

Advance Policy Questions for John Rood
Nominee for Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Department of Defense Reforms

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included the most sweeping reforms since the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

Do you support these reforms?

Yes. The reforms put in place by the FY 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) included substantial changes to enable greater efficiency, reduce overhead, and to provide more authorities to the Services to manage programs and influence the timing and type of systems being acquired for their use.

What other areas for defense reform do you believe might be appropriate for this Committee to address?

I do not have additional recommendations at this time. If confirmed, I will review the progress in implementing the reforms enacted in the FY 2017 NDAA in my area of responsibility and advise the committee if I believe further reforms are warranted.

Section 911 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 also required that the Secretary of Defense establish cross-functional teams to address critical objectives of the Department.

What are your views on the potential focus areas and uses for future cross-functional teams?

Cross-functional teams have the potential to enable the Department to bring together people with diverse backgrounds and responsibilities to address some of the toughest problems facing us. During my tenure in government and industry, I have seen cross-functional teams used effectively. If confirmed, I will review current planning activities underway within the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy to determine where cross-functional teams can best be utilized.

Duties and Qualifications

Section 134 of title 10, United States Code, provides the duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is the principal official reporting to the

Secretary of Defense who is responsible for policy development and planning. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy leads the formulation and coordination of national security and defense policy with the Department of Defense and integrates policies and plans to achieve desired objectives. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy also is responsible for efforts to build partnerships and defense cooperation with U.S. friends and allies.

As specified in Section 134, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy assists the Secretary of Defense in preparing written policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans; and in reviewing such plans. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy has responsibility for supervising and directing activities of the Department of Defense relating to export controls, as well as policy oversight, guidance, allocation, and use of resources for Department of Defense security cooperation and combatting terrorism.

If confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?

If confirmed, I expect the Secretary of Defense to have me serve as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of Defense Department policy and plans to achieve national security objectives. If confirmed, I expect to represent the Department of Defense, as directed, in matters involving the National Security Council (NSC), Department of State, and other Federal Departments, Agencies, and inter-Agency groups with responsibility for national security policy, including serving as a member of the NSC Deputies Committee.

What background and experience do you possess that qualify you for this position?

I served in a number of positions in the US Government for over 20 years that provide a broad and deep set of experiences that are relevant to the duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and make me well qualified for this position. These positions include:

- Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security;
- Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation;
- Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Counterproliferation Strategy at the National Security Council;
- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy;
- Director for Nonproliferation, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense at the National Security Council;
- Four years working as a Senate staffer, including as Senior Policy Advisor to U.S. Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona and for the Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security; and
- Serving as an analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency following weapons of mass destruction and missile programs in foreign countries, including North Korea.

I also believe my experience working in the aerospace and defense industry since 2009 has provided a valuable set of experiences on how the Defense Department and industry can best partner, and the importance of defense cooperation with America's friends and allies around the world that are relevant to the role of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy that I can draw upon if confirmed.

Major Challenges and Priorities

If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish?

The United States faces the most complex security environment and set of growing threats that we have seen in several decades. Our major challenges include Russia and China which are major powers who have chosen to be strategic competitors to the United States, the growing threat from North Korea and Iran, and countering terrorism including defeating ISIS. Adapting our security posture, policies, and building an effective and flexible set of capabilities is essential in this complex environment. It is also critically important that the United States build and maintain effective partnerships with our friends and allies around the world.

Along with our friends and allies, it is critically important that we develop effective responses to the threat posed by growing weapons of mass destruction and missile capabilities in the hands of potential adversaries, more effective ways to deter and defend against cyber attacks and attacks on our space capabilities, preservation of freedom of access to the global commons, as well as improved cooperation to combat terrorism and the spread of violent extremism. Furthermore, if confirmed, I will work closely with other key elements within the Defense Department and with the Committee to address these major challenges and to champion Secretary Mattis's priorities to Build a More Lethal Force, Strengthen Allies and Partnerships, and Reform the Department.

In your view, what are the major challenges, if any, you would expect to confront if confirmed?

Developing and updating our policies and approaches for today's complex security environment and the growing threats we face will be the major challenges I would face if confirmed. If confirmed, one of my priorities will be to complete work on a new National Defense Strategy to guide the Department's actions in this complex environment. An effective strategy will also depend on buy-in from key Defense Department organizations, the U.S. Congress, and inter-agency partners in order for it to be effectively implemented.

If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would you establish to address these challenges?

If confirmed, I would aim to complete work on a new National Defense Strategy as a key priority and finish it no later than early in 2018. If confirmed, I also plan to undertake a

review of the OSD Policy organization to assess its organizational health, workforce, and lines of responsibility.

Relations with Congress

What are your views on the state of the relationship between the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Senate Armed Services Committee in particular, and with Congress in general?

From my time as a Senate staffer, I am acutely aware that Congress is a co-equal branch of government and that committees like the Senate Armed Service Committee play an important role in safeguarding America's security. The relationship between the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Senate Armed Services Committee appears more strained than I believe appropriate and could be improved through more regular communication by OSD Policy with the Committee and frequent contact. I welcome more regular communication and collaboration with the Committee.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a productive and mutually beneficial relationship between Congress and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?

If confirmed, I look forward to working with my team in the Office of the Under Secretary for Policy to maintain a regular and productive communication pattern with the committee and to frequent dialogue and collaboration.

Torture and Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014, and required by section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92)?

Yes.

U.S. Strategic Vital Interests

It is important to delineate between the United States' strategic vital interests and other interests. Strategic vital interests must represent those for which the United States is willing to commit the nation's blood and treasure.

What and where are the United States' strategic vital interests?

Protection of the American people and our homeland from an increasingly complex set of threats remains of paramount importance and the core of the United States' vital strategic interests. Maintaining our security commitments to allies is also a vital strategic interest

of the United States. In addition, the protection and promotion of the prosperity of America's economy, the rule of law, and the institutions of our democracy against threats such as cyber attack or information operations is another vital strategic interest of the United States. Preservation of freedom of movement within the global commons: the sea, air, and outer space domains through which the world conducts business is another vital strategic interest.

How do these overlay with extant and emerging threats around the globe?

Several of the key threats that are growing today pose an increasing challenge to the United States' vital strategic interests. For example, Russia's increasingly aggressive posture toward our NATO allies and willingness to use force against its neighbors and cyber intrusions to advance its agenda pose a threat to America's vital security interests. Other growing threats to our vital security interests include China's aggressive behavior toward U.S. forces and allies in Asia and attempts to impede freedom of navigation, the threat posed by North Korea to the U.S. and her citizens and territories, Iran's destabilizing behavior, and the threat of terrorism that poses a serious threat to U.S. citizens, allies, and our homeland.

National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy

What is your understanding of the Trump Administration's global vision for the United States and its role in shaping the global security environment?

My understanding is that the protection of the United States, our homeland, and our vital strategic interests, as well as promotion of a prosperous and secure U.S. economy remains at the core of the Administration's global vision. The Administration seeks to work with friends and allies to address the complex threats we face, to persuade Allies to bear their share of the shared burden of protecting our people and global institutions we have built, and in confronting transnational threats such as terrorism, cyber attacks, attempts to impede free access to the global commons, and key regional threats like North Korea and Iran.

In your view, what should the envisioned end states entail for the new National Security and National Defense Strategies?

The National Security Strategy should characterize the complex security environment facing the United States and articulate a vision for how we can best utilize a whole-of-government approach to protect our vital security interests and work with friends and allies to advance our security objectives around the world.

In accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) must address the current threat environment, analyze trends, and look towards what will be required to protect and defend the United States, its citizens, and its vital interests. The NDS is an important mechanism to help drive DoD investments and force planning for the future.

The National Defense Strategy should articulate how the instruments of national power employed by the Defense Department and our military Services can support achievement of the aims of the broader National Security Strategy and work in concert with our diplomatic, intelligence, aid, and strategic communication efforts. The National Defense Strategy should also prioritize the Defense Department's efforts against the most consequential threats, examine the sustainability and efficacy of our current force posture and deployments, and provide focus to our planning, budgeting, acquisition, and personnel approaches.

What are the objectives and key attributes of the National Defense Strategy? What are the key strategic challenges that the strategy should prioritize and address?

The National Defense Strategy should include an examination of the global security environment and an assessment of the trends and activities by key adversaries that pose the greatest threats to our vital strategic interests. The strategy should prioritize the greatest challenges we face from major potential adversaries like Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, and transnational terrorism, as well as look at our assumptions and effectiveness of approaches we have tried in the past in the conflict with ISIS and Al Qaeda and our involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. I understand that the strategy being developed will define a strategic framework to address identified threats and opportunities, revise force shaping and sizing criteria, analyze force employment approaches, and review force structure requirements.

What is your opinion on the force planning construct that the National Defense Strategy should advocate for, and why?

The National Defense Strategy should articulate a force planning construct that enables the United States to deter, defend against, and if necessary defeat, aggression from any adversary. Such capabilities are essential to deterring large potential adversaries like Russia and China from aggressive actions toward the United States and our allies. The force planning construct should be sufficient to provide the flexibility for the United States to engage in a conflict with a regional adversary such as North Korea or Iran, while retaining sufficient capabilities to deter and if necessary defeat aggression by another state.

The National Defense Strategy, through the force planning concept, ultimately drives budget requirements. However, defense budgets, if determined in the absence of a strategy, which is often the case, can also impact the feasibility of a strategy. There has been no clear guidance on budgetary levels from Congress as the Department of Defense creates the new National Defense Strategy.

How do you believe the National Defense Strategy should take into account budget considerations? Do you believe the strategy must be budget constrained or budget informed? If so, how would you determine the budgetary levels to guide the strategy?

Our National Defense Strategy should be based on America's role in the world and the capabilities needed to deter, and if necessary, defeat the evolving threats facing our nation and to protect our vital strategic interests. Such a strategy should be budget informed, but not constrained by budgetary levels. As the level of threats we face evolves, it may be necessary to increase or decrease the level of resources we devote to the defense budget that underpins our National Defense Strategy or to evaluate the appropriate level of risk we are willing to accept to achievement of the objectives of the National Defense Strategy.

The Department should both ask for additional resources where they are critically needed and also harvest savings from institutional reforms. Finally, I support the Secretary's emphasis on the unique advantages that our allies and partners afford us. When we pool our resources together against the risks posed by instability and aggression, those investments become much more effective.

Do you believe the National Defense Strategy should be requirements-driven? If so, how would you determine which requirements merit inclusion?

The National Defense Strategy should assess the evolving security environment and developing trends that are impacting it, and should rigorously analyze and define the key challenges for the Department. The Department must then determine the objectives, priority missions, force structure, and capabilities necessary to address the key challenges at an acceptable level of risk.

What are the key elements of strategic deterrence in the 21st Century?

At the core of strategic deterrence is the ability to persuade adversaries that an attack on the United States or its allies would result in costs that far outweigh any benefits they might expect to achieve through such an attack. It requires that we maintain the ability to practice deterrence by denial of the strategic objectives of an attack through means like missile defense. Effective strategic deterrence also requires the United States and our allies to have the capability to impose costs in response that adversaries would consider unacceptable. It is also essential that adversaries recognize that U.S. capabilities, and the resolve to use these capabilities, are both credible.

What are the core elements of a comprehensive global defense strategy to: deter war with Russia and China; contain North Korea; defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Al Qaeda, and other purveyors of violent extremism; stabilize Afghanistan; and limit Iran's malign influence and other activities?

In my view, such a strategy should begin with a clear articulation of our vital national security interests in the new National Defense Strategy and a plan for rebuilding America's military capabilities, strengthening the credibility of our deterrence capabilities, bolstering our alliances and partners, and mobilizing friends and allies to join the United States in

confronting shared threats. This will require a whole-of-government approach and the commitment of friends and allies as the United States cannot do it alone.

U.S. Military Force Sufficiency

How important are the U.S. military's global power projection capabilities in ensuring we remain a global power?

Maintaining the ability for the United States to project power globally is critically important. Our ability to deploy and sustain forces across the world is an essential element of our deterrence and defense strategies. As potential adversaries seek to limit the ability of the United States to access certain areas and to impede freedom of movement within the global commons, it is essential that the United States and our friends and allies adapt and improve our capabilities and cooperate to continue to ensure freedom of navigation and access to the global commons.

Do you believe the United States must retain the capability to strike any global target (hold any target at risk), both in the nuclear and conventional sense?

Yes. The United States should maintain effective and credible military capabilities, both conventional and nuclear, that provide the ability to hold at risk any target globally. Such a capability is a key element of effectively deterring, and if necessary, defeating aggression toward the United States and our allies.

In your opinion, does power projection include our ability to deploy and sustain forces anywhere on the planet, across the full range of military operations?

Yes. Our ability to deploy and sustain forces around the world is central to our ability to project power and deter potential adversaries. Our ability to maintain such capabilities is increasingly challenged both by advances in the capabilities of our adversaries and by our own budgetary decisions. We should take steps to preserve and bolster this critically important element of our national military capability.

What is the future role of forward stationing forces in order to deter adversary action and what is the proper balance between forward stationed, rotationally deployed, and surge forces in executing our defense strategy?

Forward stationed forces play a key role in deterring potential adversaries and reassuring allies of U.S. commitment to our security obligations and willingness to address shared threats. Given resource and force size constraints, and the need to provide home dwell time for specialized forces in high demand, rotational deployments of U.S. forces are an effective complement to U.S. forward stationed forces in accomplishing our deterrence and reassurance objectives. It is also essential that the U.S. maintain sufficient depth in the total Joint Force to surge forces when needed to accomplish our key national security objectives or at critical junctures in a conflict. The proper balance between forward-stationed, rotationally deployed, and surge forces will vary from region to region and is constantly changing based on a dynamic security environment. However, all three types

of forces are necessary to ensure the Joint Force is postured to protect U.S. security interests.

Do you believe we must also have a sufficient strategic and operational reserve, national mobilization capability, and robust defense industrial base to provide a second echelon of follow-on forces if a contingency arises in a particular region, especially against a near peer, great power state?

Yes. I believe the Department of Defense must maintain sufficient depth and capacity in the total force that can be mobilized to defeat aggression in more than one theater, including a scenario where U.S. forces are engaged against a near-peer adversary. This includes investments in advanced capabilities and a sufficient state of readiness across the Joint Force to prevail in a broad range of contingencies. We must also have a strong, capable, and responsive industrial base with the capability to surge production when necessary.

In light of current and future threats to the United States' strategic vital interests, do you believe the U.S. military must have the capacity to fight two wars simultaneously?

Growth in the threats facing the United States, continuing force deployments in counter terror missions, years of underfunding, and funding instability have seriously impacted readiness and stretched the capacity and capability of the Joint Force to the point where our options may be constrained if we are challenged by contingencies in multiple theaters simultaneously. We cannot expect our adversaries to limit their challenges to only those areas where U.S. forces are best postured to confront them. I believe we need to maintain the capability in the total Joint Force to be able to deter, and if necessary defeat a large adversary and to deal with more than one military contingency at the same time. I expect this issue to be addressed in the National Defense Strategy.

In your opinion, does the Fiscal Year 2018 defense budget request sufficiently support the attainment of these attributes?

The Fiscal Year 2018 defense budget is a first step toward strengthening the U.S. military. It supports the goals that Secretary Mattis has articulated of restoring readiness and developing a larger, more capable, and more lethal Joint Force, including through funding for critical power projection capabilities. However, the defense budget remains at near historic lows as a percentage of GDP. After years of force reductions, budget cuts, and funding instability, additional investments are needed to build the capacity of the Joint Force and critical capabilities.

Russia

What challenges to U.S. national security interests does Russia present, and what are the key principles that must underpin a successful strategy to protect our interests?

As Secretary Mattis has testified to the Committee, Russia has chosen to be a strategic competitor of the United States. Russia has shown a willingness to use violence and intimidation to accomplish its political objectives, and to use asymmetric capabilities with the aim of destabilizing and influencing events in other nations. Challenges posed by Russia include violations of treaties with the United States; increased nuclear capabilities and a greater reliance on nuclear weapons including threats toward its neighbors; the use of hybrid warfare tactics to destabilize countries that Moscow considers to be in its sphere of influence; the invasion and occupation of sovereign territory in Ukraine; involvement in cyber hacking and information warfare; and support to rogue regimes in Syria and Iran.

We must be realistic about the challenges posed by Russia and be willing to confront the Russian Government when it takes actions that threaten our vital strategic interests or threatens our allies. We must work closely with allies to maintain and build NATO's solidarity and capabilities. In addition, we need to rebuild America's military capabilities to deter Russian aggression and counter its capability advancements. Yet, while we must be resolute in responding to Russian provocations, we should also continue to seek cooperation with Russia in pursuit of shared interests where appropriate.

Section 1232 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 placed a limitation on military cooperation between the United States and Russia conditioned on significant changes in Russia's aggressive and destabilizing behavior. Section 1232 contained exceptions to support U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan, and to allow compliance with arms control and other treaty obligations. It also grants the Secretary of Defense the authority to waive the limitation if he determines it is in national security interest of the United States.

Do you believe any change to this policy is necessary at this time to support U.S. national interests? If so, what changes would you recommend?

I do not believe a change to this policy is necessary at this time.

Do you agree with General Scaparrotti that our current force posture in Europe is "inadequate" to deter Russia? What changes to our force posture would you recommend?

While the United States has taken significant steps to enhance the readiness and responsiveness of U.S. forces in the European theater through steps such as the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) and NATO allies have taken positive steps to increase their defense spending and capabilities, I am concerned that these steps are insufficient to adequately deter Russia given its aggressive behavior and posture.

The United States has worked with our NATO allies to build the capabilities of our allies in the Baltic States and central Europe to deter further Russian aggression. NATO Allies are also taking greater steps to share the burden of common defense and to meet the

commitment they have made to spend at least two percent of their GDP on defense as agreed at the NATO summit in 2014. That said, NATO should continue to improve its posture by emphasizing increased readiness; missile defense; counter anti-access/area-denial capabilities; and combat enablers like command and control systems, precision munitions, and joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.

While these steps are positive, if confirmed, I will consult with the Joint Staff and the U.S. European Command on what future efforts and investments will be appropriate to increase U.S. capabilities to deter Russian aggression. I will also work to ensure our NATO allies spend their defense dollars wisely in pursuit of these goals and to transform their forces for the threats we face today and in the future.

Should the Department of Defense revisit the European Infrastructure Consolidation (EIC) initiative announced in 2015? If so, how should any such revision to our force posture in Europe take into account U.S. objectives and plans under the European Deterrence Initiative to bolster the military capabilities of our European allies?

My understanding is that the European Infrastructure Consolidation (EIC) initiative is not intended to reduce our military capabilities in Europe, but instead will shift capabilities to lower cost locations, eliminate excess facilities, and maximize utility. My understanding is that the aim is for the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) to build U.S. capability in Europe, including through funding increased rotational ground, air, and maritime forces in Europe. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) Commander and the Joint Staff to review whether any adjustments to the EIC and ERI would be appropriate, and, more broadly, whether adjustments to our posture in Europe are called for.

Do you support continued U.S. security assistance to Ukraine, and if so, how does the provision of such assistance contribute to a broader U.S. regional security strategy?

Yes. I support continued U.S. security assistance to Ukraine to build the capability of its forces to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. U.S. security assistance to Ukraine and other states in the region is part of a broader U.S. strategy to deter further Russian aggression against Ukraine and other states in the region, and to provide the capabilities for states like Ukraine to defend their sovereignty and encourage reforms and closer ties with the United States and our NATO allies. These programs, combined with efforts to improve the readiness and responsiveness of U.S. forces in Europe through programs such as ERI, will help to deter further aggressive Russian actions in the region.

Do you support providing lethal defensive security assistance to Ukraine as in the interests of the United States?

Yes.

In your view, what are the key elements of a strategy to counter Russian hybrid tactics that employ both hard and soft power and present attribution challenges?

The hybrid warfare tactics employed by Russia present a challenge that requires the United States and our allies to adjust our tactics and procedures, and to address capability shortfalls to counter Russian capabilities. Along with our NATO allies, we need to recognize Russia's willingness to employ disinformation and other information warfare tactics coupled with new capabilities such as cyber and electronic attack, UAVs, use of irregular and special forces, and the threat to use nuclear weapons to accomplish its aims. Countering such steps will require the United States and our allies to have more robust capabilities in Europe, to adjust our procedures for attributing attacks in the face of Russian information operations, the development and deployment of capability enhancements that counter the capabilities that Russia has demonstrated in places like Ukraine and Georgia, and working with our allies to demonstrate the will to confront Russian aggression.

What is your assessment of the Russian malign influence threat, and what recommendations, if any, would you have for the role of the U.S. Government, and the Department of Defense in particular, in countering that threat?

I'm very concerned by Russia's growing willingness to use information operations and disinformation as part of its aggressive actions toward its neighbors and NATO allies, and in an effort to undermine democracy in the United States and our allies. The strategy and capabilities needed to confront and counter such steps by Russia requires an integrated, whole of government approach by several departments and agencies. If confirmed, I plan to work within the inter-agency and with international partners to develop appropriate defensive and offensive capabilities to deter and counter such Russian malign influence operations.

Russia's Violation of Arms Control Agreements

Russia's deployment of a nuclear ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) in violation of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty poses a risk to our NATO Allies and U.S. forces in Europe.

Taking into account doubts about whether Russia will return to compliance with the INF Treaty, how should the United States address the military and political implications of this new nuclear GLCM?

The Defense Department should examine options for defensive and offensive capabilities to counter Russia's new nuclear GLCM to prevent Russia from gaining a significant military advantage from this capability. These options should be aimed at deterring Russia from the actual or threatened use of this capability as a means of coercion, to assure our NATO allies, and to create a disincentive for Russian violation of arms control agreements like the INF Treaty.

Is there a gap in U.S. military capability that could be filled by a system comparable to the GLCM?

I understand that the Defense Department is reviewing this issue. If confirmed, I plan to explore options for additional capabilities in this area and the associated tradeoffs.

Should we increase NATO's defenses against these new cruise missiles as well as against Russia's air and sea-launched cruise missiles?

My understanding is that potential improvements in cruise missile defense is one of issues being considered as part of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) ordered by the President in January 2017. If confirmed, I look forward to participating in this review and examining potential additional capabilities.

According to the State Department, Russia also remains in violation of the Open Skies Treaty. Russian leaders have given no indication that they intend to come back into compliance with the Open Skies Treaty. Russia has also imposed costs on Ukraine in violation of Open Skies Consultative Commission Decision 2/09, leading the State Department to conclude that this "could be grounds for a breach determination on the part of Ukraine."

If the United States is able to find a way to provide similar quality imagery to NATO Allies as is provided through the Open Skies Treaty, and Russia remains in violation of the treaty, is the Open Skies Treaty still in the best interest of the United States?

As a general matter, I believe that in circumstances when Russia or another party to a treaty with the United States is in violation of the treaty, that it is appropriate for us to reassess whether our continued participation remains in the U.S. interest.

I understand that the Defense and State Departments, are currently assessing the costs and benefits of the Treaty in light of Russia's ongoing Treaty violations. If I am confirmed, I will continue to place a high priority on monitoring and encouraging full implementation of all treaties and agreements. I will also continue to prioritize Department efforts to mitigate any risks potentially posed by Open Skies Treaty overflights.

If confirmed, I will explore whether there are suitable alternatives to provide similar imagery to NATO allies.

If Russia remains in violation of the INF Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty, should we extend the New START treaty for an additional five years, as stipulated by the treaty?

Russia's track record of violating its arms control agreements has serious implications for the future efficacy of arms control in general, including the New START Treaty. We should also first ensure that Russia meets its obligations to reduce its strategic offensive

arms in the New START Treaty by the February 2018 deadline before considering any extension.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

In your opinion, does the NATO Alliance benefit the national security interests of the United States?

Yes. NATO is a critically important alliance that benefits the national security interests of the United States. NATO is an important political and military alliance that allows the United States and our allies to deter and defend against shared threats, facilitates European stability, and helps us sustain our values and democracies. NATO provides an unparalleled multinational command structure and mechanisms to build interoperable military capabilities, including for operations outside the territory of its member states such as in Afghanistan.

What are the major strategic objectives of the NATO Alliance in the coming years?

NATO's objectives in the coming years should include deterring aggression against its member states, projecting stability in Europe and in out of area operations in places like the Mediterranean and Afghanistan, promoting member contributions to our shared defense, and countering a growing array of transnational threats such as terrorism, growth in weapons of mass destruction and missile capabilities, and cyber and information operations that aim to disrupt our economies and undermine our democratic institutions.

In your opinion, what are the greatest challenges for NATO and the most important capability improvements that the Alliance must make to deal with the accelerated and growing threats it faces?

Improving the capabilities of NATO to deter and counter Russian aggression and its hybrid warfare capabilities, such as electronic warfare and cyber attack, UAVs, irregular and special operations forces, and information operations is a substantial challenge that NATO should address. Other priority areas for capability improvements include missile defense, countering growing weapons of mass destruction capabilities, and counter-terrorism cooperation. In the near-term, NATO should emphasize increased readiness, missile defense, counter anti-access/area-denial capabilities, and combat enablers like command and control systems, precision munitions, and joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.

What is your perspective on accusations that our NATO Allies do not carry their fair share of the security burden?

At the 2014 Wales Summit, all 28 Allies pledged to halt cuts in defense spending and agreed "to aim to move towards" spending 2% of GDP on defense - with 20% going to major equipment purchases - within a decade.

I agree with Secretary Mattis' calls for Allies to live up to the Wales Pledge, and I am encouraged that Allies agreed to undertake additional commitments at the NATO Leaders' Meeting at the end of May, including doing more to fight terrorism and to ensure equitable burden sharing.

In your view, is there a continuing requirement for U.S. nuclear weapons to be deployed in NATO countries?

Yes. NATO Allies reaffirmed this stance at the Warsaw Summit in July 2016. In my view, it is critically important that NATO deploy an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities.

If confirmed, will you support fielding the dual-capable F-35 modifications for the United States and its allies in the shortest feasible time?

Yes.

Balkans

How would you describe today's threats to the security and stability of the Balkans?

The Western Balkans have come a long way since the wars of Yugoslav succession and ethnic strife of the 1990s and early 2000s. Today, three countries in the region (Albania, Croatia, and Montenegro) are NATO members, and with the exception of Kosovo, all other countries are in NATO's Partnership for Peace. Although intra-state and state-on-state conflict are no longer the primary threats to security and stability in the Balkans, complex ethnic-based challenges continue to threaten the region's long-term stability. These challenges include corruption, organized crime, fragile rule of law, and malign Russian influence. Russia uses ethnic, historic, and religious ties to the region to promote an anti-NATO and anti-U.S. agenda; meanwhile, violent extremist organizations exploit the region's relative poverty and fragile rule of law to recruit and to transit fighters from and through the region.

What do you see as the role of NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) and what conditions are required before that presence can be reduced or eliminated?

KFOR's mission is to maintain a secure environment and freedom of movement throughout Kosovo under UNSC Resolution 1244. KFOR is the "third responder" to security incidents, behind the Kosovo Police (first responder) and the European Union Rule of Law Mission known as EULEX (second responder). Today KFOR consists of approximately 4,300 military personnel from 30 allied and partner nations. NATO uses a "conditions based" concept to determine KFOR force levels. The key conditions that will allow a reduction in KFOR is for Kosovo to have trained, professional, and multi-ethnic security forces to provide both domestic security and territorial defense, and for Kosovo to have good relations with its neighbors.

What is your assessment of the path forward for Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to pursue closer cooperation with and eventual membership in NATO?

NATO agreed in 2008 at the Bucharest summit that Macedonia would receive an invitation for membership upon successful resolution of its issue with Greece concerning the country's name. The new Macedonian government under Prime Minister Zaev has reinvigorated efforts to address the name issue, which is a positive sign. Meanwhile, the Armed Forces of Macedonia continue to demonstrate their commitment to the NATO Alliance. Macedonia has contributed forces to NATO's Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan since 2002 and is currently in its 17th NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) cycle.

In 2010, Allies agreed that Bosnia and Herzegovina would receive a Membership Action Plan, subject to the successful registration of defense properties in the country. Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to register its defense properties to meet this condition. In addition, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Tri-Presidency passed a defense review that was long-stalled due to competing visions of the future of the armed forces. These reforms, once implemented, will improve the Armed Forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina and bring them closer to NATO integration.

Given the significant challenges that confronted Montenegro along its path to NATO membership, including a Russian-backed coup attempt against the government, what recommendations, if any, would you have for the role of the U.S. Government, and the Department of Defense in particular, in supporting Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina should they decide to pursue NATO membership?

I recommend that the U.S. Government and the Department of Defense emphasize that Montenegro's accession demonstrates that NATO's door remains open to European countries that share our values, contribute to the common defense, and strive to achieve security, prosperity, and freedom for their people. I would encourage Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to continue to work through the NATO Partnership for Peace program and continue to build their capabilities and professionalize their militaries in support of their NATO aspirations. In addition, I recommend that the United States Government make clear that it will reject any attempt to use force, threats, or intimidation aimed at disrupting attempts to join NATO.

Asia and the Pacific

The Defense Department's January 2012 strategic guidance, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," states "while the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region."

What are U.S. security priorities for the Asia-Pacific region?

In my view, the top U.S. security priorities for the region are:

- Addressing the growing threat posed by North Korea and its growing nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities including working closely with our allies in the region such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Australia.
- Working with friends and allies in the region to deal with China's increasing assertiveness, growing military capabilities, and efforts to impede access to the global commons.
- Growing and maintaining strong, cooperative relationships with key friends and allies in the region, and supporting the growth of their capabilities.

Will the Trump Administration continue the rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region? If so, what does the term "rebalance" mean to you in terms of force structure, posture, basing, capabilities, and funding?

The Asia-Pacific region is of critical importance and the United States itself is a part of this region with extensive political and economic interests and alliance relationships. If confirmed, I will review whether it would be appropriate to recommend to the Secretary of Defense adjustments in U.S. force structure, posture, basing, capabilities, and funding devoted to addressing the challenges we face in this region.

How do you assess the strength and health of our alliances in the region?

The United States continues to benefit from the strong alliances we have built in this key region over the course of several decades. While the health of these alliances remains sound, together with our friends and allies in the region, we face growing challenges. It is essential that the United States continue to work closely with long-standing allies, while also strengthening relationships with other friends in the region, including by building their capabilities to address the new security challenges facing us.

There are increasing calls from members of Congress for an Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative, similar to the European Deterrence Initiative, with funding of up to \$7.5 billion over five years. Do you agree with such an Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative?

I agree with Secretary of Defense Mattis that the Asia-Pacific region is a top priority for the United States and, if confirmed, I will work to assess the specific capability investments and other changes needed to adapt our forces, posture, and presence to achieve our objectives, and make recommendations to the Secretary on resourcing this priority.

If so, what would be your recommended objectives and priorities of the Defense Department and how should it use the funding, if appropriated?

If confirmed, I will assess the objectives and priorities of the Department as they relate to the Asia-Pacific region, and make recommendations to the Secretary on appropriate levels of funding.

North Korea

In your view, what should be the U.S. overall strategy to mitigate the threat posed by North Korea to our allies in the region and to the United States?

The United States should work closely with our allies in the region, particularly Japan and the Republic of Korea, to deter and defend against the growing threat posed by North Korea, including by strengthening our capabilities, demonstrating our resolve through combined military exercises, and ensuring U.S. military options remain credible to deter and, if necessary, respond to North Korean aggression.

In concert with allies like the Republic of Korea and Japan we should take political and economic steps to pressure North Korea and curb hard currency earnings the regime gains from activities such as arms sales.

In my view, it is also essential that the United States engage with China to use its significant influence with North Korea, as well as Russia which also has influence with the regime with the aim of achieving the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea and curbing its aggressive behavior.

What recommendations would you have concerning the U.S. approach to the latest North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile provocations? What are the core elements of a strategy to contain or deter the North Korean threat?

I agree with Secretary Mattis about the importance of standing with our allies in the face of the growing North Korea threat and remaining committed to defending the Republic of Korea and Japan with the full range of U.S. military capabilities, including conventional and nuclear capabilities. To deter the North Korean threat, I support ongoing U.S. efforts to increase the visible presence of U.S. military assets around the Korean Peninsula, such as ballistic missile defenses, strike assets, as well as increasing military cooperation, exercises, and integration of defenses with allies in the region.

The United States has never fought a conventional war against a nuclear armed state. How should that fact change the calculus for readiness for U.S. Forces Korea?

As the United States seeks a diplomatic resolution to our concerns about North Korea, U.S. Forces must maintain a high state of readiness to respond to potential North Korean aggression. As Secretary Mattis has done, we should make clear to North Korea that any attack on the United States and our allies will be defeated, and any use of nuclear weapons will be met with a massive military response that is both effective and overwhelming. We have successfully deterred for more than six decades a large-scale

North Korean attack on the Republic of Korea and Japan through a robust military posture on the Korean Peninsula and in the region, regular defensive exercises, and overwhelming military capabilities.

The deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system to South Korea is a highly visible and concrete action to counter the North Korea missile threat.

What other steps would you recommend the Trump Administration take to ensure the safety and security of South Korea and U.S. forces stationed in the region?

I recommend that the Administration reaffirm that the United States remains firmly committed to our treaty obligations with the Republic of Korea, and deepen our coordination and joint activities with this key ally. President Trump's recent trip to the Republic of Korea was a visible sign of resolve and an important step to assure our allies in the region.

The deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to the Republic of Korea is one highly visible and concrete action the United States is taking to counter the North Korean missile threat, and, if confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Defense to continue to improve our force posture on the Korean Peninsula and in the surrounding region, including through promoting interoperable missile defense, increased C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), and acquisition of other critical alliance capabilities.

What policy recommendations would you make to ensure U.S. and allied forces have the capability to defeat sites in North Korea containing weapons of mass destruction?

If confirmed, I would consult with U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), and other U.S. Combatant Commanders supporting U.S. operations against North Korea to understand what, if any, gaps exist between what they need and what they have available, and work with the Secretary of Defense to ensure we are providing the resources necessary to ensure effective deterrence and response measures.

China

If confirmed, what policies would you recommend to deter war with China, maintain free passage through the global commons, and assure our Pacific allies and friends?

It is essential that the United States take steps to maintain our military advantage over China, which has eroded in recent years. We should continue to make the investments necessary to ensure that we can defend our interests and uphold our security commitments in the region. It is also important that we work closely with friends and allies in the region to demonstrate our resolve to maintain free passage through the global

commons, including through joint freedom of navigation exercises, and showing the willingness to confront China when it challenges the system of free trade, commerce, and access to the global commons that has promoted peace and economic prosperity in the region.

In your view, what effect is China's expanding economy and growing military having on the region-at-large and how does that growth influence the U.S. security posture in the Asia-Pacific region?

China's rapid rise, growing assertiveness, expanding military capabilities, and attempts to interfere with free access to the global commons have increased tensions in the region. I agree with Secretary Mattis that we should seek to engage and collaborate with China where possible or where our interests align, but also be prepared to confront China if it chooses to act contrary to our interests. In light of this dynamic, I believe it is important that we assess our current capability mix and force posture in the region and take steps to improve our capabilities in areas where our military edge has been eroded.

What policies would you recommend the United States put in place, both unilaterally and in coordination with allies and partners, to counter the increasing challenge posed by China in the East and South China Seas?

China's aggressive behavior has caused growing concern among countries in the Indo-Pacific region. In my view, the United States should continue to undertake operational exercises by our forces, as well as in concert with friends and allies to demonstrate our resolve to freely access the global commons. The Defense Department should support the continued building of partner capabilities in the region and cooperative activities with U.S. forces to counter China's growing capabilities. The United States Government should work closely with friends and allies on political, economic, and military steps to reassure our partners, uphold our alliance commitments, and steadfastly protect the rights and freedoms of the international community to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows.

What U.S. national interests do U.S. forces postured in or near the South China Sea protect? What do you expect U.S. allies to do to assist in countering Chinese provocations in the South China Sea?

Preservation of freedom of movement within the global commons: the sea, air, and outer space domains through which the world conducts business is a vital strategic interest of the United States that China has taken steps to challenge. U.S. allies have a shared interest in preserving access to the global commons which has been an enabler of economic growth, stability, and freedom in the region. In my view, we should encourage our allies to work in concert with the United States Government on political, economic, and military steps such as joint exercises to counter China's provocative actions in the South China Sea.

In the East China Sea, what specific steps can the Department of Defense take to improve our bilateral cooperation and force integration with Japan?

Improving interoperability with Japanese forces in the East China Sea is critical to ensuring stability and preventing a miscalculation by either party. Strengthened coordination and cooperation between our naval and coast guard ships, Japanese and U.S., is very important. We should also work to improve information sharing through enhanced surveillance and reconnaissance operations, and support Japanese efforts to improve their capabilities for remote island defense.

Given that China's land reclamation in the South China Sea demonstrates a disregard for international rules and norms, would you recommend the Department of Defense support the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea? Do you believe the United States should ratify the convention?

I agree with Secretary Mattis that upholding freedom of navigation and overflight worldwide are vital to the defense of our national security interests. If confirmed, I will support policy measures designed to preserve and protect the continued global mobility of U.S. forces. I also note that the Law of the Sea Convention, to which many nations are a party, including China, largely reflects customary international law. If confirmed, I will keep these objectives and facts in mind in making any recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.

What is your view of the United States' responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act? What policy recommendations do you have for improving U.S. support to Taiwan?

Successive U.S. administrations have considered any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States. As such, it has been the longstanding policy of the United States under the Taiwan Relations Act to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character and to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Defense to strengthen and improve U.S.-Taiwan relations, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act.

China's defense budget seems to be increasing at an alarming rate year after year. However, China's plans and strategies do not seem aimed at military domination outside of its immediate neighborhood.

How would you explain this discrepancy and why China is engaged in such a massive military build-up?

China is a long-term strategic competitor, engaged in a rapid, comprehensive military modernization process. China's military reforms seek to enhance its ability to conduct joint operations and improve its ability to fight high-intensity regional conflicts at greater distances from the Chinese mainland. China's global interests are growing, and its military will increasingly be called upon to safeguard China's trade, investments, and citizens abroad.

Chinese base construction in Djibouti reflects this growing interest that is beginning to reach beyond China's immediate neighborhood.

Japan

Congress and this Committee strongly support the growing relationship between the United States and Japan and the increasing integration of our military forces at the operational and tactical level.

What is your view of the state of the U.S.-Japan security relationship?

The U.S.-Japan security relationship is very strong. Prime Minister Abe has encouraged the development of an increasingly capable Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF), accelerating what had been a long-term gradual improvement. The JSDF is taking more responsibility for the defense of Japan while playing an increasingly visible role in regional security affairs, including disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. If confirmed, I would encourage increasing interoperability and improved capabilities for the JSDF and our U.S.-Japan alliance.

What policies would you recommend to continue to improve this relationship and improve U.S.-Japanese interoperability?

If confirmed, I would support Secretary Mattis's strong commitment to strengthening the capabilities of the U.S.-Japan alliance to operate together and contribute to the maintenance of regional security. This is consistent with the principles in the 2015 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines. Should I be confirmed, I would encourage Japan to continue to increase participation in multi-lateral operations with key partners in the region.

Afghanistan

What are the key U.S. national security interests in Afghanistan and how would you describe the strategy to secure them?

The primary U.S. national security interest in Afghanistan is to prevent Afghanistan from being used as a safe-haven for terrorists to plan and launch attacks against the U.S. homeland, U.S. citizens, or our allies and partners. The Administration's approach to achieving these goals is guided by the President's new South Asia Strategy, which is characterized as "R4+S" (i.e., regionalize, realign, reinforce and reconcile, and sustain).

The strategy requires a whole-of-government approach. The Defense Department will work with other U.S. departments and agencies to build a broad diplomatic consensus for a stable Afghanistan, emphasizing regional integration and cooperation, stressing cooperation toward a political settlement in Afghanistan, and holding countries accountable for the use of proxies or other asymmetric means that undermine stability and regional confidence.

The strategy also involves adjustments to the military mission by providing more advisors, combat enablers, fire support, and tactical-level training, advising, and assisting (TAA) to the Afghans – all in a manner that will become fiscally, militarily, and politically sustainable over time.

If confirmed, I will support the Secretary in further developing and executing this strategy for Afghanistan.

President Trump announced in his Afghanistan speech on August 21, 2017 that the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan would no longer be guided by timelines for withdrawal, but instead by a “conditions-based approach.”

What conditions (security, political, etc.) does the new U.S. strategy seek to create? What metrics of success or failure will be applied to assess progress toward those conditions?

My understanding is that the following are the goals of the Administration’s strategy in Afghanistan: terrorist groups cannot exploit sanctuaries in Afghanistan to plan and stage attacks against the U.S. homeland, U.S. citizens, or our allies and partners overseas; a political settlement with the Taliban is reached; the Afghan government counters corruption and is viewed as a legitimate government by its citizens; the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) continues to professionalize and reduce corruption; the ANDSF secures more of the Afghan population and territory; regional actors support a stable Afghanistan; and the Afghan and Pakistani governments work together to secure their border.

My understanding is that in order to assess progress, the Defense Department is developing a framework for assessing the strategy. This assessment framework will be informed by past efforts (e.g., a failure analysis of our past efforts, lessons learned from Iraq and Syria, and various reports from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), the DoD Inspector General, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO)).

Do you believe it is in U.S. national security interests to maintain a long-term U.S. military presence in Afghanistan?

We should not allow Afghanistan again to become a safe-haven from which terrorists can plan and execute attacks on the U.S. homeland, our citizens, or our allies and partners abroad. We should remain committed to this goal and to supporting our Afghan partners as long as necessary to accomplish this objective.

With its announcement on August 21, 2017, the Administration has stated that an Afghan-led peace process that culminates in a political settlement is the desired end-state in Afghanistan.

What is the role of U.S. and coalition military operations in promoting reconciliation with the Afghan Taliban and other insurgent groups and an eventual political settlement?

Our military aim is to support our Afghan partners so they can sap the Taliban's will to fight and set the conditions for political dialogue. We must demonstrate to the Taliban that they cannot win on the battlefield what they cannot win at the ballot box.

What is your understanding of how the President's new strategy will translate military progress on the battlefield into political progress toward a settlement?

My understanding is that the elimination of the time-based approach is aimed at sending a clear signal to the Taliban that they cannot wait us out. Our continued training of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, and their increasing battlefield success, is intended to reinforce the clear message to the Taliban that they cannot win militarily and thus create movement toward a political settlement.

Do you believe that the increase in U.S. forces and additional authorities provided by the President's new strategy will produce battlefield results that will significantly alter the Taliban's calculus and create the conditions for political reconciliation—especially when the United States failed to achieve this goal with far more troops on the ground in the past? If so, why?

My understanding is that the increase in personnel is primarily in support of the NATO-led Resolute Support train, advise, assist mission. This new approach expands advisory efforts down to the tactical level, increasing the combat support the U.S. provides through our Afghan partners, and enhancing the authorities of U.S. commanders.

I understand these changes prioritize the provision of effective support to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. The U.S. has trained and equipped the ANDSF, and they have developed into a capable force able to defend critical terrain, such as population and economic centers, and are moving towards the goal of securing their own country.

Previously, when U.S. and international forces were in the lead, and working off a publicly set time-based strategy with drawdown dates, the Taliban knew we would eventually leave and they could wait us out. The new strategy aims to support the ANDSF getting stronger every day, and their continued success against the Taliban, combined with additional U.S. authorities that allow our forces to take the fight to the enemy and better support the ANDSF, will help set the conditions for a political settlement.

If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the Secretary of Defense in implementing and assessing in an ongoing manner the effects of this new strategy and recommending revisions as necessary based on the results generated.

Do you believe the United States can achieve its national security objectives in Afghanistan if Pakistan continues to provide sanctuary and support for militant and terrorist groups, including the Taliban and the Haqqani Network?

Sanctuary for the Taliban and other terrorist networks inside Pakistani territory negatively impacts security conditions and stability in Afghanistan. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary and our Combatant Commanders to find ways to deny extremist forces sanctuary in Pakistan and cut off support to such groups.

What is your assessment of the roles Russia and Iran are playing in Afghanistan, including support for the Taliban and other militant groups?

Russia and Iran both support the Taliban in some way, either as a hedge against a failed Afghan government to counter a perceived threat from ISIS, or to act as a spoiler to U.S. presence in the region.

Pakistan

What is your view of the current state of the U.S.-Pakistan security relationship?

It is important for the United States to maintain a constructive relationship with Pakistan to advance our mutual interests. However, the United States should also demonstrate its serious concerns about Pakistan expanding its nuclear program and providing safe-haven for militant groups in its territory.

Earlier this year, General Nicholson said that one of the biggest security issues in South Asia is the existence of terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan.

Do you believe that there is a step or a series of steps the United States might take that would lead Pakistan to change its calculus regarding its support and sanctuary for militant and terrorist groups?

Sanctuary and freedom of movement for the Afghan Taliban and associated militant networks inside Pakistani territory continue to be contributing factors that negatively impact security conditions and stability inside Afghanistan. If confirmed, I will examine ways in which we can end Pakistan's sanctuary for militant networks.

What steps would you recommend the United States take to convince or compel Pakistan to cut off support and sanctuary for militant and terrorist groups?

If confirmed, I would assess what new steps we could undertake to convince Pakistan to end support and sanctuary for militant groups.

Do you believe U.S. security assistance to Pakistan is effective and supports U.S. national security objectives?

If confirmed, I would assess the effectiveness and alignment of U.S. security assistance to Pakistan with our broader national security objectives.

India

What is your view of the current state of the U.S.-India security relationship?

The U.S.-India relationship has strengthened significantly, particularly with regard to security and defense issues. I am encouraged by the growing collaboration and the increasing level of technology and trade initiatives and, if confirmed, will look for opportunities to advance the U.S.-India security relationship.

What policy recommendations would you make to bolster the overall defense relationship between our two countries?

Continued steps to facilitate defense trade and cooperation between U.S. and Indian industry is an important element of bolstering the overall defense relationship between our countries. We should also continue regular exercises and professional military exchanges with India.

What recommendations do have for accelerating the process of U.S. foreign military sales to India?

There have been positive strides over the last several years to improve bilateral communication and the Indian Government is much more experienced and comfortable with the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process. The designation of India as a Major Defense Partner is also a positive step. I believe it is important for senior officials in the U.S. Defense Department to maintain regular high-level exchanges with their counterparts in India's Ministry of Defense and continue efforts to facilitate closer defense cooperation.

Middle East

What are the greatest threats to U.S. national security interests in the Middle East and what policy objectives should we pursue to protect them?

The United States faces a number of threats in the Middle East, including Iran's destabilizing activities and growing missile capabilities, as well as terrorist groups and the continued presence of violent extremist organizations. I am also concerned about Russian efforts to compete for influence in the region and its involvement in the conflict in Syria. If confirmed, I would pursue policy objectives that address these concerns; and I would focus our efforts on building partner capacity; working by, with, and through partners to address common threats; ensuring that the United States can deter – and if necessary respond to – aggression; and retaining the plans and preparations to address the potential threats of the future.

Iran

What is your assessment of U.S. national security interests associated with the growth of Iranian influence in the Middle East?

The growth of Iranian influence in the Middle East poses a direct challenge to U.S. national security interests. Iran's revolutionary government seeks to revise the international rules-based order, to expand its influence across the territory stretching from the Gulf States to the Mediterranean, and remains hostile to our ally Israel.

How would you describe our strategy to counter Iran's malign influence and other activities throughout the Middle East, and more specifically, Iran's proxy networks?

I understand that there continues to be a whole-of-government effort to counter Iran's destabilizing activities, support our partners and allies, and remain postured to respond against any future potential aggression. In my view, the United States should increase cooperation with friends and allies in the region and seek to build a more robust collection of countries globally who work in concert with political, economic, and military tools to counter Iran's malign influence including joint actions directed at Iran's proxy networks.

What roles do U.S. allies and partners play in the region in the strategy to counter Iran and how should United States support them as part of our strategy?

U.S. allies and partners help enforce UN Security Council Resolutions against Iran, deter aggression against Israel and the Gulf States, counter the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, support counter-terrorism efforts, and provide support such as basing of U.S. forces in the region. The United States should work together with our allies to maximize the effectiveness of our efforts and support the provision of defense capabilities to improve their ability to deter and defend themselves and operate with U.S. forces.

What is your assessment of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and how Iran would react to action by the United States to unilaterally withdraw from the JCPOA?

I did not support the JCPOA because of concerns that it allows Iran to retain key elements useful for a nuclear weapons program, continue research and development of new capabilities needed to more efficiently produce greater quantities of nuclear material, and concerns about the effectiveness of the approach in preventing Iran from attaining a nuclear weapon and the means to deliver it. I was also concerned that the sanctions relief obtained as a result of the agreement would fuel Iran's capacity to improve its ballistic missile capabilities, support terrorism, and undertake destabilizing actions throughout the region.

If confirmed, I would work with my colleagues at the State Department and other agencies to assess options for addressing concerns about the JCPOA and effectively working with allies to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and the means to deliver it, as well as countering its destabilizing actions in the region.

Iraq

What are the key U.S. national security interests in Iraq and how would you describe the strategy to secure them?

The key U.S. national security interest in Iraq remains strengthening Iraq's defense institutions and stabilization. U.S. forces should continue to build Iraqi Security Forces capacity, specifically the Counter-Terrorism Service and Iraqi Army, so that they are the security force of choice in Iraq able to defend against both internal and external threats. I understand that the Defense Department's strategy is to work by, with, and through the Government of Iraq to liberate the country from ISIS, and to secure those liberated areas in order to facilitate the swift and safe return of internally displaced persons. The primary roles and missions of U.S. forces are training, advising, and assisting the Iraqi Security Forces to militarily defeat ISIS.

Do you believe that an enduring U.S. military presence is needed in Iraq? If so, what should be the missions and size of the enduring U.S. military presence?

Yes, the details of which must be determined in conjunction with the Government of Iraq. A small contingent of U.S. forces should continue to build Iraqi Security Forces capacity, specifically the Counter-Terrorism Service and Iraqi Army, so that they are the security force of choice in Iraq able to defend against both internal and external threats.

The United States and Iraq are long-term partners in improving the Iraqi Security Forces and dealing ISIS a lasting defeat. The United States and Coalition should continue to work by, with, and through the Government of Iraq to enable the Iraqi Security Forces.

How would you characterize Iran's influence in Iraq today and what is your recommended strategy to limit that influence in the future?

Iran is using its long-standing political, cultural, and religious ties to deepen its involvement in the Iraqi state. If confirmed, I will execute the Secretary's guidance on working with the Government of Iraq to strengthen Iraq's security institutions and promote Iraqi national sovereignty.

A strong bilateral relationship between the United States and Iraq is one of our best tools to mitigate Iranian malign influence in Iraq. This includes but is not limited to security cooperation. If confirmed, I would support Iraq's further reintegration into regional fora and its bilateral diplomatic and economic initiatives with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

Syria

What are the key U.S. national security interests in Syria and how would you describe the strategy to secure them?

The primary U.S. interest in Syria is to defeat ISIS. The United States also seeks to de-escalate the civil war and counter Iran. To accomplish this, the United States is working with a Coalition and with local partner forces to fight ISIS. The United States also seeks to leverage de-escalation zones to lower violence in the civil war and prevent Iran from expanding its influence. I am concerned about Iran's actions in Syria, which have propped up the Assad regime and bolstered their influence with Hezbollah. I believe U.S. forces should deter Iranian malign activities in Syria, particularly as they relate to the Israeli border and Iran's support for Lebanese Hezbollah.

How does the strategy address the residual threat from Al Qaeda in Syria and their associates?

My understanding is the strategy prioritizes targeting of ISIS as well as residual Al Qaeda in Syria terrorists and other associated terrorist organizations that pose a threat to the United States. I have not yet been briefed on the specifics of how this strategy is implemented and operationalized. If confirmed, I would want to ensure the strategy effectively addresses the threat posed by ISIS, Al Qaeda, and other associated terrorist groups.

Do you believe a political resolution to the civil war in Syria is necessary to address the underlying conditions that enable violent extremists like ISIS and Al Qaeda to take root?

Yes.

Is the removal of Bashar al-Assad from power a goal of U.S. policy as part of a political resolution to the civil war in Syria?

I have not been briefed on the specific objectives of U.S. policy in Syria, but senior U.S. officials have publicly indicated the objective is a negotiated solution to the conflict. My personal view is that it is hard to imagine a stable solution that leaves Bashar al-Assad in power, who has repeatedly used chemical weapons, barrel bombs, and other weapons to kill large numbers of the Syrian people.

How does the strategy address the presence and efforts of Iran and Russia in Syria?

I am concerned about Iran's actions in Syria, which have propped up the Assad regime and bolstered their influence with Hezbollah. I believe U.S. forces should deter Iranian malign activities in Syria, particularly as they relate to the Israeli border and Iran's support for Lebanese Hezbollah. My understanding of the Administration's efforts with Russia on Syria is that it has looked for places where Russia can be a constructive actor in Syria, such as the southwest de-escalation zone agreed to by President Trump and President Putin.

How successful have Iran and Russia been in achieving their objectives in Syria?

Iran and Russia have largely succeeded at propping up the Assad regime in Syria and in the case of Russia securing basing and access to the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East.

What steps should be taken to address potential conflict between coalition-supported partners and pro-regime forces as they come into closer contact in the Euphrates River Valley?

I believe the Defense Department should maintain its “de-confliction” efforts with Russia to ensure the safety of U.S. and Coalition forces operating in Syria.

Strategy to Defeat ISIS

How would you define success in the defeat of ISIS?

I would consider success in defeating ISIS to be when the threat the group poses has degraded to a point where it is localized and periodic and can be addressed by partner nations and forces without extensive assistance from the United States.

What goals, objectives, and indicators of success would you recommend for the strategy to defeat ISIS?

The United States and its partners must deny ISIS the territory and space to plot attacks and prey on vulnerable populations, and discredit its narrative so that its global organization cannot threaten the United States or our allies and partners.

In your opinion, what are the major lessons learned from the fight against ISIS in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and elsewhere?

The major lessons learned from the fight against ISIS are that: 1) defeating the group requires a whole-of-government approach and cannot be achieved through military efforts alone; 2) the “by, with, and through” approach with local partners continues to be effective; and 3) we must address ISIS globally.

What non-military activities by the U.S. Government will be important for achieving a lasting defeat of ISIS?

There are a number of non-military activities by the U.S. Government that are integral to achieving a lasting defeat of ISIS. The most pressing need is a sufficient stabilization effort to consolidate military gains in Syria and elsewhere. Although U.S. forces, our allies, and local partners are succeeding in retaking territory from ISIS in Iraq and Syria through military efforts, consolidating these gains requires non-military resources to help stabilize the areas to prevent ISIS’s return and to achieve its lasting defeat.

In addition to stabilization efforts, public diplomacy, information operations, and cyber strategies must be employed to isolate and delegitimize ISIS and its ideology. We must also continue efforts to cut-off or seize ISIS's financial support, including financial transfers, money laundering, oil revenue, and human trafficking.

How do you propose to counteract potential for terrorist attacks by ISIS as its territory shrinks and its fighters disperse?

I understand that the strategy is to continue to work “by, with, and through” local partners and together with a global coalition of partners to defeat ISIS. As to specific next steps, if confirmed, I will work to evaluate, tailor, and execute our strategy based on realities on the ground after the last remaining pockets of ISIS territory are liberated.

Although ISIS will soon no longer control territory in Iraq and Syria, ISIS fighters will remain, working to destabilize local governance, plot and inspire attacks overseas, and project a veneer of legitimacy through their media operations. We should continue our counter-ISIS operations globally, adjusting as necessary to counter the group’s changing tactics.

Yemen

What are the U.S. national security interests in Yemen?

Our priority in Yemen is countering terrorism. We should deny terrorist organizations safe haven by working with the Hadi-led Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) and Yemeni partners such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to disrupt threats posed by AQAP and ISIS-Yemen plots.

I am also concerned about threats to freedom of navigation in the Bab el Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea, as well as ongoing attacks against Saudi Arabia. In addition, countering Iran’s malign activities in Yemen as part of its regional ambitions is another U.S. security interest.

In your view has Saudi Arabia responded appropriately to the threat they face from the Houthis?

The Houthis continue to conduct rocket and missile attacks into Saudi territory and threaten Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity. A peaceful resolution to this conflict requires the Houthis to cease these attacks and until that occurs I would expect the Saudis to continue military operations in Yemen.

In your view, what conditions in Yemen need to be reached for the Houthis to be willing to negotiate and is the Saudi-led coalition capable of creating those conditions? What is the appropriate role for the United States in support of the coalition?

The Saudi-led Coalition has managed to push the Houthis back and allowed the Republic of Yemen Government to retake large portions of Yemeni territory. It is now time for the Houthis to come to the table. There is a place for the Houthis within the Yemeni government, but they need to accept the responsibility of governance and rule of law.

The United States should not be a co-belligerent in this civil conflict. However, I support providing limited support to the Saudi-led coalition to allow Saudi Arabia to secure its borders and ensure freedom of navigation in the Bab al-Mandeb and Red Sea.

In your view, is it possible for the United States to provide the Saudi-led coalition with assistance designed to reduce civilian casualties without becoming a “co-belligerent”? If so, what assistance do you believe should be provided?

It is my understanding that the United States provides limited support to the Saudi-led military operations against the Houthi insurgents who have threatened Saudi Arabia and regional security. I understand this includes advice on best practices to mitigate the risk of civilian harm, limited aerial refueling, and information sharing. The United States should also reinforce to the Saudis the importance of accuracy and precision to reduce the risk of civilian casualties and, more importantly, the need to reach a lasting political settlement.

To what extent are the Houthis, supported by Iran, a threat to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea? What policy positions would you recommend for the United States to address this threat?

It is my understanding that Iran is providing support to the Houthis, improving capabilities and enabling maritime attacks. The United States should remain committed to ensuring freedom of navigation in the Bab el Mandeb strait and the Red Sea. If confirmed, I look forward to working with our partners to find ways to combat this threat while ensuring the free flow of aid and commerce.

In your opinion, what would be the implications of the United States cutting off the sale of precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners?

My concern is that withholding U.S. sales of precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia and coalition partners would be ineffective in achieving our aims as I would expect the Saudis and their coalition allies would rely on less accurate munitions in the short run and over the long term to develop alternative non-U.S. sources of other munitions with less accuracy.

Africa

What should be the primary policy objectives for U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Africa?

My understanding is that the primary objective for U.S. counterterrorism (CT) efforts, including those CT efforts in Africa, is to protect the United States, our citizens, and our interests. In Africa, I further understand that the Department executes a "by, with, and through" approach to build the capacity of our partners to contain the terrorist threat, degrade terrorist networks, and deny terrorists safe havens in Africa. In addition, I understand U.S. forces have taken direct action against terrorists as necessary to meet our primary objective.

Are current U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Africa meeting these objectives?

The Department's current counterterrorism efforts have had largely positive effects. This includes both U.S. direct action and building the counterterrorism capacity of our African partners.

What changes, if any, would you recommend?

If confirmed, I will work to determine if the Department is striking the right balance between partner enablement and U.S. direct action operations.

Western Hemisphere

What should be the Department of Defense's strategic priorities in the Western Hemisphere?

The Department's first priority in the Hemisphere must be to defend the security and prosperity of the American people and our homeland. I believe the Department can best accomplish that by strengthening and expanding our relationships with our partners in the region and helping them to do more to work together to address local, regional, and global security challenges.

Is the Department appropriately resourced to support these priorities? If not, where do you assess the Department is accepting the greatest risk?

The Department faces constraints on limited resources. In the Western Hemisphere, this necessitates leveraging the considerable capabilities of our partners and helping them build and sustain capabilities. If confirmed, I will work to provide Secretary Mattis with recommendations on resource allocation and risk mitigation across our global priorities.

Latin America and the Caribbean

Many of the internal security challenges in Latin America are associated with transnational criminal networks.

How should the United States approach security assistance given the overlapping roles of host governments' law enforcement organizations and militaries in combating these networks?

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Department plans its security cooperation activities closely with the State Department and other U.S. agencies and promotes close cooperation and respect for human rights among partner nation military and law enforcement forces.

What types of U.S. assistance are appropriate for Latin American countries given that these challenges emanate from non-state actors?

These challenges require regional approaches; I believe our security cooperation must take an interagency approach on both the United States and partners' sides so that capabilities are interoperable with the United States and other partners in the region. The Department also should continue to pursue defense institution building efforts to help partner ministries improve their ability to procure, employ, and sustain the capabilities over the long term.

In some countries in Latin America, such as Mexico, the Department of Defense plays an important role in training, equipping, and rendering assistance to partner nation militaries.

How should the Department of Defense coordinate efforts with security efforts in those countries led by other U.S. agencies, such as the Department of State?

Security efforts need to be coordinated closely between the Department of Defense and the Department of State – and with our partner security forces – at all levels: through the U.S. Embassy in the partner nation, through interagency coordination, and in consultation with Congress.

There is a significant concern that while the United States is equipped to train troops and military police to more effectively counter the narcotics trade, the real problem facing many of these countries is institutional corruption within the highest ranks of government.

How effective can the Department of Defense be in countering narcotics in Central America without significant institutional reform, especially in the countries in the Northern Triangle?

I agree that U.S. efforts to address these challenges with our partners cannot be effective without additional progress on institutional reform. If confirmed, I will look for ways to prioritize and advance the Department's defense institution-building efforts already underway with partners in the region.

Colombia

What role should the Department of Defense play in supporting the government of Colombia?

The Department has an important role to play in support of the broader U.S. approach to Colombia, specifically through its close relationship with the Colombian military. The Colombian military is a key player in Colombia's efforts to address insecurity within the country, implement the recent peace accord, and counter drug trafficking.

Provided that the Colombian government continues to make progress towards peace with the major rebel groups, what should be the United States' approach toward preventing the growth of illegally armed groups and drug trafficking organizations?

Even with successful peace accord implementation, illegally armed groups and drug trafficking organizations likely will continue to present a security challenge for Colombia and facilitate the flow of drugs into the United States. Continued U.S. support, including security assistance, will continue to be required to sustain the successes of Plan Colombia.

Does the Department of Defense require any additional capabilities, legal authorities, or support for its role in Colombia given developments associated with disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration?

If confirmed, I will examine whether the Department requires additional capabilities or authorities in support of broader U.S. assistance to Colombia's disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts.

The Colombian military has become a security exporter throughout the region and the world due to its successes and expertise. What assistance should the United States provide to facilitate its growth as a source of stability?

The United States actively supports Colombia's growing role as a regional and global security exporter, including through various security cooperation capacity-building programs. We need to ensure Colombia can continue to implement its peace accord and reduce the levels of cocaine coming out of the country, I believe the Department should continue to pursue these efforts with Colombia and other willing and capable partners in the region.

Personnel

Based on your assessment of the threats facing the United States now and in the near future, what knowledge, skills, and abilities will be required by future military personnel to succeed against the nation's adversaries?

There is no doubt that the threats facing our Nation are changing. We need to continue to recruit, train, and retain the best talent that our country has to offer. Today's force and our future force need to remain highly skilled and adaptable. New threats, such in cyber and space, will continue to place a great demand on our Armed Forces and will require that we posture our forces to meet these new and emerging challenges.

Do you believe personnel policy and manpower considerations play an adequate role in the development of the overall national defense strategy?

Yes. People are our Nation's greatest asset. The men and women who serve in our forces, and the government civilians and contract employees who support them, are essential to our national security. We must always consider the requirements of our Total Force--active, reserve, government civilian, and civilian contractor--in developing our national defense strategy.

Do you believe that the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act and the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act need to be updated to better reflect the national security challenges that we face today and will face in the future?

I would defer to the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness on whether the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act and the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act need to change. However, I do believe that our personnel systems need to allow the Department to attract and retain the best quality officers to lead our Armed Forces into the future. Additionally, our personnel system needs to be flexible enough to adjust to new challenges and threats such as cyber-warfare that we face today and the unknown that we're certain to face in the future.

Defense Security Cooperation

What is the appropriate role of the Department of Defense in the conduct of security sector assistance?

In many cases, working by, with, and through allies and partners is central to addressing regional and global security challenges. Building the capacity of allies and partners helps develop and maintain operationally viable defense partnerships to either avoid the need to commit U.S. forces or to ensure interoperability with U.S. forces in coalition operations. DoD executes Title 10 and Title 22 security assistance programs as subsets of broader DoD security cooperation efforts.

What should be the Department of Defense's relationship with the Department of State in the conduct of these activities?

DoD and State need a close working relationship to ensure security cooperation activities are consistent with broader U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives. My understanding is that coordination mechanisms exist at the country-team level, at the regional combatant command level, and here in Washington to ensure that DoD execution of security cooperation programs is consistent with foreign policy goals and objectives.

What should be the strategic objectives of the Defense Department's efforts to build the capabilities of a partner nation's security forces?

I believe our strategic objective is to help our partners develop effective militaries and legitimate security institutions that are capable of providing for their countries' security and contributing to wider efforts to address shared regional and global security challenges. Such efforts reduce the burden on U.S. forces and promote interoperability among our forces when operating as a coalition.

In your view, is the Defense Department appropriately organized and resourced to effectively conduct such activities? If not, what changes would you recommend?

The NDAA for FY 2017 included significant changes to DoD's security cooperation enterprise to allow DoD to organize and resource security cooperation more effectively. Fully implementing these important reforms will take time but should enhance the coherence of DoD's security cooperation activities, deliver more impactful results, and inform further course corrections, as necessary.

Special Operations Forces

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included provisions designed to enhance the oversight and advocacy of special operations forces by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SOLIC). Among other things, these reforms establish an administrative chain of command from the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command through the ASD SOLIC to the Secretary of Defense, mirroring the relationship between the service secretaries and service chiefs.

What is your understanding of the “service secretary-like” responsibilities of the ASD SOLIC for special operations forces?

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict is the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on special operations and low-intensity conflict matters. Additionally, the ASD (SO/LIC) is in the administrative chain of command between the Secretary of Defense and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command. As such, ASD (SO/LIC) exercises Military Department Secretary-like responsibilities, which include authority, direction, and control of special operations-peculiar matters relating to the organization, training, and equipping of special operations forces.

These duties are in addition to ASD(SO/LIC)'s responsibilities as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on counter terrorism efforts and resources to combat narcotics trafficking and other illicit networks, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, strategies for irregular warfare, stability operations, and detainee policy.

In your view, how should these responsibilities be balanced with other responsibilities related to policy and operational issues?

If confirmed as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, I would work closely with ASD(SO/LIC) and the rest of Policy and OSD to ensure there is a proper balance of responsibilities, particularly in a resource constrained environment.

Continuing Use of Guantanamo as a Detention Center

Would you advise the President to transfer additional detainees to Guantanamo?

It is lawful to capture enemy combatants and to detain them for the duration of a war. Regarding the detention facility at Guantanamo, it is my understanding that the facilities are safe, humane, and secure.

What should be the Defense Department's long-term detention strategy?

I believe we should develop an enduring detainee policy that is appropriate for enemy personnel captured on the battlefield. Along those lines, a long-term detention strategy is necessary for those detainees who pose a continuing threat to the security of the United States.

Do you think the U.S. Government should continue the Periodic Review Board Process and continue to transfer detainees to other countries, subject to the restrictions currently in law?

I understand that the Department has long had processes for reviewing detention and transferring detainees from Guantanamo. If confirmed and if asked by the Secretary of Defense, I would assist in the assessment of the Periodic Review Board process and ensure that the Department is acting consistent with the law.

Cyber Policy and Authorities

What should be the key elements of our national cyber policy?

We should continue to develop a clear whole-of-government policy that addresses our responses to malicious cyber activities and that strengthens and provides resiliency for our information networks and critical infrastructure. Our national cyber policy should also include a strategic approach to the U.S. Government's recruitment and retention of the personnel we need to meet the highly technical challenges posed by this domain. It is my understanding that DoD, in concert with its interagency partners, has undertaken substantial work to address many of these challenges in accordance with President Trump's Executive Order 13800, *Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure*.

The Department must continue to focus on developing the forces and capabilities needed to accomplish the Department's missions in and through cyberspace, including defending DoD networks, systems, and information; defending the Nation against attacks of significant consequences; and providing military options to the President.

In your view, what cyber actions by an adversary would constitute an act of war?

My understanding is that such a determination is made on a case-by-case basis by the President. However, malicious cyber activity does not need to be deemed an “act of war” to warrant a response. If confirmed, I am committed to working with other elements of the government to develop a reinvigorated national strategy for responding to challenges in the cyber domain.

How would you recommend structuring cyber execution authorities?

The right alignment of roles, responsibilities, authorities, and accountability is critical to effective operations, particularly given the dynamic nature of activities in cyberspace. If confirmed, I would prioritize reviewing the alignment of these roles, responsibilities, and authorities to ensure that the Department can respond effectively to emerging threats in cyberspace.

Do you foresee delegation of cyber execution authority down to tactical levels such as with the application of conventional force, or do you envision more centralized control of execution authorities at the Commander-in-Chief level, such as with nuclear weapons?

As a military operational domain, there can be cyberspace operations and effects at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Accordingly, the Department needs a tailored approach to the alignment of authorities and accountability rather than a one-size-fits all approach for cyberspace.

In your view, what is the appropriate role for the Department of Defense in protecting our national critical information infrastructure and defending against cyber-attacks?

The role of the Department is to defend the United States, its people, and its interests. Critical infrastructure must be defended, and any aggressor should know that we will respond strongly to attacks on such infrastructure. The Department works closely with the Department of Homeland Security, which plays the lead role in protecting, mitigating, and recovering from domestic cyber incidents, and with the Department of Justice, which plays the lead role in investigating, attributing, disrupting, and prosecuting cybercrimes.

The Department has a variety of capabilities that can be used to defend the Nation in cyberspace, and, if confirmed, I would prioritize the readiness of those capabilities. I would also engage the Intelligence Community, the Department of Homeland Security, and other departments and agencies to ensure close cooperation and support as each carries out its respective responsibilities.

Space

There is growing concern about the vulnerability of our nation’s space-based systems and its supporting architecture.

Do you share this concern and, if so, what policy elements would you recommend for addressing these vulnerabilities?

Yes, I am concerned that potential adversaries are actively pursuing counterspace capabilities as a means to reduce U.S. military effectiveness. If confirmed, I would review space policy, strategy, plans, capabilities, and resources to understand better the current situation and determine how best to maintain U.S. advantages in space.

What do you perceive as the greatest threats to our national security space satellites?

We face a multi-faceted threat. As Director of National Intelligence Coats stated in his 2017 Worldwide Threat Assessment, “[Russia and China] will continue to pursue a full range of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons as a means to reduce U[.]S[.] military effectiveness,” and “[t]he global threat of electronic warfare (EW) attacks against space systems will expand in the coming years in both number and types of weapons.” If confirmed, I would focus on ensuring that national security space systems are as available for use as the multi-domain capabilities that depend upon them.

Do you support the development of offensive space control capabilities to counter those threats?

The United States seeks to deter conflict, including in space. Space, however, is a warfighting domain similar to land, sea, air, and cyber. Just as we have integrated space capabilities into our military force structures, so too have other nations. I share the view of Secretary Mattis, as stated in his confirmation testimony, that “[o]ffensive space control capabilities should be considered to ensure survivable and resilient space operations necessary for the execution of war plans.”

If confirmed, would you propose any changes to national security space policy, organization, and programs?

If confirmed, I would review this issue in more detail. But given the importance of space systems to U.S. national security, it is essential that our policies, organizations, programs, and resources are aligned to ensure the benefits we derive from space. As with any enterprise, we must ensure clear lines of authority and accountability and unity of effort for our national security space enterprise.

Ballistic Missile Defense

The U.S. homeland and its deployed forces enjoy a measure of protection against ballistic missile threats from rogue nations such as North Korea and Iran, yet the threat continues to grow. During the past year, North Korea conducted several missile tests and

continued development of mobile long-range missiles. Likewise, Iran continues to test ballistic missiles of increasing range. Russia and China also continue to deploy ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles that threaten U.S. forces, allies, and the U.S. homeland.

Without presupposing the outcome of the Department of Defense's Ballistic Missile Defense Review, what policies would you recommend for U.S. missile defense capabilities in the following areas: (1) homeland missile defense; (2) regional missile defense; (3) improved discrimination and sensors; (4) next generation missile defense; and (5) defense against cruise and hypersonic missiles?

The President directed the commencement of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) to identify ways to strengthen missile defense capabilities, determine the appropriate balance of homeland and theater defense priority capabilities, and provide the necessary policy and strategy framework for our nation's missile defense systems. Defending the nation and U.S. interests abroad from ballistic missiles is one of the Department's highest priorities.

It is my understanding that the policy areas referenced above will be examined during the course of the BMDR. Given the growing size and sophistication of the threat to the U.S. homeland, we clearly need a missile defense system that can handle a larger volume of threat missiles and effectively deal with their increased sophistication. We also need to evaluate options for better sensor coverage, the ability to deal with countermeasures, and take steps to deal with growing cruise and hypersonic missile threats.

If confirmed, I will support the conduct of the BMDR and look forward to evaluating options to increase the scale and capabilities of the U.S. missile defense system.

Do you believe the United States should encourage our regional allies and partners to increase their missile defense capabilities to contribute to regional security and help reduce the burden on U.S. forces and requirements? What recommendations would you have for expediting allied purchases of critical ballistic missile defense capabilities?

Yes. If confirmed, I will continue the Department's policy of encouraging allies and partners to increase their missile defense capabilities.

Nuclear Weapons and Stockpile Stewardship

In your view, what is the role of U.S. nuclear weapons?

The first role of U.S. nuclear weapons is deterrence. They play a key role in U.S. security, and have prevented aggression against the United States and provided a measure of assurance to allies. Importantly, a flexible, robust, and survivable nuclear arsenal provides the President with credible response options to strengthen deterrence; and supports U.S. nonproliferation policy by extending deterrence to allies, thereby dissuading them from acquiring nuclear weapons themselves.

President Obama’s June 2013 Nuclear Employment Strategy affirmed that the United States will maintain a nuclear triad, noting that “Retaining all three Triad legs will best maintain strategic stability at reasonable cost, while hedging against potential technical problems or vulnerabilities.”

Would you recommend the Trump Administration continue the policy of modernizing each leg of the nuclear triad and the Department of Energy nuclear weapons complex as a critical national security priority?

Yes. The legacy systems that comprise the current triad are all well past their intended service lives and are nearing the end of sustainability. The United States must modernize to maintain a viable deterrent into the future. I agree with Secretary Mattis that we cannot solve the nuclear deterrence problem without a triad.

Would you support the Long Range Standoff Weapon and its timely replacement of the AGM-86 Air-Launched Cruise Missile?

Yes, I believe the current AGM-86B Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) makes a unique contribution to U.S. nuclear deterrence capabilities and is a necessary element of the U.S. nuclear triad. We need a modernized capability to play this role in the future.

Cluster Munitions

The current policy on cluster munitions entitled “DOD Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians,” issued on June 19, 2008, prohibits the Department of Defense from employing cluster munitions that result in more than 1% unexploded ordnance. There is currently no cluster munition that meets the 1% requirement. Based on reports received from the Department of Defense, it is clear that the current Department policy on cluster munitions will negatively impact the Joint Force’s operational requirements for munitions.

Given the escalating rhetoric with North Korea, and the already insufficient munitions inventory, do you believe that if the cluster munitions policy remains unchanged, it will negatively impact our ability to meet current and future operational requirements? Do you believe the policy should be adjusted? If so, how?

Cluster munitions are vital to U.S. military warfighting capabilities in certain operational contexts, and I believe that will remain the case in the future. In some scenarios, not being able to employ cluster munitions puts our service members, as well as our Allies and partners and civilians, at increased risk. The U.S. military must have the tools it needs to defeat any adversary while complying with the laws of war and minimizing unintended harm to non-combatants.

I do believe the United States should remain committed to acquiring better, more highly

reliable weapons that ensure both effectiveness on the battlefield and the protection of civilians and U.S. and friendly forces from unnecessary harm.

I am unable to give you a more detailed answer at this time on whether policy changes are necessary. If confirmed, I will take a comprehensive look at the Department's cluster munitions policy and take appropriate action to ensure the Department's policy meets national security requirements, including the need to minimize unintended harm to civilians and to U.S. and friendly forces.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate committees in a timely manner?

Yes.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with this Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.

Do you agree to answer letters and requests for information from individual Senators who are members of this Committee?

Yes.

If confirmed, do you agree to provide to this Committee relevant information within

the jurisdictional oversight of the Committee when requested by the Committee, even in the absence of the formality of a letter from the Chairman?

Yes.