Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?  
No. At this time I do not believe modifications are necessary. If confirmed, I will continue to be alert to the need for modifications.

If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?  
N/A

Do you believe that the role of the combatant commanders under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and the policies and processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled?  
Yes

Do you see a need for any change in those roles, with regard to the resource allocation process or otherwise?  
No

Duties

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)?

The Unified Command Plan specifies the responsibilities of AFRICOM. If confirmed as the Commander of AFRICOM, I would ensure the accomplishment of those responsibilities. In my view, the most important requirement is to detect, deter and prevent attacks against the United States, its territories, possessions, and bases and to employ appropriate force to defend the nation should deterrence fail. AFRICOM’s responsibilities also reflect a new and evolving focus on building partner operational and institutional capacity at the country and regional levels and supporting the efforts of other U.S. government agencies in the Area of Responsibility. These activities are consistent with and seek to further the U.S. Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, as released by the President in June 2012.

What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

In my 36 years of military service, I have served in numerous positions that prepared me for this command. For the greater part of my career, I have focused on the training and readiness of Soldiers to build an effective team; preparing and leading Soldiers for missions ranging from humanitarian assistance to combat operations. Leading Soldiers has prepared me well to do the same for joint, multinational, and coalition forces. As the Commander of the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command in Afghanistan, I came to appreciate the values and challenges of training Afghan forces, working with 50 coalition countries, and numerous
interagency, intergovernmental, and non-governmental organizations. As Commander, Multinational Command Northwest-Iraq, I worked to increase the capacity of Iraqi security forces. At the same time ensuring our efforts were coordinated with numerous partner nations, interagency and intergovernmental agencies and non-governmental organizations. If confirmed, I will continue this effort of partnership in AFRICOM.

Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Commander of AFRICOM?
Yes. If confirmed, I will schedule a series of briefings with the AFRICOM staff, intelligence community, Department of State, National Security Staff, and other interagency partners to better understand the challenges, expand the breadth and depth of my knowledge, and prepare myself for this position.

If confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?
The specific responsibilities of AFRICOM are defined in the Unified Command Plan which is approved by the Secretary of Defense and the President. If confirmed, I would expect to have discussions with the Secretary of Defense to confirm priorities for the command and to focus my efforts on those areas that require immediate attention.

Relationships

Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U.S. Africa Command to the following offices:

The Secretary of Defense
Subject to direction from the President, the Commander of AFRICOM performs duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commander of AFRICOM is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the readiness of the command to carry out its mission.

The Under Secretaries of Defense
A direct command relationship between the Under Secretaries of Defense and the AFRICOM Commander does not exist. However, I anticipate that the AFRICOM Commander will regularly interact, coordinate and exchange information with the Under Secretaries of Defense on issues relating to AFRICOM affairs. The commander should directly coordinate with the Under Secretaries of Defense on a regular basis.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Commander of AFRICOM coordinates and exchanges information with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs as needed to discuss international security strategy and policy as it relates to African nations. The Commander of AFRICOM also coordinates as required for issues related to security cooperation programs and foreign military sales.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities
The Commander AFRICOM coordinates and exchanges information with the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities as needed to discuss matters related to special operations, counterterrorism, civil affairs, and information operations. The AFRICOM Commander also coordinates as required for capabilities development to support the accomplishment of AFRICOM operations.

**The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**
There is not a direct command relationship between the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the AFRICOM Commander. The Chairman functions under the authority, direction, and control of the National Command Authority. The Chairman will transmit communications between the National Command Authority and AFRICOM Commander as well as oversee the activities of the commander as directed by the Secretary of Defense. As the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman is a key conduit between a combatant commander, interagency organizations and the service chiefs.

The Vice Chairman serves on several councils and boards whose decisions affect AFRICOM including the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the Defense Acquisition Board, the Defense Advisory Working Group, and the Senior Readiness Oversight Council. Interaction between the Commander of AFRICOM and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is important to ensure these boards and councils make informed choices on matters affecting the command.

The AFRICOM Commander will keep the Chairman and Vice Chairman informed on significant issues regarding the AFRICOM area of responsibility. The Commander will directly communicate with the Chairman and Vice Chairman on a regular basis.

**The Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs**
There is no direct command relationship between the Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs and the AFRICOM Commander. The Service Secretaries are responsible for all affairs of their respective Services including functions pertaining to the administration of and support for forces employed by AFRICOM. The Secretaries fulfill their responsibilities by exercising administrative control through the Service Component Commands assigned to AFRICOM. In this manner, the Secretary of the Army is the executive agent for AFRICOM Headquarters.

The Service Chiefs are responsible for ensuring the organization and readiness of each Service branch and for advising the President. The Service Chiefs are also members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and serve as advisers to the President, National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council and the Secretary of Defense. For matters affecting AFRICOM, I would anticipate regular communications between the Commander of AFRICOM and the Service Chiefs. The Commander, AFRICOM will rely on the service chiefs to provide properly trained and equipped forces to accomplish missions in the AFRICOM AOR.

**Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command**
The AFRICOM commander maintains a close relationship and communicates directly with the commander United States Special Operations Command on issues of mutual interest. As a subordinate command of AFRICOM, Special Operations Command Africa and its units deploy throughout Africa supporting the AFRICOM commander’s theater security cooperation program, deliberate plans, and operational contingencies.

**The other combatant commanders**
Formal relationships between the AFRICOM commander and the other geographic and functional combatant commanders will derive from command authority established by Title 10 U.S. Code
section 164 and from the Secretary of Defense when such relationships are established by him during operational missions. Combatant commanders closely coordinate as necessary to accomplish all assigned missions. These relationships are critical to the execution of our National Military Strategy, and are characterized by mutual support, frequent contact, and productive exchanges of information on key issues.

The respective U.S. Chiefs of Mission within the AFRICOM area of responsibility (AOR)
Each Ambassador serves the President directly as his personal representative for each country. If confirmed, I will ensure that all activities of the Combatant Command in each country are fully coordinated with the Chief of Mission, consistent with U.S. policy.

The respective U.S. Senior Defense Officials/Defense Attachés (SDO/DATT)
There is a supervisory relationship between the AFRICOM commander and the U.S. Senior Defense Officials/Defense Attachés. The U.S. Senior Defense Officials/Defense Attachés are formally evaluated by the AFRICOM Commander. This relationship ensures the Senior Defense Officials/Defense Attachés maintain close coordination with AFRICOM on all matters involving U.S. military forces in the country. As the AFRICOM commander, I will maintain a close working relationship with the U.S. Senior Defense Official in each country in order to coordinate activities between the command and the respective country’s military.

Major Challenges and Opportunities

If confirmed as the Commander of AFRICOM, you will be responsible for all military operations in that region. In your view, what are the major challenges and opportunities that would confront you if you are confirmed as the next Commander of AFRICOM?

The security environment of the African continent is dynamic and, if confirmed, I will seek to counter emerging threats while strengthening African nations’ capabilities to effectively address their own security challenges. A major challenge is effectively countering violent extremist organizations, especially the growth of Mali as an al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb safe haven, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and al-Shabaab in Somalia. In order to effectively do so, AFRICOM relies on current African Partners and seeks the opportunity to develop new partnerships. Currently, there is an opportunity to assist the nations of Libya, South Sudan and Somalia as they continue to develop their armed forces and develop governmental structures.

If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges and opportunities?

If confirmed, I will support the administration’s whole of government approach implementing the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa. We will continue our commitment to protect our Nation from threats emanating from the African continent and strengthen the defense capabilities of our African partners and seek to develop new partnerships. If confirmed, I will review and assess AFRICOM’s programs and strategy before taking any action.

U.S. Objectives in Africa

In his address in Ghana in July 2009, President Obama reaffirmed Africa’s strategic importance to the United States and our national interests. He identified four priorities for the U.S. government’s engagement efforts: (1) supporting strong and sustainable democracies and good governance; (2) fostering sustained economic growth and development; (3) increasing access to quality health and education; and (4) helping to prevent, mitigate, and resolve armed conflict. In June 2012, the Administration reaffirmed
these priorities in the *U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa*, emphasizing the increasing
capacity of African states to take the lead on security issues on the continent, but also noting
the continuing challenges.

In your view, what is AFRICOM currently doing to advance each of these objectives?

AFRICOM’s primary contribution is in the area of helping to prevent, mitigate and resolve armed
conflict. The command works with African partner nation’s military forces to strengthen their
defense capabilities so that they are better able to address security challenges. AFRICOM’s
operations, exercises and theater security cooperation engagements focus on advancing this
priority. The command's efforts to support military professionalization and security sector reform
efforts help to inculcate respect for the rule of law, human rights, and military subordination to
civilian authority— all of which reinforce the appropriate role of a military in a democratic
society. AFRICOM's efforts play a mostly indirect but important role in supporting democratic
consolidation and preventing a return to conflict in fragile, post-conflict states. A stable and
secure environment is a precursor to significant advances in the other three areas: supporting
strong and sustainable democracies and good governance; fostering sustained economic growth
and development; and increasing access to quality health and education.

Counterterrorism Priorities

**Within the AFRICOM AOR, what do you consider the highest counterterrorism priorities?**

I consider the threat from al-Qaeda and its affiliates to be the highest counterterrorism priority.
The three groups in the AFRICOM area of responsibility – al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-
Shabaab, and Boko Haram – each present a threat to western interests in Africa. While each has
not specifically targeted the United States, they have successfully carried out attacks on western
interests and engaged in kidnapping. If they deepen their collaboration, they have the potential to
be an even larger threat.

**Given your current knowledge of AFRICOM programs, do you believe the Command’s
resources are aligned in a manner consistent with these counterterrorism priorities?**

Yes, countering violent extremist groups is the command’s first priority.

**Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)**

**What is your assessment of the threat posed by Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM)?**

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has publicly stated the willingness to attack U.S. and Western
interests. The group’s ability to conduct large scale terror attacks is restricted by the paucity of
U.S. and Western targets in North Africa and successful Algerian security service
counterterrorism efforts. Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb’s greatest threat to U.S.
interests is likely a catalyst for instability in North Africa through weapons facilitation and
training jihadists in northern Mali.

Since the group publicly announced merger with al-Qaeda on 13 September 2006, al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb has been committed to attacks against Western targets. On 10 December 2006,
it attacked a bus carrying expatriate employees of the Algerian-American oil company Brown
Root and Condor. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has continued to conduct bombings in
Algeria, predominantly in the coastal region east of Algiers. On 24 January 2012, Algerian security services disrupted an al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib plot to attack U.S. or western ships with a small boat. The attack was disrupted in the early planning stages, highlighting host nation’s successful efforts to contain and neutralize the group. On 19 January 2013, Algerian security forces were also successful in defeating the militants holding hostages at the Amenas gas plant facility.

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib has openly operated in northern Mali since the collapse of government control in mid 2011. Credible reporting indicates al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is training jihadist from across the region, to include members of other al-Qaeda affiliates such as Nigeria’s Boko Haram. Coupled with arms flowing from Qadhafi era Libyan stockpiles, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb activities in northern Mali pose a long term threat to security and stability in the region.

In your view, does AQIM pose a threat to the United States and/or western interests outside of its immediate operational area? What capacity has AQIM demonstrated to plan and carry out actions threatening U.S. interests?

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb likely does not pose a threat to U.S. and Western interests outside its immediate operating area of Algeria and northern Mali in the near term, but could in the future. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb maintains intent and aspirations and will continue to work on increasing their capability with the help of other al-Qaeda affiliates.

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb leadership has threatened Europe in numerous public statements since 2006, yet continues to focus the majority of its efforts in North Africa. Public statements frequently mention Spain and France, playing on North Africa’s colonial history with Europe to garner support from the large North African Diaspora. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb maintains aspirations and intent to attack U.S. and Western interests, and in 2012, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb leader made a public call to target U.S. Embassies after the attack on the U.S. mission in Benghazi, Libya. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb also poses a threat to Western aircraft flying in Algeria and Mali. The primary threat to westerners in North Africa remains hostage taking.

In your view, what has been the impact of the recent expansion of AQIM’s area of operations in northern Mali on the group’s capacities and aims?

Due to the emergent safe haven in Northern Mali, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has increased its ability to consolidate its resources. The French-led intervention in Mali and the return of Malian Forces to population centers in northern Mali have impacted al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s ability to operate unimpeded. However, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is able to coordinate training, distribute resources, and conduct attack planning, within its own ranks as well as with other foreign terrorist organizations. With this capability, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb will, at the very least, aggressively pursue the expansion of its influence to neighboring countries, and might begin planning to conduct attacks against Europe or the homeland in accordance with general al-Qaeda doctrine. French-led operations in Mali have disrupted and slowed al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, but there is still much work to be done.

Does AQIM have the capacity to carry out attacks in Europe or on European commercial aircraft flying over North-West Africa?

Prior to the start of the French-led intervention in Mali, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s
growing safe-haven and freedom of movement in northern Mali did afford greater opportunity to plan and execute operations. I believe it is critically important to continue to work with our allies and partners to address this threat.

What is your understanding of the extent to which AQIM has benefitted from the flow of arms from Libyan stockpiles since mid-2011—either in terms of arming itself or profiting from regional arms sales?

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb took advantage of the readily available stocks of weapons and ammunition accessible in Libya to expand and strengthen its safe-haven in northern Mali and make itself a more formidable military threat, as well as to indirectly benefit financially through long established smuggling networks already under its control.

Almost immediately following the early 2011 outbreak of hostilities in Libya, al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb began actively working to move weapons from Libya to its secure operating areas in northern Mali.

There is no indication yet that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is making significant profits from the sale of Libyan arms to third parties. However, the instability of increasing amounts of weapons available in the Sahel may lead to greater opportunities to conduct kidnaps for ransom, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s primary source of revenue in the Sahel.

What is your assessment of the threat posed by the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), an AQIM splinter faction that has recently emerged in Mali and controls significant territory there?

The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa self-identifies as a terrorist organization, and has openly threatened Western interests in the region. It maintains a working relationship with the regional groups Ansar al-Dine and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. The group has also called for local and foreign fighters to join together in opposing an international military intervention in northern Mali.

If confirmed, what efforts, if any, would you undertake to prevent and/or counter the spread of AQIM operations, fundraising activities, and ideology in North and West Africa?

Preventing and countering the spread of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb takes a whole-of-government approach. Military efforts alone are only a part of the unified action required to achieve this whole-of-government approach and achieve lasting results. Currently, the Department of Defense is executing a Global Campaign Plan for Counterterrorism that supports “…U.S. Government efforts to disrupt, degrade, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda, its Affiliates and Adherents and other terrorist organizations…” As part of unified action, and in concert with this global campaign plan, AFRICOM’s theater strategy and theater campaign plan, with four subordinate campaign plans, orients on neutralizing al-Qaeda networks in Africa. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is a significant component of that network in North and West Africa and a major focus of AFRICOM’s North-West Africa Campaign Plan.

Special Operations Command Africa is responsible for coordinating all activities to neutralize al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb. Their operations include a counter-ideology component to deny al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb recruitment and retention efforts and interfere with their fundraising. These operations also include working closely with our critical partners to expand their counterterrorism capabilities, enabling them to carry the fight to al-Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb through “train and equip” missions which provide needed capabilities and tactics, techniques and procedures. AFRICOM is also working with regional organizations like the Economic Community of West African States to increase their capabilities and capacity to thwart al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and their affiliates and adherents.

Integral to all of this is AFRICOM’s participation in the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership which is an interagency, Department of State, Department of Defense, and U.S. Agency for International Development, multi-year strategy aimed at defeating terrorist organizations and their ability to gain recruits.

If confirmed, I will assess the current operations and adjust as necessary in order to maintain consistent pressure on al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and affiliated terrorist groups while ensuring appropriate support for our critical partners.

**What risks, if any, do you see accompanying greater potential AFRICOM engagement in regional efforts to expand government control and dismantle AQIM?**

With the increasing threat of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, I see a greater risk of regional instability if we do not engage aggressively. Our long-term fight against al-Qaeda necessitates persistent engagement with our critical partners.

Strengthening the defense capabilities of African states and regional organizations is an essential element of the AFRICOM strategy and mission, and supports U.S foreign policy goals in Africa and the core principles of the U.S. National Strategy for Counterterrorism. Further, building partner capacity is a major component of the strategic and operational approaches within the Africa Command Theater Campaign Plan and subordinate campaign plans.

Recent events in North-West Africa – specifically the coup in Mali and loss of control of territory in the north – increased the threat of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to our African partners in the region and, ultimately, to the U.S. The French-led intervention in Mali and the creation of an African-led International Support Mission (AFISMA) to help restore Mali’s territorial integrity are positive steps to restoring stability to Mali. Our current efforts to support the French and AFISMA with planning support, intelligence sharing, aerial refueling, and airlift for French and AFISMA forces which will play a critical role in assisting international efforts to restore stability.

I feel we face an increased threat to the U.S. if we do not engage with select critical partners.

**To what extent does AQIM pose a threat to stability in Morocco and Tunisia?**

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb does not present an immediate threat to Morocco or Tunisia’s stability, but that does not mean it or other extremists do not possess some capability or intention to conduct terror attacks in these countries. Within Morocco, the threat of an attack is degraded by the country’s multi-dimensional counter-terrorism strategy that includes regional and international security cooperation. However, these efforts do not completely negate the threat as evidenced by the 28 April 2011 Marrakesh bombing. Tunisia possesses a modest capacity to counter terrorism, but the concept is limited by perceptions of the former regime’s heavy-handed and overly liberal use of previously established anti-terrorism legislation.
Do you believe current legal authorities, including the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), are sufficient to enable you to carry out counterterrorism operations and activities against AQIM at the level you believe to be necessary?

The current legal authorities, including the Authorization for Use of Military Force, to conduct counterterrorism operations and activities against al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb appear to be sufficient for operations in the AFRICOM area of responsibility. However, the Authorization for Use of Military Force is now 12 years old; and al-Qaeda has dispersed and operates in areas far from the original battlefield. Given these evolutionary changes in the global security landscape, I intend to continuously review the current intelligence on al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and assess whether the existing authorities are sufficient to take all necessary actions.

**Somalia and al Shabab**

What is your assessment of the threat posed by Al Shabab?

Al-Shabaab is currently undergoing a significant transition in response to pressure from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), The Federal Government of Somalia, and allied Somali forces, but will remain a threat for the near to mid-term in Somalia and increasingly in East Africa. Unable to effectively combat pro-government forces’ superior armor and weaponry, al-Shabaab has withdrawn to rural safe havens where it can evade enemy forces and project a largely asymmetric war, including improved improvised explosive and increased suicide bombings. No longer responsible for administrating large population centers, al-Shabaab can refocus its somewhat debilitated revenue streams on more weapons, fighters, and attack planning. External attacks, such as those in Kenya, are likely to be a continued focus as these attacks are a key component to al-Shabaab’s strategy to expel regional militaries from Somalia.

In your view, does al Shabab pose a threat to the United States and/or western interests outside of its immediate operational area?

Al-Shabaab is an al-Qaeda affiliate and is likely to remain dedicated to the principles of al-Qaeda, including executing attacks on the west. Al-Shabaab maintains the near-term capability to threaten Western interests in Kenya as some elements in the large Somali populations throughout Kenya support al-Shabaab financially, ideologically, and logistically. As part of a highly mobile population in East Africa, these supporters also maintain the ability to move in and out of regional nations in support of attacks. Al-Shabaab’s foreign fighters remain the greatest threat to Western interests regionally and internationally.

In the last year, the United Nations-supported African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and its regional partners have made substantial military progress against al Shabaab. How would you evaluate the success of these efforts and the prospects for longer term stability in Somalia?

African Union Mission in Somalia has made progress in reducing the territory under al-Shabaab control. The capital, Mogadishu and the port of Kismaayo, formerly a key hub for al-Shabaab, are now under the Somali government and African Union Mission in Somalia control. African Union Mission in Somalia successes have provided space for the political process to work. However, the Somali government is in the earliest stages of development and there is still a long way to go to ensure long term stability. It will take the combined efforts of the international community to assist the Somali government and people recover from more than ten years of conflict.
The State Department has provided security assistance to Somalia's nascent national security forces for several years through the AU peacekeeping mission and through contractors. What role, if any, do you see for AFRICOM in that effort?

AFRICOM supports Department of State efforts in preparing Africa Union peacekeepers deploying to Somalia as part of African Union Mission in Somalia by providing Global Peace Operations Initiative funding to African Union Mission in Somalia staff, providing secure communications to Africa Union Mission in Somalia contributing nations, and providing logistics training, excess equipment, and mentor support to Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance training in the region. In addition, AFRICOM has supplied niche intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, and counterterrorism training to deploying African Union Mission in Somalia units, and additional communications via Department of Defense 1206 funding mechanisms. This is a critical effort and AFRICOM will continue to work with Department of State to support African Union Mission in Somalia troop contributing nations. If directed, AFRICOM is prepared to expand support to nascent Somalia security forces.

Do you believe current legal authorities, including the 2001 AUMF are sufficient to enable you to carry out counterterrorism operations and activities against al Shabaab at the level you believe to be necessary?

The current legal authorities, including the Authorization for Use of Military Force to conduct counterterrorism operations and activities against al Shabaab appear to be sufficient for operations in the AFRICOM area of responsibility. However, the African Union Mission in Somalia is now 12 years old and al-Qaeda has dispersed and operates in areas far from the original battlefield. Given these evolutionary changes in the global security landscape, I intend to continuously review the current intelligence on al-Shabaab and assess whether the existing authorities are sufficient to take all necessary actions.

What role, if any, do you see for AFRICOM in preventing further deterioration of the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, which according to experts remains among the worst anywhere in the world?

The primary factor undermining humanitarian support in certain famine and food insecure regions in Somalia is a general lack of security in ungoverned spaces and/or al-Shabaab resistance to relief operations. Department of Defense support to regional militaries serves to facilitate and improve aid delivery, preventing a worsening of the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. Regional partners such as Ethiopia and Kenya have demonstrated a commitment to supporting humanitarian assistance operations, which, as a secondary benefit, also enhances Somalia’s internal security. AFRICOM is well positioned to support the broader U.S. government’s humanitarian assistance effort, and to assist our regional partners in key areas such as logistics, medical, communications, and planning.

Nigeria and Boko Haram

In the past year and a half, Boko Haram’s attacks in Nigeria have become increasingly sophisticated and deadly. There is concern that the group is expanding ties with other violent Islamist groups on the continent. In a hearing before the Committee in March of this year, General Carter Ham, the current Commander of AFRICOM, stated that Boko Haram has emerged “as a threat to Western interests.”

Do you agree with General Ham that Boko Haram represents a threat to Western interests?
Yes. Although Boko Haram’s primary target set is largely domestic, the group demonstrated a willingness to specifically target western interests within Nigeria when it launched a car bomb attack against the United Nations’ headquarters building in Abuja in August 2011. Additionally, Boko Haram was involved in the abduction and subsequent murders of two western citizens in May 2011 and possibly a German in January 2012. Boko Haram’s growing ties to the al-Qaeda network, particularly al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, almost certainly exacerbates the threat Boko Haram poses to western interests.

**What is your assessment of Boko Haram’s intentions to expand its scope of operations beyond domestic attacks? How do you assess its capability to do so?**

Boko Haram’s ties to external al-Qaeda affiliates, particularly with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, along with its larger regional presence and activities, will broaden its intentions to expand its scope of operations beyond domestic attacks. Boko Haram maintains presence beyond Nigeria in the neighboring countries Niger, Cameroon, and Chad. Additionally, there are indications that a sizable contingent of Boko Haram members is located in northern Mali, where they almost certainly augment al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb effort to secure its territorial gains and facilitate the establishment of an Islamic state. The group’s demonstrated ability to conduct complex coordinated attacks with multiple vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices indicates Boko Haram already possesses the capability to conduct such an operation beyond domestic Nigerian targets.

**To what extent has Boko Haram benefitted from the flow of arms from Libyan stockpiles since mid-2011 – either in terms of arming itself or profiting from regional arms sales?**

Boko Haram has benefitted from the proliferation of weapons from Libya. Additionally, the large amount of weaponry al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb acquired from Libyan stockpiles, coupled with the relationship between Boko Haram and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, almost certainly resulted in additional arms provided to Boko Haram. There has been no indication yet of Boko Haram profiting from the sale of weapons.

**What is your assessment of the Nigerian government’s efforts to eliminate Boko Haram?**

Nigeria’s security response to Boko Haram has had some isolated successes, and the Nigerian government almost certainly has the will and means to continue security operations. The Nigerian government is conducting a three-pronged response to Boko Haram including extensive security and intelligence operations, limited co-option efforts, and a fledging public relations campaign. However, even if Nigeria manages to destroy all current Boko Haram factions and nodes, long-term stability in northern Nigeria is contingent on the Nigerian government making a concerted political effort to resolve socio-economic issues like endemic poverty, poor economic prospects, political marginalization, and corruption.

Nigeria deployed a joint task force to counter Boko Haram in June 2011 and has steadily increased the size and scope of operations over the last year. Nigerian counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capabilities are still developing and the army and police often rely on heavy-handed static security operations. The army and police have been widely criticized for the excessive use of force which results in local resentment and undermines Nigeria’s modest counter-terrorism successes.
Last, while some in the government acknowledge that the use of excessive force by the Nigerian army and the continued socio-economic marginalization of northern Nigeria are alienating the population and helping Boko Haram. There has been little progress made in addressing alleged human rights abuses by the security services or underlying socio-economic issues in northern Nigeria.

The Nigerian government has also indicated a willingness to pursue negotiations with Boko Haram. Boko Haram leadership has rejected negotiations, but more moderate fringe factions could still be co-opted.

**What is your assessment of Boko Haram's relationship with AQIM and Al Shabaab, respectively? Is there any evidence to suggest that Boko Haram and AQIM have developed operational links?**

Boko Haram’s connection to the broader al-Qaeda movement is primarily through al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. There are few indications that Boko Haram has direct connections to al-Shabaab, and those that exist indicate al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb acts as an intermediary.

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb appears to provide support to Boko Haram, evidenced especially in the manner of its resurgence after the Nigerian government crackdown on the organization in 2009. Malian government sources show that for several years Boko Haram has sent operatives to train with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb elements in the Sahel. Boko Haram has confined the majority of its attacks to northern Nigeria; however, the targeting of Western interests within Nigeria, such as the United Nations’ headquarters in Abuja, may indicate al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb influence on Boko Haram’s target selection. In addition, specific tactics used, most notably that of the suicide vehicle borne improvised explosive devices is almost certainly the influence of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb on Boko Haram operations.

**If confirmed, what role would you recommend for AFRICOM in building the capacity of the Nigerian security forces to respond to the Boko Haram threat?**

Growing and deepening the relationship with the Nigerian Defense Staff is crucial to securing greater partnering opportunities. An approach to strengthen Nigerian security forces hinges on buy-in from senior defense leaders who are willing to address underlying issues to enhance leadership, anti-corruption, and equipment and supply procurement deficiencies. Nigeria is a prime example of where a whole-of-government approach is critical to address the complex Boko Haram threat which is exacerbated by underlying political, economic and social fractures.

**What risks, if any, do you see accompanying greater potential AFRICOM engagement in regional efforts to expand government control and dismantle Boko Haram?**

My chief concern would be the risks associated with the performance of U.S. trained or equipped Nigerian defense forces continuing on a path of unprofessional activity—violence against civilians, illegal detainment, and ultimately, ineffective operations against Boko Haram.

**Do you believe current legal authorities, including the 2001 AUMF are sufficient to enable you to carry out counterterrorism operations and activities against Boko Haram at the level you believe to be necessary?**

The current legal authorities, including the Authorization for Use of Military Force to conduct counterterrorism operations and activities against Boko Haram appear to be sufficient.
for operations in the AFRICOM area of responsibility. However, the Authorization for Use of Military Force has been in place for 12 years and al-Qaeda has dispersed and operates in areas far from the original battlefield. Given the evolutionary changes in the global security landscape, I intend to continuously review the current intelligence on Boko Haram and assess whether the existing authorities are sufficient to take all necessary actions.

Violent incidents, reportedly including indiscriminate killing of civilians, committed by Nigerian police and military services during operations intended to be against Boko Haram have risen significantly in recent months.

In your view, what measures should the United States incorporate into current and future military-to-military engagements to help stem these incidents?

Basic military professionalization underlies all engagement with Nigerian Defense Forces. This includes orchestration of a training program by AFRICOM and often delivered by U.S military judge advocates through the Defense Institute for International Legal Studies. The AFRICOM effort is to advance the rule of law in African militaries, address human rights laws, respect for international law, and the law of armed conflict. Increasing the intensity and depth of this program using Defense Institute for International Legal Studies and similar training resources would be an important step toward stemming indiscriminate violence.

Professionalization of military forces is also a key reason for a preference toward use of U.S. uniformed trainers. The objective is to model the U.S. Army’s soldier code of conduct and ethics and also to demonstrate a disciplined Non-Commissioned Officer Corps.

Mali

What is AFRICOM currently doing to respond to the situation in northern Mali, including the significant expansion of AQIM’s operational presence there?

It is my understanding that AFRICOM is accelerating its cooperation with Mali’s neighbors and continuing to explore ways to counter the threat posed by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its sympathizers while at the same time supporting international intervention efforts.

The situation in Mali’s north is complicated by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s growing entrenchment into political and religious institutions, unaddressed grievances, vast ungoverned expanses, porous borders, and continuing spillover from the instability in Libya. A successful solution will require working closely with the international community – in particular Mali’s neighbors and the Economic Community of West African States – to fully restore credible, elected political leadership in Mali while addressing the growing humanitarian crisis and strengthening the Malian security forces, ultimately restoring governance and security for the whole of Mali’s territory.

What is your understanding of the impact of the suspension of U.S. security assistance programs in Mali on AFRICOM’s activities in Mali and the region?

Following the March coup, and pursuant to section 7008 of the Department of State Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriation Act, the U. S. suspended all security assistance to the government of Mali on 19 April 2012. As a result, there currently is very little U.S. military engagement with Mali. U.S. law dictates that U.S. security assistance to Mali remains on hold until elections are held and a democratically-elected government takes office. Once legal
and policy requirements are met, military engagements can resume, AFRICOM would then consider growing military professionals through the International Military Education and Training program, Counterterrorism Fellowship Program and the Department of Defense Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection /Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Prevention Program.

AFRICOM and its components currently maintain border-security, peacekeeping, and counter-terrorism training with most of Mali’s neighbors until a direct solution in Mali becomes possible.

**If confirmed, what steps would you propose to reshape the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the Defense Department’s complementary Operation Juniper Shield (formerly Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara) in light of regional security and governance setbacks stemming from the crisis in Mali?**

The Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership continues to be the U.S. government’s regional construct for counter terrorism partnership in the Trans-Sahel and we will continue to work closely with our interagency and regional partners to further the Partnership’s objectives.

**Libya**

The recent attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi which resulted in the death of four American citizens, including the American Ambassador, Christopher Stevens, demonstrated that post-conflict Libya is wrought with security challenges that have implications for the future of Libya and the region as a whole. Conversely, as Libya transitions to a representative government, the United States is presented with a historic opportunity to re-define U.S-Libyan relations.

**What role, if any, do you envision the United States playing in helping Libya build capable security institutions?**

Department of Defense should have a supporting role to the broader U.S. government and international community effort to establish security institutions in Libya. The Department of Defense sponsored Defense Institution Reform Initiative and Minister of Defense Advisor programs are approved for Libya. The Defense Institution Reform Initiative team made three visits to Libya. All support to the government of Libya will remain difficult until the security situation improves, and the U.S. Embassy, Tripoli can support temporary personnel.

**What is your assessment of the risks associated with the paramilitary forces that continue to have control of large swaths of Libya?**

The hundreds of disparate militias still operating in Libya a year after the revolution represent a significant threat to the future stability of Libya. Their continued presence undermines the authority of the government and creates the potential for continued armed conflicts over territory, ethnic ideology, and revenge killings, as well as creating a more permissive environment for al-Qaeda and other violent extremist organizations to operate. The post-Revolutionary Libyan governments have attempted several programs to disarm, demobilize, and integrate these militias into military and security services, but the pace for progress remains slow. It is too early to tell if current Prime Minister Ali Zeidan’s government will continue to rely on loosely affiliated militias to provide security throughout Libya.
What is your assessment of the impact of the proliferation of weaponry from Libyan military stockpiles into neighboring countries?

The availability of weapons from depots in Libya has invigorated illicit arms smuggling across Africa, particularly in the Northwest. The Sahel ranks among the world’s principal smuggling routes and is maintained by militants from local Tuareg tribes who assist in trafficking arms. After the collapse of the Qadhafi government in Libya, hundreds of looted missiles, Kalashnikov rifles, rocket propelled grenades, and small weapons were sold throughout the Sahel. Additionally, experts estimate Libya had as many as 20,000 first-generation man-portable air defense systems before the uprising, at least some of which are likely in the hands of terrorist organizations and militias seeking to incite further instability in Africa and the Middle East. Armed Tuaregs fighting for Qadhafi returned to homelands in Mali and Niger and smuggled weapons that fueled the Mali rebellion, further destabilizing the region and reinforcing a safe haven for al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

In your view, what role, if any, should AFRICOM play in assisting the Libyans with addressing the threat to stability posed by paramilitary forces?

AFRICOM should have a complimentary role in assisting Libya with their militia threat, supporting USAID as the lead U.S. agency for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. AFRICOM should support proposals for 1206 (counter terrorism) and 1207a (border security) to develop a core capacity for the Libyan military with personnel that have come under the government's control. AFRICOM should also support Foreign Military Sales cases using Libyan national funds to strengthen the military infrastructure.

What do you view as the most significant challenges to the Libyan government in building capable and sustainable security institutions?

The Libyan government’s most significant challenge is its lack of control of the militias operating in Libya. This condition is exacerbated by the proliferation of conventional weapons and unsecured borders. Together, this is leading to a rise of terrorist activity, particularly in Eastern Libya.

In what ways can the United States be most effective in assisting the Libyan government in building capable and sustainable security institutions?

The U.S. can be most effective by assisting the Libyan efforts at disarmament and working with the individual services in Libya to assist them with their development. AFRICOM has organized visits by the Libyan Air Force and Navy Chiefs of Staff. Increasing the International Military Education and Training to better facilitate Libyan participation in U.S. senior service schools, English language training, and other training in the United States will also be beneficial.

With the experience of Benghazi as context, do you feel that the mechanisms for rapidly moving forces from EUCOM to respond to crises in AFRICOM are adequate? Are there improvements to this process that you recommend?

The newly assigned Commander's In-extremis Force, Army allocated Regionally Aligned Force, and the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task postures AFRICOM to better plan for and respond to contingencies. We recommend the Commander's In-extremis Force be placed in Europe for a shorter response time to the continent. We will continue to closely coordinate with the Department of State and country Ambassadors to ensure an accurate understanding of U.S.
Africa Command's response times and capabilities as we support activities on the African continent. Additionally, with tighter budgets and declining resources, we must look at more agile ways to share resources between forces assigned to Europe and Africa.

**Algeria**

In your view, what is the appropriate role for Algeria to play in addressing transnational security threats in the Sahel, including AQIM? If confirmed, what steps would you take to encourage Algeria to play a more active and constructive role in addressing security threats emanating from northern Mali?

Algeria’s military is the most capable of any country in north Africa. As such, I view Algeria as a regional leader, capable of coordinating the efforts of the Sahelian countries to address transnational security threats. Algeria shares our concerns with the situation in northern Mali. Their knowledge of conditions on the ground in northern Mali is invaluable to the U.S. To ensure continued Algerian cooperation on northern Mali, any military solution must be United Nations authorized, internationally supported, and use African forces. If confirmed, I would continue to encourage Algerian regional leadership through regional exercise and conference participation, senior leadership engagement and high-level bilateral dialogues.

**What is your assessment of the operational and logistical capacities of the Algerian-led joint operational command structure for the Sahel, known as the CEMOC?**

The Algeria based Combined Operational General Staff Committee plays no significant role in regional counterterrorism activity and is unlikely to carry out counterterrorism military operations for the foreseeable future. Contributing Combined Operational General Staff Committee members possess varied operational and logistical capabilities, but the Combined Operational General Staff Committee organization lacks operational experience and has not demonstrated any logistical capacity since its 2010 inception. The Combined Operational General Staff Committee’s one major accomplishment has been the creation of the Unity Fusion Liaison, located in Algiers, Algeria, which is a mechanism for sharing operational intelligence between the four member nations (Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger) as well as Burkina Faso, Libya, and Chad. Bilaterally, however, participating Combined Operational General Staff Committee countries have conducted joint training and localized operations.

**Congo/Great Lakes**

What is your assessment of the threat to regional stability posed by the ongoing military mutiny, known as the M23, in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo?

The March 23 mutiny – the armed group known as M23 – in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo is destabilizing the entire Great Lakes region. Over the course of this crisis, we have been concerned by reports of enhanced external support to M23. We have strongly urged all neighboring governments to take all necessary measures to halt and prevent any and all support to M23 from their territory and we have underscored to Rwanda that any support to M23 must permanently end. Furthermore, the security forces focus on the March 23 Movement has allowed other armed groups in the region to expand, resulting in increased ethnic violence and attacks on civilians across eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The humanitarian situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo has deteriorated, and we remain gravely concerned about the hundreds of thousands of people displaced by insecurity and violence in Kivus. Additionally, numerous medical aid organizations have removed most staff from the area due to unacceptable
security risks. While the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo have been unable to end the M23 rebellion militarily, the Democratic Republic of Congo has engaged with M23 in discussions in Kampala, and we continue to urge the presidents and leadership of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda to continue their direct dialogue to address the root causes of instability. We support the United Nation’s efforts to establish a Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework among the governments in the region.

In your view, in what ways (if at all) have U.S. security sector reform efforts in DRC had a measurable impact on the operational and logistical capacity, degree of command and control, and transparent civilian oversight of the Congolese military?

Assisting Democratic Republic of the Congo military has been a challenge. The desired end-state is for a disciplined, professional military that respects human rights, rule of law, and civilian authority. The U.S. provides Democratic Republic of the Congo officers with training and assistance in leadership development, military justice, civil-military relations, and respect for human rights. The challenge is translating these efforts into long-term institutional capacity. Although progress is slow, there have been some improvements. Logistical capacity is one example: the US led Defense Institutional Reform Initiative complements European Union efforts to develop logistics doctrine by helping Democratic Republic of the Congo military translate their doctrine into strategic and operational guidance.

True security sector reform in Democratic Republic of the Congo will require full commitment by the government and a unified multilateral effort among the international community. A memorandum of understanding between the U.S. government and the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on security force assistance is forthcoming. This document will establish ground rules for security assistance and provide a path for improved cooperation with measurable conditions.

What is your assessment of the performance of the U.S.-trained Light Infantry Battalion (LIB, known as the 391st) in its two deployments to date (first in Dungu, for operations to counter the Lord’s Resistance Army, and currently in Goma, for operations to counter the ongoing M23 rebellion)? What has been the impact of the LIB training program – which was carried out in 2010 and supported by AFRICOM advisors – on the overall capacity, control, and oversight of the Congolese forces? If confirmed, would you support additional U.S. operational and logistical training for the Congolese military?

The 391st Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) has been scrutinized because of its standing as a U.S. trained unit. There are, however, limited metrics to measure the battalion’s combat effectiveness and performance in protecting civilians. During a 2012 assessment, AFRICOM’s Counter-Lord’s Resistance Army Control Element found that morale was high and the officers and enlisted soldiers appear motivated, organized and trained in small unit maneuver and tactics. While the unit appears tactically proficient, they have had limited engagements against Lord’s Resistance Army and March 23 Movement targets. This prevents a full understanding of the combat effectiveness of the 391st Light Infantry Battalion. It can be noted, however, that during a minor firefight with March 23 Movement, the 391st stood its ground.

The 391st Light Infantry Battalion illustrates the larger institutional challenges within DRC’s military and broader defense sector reform. While this unit is highly respected by senior military and government leaders within the Democratic Republic of the Congo, it has not had a significant impact on the overall capacity, control and oversight of Congolese forces. The rebellion by the March 23 Movement underscores that the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo
remains a fractured military with a profound need for national-level security sector reform. Broad security sector reform will require full commitment by the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and a unified multilateral effort among the international community - a single U.S. trained battalion will not change the core institutional challenges within the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

**If confirmed, what changes (if any) would you propose to U.S. security assistance for Rwanda in light of the Rwandan military’s alleged role in supporting the M23 in contravention of United Nations sanctions?**

Ensuring peace and security in Darfur, Sudan is a key U.S. policy priority. Rwanda supports this policy priority by providing 3,200 peacekeepers to the United Nations – African Union Mission in Darfur, and 850 peacekeepers to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan. While we continue to support Rwanda’s participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions in Africa, we recognize that the March 23 Movement would not be the threat it is today without external support including evidence of support from the Rwandan government. As the United States has made very clear, Rwanda must permanently end all forms of support to Congolese armed groups. For these reasons, we also cut approximately $200,000 of FY12 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to Rwanda, as required by law. The Department continues to closely monitor reports of external support and we will continue to respond appropriately.

**What is your assessment of the current operational capacity of Burundian troops serving in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)? In your view, what has been the impact of U.S. military training for Burundian troops deploying under AMISOM on Burundi’s internal stability and on regional stability in the Great Lakes?**

The Burundian National Defense Forces operating as part of African Union Mission in Somalia are very good tactically at the lower level (squad - company) and have interacted well with the Uganda People's Defence Force in shared sectors. However, they lack staff planning ability at battalion and higher levels.

The training the U.S. has provided to the Burundians has helped to integrate their forces at the lower levels and unified their armed forces, which, as recently as five years ago, were still fighting remnants of a civil war. Burundi works with neighboring countries to improve security in border areas. They are increasingly concerned with instability in the Kivu area of Democratic Republic of the Congo and the resulting refugee flows. Their focus, however, remains on African Union Mission in Somalia and internal stability.

**Building Partner Capacity and Security Assistance**

In the past few years, Congress has provided DoD a number of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner nations, including the global train and equip authority (“Section 1206”), Global Security Contingency Fund, and the associated transitional authorities for East Africa within the GSCF statute.

**What is your understanding of the purpose of the Section 1206 global train and equip authority and Global Contingency Security Fund?**

Section 1206 since its inclusion in the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act has allowed AFRICOM to increase capability of our partners to conduct Counter Terrorism activities. AFRICOM has concentrated its efforts in the East and North West areas where the greatest threat
exists. The 1206 authority is more responsive than other security cooperation methods such as Foreign Military Financing and is a critical tool. All combatant commands must compete annually for funds under this program. This annual competition challenges a longer-term approach to program development for partner nations. While AFRICOM does not have U.S. forces employed in stability operations, the counter-terrorism aspects of 1206 have been heavily used in support of partner nations requirements against al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb or to provide security in countries that may be threatened by them. Section 1206 is a particularly valued tool since it allows AFRICOM to select programs that best meet partners’ needs. The dual-key nature of 1206, requiring Department of State and Department of Defense secretary approval, effectively supports interagency efforts to strengthen capacity building programs. However, there are inherit limitations of 1206 in terms of one year funding which makes it difficult to put together complex or sustained projects that are required for sustained engagement.

While 1206 specifically addresses Counter Terrorism, the Global Security Contingency Fund is intended as an interagency approach to address broader issues. The GSCF is in its early stages of development, but should bring a responsive ability to address a broad range of security issues not limited just to counter terrorism. Funds to implement the authority must come from both Department of Defense (80%) and Department of State (20%). Under the current authority which expires in 2015, once funds are placed in the Security Contingency Fund, they are available until expended. This enables planning a bit farther into the future. To date, however, it is authority without a corresponding appropriation. As the Security Contingency Fund process matures, I believe we will see a more coordinated effort between Department of Defense and Department of State in key partner nations.

**In your view, what should be our strategic objectives in building the capacities of partner nations in the AFRICOM AOR?**

AFRICOM’s capacity building efforts seek to provide partner nations with the capability to solve their own problems and directly further the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa. When African nations work together to defeat terrorists like Al-Shabaab, threats to our homeland are decreased. When the U.S. is perceived as a positive influence in other regions, it assists our efforts across the board.

Building Partnership Capacity is the baseline to all of AFRICOM’s strategic lines of effort in Africa. The intent is to enable African partners to develop the defense capabilities necessary for the command to achieve its objectives. It is preferable to avoid crises that may demand the introduction of U.S. Forces, therefore the Command strives to enable African partners to build stability, control borders and ungoverned terrain, defeat terrorist groups, and develop militaries that are professional and obey the rule of law.

An example of AFRICOM’s partnership building engagement is the ongoing efforts with African partners that are deploying troops to various peacekeeping missions throughout the continent, including to the African Union Mission in Somalia. The Command has provided training and equipment that have proved to be instrumental in the success these forces have made in both maintaining stability and combating terrorist groups. The Command has also assisted Africans in developing rotary wing medical evacuation capabilities to be used in peacekeeping operations.

Other areas of focus are providing training and equipment for partners for the purpose of developing strong border controls to prevent trafficking of weapons and narcotics which can destabilize a country.
In the maritime domain, the Command has assisted regional organizations in developing agreements, operations, and training for maritime security, as well as developing courses for peacekeepers at select African Union regional peacekeeping training centers.

All of these efforts combine to develop capacities among African partners that allow Africans to solve many of their own security problems. This is cost effective, does not require U.S. Forces, and prevents conflict.

The funding pool available for security assistance and other military-to-military engagement activities devoted to the AFRICOM AOR is extremely small and tends to be allocated to specific countries.

What is your understanding of the role AFRICOM plays in developing U.S. security assistance (e.g., Section 1206, Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training assistance, Combatant Commander Initiative Fund, etc…)?

AFRICOM provides input to all of the security assistance processes annually, based on Department of Defense guidance, AFRICOM strategy and theater campaign plan prioritization. The command submits proposals to take advantage of authorities such as 1206 and has successfully utilized the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund – specifically this year the Command was able to fund attendance of Libyan officers to U.S. schools. AFRICOM depends on its input to these programs to get its mission accomplished. Security Cooperation is the primary means to affect conditions on the continent.

Defense Strategic Guidance

The Defense Strategic Guidance, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense”, announced by President Obama on January 5, 2012, includes, among other things, the intention of the Administration and the Pentagon to “rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.” In his associated remarks, Secretary Panetta explained that the “U.S. military will increase its institutional weight and focus on enhanced presence, power projection, and deterrence in Asia-Pacific.”

What do you anticipate will be the impact on the operations and activities of AFRICOM?

The impact on the operations and activities of AFRICOM will be minimal. In fact, based on the interconnectivity between Africa and the Asia-Pacific region, AFRICOM’s activities may become more important. The eastern portion of AFRICOM’s area of responsibility abuts the Indian Ocean, a centrally important component of the global commons, reflecting historic trade ties and encompassing sea lanes of communication that link Africa to the Middle East, Europe, and the rising powers of India and China in the Asia-Pacific region.

Several key strategic geographic points exist around the African continent that are essential to the flow of commerce. For example, Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti sits on the western side of the Bab el-Mandeb waterway from Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula. The waterway is only 20 miles across and must remain open to ensure the health of the global economic system. Other important choke points include the Mozambique Channel and the Cape of Good Hope.

Africa is a pivotal point to the Middle East and Asia-Pacific providing critical access to the Indian Ocean region and an overwatch position for Iran. It also serves as an essential platform supporting U.S. Central Command counter-Violent Extremist Organization operations.
AFRICOM will continue to counter piracy threats emanating from Somalia in support of international efforts to promote a lawful maritime environment and global trade in the Indian Ocean region. The command will continue to strengthen the defense capabilities of African partners to solidify security gains in Somalia that underpin the development of effective governance, economic growth, and development.

**DoD Counter-narcotics Activities**

DoD serves as the single lead agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime foreign shipments of drugs flowing toward the U.S. On an annual basis, DoD’s counter-narcotics (CN) program expends approximately $1.5 billion to support the Department’s CN operations, including to build the capacity of U.S. Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, and certain foreign governments, and provide intelligence support on CN-related matters and a variety of other unique enabling capabilities.

In your view, what is the appropriate role of DoD — and by extension AFRICOM — in counterdrug efforts?

In my opinion, AFRICOM’s role in support of broader Department of Defense counternarcotics efforts should focus on three primary areas. First, capacity building efforts with partner nations on the African continent are critical to helping civilian law enforcement agencies, Gendarmes and military organizations combat the growing menace of narcotics trafficking. Working hand in hand with partners in the Drug Enforcement Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, among others, the command is able to bring the full weight of U.S. experience from the decades-long domestic fight against narcotics to bear in helping to solve this problem in Africa through training, equipping and information sharing initiatives. Second, through Counter Threat Finance efforts, the command works with U.S. interagency partners to track down and ultimately seize illicit proceeds that go directly to Drug Trafficking Organizations. Third, statutory requirement to serve as the lead U.S. agency for Detection and Monitoring allow the command to bring our tremendous technology assets to bear, and a robust cadre of intelligence analysts can lend great value to the International Community in analyzing and dismantling drug trafficking organizations.

In your view, what should be the role of the United States in countering the flow of narcotics to nations other than the U.S.?

The U.S. has tremendous equities in helping to stem the world-wide manufacturing and distribution of illicit drugs, regardless of whether these drugs end up in the U.S. In places like West Africa, drug trafficking and manufacturing is having a tremendous destabilizing effect through corruption of often senior government officials, increased rates of drug usage (and corresponding increases to rates of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection /Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome among Africans, and proceeds of illicit trafficking going towards organizations operating on the continent and internationally. Working with international partners through such organizations as the European Union and the Economic Community of West Africa States, AFRICOM seeks to integrate their capacity building efforts with those who share common interests in seeing African partners increase their ability to effectively address this problem. These integration efforts will also allow all international parties to better utilize funding for Counter Narcotic efforts.

Given that the vast majority of illegal drugs arriving in Africa are not destined for the
United States, should DoD invest resources in countering the flow of illegal drugs to or through Africa?

It is my opinion that current Department of Defense resources being invested in counternarcotics efforts are funds well spent in spite of the fact that many of the drugs are not intended for the U.S. The destabilizing influence of narcotics trafficking, coupled with the financial benefits realized by terrorist organizations operating in Africa, make a compelling case for overall U.S. government involvement in solving this problem. The cost funding an effective counternarcotics program in an African partner nation is far less than the cost of dealing with the consequences of not addressing this problem which could result in increased regional instability. Additionally, the capacity building and resources provided to African partners under the counternarcotics program are also effective in helping to improve border control and reduce the trafficking of other illicit goods like weapons and persons.

Illicit trafficking is a growing concern in Africa. West Africa is a node for Latin American drugs transiting to their primary destination in European markets. In addition, drugs and their precursors originating on other continents are transshipped through Africa. Despite the increase in illicit trafficking across the African continent, AFRICOM has secured a limited amount of funding for its counternarcotics efforts.

What is your assessment of the current AFRICOM counternarcotics program?

It is my understanding that the AFRICOM counternarcotics program has improved the capacity of African nations to more effectively address their challenges in this area. To date, the program’s efforts have primarily been focused in West Africa, working with countries such as Ghana, Senegal and Cape Verde. The command’s capacity building efforts have had a direct, positive impact on these countries’ capabilities, as evidenced by the October 2011 seizure in Cape Verde of 1.5 tons of cocaine, which was directly supported by the Counter Narcotics-funded Cape Verde Maritime Operations Center. Additionally, the Counter Narcotics program has taken the lead in coordination with the Department of State in developing the West African Cooperative Security Initiative, a whole-of-government approach that better integrates all U.S. government counternarcotics efforts in this important region.

Based on your review of the current program, if confirmed, what changes, if any, are you interested in exploring?

If confirmed, I will assess the current program before recommending changes. The Counter Narcotics program has been effective in establishing a presence and making a difference in West Africa, however, this is not the only region of Africa with a narcotics trafficking problem. East Africa, particularly Kenya and Tanzania, is experiencing an increase in heroin trafficking across the Indian Ocean from Afghanistan and Pakistan destined for U.S. and European markets. Additionally, in the Sahel region of North Africa, cocaine and hashish trafficking is being facilitated by, and directly benefitting, organizations like al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb leading to increased regional instability.

**Lord’s Resistance Army**

Despite pressure by the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) and efforts by U.S. Special Operations personnel to support them, elements of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) – including Joseph Kony – continue to operate and commit atrocities against civilian populations in the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and South
Sudan. Some observers have identified operational concerns with this mission, including that: (1) supported forces are trying to find an elusive foe in an area roughly the size of California, much of which is covered in thick jungle; (2) technical support to U.S. forces and their UPDF partners from the defense and intelligence community continues to be inadequate; and (3) limitations continue to be placed on the ability of U.S. Special Operations personnel to accompany UPDF partners outside of main basing locations, thereby limiting the level of direct support they can provide.

In your view, what is the objective of Operation Observant Compass?

The governments of Uganda, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Republic of South Sudan, in collaboration with the African Union, continue to dedicate material and human resources to bring an end to the threat posed by the LRA. They are leading this effort, and the United States is committed to supporting this regional effort. Through our engagement, we are strengthening partnerships and regional cooperation.

The United States is providing cross-cutting support to advance four objectives: (1) the increased protection of civilians, (2) the apprehension or removal from the battlefield of Joseph Kony and senior LRA commanders, (3) the promotion of defections and support for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of LRA fighters, and (4) the continued humanitarian relief of affected communities.

In your view, what is the appropriate level of priority to be accorded to AFRICOM’s efforts to counter the Lord’s Resistance Army in central Africa, compared to other AFRICOM objectives?

The command’s number one priority is East Africa with particular focus on Al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda networks. This is followed by violent extremist and al-Qaeda in North and West Africa and the Islamic Maghreb. AFRICOM’s third priority is Counter-LRA operations.

If confirmed, will you promptly review and report back to the committee on your assessment of this mission?

This deployment is not open-ended and we will continue to regularly assess and review whether we are making sufficient progress. I commit to reporting to the Committee on this deployment at any time you request.

Each of the countries currently affected by the LRA face other security threats viewed by their governments as more serious to their national well-being and, as a result, these countries place a lower priority on addressing the LRA problem.

If confirmed, how would you seek to strengthen the impact of Operation Observant Compass while recognizing those competing national priorities of our partners in the counter-LRA fight?

If confirmed, I will continue to work to maximize the success of Operation Observant Compass by seeking, within the parameters of the current mission, to deepen cooperation with Ugandan and other regional forces and increase intelligence that is appropriate to the operating environment.
Support to United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in Africa

In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on July 29, 2009, Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations (UN), stated that the United States “is willing to consider directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers, civilian police, and other civilian personnel—including more women I should note—to UN peacekeeping operations.” Admiral Mullen has said he views “UN peacekeeping operations to be extremely important and cost effective in comparison to unilateral operations” and that “the success of these operations is very much in our national interest.”

In your view, should the United States increase the number of personnel it contributes in the form of staff positions and military observers to UN peacekeeping missions and other international peace operations?

I agree with Ambassador Rice and Admiral Mullen and support an increase in contributions to UN peacekeeping operations. United Nations peacekeeping operations play a vital role in advancing the goal of improved peace, stability and security throughout Africa. Peacekeeping operations support United Nations objectives, while they also help to advance U.S. security interests. The U.S. role in United Nations peacekeeping operations, whether in the form of civilian police, staff officers, or military observers, may offer the U.S. a cost-effective way to continue to advance our mission and interests.

In your view, what are the advantages and disadvantages of contributing additional military personnel to UN operations in the form of staff positions and military observers’ positions?

In considering increasing U.S. personnel contributions to UN peacekeeping operations, it is important to balance the advantages and disadvantages that accompany any decision to deploy American military personnel. As Admiral Mullen described, United Nations-led peacekeeping operations can be cost effective, especially in comparison to unilateral operations. For the majority of these operations, sharing the manpower and financial burden among donor organizations and countries allows the international community to do more with less. U.S. personnel support to UN operations offers the U.S. the unique opportunity to build relationships and trust that could be of future benefit. When U.S. military personnel work in partnership with other UN members’ military personnel, they build long-lasting relationships centered on trust and a sense of shared purpose, while gaining invaluable cultural, regional, and international experience which helps to further our national interests.

Careful thought and planning must accompany any decision to establish or increase the U.S. participation in UN peacekeeping operations. It is vital that we understand the security risks to our troops and personnel, while we also have a complete understanding of how U.S. personnel will operate within the UN mission. The posting of U.S. personnel to UN missions and operations always require a clearly defined chain of command in order to mitigate any potential problems or concerns. Any increase in U.S. support for UN operations will necessarily incur a personnel cost and commitment that must be understood, accepted, planned for, and managed. Finally, and most importantly, significantly increasing the U.S. presence, or in some cases even creating a U.S. presence for small UN operations, carries the risk of overshadowing other participating nations.
National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime

Criminal networks are not only expanding their operations, but they are also diversifying their activities, resulting in a convergence of transnational threats that has evolved to become more complex, volatile, and destabilizing. The Director of National Intelligence recently described transnational organized crime as “an abiding threat to U.S. economic and national security interests,” and stated that “rising drug violence and corruption are undermining stability and the rule of law in some countries” in the Western Hemisphere. In July 2011, the President released his Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security. One of the priority action areas designated in the strategy is “enhancing Department of Defense support to U.S. law enforcement.”

What is your understanding of the President’s strategy to combat transnational criminal organizations?

The Department of Defense plays an important supporting role in the implementation of the President’s strategy, which declares that transnational organized crime is a threat to national and international security. The strategy provides a valuable framework from which AFRICOM can address this complex problem set, in partnership with other U.S. government agencies and foreign partners. Illicit drug trafficking is but one facet of an interconnected transnational threat that is directly destabilizing many countries in Africa. As part of a whole-of-government approach to combating transnational organized crime, the Department of Defense can bring to bear unique authorities and capabilities to augment those of our law enforcement, intelligence, and foreign partners so we address the threats transnational organized crime pose in a coordinated manner.

What is your assessment of the threat to the United States posed by transnational organized crime operating in the AFRICOM AOR?

Transnational organized crime in the AFRICOM area of operations threatens U.S. interests by taking advantage of failed states and contested spaces, forging alliances with corrupt government officials and some foreign intelligence services, destabilizing political, financial, and security institutions in fragile states, undermining competition in world strategic markets, using cyber technologies and other methods to perpetrate sophisticated frauds, creating the potential for the transfer of weapons of mass destruction to terrorists, and expanding narcotics, weapons, and human trafficking networks. Terrorists and insurgents are increasingly turning to criminal networks to generate funding and acquire logistical support, amplifying the threat to U.S. interests.

What role does AFRICOM play in combating transnational organized crime and in training and equipping partner security forces that have been tasked with combating it?

AFRICOM conducts a number of programs that directly support the President’s transnational organized crime strategy and Department of Defense guidance that addresses transnational organized crime. In addition to the command’s Counternarcotics and Law Enforcement Assistance program, there are a variety of security cooperation programs that fund military-to-military capacity building and operations that enable partner nations to more effectively deal with security threats directly relating to transnational organized crime within their borders. The Command’s newly-established Counter Threat Finance program is another important tool that allows the command to go after financial proceeds from these illicit activities.
Counter Threat Finance

A number of officials in DoD and the Intelligence Community have called for investing additional resources in identifying and tracking the flow of money associated with terrorist networks and illicit trafficking.

What are your views on the role of DoD in counter threat finance activities?

Department of Defense is not and should not be the lead in this effort. Department of Defense does have unique capabilities and capacities that can be brought to bear to augment the efforts of the broader interagency community.

What do you believe is the appropriate role, if any, of AFRICOM in supporting counter threat finance activities?

Department of Defense in general, and AFRICOM specifically, routinely contribute to threat finance activities with intelligence analysis to identify critical network vulnerabilities, providing strategic and operational planning expertise and organizing and executing engagement activities to help shape the environment. Countering threat finance activities supports efforts to counter violent extremists, drug traffickers and other illicit and destabilizing activities. Additionally, the Kingpin Act has proven to be an effective tool for the command to use to go after the highest-level drug traffickers through direct financial sanctions.

AFRICOM's Military Service Component Commands

AFRICOM does not have any assigned forces and – as a result – is required to compete for forces within the global request for forces process. Given the Department’s focus on the greater Middle East and Asia-Pacific, do you believe the AFRICOM Commander will be able to secure the necessary personnel to accomplish its partnering and engagement mission within its AOR? If not, how would you assess the risk to U.S. strategic interests in the region?

If confirmed, I plan to assess the requirements AFRICOM currently fulfills regarding partnering and engagement missions and report those finding back to this committee in a timely manner.

However, to my understanding, the command has adequate access to resources to accomplish its partnering and engagement missions. AFRICOM's access to rotationally allocated resources has increased over the past two years through efforts such as the allocation of a Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force in Fiscal Year 2012 and the allocation of a U.S. Army Regionally Aligned Force in Fiscal Year 2013. These assets provide much needed flexibility to respond to opportunities for engagement that arise on the continent. For example, the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force has filled a key role in our support to the African Union Mission in Somalia by providing a 10-week training course for deploying African troops. This engineering focused course teaches deploying troops valuable route clearing techniques against Improvised Explosive Devices, increasing survivability of deployed troops and reducing the threat to civilian populations. The efforts of the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force, coupled with a wide variety of other U.S. Government programs, are helping Africa Union Mission in Somalia forces to make a positive difference.

The threat to U.S. strategic interests including the global economic system and American citizens at home and abroad will continue to increase if the partnership and engagement missions are
curtailed or reduced. There are many opportunities to partner with stable African partners and to
develop partnerships with newly emerging governments. As opportunities arise, other entities see
opportunities to capitalize on undergoverned and ungoverned spaces on the continent. The attack
on the U.S. Embassy in Benghazi and the subsequent unrest in many areas across the continent in
the days that followed are illustrative to the impact these threats can have if partners are not
capable of establishing and maintaining a secure environment for their citizens.

Regional Alignment and Rotational Deployments of Army Brigades

The Army plans to align general purpose combat brigades with regional combatant
commands, including AFRICOM, to support theater engagement and security force
assistance missions and to make those forces, and other supporting units, available on a
rotational basis for deployment to those regions for training and exercises.

What is your understanding and assessment of the Army’s capability and capacity to align
combat brigades or other units with regional combatant commands?

The Army is in the process of developing its Regionally Aligned Force concept and is conducting
a “proof of principle” with a brigade combat team aligned to AFRICOM in Fiscal Year 2013.
The Army’s objective is to enhance its support of combatant commanders. Regionally Aligned
Force brigades receive training in culture, geography, language, and gain an understanding of the
militaries they will engage during their mission alignment.

What are your views, if any, on the use of general purpose forces for missions providing
security force assistance to other nations’ militaries?

Iraq and Afghanistan have proven that general purpose forces are fully capable of providing
significant security force assistance to partner nations. As we reduce the rotational requirement
to combat areas we can use these forces to great effect in Africa. General Purpose Forces will
have to be fully flexible to do their primary mission and to work in the area of security
cooperation and security force assistance.

In your view, how should, if at all, a unit’s regional alignment determine the assignment of
personnel, selection of unit commanders, priority for cultural and language training
compared to core combat training, and identification and acquisition of special equipment?

Regionally Aligned Forces units will be trained to conduct the full range of military operations,
but will also receive training in culture, geography, language, and gain an understanding of the
militaries they will engage during their mission alignment. The current Army Brigade Combat
Team structure will contain most of the skill sets required for training and equipping missions on
the African continent. Regionally Aligned Forces units will be able to “reach-back” into Division
and Corps assets in the U.S. for more specialized skills.

If confirmed, how would you propose to implement the use of regionally aligned forces in
support of your theater assistance and engagement strategies?

The Department of the Army has significant authorities in which they can employ Regionally
Aligned Forces in support of Geographic Combatant Commanders. Regionally Aligned Forces
can be employed for Theater Security Cooperation activities, operational planning, inspections,
coordination visits, and the conduct of exercises. If confirmed, I would find opportunities across
the continent and within planning efforts to incorporate the expanded capabilities and capacity of
the Regionally Aligned Forces within these authorities.

**In your view, how should funding responsibility be consolidated or distributed between the military departments and the combatant commands for training and employment of regionally aligned forces?**

Exercise and security cooperation activities funding is separate from service funds. Services exist to provide trained and ready forces. The regionally aligned forces should be no different. For the combatant commands, it will be necessary to include costs of using the Regionally Aligned Force units in security cooperation proposals utilizing authorities like 1206 (Counter-Terrorism) and 1207 (Security and Stabilization).

**In your view, is it feasible and suitable to satisfy theater engagement and assistance strategies completely with rotational forces? If not, why not?**

AFRICOM has successfully conducted operations, exercises and activities since its inception without permanently assigned forces. Like other commands, it plans and requests forces through the Global Force Management process.

What is your understanding and assessment of the performance criteria and metrics that are or will be used to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of combatant command theater engagement strategies and, if confirmed, how will you integrate the use of regionally aligned Army brigades or other units into the evaluation system?

Over the last four years AFRICOM has developed a comprehensive integrated assessment process linking all theater, regional and contingency plans - including all operations, exercises and security cooperation activities. The Command measures progress in achieving objectives and effects using a combination of indicators from multiple sources: the Department of Defense, other U.S. Government agencies, and numerous open-source international agencies - such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the African Union. The Command also relies on the Department of State to provide polling data from African citizens to add depth and breadth to the results. The Command uses correlation analysis of U.S. activities and resources with progress in the overall environment to shape and influence the planning and scheduling of future engagement activities. I look forward to continuing the best assessment practices at AFRICOM, and ensuring that future Command-wide assessments support decision-making both at the Command and throughout the Department of Defense.

**Global Peace Operation Initiative**

In 2005, the U.S. along with our partners in the G-8 launched the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) to train peacekeepers. This program is run by the Department of State’s Bureau of African Affairs. DoD has provided varying degrees of personnel support since the program’s inception. A number of national militaries in the AFRICOM AOR have benefited from this program and have provided peacekeeping troops to multilateral peacekeeping operations around the globe.

What is your understanding of the GPOI program?

Global Peace Operations Initiative is intended to address capacity gaps in forces supporting peacekeeping operations. Since its inception in 2004, the program’s goal is primarily to train and deploy peacekeepers. The program has shifted focus to help peacekeeping contributing countries
train and deploy themselves. The program focuses its effort in Africa, as it is the stage for several of the largest peacekeeping operations.

**Would you support or oppose AFRICOM’s continued involvement in the program?**

Based on my current understanding, I would support increased involvement in the Global Peace Operations Initiative. AFRICOM provides resources to Global Peace Operations Initiative to develop human capital and critical enablers to support United Nations /African Union peacekeeping. In the future, with additional funding, AFRICOM could increase support to build, planning capability, intelligence support, logistics capacity, skills training, peacekeeping staffs, and other efforts critical to the success of peacekeeping operations.

**If confirmed, will you advocate for AFRICOM to play a more direct role in providing U.S. military personnel (vice private contractors) for the training missions conducted under GPOI?**

Yes. To the extent military personnel are available. Integrating uniformed trainers provides a significant cost savings and improvement to the Global Peace Operations Initiative program while supporting Department of Defense and Department of State objectives to build the capacity of our partners. Initially I would support a hybrid contractor-military peacekeeping training model led by the State Department, coordinated with our country teams, and supported with military trainers, and transition to full uniformed support of Global Peace Operations Initiative in the future.

**Mass Atrocities Prevention**

President Obama identified the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide as a core U.S. national security interest, as well as a core moral interest, in August 2011 under Presidential Study Directive 10.

Among interagency partners, what is AFRICOM’s role in addressing atrocity threats, and what tools does AFRICOM have for preventing or responding to atrocities in its AOR?

AFRICOM is committed to preventing mass atrocities. General Ham highlighted the importance of this to the command by including building the capacity of African partners to prevent and protect their populations from mass atrocities in his Commander’s Intent. AFRICOM participates in and is a leader within the Mass Atrocities Prevention Response Options development construct within Department of Defense. The staff includes Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response planning into planning activities and includes such items as respect for the rule of law, submission to civil authority, and adherence to human rights norms into military-to-military engagements. This ultimately addresses the root causes of mass atrocities.

Has AFRICOM developed planning processes toward this effort so that it will be able to respond quickly in emergency situations? In your assessment, what country or countries are the most at risk for mass atrocities in Africa?

AFRICOM plans for a range of contingencies in support of U.S. national security policy and to prepare for possible crisis response scenarios. AFRICOM also pursues on-going efforts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, South Sudan and Central African Republic to prevent Mass Atrocities. In Liberia, the command is committed to building the Liberia Security Sector to prevent a repeat of their disastrous recent history.
Special Operations Authorities

It has been reported that Admiral McRaven, Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, is seeking changes to the Unified Command Plan (UCP) that he believes would allow SOCOM to better support the requirements of the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC). Reportedly, such changes would give the Commander of SOCOM combatant command authority over the TSOCs – including responsibilities for resourcing – and provide for more rapid deployment of special operations forces to and between geographic combatant commands without the requirement for approval by the Secretary of Defense in every case. Operational control of deployed special operations forces would reportedly remain with the respective geographic combatant commander.

Some have expressed concern that such changes could raise problems related to civilian control of the military, infringe upon the traditional authorities of the geographic combatant commanders, and make it more difficult for ambassadors and geographic combatant commanders to know what military personnel are coming into their areas of responsibility and what they are doing while they are there.

Please provide your assessment of whether such UCP changes would be appropriate and can be made without conflicting with civilian control of the military, infringing upon authorities provided to the geographic combatant commanders, or raising concerns with the Department of State.

This is a topic which will require further study. If confirmed, I will review Admiral McRaven’s recommended changes to the Unified Command Plan and provide an assessment back to this committee in a timely manner.

However, from my experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is critical that Special Operations Forces are fully integrated with conventional forces. This integration provides the commanders and forces a common operational picture, allows for a more proactive and responsive decision-making process, and access to shared resources.

Special Operations Forces

As forces have been reduced in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is an expectation that additional special operations forces may be available for missions in other combatant commands, including AFRICOM, which have had only a small presence of such forces in recent years.

What special operations capabilities are in highest demand by AFRICOM?

Given the complex strategic environment in Africa and the need for persistent, distributed, low visibility and small footprint operations, additional Special Operation Forces specifically organized, trained, and equipped to operate in sensitive environments are required. Special Operations Forces capabilities in highest demand include the following: (1) experienced special operations forces ground operators to build and maintain partner force counterterrorism capacity and enable their operations; (2) Special Operations Forces focused on enhancing partner nation non-lethal capabilities (e.g., Civil Affairs, Military Information Support Operation) to shape the information environment and create good will; (3) Special Operations Forces intelligence personnel and equipment (e.g., analysts, collectors, associated enablers) to better illuminate the
threat; and (4) Special Operations Forces non-standard, medium and vertical airlift (i.e., low signature, non-standard aviation, MC-130H, and MC-130P) to provide low signature movement across the continent, transport and resupply a crisis response force and extend the range of vertical lift platforms. Non Special Operations Forces assets required includes Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and Personnel Recovery/Casualty Evacuation rotary wing with associated enablers.

Which countries in the AFRICOM AOR do you believe have the greatest need for increased engagement with U.S. Special Operations Forces?

To achieve a Global Special Operations Forces Network, Special Operations Command AFRICA requires greater access and engagements throughout Africa. In order to optimize effectiveness and strengthen our African partners’ counterterrorism /counter Violent Extremist Organization capabilities necessitates greater engagements with the following key countries: Libya; Niger; Tunisia; Algeria; Mauritania; Nigeria; Mali; Cameroon; South Sudan; and Kenya. Greater collaboration and engagements within the aforementioned countries greatly furthers the U.S. government counter terrorism/counter violent extremist organizations efforts against the growing and interconnected al Qaeda threat throughout Northwest Africa and collaborative actions against al-Shabaab within East Africa.

In support of ongoing regional Counter-Lord's Resistance Army operations, U.S. Special Operations Forces are advising and assisting partner nation forces from Uganda, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Republic of South Sudan, in addition to a number of United Nations missions in the region, to find and remove Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army as a destabilizing force in the region.

While U.S. Special Operations Forces continues to build capacity in Counter-Lord's Resistance Army partner nation forces and has begun to assist the nascent African Union Regional Task Force, longer-term development of these forces may require an integrated Special Operations and Conventional Forces approach to mature the Africa Union Regional Task Forces as an institution and increase capacity of individual partner nation forces.

Special Operations Personnel in Embassies

U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) deploys personnel to work with country teams in a number of high priority countries where the United States is not engaged in direct action operations, but rather trying to train host nation security forces. Their mission is to support the priorities of the Ambassador and the combatant commander’s theater campaign plan. At times, Ambassadors have complained that they have not been adequately informed of activities by special operations forces in their country.

If confirmed, what do you intend to do to make sure the goals of special operations personnel deployed to these countries are aligned closely to those of the Ambassadors with whom they are working?

If confirmed, I will ensure the activities of special operations personnel, as well as all personnel, are coordinated with the embassy Chief of Mission. AFRICOM currently conducts this coordination by requiring Chief of Mission concurrence on operations, exercises and engagement activities.
Marine Security Guards in Embassies

Due to the attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya, which resulted in the death of a U.S. ambassador and three other Americans, many are conveying concern about the safety of U.S. diplomatic personnel around the world.

Do you share this concern?

Yes. The Marine Corps has a longstanding relationship with the Department of State to provide internal security at diplomatic posts. The Marine Security Guard Detachment Commander, acting under operational supervision of the Regional Security Officer, is tasked with providing internal security functions to prevent the compromise of classified information and equipment vital to the national security of the United States. A secondary mission of Marine Security Guard is to provide protection for U.S. citizens and U.S. government property located within diplomatic premises. Under certain emergency situations they will provide special protective services to the Chief of Mission or Principal Officer. These protocols have proven successful for the past several decades, and provide flexibility to Regional Security Officers for the employment of Marine Security Guards upon diplomatic posts.

The Marine Security Guard Program was established in 1946, and its mission, to provide internal security at designated embassies of classified information and equipment, remains unchanged to this day.

In light of increasing threats to U.S. diplomatic personnel by terrorists throughout the world, do you believe it is time to re-examine the Program’s mission and protocols?

I believe the Marine Security Guard Program, as defined under existing protocols between the Marine Corps and Department of State, functions well and meets the needs of our diplomatic missions around the world. However, based on changing security dynamics we are in the process of taking a look at what changes to the program might be necessary. I fully appreciate the importance of this mission and understand it is important to work closely with the Department of State to ensure our Marine Security Guard organization, mission and security protocols are responsive to their needs.

If so, should it be broadened to provide additional protection to U.S. diplomatic personnel?

At this time, I don’t believe the program should be broadened to provide additional protection to U.S. diplomatic personnel. However, the Marine Corps has a long history of working with the State Department, and should adjustments be required, will work eagerly to ensure the internal security functions aboard diplomatic premises meet the standards required.

In your opinion, what additional steps, if any, should be taken to reduce the risk of attacks on U.S. embassies and consulates and diplomatic personnel by terrorist organizations within Afghanistan and throughout the region?

We must continue to monitor threats to our diplomatic posts in Afghanistan and around the region, and adjust our security posture based on the threats and changing conditions on the ground. External security at our embassies and consulates is, first, the responsibility of the host nation and must remain so. In Afghanistan, we maintain a heightened security posture, and will continue to do so, in order to reduce risks commensurate with local threats and to advance the important work of our diplomatic personnel.
Demand for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities of every kind has grown exponentially in recent years largely due to the enhanced situational awareness and targeting capabilities they bring to our commanders. Almost all of the geographic combatant commands have validated ISR requirements that are not being met.

What is your understanding of the support AFRICOM is currently receiving to respond to its ISR requirements?

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets are a scarce resource and should be allocated based on threat. My understanding is AFRICOM does not receive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to meet its requirement. However, Department of Defense has provided additional assets to meet specific needs for operations such as in response to recent attacks in North Africa. This year, AFRICOM will receive additional intelligence capabilities to include multi-intelligence Global Hawks, foliage penetration, and counter-improvised explosive device technologies.

AFRICOM receives only about 7% of its total intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance requirements. However, in response to the recent attack in North Africa, AFRICOM is currently getting about 50% of its stated need for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in North Africa. AFRICOM’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance requirements are supported by the Air Force, the Navy, and the National Intelligence Community. The services provide AFRICOM with a wide variety of intelligence capability. Predator, Pilatus fixed wing aircraft, and Scan Eagle provide full motion video. EP-3 Orion and other maritime assets provide signals intelligence. Seaborne assets provide tactical intelligence capability as well as a forward staging area for MQ-8 unmanned helicopter, and Scan Eagle. Joint Surveillance and Target Attack aircraft provide ground moving target indicator capability. Global Hawk provides long-dwell, long-range imagery.

While AFRICOM is allocated a wide variety of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, current allocation does not provide sufficient quantity or sensor mix to achieve the objectives which the Joint Staff directed to AFRICOM.

Do you believe the threat emanating from AFRICOM’s AOR should garner additional resources from within DoD? If so, how do you intend to advocate for additional ISR assets?

Yes, I believe additional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities are necessary to protect American interest and assist our close allies and partners. The recent crises in North Africa demonstrate the volatility of the African security environment. As the U.S. makes significant progress against al-Qaeda on many fronts, huge pockets of ungoverned spaces and unstable security situations have provided a safe haven for al-Qaeda, its allies and affiliates. Al-Qaeda has taken advantage of the poor security situation in Libya, easy access to weapons, and the rebellion in Mali to establish deep roots throughout North and West Africa. While significant progress has been made in Somalia, an increasingly desperate al-Shabaab has turned to Improvised Explosive Device attacks against our African partners. Additionally, Boko Haram carried out hundreds of Improvised Explosive Device attacks in Nigeria. Finally, kidnapping for ransom continues to be a significant concern in Somalia and Mali.

If confirmed, I will request additional assets through the global force management process to take advantage of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance resources as we draw down in
Afghanistan. Until Global Force Management allocation meets requirements, I will continue to leverage contract and experimental intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and look to the broader Research and Development community for innovative solutions to unique AFRICOM requirements.

Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)

What is your understanding of the mission of CJTF-HOA and its command relationship to AFRICOM?

Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa is a subordinate command of AFRICOM. Its mission is to protect, defend, and promote the national security interests of the United States by conducting military operations to prevail in our current and future operations against violent extremist organizations and other transnational threats, and strengthens the capabilities of our East African Partner Nation militaries and regional security organizations in order to assist East African Nations to create security environments that promote security and stability within their country borders and throughout the region.

How do its roles and responsibilities compare with AFRICOM's service component commands?

Unlike the service specific and functional commands, Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa is focused on a specific geographic area of operation – the East Africa Combined – Joint Operations Area Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa is directed by AFRICOM to plan, coordinate, synchronize, direct and assess operations, exercises, security cooperation activities and engagements with AFRICOM components and Special Operations Command Africa along six lines of effort: Counter Violent Extremist Organizations; Strengthen Defense Capabilities; Prepare and Respond to Crisis; Counter-Piracy; Counter Illicit Trafficking; and Maintain Strategic Posture.

How does AFRICOM ensure that CJTF-HOA activities complement rather than conflict with activities being conducted by AFRICOM's service components?

AFRICOM has published an East Africa campaign plan with Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa designated as the supported command.

What are the most effective metrics to measure the impact of CJTF-HOA’s efforts to date?

Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa is currently developing a formal set of assessment criteria to measure the impact of their efforts.

Currently, the metrics used to measure the impact of Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa effort includes the diminished effectiveness and ability of extremist organizations to operate in East Africa, the increased capability, willingness, and partnership of East African nations to eliminate extremist organizations, and the ability and capability of East African nations to respond to crisis, protecting U.S. interests in the region.

Maritime Security

Maritime security has proven to be a significant issue on the coasts of West and East Africa.
What is your assessment of AFRICOM’s ongoing maritime security initiatives?

My understanding is AFRICOM has seen some success in maritime security initiatives. There have been several recent, positive developments in this area as a result of AFRICOM’s initiatives, especially in the Gulf of Guinea. These initiatives are also US interagency efforts, especially in conjunction with the Department of State. In particular, the command’s effort to assist the Economic Community of Central African States and the Economic Community of West African States in developing a legal and operational framework for regional cooperation was a positive development. This assistance, requested by Economic Community of Central African States and Economic Community of West African States, will improve the ability of these states to meet the significant challenges of illicit maritime activity, including piracy, drug, arms, and human trafficking, and threats to energy and port security which potentially have a negative impact on economic development. These transnational threats directly impact the quality of life of the population and affect U.S. national interests. These regional problems are best addressed with regional solutions. If confirmed, I will continue to assess these programs and seek opportunities to build upon these positive steps with our African partners.

Very few African countries have the capacity to project naval forces beyond their coastal waters; as a result, the economic exclusion zones of many coastal African countries are exploited by a variety of international actors.

What opportunities, if any, do you see for expanded U.S. engagement on maritime security in the AFRICOM AOR?

There are many opportunities to expand AFRICOM’s maritime engagement. AFRICOM is seeking to include more partners in these maritime security efforts to include the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations; International Organizations such as the United Nations and African Union; and Regional Organizations such as Economic Community of Central African States and Economic Community of West African States. There is also an opportunity to expand beyond the shores of Africa to include developing closer coordination and cooperation on activities and events that have transatlantic impact from South America and the Caribbean, through Africa and into Europe. Illicit maritime trafficking has global reach and impact which and can be addressed by closer cooperation between hemispheres (North, South, East, and West).

This multinational approach is already happening in the Navy’s Africa Partnership Station, AFRICOM teams with our African and other enduring partners to conduct training, exercises and operations like African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership. For example, Naval Forces Africa has completed five deployments by U.S. ships along with deployments of ships from several European nations. My current understanding is that on the whole, our African partners are very satisfied and have requested more support.

For the past two years AFRICOM, in conjunction with the Department of State and the African Center for Strategic Studies, has been working to enable countries to develop national maritime strategies that foster rule of law, emphasize good governance and support economic development. In addition several countries, such as Ghana and Mozambique have requested AFRICOM support to develop plans to respond to threats to security of offshore oil production facilities and transport vessels.

These challenges present opportunities to enable African countries to guard their own waters and manage their valuable offshore resources. The freedom of commerce along the strategically
important maritime transportation corridors is an African, U.S., and global shared interest. If confirmed, I plan to continue the process of cooperation with U.S. Government agencies and international partners, and seek to enhance and continue the programs and activities that build partner maritime security capacity.

**China**

**In your view, do China and the United States share common security objectives in the AFRICOM AOR?**

In my opinion, China and the U.S. should cooperate on issues of mutual interest, such as counter-terrorism, and on other projects that satisfy both countries’ objectives.

**In your opinion, what effect has China’s engagement with African militaries had on those militaries and on U.S. security interests?**

My understanding is China offers military equipment to African countries at prices that each country can afford, and training at Chinese military schools is often completely subsidized. While in many cases the equipment available from China may be older and less technologically advanced than what other countries can offer, this equipment provides African militaries with more “bang for the buck” than they might be able to afford from any other source, while having the added perceived benefit of coming without ties, such as Western concern about human rights and democracy. Chinese equipment and training has been known to complement U.S. activities, however, for example by providing a baseline for militaries that move on to Africa Contingency Operations Training & Assistance peacekeeping training and participate in UN peacekeeping operations.

**To what extent do you view China's activities on the continent as a threat/challenge to U.S. national security interests?**

In my opinion, we should seek to cooperate with China where we have mutual interests. China acts on the basis of “non-interference in internal affairs,” which means the country does not restrict its arms sales as a result of concerns about how the purchasing country behaves internationally or with respect to its own citizens. As a result, China does not discriminate against countries on the edge of instability or those with poor human rights records against their own people. However, China is not actively targeting U.S. interests, activities, or personnel so it is not a direct threat.

**Are United States policies in Africa sufficient to counter China's influence when that is appropriate, or are there additional measures we should be considering? What role should AFRICOM play in this regard?**

In my opinion, current U.S. policies are sufficient to address the influence of China in Africa. It is important to look for and capitalize on areas of mutual national interest between our two countries. For example, solid opportunities exist for cooperation with counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Guinea. Additionally, the Chinese conduct training and have programs that are similar in nature to ours, but there is very limited coordination or cooperation on these efforts. If and when our national interests align, AFRICOM should work to coordinate these efforts if possible in order to better develop our African partners and increase the security on the continent.
**Do you foresee China’s growing energy and resource demands affecting security developments in Africa?**

China gets significant energy and natural resources from Africa and would be reluctant to allow those levels to decline. As a result of China’s interest in gaining international respect and support, it is more inclined to use diplomacy and negotiation to maintain this desired level of resources. In one recent example with Sudan and South Sudan, China attempted to mediate between the two countries when oil production was shut down over a dispute regarding past and future dispensation of oil revenues.

**Section 1208 Funding**

Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375), as amended, gave U.S. Special Operations Command the authority to provide support (including training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism.

**What is your assessment of this authority?**

Section 1208, within the context of its authority, has proved to be one of the most responsive and flexible tools to meet AFRICOM security challenges. This authority allows AFRICOM to enable partner nations who share the common goal of countering the violent extremist organizations threat in the region. AFRICOM is responsible to identify and engage the "right" partner unit which is capable and willing to conduct counter terrorism operations against violent extremist organizations threats. To do this requires close coordination with both the regional country teams as well as the legitimate government officials, both civilian and military. It is essential that all parties understand and agree to the common threat picture and have a displayed willingness to act against those threats.

Section 1208 is not a capacity building authority. The purpose of the funding is to better enable those units that are legitimate representatives of our partner nation. In some cases, such as Libya, those units may be "deputized" militias.

**Do you believe this authority has been appropriately utilized in Africa?**

Yes. It has been used appropriately in Africa. The successes in east Africa, specifically the visible improvements made against al-Shabaab in Somalia, is a reflection of using this line of funding. All activities were conducted with complete transparency and in full coordination with our Interagency Partners in the region. Additional details require a higher classification.

However, there is room to expand this authority to achieve focused effects against the threat. As Special Operations Command continues to resource and enable the Theater Special Operations Command and those enhanced capabilities come available, expansion of the 1208 authority against al Qaeda will provide opportunistic, disciplined, small footprint, high-impact special operations forces the ability to maximize the use of this authority.

**If confirmed, how would you seek to have this authority used in Africa?**

I will continue to identify those partner nations who are actively pursuing operations to counter the violent extremist organizations threat stream in Northwest Africa. The countries of Libya,
Niger, and Mauritania are actively countering the threat stream emanating out of northern Mali. Ideally, AFRICOM would partner with those units who are actively conducting Counter-terrorism / Counter violent extremist organizations operations to better enable their efforts.

Within the capabilities of the Theater Special Operations Command, I would seek to expand the use of the 1208 authority by continuing to develop and socialize concepts of operation focused on isolating and degrading the threat network across the continent to achieve U.S. counterterrorism objectives.

**Africa Health Related Issues**

Health issues are a significant concern in many African nations and in their militaries and the U.S. Government’s engagement strategy in Africa includes an emphasis on health-related issues.

**To what extent should AFRICOM be involved in broader U.S. Government “health diplomacy” efforts in Africa?**

First, AFRICOM should continue to synchronize Department of Defense health engagement on the continent to achieve optimum results. Simultaneously, AFRICOM should coordinate its health engagement with other parts of the U.S. government to ensure maximum impact.

AFRICOM is already doing that in a number of areas. Programs like the Partner Military Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection / Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Prevention Program and our Pandemic Response Program are good examples. Partner Military Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection / Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Prevention Program, implemented by the Department of Defense Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection / Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Prevention Program’s office is primarily funded by the President’s Emergency Plan for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Relief and executed in collaboration with agencies like Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Commerce, Department of Labor and Peace Corps in 41 African countries.

AFRICOM’s Pandemic Response Program, currently being implemented in 17 Africa Countries, was funded by U.S. Agency for International Development from 2008 to 2012. The program is now funded by Department of Defense but is still implemented in collaboration with Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development and Center for Disease Control. Similarly, the AFRICOM’s malaria initiative with partner militaries in East Africa (and soon in West Africa) is coordinated with the President’s Malaria Initiative in target countries (same partners as above). Additionally, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s bio surveillance program, working with AFRICOM, is coordinating with U.S. Department of Agriculture, Department of State, and U.S. Agency for International Development.

**In your view, should AFRICOM’s engagement strategy, perhaps more than other combatant command engagement strategies, include an emphasis on military health engagement?**

Comparisons across combatant command geographical areas of operation are difficult due to the number of cultures and economies being engaged. But, the conditions of many partner nation militaries in Africa are such that without improved health intervention (improved nutrition, better
disease prevention, care and treatment) these militaries will be less able to deploy in their own countries, much less in peacekeeping operations. As a result, AFRICOM has included health and medical engagement in our strategies with many partners in Africa.

How much success has DoD had in efforts to support prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS in African militaries?

Africa Command's military Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection /Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome program is aimed at mitigating the impacts of the disease on African military readiness. The program includes activities that help prevent the escalation of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection /Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome infection rates within African security forces, and provide care and treatment for the service members and families infected or affected by the disease. DOD activities that support African militaries' fight against Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection /Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome now reach 41 African countries.

During FY 2011, the command's programs reached 508,000 African troops and family members with prevention messages, and provided counseling and testing services for 412,000 service members and their families. Almost 4,000 health care workers have received Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection /Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome training. Approximately 43,000 individuals are on antiretroviral treatment as a result of these collaborative efforts. The fight against Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection /Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome in Africa is having an impact. A leader of a southern African country remarked that, three years ago, he was conducting burials everyday for a Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection related death; however, today he conducts one burial every eight to ten days.

Other indicators of success include; 17,923 males were circumcised as part of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection prevention efforts; 96,558 eligible adults and children were provided with a minimum of one care service; 68,237 Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection positive adults and children received a minimum of one clinical service; 29,856 HIV-positive persons received cotrimoxazole prophylaxis.

If confirmed, how, if at all, would you like to see such efforts increased or programmatically altered?

If confirmed, I would assess the programs before recommending changes. Current programs are effective and favor greater efforts in Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection prevention and treatment.

In your view, what should DoD’s role be in the program relative to other elements of the U.S. Government?

Health and Humanitarian Assistance efforts require a “whole of government” approach. Department of Defense and its organizations bring a wide range of capabilities to the table and when properly coordinated the U.S. government efforts are greatly enhanced without expense to national security. It is important that the balance be maintained. In AFRICOM’s case these efforts provide it with additional access to partner nations and enhance positive perceptions of our military.
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response in AFRICOM

The Department of Defense has developed comprehensive policies and procedures to improve the prevention and response to incidents of sexual assault. However, new allegations of sexual assault continue to be reported, and many question the adequacy of the chain of command’s response to these allegations.

A frequent complaint of victims of sexual assault and their advocates is that military commanders frequently fail to hold assailants accountable for their criminal acts. Some in Congress have proposed that commanders’ authority to address sexual assaults be removed and given to an independent entity.

What is your view of the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program in AFRICOM?

It is my understanding that the program is effective in AFRICOM. The program addresses the needs of the combatant command staff by providing trained, in-house Victim Advocates that work hand-in-hand with the garrison Sexual Harassment/Assault Response & Prevention coordinator. The Stuttgart garrison support agencies provide training, guidance and support the Victim Advocates efforts and directly address the needs of victims. Supporting agencies also include Family Advocacy, the Provost Marshalls Office, Army Criminal Investigation Division, medical personnel and others as required to ensure program compliance and the needs of the victim are met.

What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources in AFRICOM to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?

Although the command’s primary support is garrison based, all indications are the training and resources are adequate to respond appropriately to allegations of sexual assault.

What is your view of the proposal to give the authority to an independent agency, not part of the chain of command, to address allegations of sexual assault, including the authority to hold assailants accountable for criminal acts?

The services recently changed the level of commander with Uniform Code of Military Justice authority over these types of cases and this change should be assessed before making further changes.

Giving authority to an independent agency could undermine command authority by sending the message the commander cannot be trusted to make a fair and impartial assessment.

What is your understanding of the adequacy of the resources and programs in place in AFRICOM to offer victims of sexual assault the medical, psychological, and legal help that they need?

U.S. Army Garrison Stuttgart is the lead agent to provide these services to the staff and they have the core functions in place to support AFRICOM members. They have shown a sincere spirit of teaming with the command to take care of our personnel.

Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting, to be effective?
Yes. The policies and procedures seem effective. Confidential reporting provides an option for those who wish to seek assistance while maintaining confidentiality.

**What is your view of steps taken to prevent sexual assaults in AFRICOM?**

AFRICOM works in synchronization with the victim advocates. Training is highlighted and conducted by senior leaders in small groups to discuss troops’ responsibility to stop activities that lead to heightened possibility of sexual assaults. Additionally, the garrison is examining the infrastructure and facilities to identify mitigation measures in the barracks and other areas.

**Quality-of-Life Challenges in AFRICOM**

**What quality-of-life challenges are unique for personnel and their families assigned to the AFRICOM area of responsibility?**

The lack of reliable infrastructure on the African continent presents unique quality of life challenges for our personnel and their families. Among these challenges are unreliable broadband internet, sporadic postal service access, shortages of essential goods, varying degrees of host nation medical care and schooling capabilities. There is a relatively small AFRICOM personnel footprint in our African embassies—of the thirty-six staffed, there are fewer than 200 personnel in both accompanied and unaccompanied tours.

Additionally, there are approximately 5,000 unaccompanied personnel on the continent at any given time, and the command conducts a variety of outreach and educational activities such as travel clinics to impart proper respect for, and adherence to, the unique medical and safety requirements of our area of responsibility.

**If confirmed, how would you address these theater-wide challenges to help improve the quality-of-life for these personnel and their families?**

The Command invests in productive partnerships with service components and supporting non-governmental agencies. Army morale, welfare, and recreation activities are proactive – providing large mobile support kits containing exercise and recreation equipment, games, lounge items, and electronic equipment to support our service members. As always, AFRICOM also receives superb support from the Red Cross, the United Services Organization, and other organizations with the mission of supporting America’s uniform personnel. I will continue to invest in, and encourage these relationships. For school issues, we work closely with the Department of Defense Education Activity to ensure military dependents get quality education on the continent. U.S. Transportation Command facilitates medical evacuation service capability for military personnel and their families on the continent.

**Mental Health of Servicemembers and Stress on the Force**

The Committee is concerned about the stress on military personnel resulting from lengthy and repeated deployments and their access to mental health care to deal with this increased stress. The suicide rates in each of the Services are clear reminders that service members, particularly those who have been deployed multiple times, are under tremendous stress and need access to mental health care.

**In your view, are there sufficient mental health assets in AFRICOM to address the mental health needs of the military personnel and their families?**
Yes. I believe there are adequate Mental Health resources in the Stuttgart Army Garrison Community to appropriately address the needs of the headquarters staff and their family members. For example, AFRICOM is particularly pleased with the response to Department of Defense Military and Family Life Consultant Program. Through the Military and Family Life Consultant Program, licensed clinical providers assist service members, civilians, and their families by providing brief, solution-focused problem solving support. They work in support of and in conjunction with existing military entities/services. There are no records kept and contact with Military and Family Life Consultant Program is anonymous with the exceptions of allegations made of harm to self, others, allegations of domestic abuse, sexual assault and child abuse. The role of the consultant is unique—they are not traditional therapists. The primary Military and Family Life Consultant Program role is to assess needs, provide support, or refer as necessary. Among the service they provide is assistance to service members, civilians, and families with development of an action plans. For example, in Djibouti, usage statistics indicate eight contacts are made on an average day, and the program there will gain a second consultant to serve that population. The command is also pleased with the services provided by our local Army health care providers and the medical services in the local community, as well as Military OneSource.

If confirmed, what actions will you take to address the mental health needs of military personnel and their families in AFRICOM?

If confirmed, I will continue to place an emphasis in ensuring that behavioral health services are available to our service members and their families. I recognize that we must foster a culture that facilitates an awareness of the impact of behavioral health issues on individual service members, families, units, and our military communities.

This awareness starts from the top leadership and extends down to each individual assigned to the command. I will continue to engage to ensure we maintain an interdisciplinary approach to addressing the behavioral health needs of the force. This includes increasing the effectiveness of health surveillance, detection and response efforts to identify, refer, and treat service members and families at risk; reducing cultural stigma associated with seeking behavioral healthcare and developing resiliency and coping skills that foster help-seeking behavior among our service members and their families.

I will leverage policies and programs that assist service members suffering from physical and behavioral health conditions. The starting point at every level is education and training. I will also empower all Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, Airman, and Civilian personnel to act as sensors for leadership by noticing small changes in behavior and taking action early. These efforts encourage unit strength, resilience, and readiness. I will encourage that service and family members to seek mental health assistance when needed.

Do you have any views on how to reduce the stigma, real or perceived, for seeking mental health care?

We have taken conscious steps to adjust policy to reduce stigma by facilitating culture change within our force through continued education and by continuing to enhance the support network for service members who may be at risk. I will continue to emphasize the importance of assessing the need for behavioral health services at key transition points to include redeployment, reintegration, and service members to civilian transition. I will also continue to emphasize the need for behavioral health screening during routine periodic health and wellness exams. I will
encourage social support and awareness of behavioral health programs which, through buddy or peer-to-peer involvement, has been successful in increasing behavioral health treatment-seeking among Veterans. Additionally, increased social support may also lead to stigma reduction.

**Congressional Oversight**

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

Yes

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, AFRICOM?

Yes

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes