for increased presence of an aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean in 2016 and beyond and if an increased presence does not occur what are the considerations or alternatives?
In my opinion, positioning an aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean would send a strategic message not only to the Russians but also to ISIS, and Iran and its proxies. An aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean could support CENTCOM and AFRICOM as well as EUCOM. I understand that there are competing global requirements for aircraft carriers, and if confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff for the appropriate sourcing solutions.

With respect to alternatives, it is important to note that America has very strong Allies in the Black Sea Region. Our NATO Allies including Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria play a significant role to demonstrate our presence and commitment to the region. Romania's Mikhail Kogalniceanu Air Base serves as a logistical hub and hosts U.S. military personnel. Also, we have rotational forces training at the Novo Selo Training complex in Bulgaria on a regular basis, and Turkey remains a stalwart regional ally in the fight against ISIS.

If Future Years Defense Program requirements remain funded at current levels, what would be your assessment of the level of risk to the U.S. national security objectives in the EUCOM AOR?

I believe that EUCOM requires more resources to address the growing number of complex threats in the region, including a revanchist Russia. For example, I understand that EUCOM has submitted a $3.4 billion request in OCO for FY17, the third such request. If confirmed, I will closely review the allocation of resources across the FYDP, assess the gaps and identify risk.

Readiness of Forces

What is your assessment of the readiness of U.S. forces that have been deployed to Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, Operation Atlantic Resolve, and other operations in the EUCOM area of responsibilities?

Although I haven't had the opportunity to work with the professionals deployed to the EUCOM AOR, I have confidence in the readiness of our deployed forces. If confirmed, I will make a personal assessment of the readiness of our forces to execute the assigned missions in the EUCOM AOR.

NATO Commitments to Afghanistan

At the NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014, NATO members committed to promoting a stable, sovereign, democratic and united Afghanistan and to “never again be threatened by terrorists from within Afghanistan.” NATO members also reaffirmed their commitment to train, advise, and assist the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) after 2014 through the non-combat Resolute Support Mission, contribute to the financial sustainment of the ANSF, and to strengthen NATO’s partnership with Afghanistan.

Do you agree with the goals endorsed at the NATO Wales Summit and the importance of the Resolute Support Mission?
Yes, I agree with the goals endorsed at the Wales Summit.

What are the major challenges you foresee, if confirmed as the next Commander, EU COM and SACEUR, in implementing the commitments to stability and security in Afghanistan?

If confirmed, as the Commander of EU COM, I would have no direct role regarding commitments in Afghanistan. As SACEUR, I believe the primary challenges are to encourage the coalition partners to stay the course and to synchronize the coalition’s actions with Afghan security capability.

Building and Sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces

The goal in Afghanistan remains building the ANSF to an end strength of 352,000, consisting of 195,000 Afghan National Army soldiers and 157,000 Afghan National Police personnel. The transition to the Resolute Support Mission envisioned one central hub in Kabul and Bagram with four spokes in Mazar-e Sharif, Herat, Kandahar, and Laghman.

What is your assessment of the importance of maintaining NATO or U.S. presence in areas outside of Kabul and Bagram to NATO’s train-advise-assist mission and the U.S. counterterrorism mission?

Based on my review, our regional presence facilitates NATO and US mission success. Experience in 2015 demonstrated that the Afghan forces, while resilient and increasingly capable, are challenged to independently contend with a seasoned and well-resourced Taliban. Our regional presence mitigates this risk through continued training, advice, and assistance at the Afghan National Army Corps and Police Zones. Our presence also provides some oversight of our financial contributions toward Afghanistan and additional insight into the assessment of the capability and effects of Afghan Security forces.

In your assessment, are the current target end strengths for the ANA and ANP sufficient for Afghan security forces to maintain security and stability in Afghanistan in 2016 and beyond?

Currently, the ANDSF are near their target end strength level of 352,000, consisting of an Afghan National Army (ANA) of 195,000 and Afghan National Police (ANP) of 157,000. Based upon my current understanding, I agree with General Nicholson that the ANA and ANP are the right size and are developing the right capabilities, with allied support, to address the security situation in Afghanistan. However, if confirmed, I will carefully monitor the security conditions and recommend adjustments accordingly.

At the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Wales in September 2014, NATO leaders declared “we are adapting our operations, including in Afghanistan, in light of progress made and remaining challenges.” At the NATO
Summit in Chicago in May 2012, the countries participating in the coalition discussed a model for the future size of the ANSF of around 228,000, a reduction of about one third from the current ANDSF end strength.

What is your understanding regarding current assumptions for the size of the Afghan security forces through 2016 and beyond?

My understanding is that the Secretary of Defense has publicly said that DoD will seek funding for the current authorized end strength of 352,000 personnel through at least the end of 2017, along with the funding that our coalition partners and the Afghan government will provide. Our coalition partners will meet at the NATO Summit in Warsaw this summer to determine the level of financial commitments towards sustaining through 2020. I concur with General Nicholson that we will continue to coordinate with the Afghans and international partners on force planning beyond that point based on a review of the anticipated security environment, ANDSF performance and capacity, and available funding.

Do you agree that any future reductions in the size of the ANSF need to be based on the security conditions in Afghanistan at the time those reductions would occur?

Yes. As conditions on the ground change NATO will, in partnership with the Afghan government, continue to assess the necessary size of the ANDSF to ensure the success of the mission, and overall security and stability in the country. For example, General Campbell and General Nicholson have testified that Afghan shortfalls in rotary-wing aviation, combined arms operations, intelligence collection and dissemination, and maintenance all remain concerns. So I agree that the security conditions need to be constantly assessed relative to capabilities, the needs of the government in conjunction with its national strategy, and available funding.

What should be NATO’s role in assessing the security conditions in Afghanistan for purposes of determining future force requirements for the ANSF after 2016?

If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with General Salvatore Farina, Commander of Joint Forces Command-Brunssum, which is NATO’s operational level command responsible for the mission in Afghanistan, as well as LTG Nicholson, the Commander, Resolute Support (COMRS), in his role as the senior NATO uniformed officer in Afghanistan. As the in-theater operational commander, exercising operational control of all Resolute Support (RS) forces in Afghanistan, General Nicholson will have the best insight into conditions on the ground. Based on the their recommendations, along with those of other key government and civilian leaders, I will work with NATO’s Military Committee and give my best advice to the North Atlantic Council and NATO Secretary General on the security conditions and, in turn, the future force requirements beyond 2016.

What is your assessment of the risks involved with the train, advise, and assist mission and what steps can and should be taken, in your opinion, to mitigate those risks?
Our troops and personnel, although in a non-combat role, are operating in a hostile environment. Risks are mitigated through proper training, attention to force protection procedures, especially the insider threat, appropriate ROE and ready access to joint fires and reinforcement in extremis.

EUCOM’s Strategic Missions

In your view, what are the key strategic missions of U.S. European Command?

I believe USEUCOM’s key strategic missions are to:

- Prepare ready forces
- Ensure strategic access and enable global operations
- Deter conflict
- Enable the NATO Alliance
- Strengthen partnerships to counter transnational threats
- Protect and defend the United States and its interests

In your view, what are the primary threats to U.S and NATO security interests in Europe?

As I mentioned previously, I see four principal threats to U.S. and NATO security interests, namely, Russia, terrorism, migrant and refugee flows, and the collective threats to Israel. The common thread among them is the intent to fracture the unity of our alliance and partnerships. To paraphrase the Chairman, if we fully leveraged the political, the economic, and the military capabilities of the 28 nations in NATO together with our own, no one could threaten us. However, state and non-state actors alike seek to erode the foundation of security that supports a democratic and prosperous Europe.

National Military Strategy

The June 2015 National Military Strategy states: “We are positioning forces where they are most needed, exemplified by our rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region as well as our evolving presence in Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa” while emphasizing “…we will press forward with the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region…” What impact, if any, do you anticipate this guidance will have on the operations and activities of EUCOM?

The 2015 National Military Strategy provides guidance on resource allocation and force posture to attain our strategic objectives. EUCOM is not the first priority and this may impact resourcing and force posture. If confirmed, I will communicate our requirements to meet assigned missions and the residual risk to the Chairman and to the Secretary of Defense.

How would you characterize the nature of the “evolving presence in Europe”? 
The evolving presence in Europe is an incremental response to the emerging challenges to European Security and U.S. interests. We have reversed the reduction of forces that was based on the assumption that Russia was a partner in Europe free, whole and at peace. In particular, the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) has funded increased force posture, additional Army Prepositioned Stocks, and training to build partner capacity. If confirmed, I will assess the force posture and resources required for EUCOM’s mission.

U.S. Force Structure in Europe

Since the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance stated that there was a strategic opportunity to “rebalance the U.S. military investment in Europe,” troop levels have declined with now approximately 62,000 U.S. military personnel stationed in the European area of responsibility. The divestment of two of the four Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) stationed in Europe as well as a reduction in the number of aircraft have recently been offset by the deployment of a brigade-sized European Activity Set of equipment used by rotational forces and plans in fiscal year 2017 for an additional pre-positioned set of combat-ready equipment sufficient to support another armored brigade combat team and division-level enablers.

Do you believe that additional increases in U.S. forces stationed in Europe should be considered, consistent with EUCOM’s key strategic missions?

I am in complete agreement with General Breedlove’s stated position that additional forces are required to meet EUCOM’s assigned missions. I also support resourcing of the National Commission on the Future of the Army’s recommendation on enhancing the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade capabilities and the stationing of an Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) in Europe.

If confirmed, would you agree to undertake a review of the U.S. force posture in Europe to determine whether additional increases are appropriate?

If confirmed, I will undertake a review of the U.S. force posture in Europe to determine if additional forces are appropriate.

Use of Rotational Forces in Europe

The European Reassurance Initiative stresses the importance of a U.S. rotational presence for building partner capacity and promoting interoperability.

What role do you foresee for U.S-based forces in maintaining a rotational presence in Europe and promoting interoperability with our NATO and other European partners?

U.S.-based forces will continue to play a vital role in building partner capacity and interoperability within European Command’s area of responsibility. The Command leverages the Global Force Management (GFM) process to provide forces to build partner
capacity and promote interoperability with Allies and partners that cannot be addressed solely by our assigned forces. This includes a persistent presence in support of Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE, U.S.-based Navy and Marine Corps forces for NATO exercises, and our Black Sea Rotational Force program.

U.S. participation in the NATO Response Force and the rotation of U.S.-based Armor Brigade Combat Teams and other enablers to Europe will provide additional opportunities to build partner capacity and promote interoperability.

Army training facilities in Germany are used to train our forces and the forces of numerous Allies and partners every year, significantly enhancing partner capacity. These efforts are critical to ensuring interoperability of U.S. and Allied forces to conduct collective defense as well as expeditionary operations.

What are the limitations you assess are associated with “rotational presence”?

In my view, the primary limitations of rotational forces are OPTEMPO / force availability and reduced relationship and environmental awareness. A rotational presence requires three units to provide one unit for deployment. One unit is on mission, one is in recovery, and one is in preparation for mission. A permanently assigned unit releases two units for other missions. Also, a permanently assigned unit can better establish and maintain strong relationships with supporting U.S. and Allied forces and attain better situational understanding of their environment.

U.S. Commitment under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty

A cornerstone of the NATO alliance is the principle of collective self-defense as codified in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

In your view, how important to U.S. strategic interests is the U.S. commitment to its obligations under Article 5?

I believe the U.S. commitment to the NATO Article 5 obligations is critical to U.S. strategic interests.

The NATO Alliance incorporates the U.S.’s closest allies and the U.S. and Europe remain each other’s most important markets. No other commercial artery in the world is as integrated. The transatlantic economy generates $5.5 trillion in total commercial sales a year and employs up to 15 million workers on both sides of the Atlantic. It is the largest and wealthiest market in the world, accounting for over half of world GDP. NATO provides the essential bulwark of stability for this important set of relationships and the security of Europe free, whole and at peace.

NATO’s unity and cohesion is underpinned by U.S. leadership, and the U.S. Article 5 commitment to the Alliance. When the U.S. leads, NATO tends to work.
Finally, it is worth remembering that the NATO Alliance has invoked the Article 5 commitment one time in its history, and that was in defense of and in solidarity with the United States on September 12, 2001.

What threat do Russian snap exercises involving tens of thousands of conventional forces on the one hand and Russian hybrid tactics that are difficult to attribute pose to the process of reaching a decision under Article 5 for NATO to act?

The complexity of Russian activities makes Article 5 decision difficult. Due to the size and proximity of Russia’s snap exercises, the NATO Intelligence architecture is pressed to provide accurate and timely indications and warning for a proper decision-making process. Additionally, the nature of hybrid tactics is ambiguous and deliberately below the level of conflict.

How important to being able to meet Article 5 obligations is follow through on Article 3 which commits Allies to develop their “individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack”?

Article 3 is an often overlooked, but fundamental, part of the North Atlantic Treaty. It commits Allies to the principles of “mutual aid” and “self-help” in providing the capabilities required for “individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” This reminds us that all Allies must contribute to collective defense, and that each Ally has a responsibility to maintain their capability for their own defense.

How is the ability to meet obligations under Article 5 and Article 3 related to NATO guidelines agreed to at the NATO Wales Summit in 2014 to invest 2% of Gross Domestic Product in Defense and 20% or more of their defense budgets in equipment, research and development?

The ability of the Alliance to develop required capabilities to meet Article 5 and Article 3 requirements are directly related to the resources provided by nations. Alliance nations’ investments in defense provide for NATO readiness today and for NATO’s ability to prepare for the future.

Russia

The June 2015 National Military Strategy says: “While Russia has contributed in select security areas, such as counternarcotics and counterterrorism, it also has repeatedly demonstrated that it does not respect the sovereignty of its neighbors and it is willing to use force to achieve its goals. Russia’s military actions are undermining regional security directly and through proxy forces.”

What do you see as the most important EUCOM and NATO activities to deter Russian aggression and the threat to our NATO Allies and partners?
The activities by EUCOM and NATO forces that best deter Russia are those that reinforce Alliance solidarity and demonstrate steadfast commitment to a Europe that is free, whole and at peace. Joint, Allied, full spectrum military operations and training demonstrate capability and resolve. Activities that build partner capacity, particularly in the Baltics and the Ukraine, deter Russian aggression. Finally, the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) and the activities it enables is a key component of deterrence as well.

**What aspects of U.S. and NATO force posture do you assess have the most deterrent effect on Russia?**

A deterrent force posture must demonstrate a full spectrum, multi-domain capability, sufficient capacity, agility and readiness. In NATO, deterrence begins with each nation’s defense forces and is reinforced by NATO Article 5, according to which an attack on one will elicit a response by all 28 members. Recent additions to European force posture, such as the U.S. rotational ABCT, the enhanced NATO Response Force and the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force improve our deterrent effect on Russia.

**If confirmed, would you agree to undertake a review of the U.S. and coalition force posture in Europe to determine whether the current and planned force posture in Europe is adequate to deter, and if deterrence fails, to deny Russian objectives and defeat Russian aggression against NATO?**

Yes. If confirmed, I agree to undertake a review of U.S. and coalition force posture in Europe.

**Countering Russian propaganda has proven difficult and results have been mixed at best. What do you assess as key priorities and limitations to Information Operations in the EUCOM AOR vis-à-vis Russia?**

It is my opinion that EUCOM, in coordination with the Department of State, can challenge Russia in the information domain. Our strategic communications, information operations (IO), and related influence capabilities such as Military Information Support Operations (MISO) are powerful tools to counter Russian disinformation and propaganda. To successfully oppose Russia in this domain, EUCOM influence programs must be properly resourced and have the requisite authorities to conduct these activities. The information operations capacity and capabilities we need to achieve this mission are difficult to “surge.” Accordingly, I believe that funding for influence operations should be increased and included in the Department’s base budget.

**NATO-Russia and U.S. Relations**

The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) has served as an important venue for discussions between NATO and Russia. Following Russia’s illegal military intervention in Ukraine and its violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, in April 2014 the Alliance suspended all practical cooperation between NATO and Russia including the NRC.
Do you believe the NATO-Russia Council has potential as a forum for NATO-Russian cooperation, and if so, under what conditions?

Yes, I believe it is possible, and it is my understanding that the NRC is meeting this week with a very limited agenda. I believe the meetings should remain limited until Russia acts in accordance with international norms.

Many European nations advocate for increased dialogue with Russia. How do you see the NATO-Russia relationship evolving in the future?

The NATO-Russia dialogue could facilitate multiple areas of cooperation including combating terrorism, managing refugee flows, counter-narcotics training, crisis management, logistics, maritime search and rescue, and others. However, dialogue should remain limited until Russia acts in accordance with international law and we can re-establish a baseline of trust.

What do you believe are appropriate objectives for U.S.-Russia security relations, and what do you believe are the areas of common interest between the United States and Russia in the security sphere?

In the past we have seen some contributions from Russia with their counter narcotics and counter terrorism efforts. However, I believe that our cooperation in the security sphere should remain limited until Russia acts in accordance with intentional norms.

Missile Defense in Europe

The United States is deploying the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) as its contribution to NATO missile defense capability. As part of its decision to develop such a capability, NATO has agreed to develop and pay for a missile defense command and control network, the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense system. Various NATO nations, including Turkey, Poland, Romania, Germany, and Spain, have agreed to host elements of NATO missile defense, and they and others are making additional national contributions to NATO missile defense.

Do you agree that this current NATO approach to missile defense contributions is reasonable and appropriate?

Yes, and, if confirmed, I will continue to support ongoing U.S. and NATO BMD efforts in Europe, and pursue efforts to increase Allied and partner voluntary national contributions to the BMD mission.

Do you believe that EPAA will provide the capability needed to protect U.S. forces in Europe and our NATO Allies against existing and emerging Iranian missile threats?
EPAA ensures and enhances the protection of the territory and population of all NATO Allies in concert with their missile defense capabilities against the current and growing ballistic missile threat. U.S. Patriot and EUCOM assets add to that protection.

If confirmed, I will work with our Allies to integrate this architecture with NATO members’ missile defense capabilities as well as the emerging NATO C2 network under development.

**In your opinion, is there a need to assess air and missile defense capabilities of the U.S. in Europe as well as those of NATO Allies and partners against a Russian threat?**

Yes. Russia continues their long-term efforts to modernize the military and its recent actions in Ukraine and Syria demonstrate an increase in force projection and combat capabilities, including a growing range of offensive missile systems.

**EUROCOM Role in Coordinating Missile Defense with Israel**

U.S. European Command has Israel in its area of responsibility (AOR) and, among other missions, has the mission of coordinating and integrating U.S. missile defense capabilities and operations with those of Israel. To this end, EUCOM has sponsored a number of previous missile defense exercises with Israel. In addition, the United States has deployed an EUCOM missile defense radar (known as an AN/TPY-2 radar) to enhance defense against missiles from Iran.

Do you agree that coordinating and integrating of U.S. and Israeli missile defense capabilities and operations is a critical component of our security posture in the EUCOM AOR?

Yes, and if confirmed, EUCOM’s mission to assist in the Defense of Israel will remain a high priority. Periodic missile defense exercises, such as JUNIPER COBRA 16, provide an excellent opportunity to train our military forces to respond to a regional crisis. This training is essential to building and maintaining defense interoperability and ensures Israel’s qualitative military edge.

If confirmed, would you continue to make this mission a high priority as Commander of EUCOM?

Yes. If confirmed, the defense of Israel and our bilateral relationship with the IDF will remain a high-priority mission for EUCOM.

U.S. assets are committed to supporting the missile defense capabilities of Israel. As co-developed programs such as David’s Sling and Arrow 3 become operational, do you foresee opportunities for U.S. assets to be used in missions other than missile defense?

Yes. The U.S. has provided more than $3.3 billion over each of the past 10 years to support development of Israel’s rocket and missile defense systems. U.S. military aid has helped transform Israel’s armed forces into one of the most technologically sophisticated militaries
in the world, maintaining Israel’s “qualitative military edge”. Delivering advanced radar, air, and missile defense systems to Israel will provide some relief and flexibility to utilize our high demand, low density missile defense assets for other national security interests.

**NATO-led Kosovo Force**

Approximately 4,800 troops from 31 contributing nations, including nearly 700 U.S. troops, are deployed as part of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). KFOR’s mission is to assist in maintaining a safe and secure environment in Kosovo consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and to support the development of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF). NATO has sought to gradually draw down the KFOR presence as the security situation has improved.

What do you see as the major challenges in Kosovo, including in connection with the establishment of the Kosovo Security Force?

Kosovo faces the principle challenges of solidifying the gains of independence and continuing to build the institutions of a modern, democratic state. Despite significant progress, recent political instability demonstrates that there is more work ahead. Also, implementation of a political agreement with Belgrade resolving the impasse over northern Kosovo represents a key step moving forward. Setting the stage for successful negotiations and peaceful resolution remains a top priority.

While the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) has matured under its limited mandate, the KSF does not yet possess the capabilities to replace NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) as Kosovo’s enduring security and defense organization. Until the legislative restrictions on the KSF are removed, the KSF will be unable to provide the level of security provided by KFOR, and KFOR’s presence will continue to be an important source of stability, appreciated by both Kosovar Albanians and Kosovo Serbs. It is essential that NATO remains an active partner in shaping the future KSF with U.S. support, so that the future KSF enhances regional security and is not perceived as a threat to its neighbors.

What do you see as the major challenges in the Balkans, especially given recent flows of refugees through the region?

While significant progress has been made over the last 20 years, conditions in the Balkans remain fragile. Deep ethnic divisions are a constant point of friction in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. The level of corruption in most Balkan governments exceeds western norms, and political instability is a fact of life in many cases. Economically the region continues to struggle, and the defense budgets of most of our allies and partners in the region continue to decline.

The Balkans also fall along a migrant route for refugees headed to Western Europe. Balkan governments struggle to deal with a large volume of migrants remaining within their borders, and nations along the migrant route are focused on moving refugees in and out of the country.
as quickly as possible. Any situation which leaves large numbers of migrants in a small Balkan nation would be a significant source of instability.

**NATO Enlargement**

**What are your views on whether NATO would benefit from further rounds of enlargement?**

This is fundamentally a political decision. If confirmed, my role as SACEUR is to support those nations invited to join the Alliance to further develop and successfully integrate their military forces and capabilities into Alliance structures.

**What criteria should the United States apply in evaluating candidates for future NATO enlargement?**

The criteria for membership is established in the Membership Action Plan mechanism. It supports stable, democratic, and reform-driven Nations who wish to contribute to security.

**In your view, is there a limit on the extent to which NATO can be enlarged and still be an effective military organization capable of making decisions and acting in a timely fashion?**

No. Expansion will be contingent on NATO’s will and capability to adjust its structure and processes to ensure agility and effective C2. NATO maintains an “Open Door” policy, based on Article 10 of its founding treaty, for those nations which can further the principles of the Alliance and contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.

**In your view, how should the United States and NATO proceed on the issue of NATO membership for Macedonia?**

Decisions on NATO membership are outside the role and responsibilities of the EUCOM Commander and SACEUR. Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, and the agreed Open Door policy for further NATO enlargement, allow for stable, democratic and reform-driven Nations to be considered for NATO membership.

**In your view, how should the United States and NATO proceed on the issue of NATO membership for Georgia?**

This is outside the role and responsibilities of the EUCOM Commander and SACEUR. Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, and the agreed Open Door policy for further NATO enlargement, allow for stable, democratic and reform-driven Nations to be considered for NATO membership.

That being said, I believe the U.S. and NATO should continue to reaffirm support for Georgia’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, and the Bucharest decision regarding Georgia’s eventual NATO membership. Georgia’s unwavering and substantive support to RESOLUTE
SUPPORT operations, and commitment to the Geneva talks and a peaceful resolution of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia territorial disputes are all encouraging signs that I commend. Likewise, Georgia continues to demonstrate itself as a strong partner of NATO.

What is your assessment of current U.S. defense cooperation with Georgia?

The current state of U.S. defense cooperation with Georgia is robust, deep, and comprehensive. EUCOM participates in many areas of security cooperation with Georgia that range from supporting their wounded warriors, to developing a comprehensive national strategic policy. Further, EUCOM synchronizes efforts with NATO in the implementation of the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package. EUCOM holds multiple annual, large-scale military exercises with Georgia which include a full range of capabilities, from cyber to combined arms. EUCOM continues to support the deployment of Georgian battalions to Afghanistan as part of NATO’s RESOLUTE SUPPORT Mission (Georgia is the second largest troop contributor after the U.S.), and to sponsor Georgia’s participation in the NATO Response Force.

What opportunities, if any, do you see for enhanced U.S. defense cooperation with Georgia, including defensive arms?

The goal of U.S. Defense Cooperation with Georgia is to improve Georgia’s defense institutions, professionalize its military, enhance its territorial defense and support its desire to participate in Institutional peace – keeping and the NATO Response Force.

Increased allied resources for the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package and increased allied exercises in Georgia provide opportunities for additional defensive cooperation.

NATO- European Union

How would you characterize the NATO-EU relationship today?

In terms of NATO-EU military cooperation and coordination, it is my understanding that a strong relationship from the tactical to strategic levels exists.

In your view, what should be NATO’s position with regard to European efforts to strengthen the European Security and Defense Policy and build military capacity within the European Union?

NATO’s position regarding the strengthening of European Security and Defense Policy will be decided by consensus by its 28 member nations. However, from a purely military perspective, the military capabilities within Europe are derived from a single pool of forces which are made available to either NATO or the EU. In a resource constrained environment, it makes sense to leverage the capabilities of all NATO and EU members to ensure the best return on a limited defense investment.
In your opinion, what should be NATO’s role in the refugee crisis and the EU-Turkey agreement regarding refugees?

NATO’s roles and missions in support of mitigating the refugee crisis are assigned by the North Atlantic Council. With that said, lessons learned over time most likely hold true in this case. There is no short term NATO military solution in the transit zone to provide a long-term resolution of the refugee crisis.

Interagency Collaboration

The collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces, general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and agencies has played a significant role in the success of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in recent years. However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature.

What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere?

- I strongly support the collaborative interagency approach. In my experience, it takes a network, with all required agencies, to defeat a threat network.
- A collaborative interagency network requires committed and stable experts. Part time members or turbulence on the team reduces effects.
- An interagency collaborative effort requires clear senior leader interest and routine senior leader engagement to drive synchronization and results.
- A flat and fast communication process and common data access increases efforts. This is particularly difficult in allied interagency collaboration.

Force Protection

General Breedlove testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that “the capabilities available for EUCOM force protection are not keeping pace with the number of at-risk locations and people, and the magnitude of the threats they face.” Do you share this concern?

I have complete confidence in General Breedlove’s assessment and share his concern. Since General Breedlove’s last hearing, ISIL attacks have increased in the AOR with devastating attacks in Paris, Istanbul, and Brussels. Additionally, the continuing refugee flow masks the movement and return of some foreign fighters to Europe, increasing the security threat. If confirmed, I’ll assess our force protection in light of these threats.

In your opinion, what additional steps, if any, should be taken to reduce the risk of attacks on U.S. embassies, consulates, and diplomatic personnel as well as Department of Defense personnel by terrorist organizations around the world and in the EUCOM AOR in particular?
We should continue to support DOS efforts to proactively protect embassies, consulates, and diplomatic personnel and ask DOS to continue supporting DoD efforts to engage with embassies on crisis response, training, surveys, assessments and familiarization visits. Routine risk assessments, Crisis Management Exercises, and FAST Training and Personnel Recovery Tabletops at U.S. Posts will reduce the risk.

**NATO Special Operations Headquarters**

**The NATO Special Operations Forces Headquarters (NSHQ) was created in 2007 to enhance the capabilities of and promote interoperability between the special operations forces (SOF) of NATO member nations.**

**What role do you believe the NSHQ should play in future contingencies involving NATO SOF?**

The NSHQ provides a critical role in coordinating and synchronizing SOF operations and activities across the alliance. The Commander of the NSHQ fills an additional role as the Director of Special Operations—the principal advisor to SACEUR on the appropriate use of SOF. I have worked with NATO SOF and if confirmed, look forward to considering the use of their unique skills and experience to address the emerging threats in Europe.

**How do you believe the NSHQ can most effectively support NATO SOF capabilities and interoperability?**

The NSHQ advocates and influences the development of Alliance SOF to achieve national and Alliance capability objectives and interoperability. NSHQ achieves this through a variety of mechanisms:

- Administration and oversight of the SOF evaluation program and process
- Development and Maintenance of NATO SOF Doctrine
- Training and Education provided by the NATO Special Operations School
- Participation in NATO exercises and Training events

**What do you believe are the appropriate roles for EUCOM and SOCOM in providing guidance and resources to the NSHQ?**

- USSOCOM has been designated by the U.S. Secretary of Defense as the “lead component” with executive agent-like responsibilities for NSHQ.
- USSOCOM provides SOF advocacy and insures that NSHQ has access to all standards, tactics, and procedures to allow NATO SOF to be interoperable with US SOF.
- EUCOM, through the NATO Manning division, provides the necessary manpower support to ensure that NSHQ is manned at the appropriate levels.
Additionally, the Army, via USAREUR, is the conduit for ensuring funding appropriated from Congress is provided and in line with the authorities outlined in the National Defence Authorization Act for NSHQ.

Building Partner Capacity within the EUCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR)

In the past several years, Congress has provided a number of new authorities requiring the Departments of Defense and State to work collaboratively to provide security assistance to partner nations. These include the global train and equip authority (“Section 2282”) and the Global Security Contingency Fund.

In your view, what should be our strategic objectives in building the capacities of partner nations?

Capacity-building efforts should enable partner nations to conduct operations and activities that support U.S. national interests on their own or in concert with the U.S. This includes providing for national defense, conducting expeditionary operations in support of regional and/or global security, and countering transnational/transregional threats.

How would you define our strategic objectives for building the capacity of partner nations in the European Command area of responsibility and in what ways, if any, do those objectives differ from other geographic combatant commands?

Capacity-building efforts in the EUCOM AOR should increase the resilience of Allies and partners for indirect action and unconventional (or “hybrid”) warfare. They should also develop conventional capabilities needed for territorial defense, NATO collective defense, and expeditionary and peacekeeping operations. For many partners in EUCOM, this requires making further progress in the transition from Russian to NATO-interoperable systems and doctrine. In addition, building partner capacity has a critical role to play in enabling Allies and partners to respond to the surge in transnational/transregional threats to European security. Last but certainly not least, capacity-building efforts should support the development of the institutions needed to sustain and further enhance these capabilities.

The degree to which these objectives differ from other geographic combatant commands is based on two characteristics unique to the EUCOM AOR. The first is the willingness of European Allies and partners to support U.S. interests and operations. Europe is our partner of first resort. The second is NATO, in terms of the treaty commitments to which Allies are bound, and the formal, institutionalized framework for defense cooperation, and command and control of military operations.

What is the relationship of the global train and equip authority and the Global Security Contingency Fund to other security assistance authorities, such as DOD counternarcotics assistance and foreign military financing?
The Global Train and Equip authority and Global Security Contingency Fund complement other security assistance authorities, enabling the Departments of Defense and State to respond to a broader range of security challenges.

The Global Train and Equip authority enables the Department to address emergent requirements to build the capacity of: 1) Ministry of Defense forces to support coalition military or stability operations that support U.S. interests; 2) Ministry of Defense and non-Ministry of Defense forces to conduct counterterrorism operations.

The Global Security Contingency Fund enables the Departments of Defense and State to plan and execute a sustained, comprehensive program of security sector assistance for a partner nation facing severe, unanticipated, and immediate security threats due to instability and conflict.

Has the Global Security Contingency Fund authority been effective in the development of Ukrainian security forces?

The Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) authority has been a vital component of EUCOM’s security assistance to Ukraine. It has allowed EUCOM to fill a security gap for the Government of Ukraine and demonstrate the value of U.S.-led security assistance during their ongoing crisis. In the weeks following the illegal occupation of Crimea and the Russian intervention in the Donbass, the government of Ukraine rapidly mobilized both its conventional Armed Forces and many separate battalions of volunteers, which were eventually incorporated into the National Guard. The GSCF allowed the Command to impart standardized and western military training to this new formation and to its leadership, which in turn led them to build their force infused with western military principles. EUCOM is still witnessing the second order effects of the original train-and-equip package that was funded with this authority.

NATO Members’ Spending on Defense

In 2015, according to General Breedlove:

- 21 Allies halted or reversed declines in defense investment as a percentage of GDP;
- 24 Allies halted or reversed declines in equipment investment;
- 5 Allies met the 2% of GDP guideline; and
- 8 Allies allocated the NATO guideline of 20% or more of defense budged to equipment.

What is your assessment of the impact on NATO of the failure of the majority of NATO allies to meet agreed targets for defense spending?

I recognize that defense spending is a political decision made by sovereign member states, and that Alliance defense spending is moving in a positive direction. However, the members must strive to meet the Alliance target, particularly in view of the multiple emerging security challenges in Europe.
If confirmed, what steps would you take to encourage NATO allies to increase their defense spending and enhance the military capabilities that they can contribute to NATO operations?

If confirmed, I will engage NATO member leadership on these defense spending levels, their plans to meet Alliance targets and the capabilities they provide in the collective defense of Europe.

**Prevention of and Response to Sexual Assaults**

**What is your assessment of the problem of sexual assaults in EUCOM?**

It is my understanding that EUCOM takes sexual assault prevention seriously, that the required programs and personnel are in place, and that their trends are representative of DOD trends. If confirmed, I will emphasize healthy command climates that ensure individual dignity and respect. I will lead by example and place personal emphasis on sexual assault prevention, and I will conduct a personal assessment of EUCOM’s programs and results.

**What is your assessment of EUCOM’s sexual assault prevention and response program?**

It is my understanding that EUCOM takes sexual assault prevention seriously, the required programs and personnel are in place and that their trends are representative of DOD trends. If confirmed, I will emphasize healthy command climates that ensure individual dignity and respect. I will lead by example and place personal emphasis on sexual assault prevention, and I will conduct a personal assessment of EUCOM’s programs and results.

**What is your view of the provision for restricted and unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults?**

I support both restricted and unrestricted reporting. This provides the victim a personal choice and a much greater voice while ensuring the victim’s safety and support, and providing the chain of command awareness of a crime. In units with healthy command climates, restricted reports are less frequent, reflecting the trust in the leadership.

**What is your view about the role of the chain of command in providing necessary support to victims of sexual assault?**

The chain of command, particularly the commander, is critical to enforcing the standards of support to victims of sexual assault. Their demonstrated level of concern for the victim, adherence to required and trained resources, and insistence on timely care and protection permeates a unit’s environment and actions.

**What is your view of the adequacy of resources and programs in EUCOM to provide victims of sexual assault the medical, psychological, and legal help they need?**
It is my understanding that the resources and programs in EUCOM provide appropriate medical, psychological, and legal help to victims of sexual assault. If confirmed, I will require the component commands to report on their adequacy of their programs and make my own assessment of their findings. Additionally, I will continue to promote education among our people concerning resources and reporting options available to them, to encourage the confidence that they will receive the compassionate and professional help they require if they report an allegation.

**What is your view of EUCOM initiatives to prevent additional sexual assaults?**

It is my understanding that EUCOM and its components actively implement dynamic and engaging training. The training includes hands on interactive role-playing, drama, mentoring, and communication training. For example, EUCOM developed a policy which specifically targets temporary and deployed personnel, to emphasize bystander intervention as everyone’s duty.

**What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources available to EUCOM to investigate and prosecute allegations of sexual assault?**

It is my understanding that EUCOM investigative and prosecutorial resources are adequate. Criminal investigative agencies prioritize sexual assault cases and thoroughly investigate all allegations of sexual assault. With increased training and specialization, both investigators and prosecutors are becoming increasingly skilled in dealing with these types of cases, which can often be complex and challenging by their nature.

**What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults occur?**

Commanders establish the culture in their unit. All leaders must be involved in changing culture for the better, and should be held accountable for climates that demonstrate a pattern of disrespect and indiscipline.

**Surveys report that up to 62 percent of victims who report a sexual assault perceive professional or social retaliation for reporting. If confirmed, what will you do to address the issue of retaliation for reporting a sexual assault?**

If confirmed, I will set the example and prioritize prevention of sexual assault and the prevention of retaliation for reporting sexual assault.

If confirmed, I will ensure subordinate commanders take appropriate action with those who retaliate against one reporting sexual assault. I will ensure personnel know they are expected to report wrong doing to appropriate authorities.

**Sexual assault is a significantly underreported crime in our society and in the military. If confirmed, what will you do to increase reporting of sexual assaults by military victims?**
I am aware that sexual assault is significantly underreported in our society and the military.

If confirmed, I will emphasize and require proper command climates and emphasis in training the chain of command on sensitivity and privacy in their handling sexual assault incidents. Reporting is a matter of victim trust in their leadership and confidence that the incident will be handled privately and with appropriate understanding, sensitivity, and care.

**In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a judge advocate outside the chain of command, instead of a military commander in the grade of O-6 or above as is currently the Department’s policy, to determine whether allegations of sexual assault should be prosecuted?**

In my opinion, requiring a judge advocate to act in place of the commander would significantly undermine the overall command authority and trust in all matters. We hold commanders responsible for all aspects of mission and discipline in their unit, and we trust them with life and death decisions in combat. Our commanders are trained and provided specifically trained legal counsel and oversight and can properly determine prosecution of sexual offenses.

**What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to address the problem of sexual assaults in EUCOM?**

If confirmed, I will set the example and clearly establish prevention of sexual assault as a priority.

Additionally, if confirmed, I will emphasize and require proper command climates and emphasis in training the chain of command on proper processes, sensitivity and privacy in their handling sexual assault incidents.

**What is your assessment of the effect, if any, of recent legislation concerning sexual assault on the capability of EUCOM commanders to prosecute sexual assault cases?**

I can’t speak directly to the effect of recent legislation concerning sexual assault on the EUCOM commanders’ prosecution of sexual assault cases. This level of detail is not available to me. However, my assessment of the legislative impact in my present command is positive. Particularly the requirement for trained victim advocate counsel and counsel for commanders is positive and has clearly empowered and protected the victim and increased our prosecution in sexual assault cases. If confirmed, I will check adherence and review the effect of the recent legislation.

The Armed Services Committee has received testimony about troubling allegations concerning child sexual abuse by coalition partners in Afghanistan. **In your view, what is the appropriate role for a U.S. military commander who is working with coalition partners, when that U.S. officer becomes aware of allegations of child abuse by members of that coalition force?**
The U.S. military takes all allegations of this nature very seriously and upon witnessing or receiving allegations, U.S. military members are required to report any incidents to their chain of command. Additionally, we notify our coalition partners and encourage them to take appropriate action.

If confirmed, what direction would you give to U.S. personnel assigned to your command who become aware of such allegations?

If confirmed, I will continue to instruct U.S. personnel to report any suspected violations through their chain of command as soon as they become aware of them.

Under what circumstances would you expect U.S. personnel under your command to intervene to stop such misconduct if they suspect it or observe it?

If U.S. personnel suspect or observe an incident of abuse, I expect them to report it through their chain of command, bring it to the attention of the appropriate coalition officials, and encourage the officials to address the incident through appropriate criminal justice systems.

While U.S. forces do not have the legal authority to enforce matters of coalition domestic law, I expect our service members to do what is morally correct at all times and to stop abuse on the spot, if observed. I would expect all U.S. personnel under my command to embody this responsibility and act accordingly.

**Congressional Oversight**

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes, I do.

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

Yes, I do.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, EUCOM?

Yes, I do.
Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes, I do.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes, I do.