

**Advance Questions for Admiral John M. Richardson, USN**  
**Nominee for the Position of Chief of Naval Operations**

**Defense Reforms**

**Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 provisions? If so, what modifications do you believe would be appropriate?**

Goldwater-Nichols was revolutionary in its time and has helped to transform the Department of Defense. However, much has changed in the past 30 years in both the Joint Force and the security environment. As such, I believe a review would be useful. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy if such a review were undertaken.

**Duties**

**Section 5033 of title 10, United States Code, describes the duties of Chief of Naval Operations and requires that the person nominated to fill the job have had significant experience in joint duty assignments, including at least one full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment as a flag officer.**

**What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Chief of Naval Operations?**

Under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations is responsible for organizing, training and equipping forces that will be provided to combatant, fleet and component commanders; serves as the primary maritime advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense; is the senior Uniformed Leader of the Navy; and represents the Navy on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**What background and experience, including joint duty assignments, do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?**

My career has afforded me a broad range of experience as a Naval Officer and Joint Warfighter. I have been privileged to command the submarine USS Honolulu, Submarine Development Squadron 12, Submarine Group 8, Submarine Allied Naval Forces South, Naval Submarine Forces, and served as the Director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program.

My Joint assignments included the Naval Aide to the President, the Assistant Deputy Director for Regional Operations on the Joint Staff, and the Director of Strategy (J5) for U.S. Joint Forces Command.

I have also served on a number of Navy staffs including U.S. Pacific Fleet, the Navy Staff, and U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa.

**Do you meet the joint requirements for the position, including at least one full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment, or did you require a waiver?**

I meet the Joint requirements for the position.

**Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Chief of Naval Operations?**

No.

### **Relationships**

**Other sections of law and traditional practice establish important relationships between the Chief of Naval Operations and other officials. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Chief of Naval Operations to the following officials:**

#### **Secretary of Defense**

The Secretary of Defense is the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense. As a Service Chief and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) is a military adviser to the Secretary of Defense, particularly regarding matters of naval warfare, policy, and strategy.

#### **Deputy Secretary of Defense**

The Deputy Secretary of Defense, on occasion, serves as acting Secretary in the absence of the Secretary. During these periods, the CNO's relationship with the Deputy Secretary will essentially be the same as with the Secretary. The Deputy Secretary is also responsible for the day-to-day operation of the Department of Defense. If confirmed, I will endeavor to interact regularly with the Deputy Secretary to provide my best possible professional military advice and the same level of support as I would the Secretary.

#### **The Under Secretaries of Defense**

Under current DoD Directives, Under Secretaries of Defense coordinate and exchange information with DoD components, to include the Services, in the functional areas under their

cognizance. If confirmed as CNO, I will respond and reciprocate, and use this exchange of information as I communicate with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide military advice to the Secretary of Defense.

### **The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

The CNO is a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, as such, works with and through the Chairman in the execution of duties. Along with the other Service Chiefs, if confirmed I will be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tasked with the responsibility for actively reviewing and evaluating military matters and offering professional military advice to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense.

### **The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

When functioning as the Acting Chairman, the Vice Chairman's relationship with Combatant Commanders is that of the Chairman. Also, the Vice Chairman has the same rights and obligations as other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I would exchange views with the Vice Chairman on any defense matter considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Vice Chairman also heads or has a key role on many boards that affect readiness and programs and, therefore, the preparedness of naval forces. If confirmed, I will establish a close relationship with the Vice Chairman on these critical issues.

### **The Secretary of the Navy**

The CNO is responsible, under the Secretary of the Navy for providing properly organized, trained, and equipped forces to support Combatant Commanders in the accomplishment of their missions. In addition, the CNO assists the Secretary of the Navy in the development of plans and recommendations for the operation of the Department of the Navy. The Navy enjoys a productive, collaborative environment within the Department, and if confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the Navy to perpetuate it.

### **The Under Secretary of the Navy**

The Under Secretary of the Navy is the principal assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and is first in line of succession. The Under Secretary performs such duties, and exercises such powers, as the Secretary shall direct. If confirmed, I look forward to establishing a close relationship with the Under Secretary to achieve the Secretary's goals.

### **The Assistant Secretaries of the Navy**

The Assistant Secretaries of the Navy work with the Under Secretary to achieve the Secretary's goals. Like the Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretaries perform such duties, and exercise such

powers, as the Secretary shall direct. If confirmed, I will work with the Assistant Secretaries to achieve the Secretary's goals.

### **The General Counsel of the Navy**

The General Counsel of the Navy serves as legal advisor to the Department of the Navy and performs such functions as the Secretary of the Navy shall direct and as necessary to provide for the proper application of the law and effective delivery of legal services within the Department. If confirmed, I will work closely with the General Counsel to achieve the Secretary's goals.

### **The Judge Advocate General of the Navy**

Under 10 USC § 5148(d), the Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the Navy performs duties relating to any and all Department of Navy legal matters assigned by Secretary of the Navy. The JAG provides and supervises the provision of all legal advice and related services throughout the Department of the Navy, except for the advice and services provided by the General Counsel. It is important that the CNO receive independent legal advice from his senior uniformed judge advocates. If confirmed, I will work closely with the JAG and seek the JAG's legal advice.

### **The Commandant of the Marine Corps**

A unique historical and operational relationship exists between the Navy and the Marine Corps. Many of our capabilities, programs, and personnel issues are inextricably linked. Our forces deploy together, and both must be ready on arrival. If confirmed as CNO, my relationship with the Commandant of the Marine Corps must be exceptionally close and I will be committed to making every facet of the Navy-Marine Corps team stronger.

### **The Chief of the Navy Reserve**

Under 10 USC § 5143, the Chief of the Navy Reserve serves on the staff of the CNO and is the principal adviser on Navy Reserve matters to the CNO and is the commander of the Navy Reserve Force. The Chief of the Navy Reserve has an essential role in advising CNO of Navy Reserve capabilities alignment to Navy's Total Force mission and operations. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the Chief of the Navy Reserve to continue and enhance the vast progress and Total Force synergies we have achieved.

### **The Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force**

Our Armed Forces must work together to recognize each other's strengths and to complement each other's capabilities. We must achieve and maintain synergy in warfare, training, and procurement to ensure each Service contributes optimally to Joint and combined operations. If confirmed, I am committed to working with my counterparts to enhance Joint interoperability

and other aspects of the Joint relationship in order to improve the war fighting capabilities of the United States.

### **The Combatant Commanders**

The CNO's responsibility as a Service Chief is to provide properly organized, trained, and equipped forces to the Combatant Commanders to accomplish their military missions. If confirmed, I will work to foster close working relationships with the Unified and Specified Combatant Commanders.

### **Major Challenges and Priorities**

**In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Chief of Naval Operations?**

The international security situation is becoming more demanding and complex as both state and non-state actors challenge our national interests. Simultaneously, we face an era of fiscal challenges and uncertainty. Against this backdrop, the principal focus of the next CNO will be to provide relevant, ready naval forces to meet today's challenges, as well as to modernize the Navy to protect America's interests in the future.

**Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?**

If confirmed, I will remain focused on providing adaptable, agile, and effective war fighting capabilities. Working with the fleet commanders and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, I will continue to work to establish a sustainable forward presence that is consistent with our force structure and can quickly respond to crises and deter conflict. As well I will work to ensure that the Navy, operating as part of the Joint Force, will remain capable of winning in conflict should deterrence fail.

As we address increasingly complex security challenges, the Navy has an obligation to deliver present and future capability in a fiscally responsible manner. I will work diligently with leadership to ensure that we deliver the most effective Navy possible for the resources we are provided. This must include close oversight to drive out inefficiencies and waste.

Finally, the Navy's success depends on attracting and retaining high quality people. I will devote myself to enhancing the Navy's ability to develop leaders – for today and tomorrow. This must include a comprehensive approach that provides opportunity for each member of the Navy to reach their full potential, that develops a diverse and adaptable force, and that supports our Navy families who share in the sacrifice to strengthen our nation.

**Recognizing that challenges, anticipated and unforeseen, will drive your priorities to a substantial degree, if confirmed, what other priorities, beyond those associated with the major challenges you identified above, would you set for your term as Chief of Naval Operations?**

If confirmed, I would look forward to more fully exploiting the electromagnetic spectrum and to harnessing the potential of revolutionary advances in information technologies.

### **Most Serious Problems**

**What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the execution of the functions of the Chief of Naval Operations?**

For any Chief of Naval Operations, there is always the challenge of balancing the need for the Navy to be ready today and the need to modernize for the future. This tension is more acute today because we face uniquely complex problems in both the security and fiscal environments – as the security demands increase, the resources to address these demands are harder to obtain.

Exacerbating these diverging trends, the environment demands faster and faster responses – as a result we absolutely must be more agile.

**If confirmed, what management actions and associated timelines would you establish to address these problems?**

Becoming more agile and responsive is relevant in every dimension of the CNO's responsibilities – organizing, training, and equipping. If confirmed, I would look forward to working with Defense Department leadership and the Congress to improve our Navy's responsiveness.

### **Organize, Train, and Equip Responsibility**

**The Chief of Naval Operations is responsible for organizing, training and equipping forces provided to fleet and component commanders, including the prioritization of funding and effort to meet these needs in the near term, while developing capabilities for the far term.**

**How would you characterize your experience in force management and capability requirement decisions?**

I have years of relevant experience in this area. By virtue of my time as Commander, Submarine Development Squadron 12, and Commander, Submarine Forces, I am very familiar with providing ready forces and capabilities to meet Combatant Commander demands. Through my time as Commander, Submarine Group Eight, and Deputy Commander, US Sixth Fleet, I am familiar with defining and requesting forces and capabilities to execute Combatant Commander

responsibilities. Finally, as a member of the Joint Staff serving in J3 during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, I was responsible for adjudicating all Combatant Commander requests with the ability of the services to provide forces and capabilities.

**What innovative ideas are you considering for organizing, training and equipping the Navy?**

I anticipate a sustained focus on how the Navy can continue to improve both the process and substance of how it organizes, trains, and equips its forces. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretaries of the Navy and Defense, as well as with the Congress, to develop initiatives in each of these areas.

### **Security Strategies and Guidance**

**How would you characterize current trends in the range and diversity of threats to national security we face today?**

As Dr. Kissinger testified in January, I believe that the traditional power and state structures in many areas of the world are being challenged by different models of governance and power. This trend is manifesting itself concurrent with advances in technology that allow both state and non-state actors – even individuals – to act with increasing range, precision, and speed. The Navy faces an increasing array of diverse threats that will challenge our superiority and hamper our access and ability to operate around the world.

**The Defense Strategic Guidance issued January 2012 took into account a \$487 billion dollar reduction in defense resources.**

**With the additional \$500 billion in cuts to the Department of Defense as a result of sequestration, is the Defense Strategic Guidance still valid?**

The FY 2016 President's Budget Request is the minimum funding necessary in order to execute the Defense Strategic Guidance and 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Should the budget be cut below the PB16 levels, the defense strategy would need to be revised.

**In your view, as Russian aggression and the emergence of ISIL have occurred since the Defense Strategic Guidance was issued in January 2012, is that strategic guidance still appropriate for the threats we face today or do you think an update is warranted?**

The guidance in the Defense Strategic Guidance and the Quadrennial Defense Review remains relevant. No strategy will ever be able to anticipate all surprises. This reality reinforces the imperative to continue to do our best strategic thinking even as we develop forces that can remain balanced, responsive, and adaptive to unforeseen challenges.

**In your view, is our defense strategy and current establishment optimally structured, with the roles and missions of the military departments appropriately distributed, and U.S. forces properly armed, trained, and equipped to meet security challenges the Nation faces today and into the next decade?**

I believe our strategy and structure is essentially sound. The reality of a dynamic security and fiscal environment demands that both our strategy and structure be continually assessed and adapted. Of particular concern is the need to remain ready today and to modernize for tomorrow in a fiscally constrained environment.

**If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to the capabilities, structure, roles, and missions of the defense establishment?**

If confirmed, I will continue to examine options that increase the adaptability and agility of current and planned Naval forces to further enhance the natural advantages they offer through their forward presence and responsiveness. I would also look forward to working with other leaders across the defense enterprise to identify additional areas where we can improve our ability to address a broadening range of challenges. I see the need to reconstitute our nuclear deterrent forces and to fully exploit the potential of information technologies as areas of particular priority.

#### **Military Capabilities in Support of Defense Strategy**

**In your opinion, do current military plans include the necessary capabilities to meet the defense strategy stated in the 2014 QDR? Please identify areas of higher risk.**

The FY 2016 President's Budget provides for the minimum necessary capabilities to meet the defense strategy stated in the 2014 QDR, albeit with considerable risk. The strategic environment is very dynamic. If confirmed, I will remain personally involved to ensure that maximize the Navy's capability within available resources and to provide leadership with my most accurate and timely assessment of the Navy's ability to meet strategic objectives.

**Does the 2014 QDR specify the correct set of capabilities to decisively win in future high-end engagements?**

I believe so. This is an extremely dynamic environment, and if confirmed, I will remain personally engaged to ensure that I maximize the Navy's capabilities within available resources and provide leadership with my most accurate assessment of the Navy's ability to win in a high-end fight.

**According to the force sizing construct in the 2014 QDR, American forces should be able to “defeat a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased campaign, and deny the objectives of – or impose unacceptable costs on – another aggressor in another region.” In your opinion, does the Department’s force sizing construct provide adequate capability to address the country’s current threat environment?**

Currently yes. But after three years of budget shortfalls and a high operating tempo, the Navy currently operates with considerable risk in its ability to fully execute this warfighting mission in accordance with existing plans. The FY 2016 President’s Budget Request begins to put the Navy on a path to recovery. If confirmed, I will work with my fellow leaders to maximize the Navy’s abilities within available resources.

**Is the Navy adequately sized to meet this construct?**

The Navy’s 2014 update to the 2012 Force Structure Assessment calls for a force of 308 ships. Provided sufficient readiness is restored and maintained across the Fleet, this fleet size should support the highest priority requirements for both presence and “surge” in the event of increased tensions or outright conflict. The FY 2016 President’s Budget puts the Navy on a path to procure the right mix of ships as defined by the Navy projections, though there are some capability risks of concern – amphibious ships, attack submarines, small surface combatants, aircraft inventory, and other modernization efforts.

**If the Navy cannot meet the demands placed on it, how will you address this issue?**

If confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prioritize missions to meet the most critical objectives in protecting national security, and evaluate and clearly articulate areas of risk.

### **Defense Reduction**

**In your view, what have been/will be the impacts of the following defense budget reductions on the Navy’s capability, capacity, and readiness:**

**Initial Budget Control Act reduction of \$487 billion?**

The initial reduction from the Budget Control Act of 2011 placed abrupt, deep fiscal constraints on the Navy, which required hard choices and prioritization. This sudden topline-driven reduction compelled us to accept risk in our defense strategy in key areas. The Navy needs the restoration of adequate and predictable funding to recover balance, resilience, and adaptability.

**Sequestration in FY 2013?**

Sequestration in FY 2013 resulted in a \$9 billion shortfall to the Navy's budget, compelling reductions in afloat and ashore operations, and particularly in ship and aviation maintenance and

training. This resulted in degraded readiness and fleet response capacity, ultimately contributing to excessively long deployments for Carrier Strike Groups and Amphibious Ready Groups. In addition, the Navy cancelled five ship deployments and delayed the deployment of the USS Harry S. Truman Strike Group by six months. Civilian furloughs, combined with hiring freezes and no overtime for our civilian employees, contributed to reduced maintenance and sustainment output. We are still recovering from these cuts, particularly in crisis response capacity. The FY 2016 President's Budget Request puts the Navy on a path to recover by FY 2020.

**Reduction of \$115 billion in projected spending in the FY 2015 budget, in line with the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review?**

Congress's passage of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 averted some of the BCA cuts in FY 2014-2015, but still resulted in significant funding shortfalls in FY 2014-2015 and extended budget caps through FY 2023. For FY 2015, the funding shortfall compelled the Navy to further reduce procurement of weapons and aircraft, slow modernization, and delay upgrades to all but the most critical shore infrastructure. If we are held to current statutory budget levels for FY 2016-2019, the Navy would not be able to execute the defense strategy as currently written.

**Sequestered Budget Control Act discretionary caps starting in FY 2016 onward?**

If funded at less than the FY 2016 President's Budget Request, the Navy would be unable to execute the defense strategy as currently written. The required cuts would force us to further delay critical warfighting capabilities, reduce readiness of forces needed for contingency responses, further downsize weapons capacity, and forego or stretch procurement of force structure as a last resort.

**The fiscal year 2016 budget request assumes that the Budget Control Act will be amended in fiscal year 2016. The fiscal year 2016 Budget Resolution passed by the Senate and House of Representatives do not assume this, but instead provides \$38 billion of the requested spending through the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget.**

**Should this OCO funding not be available, what recommendations would you have, if confirmed, for how the Navy should manage additional cuts for fiscal year 2016?**

The FY 2016 President's Budget is the minimum funding necessary for the Navy to execute its responsibilities in the current defense strategy. The severity of those cuts would determine the degree to which critical warfighting capabilities would be further delayed, the readiness of forces needed for contingency responses would be further eroded, weapons inventories would be further reduced, and procurement of force structure would be cancelled or further postponed.

**What are your views on the impact that these cuts could have on readiness for the Navy?**

The cuts would have a significant impact on readiness for the Navy. If cut, my advice would be to prioritize the readiness of forces forward deployed. This would come at the expense of surge and response forces. In addition, ship and aviation depot maintenance backlogs would increase and shore infrastructure would further deteriorate, creating greater risk of mishaps or serious injury.

**What are your views on the impact that these cuts could have on Navy capabilities?**

These cuts would also have a significant impact on the Navy's capabilities, resulting in a smaller, less capable force. Modernization and asymmetric capabilities could be slowed, and inventories of critical assets would be insufficient to execute the current strategic requirements for the Navy.

**Headquarters Streamlining**

**The Senate-passed Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act directs reforms to consolidate the headquarters functions of the Department of Defense and the military departments.**

**If confirmed, and if the provisions in the bill become law, what would be your role in streamlining functions, as well as identifying and implementing reductions in the Navy headquarters?**

It is crucial for the Department to carefully align resources to the highest priority missions, functions, and tasks, and I am committed to continuing to examine management activities and improve efficiency of operations at all levels. If confirmed, I will work with the Department and Congress to continue to make significant strides in gaining efficiencies and savings through a more appropriate alignment of workforce to workload, a streamlining of operations, and the optimization of mission delivery while reducing redundancies and overhead.

**What areas and functions, specifically and if any, do you consider to be the priorities for possible consolidation or reductions within the Navy?**

Every area and function must be considered as a potential candidate for reductions. While I view right-sizing the staff to be a critical responsibility, it requires a thoughtful approach. If confirmed, I will specifically explore areas where greater use of advanced processes and technology could add value. I will exchange information and best practices with other leaders across the defense enterprise and the private sector to ensure we consider all alternatives.

**To the extent that the Navy has functions that overlap with the Department of Defense, Joint Staff, or other military departments, what would be your approach to consolidating and reducing redundancy?**

If confirmed, I will look forward to participating in a Department-wide examination of functional overlaps to identify areas for greater streamlining.

### **International Partnerships**

**Interactions between the naval forces of different countries are often negotiated at the Chief of Navy level, including international exercises, Foreign Military Sales, educational exchanges, and protocols for operations. For example, recent former Chiefs of Naval Operations were able to draw on their experience to gain international cooperation on the Codes for Unplanned Events at Sea (CUES) by the Western Pacific Naval Symposium and the use of France's aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle in the fight against the Islamic State.**

**If confirmed, how do plan to ensure the U.S. Navy continues to build strong partnerships, overcome challenges, and exploit opportunities in international cooperation?**

I believe we are stronger when we operate together, engaged with allies and partners, and if confirmed would enthusiastically continue to take advantage of these opportunities. Through activities like leader-to-leader engagements, student exchanges, exercises, and information sharing, the Navy is already providing a foundation for strengthening alliances and improving our combined capabilities. I would seek to maintain these activities and expand upon them where possible.

**How would you characterize your familiarity with international naval leaders, forums, and processes?**

Many of my assignments have afforded me the opportunity to establish solid relationships with international naval leaders and key forums throughout the world. If confirmed, I look forward to fostering those relationships and building new ones through a robust engagement plan.

### **Joint Operations**

**Naval operations are becoming increasingly "joint" as Marines plan to deploy in larger numbers and on a wider range of ships; the U.S. Army and Air Force begin to invest in counter-maritime capabilities; and air and naval forces continue to develop and implement interoperable capabilities to defeat anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) networks – a process that started with the Air-Sea Battle Concept in 2010.**

**How would you characterize your familiarity with the other services' capabilities and how they organize, train and equip their forces?**

I have been privileged to serve on the Joint Staff, Joint Forces Command, and on several operational staffs. In these assignments, I gained an appreciation for the capabilities and processes that the other services bring to the Joint Force.

**Are there other innovative ideas you are considering to increase Joint interoperability and ensure opportunities to improve cross-domain capability and capacity are not missed?**

If confirmed, I will work closely with the other Service Chiefs and Combatant Commanders to seek new ways to combine forces in adaptive and responsive force packages. I look forward to improving information sharing standards and architectures within the Naval and Joint Forces to enhance interoperability.

### **Recapitalizing the Fleet**

**Despite the Navy's 308-ship requirement to meet the maritime demands of the National Military Strategy, it is currently operating with 272 battle force ships. Additionally, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has concluded that the Navy has underestimated the costs for its shipbuilding plan by approximately 11 percent.**

**Do you consider the 308-ship force structure requirement to be appropriate given the current and future strategic environment? If not, please describe what changes may need to be made.**

Currently, yes. The 308-ship FSA update was completed in 2014 based on the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. The 308-ship battle force possesses the minimum capability and capacity to continue protecting American interests, to deter or contain conflict and, if called upon, to fight and win our nation's wars.

**Do you agree with the CBO's assessment that there is significant cost risk associated with executing the Navy's shipbuilding plan?**

The Navy and CBO are in relatively close agreement in our cost estimates for the first ten years of the 30 year shipbuilding plan because we have a good understanding of the ships' requirements and costs. Beyond the first ten years, our estimates begin to diverge largely due to uncertainty in costing and differing inflation projections. As the near term is most relevant from an execution perspective, the relatively small differences pose limited risk to the shipbuilding plan. If confirmed, I will be personally engaged to ensure that the Navy maintains accurate estimates of costs for shipbuilding.

**What actions do you believe are necessary to execute the Navy's shipbuilding plan within the Navy's budget estimates?**

An immediate concern is maintaining a viable shipbuilding program while also building the Ohio Replacement class submarine. I will work with Defense Department and Congressional leaders to address this challenge.

**How would you characterize the risks to national security posed by the current shortfall in battle force ships and tactical aircraft?**

Today, the Navy meets all requirements of the current defense strategy, albeit with considerable risk.

**What adjustments to the respective shipbuilding programs are necessary and appropriate to reduce operational risk?**

Based on our current strategy, I believe the FY 2016 President's Budget Request reflects the best balance of available resources to meet our requirements. If confirmed, I will continuously evaluate this question as a critical part of my responsibilities.

**What further adjustments would you consider if the Navy's shipbuilding program comes under further pressure due to cost growth?**

The Navy is working hard to reduce cost growth and increase affordability and stability within our shipbuilding programs. Should these measures prove inadequate, if confirmed I will work with Defense Department leaders and the Congress to determine the appropriate responses and to develop acceptable adjustments.

### **Ford-class Aircraft Carriers**

**After more than \$2 billion in cost growth in each of the first three Ford-class aircraft carriers, the costs of these ships range from \$11.5 billion to \$13.5 billion.**

**Do you support the on-going Navy study of alternatives for future development of aircraft carriers that would replace or supplement the Ford-class carrier?**

I fully support the Department's decision to consider alternatives to the current aircraft carrier design as well as changes to the existing Ford class design to reduce cost while retaining essential capability. The study will provide insight into the requirements, capabilities, costs, and alternatives for aircraft carriers.

**In your view, should the Navy build 11 Ford-class aircraft carriers or should the Navy pursue a different mix of platforms for sea-based tactical aviation?**

The current plan for the Ford-class construction is the Navy's best approach for meeting the demand for an 11-aircraft carrier force. We are not where we need to be on costs and are working hard to reduce them---more effort is needed. While providing the needed capability to

meet current and projected threats, delivery of this class will also provide major lifecycle savings compared to Nimitz class carriers (~\$4B/ship due to reduced crewing and maintenance requirements). If confirmed, I look forward to further reducing the acquisition cost of the Ford-class ships.

**What options would you pursue to control the cost of aircraft carriers and ensure individual responsibility of officials in charge of different aspects of the acquisition program?**

I believe that acquisition discipline arises from adhering to four basic behaviors:

- (1) A clear command and control structure that clearly specifies authorities, responsibility, and accountability;
- (2) Unambiguous program requirements, defined early in the process and informed by realistic assessments of technological maturity and affordability;
- (3) A stable and mature design and build plan before entering into production; and
- (4) A close and knowledgeable oversight process to ensure delivery of the required capability on time and within budget.

The Navy has taken action to incorporate these behaviors and drive improved performance. CVN 79 is now benefiting from design maturity, stable requirements, and a cost-effective construction plan. I will seek further opportunities to routinely review and align the requirements and costs for this program.

**If confirmed, how do envision being personally involved in the oversight of this program?**

If confirmed as the Chief of Naval Operations, I will be personally involved in acquisition, to include the CVN program. In each of my preceding positions, I have engaged with those in my command to make clear my standards and expectations and directly monitor performance in meeting these standards. I would continue this approach as CNO.

**The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation's Fiscal Year 2014 Annual Report states the reliability of four systems – the electromagnetic aircraft launching system, advanced arresting gear, dual band radar, and advanced weapons elevators – are the most significant risks to the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) for successfully completing initial operational test and evaluation.**

**What is your understanding of the testing and reliability status of each of these key systems on CVN-78, which is scheduled to deliver in March 2016?**

My understanding for each of these systems is:

The Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching System (EMALS) has nearly completed all initial land based developmental testing with some shared inverter and reliability testing remaining. EMALS is currently conducting certification testing of the first production hardware on board CVN-78. Over 100 deadloads have been successfully launched in shipboard testing. While not meeting its original reliability growth curve, EMALS reliability is tracking to the revised reliability growth plan reviewed with DOT&E staff in early FY 2015.

The Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) is conducting land based developmental testing with deadloads, and will begin land based developmental aircraft testing at the end of this calendar year. Certification testing of the production hardware on board CVN 78 is scheduled to begin in late July 2015. AAG is not meeting its original reliability growth plan due to technical design issues but a revised plan was reviewed with DOT&E staff in early FY 2015. The Navy will commence AAG reliability tracking when land based performance testing begins this summer.

Dual Band Radar (DBR) has been in use at Wallops Island supporting land based integration and testing since March 2014; land based testing will continue through June 2016. Shipboard radar subsystem testing began in May 2015, and shipboard radar testing starts in August 2015. DBR has just begun reliability tracking at Wallops Island, and will continue through post-delivery testing onboard CVN 78. The DBR reliability growth plan was revised and reviewed with DOT&E staff in early FY 2015.

Finally, the Navy has completed the functional demonstration of the Advanced Weapons Elevator (AWE) at the land based test site. While behind schedule, shipboard installation is in progress, and testing will commence in August of this year. AWE reliability tracking begins at ship delivery and will continue through post-delivery testing.

Clearly, the maturity and reliability of each of these systems is not where the Navy would like them to be. Navy leadership attention is focused on expeditiously completing these test programs and demonstrating effective operation and suitable reliability to support Initial Operational Test & Evaluation in 2018.

**What is your understanding of the measures being taken to ensure these key systems are stable for the next aircraft carrier, USS John F. Kennedy (CVN-79)?**

CVN 79 is benefitting from a much more stable design and near complete test programs for the developmental technologies as well as construction experience on FORD. For each of these key systems, hardware design is complete and detailed test and installation experience is known. Shipboard test performance remains a risk. The Navy has incorporated lessons learned from these test programs and shipboard installation into CVN 79 plans. As a cost-saving measure, the

Navy is adapting a proven off-the-shelf radar (Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar (EASR)) to replace the DBR on all future FORD class hulls and air-capable amphibious ships.

### **Ohio-class Replacement Program**

**Navy leaders have testified that the Ohio-class Replacement Program will require significant investment and will result in equivalent reductions in the Navy budget, if a higher Navy topline or outside funding is not provided.**

**What is your recommendation for how the Ohio-class Replacement Program should be funded?**

It is absolutely critical for the nation to replace the Ohio class submarines. The Navy is doing everything it can to limit requirements and control costs for this ship. Without increased shipbuilding funding in FY 2021 and beyond, the Ohio Replacement Program will consume the majority of the Navy's annual shipbuilding budget, costing the equivalent of 2-3 ships per year. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Defense Department leadership and the Congress to address this significant challenge.

**What additional Congressional authorities do you believe are necessary for the Ohio-class Replacement Program?**

Obtaining sufficient funding to build the Ohio Replacement Program (ORP) while also preserving other shipbuilding is a significant challenge for the Navy. As the ORP design matures and the build plan is mapped out, if confirmed, I will work with the Assistant Secretary for Research, Development, and Acquisition to review the ORP shipbuilding and procurement strategies, including an assessment of additional authorities that might improve the cost and efficiency of ORP production and related shipbuilding programs. When that work is complete, I look forward to discussing the plan with the Congress.

**Navy leaders have testified that 12 Ohio-class replacement submarines must be procured and the Ohio-class Replacement Program schedule cannot be delayed in order to ensure the first deterrent patrol occurs in 2031.**

**Do you support the view that there is no room for delay of the Ohio-class Replacement Program?**

Yes, the Navy has stretched the Ohio class to the maximum extent possible, from 30 to 42 years. There is no room for further delay of the ORP.

**What is the minimum number of Ohio-class replacement submarines that must be procured to meet mission requirements?**

A 12-ship, 16-missile tube SSBN force has sufficient flexibility and capacity, and satisfies national strategic deterrent requirements in a cost efficient manner.

**What further support could Congress provide to ensure the Ohio-class Replacement Program remains on schedule?**

If confirmed, I look forward to being personally engaged with Defense Department leaders and the Congress to find ways to fund and execute both the Ohio Replacement and the rest of the shipbuilding plan.

**Do you assess Ohio-class replacement submarines will have the capabilities and attributes needed to perform their unique mission in the 2030s?**

Yes. The program is being designed to provide the nation's most survivable nuclear deterrent into the 2080s, and will deliver the core essential military capabilities required by our Nation in a cost effective and fiscally responsible manner.

**How confident are you that the program will be able to produce Ohio-class replacement submarines that meet current cost estimates (i.e., \$14.5 billion for the lead ship with plans and \$5.2 billion for hulls 2-12)?**

I am confident the program will deliver at the current cost estimate.

**Congress established the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund in section 1022 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. 'Buck' McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015.**

**What are your views on how the Navy should use this Fund to acquire Ohio-class replacement submarines?**

The Navy is currently undertaking a thorough review of the program design and build plan, costs, authorities, and other issues that could affect how the Fund might best be used. If confirmed, I look forward to sharing the results of that with you in order to inform the best way forward.

### **Attack Submarine Force Levels**

**The Navy's most recent statement of requirements for attack submarine force levels was 48 attack submarines. However, the Navy projects that the number of attack submarines will fall as low as 41 boats and remain below the 48-boat requirement for 16 years.**

**What options exist to ensure the Navy deploys attack submarines sufficient to meet the requirements of the combatant commanders and other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance needs?**

The Navy can partially mitigate the attack submarine shortfall through multiple parallel efforts: continuing procurement of two Virginia class attack submarines (SSNs) per year; shortening the construction timeline for Virginia class submarines; extending the deployments of select Virginia class attack submarines; and extending the service lives of select SSN 688 attack submarines.

**What risks are being incurred by allowing the attack submarine force levels to remain below 48 for 16 years?**

Under current planning guidance, an attack submarine force level below 48 will increase the risk of gaps in our coverage for indications and warning of potential hostile action, and delay or reduce the arrival of submarines critical to warfighting if conflict should arise.

### **Chinese Nuclear Attack Submarines**

**According to the Department of Defense, in the next decade, in addition to expanding its force of nuclear powered attack submarines (SSNs), China likely will construct a guided missile attack submarine (SSGN) incorporating better quieting technologies.**

**What are the implications for the U.S. Navy, as well as U.S. military operations in the Pacific, of the deployment by the Chinese of new nuclear submarines incorporating better quieting technologies?**

Our nation currently has superiority in the undersea domain. Military effects from the undersea domain enable and support joint forces in the air, surface, cyber, land, and space domains to gain access and be more effective. It is critical that we maintain superiority under sea in order to achieve desired military outcomes and strategic influence. The U.S. advantage is being challenged by China and Russia, and we must be alert to an advancing and adapting threat. Quieter and more capable submarines will require that the Navy continually improve our undersea capabilities.

**According to the Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement submitted by the President, “China’s strategy for strengthening its military involves the acquisition of foreign technology as well as greater civil-military integration.” The report notes that “one notable area of interest is China’s selection of domestic manufacturers for the AP-1000, which is a civil nuclear reactor’s canned motor pumps. These are the same domestic manufacturers contracted to produce the pumps for China’s first generation nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine.**

**What are the risks pertaining to the possible diversion of civil nuclear reactor technology for military use – particularly for quieting Chinese submarines and providing longer patrol time?**

These questions are very difficult to discuss in an unclassified environment. As requested by the Congress, in my role as Director, Naval Reactors I submitted a classified report on 24 April 2015. These topics were also discussed at classified briefings with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 11 May 2015 and the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 3 June 2015. If desired, I look forward to continuing those discussions in a classified setting.

**Can you assure the committee that there will be no risk of military diversion resulting from the U.S.-China nuclear cooperation agreement?**

While it is impossible to state that there will be “no risk,” per the terms of the successor U.S.-China Atomic Energy Act Section 123 Agreement each party agrees any material, equipment, components, technology, and information transferred pursuant to this Agreement shall not be used for any nuclear explosive device, for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device, or for any military purpose. Enhancements included in the successor Agreement help to strengthen enforcement of the terms of the Agreement.

**Given China’s activities in the South and East China Seas, in your view, does it make sense at this time to agree to expand civil-nuclear cooperation?**

The successor U.S.-China Atomic Energy Act Section 123 Agreement ensures continued U.S. access to China’s civilian nuclear complex, allowing for the development of a culture of best practices on nuclear security and safety, as well as the opportunity to ensure Chinese nonproliferation policies are consistent with international nonproliferation norms. I believe that the United States’ ability to achieve a positive outcome in this effort is enhanced through an open and active relationship fostered under this Agreement.

**What message could this cooperation send to our allies in the region who look to the United States to respond to increasing Chinese military and political influence in the region?**

I believe that the successor U.S.-China Atomic Energy Act Section 123 Agreement is intended to reaffirm that the U.S. will remain an active partner in the Pacific, and to reassure our partners and allies of the U.S. commitment to strategic balance in the region.

**In your role as Director of Naval Reactors, what actions did you take to ensure the AP-1000 pump design and its components would not enable the Chinese Navy to advance their submarine reactor pump technologies?**

The AP-1000 reactor coolant pumps are designed by Curtiss Wright, the same company that produces the U.S. Navy's reactor coolant pumps. The military and commercial product lines are segregated at the Curtiss Wright facility. Personnel, cyber and physical security protocols are enacted at Curtiss Wright and our other critical military suppliers to protect U.S. Navy technology.

**What role does your office play in reviewing license applications for the export of nuclear technology?**

The Department of Defense, including the U.S. Navy and Naval Reactors, is involved in reviewing civil nuclear technology export license requests. These reviews, which are informed by Intelligence Community assessments, evaluate the implications of potential diversion to military programs and are an important part of the Interagency process used to adjudicate export license requests.

**Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)**

**The Navy plays an important role in defending the nation against the threat of long range ballistic missile attack and in defending allies, friends, and deployed forces against theater ballistic missile threats.**

**In conjunction with its 2014 Force Structure Assessment update, the Navy informed the committee that the entire 88-ship large surface combatant requirement includes having a BMD capability, with 40 of these needing the advanced BMD 5.X capability. Today, the Navy has 33 BMD-capable ships, with just three of these having the advanced BMD 5.X capability. In 2020, the Navy projects having 39 BMD ships, with 16 having BMD 5.X.**

**Do you view ballistic missile defense as a core Navy mission?**

Yes, it is a proven capability the Navy provides to the Joint Force.

**What options should be explored to reduce the shortfall in meeting the stated requirement of having 88 BMD-capable ships, including 40 with the advanced BMD 5.X capability?**

The Navy is on a path to field 88 large surface combatants, to include 40 new and modernized DDGs equipped with advanced BMD capability.

**Do you support removing BMD capability from Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruisers as part of the Navy's proposed cruiser phased modernization plan?**

Given my current understanding of the issue, I do. This represents one of the difficult choices forced by tight financial constraints. At this point, the Navy has determined that the benefits to

investing in DDG modernization, to include its BMD enhancements, are greater than those that would result from retaining BMD capability on the CGs.

**If so, how do you reconcile having a shortfall to the stated BMD requirement and removing BMD from large surface combatants?**

Investing in DDG modernization is the most cost effective path to meeting our BMD requirement.

### **Amphibious Fleet Requirements**

**What is your view of the need for and size of the Navy's amphibious ship fleet?**

Amphibious ships are a critical element of our joint force capabilities. I support the current requirement of 38 amphibious ships and the plan to build 34, given fiscal constraints. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the Commandant and the Secretary of the Navy to continue to support amphibious shipping.

**What alternatives would you consider to augment amphibious ships in providing lift to Marine Corps units? In what scenarios would these alternatives be necessary and appropriate?**

Increased fleet operations have strained combatant scheduling and reduced our fleet commanders' tasking flexibility. As such, the Navy has evaluated methods to use auxiliary ships to augment — not replace — our most capable amphibious ships. We have successfully embarked Marine detachments on ships such as the afloat forward staging bases (AFSB), destroyers, littoral combat ships (LCS), mobile landing platforms (MLP), and joint high-speed vessels (JHSV). Military Sealift Command (MSC) also maintains additional auxiliary platforms which are successfully operating with Marine detachments today. These platforms help mitigate shortfalls of amphibious shipping.

None of these alternatives provide the same breadth or depth of capabilities resident in our amphibious fleet. Their use is most appropriate in settings where the risks of combat are believed to be low, and where the greatest needs are for lift, rather than the broader suite of military capabilities offered by more capable amphibious platforms.

If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Marine Corps, the Secretary of the Navy, and others to identify the most appropriate solutions to supporting Marine Corps activities and operations around the globe, given existing resources.

### **Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)**

**In December 2014, the Secretary of Defense announced his decision to upgrade the Littoral Combat Ships, designated LCS-33 through LCS-52, to provide a more capable and lethal small surface combatant, generally consistent with the capabilities of a frigate.**

**Do you support the Secretary of Defense's decision to upgrade the LCS?**

Yes, I believe the modifications to the LCS design will add valuable lethality and survivability to the final 20 hulls.

**What is your understanding of the acquisition strategy for the LCS and LCS mission modules, as modified by the Secretary of Defense's decision?**

The Secretary of Defense's decision to procure a modified LCS (Frigate) to follow the LCS Flight 0+, will produce 32 LCS and 20 Frigates. The acquisition strategy procures three LCS per year through FY2018. Frigate procurement starts in FY2019 with two ships, and continues with three ships per year from FY2020 through FY2025. The Navy is updating the mission module procurement plan.

**Are you concerned by the personnel and configuration management issues that are presented by fielding and sustaining LCS Flight 0, LCS Flight 0+, the upgraded LCS (frigate), and "backfitting" frigate-like capabilities on existing LCS, as well as the managing the various mission modules and mission module increments?**

The Small Surface Combatant Task Force examined a range of configurations and platforms before arriving at the plan that was subsequently approved by the Secretary of Defense. The Navy is working with the shipbuilders to incorporate the changes. If confirmed, ensuring that this plan delivers the best outcome in a cost effective manner will be one of my top priorities.

**If so, and if you are confirmed, how would you propose managing and simplifying these configuration issues?**

If confirmed, I will assess whether any additional steps are required beyond a close collaboration with the program manager and the shipyards.

**What is your view of the peacetime and wartime mission of the LCS?**

LCS provides the Navy with critical capabilities to address validated gaps in Surface Warfare (SUW), Mine Countermeasures (MCM), and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) in both open ocean and the littorals. LCS also supports deployed forward presence to meet Combatant Commander demand.

**What is your assessment of the requirements for survivability of the LCS Flight 0, Flight 0+, and LCS (frigate)?**

LCS survivability requirements were analyzed by Naval Sea Systems Command, which determined they are adequate to meet the missions expected of the ship. The work performed by the Small Surface Combatant Task Force identified several survivability enhancements for the Frigate that will be back-fitted as practical in LCS.

**What is your assessment of the delivered survivability capability of the LCS Flight 0, Flight 0+, and LCS (frigate)?**

The delivered survivability capability of LCS meets the requirements laid out in the LCS Flight 0+ Capabilities Development Document (CDD).

**Do you support the Navy force structure assessment requirement of 52 small surface combatants?**

Currently yes. I support the Force Structure Assessment (FSA) requirement of 52 small surface combatants. The Navy plans to meet this requirement with a combination of 32 LCS and 20 Frigates.

### **Tactical Fighter Programs**

**The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program, which is the largest and most expensive acquisition program in the Department's history, was formally initiated as a program of record in 2002 with a total planned buy of 2,443 aircraft for the U.S. At projected procurement rates, the aircraft will be procured by the Department well into the 2030 decade to reach its total quantity buy. The program has not yet completed its systems development and demonstration phase, and is not due to enter full rate production until 2019, 17 years after its inception.**

**The Navy's FY16 budget request indicates a program of record of 369 F-35C, with Navy procurement continuing throughout the life of the F-35 procurement program.**

**The overall requirement for 2,443 aircraft was established nearly 20 years ago. Since that time, however, there have been countervailing pressures to: (1) reduce force structure to conserve resources; (2) improve capability to respond to prospective adversary technological advances and increased capabilities from updated threat assessments; and (3) respond to an evolving national defense strategy.**

**Do you believe the Navy's F-35C requirement is still valid?**

Yes, the F-35C will be a vital part of the future Carrier Air Wing.

**Do you believe the Navy can afford and needs to procure 310 more F-35Cs with a procurement cost of over \$42 billion?**

The F-35C provides essential 5th generation strike fighter capability to our Carrier Air Wings. Without this capability, we cannot achieve air superiority. The Department of the Navy currently has a requirement for 340 F-35Cs. If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman and other service chiefs to revalidate the appropriate number of aircraft the Navy requires to meet the mission.

**Do you believe that the Navy will still want to buy the F-35C, an aircraft design that will be 30 years old before the Navy production is scheduled to finish?**

The Navy is committed to making the F-35C the next Carrier Air Wing fighter, complementing the F/A-18E/F until that aircraft reaches the end of its lifetime in the 2030s.

**Do you believe the Navy's current and planned force mix of tactical aircraft is sufficient to meet current and future threats around the globe, and most especially in the Asia-Pacific theater of operations where the "tyranny of distance" is such a major factor?**

Currently, I do. There are capability, inventory, and readiness aspects to delivering the required force mix. If confirmed, I will work with leadership to determine the best options to pace the threat in a dynamic security and fiscal environment.

**The Secretary of the Navy recently remarked that he believed the F-35 should be and would be the nation's last manned fighter aircraft. Do you believe this to be true?**

If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Navy to aggressively advance the development of unmanned systems. It is crucial that we push the boundaries of what unmanned technologies can achieve; the next generation in tactical aviation will play a large part in this transformation.

**What will be your role in leading capabilities and requirements development to increase the role of unmanned aerial combat systems in the Navy?**

If confirmed, I intend to make the continued development of unmanned systems a hallmark of my tenure. I intend to push the Navy into new ways of thinking about combinations of people and technologies to maximize our operational advantage.

**How do you see the future balance developing between manned and unmanned combat aircraft for the Navy's future force structure?**

I believe that the advent of advanced information technology is redefining the approach to obtaining the most effective relationship between people and technology. There is vast potential to change the balance of manned and unmanned platforms in general, and this potential is a key to helping the United States minimize the risk to our people and stay ahead of rapidly evolving threats.

## **Readiness**

**What is your assessment of the current readiness of the Navy to meet national security requirements across the full spectrum of military operations?**

While forward deployed Navy forces continue to meet readiness standards, I am most concerned about the Navy's ability to meet the timelines associated with providing either follow-on or "surge" forces should they be requested by Combatant Commanders. For instance, we are currently not meeting our required crisis response capacity and do not fully recover until 2020.

**What is your assessment of the near-term trend in the readiness of the Navy?**

The 2016 President's Budget Request provides the minimum resources to achieve the levels of readiness to meet requirements by 2020. This plan still includes considerable risk, and does not allow for any unexpected contingencies.

**How critical is it to find a solution to sequestration given the impacts we have already seen to readiness in fiscal year 2013?**

It is absolutely critical. Without relief from the current budget caps, we will fall farther below requirements to the point that the Navy will not be able to meet our responsibilities in the current strategy.

**What is your understanding and assessment of the methods currently used for estimating the funding needed for the maintenance of Navy equipment?**

To estimate the resources needed for maintenance, the Navy takes a requirements-based approach that first defines the required level of readiness for a given unit at a particular time, for a particular mission. This accounts for personnel, equipment, sustainment, training, and ordnance. Efforts are made to ensure that units are appropriately ready, balancing the operational availability to the warfighters consistent with expected employment. While this analytical approach provides discipline and predictability to the system, recent budget perturbations and uncertainty makes cost and associated readiness estimates much more complex, and drives up the cost/readiness in nearly every case. When readiness suffers – particularly in maintenance – it can take years to recover.

**Given the backlog in equipment maintenance over the last several years, do you believe that we need an increased investment to reduce this backlog?**

The FY 2016 President's Budget Request, with OCO funding, fully funds ship maintenance to continue life cycle maintenance reset of CVNs and surface force ships. To address workload to be completed in our public shipyards, Navy also funds additional workforce and will send selective submarines to private shipyards. Navy funds aviation depot maintenance to capacity, increasing funding as throughput improves.

**How important is it to reduce the materiel maintenance backlog in order to improve readiness?**

It is very important to the Navy. Maintenance and training backlogs have delayed deployments, which have in turn forced extensions for those already deployed. Since 2013, many CSGs, ARGs, and destroyers have been on deployment for 8-10 months or longer. This comes at a cost to the resiliency of our people, sustainability of our equipment, and service lives of our ships. Readiness shortfalls take stable and predictable funding over a period of years to correct, and force operational units to extend beyond sustainable levels.

**How important is it to receive OCO funding two or three years after the end of combat operations in order to ensure all equipment is reset?**

It is very important. We remain reliant on OCO funding for ongoing overseas operations, reset, and enduring requirements.

**In your judgment, is the current and recent operational tempo adversely affecting the readiness or retention of Sailors on active duty and in the reserve component?**

There is no doubt that our Sailors and their families are mission focused – they are proud to do their job – making significant sacrifices – as they serve the nation. Having said that, in my experience, the dominant factor that is negatively affecting our Sailors’ professional experience in the Navy, and the stress that their families experience, is the frustration associated with things like delays to getting underway, deployment extensions, training delays and gaps, delays in maintenance periods, and last-minute parts availability. These avoidable unpredictabilities are the single biggest detractor to quality of service.

**If confirmed, what will be your priorities for maintaining readiness in the near term, while modernizing the Navy to ensure readiness in the future?**

If confirmed, I will strive to achieve the appropriate balance between these two imperatives. My first priority will be to deliver a sustainable level of mission-ready forward presence and contingency response capacity to the Combatant Commanders. However, these near-term priorities cannot be made at the expense of the capability and capacity of the Navy’s future force. We must maintain commitment to modernize our Navy to meet tomorrow’s challenges, particularly the need to modernize our undersea strategic deterrent, and to address emerging opportunities in information technology. If confirmed, I will work with Defense Department leadership and the Congress to achieve adequate and predictable resources to meet current readiness and employment requirements while investing in the future.

**In years past, Congress has based additional readiness funding decisions on the Service Chief unfunded priorities lists. However, in recent years those lists have not been provided or have arrived too late to help in our markup process.**

**If confirmed, do you agree to provide unfunded priorities lists to Congress in a timely manner beginning with the fiscal year 2017 budget request?**

Yes. I will make all efforts to comply with Congressional direction.

**In the past, a number of ships failed inspections by the Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV), including Aegis cruisers and destroyers, due to poor material condition. The Navy classified INSURV inspection results in 2008 and stopped using pass-fail criteria in 2012.**

**Do you support the current policy of keeping INSURV results classified?**

Yes, getting an unvarnished assessment of our ships is critical to understanding the readiness level of the fleet. Furthermore, the detailed readiness assessment of our forces should be kept from any potential adversaries.

**Do you support the current grading criteria, which lack a pass/fail determination?**

Yes. I believe that the existing system, which grades ships using a holistic score and compares them to other ships in their class, provides more useful insight about a ship's condition and the path to correct deficiencies.

**Given INSURV no longer provides failing or unsatisfactory scores, how will you ensure Congress is promptly notified when the material condition of a ship is unsatisfactory?**

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the readiness of our fleet is promptly known to Defense Department leadership and the Congress.

**Navy leaders have stated rotational deployments will be stabilized and more predictable through continued implementation of an improved deployment framework called the Optimized Fleet Response Plan (O-FRP).**

**What is your understanding of the O-FRP?**

O-FRP is designed to align manning, maintenance, and modernization of our platforms with training in order to achieve readiness and meet regional needs in the most effective and efficient manner. O-FRP should allow the Navy to achieve stable and predictable 7-month deployments, which will help to reset our readiness and increase certainty for our Sailors and families.

**Do you support implementation of the O-FRP?**

Yes. As O-FRP goes forward, if confirmed I will work closely with the fleet commanders to continuously review effectiveness of O-FRP in meeting our strategic objectives.

**To what extent will implementation of the O-FRP improve the material readiness of the fleet?**

O-FRP is designed to improve material readiness by providing greater stability and predictability in maintenance schedules. Restoring predictability to maintenance periods, when combined with sufficient and predictable resources in our shipyards and depots should allow for better maintenance outcomes and improved overall fleet readiness.

**What metrics should Congress use to track the material readiness and material condition of Navy ships and aircraft, as well as the effectiveness of O-FRP?**

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the material readiness of our fleet is promptly known to Departmental leadership and the Congress.

**United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea**

**Officials of the Department of Defense, including previous Chiefs of Naval Operations, have advocated for accession to the Law of the Sea Convention.**

**Do you support United States accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea?**

I support accession to the Convention. Being a party to the Convention enhances the United States' security posture by reinforcing freedom of the seas and rights vital to ensuring our global force posture. The Convention provides legal certainty in the world's largest maneuver space. Access would strengthen the legal foundation for our ability to transit through international straits and archipelagic waters; preserve our right to conduct military activities in other countries' Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) without notice or permission; reaffirm the sovereign immunity of warships; provide a framework to counter excessive maritime claims; and preserve our operations and intelligence-collection activities. Joining the Convention would also demonstrate our commitment to the rule of law, strengthen our credibility among those nations that are already party to the Convention, and allow us to bring the full force of our influence in challenging excessive maritime claims. Finally, it would secure for us a leadership role in shaping and influencing future maritime developments.

**How would you respond to critics of the Convention who assert that accession is not in the national security interests of the United States?**

There are significant national security impacts from failing to join the Convention. By remaining outside the Convention, the United States remains in scarce company with Iran, Venezuela, North Korea, and Syria, and foregoes the most effective way to counter undesirable changes in the law or to exercise international leadership. By not acceding to UNCLOS we deny ourselves the ability to challenge changes to international law as a result of the practice of nations at the local, regional, or global level. As some states seek to interpret treaty provisions in a manner that restricts freedom of navigation, U.S. reliance on customary international law as the legal foundation for our military activities in the maritime becomes far more vulnerable and needlessly places our forces in a more tenuous position during operations. Moreover, by failing to join the Convention, some countries may come to doubt our commitment to act in accordance with international law.

**In your view, what impact, if any, would U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention have on ongoing and emerging maritime disputes such as in the South China Sea and in the Arctic?**

Acceding to the Convention would strengthen our credibility and strategic position on issues pertaining to these regions. While we do not take sides in the various territorial disputes in the South China Sea, we do have a national security interest in ensuring disputes are resolved peacefully, countries adhere to the rule of law, and all nations fully respect freedom of the seas. However, we undermine our leverage by not signing up to the same rule book by which we are asking other countries to accept. As for the Arctic, the other Arctic coastal nations (Russia, Canada, Norway, and Denmark (Greenland)) understand the importance of the Convention and are in the process of utilizing the Convention's procedures to establish the outer limits of their extended continental shelves (ECS) in the Arctic. The United States has a significant ECS in the Arctic Ocean, but cannot avail itself of the Convention's mechanisms to gain international recognition of its ECS. We must put our rights on a treaty footing and more fully and effectively interact with the other seven Arctic Council nations who are parties to the Convention.

### **U.S. Force Posture in the Asia-Pacific Region**

**The Department continues the effort to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific as announced in the January 2012 Strategic Defense Guidance.**

**Are you satisfied with the rebalance efforts to date?**

Thus far, I am satisfied with our rebalance efforts, as they have resulted in a significant adjustment in U.S. Navy force structure and capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region.

**What do you see as the U.S. security priorities in the Asia-Pacific region over the next couple of years and what specific Navy capabilities or enhancements are needed in to meet those priorities?**

The Indo-Asia-Pacific region is becoming a priority not only for the U.S., but for the world. Rising economies, access to natural resources, critical trade routes, and growing navies all present both opportunities and risks. In order to protect our interests, the U.S. faces a range of challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, including provocations by North Korea and the growth of its ballistic missile programs, as well as China's expansion into the Pacific and Indian oceans, supported by their rapidly growing navy.

Going forward, a whole-of-government approach is warranted. Moreover, I believe we must address this challenge in a regional context - continuing to enhance relations with and the capabilities of regional allies and partners. For our part, as this is such a vast maritime theater, the Navy must continue to prioritize the full spectrum of our capabilities towards the Pacific.

**Do the budget cuts and resource constraints associated with sequestration threaten your ability to execute the rebalance to the Pacific?**

Resourcing levels below the FY 2016 President's Budget Request would necessitate reworking the current defense strategy, including the rebalance to the Pacific.

#### **Anti-Access/Area Denial**

Over the past few years, much has been made of the emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities of certain countries and the prospect that these capabilities may in the future limit the U.S. Navy's freedom of movement and action in certain regions.

**Do you believe emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities are a concern?**

Yes. The development and proliferation of advanced systems that can sense, target and strike ships at increasing ranges and accuracy is a vital concern to me. If confirmed, I will work with other defense leaders and leaders in industry to develop technologies that assure access by the joint force.

**If so, what do you believe the Navy needs to be doing now and in the next few years to ensure continued access to all strategically important segments of the maritime domain?**

The free use of the maritime commons is critical to the global economic system and U.S. national interests. The Navy will continue to first and foremost be present and exercise freedom of navigation in international waters and to reassure our allies and partners. Further the Navy must continue to develop new concepts, platforms, and technologies that can effectively address this emerging threat to access.

**If confirmed, you would play an important role in the process of transforming the Navy to meet new and emerging threats. Concerning capability and capacity to meet new and emerging threats, what are your goals regarding transformation of the Navy?**

If confirmed, one of my primary goals would be to ensure the Navy fully exploits the potential offered by advances in technology, and particularly information technology, to enhance our ability to rapidly and adaptively combine forces and capabilities. To support this aim, the acquisition processes that design and build these capabilities must become more agile. Finally, we must consider what changes must be made to the way that we train and employ our people to ensure that our Sailors remain on the cutting edge of capability. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Navy incorporates these changes swiftly and effectively.

### **China Assertiveness**

**How has China's aggressive assertion of territorial and maritime claims, particularly in the South China Sea and East China Sea, affected security and stability in the region?**

China's actions in the South and East China Seas, as well as its rapid military modernization and growing defense budgets, have led many in the region, including the U.S., to question its long-term intentions. China has still not clarified its 9-Dash Line claim, and it continues to conduct land-reclamation and construction activities in the South China Sea. Such behavior has been destabilizing for the region and has increased the risk of miscalculation or conflict among regional actors. Our allies and partners in the region are increasingly looking to the U.S. for leadership and support in the face of these challenges, and so our response to China's challenges to the international maritime order should be firm and consistent.

### **China**

**What is your assessment of the current state of the U.S.-China military relationship?**

The U.S.-China military-to-military relationship is a critical component of our overall bilateral relationship and an important aspect of our regional maritime strategy. Right now, I believe the military relationship is contributing to stability in the region. This stability allows us to increase cooperation on areas of overlapping interests, while improving our ability to manage other aspects of the security relationship responsibly. The broader bilateral relationship can improve through strengthening trust and transparency between the two militaries.

**What are your views regarding China's interest in and commitment to improving military relations with the United States?**

I believe China recognizes the U.S. will have an enduring presence in the Pacific and therefore has a clear interest in sustaining military-to-military contacts. If confirmed, I will continue to use the military relationship as a tool to build sustained and substantive dialogue, develop areas

of practical cooperation, and manage competition in a way that protects national interests and supports overall stability in the relationship and the Asia-Pacific region.

**What is your view of the purpose and relative importance of sustained military-to-military relations with China?**

Mil-Mil relations are an important part of our bilateral relationship. They can be fruitful because of a shared military culture, this is true for navies in particular as we operate together in international waters governed by common rules and must communicate with one another. The goal would be to protect national interests by strengthening understanding, transparency, and familiarity. This must be done in a thoughtful way that protects our interests.

**What role do you see for the Chief of Naval Operations in this process?**

I believe the CNO plays a pivotal role to personally sustain a meaningful working relationship with all of his counterparts around the world, to the end of promoting the international rules and norms that have been the foundation of regional stability for decades and have afforded nations such as China unprecedented economic growth and prosperity.

### **Unmanned Systems**

**The Navy's current plan for the Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) system aircraft is to develop an airframe optimized for unrefueled endurance (~14 hours) and the ISR mission.**

**Given the combat radius of the planned Carrier Air Wing, are you concerned the Navy's aircraft carriers will lack the ability to project power at relevant distances, given emerging anti-access/area-denial threats?**

I am concerned. The rapidly evolving technological and security environments require that we continually work to develop concepts and capabilities that will allow us to maintain assured access and project power when needed. That is why our planned modernization integrates the warfighting capabilities of the entire Air Wing including strike fighter, airborne electronic attack, and command and control modernization to assure access in contested environments. As part of this integrated approach, the UCLASS program is designed to provide both Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting and future strike capabilities. If confirmed, I look forward to participating with other defense leaders and industry to ensure success in this critical area.

### **Strategic Thinking**

**How do you plan to foster a dedicated, educated, and assigned group of strategic thinkers and planners who rise to the rank of flag rank officer?**

The Navy has several opportunities for an officer to develop into a strategic leader. The Naval War College, Naval Post Graduate School, and other services' schools provide a rich education in strategy and policy. As well, the Navy has programs with other colleges and universities both in the United States and abroad that provide opportunities to become educated in strategic thinking. We are and will continue to pursue initiatives to improve in this vital area.

### **Conventional vs. Nuclear Deterrence**

#### **What role do you see for the Navy in conventional deterrence?**

Naval forward presence is critical to conventional deterrence. Captured in the phrase that the Navy is “where it matters, when it matters” is the ability to be forward to enhance stability and deter undesired behavior.

#### **How do strategic and conventional deterrence complement one another?**

It is a complementary relationship. Our nation's strategic deterrent has been a bedrock of peace and stability, precluding major wars for over 50 years. The Navy's contribution to this is the SSBN force, which has provided a survivable and responsive capability and 100 percent alert coverage since the 1960s. That force recently celebrated its 4,000th strategic deterrent patrol. Complementing this strategic deterrent, as discussed above, our conventional naval forces are present to be seen and to reassure our partners that we have a global reach that protects the international system. Both work in tandem within the Joint force to guarantee stability.

### **Offset Technologies**

**During the Cold War, the DOD pursued three key technologies to offset the numerical superiority of Soviet conventional forces: precision guided munitions, stealth technology, and satellite-based navigation. These three technologies have given U.S. forces unparalleled superiority until now. However, with advancements by our emerging adversaries, it seems like the military technological superiority is beginning to erode. As a result, it is critical that the United States once again focus on offsetting the erosion of our technology advantages being achieved by our potential adversaries.**

**Which technology priorities do you believe the Navy should be pursuing to maintain the military technological superiority of the United States?**

The advances in information technology – via cyber capabilities and in the electromagnetic spectrum – present significant future potential. Related, these technologies, when coupled with precision guidance and sensors, present significant opportunities for unmanned systems. The advent of additive manufacturing (3D printing) technology is another area that should be aggressively pursued. Finally, advances in power generation and conditioning allow for

opportunities in directed energy weapons. Just as important as any technology, the process by which the Navy develops and fields new capabilities must become more agile. We must learn and adapt faster.

**What strategies would you recommend be implemented to develop these technology priorities?**

If confirmed, I look forward to continuing the momentum the Navy has established to develop and deploy innovative technologies and to refine our staff organization and processes to become more adaptable and agile. My sense is that closer collaboration with industry will enhance our effectiveness in this endeavor.

**What role should the services play in their development?**

The services play a vital role in resourcing the research and development to address needs, lead creative thinking about the future, and ensure that promising approaches survive the leap from research to production. If confirmed, this will get my personal attention.

### **Science and Technology**

**One of the main objectives of the defense research enterprise is to develop advanced technologies that will be of benefit to the warfighter. In this regard, it is critical that advancements quickly transition from the development phase into testing and evaluation and ultimately into a procurement program for the warfighter.**

**What are some of the challenges you see in transitioning technologies effectively from research programs into programs of records?**

If confirmed, I intend to work with Defense Department leadership and the Congress to enhance the Navy's ability to develop capabilities that can be rapidly prototyped and tested in the field, and if successful, integrated into the fleet. I believe this will accelerate the learning cycle and allow capability to enter the Navy at a pace more comparable to the private sector. This must be done thoughtfully, keeping in mind that Naval systems must operate reliably for extended periods of time in hostile maritime environments. Continued mission success and the safety of our sailors depend on these capabilities.

**As the Chief of Naval Operations, what steps will you take to ensure that the services are benefitting more quickly and directly from the research being performed by the defense research enterprise?**

Leveraging the research being conducted elsewhere in the defense enterprise, ensuring we don't duplicate efforts unnecessarily, and bringing the technical communities together to share information are all high priorities for me. Our technical workforce needs to be able to spend

time interacting with researchers and attending professional workshops. If confirmed, I will engage with universities, industry, and research institutions to work on our toughest challenges.

**Do you feel that defense technologies and systems, especially in areas such as mobile communications, computing, and robotics, are keeping pace with global and commercial technological advances? If not, what do you suggest that the Department do to keep up with the pace of global technological change?**

Global technological advancements are profound, and I believe that we should monitor and leverage them that at every opportunity, as they represent a source of tremendous advantage. If confirmed, I look forward to identifying specific areas where we can trust commercial markets to produce capabilities that are suitable – even preferable – to independently developing them “in house.”

**As you know, robust investment in S&T underpins technological advances in our military capabilities and is vital for maintain our military technological superiority over emerging adversaries.**

**If confirmed, what metrics would you use to assess whether the Navy is investing adequately in S&T programs?**

Given the challenges associated with identifying a benefit, it may be most useful to ensure that a fixed percentage of overall funding remains allocated to basic research. I believe the Defense Department, to include the Navy, must have a robust understanding of the areas of basic research that are likely to provide those advances most relevant to its missions, and invest in those that are least likely to attract adequate funding from other sources. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Navy’s analysis in this area remains robust.

**How would you assess the value and appropriate investment level for basic research programs?**

I believe that our current investment in basic research is appropriate given the current fiscal reality.

**What tools would you use to ensure that appropriate technologies are transitioning quickly into programs of record?**

If confirmed, this will be an area of keen interest during my tenure as CNO. At every level of this organization, we recognize that delivering technological superiority to our warfighters is of paramount importance yet often happens too slowly. I would assist the Secretary in the acquisition process to ensure that the warfighter's needs are properly articulated, prioritized, and resourced, and that the requirements process is agile enough to drive an even faster pace. The Navy has already started moving in this direction with Task Force Innovation, establishing a

DASN for unmanned systems, and establishing the office of OPNAV N99 to focus on transitioning new technologies more quickly.

### **Technical Workforce**

**A significant challenge facing the Department of Defense today is an impending shortage of high quality scientific and engineering talent to work at Defense laboratories and technical centers.**

**In your view, what are the pros and cons of having active-duty Navy personnel trained and working as scientists and engineers within the Navy research and acquisition system?**

The Navy is continually assessing the appropriate roles for military, civilian, and contractor personnel to determine the best approach to meeting our research and acquisition needs. If confirmed I look forward to exploring this issue more fully.

**How would you ensure that directors of labs in your service have the tool they need to dynamically shape their S&T workforce?**

If confirmed, I will work with the directors and the resource sponsors to ensure that we maintain a system that is responsive to the needs of the current S&T environment, including people, security, and instrumentation and tools.

### **Test and Evaluation Issues**

**What do you see as the role of the developmental and operational test and evaluation communities with respect to rapid acquisition, spiral acquisition and other evolutionary acquisition processes?**

The operational test and evaluation communities play a critical role in ensuring the systems the Navy produces are ready for the stresses of extended operation at sea and ultimately for combat. This community ensures that our systems will perform to expectations and allow our Sailors and Commanders to have the capability and confidence in their gear that they need to win.

**Are you satisfied with the Navy's test and evaluation capabilities, including workforce and infrastructure?**

Yes.

**In which areas, if any, do you feel the Navy should be developing new test and evaluation capabilities?**

New technologies and rapid prototyping and fielding schemes will likely require us to develop new test and evaluation capabilities as well – capabilities that will evaluate new systems in ways that both provide the confidence in the system’s performance and also are responsive. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with Defense Department leadership and the Congress to explore ways to achieve both of these aims.

**What are your views on the appropriate roles of OSD developmental and operational testing organizations with respect to testing of Navy systems?**

The evaluation performed by OSD developmental and operational testing organizations is critical to delivering combat ready systems. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to partner with these organizations.

**Recruiting and Retention**

**What do you consider to be the key to the Navy’s success in recruiting the highest caliber American youth for service and retaining the best personnel for leadership responsibilities?**

Today our recruiting and retention numbers are at historic highs. Maintaining this quality as the economy improves will be critical to our ability to command the seas and provide options to national leadership. Key to recruiting and retaining high quality personnel will be to remain true to our values and beliefs. People with talent such as we see joining our ranks have many choices – and they chose to join our Navy team because we work together in high-performing teams that stand for something noble and true. We must always remain vigilant to ensure that our behaviors remain consistent with our values. As such, our ability to revise and renew outdated and cumbersome policies, practices, and technologies, to permit our current and future generations to fulfill their potential and their desire to serve, will be critical to keeping people on our team.

**What steps, if any, do you feel should be taken to ensure that current operational requirements and tempo do not adversely impact the overall readiness, recruiting, retention, and morale of sailors?**

Central to recruiting and retaining high quality personnel and maintaining readiness and morale is our ability to provide Sailors deployment predictability and the resources necessary to carry out their mission. Years of continuing resolutions, coupled with the long-lasting negative effects of sequestration in 2013 and the looming threat of sequester in the future have increased frustration and anxiety in our Sailors. This “say-do mismatch” over time erodes trust, and factors heavily into a family’s decision to stay Navy or recommend a career in the naval service to others.

**What impact, if any, do you believe the Department's proposals aimed at slowing the growth of personnel and health care costs will have on recruiting and retention in the Navy?**

If communicated properly and put in the appropriate context by leadership, slowing growth, while still meeting expectations regarding those matters that Sailors and their families value most, should allow the Navy to make appropriate adjustments in a controlled and sustainable manner. Our Sailors want to be fairly compensated for their hard work and sacrifice, but they also join and stay in the Navy for the sense of purpose and teamwork that comes from operating around the world as part of high-performing units on advanced platforms.

**Military Compensation**

**What is your assessment of the adequacy of military compensation?**

To win in the challenging future security environment, we must continue to recruit and retain high-quality people and their families. Our warfighting readiness and ability to win a future conflict depends on this. My general sense is that the basic structure of the compensation system is about right. There may be additional room to achieve greater efficiencies or provide even higher levels of satisfaction, but doing so will require developing deeper insight into the specific needs and desires of our sailors and civilians. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of Defense on these types of initiatives.

**What recommendations would you have for controlling the rising cost of personnel?**

I agree with the recent Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission (MCRMC) findings that our current system is generally sound, although we must continue to look for efficiencies where possible. I support proposals to modernize our retirement system so long as our Sailors are given supporting education to make choices to best support their families. My inclination is that the MCRMC recommendation to combine some commissary and exchange functions make sense; I would like to study this more closely. If confirmed, I will work with my fellow Chiefs to continue to seek out opportunities to better align service member needs with support, both through compensation and through updates to how we manage our people.

**Do you support the Administration's compensation and health care proposals?**

I support opportunities to find efficiencies in how we manage and pay for the healthcare of our Sailors and families, but am mindful of the absolute need to keep our commitments to fairly reward them for their service. As we work through this process, our priority must be to ensure we continue to recruit and retain high quality people and their families. Our warfighting readiness and ability to win a future conflict depends on this.

**Education for Sailors**

**An important feature of the Post-9/11 GI Bill is the ability of career-oriented service members to transfer their earned benefits to spouses and dependents.**

**What is your assessment of the effect of the Post-9/11 GI Bill on recruiting and retention of sailors?**

According to quick polls and surveys, the Post 9-11 GI Bill has a positive effect on both recruiting and retention. It provides excellent opportunities for academic, technical, intellectual, personal, and professional development of our Service members and their families. This contributes to overall readiness, quality, and morale of our force.

**In your view, what has been the effect of the transferability option on retention and career satisfaction of sailors?**

The Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits and the ability to transfer unused portions to dependents contribute significantly to both the retention and morale of our force and have the potential to strengthen our country's educational base and technological leadership.

**How important do you believe tuition assistance benefits are to young sailors, and what trends do you see in the Navy's ability to pay for such programs at current levels over the FYDP?**

I share CNO Greenert's commitment to tuition assistance. Sailor demand for tuition assistance remains strong and our plan is to maintain funding at the current level. Such assistance continues to be a key component of the Navy's Learning Strategy and supports overall readiness by providing academic, technical, intellectual, and professional development for our Sailors.

**What changes, if any, would you recommend to current eligibility criteria for tuition assistance?**

I do not recommend any changes to the program at this time. Current law and policy provide the Services sufficient flexibility to tailor the Tuition Assistance Program to meet the requirements for our Sailor's personal and professional development while meeting the Navy's warfighting requirements.

**Do you believe that tuition assistance should be used to enhance a sailor's career while he or she is in the Navy?**

Yes. Navy-funded education through tuition assistance or other means is a strategic investment in our people. Sailors develop critical thinking skills, broadening their intellectual base, and acquire the ability operate effectively in complex environments -- regardless of the specific course of study.

**Do you agree with the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission that tuition assistance should be limited to courses and education that contribute to a sailor's professional growth?**

As long as we do not become too restrictive regarding our definition of what "contributes to a Sailor's professional growth," I believe that Navy-funded education should both enhance the professional growth of our people and the effectiveness of our Navy. As with other personnel programs this will have to be closely studied and thoroughly communicated in order to achieve the desired positive effect.

**Assignment Policies for Women in the Military**

**As you know, two years ago, the Department rescinded the policy restricting the assignment of women to certain units which have the primary mission of engaging in direct ground combat operations, and has given the military services until January 1, 2016, to open all positions currently closed to women, or to request an exception to policy to keep a position closed beyond that date, an exception that must be approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. The services have opened a large number of positions to service by women and continue to work to develop gender-free physical and mental standards for all military occupations, presumably with the goal of allowing individuals, regardless of gender, to serve in those positions if they can meet those standards.**

**If confirmed, what role will you play in the development of these standards?**

If confirmed, I will ensure we follow Department guidance and meet our reporting obligations under the law. The Navy will provide a written report to the Secretary of Defense in September 2015 with validation of standards as gender neutral in accordance with Public Laws stating that occupational standards "accurately predict performance of actual, regular, and recurring duties of a military occupation; and are applied equitably to measure individual capabilities." We are on track to certify that these validated standards are in use or will be in use by 30 Sep 2015 at schools and in training.

**Will you ensure that the standards will be realistic and will preserve, or enhance, military readiness and mission capability?**

Yes, if confirmed I will ensure that all standards will be operationally relevant and accurately reflect the tasks required to accomplish the mission.

**Do you believe that decisions to open positions should be based on bona fide military requirements?**

Over 95 percent of Navy jobs are already open to both men and women. The Navy will continue to open positions to obtain the talent necessary to best meet military requirements.

**If so, what steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that such decisions are made on this basis?**

If confirmed I will continue our present course. Warren Buffet has been quoted as saying that as he grew up, he had the privilege of only having to compete against 50 percent of the population. The Navy's goal is to ensure that we do not afford that advantage to any potential adversary. Our missions will be executed by the best qualified and most capable people, regardless of gender. In order to preserve unit readiness, cohesion, and morale, and to limit attrition, lessons learned from the surface, aviation, and submarine integration will be used to ensure future and continued success.

**In 2011, the Navy opened service on submarines to women.**

**What is the implementation status of this decision?**

I am pleased with progress being made; we are moving forward smoothly and deliberately. Women can now serve on all three types of submarines; SSBNs, SSGNs, and SSNs. To date, 56 women are currently serving onboard submarines, including 40 nuclear-trained officers and 16 supply officers. Sixteen submarine crews in Ohio- and Virginia-class submarines are integrated. In June 2015, the Navy announced the names of the first enlisted female submariners. These Sailors will be assigned to the first two of eighteen submarine crews and will report to USS Michigan in 2016. The women and the men are performing superbly.

**What challenges still exist and what proactive measures are submarine force leaders taking?**

The integration of women into the submarine community is progressing smoothly and deliberately. As the force moves toward integrating enlisted females in 2016, the Navy will continue to adhere to the principles and will benefit from the lessons learned that have led to success to date. The crews that will receive these females will have appropriate levels of training and certification to ensure they are prepared for these Sailors. Additionally, the enlisted Sailors are being assigned to crews that are already integrated with female officers.

### **Family Readiness and Support**

**Sailors and their families in both the active and reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military leaders have warned of concerns among military families as a result of the stress of deployments and the separations that go with them.**

**What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for service members and their families?**

Each Navy family has unique needs driven by their own personal circumstances and geographic location. From pay and compensation, to deployment predictability, to healthcare, our families have unique concerns that unit leadership must address in a timely and compassionate manner. Our Sailors tell us that predictability, combined with tailored communication before, during, and after deployments helps bring families together, building bonds that improve unit readiness and cohesion.

**How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global rebasing, deployments, and potential future reductions in end strength?**

I believe that most family issues are best addressed and cared for at the local level by commanders and senior enlisted leaders whom Sailors and their families know and trust. If confirmed, it would be my responsibility to ensure that commanders have access to the information and resources they need to respond to local concerns in a timely and compassionate manner. Additionally, it would be my responsibility to set a climate and environment that encourages candid and unsolicited family feedback, good or bad. This direct information, whether shared through our Ombudsmen network or electronically is an important look into command climate and readiness.

**Military Quality of Life**

**The Committee is concerned about the sustainment of key quality of life programs for military families, such as family support, child care, education, employment support, health care, and morale, welfare and recreation services, especially as DOD faces budget challenges.**

**If confirmed, what further enhancements, if any, to military quality of life programs would you consider a priority in an era of intense downward pressure on budgets?**

If confirmed, I will continue to give the current family support programs high priority and to remain fully engaged in this area; monitoring it closely to ensure it remains responsive to families' needs and receives the appropriate level of support. In this endeavor, I hope to learn from our people and outside industry what additional initiatives we might introduce to better retain needed support while driving costs down.

**Suicide Prevention**

**The numbers of suicides in each of the Services continues to concern the Committee.**

**What is your assessment of the Navy's suicide prevention program?**

There is no single proven solution to prevent suicide. Every suicide is a tragedy, and even one is too many. Our goal to eliminate suicides will be realized through continued efforts in communications, skills training, policy, and research. Progress may fluctuate from year to year, but our Navy's commitment will be rock steady – we will spare no effort to reach those Sailors who are suffering in this way. This is an area where we need to continue to improve, and if confirmed I am committed to leading that effort.

**In your view, what role should the Chief of Naval Operations play in shaping policies to help prevent suicides both at home and in theater and to increase the resiliency of all service members and their families?**

The CNO's role is to ensure that our Sailors first and foremost understand that suicide prevention is a priority mission. The CNO must also ensure that unit leaders have the information, training, tools, practices, and policies to be healthy, resilient, and mission ready day in and day out. I believe that suicide prevention extends beyond simple policy guidance and oversight, and that it must be a command-led effort to first connect with Sailors who may be in distress, and then to guide them to the appropriate means to help them successfully arrive at a "safe harbor" where they will be more at peace.

**If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that sufficient mental health resources are available to service members in theater, and to the service members and their families upon return to home station.**

If confirmed, I will continue efforts to make resources and direct care more accessible to Sailors and their families. We will continue to embed mental health providers directly within operational units. I believe these deckplate resources are a crucial element in helping to detect stress injuries early before they lead to decreased mission capability and mental health problems. We are also embedding mental health providers in primary care settings to ensure these resources are available upon return to the home station. Finally, I will do all that I can to reduce the stigma associated with asking for help so that our Sailors take full advantage of the available resources.

### **Prevention of and Response to Sexual Assaults**

**The Fiscal Year 2014 Department of Defense Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military reflects that substantiated reports of sexual assault in the Navy increased by 17% from 420 reports in fiscal year 2013 to 491 reports in fiscal year 2014.**

**What is your assessment of this report?**

The report makes clear that while the Navy is making some progress to eliminate sexual assault, we still have much work to do.

**What is your assessment of the problem of sexual assaults in the Navy?**

The Navy's success is predicated on high-performing teams bonded through trust and respect. Sexual assault within our ranks has a poisonous effect on unit performance and cohesion, reflecting a breach of trust. While I believe that we recognize the seriousness of the crime, there is additional work to do both to eliminate this crime, and to provide the strongest possible support to survivors. To be successful, we must do more to break the continuum of harm that starts with harassment or a hostile climate, and far too often ends in sexual violence.

**What is your assessment of the Navy sexual assault prevention and response program?**

I firmly support the Navy's sexual assault prevention and response program. Having said that, eliminating sexual assault remains a challenging and complex problem. If confirmed, I will build upon current efforts and deepen my understanding of how to lead efforts to improve Navy responses, enhance accountability, and protect all of our Sailors from this crime.

**What is your view of the provision for restricted and unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults?**

In my view, having both these reporting options provides survivors a critical range of options, and both supports our goals of getting victims the care they need and holding offenders appropriately accountable.

**What is your view about the role of the chain of command in providing necessary support to victims of sexual assault?**

Commanders must lead the way in our efforts to eliminate sexual assault. Commanders support victims through participation in the Sexual Assault Case Management Group (SACMG) meetings held monthly, during which commanders address the needs and desires of survivors to ensure that they are receiving appropriate access to sexual assault response coordinators, sexual assault prevention and response victim advocates, healthcare, and counseling, as well as ensuring all of the proper arrangements for any requested expedited transfers are being made. When sexual assault does occur, commanders must lead decisive response efforts, including the responsibility for appropriate criminal or administrative actions against offenders.

Most importantly, elimination of sexual assault and the behaviors that lead to sexual assault will be manifested by deckplate leadership – the chief petty officers and junior officers in the spaces. These leaders respond to their Commanding Officer (CO). That CO is accountable to remain fully engaged in establishing the proper climate and ensuring that his or her team is following through.

**What is your understanding of the adequacy of Navy resources and programs to provide victims of sexual assault the medical, psychological, and legal help they need?**

I believe the Navy has sufficient resources and authorities to address the needs of victims. Needs and requirements are regularly assessed to ensure that sufficient resources are available.

**What is your view of the steps the Navy has taken to prevent additional sexual assaults both at home station and deployed locations?**

Sexual assault prevention requires multiple, layered efforts at several levels working in concert. Navy sexual assault prevention incorporates cultural improvement through engaged leadership, education and awareness, intervention, accountability, and partnerships across Navy organizations. Policy alone will not stop sexual assault; it requires action at the fleet level and involves all leaders.

**What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources the Navy to investigate and prosecute allegations of sexual assault?**

The Navy has increased the training and resources applied to the investigation and prosecution functions. The Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) has increased the number of investigators trained to investigate sexual assault offenses and enhanced its protocols to ensure these investigations are conducted or overseen by personnel qualified in this specialized field. The JAG Corps has similarly refined the training provided to judge advocates prosecuting or advising commanders in these cases, most notably requiring every attorney serving as lead trial counsel in a sexual assault case to be special victim qualified. As the law enforcement and legal components have individually improved, they have also endeavored to become more collaborative, both in training and execution. NCIS and the JAG Corps participate in an annual Special Victims Capabilities Course, attended by numerous members of the response community including trial and defense counsel, paralegals, Victims' Legal Counsel, and Victim Advocates. NCIS also created the Adult Sexual Assault Program (ASAP) in the Navy's largest fleet concentration areas to provide a distinct and recognizable group of personnel to investigate sexual assault related offenses. Upon receiving a report, ASAP personnel employ a surge team response. Members of the team collaborate with trial counsel and victim advocate personnel, resulting in the faster delivery of an investigative package to the convening authority. These types of functions are critical to responding to sexual assault, which in turn is essential to the commander's ability to maintain good order and discipline. With the dynamic nature of this area and the fluidity of our force, we cannot afford to reduce the training and resources currently provided – we must continue to seek ways to improve.

**What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults occur?**

Engagement by the chain of command is essential as we create a culture at all levels that is intolerant of actions and behaviors that lead to sexual assault.

Elimination of sexual assault and the behaviors that lead to sexual assault will be manifested by deckplate leadership – the chief petty officers and junior officers in the spaces. These leaders respond to their Commanding Officer. That CO is accountable to remain fully engaged in establishing the proper climate and ensuring that his or her team is following through.

**Surveys report that up to 62 percent of victims who report a sexual assault perceive professional or social retaliation for reporting. If confirmed, what will you do to address the issue of retaliation for reporting a sexual assault?**

Retaliation is unacceptable. If confirmed, I will continue our efforts to address and confront this issue. Everyone needs to be sensitive to the perception of retaliation, recognize its signs, and step in to eliminate it. Training to recognize and eliminate retaliation has been added to the training curriculum for first line supervisors, prospective command leadership and in the future Sailor training for FY16. In addition, each installation-based Sexual Assault Case Management Group (SACMG) specifically asks for any experiences of retaliation against any reporters of crime, or against first responders or witnesses during its monthly review of open cases of sexual assault.

**Sexual assault is a significantly underreported crime in our society and in the military. If confirmed, what will you do to increase reporting of sexual assaults by military victims?**

If confirmed, I will continue the progress being made by Navy leaders around the Fleet. Increases in sexual assault reporting provide some hope that the Navy is making progress to elevate Sailors' trust and confidence in command leadership and in the SAPR process. Better understanding of the precursors, indicators and behaviors associated with this crime, awareness of the multiple avenues to report, trust that the command will take all reports seriously, and confidence that the command will support survivors throughout the process, have all contributed to the increase in reporting. We must keep Sailors' trust in the response process by ensuring the chain of command is central to this response.

One area of concern is that the RAND report of 2014 indicated that male reporting rate is very low. We are incorporating male victim scenarios into our training and awareness, better understanding and removing barriers to male reporting, and continuing evaluation of support services to ensure they are gender-responsive.

**In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a judge advocate outside the chain of command, instead of a military commander in the grade of O-6 or above as is currently the Department's policy, to determine whether allegations of sexual assault should be prosecuted?**

I support the Department's current policy. The Uniform Code of Military Justice operates as both a criminal justice system and a critical component of a commander's authority to maintain good order and discipline. I believe our military members and national security will best be served by retaining the military commander's key role in the military justice decision process. While the Navy cannot do without the legal analyses and recommendations provided by our highly proficient judge advocates, and I demand that all leaders in the Services to take advantage of this expertise, I firmly believe the military commander's role is indispensable in the prosecutorial process.

**What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to address the problem of sexual assaults in the Navy?**

If confirmed, I will continue to enhance our prevention efforts through responsive Fleet-wide training based on what we've learned, addressing the spectrum of destructive and inappropriate behaviors to improve our ability to recognize and interrupt the continuum of harm as early as possible. I intend to continue command and leadership engagement and involvement at all levels.

We have enhanced our response efforts by full implementation of Deployed Resiliency Counselors on large deck ships, enhanced NCIS investigative capability using specially trained Master-at-Arms, and continued legal assistance to victims through our Victims' Legal Counsel program. I will continue to assess the extent to which these resources are effective and sufficient. We will incorporate male victim scenarios into our training and awareness, better understanding and removing barriers to male reporting, and continuing evaluation of support services to ensure they are gender-responsive.

**What is your assessment of the effect, if any, of recent legislation concerning sexual assault on the capability of Navy commanders to prosecute sexual assault cases, including cases where prosecution is declined by civilian prosecutors?**

It is still too early to fully understand the impact of recent legislative changes. Initial surveys indicate that the changes, particularly those related to victims' rights, have increased trust in the system. That trust has led to increased victim reporting and participation, which we believe is enhancing commanders' ability to prosecute sexual assault cases, including those in which prosecution is declined by civilian authorities.

**Religious Guidelines**

**American military personnel routinely deploy to locations around the world where they must engage and work effectively with allies and with host-country nationals whose faiths and beliefs may be different than their own. For many other cultures, religious faith is not a purely personal and private matter; it is the foundation of their culture and society.**

**Learning to respect the different faiths and beliefs of others, and to understand how accommodating different views can contribute to a diverse force is, some would argue, an essential skill to operational effectiveness.**

**In your view, do policies concerning religious accommodation in the military appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs, including individual expressions of belief, without impinging on those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief?**

Yes.

**Under current law and policy, are individual expressions of belief accommodated so long as they do not impact unit cohesion and good order and discipline?**

Yes.

**In your view, does a military climate that welcomes and respects open and candid discussions about personal religious faith and beliefs in a home-port environment contribute in a positive way to preparing U.S. forces to be effective in overseas assignments?**

In my view, a military climate that welcomes and respects open and candid discussion about personal religious faith in garrison can positively prepare U.S. forces to be effective in overseas assignments. However, there must be clear guidance about the importance of mutual respect and trust.

**Would a policy that discourages open discussions about personal faith and beliefs be more or less effective at preparing service members to work and operate in a pluralistic environment?**

I believe that a military climate that welcomes and respects open and candid discussion about personal religious faith in garrison can positively prepare U.S. forces to be effective in overseas assignments. In a world that appears to be increasingly committed to expressing religious belief, possessing this skill is necessary to not only understand our adversaries, but also understand our partner nations (consistent with the National Strategy on Integrating Religious Leader and Faith Community Engagement into U.S. Foreign Policy). Any policy that discourages open discussion diminishes our ability to develop these skills. However, there must be clear guidance about the importance of mutual respect and trust.

**In your view, when performing official military duties outside a worship service, should military chaplains be encouraged to express their personal religious beliefs and tenets of their faith freely, or must they avoid making statements based on their religious beliefs?**

I believe that current Navy instructions and Chief of Chaplains training notices provide adequate guidance to Chaplains regarding how to serve as a Chaplain in a pluralistic environment while maintaining the tenets of their faith.

**Do you believe chaplains should be tasked with conducting non-religious training in front of mandatory formations, even if they may be uniquely qualified to speak on the particular topic, such as suicide prevention or substance abuse? If so, do you believe guidance provided to those chaplains on what they should and should not say with respect to their faith is adequate?**

Yes. Chaplains, like all naval officers should be prepared to provide training in subject matter areas they may have an expertise in or have specialized training that would be of benefit to members of the command. I believe that current Navy instructions and Chief of Chaplains training notices provide adequate guidance to Chaplains regarding how to serve as a Chaplain in a pluralistic environment while maintaining the tenets of their faith.

### **Active-Duty End Strength**

**The Navy's active-duty end strength is projected to grow from 323,000 in 2013 to 327,000 this year to 330,000 personnel in 2020. The Navy has made great strides in improving the "fit" and "fill" of sea-going billets in recent years.**

**What are your greatest personnel management concerns?**

If confirmed, I want to ensure that the Navy has the necessary policies and statutes in place to adequately recruit and retain the next generation of Sailors with the talent and skills to man our fleet. My efforts will be focused on obtaining sufficient and persistent insight into the needs and desires of current and prospective Sailors and Navy civilians, with the goal of enhancing our ability to tailor our programs to continue to attract and retain the best talent. These trends can change quickly - if we wait too long, we may find ourselves unprepared and unable to effectively respond.

**What additional force management tools does the Navy need, and which of these require Congressional authorization?**

The current force management authorities and tools are very complex. If confirmed, I would be an active participant in Secretary of Defense Carter's Force of the Future effort to pursue a broad range of initiatives aimed at attracting and retaining talent. I would seek to engage in a thorough review of existing tools and authorities, and would look forward to working with Defense Department leadership and the Congress to pursue necessary adjustments.

### **Joint Officer Management**

**What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the Goldwater-Nichols-required Joint Qualification System?**

Goldwater-Nichols was revolutionary in its time and has helped to transform the Department of Defense. However, much has changed in the past 30 years in both the Joint Force and the security environment. As such, while I do not see any urgent need for specific changes, I believe a review would be useful. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy if such a review were undertaken.

**Do you think additional changes in law or regulation are needed to respond to the unique career-progression needs of Navy officers?**

While I do not currently see any urgent need for change, I do believe that this is an area appropriate for renewed evaluation. If confirmed, I would welcome the chance to work closely with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy if such a review were undertaken.

**In your view, are the requirements associated with becoming a Joint Qualified Officer, including links to promotion to general and flag officer rank, consistent with the operational and professional demands of Navy line officers?**

I do not see any urgent need for immediate change. Having said that, I believe that a review would be useful and if confirmed, I look forward to exploring this issue in cooperation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs.

**If not, what modifications, if any, to the requirements for joint officer qualifications are necessary to ensure that military officers are able to attain meaningful joint and service-specific leadership experience and professional development?**

If confirmed, I look forward to working on this issue with Defense Department leadership and the Congress.

**In your view, what is the impact of joint qualification requirements on the ability of the services to select the best qualified officers for promotion and to enable officer assignments that will satisfy service-specific officer professional development requirements?**

We operate and fight as a Joint team. While meeting all of the many demands for advancement is a challenge, I firmly believe that developing appropriate joint understanding is a critical element of higher-level leadership. If confirmed, I look forward to exploring whether there are more effective ways to achieve this objective, and if so, discussing them in greater depth with Defense Department leadership and the Congress.

**Do you think a tour with a Combatant Command staff should count toward the Joint tour requirement?**

Yes.

**Department of the Navy Talent Management Initiatives**

**On May 13, 2015, the Secretary of the Navy announced several talent management initiatives, including: changes to Navy fitness tests, a transition to the same uniform for males and females, increasing female enlisted accessions, opening all operational billets to women, tripling the length of maternity leave from 6 to 18 weeks, expanding the Career Intermission Program, altering the promotion selection board process, revising year group management, ending General Military Training as it currently exists, and increasing graduate education opportunities.**

**Do you support these changes?**

Yes.

**Which of these changes, if any, do you believe should be modified, delayed, or eliminated?**

I support each of these new initiatives and if confirmed, look forward to implementing them in a thoughtful and responsible way.

**Navy Reserve**

**What is your vision for the roles and missions of the Navy Reserve, and, if confirmed, what objectives would you seek to achieve with respect to the Navy Reserve's organization, end strength, and force structure?**

The Navy Reserve, over 58,000 strong, fully accomplishes its mission of delivering strategic depth and operational capability to the Navy, Marine Corps, and Joint Force. As part of the Navy's Total Force of Active and Reserve Sailors supported by government civilians, Navy Reserve Sailors bring value through scalable utilization options to meet Navy requirements. Approximately 25 percent of the Navy Reserve delivers operational support on any given day, increasing Total Force operational capacity. The manner in which the Navy employs its Reserve Component provides responsive and flexible options to meet Navy mission requirements. If confirmed, I will support efforts to leverage our Navy Reserve capacity in new areas where our Reserve Component could increase Total Force efficiency and effectiveness in executing the mission.

**What is your understanding and assessment of the Navy Reserve as an operational reserve, as opposed to its long standing traditional role as a strategic reserve?**

The Navy Reserve is both operational and strategic. The Navy's integrated approach to Total Force employment enables Reserve Sailors and Reserve units to train for strategic requirements, while also supporting Navy's day-to-day operations. Operationally, the Navy Reserve's capability is routinely utilized to support mission requirements through scalable employment options. Strategically, the Navy Reserve's capacity provides a surge force for the Navy. We should retain a Navy Reserve that is both operational and strategic, thereby providing maximum flexibility to meet unknown future requirements. Commanders have assured access to their Reserve Component Sailors, so we can confidently assign missions to the Navy Reserve where it makes operational and fiscal sense.

**In your view, what are the major challenges to maintaining and enhancing the Navy Reserve as a relevant and capable operational reserve?**

Our Navy Reserve is as relevant and capable today as it has been at any time in our history. We have invested in our people and our equipment, we have an integrated Total Force approach to filling operational and support missions, and we honor the service of our Reserve Sailor's families and employers. In the future, we need to continue investing in our Navy Reserve with an appropriate level of discretionary funding and equipment recapitalization to meet mission requirements. Moreover, as we continue to support the Secretary of the Navy's Task Force Innovation and Sailor 2025 initiatives, we will maintain a robust ability to recruit and retain the highest caliber Sailors by delivering flexible career paths and opportunities that enable a lifetime of service.

**What are your views about the optimal role for the Reserve Component forces in meeting combat missions?**

The optimal role for the Reserve Component is as a partner in the Navy Total Force, where we view missions in terms of capabilities first, and then decide where the capability should reside. The value of the Navy Reserve is in both their strategic capacity to provide Sailors and units for mobilizations in support of Global Force Management requirements, as well as their operational capacity to provide daily support to the Fleet through flexible access options.

**In your view, should the Department of Defense assign homeland defense or any other global or domestic civil support missions exclusively to the Reserves?**

The Navy's approach to utilizing the Reserve Component is to examine each mission from a Total Force perspective and decide what capabilities are needed, how often we need them, and what component is best suited to carry them out. In my opinion, this approach has worked well and could usefully be applied more broadly across the defense enterprise.

### **Nuclear Naval Propulsion Program**

**Executive Order 12344 “Nuclear Naval Propulsion Program” of February 1, 1982, which was codified in section 2511 of title 50 United States Code, states “The director [of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program] shall be appointed to a serve a term of eight years, except the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of the Navy may, with mutual concurrence, terminate or extend the term of the respective appointments.”**

**Is it your understanding that both the Secretary of Energy and Secretary of the Navy have concurred on releasing you from your term as Director?**

Yes.

**In your view, is eight years the appropriate length of tenure for the position of Director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program? Please explain.**

The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program currently has a superb record of safety and effectiveness that is founded on a culture defined by deep expertise, honest and detailed self-assessment, an unwavering focus on facing the facts, and doing the technically right thing. This approach serves as a model for the Navy and the nation to discipline very complex technology operating in harsh environments. The Director must set the tone in each of these areas. Based on my three years as Director, I strongly support an eight year tenure for the Director as the best way to keep this model intact.

**What is your view of the role of the Director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program in the preservation of the Program’s unique fail-safe culture of zero defects engineering, personnel excellence, and training?**

Since the beginning of the Program under Admiral Rickover, the Director has played a critical role, both inside and outside the Program, to preserve and sustain the culture. It is true to this day.

**What is your view of the role of the Chief of Naval Operations in the preservation of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program’s unique fail-safe culture of zero defects engineering, personnel excellence, and training?**

The CNO plays a key role, working with the Director of Naval Reactors and Fleet Commanders, to ensure that the Program gets the resources needed to preserve the culture of excellence. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to support the NNPP as CNO.

**How would you characterize the professional relationship between the Director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program and the Chief of Naval Operations, including the responsibility to organize, train, and equip nuclear-powered vessels?**

In my experience both as Director and as a career nuclear operator, there is a strong professional relationship between the Director of Naval Reactors and the CNO. This relationship is founded on a common understanding of the importance of nuclear powered warships in our nation's defense, the importance of the Program's record of safety and effectiveness in ensuring access around the world, and in the importance of the Naval Reactors organization as a model for achieving sustained excellence. If confirmed, I will continue to enhance this professional relationship.

### **Congressional Oversight**

**In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.**

**Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?**

Yes.

**Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?**

Yes.

**Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Chief of Naval Operations?**

Yes.

**Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?**

Yes.

**Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?**

Yes.