

Senate Armed Services Committee
Advance Policy Questions for Mr. David Norquist
Nominee for Appointment to be Deputy Secretary of Defense

Duties and Qualifications

Section 132 of title 10, U.S. Code, provides that the Deputy Secretary of Defense shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe. Except as expressly proscribed by law or order of the President or Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary has full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense on any and all matters.

(1) Having performed the duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense for more than six months, what do you perceive to be the duties and powers of the Deputy Secretary most critical to national defense?

The most critical duty of the Deputy Secretary is to be able to seamlessly assume the duties of the Secretary of Defense if required. The day-to-day duties and powers most critical to national defense is the Deputy's responsibility to ensure the Department is postured for the future while simultaneously driving execution and performance. In order to do this effectively, the Deputy Secretary leads the internal management of the Department and ensures implementation of the National Defense Strategy (NDS). The Deputy frames critical decisions for the Secretary of Defense on future programs and capabilities. At the same time, the Deputy Secretary is responsible for performance, reform, and affordability across the Department.

(2) Over these past six months, what duties and powers of the Deputy Secretary have required the greatest investment of your time?

Implementing the NDS, to include modernization, driving reform, and leveraging the DoD Audit, has taken the greatest investment of my time. These are complex issues that require strategic vision, oversight, and follow-through. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing this important work to ensure the Department is postured for success in the decades to come.

Pursuant to DOD Directive 5105.2, *Deputy Secretary of Defense*, the Deputy is charged to ensure Department-wide capability and resources across all functions to carry out the strategic plan of the DOD in support of national security objectives.

(3) If confirmed, specifically how would you ensure Department-wide capability and resources across all functions carry out the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS)?

If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Secretary to continue to drive the implementation of the 2018 NDS. The NDS requires capability and resources to restore military readiness, modernize the Joint Force, and develop new warfighting concepts for priority theaters in great power competition. In April, I signed the FY 2021 – 2025

Defense Planning Guidance which directed that the 2018 NDS remain the guidepost for force planning, analytic, and investment direction in the upcoming FY 2021 – 2025 program budget cycle. The 2018 NDS unified framework enables a potent combination of teamwork and resources, alongside an unmatched network of allies and partners stepping up to shoulder their share of the burden for international security.

(4) Looking forward, what other duties and/or powers would you expect the Secretary of Defense to prescribe for you, if confirmed?

If confirmed, I would expect the Secretary to call on me to lead the management and operations of the Department. Specifically, implementation of the NDS. I fully anticipate the Secretary will prescribe that I oversee and direct the internal management, with a primary focus on modernization (program and budget issues), reforming the Department for greater performance and affordability, and driving policies which enhance the Department's readiness and lethality.

In accordance with title 31, section 1123 of the U.S. Code, the Deputy Secretary serves as the Chief Operating Officer of the Department of Defense. In this role, the Deputy Secretary is the accountable official for improving DoD management and performance, and is charged with developing and maintaining the agency's strategic plan required by section 306 of title 5, U.S. Code.

(5) If confirmed, how would you change or refine, if at all, the DOD strategic goals, performance goals, priority goals, or performance measures, set forth in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2018-2022 DOD Annual Performance Plan?

The FY 2018 – FY 2022 National Defense Business Operations Plan (NDBOP) and supporting Annual Performance Plan (APP) are aligned with the NDS and provide the objectives and targets to measure implementation of the three NDS lines of effort from a business operations and support perspective.

If confirmed, I would direct the Department to refine and adapt its performance measures, as articulated in the APP, to incorporate new initiatives or other data-driven changes as they are identified so we can fully implement the NDS. The Department uses performance data to hold leaders accountable, inform decisions, and benchmark progress against industry standards to ensure both the warfighter and taxpayers get the best value for resources.

(6) If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to improve or refine the strategic planning process DOD-wide, including mechanisms to guide and synchronize DOD Components' efforts to develop and nest strategic objectives; using reliable data to monitor and measure the implementation of performance improvement initiatives; and regularizing reports of progress towards achieving established goals?

The Department has made progress revamping its downstream strategic planning tools to the NDS, including the FY 2018 – FY 2022 National Defense Business Operations Plan

(NDBOP) and the supporting FY 2018 – 2022 DoD Annual Performance Report. If confirmed, I will continue to fully integrate the NDS with business operations throughout the Department. This will facilitate greater cooperation and alignment with the Services and Defense Agencies and Field Activities through shared goals and complementary objectives. Additionally, the Department will use consistent enterprise performance measures to assess NDS implementation of business operations or “core metrics” at the Department level, Service or Component level, and in other governance forums, as appropriate.

In addition, I will work with the DoD Chief Management Officer (CMO), Comptroller, and Chief Information Officer (CIO) to identify data products that meet those leaders' requirements based on live data gleaned from the Department's business systems, and presented through analytic visualizations that reflect a Department-wide perspective along with comparisons against industry benchmarks for productivity and efficiency.

(7) If confirmed, and given your observations and experience performing the duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and as Under Secretary of Defense for Comptroller, what innovative ideas would you consider implementing with regard to the structure and operations of the DOD?

If confirmed, I will leverage my experience as both the Comptroller and as the official Performing the Duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense to implement new ideas for overseeing the business operations of the Department, to include a focus on monthly execution of critical operations. In addition, I will focus on improving the Program Budget Review (PBR) process. Specifically, I will revise budget review timelines and data collection standards to maximize senior leader decision-making quality and timing.

(8) To the extent that the functions of DOD Components overlap, what would be your approach, if confirmed, to consolidating and reducing unnecessary duplication?

If confirmed, I will work with the Directors of CMO, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), and Comptroller in the upcoming FY 2021 – FY 2025 Program Review to 1) identify areas of potential duplication; 2) determine the root cause of the duplication (e.g., security, mission creep, etc.); 3) evaluate alternative solutions and best practices; 4) build support and buy-in across the Department; and 5) validate results and outcomes through the Deputy's Management Action Group. This effort will draw ideas from several sources to include existing Reform Management Group initiatives that reduce duplication in the areas of information technology (IT), data, health care, and contract management, as well as the current Defense Agency and DoD Field Activities (DAFA) reviews in progress by the CMO in response to the FY 2019 NDAA. In cases where duplication may exist, the CMO is using cross-component teams to analyze relationships, evaluate effects of duplication, assess and compare the programs' performance, and identify options for reducing or better managing duplication.

(9) If confirmed, what ideas for change in broad Department policy would you consider providing to the Secretary of Defense in your role as a member of the Armed Forces Policy Council?

If confirmed, I would use the NDS as a guide for making any recommendations to the Secretary with regard to changing broad Department policy to facilitate full implementation of the Strategy.

Section 132 of title 10, U.S. Code emphasizes that the Deputy Secretary must be “highly qualified for the position by reason of background and experience, including persons with appropriate management experience.”

(10) What background, expertise, and experience do you possess that qualify you to serve as Deputy Secretary of Defense?

I have 30 years of national security / defense experience, during which I have worked at nearly every level of the Department of Defense. In positions of ever greater responsibility, I have implemented reforms and led people to strengthen our national security and provide better stewardship of taxpayer’s money. Most recently I have spent the last 6 months serving as the official Performing the Duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and implementing the NDS.

After graduate school, I started as a GS-9 program/budget analyst working for the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Over my career I have served in positions at a field site overseas, at a Major Command, a Service Headquarters, and twice in the Department’s Comptroller office. I also served in national security related areas outside the DoD. I served as the first Senate confirmed Chief Financial Officer at the Department of Homeland Security. I served on Capitol Hill as Professional Staff on the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee. My private sector experience includes a senior leadership position at Kearney & Company (a Certified Public Accounting firm) supporting Federal clients. Throughout my career I have had the opportunity to work with Congress, the White House, and the Office of Management and Budget.

In addition, in my role as the official Performing the Duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and DoD Comptroller, I have gained a deeper understanding of the vast range of issues and challenges related to the NDS. These include our strategic approach with China and Russia, the recruitment and retention of our Armed Forces, the research and development of new technologies such as artificial intelligence and hypersonics, and the oversight and protection of the networks and systems that connect the DoD enterprise. I believe my background, expertise, and experience is directly relevant and prepares me well should I be confirmed as Deputy Secretary of Defense.

(11) Specifically, what is your experience in the management of large, complex organizations?

As the official Performing the Duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, I oversaw a \$685 billion budget and 2.8 million people. In this capacity, I focused on day-to-day operations of the Department, future plans and requirements, and our people – military, civilians, and their families.

I was also the first Senate Confirmed Chief Financial Officer of the Department of Homeland Security. In this role, I was the senior financial executive responsible for the third largest Federal agency with \$60 billion in total budget authority. I had the task of overseeing the entire financial picture for the newly created agency to include integrating 22 different federal departments and agencies under the umbrella of one Department.

(12) Please provide an example of a situation in which you improved the management and performance of a large organization. Include in your example a description of how you leveraged strategic and performance planning, measurement, analysis, regular assessment of progress, and the use of performance information to achieve the improvements you cite.

The CFO Act requires the 24 largest Federal agencies to get a clean opinion on their financial statement audits. In 2006 when I became CFO of the Department of Homeland Security it had 10 audit disclaimer conditions. In 2017 when I became Comptroller/CFO of the Department of Defense, it had not even started an agency-wide financial statement audit.

In each organization, I established tools and processes to drive change across the business enterprise. This included establishing a process of using the auditors to identify issues, have subject matter experts evaluate the root cause and develop corrective action plans, and monitor the execution of those plans through completion and then validation by the auditors. In both organizations we used dash boards to track and measure progress. In DoD, for example, this allows us to see how each organization is progressing in closing audit findings and what type of issues are most prevalent or difficult to solve. We have established forums to sharing best practices or resolving agency wide issues. By 2008 when I left DHS it had reduced the audit disclaimer conditions from 10 to 3 and the team and process in place drove DHS to its first of many clean opinions in 2013.

At DoD, while we have only completed the first audit, we have already seen the benefit. For example, in response to the audit, DLA cleared suspended stock which filled approximately 59,000 backorders worth \$287 million. We are also resolving issues the auditors identified that effect the accuracy of our inventory of real property and supplies. For example, the auditors pulled a sample of real property assets for the Navy and found that about 6.5% of the structures no longer existed. The Air Force identified approximately 41,000 contactor held inventory items which have not been used or requested in more than a decade. The Department is currently working to resolve over 2,000 findings from the audit.

Achieving this type of change across a large enterprise requires sustained focus and oversight. It also requires the sustained support of the Congress and the Department's leadership.

(13) Do you believe there are any actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties and exercise the powers of the Deputy Secretary of Defense?

If confirmed, I intend to review the existing management forums and tools (e.g., DMAG, RMG) and modify them as necessary to enhance executive oversight and program execution. I will also review and refine data collection and management to improve data-driven analysis and decision making. I will establish clear metrics and ensure the right management forums are available to engage with OSD, the Joint Staff and Service leadership to drive results.

Major Challenges

(14) What do you consider to be the most significant challenges you will face if confirmed to be the Deputy Secretary of Defense?

If confirmed, the most significant challenges I will face as Deputy Secretary of Defense is modernizing our military capabilities to compete, deter, and if necessary prevail in a high end fight; and realizing reform efficiencies across the Department to achieve greater affordability and performance.

(15) What plans do you have for addressing each of these challenges, if confirmed?

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Joint Staff, Services, Combatant Commands, and OSD leadership on how we compete today below the level of armed conflict and evolve our future warfighting concepts. I will work to test and experiment with these concepts and associated capabilities to identify gaps and risks, and then develop and deliver new capabilities to maintain the nation's military edge. I will seek to ensure the Department improves interagency coordination and synchronization in support of "whole of government" strategies to meet national objectives. Regarding reform, I will work with the CMO, CAPE, and Comptroller during the upcoming program/budget development to identify and address duplicative efforts across the Services and the Defense Agencies and Field Activities in order to prioritize modernization investments necessary to continue implementation of the NDS.

Civilian Control of the Military

(16) If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure that your tenure as Deputy Secretary of Defense epitomizes the fundamental requirement for civilian control of the Armed Forces embedded in the U.S. Constitution and other laws?

Civilian control of the military is a hallmark of the American form of government. If confirmed, I will be devoted to ensuring the Department of Defense always operates

consistently with this cherished principle. I will serve as a conduit for direction from the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense to all of the components within the Department of Defense. I will work with the Secretary to ensure there are open lines of two-way communication between the Department's civilian and uniformed leaders. I will strengthen civilian oversight if I find areas where it has atrophied and ensure leadership tasks are assigned to the correct civilian component. Finally, I will empower civilian Components to perform their statutory responsibilities.

In its 2018 report, *Providing for the Common Defense*, the National Defense Strategy Commission observed, “there is an imbalance in civil-military relations on critical issues . . . Civilian voices appear relatively muted on issues at the center of U.S. defense and national security policy.”

(17) Do you agree with this assessment? If confirmed, how, if at all, would you use your position to contribute to the discussion, debate, and resolution of core U.S. defense and national security issues?

I have not experienced the problem; however, I understand there is this perception. In my experience, the Department's civilian and military leaders work together constructively to achieve the strategic objectives established in the NDS. If confirmed, I will promote collaboration and open and transparent debate, and ensure the Secretary receives the advice of civilian and military leadership that fosters the effective vetting and resolution of core defense and national security issues.

2018 National Defense Strategy

The 2018 NDS framework prioritizes “great power competition and conflict” with China and Russia as the primary challenges with which the United States must contend, while maintaining the imperative of deterring rogue regimes like North Korea and Iran. Finally the framework emphasizes the defeat of terrorist threats to the U.S. and the consolidation of gains in Iraq and Afghanistan, while moving to a “more resource sustainable” approach to counterterrorism. The implementation of the NDS is a high priority for the Committee. Then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan led such efforts to implement the NDS for the DOD. In particular, the Deputy Secretary’s Management Action Group offers a good opportunity to effect the implementation of the NDS through the President’s budget request.

(18) In your view, does the 2018 NDS accurately assess the current strategic environment? Please explain your answer.

Yes. The NDS accurately assesses the current strategic environment characterized by great power competition. The DoD is increasingly challenged by adversaries that operate below our traditional thresholds of armed conflict and seek to achieve objectives through *fait accompli*. Wars of the future and the competitive environment of today represent radically different conflicts than those we have fought since the collapse of the Soviet Union. To preserve peace we must be prepared for the high-end fight against peer

competitors, not just in the air, on land, and at sea, but in new domains such as space and cyberspace, all of which dramatically increase the complexity of warfare. We must re-evaluate how we organize, train, equip, and conduct operations to ensure we are prepared for the future fight and engaged in the current competition short of armed conflict. The NDS also acknowledges that the international state of play is constantly shifting. If confirmed I will work with the Secretary, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and interagency partners to continually assess changes in the strategic environment to ensure timely and appropriate decisions to achieve U.S. national interests.

(19) Given the threats defined by the 2018 NDS, what are the core operational challenges confronting the DOD, in your view?

The core operational challenges confronting DoD include maintaining military advantage against major power adversaries in the newly contested domains of space and cyber; and responding to a security environment in which all domains are contested by adversaries who are optimizing their capabilities to target our existing battle networks and operational concepts.

(20) What progress has DOD made in developing, testing, and validating the operational concepts required to address each of these challenges? Please explain your answer.

Each of the Services is responsible for developing operational concepts to address the challenges outlined in the NDS. Currently, the Services are using wargaming and exercises to develop, test, and validate these concepts.

In parallel, the Joint Staff is responsible for integrating Service concepts into joint concepts. General Dunford made great progress through the recently published Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO). Based on the strategic direction established in the 2018 NDS, the CCJO provides a vision for a globally integrated, partnered Joint Force which is able to out-think, out-maneuver, and out-fight any adversary under conditions of disruptive change. This enterprise approach to Joint Force Development and Design, will integrate efforts across the Joint Force, Services, and Combatant Commanders to align functions of concept development, analysis, wargames, experiments, and exercises, building on national and DoD strategies, shared net assessment, and rigorous examination of overarching joint concepts.

(21) Are there any critical gaps or shortfalls in force size, capability, or deficiencies in force posture that must be remedied to effectuate these operational concepts, in your view? If confirmed, what would be your role in addressing these gaps, shortfalls, and deficiencies?

New operational concepts require new technologies and equipment. These new technologies and equipment are at various stages of development, prototyping, and testing. If confirmed, it would be my responsibility to promote robust testing, monitor

program progress, and secure appropriate funding in the budget to support continued development and fielding.

(22) Are the programs and resources required to address these gaps properly prioritized in DOD lines of effort and budgets? If confirmed, how would you realign or refocus DOD programs and funding, if at all?

In FY 2019 and FY 2020, yes. We regularly work with Congress to review and adjust as we execute the budget. If confirmed, in FY 2021 – FY 2025 we will review and incorporate changes based on what we have learned from previous years' execution.

(23) Does DOD have the requisite modeling, simulation, experimentation, and wargaming processes and tools to support the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary in rigorously testing and validating DOD's requirements to meet the NDS? Please explain your answer.

No, I agree with the NDS Commission that DoD's analytical support is insufficient to support the rigorous assessments needed to implement the NDS. The FY 2020 President's Budget requested an additional \$32.5 million to address these shortfalls and revitalize analytical support for the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, the Department is investing in new modeling capabilities within its Science and Technology portfolio to ensure we keep pace with emergent techniques and technologies to have cutting-edge analytic capabilities in the future.

(24) Does DOD have the requisite decision support—analytic expertise, processes, and tools—to support the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary, in evaluating warfighting return on investments?

Consistent with deficits identified by the NDS Commission, the Department is revitalizing its ability to develop, assess, and differentiate analytically between key warfighting concepts that address the challenges posed by the NDS. DoD's analytic "Tri-Chair" leadership, OSD CAPE, OSD Policy, and the Joint Staff, are driving this agenda forward to ensure that analytic priorities are aligned with senior leader priorities and are setting and maintaining the highest standards in analytic rigor.

(25) What risk factors, analytical gaps, and resource shortfalls are likely to hamper execution of the 2018 NDS, in your view?

The NDS will be hampered without appropriate funding, development, and timely fielding of emerging technologies notably cyber, space, artificial intelligence, and missiles. We also must develop and maintain associated analytical capabilities to make informed tradeoffs and decisions where we have the uncertainties associated with China's and Russia's increasing military capabilities, changes in the strategic environment, and the implications of emerging technologies for future military operations.

(26) In your view, how can DOD best contribute to a “whole-of-government” effort to develop more holistic strategies and operational concepts—integrating all tools of national power—for prevailing in competitions short of war?

DoD contributes to a “whole-of-government” effort in competition short of war in several ways. The Defense Department is often the first American entity presented to other nations because our forces operate on the front lines globally. Given this reality, we plan, coordinate, and deconflict programs and activities at several echelons with other departments and agencies across the U.S. Government. For some activities, this includes close coordination on the ground with U.S. Country Teams, various international organizations, critical allies, and foreign partners. We learned this lesson in the Counterterrorism fight, and now must translate this into renewed great power competition.

DoD must proactively shape the competitive environment to our advantage short of war building on a whole-of-government effort informed by the National Security Strategy, and guided by our NDS, rather than being reactive to our competitors’ efforts. If confirmed, I intend to sustain our existing relationships, and find new ways to bolster American advantage in an environment increasingly defined by competitions short of war.

National Security Budget Reductions/Sequestration

The discretionary caps imposed by the Budget Control Act (BCA) will be in effect for FYs 2020 and 2021. Absent a budget agreement, the Department will not receive adequate or on-time funding. Continuing resolutions are likely and sequestration remains a possibility.

(27) How does this budget uncertainty affect the Department, in your view?

Budget uncertainty negatively impacts the Department’s ability to rebuild, remain ready, restore competitiveness, provide response options, and carry out the NDS on behalf of the nation. Budget uncertainty also sends confusing signals to our partners, adversely affects workforce morale, and makes it more difficult for the Department to recruit and retain the best talent.

(28) In your assessment, what would be the effects of continued application of BCA discretionary caps through FY 2021 on DOD’s implementation of the 2018 NDS? Of continuing resolutions?

Under Budget Control Act (BCA) caps, the Department would be unable to fully implement the NDS unless Congress provides additional resources in OCO. Such a sudden cut would reverse recent readiness and modernization gains and force decisions to delay or cancel activities, such as training, hiring, depot maintenance, facility sustainment and procurement. The Department must invest heavily in the space and cyber domains and modernize capabilities in the air, maritime, and land domains to enhance lethality and

provide the combat-credible military forces needed for the United States to deter or defeat great power adversaries. These investments would not be possible under sequestration.

Continuing resolutions (CRs) represent budget uncertainty and would limit the Department's spending to last years' levels and priorities. A CR would also:

- Provide the wrong level of funding in DoD's appropriations accounts. For instance, compared to the FY 2020 budget request, DoD would have \$9B less in research and development funding and \$4B excess in procurement funding, which would inhibit future, advanced technology efforts.
- Lose ground in the two critical new contested warfighting domains of space and cyber.
- Explicitly prohibit new program starts or production rate increases of weapons unless Congress provides some relief from this restriction. For example, the Department requested more than 200 new starts in the FY 2020 Budget.
- Interrupt the Department's continued efforts to rebuild military readiness.
- Possibly force the Department to stop growing military end strength.

In its 2018 report, the National Defense Strategy Commission recommended that Congress increase the base defense budget at an average rate of three to five percent above inflation through the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).

(29) Do you believe that 3-5% real budgetary growth through the FYDP is adequate to implement the 2018 NDS effectively? Please explain your answer.

Yes. I believe an average rate of 3-5% real growth would support the implementation of the NDS through the FYDP. The Department needs to build on the recent successes to repair damaged readiness and strengthen the lethality of the military force, and to preserve the competitive advantage we have against our great power adversaries.

The President's Budget for FY 2020 did not include many of the military construction projects that the Commanders of U.S. European Command and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command enumerated on the unfunded priority lists they submitted pursuant to section 222a of title 10, U.S. Code.

(30) Do you believe that the Combatant Commands have the infrastructure they need to support execution of the 2018 NDS?

Yes. I believe the current infrastructure supports the Combatant Commands in the implementation of the NDS today. Looking ahead, new military construction projects are reviewed every year as part of the program budget cycle to ensure the Combatant Commanders can meet future challenges. We also share facilities and infrastructure with our allies and partners throughout the world, which is factored into Combatant Command plans and requirements.

Strategic Guidance Documents of the Department of Defense

(31) If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of Defense, specifically what would be your role in generating and shaping the content of each of the following strategic guidance documents?

- **National Security Strategy**
- **National Defense Strategy**
- **National Military Strategy**
- **Guidance for Employment of the Force**
- **Defense Planning Guidance**
- **Joint Strategic Campaign Plan**
- **Global Force Management Implementation Guidance**

The National Security Strategy issued in 2017 and the National Defense and Military Strategies issued in 2018 continue to provide salient strategic direction for the Department. If confirmed, I will assist the Secretary of Defense in implementing these strategies and monitoring the security environment to determine if guidance updates are necessary to better defend and advance the national interest. Specifically, I will use the annual NDS Assessment to assess our progress in implementing our strategic direction, and determine whether our strategy requires updates or additions as a result of changes in assumptions, policy, or other factors.

If confirmed, I will also play a central role in shaping the annual Defense Planning Guidance, which provides force planning and investment priorities to the Department. I will do so by ensuring this guidance drives the development of future warfighting concepts and associated capabilities. The Department's investments need to address the core operational challenges articulated in the NDS to maintain the military advantage necessary to deter and, if necessary, prevail in high-end conflict.

The Presidentially-approved 2018 Contingency Planning Guidance (formerly titled the Guidance for the Employment of the Force), the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan, and the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance are not scheduled to be updated until 2020 or later and are tailored to the current security challenges. However, any significant change to the NDS would result in a re-assessment, and potentially an out-of-cycle revision of these documents.

(32) What recommendations, if any, would you make to improve these strategic guidance documents and/or make them more useful to the Department and to Congress?

A significant contributor to the success of the NDS and the Department's implementation of the strategy is that it was issued to the entirety of the DOD workforce in a manner its objectives were understood by all. If confirmed, I will work to find ways to do the same for other strategic guidance documents. For example, creating versions at a lower classifications, when able, so they can be more widely disseminated, developing clear

and concise executive summaries, and distributing such documents extensively for broad consumption when possible and appropriate.

Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Deputy Secretary of Defense and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff often partner to lead the Department in addressing emergent issues and policy challenges that require the integration of civilian and military expertise and perspective.

(33) If confirmed, how would you structure your relationship with the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

While serving as the official Performing the Duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, I have worked closely with the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This includes participating in multiple meetings each week on emerging issues, co-chairing senior leader forums to provide guidance to the Department, and hosting a recurring weekly one-on-one meeting with the Vice Chairman. If confirmed, I will continue to work hand-in-hand with the Vice Chairman and build upon our existing relationship.

(34) If confirmed, how would you allocate particular responsibilities to the Vice Chairman and yourself as co-chairs of the Deputy's Management Action Group?

I view the Vice Chairman as a close and complementary partner in managing the agenda and execution of the Deputy's Management Action Group. If confirmed, I will work closely with him and seek his advice on military issues as well as on the full range of strategy, policy, resourcing, and management issues impacting the Department. I view the Vice Chairman as an indispensable contributor and advisor.

(35) In your view, how could the Deputy's Management Action Group be more effective in ensuring that issues with resource, management, and broad strategic and/or policy implications are addressed in a manner that aligns with the Secretary of Defense's priorities and the Department's planning and programming schedule? Please explain your answer.

The Deputy's Management Action Group is a critical forum for sharing information, creating alignment across civilian and military components, exercising effective civilian control and oversight of the Department, and making decisions on major issues. One way to make this forum more effective is to identify additional lower level forums that are working on issues that would benefit from a higher level review to broaden information sharing, remove obstacles, and bring decisions to closure. For instance, during my time as the official Performing the Duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, we instituted a monthly meeting to review DOD performance on key metrics.

Chief Management Officer

Whereas previously, the Deputy Secretary of Defense served as the Department's Chief Management Officer (CMO), section 901 of the NDAA for FY 2017 created the CMO as a standalone position, effective February 2018. The NDAA for FY 2018 vested in the CMO the responsibility for managing the enterprise business operations and shared services of the Department, and designated the CMO as the Department's primary authority with respect to the development of common enterprise data. In January 2019, the CMO was slated to assume certain responsibilities of the Chief Information Officer related to business systems management. Additionally, the CMO serves as the DOD Performance Improvement Officer, reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense in his role as the agency's Chief Operating Officer.

(36) If confirmed, and given your role as the Department's Chief Operating Officer, how would you allocate between the CMO and yourself responsibilities for the Department's enterprise business operations and for general performance management and improvement activities?

If confirmed, I will continue to provide oversight and decision authority to ensure that all major departmental decisions align with the NDS. I will look to the CMO to be responsible for the Department's enterprise business operations, work with OSD partners to perform and facilitate decision-support analysis, hire personnel with the appropriate expertise to ensure high performance, and implement reforms. Accurate and timely performance data is a key tenet for effective management and strategic decision-making. If confirmed, I will work to document the responsibilities and authorities of the CMO to enable implementation of reform and efficient enterprise business management practices.

(37) Do you believe that the Deputy Secretary and CMO have the authorities and resources necessary to effectuate the business transformation of the Department of Defense? If not, what additional authorities do you believe are required?

Yes.

A March 2019 Government Accountability Office report advised that although DOD had taken steps to implement the CMO position, it had not yet fully institutionalized the CMO's authorities and responsibilities.

(38) In your view, has the Department optimally structured and empowered the CMO position to accomplish the CMO's mission? Please explain your answer.

The CMO position was created officially in February 2018, and although the Department has come far, some work remains to be done. The Department has not yet published all required charters, documentation, and direction to fully empower the CMO. If confirmed, I will make that a priority. A Senate-confirmed CMO is necessary to fully develop and implement a long-term vision for the CMO organization and to assist in its maturation beyond its establishment phase.

(39) On which matters should the CMO have directive authority over the Secretaries of the Military Departments, in your view? If confirmed, would you establish a role for the Deputy Secretary of Defense in matters on which the Military Departments and CMO disagree?

The CMO should have the directive authority over the Services on all matters related to enterprise business operations. If confirmed, I will work closely with the CMO and Military Department Secretaries to ensure communication channels remain clear and that open discussions are held on all issues. Should the CMO and Military Departments disagree on any such matter, if confirmed, I would use the Deputy's Management Action Group as a tool to ensure that the resolutions of all disagreements reflect the priorities of the NDS.

(40) When can Congress expect the publication of an updated DOD issuance detailing the responsibilities, functions, relationships, and authorities of the CMO?

If confirmed, it will be one of my first priorities to ensure that the authorities of the CMO are documented in a charter and implemented within the Department.

Defense Agencies and Field Activities

DOD's 19 Defense Agencies and 8 Field Activities are intended to perform consolidated supply and service functions on a Department-wide basis. To this end, Defense Agencies and Field Activities were funded at more than \$106 billion for FY 2017. Each Defense Agency and Field Activity is overseen by a Principal Staff Assistant in OSD.

(41) If confirmed, specifically which Defense Agencies and Department of Defense Field Activities would you designate as subject to the authority, direction, and control of the CMO? Please explain your answer.

Two DAFA agencies are already under the authority, direction, and control of the CMO: the Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) and the Pentagon Force Protection Agency (PFPA). While the law permits additional agencies to report directly to the CMO and there is value in examining agencies with business similarities, I have no specific recommendations at this time.

Acquisition Reform

(42) Given your observations and experience Performing the Duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and as Under Secretary of Defense for Comptroller, has the Congressionally-mandated division of the former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics into two Under Secretaries: one focused on Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)); and one focused on Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)), proven effective? Please explain your answer.

Yes. Implementation of Section 901 of the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act represents a fundamental shift in how the Department maintains its lasting military advantages. The establishment of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)) sharpened the focus on the modernization priorities outlined in the NDS and added rigor to independent technical assessments. The USD for Acquisition & Sustainment (A&S) office is focused on enabling acquisition within the Department to become more agile and to focus on program execution and sustainment while engaging with Congress and industry stakeholders to position the Department to maintain its strategic advantage over our adversaries and implement the NDS.

Science, Technology, and Innovation

U.S. superiority in key areas of innovation is decreasing or has disappeared, while our competitors “leap ahead” through aggressive military modernization and advanced weaponry development. DOD has identified ten key areas in which investment to develop next generation operational capabilities is imperative: hypersonics; fully networked C3; directed energy; cyber; space; quantum science; artificial intelligence (AI)/machine learning; microelectronics; autonomy; and biotechnology. Much of the innovation in these technologies that could prove suitable for national defense purposes is occurring outside of the traditional defense industry.

(43) In your view, are the Department’s investments in these technologies appropriately focused, integrated, and synchronized across all DOD Components?

From my experience, our budget review process assists in synchronizing technology investments across the Military Departments and Services and the Defense Agencies. The establishment of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering has also driven a deeper, technically-focused review of technology investments across the Department to ensure appropriate integration. If confirmed, I will continue to work across DoD to synchronize key investments in critical technologies.

(44) What efforts is DOD making to identify new technologies developed commercially by the private sector and apply them to national security and warfighter purposes?

Much of the innovation in the ten key technology areas that could prove suitable for national defense purposes is occurring outside of the traditional defense industry. Several efforts are underway to harness commercially-developed technologies. The Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), for example, has achieved success working across DoD to bring commercial capabilities to the warfighter. In addition, DoD’s 5G plan is predicated on collaborating with the private sector to accelerate 5G technology development and deployment, address vulnerabilities, and develop dynamic spectrum sharing in congested and contested environments.

Civilian Human Resources

The Deputy Secretary of Defense serves as the appointing authority for Senior Executive Service (SES) positions in the Fourth Estate [other than Defense Intelligence SES and for SES positions in the Office of the DOD Inspector General].

(45) Given that competent and caring leadership is one of the most significant levers available to the Deputy Secretary in shaping a high-performing DOD civilian workforce, if confirmed, what factors and characteristics would be most important to you in selecting a candidate for appointment to the SES?

As the leaders of our civilian workforce, the Department's SES cadre is the cornerstone of innovation, and transformation. Applicants for DoD SES positions must demonstrate progressively responsible leadership experience that is indicative of senior executive level management, and directly related to the skills and abilities of the position. In particular, I believe we need our SES personnel to be equipped to lead, train, and mentor the workforce they supervise to ensure the success of the mission.

(46) If confirmed, how would you go about ensuring that SES under your authority are held accountable for both organizational performance and the rigorous performance management of their subordinate employees?

I believe in establishing goals and holding leaders accountable. The President's Management Agenda and guidance on employee awards make clear the importance of driving high performance and building a culture of accountability. Annual guidance is given in the form of specific measurable and actionable goals set forth in performance plans. Midyear reviews should be given to evaluate progress toward the goals and how employees are doing. Then, at the end of the year, employees are held accountable for achieving established goals.

(47) Are you satisfied that the process employed by the Military Departments and the Fourth Estate for validating whether a vacant SES position should be rehired, restructured, or eliminated is effective in responding to current and emerging mission needs? If confirmed, what role would you play in this process as regards the Fourth Estate?

We have come a long way, but there is more to do. The initial process to evaluate and execute took way too long. The CMO has revised the process to make it much more efficient, deliberate, and comprehensive. By leveraging talent management and workforce reshaping tools, DoD Components are able to develop and implement succession plans to ensure that vacancies, particularly those for critical positions, are filled in an expeditious manner so mission shortfalls are avoided. We are now able to better validate existing requirements, eliminate long-term vacancies, as well as manage, prioritize, and forecast SES allocations. We must ensure we have the ability to promptly fill the vacancies we actually need. If confirmed, I will closely monitor this process.

(48) In your judgment, what is the biggest challenge facing the Department in effectively and efficiently managing its civilian workforce?

In my judgment, the Department's biggest civilian workforce challenge is ensuring we continue to attract and retain the highest quality talent necessary to achieve the NDS. To do that, we must compete with the public and private sectors for talent, and further establish the Department as an employer of choice, by effectively describing the importance of the Nation's defense to prospective employees. This requires the right civilian personnel authorities, processes, and tools, including a full complement of streamlined and flexible hiring and market-based pay authorities, as well as attractive work-life benefits, to attract and retain high-demand talent. The Department continues to pursue human resources reform in order to streamline, simplify, and standardize authorities and processes.

(49) How would you assess the morale of the DOD civilian workforce? What is your assessment of the effect that past pay and hiring freezes have had on the DOD civilian workforce?

It is my understanding the morale of the civilian workforce is high. This is based upon the results of the annual Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey. However, factors like Continuing Resolutions and government shut downs have a de-stabilizing effect, and can result in further negative consequences. At a time when DoD competes heavily with the private sector for high technology talent like engineers and cyber experts we must ensure competitive compensation for our employees.

Environmental Contaminants

According to the Government Accountability Office, DOD has identified 401 military installations affected by known or suspected releases of Perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS) and Perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA).

(50) If confirmed, what actions would you take to address PFOS/PFOA contamination on DOD installations?

If confirmed, I will emphasize the importance of continuing to investigate, prioritize sites, and pursue cleanup actions using the longstanding risk-based process. I will support the ongoing DoD actions to test, treat, and monitor drinking water sources around our 401 installations to address PFOS and PFOA.

(51) What progress is the Department making in efforts to find a replacement for Aqueous Film Forming Foam?

The Department is committed to researching a fluorine-free foam that provides the protection our service members deserve from the risk of fuel fires. If confirmed, I commit to continued support for our investments in both the research for replacements and the demonstrations of existing fluorine-free formulations to ensure their performance meets our necessarily stringent military specifications.

(52) If confirmed, what would be your approach to addressing the current and future health concerns of service members and their families regarding alleged exposures to potentially harmful contaminants on U.S. military installations and in the context of their official military duties?

The health of the total force is one of my highest priorities. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department continues its efforts to identify, mitigate, and prevent exposures to potentially harmful contaminants on military installations. Our leaders, supervisors, and healthcare providers must be knowledgeable of potentially harmful exposures, take all necessary preventive actions, and, importantly, listen to and address all health concerns voiced by the Service members, civilian employees, and their families.

Cyber

In May 2018, the Cyber Mission Force achieved full operational capability. In September, DOD released its 2018 Cyber Strategy. The Strategy charges DOD to “defend forward, shape the day-to-day competition, and prepare for war” to compete, deter, and win in the cyber domain.

(53) What is your view as to whether the “dual hatting” of the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command as the Director of the National Security Agency should be maintained or terminated? Please explain your answer.

I worked with General Nakasone as Comptroller and while serving as the official Performing the Duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and I believe the "dual-hatted" configuration under his leadership is effective; however, the long-term sustainability of this arrangement still needs to be determined. The Department continues to study this question closely to ensure that any decision concerning the dual-hat leadership arrangement is fully informed and mitigates potential risks to national security and to the effectiveness of U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. If confirmed, I will monitor this arrangement to ensure there is no degradation to national security.

(54) If confirmed, specifically what measures would you take or direct to improve the cybersecurity culture across the DOD workforce—military, civilian, and contractor? How would you empower and hold key leaders accountable for improvements in DOD cybersecurity?

The first step is training and educating our workforce--military, civilian, and contractors regarding what cybersecurity really means. The Department is rewriting DoD Instruction 5000.02 with Tailored Security Plans (TSP) and specific Cybersecurity Instructions to ensure cybersecurity is integrated into requirements. We also updated the DoD Cybersecurity Test and Evaluation Guidebook Version 2.0 in April 2018 to promote data-driven mission-impact-based analysis and assessment methods for cybersecurity test and evaluation (T&E). The revision supports the assessment of cybersecurity, survivability, and resilience within a mission context by encouraging planning for tighter integration with traditional system T&E.

Second, red teams and auditing processes must be in place to test our controls and confirm performance. The ability to identify and resolve security vulnerabilities is vital to improving the cybersecurity culture. The Defense Digital Service, for instance, pays ethical hackers to “Hack the Pentagon” and discover bugs in DoD websites and assets. Similarly, the financial statement audit ensures our IT systems have appropriate permission and access controls.

Third, to improve the cybersecurity culture, we must also attract the next generation of cybersecurity professionals to view the Department as an employer that offers unique and challenging opportunities within the cybersecurity career field. Recent authorities provided by Congress have allowed the Department to adjust existing policies and to implement new policies to account for this dynamic need in an increasingly important mission area. One of these key authorities has been the establishment of a Cyber Excepted Service.

By memorandum of October 24, 2018, then-Secretary of Defense Mattis established the Protecting Critical Technology Task Force, reporting to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Task Force was one component of DOD’s response to Intelligence Community warnings that China and Russia are engaged in campaigns to steal trade secrets, proprietary information, and other forms of intellectual property from the United States, through infiltration of the software supply chain, acquisition of knowledge by foreign students at U.S. universities, and other nefarious means—all as part of a strategic technology acquisition program.

(55) How did you, in Performing the Duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff allocate responsibilities for leading the Task Force?

In my role as the official Performing the Duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Vice Chairman and I have maintained the same Task Force leadership construct and remain fully committed to implementing this critical element of the NDS. In this role, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has responsibility to maintain alignment and to make sure it remains a priority for the Department. The Task Force reports every other week to an Executive Committee (EXCOM), which the Vice Chairman and I co-chair and whose membership includes the Undersecretaries of Defense, the DoD CIO, the Joint Staff, all of the Services, and other key individuals. This EXCOM is a directive body that ensures the Task Force recommendations are appropriately considered and acted upon with sufficient authority and urgency. Major General Thomas Murphy, USAF, is the full-time Director of the Task Force. Major General Murphy has assembled a team of 22 subject matter experts from across the Department to lead this critical effort. Moving forward, I look forward to the expansion of current efforts to synchronize this work with our interagency partners.

(56) Given former Secretary Mattis’s call for “concrete action”—to happen quickly, what were the outcomes of the Task Force’s 30- and 90-day sprints?

The initial 30- and 90-day ‘sprints’ driven by the Task Force focused on immediate, internal Department actions to improve our critical technology protection posture and to gain momentum and lay the groundwork for larger, institutional changes that required more time. Between OSD and the Services, there were 44 prioritized tasks in the 30-day sprint, and an additional 37 prioritized tasks in the 90-day sprint. These tasks included things such as updating or altering existing Department policies, establishing DoD critical program and technology priorities, identifying resource challenges, ensuring appropriate contract and grant language was in place, and some specific actions related to distinct technology areas. All of the prioritized tasks in these sprints have been completed.

The Task Force is now focused on the next set of objectives. For instance, to increase cybersecurity within the Defense Industrial Base (DIB), the Department has begun assessing and enforcing compliance with existing, contractually-obligated cybersecurity standards and is developing a Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification process that will require DIB companies to maintain a third-party certified cybersecurity readiness in order to partner with DoD. In addition, security is being integrated into the acquisition process alongside cost, schedule, and performance. Within the research and development enterprise, the Task Force is focused on preventing individuals with problematic foreign connections from conducting DoD-funded research, as well as countering the negative aspects of foreign talent recruitment programs.

(57) Specifically how has DOD undertaken to work with partners in the National Security Innovation Base and defense research enterprise to ensure the integrity and security of DOD’s classified information, controlled unclassified information, and key data?

The Department maintains strong relationships with its partners throughout the National Security Innovation Base, including the Defense Industrial Base (DIB), academia, and other research and development centers. There are a number of forums through which this interaction regularly occurs, including the DIB Cybersecurity Program, the DIB Sector Specific Agency (SSA) Sector Coordinating Council (SCC), and conferences with the Directors of the Federally-Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) and University-Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs), the Academic Security and Counter Exploitation (ASCE) consortium, regular bilateral engagements, and many others. The Department is leveraging these relationships to improve information sharing and ensure that changes and solutions to protect the Department’s critical programs and technologies are actually effective and in the long-term interests of both the Department and the partners upon which the Department relies.

Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy and Posture

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reaffirmed long-held American doctrine that includes limiting the use of nuclear weapons to “extreme circumstances” and the need to maintain the nation’s nuclear triad of land-, sea-, and air-based capabilities. The NPR also recommended the development of a low-yield nuclear weapon to deter threats from

Russia, and potentially, the return of a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile to the Navy fleet.

(58) Do you agree that modernizing each leg of the nuclear triad and the Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons complex is a critical national security priority?

Yes. The three legs of the U.S. nuclear triad are complementary, with each component offering unique strengths. An effective, responsive, and resilient nuclear weapons complex is essential to the U.S. capacity to adapt flexibly to shifting requirements and hedge against future uncertainty. Although still reliable and credible today, our current delivery systems, platforms, weapons, and infrastructure are rapidly aging into obsolescence. We are out of margin for modernizing our nuclear deterrent enterprise. If confirmed, I will continue to support modernization programs as a critical national security priority.

(59) Do you believe the current program of record is sufficient to support the full modernization of the nuclear triad, including delivery systems, warheads, and infrastructure?

Yes, I do. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reaffirmed the critical importance of maintaining a capable Triad of nuclear forces to deter the only existential military threats to the Nation. In my role as Comptroller and while serving as the official Performing the Duties of Deputy Secretary of Defense, I ensured the nuclear triad was fully funded. I believe the Administration's nuclear modernization plan, including updates to the global Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications architecture, will preserve U.S. capabilities for meeting these challenges into the future, if fully funded to the President's Budget

(60) If confirmed, how would you work across the Joint Force to mitigate the risk that all three legs of the nuclear triad could "age out" simultaneously at the end of the 2020s?

The Joint Force faces this challenge because we have deferred or delayed previous modernization efforts, which we no longer have the option to do. The entire nuclear enterprise, including the Departments of Defense and Energy, as well as the Joint Force, are critical to mitigating the risk of our aging nuclear triad. Full implementation of the conclusions reflected in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, as well as receiving necessary and timely funding from Congress, will help to ensure timely modernization and recapitalization.

(61) Do you believe a nuclear "No First Use" policy would be appropriate for the United States? Please explain your answer?

No. The United States has never adopted a "No First Use" policy and should refrain from doing so today. There are a number of different ways, other than nuclear weapons, that

an adversary could inflict mass destruction on the United States. I would not recommend that we limit our options to deter a nuclear threat and to avoid miscalculation by adversaries in these other extreme circumstances.

In 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel directed a comprehensive review of the DOD nuclear enterprise in response to adverse incidents involving U.S. nuclear forces and their senior leadership. The review culminated in numerous recommendations to address concerns identified. Responsibility for monitoring the implementation of corrective actions has been transferred from OSD to the Military Services.

(62) Based on your recent experience performing the duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, are the Military Services maintaining appropriate focus on implementing the corrective actions required by the Nuclear Enterprise Review?

Yes. While serving as the official Performing the Duties of Deputy Secretary of Defense, I continued to track issues from the Nuclear Enterprise Review through my leadership of the Nuclear Deterrence Enterprise Review Group (NDERG). At our most recent NDERG meeting in April, we were able to close many of the remaining items that were open from the original Nuclear Enterprise Review. Further, we agreed, as a body, to shift the focus of the NDERG to monitor enduring and leading indicators of the continued health of the enterprise, and to take immediate action should there be any evidence that additional corrective actions are required. The Military Departments have done an excellent job of maintaining readiness and capability, and, if confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Military Departments and Services and relevant offices in the fourth estate to maintain leadership focus on the nuclear enterprise.

Arms Control

On February 2, 2019, after years of Russian treaty violations, Secretary of State Pompeo announced that the United States would suspend its participation in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, triggering the six-month withdrawal countdown.

(63) How can DOD mitigate any negative consequences of withdrawal from the treaty, and reassure NATO allies regarding stability in Europe?

The United States worked closely for years with our NATO Allies as we attempted to resolve Russia's Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty violations, which have occurred over multiple administrations. It is clear to our Allies that Russia is in violation and the cause of the Treaty's undoing. Going forward, DoD will continue to work cooperatively within the Alliance to adapt NATO's deterrence and defense posture to Russia's actions and ongoing malign behavior.

Missile Defense

(64) In your view, are U.S. capabilities, in both quantity and quality, adequate to ensure the protection of U.S. and allied forces deployed in the Indo-Pacific AOR from Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles?

I would be happy to provide additional information in a classified environment. However, rest assured, the United States will employ the full-spectrum of capabilities and concepts, in concert with regional partners and allies, to protect forces deployed in the U.S. Indo-Pacific AOR from Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles. Although our forces were once assured freedom of operations in the U.S. Indo-Pacific AOR, China has quickly closed the gap with respect to protection of forces from the threat ballistic and cruise missiles pose to our land and sea based assets. As mentioned in the 2019 Missile Defense Review and the 2018 NDS, China represents a formidable threat in terms of its advanced cruise and ballistic missile systems and the quality and quantity of our defensive systems. We must work to maintain our narrowing military advantage in the region where China is expanding its naval and expeditionary capabilities. The FY 2019 NDAA established the Indo-Pacific Stability Initiative (IPSI) to increase forward presence, improve capabilities, enhance posture, and leverage allies and partner nations. We must continue to improve our missile defense capability and capacity to defend our forces and project power and protect our key allies and partners.

Space

A February 2019 Intelligence Community report assessed that China and Russia are training and equipping their military space forces and fielding new anti-satellite weapons to hold U.S. and allied space operations and activities at risk, even as they push for international agreements on the non-weaponization of space.

(65) In your view, does the 2018 NDS accurately assess the strategic environment as it pertains to the domain of space?

Yes, the 2018 NDS is an accurate assessment of the strategic environment in space. Space is a contested domain and it is not a sanctuary from attack. The NDS very clearly describes the re-emergence of great power competition with Russia and China in multiple domains, including in space. Both countries understand that space capabilities enable our modern way of life and way of warfare and therefore seek to close the gap on U.S. space advantages. They seek to exploit a perceived U.S. reliance on fragile space capabilities and this perceived lack of resiliency increases the likelihood that conflict with either nation could begin in space. The United States must be prepared to defend our critical space systems in this emerging warfighting domain.

The Senate version of the FY 2020 NDAA includes a provision directing the creation of a U.S. Space Force that is focused on warfighting in the space domain and charged to transform historically late-to-need processes for developing, procuring, and fielding space warfighting capabilities, without creating an extensive and unreasonably expensive new bureaucracy.

(66) What is your assessment of the legislative provisions in the Senate bill related to the creation of a U.S. Space Force?

Establishing the U.S. Space Force underpins the Department's efforts to transform our approach to space from a combat support function to a warfighting domain, increasing the complexity of warfare. The Senate has clearly recognized the strategic shift necessary to ensure our space forces are postured to compete, deter, and win in future conflict. However, the Senate bill's provisions lack several key elements necessary to establish the Space Force as the sixth branch of our Armed Forces. Additionally, the Secretary of Defense should have the authority to transfer forces, missions, and organizations, such as the Space Development Agency, on the timing and tempo necessary for mission effectiveness. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to ensure the Department has the appropriate resources and authorities to execute these changes.

By memorandum of December 18, 2018, the President directed the establishment of U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM) as a Unified Combatant Command, with responsibility for Joint Force space operations. On June 27, 2019, the Senate confirmed the nomination of General John Raymond for appointment as the Commander, SPACECOM.

(67) What missions, functions, and tasks will transfer from U.S. Strategic Command to SPACECOM? If confirmed, how would you ensure that there is no diminution in strategic capability during the period in which these missions, functions, and tasks are being transferred to SPACECOM?

On May 24, 2019, the President signed an update to the Unified Command Plan, assigning Commander, U.S. Space Command, with the responsibility to plan and execute global space operations and missions, with an emphasis on protecting and defending our space operational capabilities. All space operational forces assigned to U.S. Strategic Command will be re-assigned to U.S. Space Command when the organization is established. This is a no-fail mission, so to ensure that there is no interruption during transfer, U.S. Strategic Command will continue to support U.S. Space Command with personnel, facilities and infrastructure as the new command grows into its final operational capability during the next few years.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response

Despite significant efforts by the Military Services to enhance their response to sexual assaults, including measures to care for victims and hold assailants accountable, the *DOD Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military for Fiscal Year 2018* documented a statistically significant increase in past-year prevalence of sexual assault and unwanted sexual conduct, primarily for female service members aged 17 to 24. These findings echoed earlier reports of alarming increases in the prevalence of sexual harassment and assault at the Military Service Academies.

(68) In your view, why hasn't the Department been more successful in preventing sexual assaults?

The estimated number of Service members who were sexually assaulted dropped between 2006 and 2016. Unfortunately, despite the Department's rigorous efforts, the number in 2018 rose to slightly above the 2014 estimate. These results emphasize that we must continue to evaluate our efforts, understand the cultural changes and adapt our approach to best reach, especially this demographic. Further, we can and must improve our prevention approach by expanding the support and preparation of our people, and continuing to promote a healthy climate by vigorously and appropriately addressing behaviors that detract from dignity and respect.

(69) What is your assessment of the potential impact, if any, of proposals to remove disposition authority from military commanders over felony-level violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, including sexual assault?

Eliminating sexual assault is a leadership issue. The Department must ensure that commanders have the necessary tools to promote mission readiness, good order and discipline, and unit morale. A commander's ability to refer cases for trial by court-martial is one of the tools used to assist in eliminating sexual assault from the ranks. We must ensure that commanders are fully equipped in this fight. Exercising prosecutorial discretion is an important means that commanders use to signal to their units what behavior is unacceptable, and to influence the actions of their subordinates.

(70) If confirmed, what specific role and tasks would you establish for yourself in DOD's program of preventing sexual assault?

If confirmed, I will continue to drive and monitor the changes directed by the Sexual Assault Accountability and Investigation Task Force (SAAITF) report. These solid recommendations by the task force need to become a reality across the DOD. If confirmed, I would be responsible to ensure the plan is being executed. There is no place for sexual assault in our military culture or in our civilian workforce.

If confirmed, I will promote the Department's need for continued evaluation and assessment of the effectiveness of the Department's prevention efforts toward eliminating sexual assault and harassment. I will ensure that new leaders and supervisors have the preparation and tools necessary to promote civility and cohesion in their units, as well as model appropriate behavior. Further, as the SAAITF plan is being implemented, I will engage with staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Military Departments and Services to identify and energize new and effective prevention initiatives.

Military Health Care Reform

Section 702 of the FY 2017 NDAA, as modified by Sections 711 and 712 of the FY 2019 NDAA, transferred the administration and management of military hospitals and clinics from the Military Departments to the Defense Health Agency (DHA).

(71) If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure the rapid and efficient transfer of the administration and management of military treatment facilities to the DHA?

If confirmed, I will personally remain engaged in implementing the transition of the Department's military treatment facilities to the Defense Health Agency. I see the Military Health System transformation as essential to meet our readiness and healthcare delivery missions.

It is a key role of the Deputy Secretary to help remove obstacles and assist with the speed of transfer from the Services to DHA, as well as find and facilitate common areas where the Services and DHA can work together. I am committed to working with all stakeholders, and as efforts proceed, if confirmed, I will personally monitor progress, and lead adjustments, in implementing the transition.

(72) Would you see value in restructuring the DHA as a new combatant command—a Unified Medical Command?

Given the current transformational change already occurring in the Department's medical system, it is not clear to me that further restructuring of a Defense Health Command is warranted. I believe that we should implement the current reforms to allow us to assess whether or what additional authorities may be needed to achieve our goals. We cannot let the quality of the care and services for our patients fail.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

(73) Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Yes.

(74) Do you agree, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner?

If confirmed, I agree to accommodate in a timely manner all congressional requests for information by supplying the requested information to the fullest extent, consistent with applicable statutes and the U.S. Constitution.

(75) Do you agree, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you?

Yes.

(76) Do you agree, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided?

Yes.

(77) Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request?

If confirmed, I agree to accommodate all congressional requests for information by supplying the requested information to the fullest extent, consistent with applicable statutes and the U.S. Constitution.

(78) Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee?

If confirmed, I agree to accommodate all congressional requests for information by supplying the requested information to the fullest extent, consistent with applicable statutes and the U.S. Constitution.

(79) Do you agree, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress?

Yes, I agree to protect DoD personnel from unlawful retaliation.