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Weapons of Mass Destruction

on

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
Programs and Activities

before the
Senate Armed Services Committee
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities

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Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Fischer, and Members of the Subcommittee, it is an honor to be here today to share with you the work being done to counter the threats of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the United States Strategic Command Center for Combating WMD (SCC-WMD).

The threat posed by nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons is immediate, growing in scope, and evolving in its potential applications. Those who wish to harm us understand that the use of such weapons could result in immense loss of life and enduring economic, political, and social damage on a global scale.

President Obama has made it clear that countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) is a critical national security priority for our nation. Quite simply, the Agency and Center’s focus is to keep WMD out of the hands of terrorists and other enemies by locking down dangerous nuclear and biological materials, destroying legacy weapons, preparing for, and responding to WMD incidents, and developing technologies to prevent, defend against, and counter a WMD attack.

Mission

Our mission spans the scope of nonproliferation- reducing WMD at their source; counterproliferation- the deterrence, interdiction, and defeat of WMD threats, and consequence management –the minimization of the operational effects of WMD attacks and mitigation of their consequences.

DTRA and the USSTRATCOM Center, and the companion Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination (SJFHQ-E) are a one-stop shop in addressing these threats. If these organizations were compared to a grocery store, not only would we provide access to nearly every kind of food product one could ask for but we have partnerships to deliver what we do not carry in-house. Our store would not only bring in the produce but would also work with the farmers in the field to improve productivity. We would not only bring your groceries to the car but we would also come home with you to help cook the meal. In fact, we would provide our
own recipes. Now obviously we are not a grocery store nor do we stock shelves with inventory, but through our partnerships and expertise, we are built lean and flexible to fill very unique and specialized CWMD roles for a wide variety of customers. What is most impactful about these three organizations is not just the depth of our mission but the broad span of services we provide, all of which are necessary for successfully countering WMD. And each of these initiatives, whether large or small in scope add up to create a very strong proactive and reactive shield for our security and that of our allies.

Regardless of the time or day, our building housing DTRA and the SCC is constantly buzzing with activity and with a diverse and remarkable collection of talented workers. As you enter our building and walk through the hallways, you encounter personnel with highly advanced technical degrees and skills related to physics, chemistry, microbiology, and nuclear engineering. They are working right alongside those with expansive experience with program management, logistics, planning, special operations, targeting and military operations. Our operation is often described as unique in this way, and it is true.

Let me give you a simple example of exactly how our agency works. On our Science and Technology (S&T) side, we are developing the technologies necessary to verify arms-control commitments. We must make sure that the equipment we are producing in our research and development efforts fit the needs and the constraints and the conditions under which our inspectors are going to have to operate. It has to be rugged, compact, transportable, easy to use and most of all effective in a variety of diverse and often difficult environmental conditions. Consistent with our one-stop shop mission, we bring everything needed to wherever the mission is to be performed.

On the other side, our operations experts have to be properly trained to make full use of the technology, make repairs, work with foreign governments and personnel, and get the job done under tight timelines. These two parallel processes, S&T and operations, must be able to support each other and the workforce must be dynamic enough to fill both roles.
What binds our mission together are the consequences of the world’s most dangerous weapons. The processes to create chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high yield explosive (CBRNE) weapons are all different and each represents different challenges in terms of approach, destruction, and impact. As a result, there are over 2,000 people who work for DTRA/SCC-WMD in 11 sites within the US and 9 sites around the world. In fact, nearly 30% of DTRA/SCC’s workforce performs work outside of the DC area. While these individuals are specialized, they are focused on one mission, protecting the United States and our allies from weapons of mass destruction.

The truth is that countering and combating weapons of mass destruction has to be performed on a larger scale than just our single institution. No one Federal Department, no single geographic region, no single country can marshal the necessary capabilities alone to successfully fight the WMD threats we face in this day and age. It requires careful collaboration not only across a variety of US government agencies but also with our allies and other partner nations abroad. As a result, the design and approach of our agency is intentionally open to collaborative partnerships and outward engagement.

For example, it is not enough to turn back a shipment of WMD materials at an overseas border crossing. The actors’ motives and intent need to be dissected and analyzed. The WMD material itself needs to be analyzed so we can better understand its strength, how it was made, and trace it back to its source. And the materials at hand must be safely secured and disposed. The DTRA and SCC role in all of this provides the support necessary to do just that.

On any given day, tens to hundreds of DTRA and Center experts are dispatched overseas, and in certain cases to some of the most dangerous and sensitive of areas, in order to provide analysis, research, testing, training and operational expertise.

Our nuclear experts are supporting global nuclear weapons lockdown efforts, helping to protect and ensure surety of our own nuclear weapons, and survivability of US Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications.
Our biologists are consolidating and improving the security of dangerous pathogen collections across the planet, collaborating closely with other like-minded nations to prevent nefarious distribution of biological materials. They are also working cooperatively with international partners to counter emerging and potentially genetically altered or weaponized infectious diseases and developing new means for protecting our military personnel against biological terrorism.

Our chemical weapons experts are assisting with the safety, security, and cooperative destruction of chemical weapons (CW) in the U.S. and Russia. They are also assisting with safety and security at Libya’s CW storage facility and developing plans to assist them with CW destruction activities. In addition to addressing this urgent need, our S&T efforts also address potential future chemical weapons threats.

DTRA structural dynamics experts are working on solutions to protect military and related government facilities at risk while also developing new means for mitigating blast effects resulting from vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices against structures and other infrastructure.

Our DTRA and Center workforce performs CWMD planning and exercise support and provides expertise to the combatant commands and other customers.

Our CWMD Science and Technology development is conducted in parallel with our operational capabilities in a complimentary and collaborative fashion. DTRA does not own or operate any functional laboratory, but we are able to select from the full range of national expertise, wherever that may be. Our performers include the DoD and Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) labs, contractors, Federally Funded Research and Development Centers, University-Associated Research Centers, and academia. And we provide and operate test and evaluation capabilities at government facilities in New Mexico and Nevada to meet our own mission requirements, and those of our various customers and stakeholders.
As our USSTRATCOM Commander General Bob Kehler recently noted while visiting DTRA and the Center, “this campus right here is where the experts are, this is where the country’s expertise is. This is the focus point; this is where it all comes together, right here.”

Structure

DTRA was created from a number of other national security entities whose combined history includes the Manhattan Project, the Defense Nuclear Agency, the Defense Special Weapons Agency, and the Chemical and Biological Defense and Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, to name a few.

As a Combat Support Agency we are available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, to support the Combatant Commanders and Services in preparing for, preventing, or if necessary, responding to any WMD threat or challenge that they might face whether it be here or abroad. In the laboratory, planning sessions, or on the battlefield, our experts provide or utilize collaborative partnerships to address every CWMD contingency.

As a Defense Agency, one of our prime responsibilities is to perform and to manage a research and development portfolio to develop tools and capabilities that the warfighter will need to address and to operate in a WMD environment, whether that be nuclear or other CWMD detection, chemical and biological protection gear, uniforms, or detectors.

As the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, I report to General Bob Kehler, commander, USSTRATCOM. Our Center supports the Commander USSTRATCOM with the Unified Command Plan responsibility to synchronize the planning for DoD CWMD efforts and advocate for CWMD capabilities.

The Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination was stood up by General Kehler last year to provide direct operational support to on-scene task forces that need CWMD expertise. To be clear, I am not the commander of the Standing Headquarters, but it is commanded by the flag officer that serves as my Deputy Director of the USSTRATCOM Center collocated in DTRA.
The Standing Joint Force Headquarters is intentionally designed to expand our threat reduction activity to nonpermissive environments, or one in which we are not permitted a cooperative opportunity to reduce weapons of mass destruction.

DTRA, the SCC and the Standing Joint Force Headquarters all have technically different roles in the counter-WMD mission area but they are located together so we can all leverage the most out of the resources that Congress provides and the capabilities that we develop and deploy together.

To quote General Kehler again, if a joint commander “needs help with an SCC-WMD issue, he turns to Mr. Myers…and if Mr. Myers can’t help him with his SCC-WMD hat on, he can flip on his other hat and turn to DTRA….all of the expertise to deal with these problems is here…and it makes all the sense in the world.”

DTRA performs its programs in response to direction provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), in direct support of each Combatant Commander on behalf of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Kehler as Commander of USSTRATCOM. As the Director of DTRA, I report through Mr. Andrew Weber, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. We also work in partnership with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Strategies and Goals- Layered Attack

One of our major strategies is erecting layers of defense between the threats and the American people. It is just common sense to go where the problem begins and attempt to counteract and eliminate these threats as far away from American soil as possible.
Nonproliferation

The most well-known nonproliferation program was created by your former colleagues Senator Richard Lugar and Senator Sam Nunn. The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program has been a true success story and has made incredible contributions to U.S. national security in the last 20 years.

The program has now helped to destroy more than 7,616 warheads created for the purpose of hitting targets in the United States. This is chilling when you consider that any one warhead could take out the city the size of Charlotte in one shot. As of the end of February this year, we have destroyed 912 ICBMs, 197 ICBM mobile launchers, 906 air-launched cruise missiles, and eliminated 33 nuclear powered submarines (SSBN) capable of launching ballistic missiles (SLBMs); eliminated 498 ICBM silos, 155 bombers, 492 SLBM launchers, and 695 SLBMs; sealed 194 nuclear test tunnels and holes; safely and securely transported 607 nuclear weapons train shipments; upgraded 24 nuclear weapons storage sites; and secured 47 Biological Threat Reduction Zonal Diagnostic Laboratories.

This past year, we eliminated 21 SS-24 ICBM rocket motors in Ukraine and destroyed over 791.8 metric tons of Russian nerve agents. We have also secured 4 bio labs in Ukraine and Georgia, and opened a Biosafety Level 2 laboratory in Georgia to help us with global bio surveillance. And this is just scratching the surface of the Nunn-Lugar program’s accomplishments. As President Barack Obama recently stated at a Nunn-Lugar Program 20th anniversary celebration, “missile by missile, warhead by warhead, shell by shell, we’re putting a bygone era behind us.”

The evolution of Nunn-Lugar has been remarkable. We are no longer building large, expensive missile dismantlement facilities or large chemical weapons destruction sites. Missile and submarine elimination projects are now being tracked alongside smaller, yet equally critical biological material projects in sub-Saharan Africa and proliferation prevention projects in Southeast Asia. Because of our success in eliminating access to materials in the former Soviet Union, groups and states seeking WMD have shifted their attention to other geographic areas and
potential WMD sources. This evolution has required a shift in our thinking as well and is the reason why we have expanded Nunn-Lugar authority to nearly 80 countries, with close collaboration with our partners at the State Department and the National Nuclear Security Administration.

In most cases, our new partners have no WMD aspirations. But, endemic diseases, man-made or otherwise, are not constrained by geographic or political boundaries. So it is up to us to go to the source. And it requires us to form cooperative partnerships to ensure that consequential WMD proliferation does not occur.

For example, DTRA/SCC-WMD is focused on helping African nations secure naturally occurring dangerous pathogens. Deadly African diseases like Ebola, Marburg, and Anthrax that were once used to make biological weapons during the Cold War are being safeguarded, cataloged, and, if needed, destroyed as part of the Cooperative Biological Engagement Program, now the largest activity within the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. For a relatively small investment, the program is reducing access to biological materials and expanding international partnerships to better counter natural and man-made biological events.

For example, the laboratories I visited in Africa in 2011 had broken windows, rusty locks, meager electrical capabilities, and insecure fencing. Keep in mind that these facilities stored Anthrax, Ebola, Marburg, and Brucellosis. During one of my visits I casually walked into an unlocked room in an unsecure building that had seven unlocked freezers. In those freezers, situated next to countless other diseases, were many vials containing several grams of Anthrax. Just 2 grams of Anthrax killed 5 Americans in the postal mail attack on the United States Senate in 2001. The anthrax that I saw was not weaponized; however, those vials could serve as the foundation for a biological weapon. In fact, during the Cold War, the Soviets reached into Africa to obtain the Anthrax which filled the 300 metric ton fermenters at Stepnogorsk. Through Nunn-Lugar we are working with our partners in Kenya and Uganda to ensure that those vials of Anthrax will not be weaponized and will not fall into the hands of terrorists.
Timing is everything with biodefense. DTRA works closely with the Departments of Health and Human Services, the Centers for Disease Control and the United States Department of Agriculture and others to maximize our expertise and relationships within the global health community to improve early warning and detection capabilities and mitigate pandemic disease threats. We are even working on a mobile testing device which would allow for us to diagnose both threat and infectious bio-agents in humans in potentially remote areas. We are also creating partnerships with industry for advanced development and manufacturing of medical countermeasures to counter emerging bio threats and infectious diseases.

Counterproliferation

If our programs and our efforts at the source are unable to stop these WMD threats before they leak out, we help Combatant Commanders and military Service Components to engage the threat on someone else’s soil. Detection, interdiction, and if need be, destruction of these weapons and materials are the goal, thus disrupting the supply or smuggling routes and providing our national leadership with knowledge concerning important threat details. Working with our International partners, our goal is to deter, dissuade, and deny those who both produce and attempt to gain access to these materials and drive them out of business.

For example, the Proliferation Prevention Program, or PPP, enhances the capacity of partner countries to deter, detect, investigate, and respond to the attempted proliferation of WMD. It provides specialized equipment, training, and facility upgrades for partner nation border security and law enforcement organizations. Training is institutionalized through a train-the-trainer approach and sustained with periodic local and regional WMD Integrated Exercises which enable students to use program skills and equipment within a realistic training environment. The Proliferation Prevention Program’s partners span the Caucuses, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East.

One example of the impact of PPP can be seen with the country of Ukraine. During an exercise in 2007, Ukrainian border guard personnel intercepted a vehicle with an unmarked container filled with a suspicious white powder. PPP observers witnessed the border guards opening the
container and literally smelling it to determine whether or not the contents were nefarious. Fast forward to today and we have fully institutionalized a “WMD Inspection” course at the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine. DTRA was able to accomplish this by providing appropriate training and training equipment. Furthermore, Ukraine has taken the initiative to offer training to its neighbors as a regional training center. They have hosted Moldovan border guards already and will soon be hosting Armenian Border Guard Forces in addition to the regular training that they provide for their own forces.

Because of our success in interdicting and eliminating weapons at the source, we have literally driven the enemy underground. As a result, our national security leadership and military commanders need non-nuclear capability to strike at Hard and Deeply Buried Targets (HDBT). DTRA works closely with the Defense Intelligence Agency to find these targets and provide Combatant Commanders and Service Components with effective CWMD contingency responses. For example, the U.S. Air Force now owns and can employ a DTRA initiated product - the Massive Ordnance Penetrator Program (MOP). The MOP is a 30,000 pound conventional penetrating weapon designed to provide substantial improvements in accuracy and lethality over current weapons in the inventory to defeat hardened deeply buried targets.

Another aspect of our work is to ensure the complete and successful stewardship of our nuclear weapons stockpile. We have systems in place to guarantee that we have complete control and accounting of our nuclear weapons at all times. In fact, last year we conducted 18 inspections of US nuclear capable units. We make sure every safety system is in place, maintained and in working order, and put the operations, maintenance and security forces through drills and exercises to ensure that everyone knows their job, they know the proper procedures and they know how to react when the situation changes. Our collective goal is to protect, control and serve the nation with 100% assured predictability, reliability and confidence in our nuclear weapons stewardship.
Consequence Management

DTRA’s roots reach to the early days of the Cold War when it provided technical and operational nuclear weapons effects expertise to the Military Services. This mission continues with additional services for the Combatant Commands and their ability to respond to WMD threats. DTRA’s Technical Reachback capabilities support any CBRNE decision making capability both here and abroad. We give the troops on the front line access to some of the smartest subject matter experts in real time. Last year, we fielded 1,492 Technical Reachback requests.

The Consequence Management Assistance Program (CMAP) has active engagements in the Middle East, South East Asia, East Africa, and Eastern Europe. One recent success story occurred in Jordan where CMAP worked to enhance their capability to respond to incidents involving WMD. This was the first time that representatives from 28 Jordanian civilian and military organizations - including the Jordanian Armed Forces, Civil Defense, Ministries of Water and Irrigation, Religious Affairs, Education, and Trade and Commerce - sat together for the express purpose of revising a national emergency response plan. This engagement produced a more focused response to chemical and biological threats and better coordination among their ministries.

Regional Contingency Teams

In my testimony last year, I shared with the Committee DTRA’s work to provide real-time technical assistance to our US Armed Forces in Japan and the Japanese government in dealing with the estimated 9.0 magnitude earthquake that rocked the east coast of Honshu, Japan, causing enormous damage and destruction. The earthquake was followed by a devastating tsunami that resulted in even more damage and tremendous loss of life. And as damage reports from the earthquake and tsunami reached the Japanese government leadership, the Tokyo Electric Power Company was working to prevent a third disaster - nuclear meltdown.

As a close ally, the United States offered its consequence management support and DTRA provided radiological sensor data to produce models of the radiological plume. We provided
daily update briefings and video teleconferences and worked to educate our military leaders about possible impacts to the Japanese population and our own troops in the area. In fact, the Japanese Ambassador even commented to me, “We wish we had a DTRA.”

Following this and other missions, DTRA began to review how to best utilize their assets and maximize both results and efficiency during fast-paced, real-time events. As a result, we created Regional Contingency Teams (RCTs) for certain national security situations to ensure that when we face a crisis, we have in place the best and most appropriate and complimentary technical, planning, and operations staff from all three of our organizations. Likewise, we set up beforehand whatever necessary equipment and coordination among Combatant Commands, Joint Staff, other DoD offices, other US government agencies and even our international partners. This approach enhances our planning and response time and allows for the best, most integrated information to be available across the board. We didn’t just alter the stove pipes; in this case we blew them up.

This concept sounds simple but it is often difficult as stove pipes are hard and thick and take considerable effort to break down. This is especially true when you consider the depth and breadth of our mission and the various roles that each organization fulfills. Communication and coordination across mission areas is sometimes difficult to accomplish. Nevertheless, it must be done - and we are making progress - but there is much left to do.

Events in the Levant, North Africa, Northeast Asia, and elsewhere have tested our model and the impact that we have seen is very positive. Our Requests for Information (RFIs) from our customers are up and the information disseminated is more timely, accurate and complete. Our Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Request helps us to continue this cross-cutting, collaborative approach.

Northeast Asia, Syria

Within this framework, DTRA is playing a critical role in current US national security issues around the world. Events in North Korea, Syria and the Middle East are well publicized and our
agency is engaged in these matters. While I would prefer to discuss our agency’s involvement in these issues during the closed session, I share the member’s interest in these issues.

Budget

We accept that the overall budget situation will likely remain difficult and that additional pressures are expected to continue. This is significant as DTRA’s annual appropriations have remained relatively flat since Fiscal Year 1999, despite the continuing importance, evolution, and transformation of CWMD mission requirements.

We are working very hard to become more effective and efficient with the resources we have. We are prioritizing. We have shut down a number of offices. We did a complete prioritization of programs and eliminated those we felt could be covered in other ways. And we are utilizing technology to reduce the need to travel and attend conferences and other administrative costs.

One of the other ways we have worked to improve the efficiency of our organization is to expand partnerships that enable us to leverage expertise and capabilities from across DoD and other federal agencies. For example, we coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security on development of nuclear detection and forensics, and piggyback on service technology development, particularly unmanned aerial vehicles as platforms for WMD search detection and interdiction. We also leverage the CDC’s global partnerships and technical expertise to implement biological research and capacity building projects that help our international partners increase capacities through improved disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and reporting.

Today, DTRA and SCC-WMD remain capable of executing our missions. However, I believe that General Kehler and I speak with one voice when I describe my most serious concern as the direct impact that this continuing fiscal uncertainty is having on our people. Uniformed service members and civilian Federal employees alike have successfully withstood the effects of round-the-world mission accomplishment and hectic operational tempos. They willingly accept the uncertainties and risks which accompany mission performance. But they are anxious about what financial risks do to their families.
Our workforce will cope with the effects of financial uncertainty in the near term. But, like General Kehler, I worry that over time our most experienced professionals and our most promising younger people will vote with their feet to pursue more stable opportunities elsewhere.

**FY14 DTRA Budget Request Overview**

Our budget request for Fiscal Year 2014 (FY14) is $1.49 billion and comprises Defense-wide Research, Development, Test and Evaluation; Operations and Maintenance; Procurement; and Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) appropriation accounts. In addition, DTRA executes the $449.3 million Science and Technology (S&T) portion of the DoD Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) and serves as the funds manager for the remainder of that program’s funding, $1.05 billion. Therefore, the total DTRA resource portfolio is approximately $2.99 billion. Details and highlights for these requests follow.

**Operations and Maintenance Funding**

Nearly 85% of DTRA O&M funding directly supports the warfighters and national missions as it pays for planning, training, exercises, and other means for collaboration across DoD and the USG, and with international partners. O&M funding is the fuel that enables us to reach out to our components and personnel, the warfighters, and international partners across the globe.

The requested O&M funding would be applied as follows:

** Nonproliferation Activities ($67.3 million) for arms control activities including the conduct of USG inspections of foreign facilities, territories, or events; coordination and conduct of the escort of inspection teams for inspections or continuous monitoring activities in the US and at US facilities overseas; and the acquisition and fielding of technology capabilities required to implement, comply with, and allow full exercise of US rights and prerogatives under existing and projected arms control treaties and agreements.

** WMD Combat Support and Operations ($180.2 million) for a wide range of combat and warfighter support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commanders, and military forces as they engage the WMD threat and challenges posed to the US, its forces and allies. DTRA
supports the essential WMD response capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces within their area of responsibility at all levels of war.

** US Strategic Command Center for Combating WMD ($11.8 million) for DTRA direct support to the SCC-WMD including development of tools; providing strategic and contingency planning, policy, and analytical support; developing interagency relationships; and working closely with USSTRATCOM partners to establish the means for assessing and exercising capabilities to combat WMD.

** Core Mission Sustainment ($185.1 million) for a wide range of enabling capabilities which include information management; resource management; security and asset protection; acquisition and logistics management; strategic planning; leadership and professional development; and provide the safety, security, and efficiency necessary for mission success. In recent years, DTRA has increased investment in its Information Technology systems to provide secure and dependable connectivity for global mission execution.

** Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
The request of $528.5 million for this important program would be used as follows:

** Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination ($10 million) for elimination of Strategic Offensive Arms in Russia and the storage and elimination in Ukraine of rocket motors from dismantled SS-24 ICBMs. Due to diminishing elimination activities needed for the Russian Federation to meet the New START Treaty requirements, the DoD intends to transition remaining responsibility for elimination activities to the Russian Federation in 2014.

** Chemical Weapons Destruction ($21.3 million) for technical support to the Russian chemical weapons destruction operations at Shchuch’ye and the Kizner Chemical Weapons Destruction Facilities. Russia began chemical weapons destruction operations at Shchuch’ye in March of 2009 and, as of April of this year, has destroyed over 1.6 million munitions and 4014 metric tons of nerve agent. Funding is also provided under this account for technical expertise and resources to support chemical weapons destruction in Libya.
**Global Nuclear Security ($86.5 million)** for improving nuclear material security, including security for nuclear warheads and weapons-usable nuclear material. This program also assists in the secure transport of nuclear warheads and other qualifying nuclear material to dismantlement facilities, secure storage areas, or processing facilities for disposition.

**Cooperative Biological Engagement ($306.3 million)** for combating the threat of state and non-state actors acquiring biological materials and expertise that could be used to develop or deploy biological materials and weapons. This program destroys or secures certain biological agents at their source, and works in partnerships to ensure a secure disease surveillance system. This program works closely with other US Government departments and agencies, international partners and the private sector.

**Proliferation Prevention ($73.8 million)** to enhance the capability of non-Russian, Former Soviet Union (FSU) states and other partner countries to deter, detect, report, and interdict illicit WMD trafficking across international borders. Beginning in fiscal year 2012, the Proliferation Prevention program began expansion outside of the FSU to Southeast Asia. In Fiscal Year 2013 and 2014, Proliferation Prevention will continue expansion activities in the Southeast Asia region on a bilateral and regional basis and begin to work with partners in the Middle East.

**Threat Reduction Engagement ($2.4 million)** to develop active and positive relationships between the defense, military, and security establishments of the United States and the states of Eurasia and Central Asia. This program engages military and defense officials in activities that promote regional stability, counter-proliferation, and defense reform; build security cooperation with the partner states; and promote exchanges that enhance interoperability with U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces for multinational operations.

**Other Assessments/Administrative Support ($28.2 million)** to ensure that DoD-provided equipment, services, and related training are fully accounted for and used effectively and efficiently for their intended purposes. This account also funds CTR program travel,
translator/interpreter support, and other agency support to include support to program personnel assigned to US Embassy offices in partner states.

**Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation**

DTRA RDT&E programs respond to the most pressing CWMD challenges including stand-off detection, tracking, and interdiction of WMD; modeling and simulation to support weapons effects and hazard predictions; classified support to Special Operations Forces; defeat of WMD agents and underground facilities; and protection of people, systems, and infrastructure against WMD effects.

DTRA RDT&E is unique in being focused solely on CBRNE; tied closely with the agency’s Combat Support responsibilities; has a top-notch in-house field test capability; relies upon competitive bids, the national labs, industry, and academia rather than an in-house laboratory infrastructure, allowing for a “best of breed” approach to performer selection; and is nimble and responsive to urgent needs.

The agency has a comprehensive, balanced CBRNE S&T portfolio that supports DoD goals and is well connected with DoD customers, as well as interagency and international partners. Our RDT&E approach balances the need for near-term pay-off with the need for long-term knowledge and expertise, and is centered upon the following projects: Basic Research, Applied Research, Advanced Research, and System Development and Demonstration. The requested RDT&E funding includes $45.9 million in Basic Research to provide for the discovery and development of fundamental knowledge and understanding by researchers primarily in academia and world-class research institutes in government and industry.

The DTRA Fiscal Year 2014 request also includes $175.3 million for WMD Defeat Technologies Applied Research, $274 million for Proliferation Prevention and Defeat Advanced Research, and $12.9 for WMD Defeat Capabilities System Development and Demonstration.
Chemical and Biological Defense Program S&T

The Department’s CBDP S&T programs support DoD-wide efforts to research, develop, and acquire capabilities for a layered, integrated defense against CBRN agents; better understand potential threats; secure and reduce dangerous materials whenever possible; and prevent potential attacks. Although funding for the CBDP is not part of the DTRA budget request, the agency executes the S&T portion of this program, for which the Department has requested approximately $449.3 million in FY14. The agency also manages funding execution in support of CBDP advanced development and procurement.

Conclusion

Madame Chairwoman, in closing my testimony I would like to highlight a recent speech by Deputy Secretary of Defense Ash Carter who spoke at a celebration of the Nunn-Lugar program’s 20th anniversary. “Historians should look back at what might have happened, but didn’t thanks to Nunn-Lugar. Imagine the alternative if loose nukes from the former Soviet Union had gotten into Bin Laden’s hands; into the hands of other terrorists with odious causes; or rogue states….contemplate all of that and you see the enduring value of Nunn-Lugar.”

This analogy is a perfect snap-shot of why what our Agency and Center does is important. What would happen if we didn’t do all of the things I have described today? What would happen if we were not funded enough to accomplish our mission? These are serious questions which strike at the heart of our national security challenges. We hope that we will continue to earn the Committee’s trust and support in meeting these threats and ensuring our security. Thank you, again, for the opportunity to be here today. I would be pleased to respond to your questions.