

Senate Armed Services Committee
Advance Policy Questions for GEN Mark A. Milley, U.S. Army
Nominee for Appointment to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Duties and Qualifications

Section 151 of title 10, U.S. Code, provides that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, section 153 of title 10 further assigns the Chairman responsibility for assisting the President and the Secretary in providing for the strategic direction of the armed forces; strategic and contingency planning; global military integration; comprehensive joint readiness; joint capability development; and Joint Force development activities, among other matters.

Given the responsibilities of the Chairman, as enumerated in law, what background, experience, and expertise do you possess that qualify you to serve as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

I have been an Army officer for over 39 years serving at every level of command to include Special Forces ODA, Company, Battalion, Brigade, Division, Corps, and Four-Star Army Major Command and have learned from both successes and setbacks. I have trained and been assigned on operational tours in Asia, Europe, Middle East, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean as well as throughout the U.S. I have operational tours in Colombia, Panama, Haiti, Somalia, Sinai, Bosnia, Korea, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and I have participated in humanitarian peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and multiple combat operations. I have served in combat at every rank from captain through general, and as a lieutenant general I commanded international forces from 42 countries in Afghanistan. As Chief of Staff of the Army, I have been a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for four years and have provided my best military advice to the Secretary of Defense and President on multiple occasions. Also as CSA, I have instituted significant improvements in modernization and readiness. My four years as CSA and a member of the JCS as well as my previous assignments have, in combination, provided me with the necessary knowledge, skills, and experience to lead the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Lastly, I have a deep sense of personal humility and fully recognize the complexity of the U.S. Military and the world security situation and that I do not know all the answers. Therefore, I will be open to a wide variety of expert opinions in order to form my best military advice.

Do you believe there is any action that you need to take to enhance your ability to exercise the responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Nothing specific at this time, but I will continue to maintain an open mind for thoughtful insight from many sources.

In matters requiring global military strategic and operational integration, the Chairman is responsible for providing advice to the President and Secretary of Defense on ongoing military operations and advising the Secretary on the allocation and transfer of forces among geographic and functional Combatant Commands, as may be necessary to address transregional, multi-domain, and multifunctional threats.

If confirmed, how would you execute these advisory functions, while ensuring that your role does not invoke command authority or infringe on the responsibilities of the Combatant Commanders?

There is a clear delineation between the position of the Chairman as an advisor and the chain of command authority from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commanders. The Combatant Commanders are responsible to conduct warfare, when authorized, and perform joint military operations globally. In the Chairman's role as an advisor and global integrator, the responsibility to oversee activities across the Combatant Commands does not assert Command authority. If confirmed, I will work tirelessly to help resolve friction points across the Combatant Commands, provide them with support, and ensure we have the options and capabilities to safeguard our national interests.

Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for overseeing the activities of the Combatant Commands and for serving as the spokesman for the Commanders of the Combatant Commands—particularly as regards their operational requirements.

If confirmed, how would you structure your relationship with the Combatant Commanders to effect these responsibilities?

The Chairman is directed by the Secretary of Defense and by law to be the Combatant Commanders' interlocutor while overseeing their actions. The Chairman is part of the connective tissue between the Combatant Commanders and the Services. Additionally, as directed by the President, the Chairman may also be called upon to serve as a communications conduit between the Combatant Commanders and the President or Secretary of Defense.

If confirmed, and given your observations and experience as the Chief of Staff of the Army and as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, what innovative ideas would you consider providing to the Secretary of Defense regarding the organization and operation of the Joint Staff?

I do not presently have recommendations regarding the operation and organization of the Joint Staff nor do I seek changes to laws or regulations of its function at this time. If confirmed, I intend to maintain continuity with the

current function and operation of the Joint Staff and institution of the current CJCS.

To the extent the Joint Staff performs functions that overlap with those of other DoD Components—particularly with regard to regional or functional topics—what would be your approach, if confirmed, to consolidating and reducing those redundancies?

Before initiating change, where there is perceived overlap, it is vital to perform due diligence to understand the foundational nature of the redundancy. While duplicative function is often bureaucratic, intentional design and constitutional checks and balances are also sources of purposeful friction that can often be viewed as unnecessary or unwieldy. To ensure change is legal and properly implemented, understanding history and purpose is integral to effective and efficient governance. If confirmed I will be vigilant on this issue.

If confirmed, what duties and functions would you assign to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? To the Director of the Joint Staff?

There are no additional duties I intend to assign to the Vice Chairman, at this time, beyond those stipulated in statute. If confirmed, I will evaluate the duties of the Director and make changes, if necessary, to ensure the Joint Staff's effectiveness.

Civilian Control of the Military

If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure that your tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff epitomizes the fundamental requirement for civilian control of the Armed Forces embedded in the U.S. Constitution and other laws?

The Constitution and applicable laws clearly articulate that we are a nation under civilian control; it underpins all that we are. If confirmed as Chairman, I will make it my priority to ensure military options are aligned with a whole of government approach and in full support of our civilian leadership. Civilian control of the military is a bedrock principle of our country and, if confirmed, I will do everything in my power to ensure it is upheld to the fullest extent.

In its 2018 report, *Providing for the Common Defense*, the National Defense Strategy Commission observed, “there is an imbalance in civil-military relations on critical issues of strategy development and implementation. Civilian voices appear relatively muted on issues at the center of U.S. defense and national security policy.”

Do you agree with this assessment? If so, if confirmed, how would you address this issue?

I have not found that in the Army and, if confirmed, I will personally lead the effort to ensure proper balance between civil-military relations throughout the Joint Force.

The National Defense Strategy Commission report also states, “. . . allocating priority—and allocating forces—across theaters of warfare is not solely a military matter. It is an inherently political-military task, decision authority for which is the proper competency and responsibility of America’s civilian leaders.”

Do you agree with the Commission’s recommendation that “the Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy . . . [must] fully exercise their responsibilities for preparing guidance for and reviewing contingency plans?” Please explain your answer.

I agree that the Secretary of Defense and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy must fully exercise their responsibility for preparing guidance, reviewing contingency plans and allocating forces across the globe. Additionally, I will diligently perform my responsibility to recommend allocation and prioritization of forces and review plans.

If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure that the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy are fully engaged in preparing guidance for and reviewing contingency plans?

If confirmed, I will be proactive in assisting the Secretary of Defense and the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in preparing guidance and reviewing contingency plans to ensure the military instrument of power is used effectively and appropriately.

If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure that the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness are fully engaged in evaluating and reporting on the readiness of DoD Components? In mitigating readiness gaps and shortfalls?

Addressing readiness within the armed forces requires constant communication and advice to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. The Joint Staff monitors all such reports and evaluations and continually offers solutions to leadership that mitigates gaps and maximizes readiness. If confirmed, I will be diligent in providing my best military advice to civilian leadership to ensure the readiness of the Joint Force.

Major Challenges and Opportunities

What do you consider to be the most significant challenges you would face if confirmed as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Today we face a complicated global security environment. We rely heavily on our allies and partners to address various security challenges. Specifically, we are in the midst of a great power competition with Russia and China and still face challenges from Iran, North Korea, and violent extremist organizations. In order to effectively address the threats we face, we are modernizing our military and maintaining its readiness to engage anywhere at a time and place of our choosing. Though I'm confident in our capabilities, our adversaries have made great strides in narrowing the gap and we must remain ever vigilant.

What plans do you have for addressing each of these challenges, if confirmed?

If confirmed, I intend to work alongside the combatant commanders who establish requirements and the services who are required to deliver capabilities. As the Joint Staff takes into account the global security environment and assesses how the Department addresses those challenges, we will offer context alongside the interagency and Congress to provide a flexible, agile deterrent with operational options for decision-makers.

Are there significant opportunities that, in your view, DoD and the Joint Staff have been unable to leverage (or have leveraged only in part) during the period of your service as Chief of Staff of the Army and as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

We in the profession of arms, accountable to our civilian leadership, are obligated to continually innovate and think creatively. An example I would offer from my recent experience was creating Army Futures Command, a new organization tasked with cultivating a workforce that is forward-looking and delivers solutions at the speed of relevance. It was intentionally placed where there is an intersection of industry and academia that fosters a collaborative environment. I believe there are areas within the authority of the Chairman to share or apply some of these lessons learned across the Joint Force to ultimately advance our capabilities while remaining trustworthy stewards of taxpayer resources.

If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to ensure that DoD and the Joint Staff leverage these opportunities, and on what timeline?

If confirmed, I understand my timeline to seize upon opportunities that may exist is limited. What I can offer currently is that I will make all efforts within my authority to develop an adaptive, collaborative and innovative workforce ready to address the full spectrum of challenges.

2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS)

The 2018 NDS moved beyond the “two-war construct” that has guided defense strategy, capability development, and investment for the past three decades, and refocused DoD on a “2 + 3 framework”. That framework prioritizes “great power competition and conflict” with China and Russia as the primary challenges with which the United States must contend, together with the imperative of deterring and countering rogue regimes like North Korea and Iran. Finally the framework emphasizes the defeat of terrorist threats to the U.S. and the consolidation of gains in Iraq and Afghanistan, while moving to a “more resource sustainable” approach to counterterrorism.

In your view, does the 2018 NDS accurately assess the current strategic environment, including prioritization among the most critical and enduring threats to the national security of the United States and its allies? Please explain your answer.

The 2018 NDS was developed with the military advice from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Force. In my view, it accurately assesses the current strategic environment and articulates the position of the Joint Chiefs with appropriate focus on great power competition.

In your view, does the 2018 NDS correctly specify the priority missions of the DoD and the capabilities by which DoD can achieve its objectives in the context of the current strategic environment? What do you perceive as the areas of greatest risk?

Yes, the NDS in my view correctly specifies the priority mission of DoD. The area of greatest risk is the growing capability of China and Russia.

In your view, are the plans and programs of the Commanders of the Combatant Commands appropriately focused, scoped, and resourced to counter the threats and achieve the national security objectives identified by the NDS?

The current CCMD CONPLANS and OPLANs are necessary but not sufficient to capture the full scope of operations across CCMDs. This is the purpose of the Globally Integrated Base plans (GIBP) for each of the priority challenges. The GIBPs use the capstone OPLAN for each of the priority challenges and prioritize military objectives across the globe to continue key global campaigning activities for all of the priority challenges and achieve the national security objectives identified by the NDS.

Does DoD have the requisite modeling and simulation capabilities and tools to support you, if confirmed as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in assessing whether the Combatant Commanders' operational plans can and will achieve the national security objectives identified by the NDS? Please explain your answer.

Yes, the warfighting modeling and simulation tools we have help assess and refine warplans in partnership with the Combatant Command staffs and Service Components. These tools help us determine the warfighting merit of operational plans and explore alternative approaches in pursuit of better warfighting options. It is through these comparative analyses that we better understand and refine operational plans; but none are predictive.

Are the forces of each of the Military Services appropriately sized, structured, postured, and resourced to implement the 2018 NDS and the Combatant Commanders' associated operational plans? Please explain your answer.

Yes, the Military Services can, according to the 2018 NDS, "field sufficient, capable forces to defeat enemies and achieve sustainable outcomes that protect the American people and our vital interests within acceptable levels of risk."

Does the DoD have the requisite analytic capabilities and tools to support you, if confirmed as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in evaluating the Military Services' force structure and sizing strategies to ensure that each Service can and will generate forces that are manned, trained, and equipped to execute the operational plans associated with the 2018 NDS? Please explain your answer.

Yes, if confirmed, I will have the requisite analytic capabilities and tools at my disposal to ensure the Joint Force can execute operational plans associated with the 2018 NDS. The Joint Staff conducts studies, analysis, assessments, and evaluates plans, programs, and strategies. To this end, the Joint Staff identifies and analyzes the Services' shortfalls while facilitating "resource-informed planning" amongst the Combatant Commands.

In your view, are the Combat Support Agencies properly designated, structured, and manned to support implementation of the 2018 NDS and execution of the Combatant Commanders' operational plans? Please explain your answer.

Yes, they are properly designated, structured, and manned to support implementation of 2018 NDS COCOM operational plans. Combat Support Agencies operate in a supporting-to-supported command relationship. This relationship provides the agencies tasking and guidance to support the CCDRs consistent with the NDS. Each CSA Director has the responsibility to evaluate their requirements and plan, program and budget accordingly. As required by Title 10, the CJCS submits biennial assessments of the responsiveness and readiness of each agency to support the CCMDs. While each of these assessments has highlighted areas for improvement, none have identified major shortfalls that require changes with respect to designation, structure or manning.

If confirmed, what changes might you propose to the missions and responsibilities (including geographic boundaries) of the Combatant Commands, better to implement the 2018 NDS? Please explain your answer.

The Joint Force continuously considers way to improve the Combatant Commands' ability to achieve military objectives. If confirmed, and once they are complete, I will review the relevant studies regarding roles/missions and offer my recommendation if any arise.

If confirmed, what changes might you propose to the missions and responsibilities of the Combat Support Agencies, better to implement the 2018 NDS? Please explain your answer.

The eight Combat Support Agencies provide unique combat support capabilities to the Combat Commands, and are well established within the DoD. If confirmed, I will work with the respective CSA to articulate any concerns I might have, or are raised to me through the biennial assessments conducted by the Joint Staff.

If confirmed, what changes or adjustments would you advise the Secretary of Defense to make in the Department's current implementation of the 2018 NDS?

I have none at this time but, if confirmed, I will ensure that the NDS is periodically reviewed and if I think changes are required then I will advise the Secretary of Defense at that time. Currently, I concur with the National Military Strategy, which details specific military policies required to meet the guidance contained in the National Defense Strategy.

If confirmed, what would you do if you determine that the DoD cannot meet the demands placed on it by the 2018 NDS?

If confirmed, I will constantly assess demands and work to ensure our forces are postured appropriately. I will also work closely with allies and partners to advance military interoperability and burden-sharing to help decrease risk globally and strengthen our ability to meet current and future defense challenges.

If confirmed, what revisions or adjustments would you recommend the Secretary of Defense make to the 2018 NDS as a result of changes in assumptions, policy, or other factors?

Current Title 10 responsibilities for the Chairman include providing advice relating to global military and strategic and operational integration. If confirmed, my recommendation would be to ensure that the guiding policy documents including National Defense Strategy and Contingency Planning Guide are aligned and reflective of strategic global integration. By doing this, I can ensure that the National Military Strategy and associated Joint Strategic Campaign Plans are formulated in a way that is consistent with national policy directives and valid assumptions in order to strengthen the nation's ability to respond in accordance with our National Security Strategy.

DoD Readiness

How would you assess the current readiness of the DoD Components—across the domains of materiel and equipment, personnel, and training—to execute the 2018 NDS and Combatant Commanders’ associated plans?

I feel confident today in saying that we can protect the homeland, meet our alliance commitments, and maintain a competitive advantage over any potential adversary. Thru stable and adequate levels of funding we are working to improve readiness and modernization across the force in order to increase our lethality, flexibility and resilience.

In what specific ways have the Combatant Commands utilized their increased budgetary authority over the past two years to foster readiness recovery?

What is your assessment of the risk the Combatant Commands and the Combat Support Agencies have accepted in regard to their readiness to execute the operational plans associated with the 2018 NDS?

Restoring warfighting readiness, both current and future, is a key priority of the 2018 NDS. With stable and adequate levels of funding we have been able to address risk in force readiness and are restoring capability to respond to contingencies. The Joint Force continues to face challenges in rebuilding future readiness, or the ability to project power and achieve superiority in multiple domains in 2025. Our competitive advantage has eroded over time because of two decades of continuous operations and exacerbated by sequestration and fiscal uncertainty. With sustained, predictable, adequate, and timely funding we can continue to improve readiness and build the future force that maintains our competitive advantage.

If confirmed, specifically what actions would you recommend to restore full spectrum readiness in all DoD Components—across the domains of materiel and equipment, personnel, and training—and on what timelines?

If confirmed, my actions will center on continuing our current efforts to address joint readiness and further develop the warfighting capabilities needed to defend the nation in the future. We face very real and significant challenges today, and we must continue to adequately invest in the future. We need to address this dynamic with sustained, sufficient and predictable funding over the course of several years, or we will lose our qualitative and quantitative competitive advantage. Losing the advantage will erode the American military's ability to deter conflict or win if deterrence fails.

What are your views on the merits of consolidating the Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress, as required by section 482 of title 10, U.S. Code, and the

Joint Force Readiness Review, established in CJCSI 3401.01E, *Joint Combat Capability Assessment*, into a single streamlined readiness report that meets the needs of all DoD Components and the Congress?

In many instances, consolidation efforts are good as long as they produce and efficient complementary, and unified outcome. However, preservation of the CJCS independent assessment should remain a priority.

National Security Budget

The discretionary caps imposed by the Budget Control Act (BCA) will be in effect for Fiscal Years (FYs) 2020 and 2021. Absent a budget agreement, the Department will not receive adequate or on-time funding. Continuing resolutions are likely and sequestration remains a possibility.

How does this budget uncertainty affect the Combatant Commands and the Joint Staff in your view?

Budget uncertainty in the form of a CR or Sequestration impacts current year execution and future year operations in support of the NDS. The Joint Force requires sustained, predictable, adequate and timely funding to meet the requirements of the NDS.

In your assessment, what would be the effects of continued application of the BCA discretionary caps through 2021 on the Department? What would be the specific implications for implementation of the 2018 NDS?

BCA cuts will negatively impact the Joint Force's ongoing readiness recovery efforts, equipment recapitalization and force modernization in favor of supporting currently deployed and next-to-deploy forces, all within a context of expanding global threats. The Joint Force requires sustained, predictable, adequate and timely funding to meet the requirements of the NDS.

The President's Budget for FY 2020 requests \$576 billion in base DoD funding, coupled with \$174 billion in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). Together, the proposed base and OCO request reflect a total budgetary increase of less than 3% in *real growth* over the FY 2019 defense budget. In its 2018 report, the National Defense Strategy Commission—supported by then-Secretary of Defense Mattis and Chairman Dunford—recommended that Congress increase the base defense budget at an average rate of three to five percent above inflation through the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).

Do you believe that DoD requires 3-5% real budgetary growth through the FYDP to implement the 2018 NDS effectively? Please explain your answer.

3-5% real budgetary growth through the FYDP allows the Joint Force to recover readiness and invest in advanced technologies necessary to effectively implement the 2018 NDS. The Joint Force assessed a number of competitive areas with China and Russia, which supported the conclusion for 3-5% growth to maintain the nation's competitive advantage in the future.

If confirmed, by what standards would you measure the adequacy of DoD funding going forward?

If confirmed, I would measure the proposed budget against the tasks, missions, and capabilities required in the NDS. PB20 supports a more lethal, ready, and partnered force by funding efforts to modernize current capabilities and expand warfighting capacity. Sustained, predictable, adequate and timely funding is required to support the Joint Force.

It is generally agreed that every defense budget must balance the size of the Joint Force, its readiness, and its ability to field and employ advanced military technology. Further, the budget must reflect the relative prioritization of today's military operations against the need to prepare for the future.

Senior DoD officials asserted that the FY 2020 budget would be the first to seamlessly align resources with strategy. Do you believe the Department's FY 2020 budget submission achieved that goal? Please explain your answer.

Yes, the DoD's FY2020 budget submission aligns resources with the 2018 NDS. The FY2020 budget continues the readiness recovery, increases lethality and invests in emerging technologies to address near peer competition.

How would you respond to critics who contend that the FY 2020 defense budget request perpetuated longstanding biases in favor of force size and near term challenges, as opposed to addressing current threats sustainably—at lower cost, and with fewer forces—and shifting investment toward prevailing in the long-term great power competition?

The FY2020 defense budget aligns resources with the 2018 NDS in a manner that simultaneously addresses near term challenges while investing in capabilities to prevail in great power competition. It achieves appropriate balance at acceptable risk.

Section 222a of title 10, U.S. Code, provides that not later than 10 days after the President's submission of the annual defense budget to Congress, each Combatant Commander must submit to the congressional defense committees a report that lists, in

order of priority, the unfunded priorities of his or her command.

If confirmed, would you commit to supporting the Combatant Commanders in providing their unfunded priorities lists to Congress in a timely manner, beginning with the FY 2021 budget request?

Yes, we are committed to comply with Congressional direction for the Combatant Commanders to provide their unfunded priorities to Congress.

Chain of Command

Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S. Code, provides that the operational chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the Commanders of the Combatant Commands. Pursuant to Section 163(a) of title 10, the President has directed that communications between the President or the Secretary of Defense and the Commanders of the Combatant Commands be transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Do you believe that these provisions facilitate a clear and effective chain of command?

Yes

In your view, how does this chain of command and chain of communication effectuate civilian control of the military?

The architecture of the chain of command originates at the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary to the commanders of the combatant commands. If confirmed, I will be a stalwart advisor supporting the chain of command to enhance decision-making and execute lawful orders as given by my civilian leadership.

Section 163(a) of title 10 provides that the President may assign duties to the Chairman to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in exercising their command function.

In your view, are there other roles or responsibilities that should be assigned to the Chairman, better to enable the Chairman's assistance to the President and the Secretary of Defense in their exercise of command functions?

Not at this time. I believe the role and responsibilities stipulated in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 are sufficient as to the role of the Chairman. If the President and the Secretary of Defense request assistance in the exercise of command functions I will perform those activities within the constraints assigned in title 10.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Section 921 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2017 made changes to section 151 of title 10, U. S. Code, concerning the role of the Joint Chiefs as military advisors to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

What is your assessment of the authorities and process by which you and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would provide military advice and opinions to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense?

The FY2017 NDAA enhanced the roles of the Chairman, the other Joint Chiefs, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body, to provide military advice to civilian leaders. As a member of the Joint Chiefs for four years, I have seen this provision implemented, and I assess the authorities and process as sufficient and appropriate for providing military advice and opinions to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

If confirmed, would you commit always to provide your best military advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council, even when your advice and opinions might differ from those of other members of the Cabinet, the President's other senior advisors, or from the President's own views?

Yes

If confirmed, would you commit always to provide your best military advice to the Secretary of Defense, even when your advice and opinions might differ from those of other DoD senior officials, or from the Secretary's own views?

Yes

If confirmed, how would you elicit from the individual Service Chiefs, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and the Combatant Commanders, their best military advice, including advice and opinions that may diverge your own?

Yes, diversity of thought is vital to the effectiveness of any highly functioning organization. If confirmed as the Chairman, it will be my duty to present my best military advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President of the United States – informed by the best military advice of the Joint Chiefs and the Combatant Commanders. Frequent communication, regardless of medium, is the cornerstone of the collaborative approach necessary to support our nation's civilian leadership and I will ensure to include any advice or opinions that diverge from my own.

If confirmed, how would you inform the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense, of the advice or opinion of another member of the Joint Chiefs, which may differ from advice you have presented on a matter?

If confirmed, it will be my duty to present my best military advice to the principal requesting it. If there is an instance when the advice or opinion of another member of the Joint Chiefs differs from my own it is also my duty to provide that information to the principal along with reasoning for the differences. I will communicate that in writing or orally depending on the situation.

If confirmed, what would be your response upon being advised that other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, individually or collectively, intend to provide their advice on a matter directly to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, the Secretary of Defense, or the Congress?

If confirmed, I will facilitate any member of the JCS, either individually or collectively, in providing their advice directly to the President, NSC, HSC, the Secretary of Defense or Congress. Additionally, I will foster a collaborative environment that promotes respect for dissent and strengthens our national security in a very complex security environment.

Strategic Guidance Documents within the Department of Defense

What is your understanding and evaluation of DoD's processes for strategic assessment, analysis, decision making, and reporting for each of the following strategic guidance documents? If confirmed as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, specifically what would be your role in generating and shaping the content of each such document?

- **National Security Strategy:**
The NSS reflects the Administration's vision for the future of the nation. It gives the strategic direction for the Joint Force, and, if confirmed, as the Chairman I will support it by providing my best military advice.
- **National Defense Strategy:**
The NDS reflects the Secretary of Defense's analysis of the security environment and provides direction for force-management and force-planning priorities over the next 7 years. If confirmed, as the Chairman, I will provide military advice to the Secretary of Defense to help shape those priorities and then direct the NMS to develop the ways and means to meet those objectives.

- **National Military Strategy:**
 The NMS builds upon the NDS direction for “what” to do and provides the Joint Force a strategy of “how” to achieve the objectives. The NMS directs the Joint Force in a continuum of strategic direction (ways and means) as well as a prioritization framework for force development and force design for the near and far term.
- **Defense Planning Guidance:**
 The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) establishes the Secretary of Defense's strategic resource priorities. If confirmed, I as the Chairman produce the Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR) which directly informs the DPG. I would consider a multitude of assessments to include the annual Capability Gap Assessment, Chairman's Risk Assessment, Joint Military Net Assessment, and others to ensure the Joint Force aligns means to ends and ways, in light of risk, allowing me to provide the best strategic advice possible
- **Joint Strategic Campaign Plan:**
 The National Military Strategy details the military ways and means required to meet the guidance contained in the National Defense Strategy. The Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) “operationalizes” the NMS into actionable tasks for global military leaders. As the global integrator, the CJCS ensures that both of these documents reflect global integration and are appropriately informed by an understanding of the global strategic environment in accordance with the guidance contained in the NDS and NSS.
- **Global Force Management Implementation Guidance**
 The Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG) allows the Secretary of Defense to integrate complementary policy and guidance on directed readiness, assignment, allocation, apportionment, and assessment into a single authoritative document. If confirmed, my role is to advise the Secretary of Defense on matters of readiness and balanced requirements of the COCOMs as the Global Integrator. Additionally, I advise the Secretary of Defense on matters of risk related to allocation & assignment of forces to better support resource-informed planning and enable the force to be dynamically employed.
- **Chairman’s Risk Assessment:**
 Title 10 directs the Chairman to prepare an annual assessment of strategic risk to national interests and military risks to the execution of the NMS. The Chairman's Risk Assessment (CRA) is submitted through Secretary of Defense, and ultimately to Congress, along with the Secretary’s Risk Mitigation Plan. The CRA is developed in collaboration with the Services and Combatant Commands, and uses a common and consistent methodology to appraise and communicate risk across the Joint Force.

If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, to update, improve, or make these reviews more useful to the Department and to Congress?

We currently provide high quality reviews of the previously mentioned documents, incorporating inputs from across the Joint Force. We also continuously seek to improve our efforts through similar processes like those resulting in the re-invigorated Joint Military Net Assessment.

Will you commit that, if confirmed, you would undertake all necessary action to ensure that each of these strategic guidance documents is timely generated and issued, and updated, as necessary to reflect changes in assumptions, policy, or other factors?

Yes. One outcome of the Global Integration initiative is more responsive processes that produce timely, regularly-updated strategic guidance.

Use of Military Force

In your view, what is the appropriate role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in establishing policies for the use of military force and the rules of engagement?

The President, as Commander-in-Chief, determines when to use military force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense and should actively advise on the policies for the use of military force and the rules of engagement.

If confirmed, what factors would you consider in making recommendations to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the use of military force?

If confirmed, my recommendations to the President and Secretary of Defense on the use of military force will be consistent with U.S. domestic and international law. Additionally, I would consider probability of success, cost in terms of casualties, and strategic risk.

Do you agree with the interpretations and applications of the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force made by both the Obama and Trump administrations?

Consistent with the policies of current and past administrations expressed in reports on the Legal and Policy Frameworks Guiding the United States Use of Military Force and Related National Security Operations, I agree that the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force provides a legal basis for operations against violent extremist organizations.

Are you satisfied that current legal authorities, including the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, enable the Department to carry out counterterrorism operations and activities at a level you believe to be necessary and appropriate?

Yes, at present, we have the legal authorities to carry out U.S. counterterrorism operations at the necessary and appropriate level.

What groups are currently assessed to be associated forces of al Qaeda for purposes of the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, and in what countries are U.S. military operations against such groups authorized?

The complete list of associated forces of al Qaeda for the purpose of the 2001 Authorization of Military Force is classified and has been made available to Congress. An unclassified list broken down by country is below:

Countries:

Afghanistan: The United States remains in an armed conflict, including in Afghanistan and against al-Qaeda, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Taliban, and the Taliban Haqqani Network, and active hostilities are ongoing.

Iraq and Syria: As part of a comprehensive strategy to defeat ISIS, U.S. Armed Forces are conducting a systematic campaign of airstrikes and other vital operations against ISIS forces in Iraq and Syria. U.S. Armed Forces have also carried out airstrikes and other necessary operations against al-Qaeda in Syria.

Yemen: A small number of U.S. military personnel are deployed to Yemen to conduct operations against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS. U.S. Armed Forces continue to work closely with the Government of Yemen and regional partners to dismantle and ultimately eliminate the terrorist threat posed by those groups.

Somalia: U.S. forces are countering the terrorist threat posed by ISIS and al-Shabaab, an associated force of al-Qaeda. U.S. forces have conducted a number of airstrikes against al-Shabaab as well as ISIS.

Libya: U. S. forces have conducted a number of airstrikes against ISIS in Libya. These airstrikes were conducted in coordination with Libya's Government of National Accord.

In your view, is a "new" Authorization for the Use of Military Force needed at this time? Please explain your answer.

The current AUMF provides the authority necessary to conduct current operations.

Under what conditions, in your view, should the Congress become involved in enacting a new Authorization for the Use of Military Force?

Authorizations for the Use of Military Force provide a U.S. domestic legal basis for use of force for certain military operations, such as the ongoing counterterrorism fight. All military operations must comply with applicable U.S. legal requirements. I would support the Congress becoming involved if the use of military force was required in a situation where current AUMF and/or Presidential authorities were inadequate to legally conduct military operations.

What factors would you consider, if confirmed, in recommending to the Secretary of Defense which forces of other nations should be eligible for Collective Self-Defense by U.S. forces, and under what conditions?

When “collective self-defense” rules of engagement are authorized, U.S. forces may defend foreign forces and individuals against any attack or threat of imminent attack. The key factors I would consider in a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense would be if it is legal to do so, and if it is in U.S. interests to do so.

Are there circumstances in which you believe it appropriate for U.S. military forces to be under the operational command or control of an authority other than the chain of command established under title 10, U.S. Code?

Normally, the U.S. armed forces operate under the established Title 10 chain of command. Though, there may be appropriate instances for the President to establish other temporary command relationships due to certain sensitive military operations. Regardless of the command relationship, U.S. military personnel are still accountable to the Title 10 chain of command and are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Furthermore, any operations the armed forces support are governed by the law of armed conflict. If confirmed, I would give the President my advice in any instance where an exception to the Title 10 chain of command may be warranted.

What is your understanding and assessment of the authorities and agreements in place to permit U.S. military personnel to carry out missions under the provisions of title 50, U.S. Code? If confirmed, how would you modify these agreements or authorities, if at all?

I understand that relevant authorities and agreements provide the necessary framework for military forces to support activities of other U.S. Government departments and agencies when called upon by the President or Secretary of Defense as the situation dictates. I believe that the current authorities and agreements are sufficient. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing work within the Department and with colleagues in other U.S. Government departments and agencies to adjust existing arrangements as the need arises.

According to the 2018 NDS, Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) will allow for the more “flexibl[e] use [of] ready forces to shape proactively the strategic environment while maintaining readiness to respond to contingencies and ensure long-term warfighting readiness.”

In your view, have past DFE operations had the desired effect in “shaping the strategic environment”? Please explain your answer.

Since DFE is a relatively new concept, we are still refining its implementation to better identify and capitalize on emergent strategic opportunities. We assess initial DFE operations have attracted Russian and Chinese attention; however, we have yet to see concrete evidence these efforts have caused our adversaries to fundamentally question or alter their strategic calculus and are therefore “shaping the strategic environment.” We remain convinced the implementation of DFE in support of combatant command campaigning will best support achieving desired NDS strategic outcomes.

In your view, have past DFE operations promoted, strained, or degraded the long-term readiness of U.S. forces?

The DFE operations executed to date have promoted force readiness. Implementation of the Immediate Response Force (IRF) in the FY20 Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) will reinforce the relationship between DFE operations and Force Management in support of the NDS. The IRF force model coupled with the Directed Readiness Tables (DRT) provide a pre-planned path for achieving the NDS priority of recovering Service readiness.

If confirmed as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, what factors would you consider in recommending the use of particular forces to execute a particular DFE mission at a particular point in time?

As the global integrator, the Chairman is in the unique position to consider all the variables that influence the strategic environment. The global integrator must also be mindful of the potential impact on operations and readiness in secondary areas of interest. The DFE First Principles --- gain or maintain initiative, demonstrate flexibility and agility, challenge adversary strategic calculus, and induce tempo --- will also serve as good guidelines, and will inform my DFE recommendations if confirmed. If confirmed, I will also analyze the relative NDS/NMS strategic priorities, combatant command campaign objectives, and projected strategic loss/gain as I weigh the opportunity costs associated with a particular DFE mission.

Joint Operations

Operations are becoming increasingly joint as Marines plan to deploy in larger numbers, on a wider range of ships, and to more forward locations; the U.S. Army and Air Force invest in counter-maritime capabilities; and both air and naval forces continue to develop and implement capabilities to defeat anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) networks.

Which Service doctrines and capabilities offer the greatest opportunity for synergy in joint operations?

The Services all recognize that they fight as part of the Joint Force, and their doctrines, concepts, and capability development efforts inherently embraces this truth and look to enhance the synergy that gives the U.S. Joint Force a competitive advantage. I am the most familiar with the Army's Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) concept that offers a significant step towards achieving what the National Military Strategy describes as "Joint Combined Arms." Each of the other Services has collaboratively worked with the Army in developing MDO concept, and there may be opportunities to expand it to the Joint Force.

What innovative ideas would you consider to increase Service interdependence and interoperability to accomplish missions and tasks in support of DoD objectives in joint operations?

If confirmed, I would increase emphasis of interdependence and interoperability through joint training at the tactical and operational levels of warfare to strengthen our ability to conduct joint operations. I would ensure this policy is incorporated into the Service's Title 10 responsibilities and then empower the Services to execute the policy. I would also consider developing joint readiness goals, objectives, and metrics to achieve statutory guidance and assess synchronization of Service goals and objectives to ensure proper alignment with DoD goals and objectives. I would also focus on communication and the network as a key functional area to rigorously ensure joint interoperability.

If confirmed, how would you shape Joint Staff engagement and coordination with the Close Combat Lethality Task Force established in February 2018 by then-Secretary of Defense Mattis?

The Joint Staff currently supports the Close Combat Lethality Task Force with personnel and material support. As the CSA, I worked closely with the CCLTF and if confirmed, I will assess the progress made by the Close Combat Lethality Task Force before determining the way forward.

What do you perceive to be the role and capability requirements for close combat formations in future Joint Force operations?

The role of close combat formations in future Joint Force operations will be to control terrain or population and achieve decision in conflict over the enemy as part of a joint or combined force. Future close combat forces must be able to shoot, move and communicate over greater distances and in more dispersed formations while increasing lethality and minimizing their electromagnetic signature in order to survive in an increasingly lethal operating environment. They will also need to be able to conduct Multi-Domain Operations across all environments with particular emphasis on subterranean and dense urban terrain.

Joint Force Headquarters and Component Commands

Is the current model for creating Joint Force headquarters below the unified command level appropriate and adequate to meet the global challenges articulated in the 2018 NDS?

Yes, the current model is appropriate and adequate.

In your view, would Combatant Commanders' operations and contingency planning and preparedness be improved by creating and exercising subordinate Joint Force headquarters prior to the emergence of a crisis?

Possibly, but it would depend on the specific circumstances. However, creating a subordinate Joint Force headquarters prior to emergence of crisis may result in unnecessary staff actions and expense for a crisis that does not emerge.

What are the most significant obstacles to establishing and exercising such Joint Force headquarters in advance of a crisis, and what could be done to overcome those obstacles, in your view?

Our combatant commanders are appropriately staffed to manage day-to-day operations up to crisis and I am not convinced that creating a JFHQ in advance of a crisis would be effective. Prematurely establishing a Joint Force headquarters may pull resources from other global operations and activities. However, if confirmed, I will examine this possibility in depth.

Alliances and Partnerships

Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are crucial to U.S. success in competition and conflict against a great power. To this end, the 2018 NDS stresses the importance of strengthening existing U.S. alliances and partnerships, building or enhancing new ones, and promoting “mutual respect, responsibility, priorities, and accountability” in these relationships. Interactions with the Armed Forces of other nations are often conducted at the level of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to strengthen existing U.S. alliances and partnerships, build new partnerships, and leverage new opportunities for international cooperation—in each Combatant Commander's geographic area of responsibility?

If confirmed, I will ensure that our Global Campaign Plans include actions to strengthen alliances and partnerships, build new partnerships, and leverage new opportunities for international cooperation. The Chairman of the Joint Staff, working in tandem with the Combatant Commands, is uniquely suited to energize our ally and partner networks to respond to such global security challenges. If confirmed, building and sustaining allies and partners will be a priority of mine.

If confirmed, on which other nations' military leaders and which multi-national and international defense-focused consultative forums would you focus your engagement, with a view to advancing most effectively the national security interests of the United States?

If confirmed, I will engage with a myriad of other nations' military leaders and defense-focused consultative fora as a means to best achieve our National Security objectives. In terms of focus, there exists clear direction to expanding our Indo-Pacific alliances and partnerships while also fortifying our existing alliances and relationships in Europe and elsewhere around the globe. In accordance with that direction, I expect to focus on those challenges and places where we are continuing to expand our influence, while, also, demonstrating solidarity with our staunchest allies as an expression of our commitment. I have done a considerable amount of this as the CSA and will expand on the solid base established over the last four years. Additionally, I will ensure to sustain key relationships established with the current CJCS, General Joseph Dunford.

Joint Officer Management

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wields significant influence over joint officer management—the policies and procedures that guide joint officer career development and the attainment of joint experience and education. The NDAA for FY 2017 modified the Joint Qualified Officer (JQO) system established by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in two significant ways. First, it broadened the statutory definition of “joint matters” to expand the types of positions for which an officer can receive joint duty credit. Further, it reduced from three years to two the minimum tour length required for joint duty credit.

What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the FY 2017 modifications to the JQO system?

The two significant modifications have provided the Department additional flexibility in our Joint Qualification System. The expansion of the “joint matters” definition has ensured the ability to award joint duty credit to additional officers making contributions to the development and achievement of strategic objectives. The reduced statutory tour length required for joint duty credit has provided the Services additional flexibility in officer assignment for tightly managed career timelines and milestones. Given the timing of the change, coupled with standard tour lengths, additional time is needed to have a full picture of the overall impact of the tour length reduction but I believe it is positive at this time.

In your view, are the requirements associated with becoming a JQO, and the link between attaining joint qualification and eligibility for promotion to General/Flag (G/FO) officer rank, consistent with the operational and professional demands of Service line officers?

Yes. Although careers are tightly managed to Service specific milestones and operational demands are significant, the 24-month minimum joint tour and associated JPME completion for joint qualification are sensible and greatly enhance an officer’s perspective and knowledge to perform at the GO/FO ranks.

In your view, what additional modifications to the JQO system are necessary to ensure that military officers are able to attain both meaningful joint and Service-specific leadership experience, and adequate professional development?

The existing joint officer qualification requirements provide a tested and flexible means to ensure officers develop the skills necessary for successful service at the operational and strategic levels; therefore no additional modification to the JQO system is necessary at this time.

What are your ideas for improving the JQO system better to meet the needs of Reserve Component officers?

Major changes to the JQO system were made in 2007 to incorporate Reserve Component officers and the Reserve policy was adjusted in 2018 to increase joint qualification opportunities for Reserve Component officers. I do not currently recommend changing the JQO system with respect to the Reserve Component.

Should the requirement to be a JQO be eliminated as a consideration in selecting officers for promotion and assignment?

No. Meeting JQO requirements enhance the ability of senior officers to operate effectively in the joint environment at the operational and strategic level. Officers who meet the requirements provide benefit to both the Services and joint organizations, and ultimately the Department as a whole.

If confirmed, what modifications would you suggest to provide DoD and the Military Services the force management and talent management tools necessary to recruit, develop, sustain, and retain a 21st century, joint, All-Volunteer Force?

If confirmed, I will assess talent management strategies so we maintain our competitive advantage over our adversaries. The FY19 NDAA talent management strategies moved the department in the right direction through the enhancement of constructive service credit, alternative promotion authority, and reordering of a promotion list based on merit. If confirmed, I will continue to work with OSD and the Service Chiefs as we implement these authorities and assess the effects these programs have on maintaining a lethal All-Volunteer Force.

Do you believe current DoD and Military Service procedures and practices for reviewing the records of officers pending the President's nomination for promotion or assignment are sufficient to enable fully-informed decisions by the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President?

Yes, in my experience as CSA, the Services evaluate officer qualifications, past performance, future potential, and any available adverse or reportable information, and each service has a rigorous process in place to ensure all decisions are fully informed.

In your view, are these procedures and practices fair to the individual military officers proceeding through the promotion or assignment process?

Yes. I believe these procedures and practices are fair and reasonable for the officers involved.

Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)

The 2018 NDS asserts that JPME has stagnated—that it focuses on the accomplishment of mandatory credit at the expense of lethality and ingenuity.

I agree with this assessment. We can, must, and will do better. The Talent Management systems of the Services and the Professional Military Education enterprise need to be in into better alignment. Our aim is to ensure that the right leaders are getting the right education, at the right time.

Based on your assessment of the threats facing the United States, now and in the future, what knowledge, skills, and abilities will officers need to succeed in great power competition against the nation’s adversaries?

Joint leaders require exceptional competence in the art and science of joint warfighting, flexibility, toughness, and ability to think through uncertainty. We must enhance the capacities of our leaders to conceive, design, and implement strategies and campaigns that integrate our capabilities globally, to defeat competitors in contests we have not yet even imagined, and respond to activities short of armed conflict in domains that are already being contested. Key attributes will be: highly developed critical thinking, problem solving, operating in ambiguity, acting within higher intent in a decentralized way, rising above disrupted communications, resiliency, and irreproachable ethical conduct.

If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to enhance DoD’s JPME system to ensure that it fosters the education and development of a cadre of strategic thinkers and planners with the intellectual acumen, military leadership proficiency, and sound judgment to lead the Joint Force in a transregional, multi-functional, multi-domain “Whole of Government” environment?

We must develop strategically minded joint warfighters, who think critically and can apply military power creatively to inform national strategy, conduct globally integrated operations, and fight under conditions of disruptive change. To do this, we must create a fully aligned PME and talent management system that identifies, develops, and utilizes, joint warfighters skilled in the art of war and the practical and ethical application of military power. To this end, we will work with the Services to sustain the Joint and Services Cross Functional Team and its charge to bring about the requisite JPME and talent management end states. The end states include, a talent management enterprise that rewards continuous intellectual development and growth; holds individual officers accountable for academic performance; and matches officers’ cognitive attributes with appropriate PME opportunities and positions of responsibility. Additionally, if confirmed I will regularly review the POI of each Service’s War College and their Staff Colleges.

In your view, to what degree does the Secretary of Defense Strategic Thinkers Program, established by Directive-type Memorandum-19-001, address the JPME concerns documented in the 2018 NDS? What does this new program add to the current PME system?

I think we need to delineate between "strategists" - those who can imagine and write strategy from a blank page, and the "strategically-minded" - those who can effectively execute strategy through campaigns and operations. The former are rare and the new Defense Strategic Thinkers Program will help develop such individuals. The NDS language refers to the latter, the development of which is a responsibility of the larger JPME system. The inaugural execution of this program has promise, and if confirmed, I look forward to ensuring its success.

In your view, how could the Department further increase the throughput of the current 10-week, in-residence course required to achieve JPME II accreditation, consistent with the need for training in joint skills in advance assignment to the Joint Staff or a Combatant Command, while enhancing the course's academic rigor?

In my current role as Chief of Staff of the Army, I do not currently see a need to increase throughput in the 10-week resident JPME II course. If confirmed, I intend to assess the broader Professional Military Education needs of the Joint Force with an eye towards rigor in all academic curriculum. I will seek to ensure the timing and throughput for curriculum align with the needs of the force and developmental goals of our service members.

Civilian Senior Executives and General/Flag Officers (G/FO)

The FY16 and FY17 NDAA's reduced the number of Senior Executive Service (SES) and G/FO positions in the Department of Defense by about 12%.

What progress has the Joint Staff made in contributing to a reduction in the number of DoD SES positions? In contributing to a reduction in the number of G/FO and restructuring the G/FO grade pyramid?

The Joint Staff has contributed an approximate 10% SES reduction in that time. Additionally, the Joint Staff has scheduled and identified by-year reductions throughout CY22. The Joint Staff has successfully identified 78 General/Flag Officer positions for reduction in conjunction with the FY17 NDAA. To date, the force reduced from 310 positions to 289 positions and plans will reduce further to 232 by December 31, 2022. In coordination with this reduction and FY17 NDAA, there is a plan to establish an Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) account of not more than 30 billets. I believe the Joint Force will successfully meet the requirements of the NDAA's; however, emerging requirements such as establishment of USSPACECOM may require future adjustments to the G/FO pyramid.

If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to ensure the Department is successful in meeting these reduction and restructuring mandates?

I will work with the Secretary of Defense, Combatant Commanders, and leaders of Defense Activities to ensure we meet the reduction and restructuring mandates. The Department has established a General/Flag Officer reduction plan timeline for each position identified for deletion. The Joint Staff reviews the plan regularly and provides updates to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on a quarterly basis, or more frequently as needed.

Regarding SES management, I will continue to execute the DoD SES Reduction Plan to meet the goals of the Department while ensuring the mission and integrity of the Joint Force.

Are you satisfied that OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Military Services have in place sufficient training and resources to provide members of the SES and G/FOs the training, advice, and assistance they need to “play the ethical midfield”? Please explain your answer.

Yes. I judge that sufficient training and resources are in place to provide members of the SES and G/FOs the training, advice, and assistance they need. The ability to make ethical decisions based on the shared values of the profession of arms is identified as a specific Desired Leader Attribute for leaders throughout the military and is foundational to all Joint and Service developmental efforts. The ethical foundation is laid at the outset of these individuals' careers and is further developed and reinforced in formal education and training settings throughout their progression through the ranks.

Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

In 2008, Congress enacted section 156 of title 10, U.S. Code, which required the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be selected by a board of officers convened by the Secretary of Defense. To this day, the Chairman’s Legal Counsel remains the only joint duty officer selected from among qualified officers of the Armed Forces in this manner.

Do you consider the board selection process required by section 156 to be an effective and efficient process for selecting an officer to serve in this critical joint position?

Yes, the board selection process is effective and efficient. Since each Military Department has their own personnel systems, the process to convene a joint selection board can present challenges. However, in order to conduct a joint selection board, the planning and preparation begins well in advance with each Service providing qualified candidates for consideration. The board itself typically runs no more than two or three days.

What lessons, if any, have been captured from this joint process that could improve the selection board processes used by the Military Services?

While the initial memorandum of instruction was established for the first joint selection board to select the LC to CJCS, the Department took into consideration the best practices of “all” of the Services, which set our joint selection boards up for success.

Would you support expanding application of the process employed to select the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to other joint officer positions? Why or why not?

To my knowledge, the Secretary of Defense has not considered expanding the application process to other Joint positions. However, if confirmed, I will review this specific suggestion.

U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)

AFRICOM does not have any assigned forces and, as a result, is required to compete for forces in the global force management process.

What is your understanding of the challenges and risks to U.S. security interests, if any, resulting from the decision not to assign forces to AFRICOM?

USAFRICOM has both assigned and allocated forces as well as regionally aligned forces that remain in CONUS and rotate into the AFRICOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) to execute missions in support of AFRICOM requirements. The amount and type of forces available to AFRICOM are appropriate to meet the challenges to US interests at an acceptable level of risk. Vital to our efforts in Africa is the network of enduring contingency locations and agreements with key African partners. This posture allows forward staging of forces to provide operational flexibility and a timely response to crises without creating the optic that the U.S. is “militarizing” Africa. AFRICOM’s partner-centric approach acknowledges that few, if any, African challenges can be resolved using only military force.

What is your assessment of the availability and predictability of forces and capabilities to support the AFRICOM Theater Campaign Plan and other emergency requirements?

The by, with, and through approach to achieve security and stability in Africa has been effective with a limited forward presence. Often our security cooperation also enhances larger partner force operations which achieve shared strategic objectives and build enduring relationships. Key to this approach is the limited forward presence on the continent and a focus on building African partner nation capabilities while supporting efforts of other international partners.

Are there any changes you would implement to the allocation or assignment of forces to AFRICOM, if confirmed?

The DoD assets allocated based on the priorities set out in the 2018 National Defense Strategy and the department's FY20 allocations for AFRICOM are appropriate. However, if confirmed, I will consider the Combatant Commander's requirements and requests for forces and assess risk based on changes in the strategic environment.

What is your assessment of current U.S. counterterrorism strategies being executed in the AFRICOM Area of Responsibility (AOR)? If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to these strategies?

I agree with the current counterterrorism strategy in Africa. Our strategy is to disrupt and degrade priority threats to the U.S. homeland, our interests, and our allies. A key component of the strategy is burden-sharing with our allies and partners. Additionally, we can improve upon our strategic coherence with allies and partners. With competing priorities amongst our allies and partners, and given finite counterterrorism resources across such a vast continent, a whole of government, whole of coalition approach remains necessary.

What is your assessment of the efficacy of the current U.S. strategy to compete against Russia and China to be the security partner of choice in Africa?

The current U.S. strategy focuses on building our partners, working toward shared objectives, operating transparently, and promoting good governance, while highlighting that Russian and Chinese projects do not adhere to high standards and can saddle countries with opaque or excessive loans. Our competitive edge lies in (1) the quality of the equipment, training, and other security assistance we provide, and (2) our support of counterterrorism operations, which neither China nor Russia currently supply.

African leaders often view Russia and China as easier to work with than the United States due to fewer restrictions and conditions on security assistance and sales. To counter this perception, U.S. delivery of high quality and timely security assistance in Africa is a way to challenge Russia and China's military access and influence.

Increasing the speed of delivery for commonly sought-after equipment, demonstrating our commitment and prioritization of African needs at a high level, and developing positive messaging that will resonate with African leaders' aspirations. I look forward to working with Congress to achieve these goals.

Libya

What is your assessment of current U.S. national security interests in Libya?

U.S. national security interests include a stable and secure Libya that contributes to regional security. We support UN-led efforts in the political reconciliation process, setting conditions for Libyan stability. In support of this goal, the United States assists in containing Violent Extremist Organizations, supports and enables diplomatic efforts, and contributes to establishing conditions that deter illegal migration along NATO's southern flank.

Who are the current U.S. counterterrorism and security partners in Libya and what is your understanding of how those relationships advance stability and security in Libya?

All security cooperation programs are on hold until an agreement for the cessation of hostilities is reached and the political reconciliation process resumes. This decision follows the offensive launched on the 3 April 2019 by the, "Libyan National Army" (LNA) Commander Khalifa Haftar (USPERSON). Since then, LNA and Government of National Accord-aligned forces continue to battle in southern Tripoli.

Are there any areas in which U.S. interests and those of our security partners in Libya diverge?

The international community generally agrees there is no military solution to the conflict in Libya and supports the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ghassan Salamé, and the United Nations Support Mission for Libya (UNSMIL). Their mission is to mediate a cessation of hostilities and resumption of the political path forward leading to credible and peaceful elections. Still, the continued failure to support the arms embargo by multiple nations undermines stability and risks an escalation of violence.

What role, if any, do you believe the United States should play in helping Libya build capable security institutions?

If an internationally recognized Libyan government requests assistance, the United States, in cooperation with international partners, should consider assisting Libya in developing capable security institutions. Resumption of a United Nations-led process is needed to set political conditions for appropriate security assistance response. It is critical that Partner Nations continue emphasis on abiding by the arms embargo and pressuring both sides to return to negotiations.

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)

To what extent does achieving U.S. national security interests in the Middle East require a continuous U.S. military presence there, in your view?

The National Security Strategy directs the Department to “retain the necessary American military presence in the region to protect the United States and our allies from terrorist attacks and preserve a favorable regional balance of power.” AQAP and ISIS originate in the Middle East, both of whom are responsible for attacks on the U.S. and our allies. Iran destabilizes the Middle East, threatening regional security through its proxy forces and desire to obtain nuclear weapons. We need to help build indigenous security capability of our regional partners to allow us to reduce our military footprint over time. However, if we do not maintain an adequate level of military presence, we risk increased terrorist threats against the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests overseas.

What opportunities exist for increasing burden-sharing with U.S. regional and European partners to counter threats emanating from and affecting the CENTCOM AOR?

Our partners understand that in order to maintain their preferred strategic relationships, they will need to shoulder more responsibility for regional security. For the military, this is best achieved by building partner security forces through U.S. defense item sales and with training.

Coalition partners support Operations Inherent Resolve and Resolute Support, and opportunities exist for increased burden sharing throughout all aspects of the operations: defense, diplomacy and development. Partner Nations could also share an increased portion of the burden for logistics, training, stabilization, humanitarian and financial support throughout the broader region.

Afghanistan

What are the U.S. national security objectives in Afghanistan, and if confirmed, what strategy would you recommend to achieve them?

The United States has a vital national interest to prevent terrorist groups from using Afghanistan as a base for planning and executing attacks against the U.S. homeland, U.S. citizens, and our interests and allies. We are doing this in Afghanistan by defeating threats posed by al-Qaeda and ISIS-K, supporting the ANDSF, and by helping to provide the Afghan people an opportunity to stand on their own. Under the leadership of the Department of State, our ultimate goal in

Afghanistan is a negotiated political settlement between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) and the Taliban.

In your view, should U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan be tied to the achievement of certain conditions on the ground? If so, and if confirmed, what conditions would you factor into your recommendation to the Secretary of Defense on future troop levels in Afghanistan?

U.S. troop levels must be based on the level of threat present in Afghanistan, and they must provide the correct compliment of capabilities to enable successful execution of the South Asia Strategy. Troop levels, force capabilities, and required resources should be accordingly adjusted as South Asia Strategy conditions are met and as the threat changes.

What are the major challenges you foresee, if confirmed, to achieving U.S. goals of stability and security in Afghanistan?

A major challenge to achieving stability and security in Afghanistan is ensuring regional players are positive contributors toward the negotiated settlement process.

In your assessment, are current target end strengths for the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police sufficient to enable Afghan security forces to project security and stability throughout Afghanistan in 2019 and beyond? Are these numbers sustainable?

While the reported ANDSF manning levels are below their target end strength of 352,000, the current numbers are sufficient for the existing conditions on the ground. The Afghan Security Roadmap developed in 2017 will help the ANDSF continue to mature in both capacity and capability, but coalition support will remain critical.

In your view, what role should DoD play in supporting the reconciliation negotiations with the Taliban that Ambassador Khalilzad has undertaken?

It is the role of the U.S. military to operate in support of the diplomatic line of effort. Our job is to ensure military pressure, by, with, and through the ANSDF, is placed on the Taliban and to improve the Afghan military capabilities.

In your view, what role should the Afghan government play in the reconciliation negotiations with the Taliban?

I support an “Afghan led, Afghan owned” reconciliation and negotiation process.

In your opinion, does the Taliban have the will and capability to undertake counterterrorism efforts against ISIS? Against al Qaeda?

To date, the Taliban has demonstrated the will and capability to conduct operations against ISIS but to my knowledge has not done so against Al Qaeda.

Syria and Iraq

What is your understanding of the current U.S. strategy and objectives in Syria?

The U.S. military mission in Syria remains the enduring defeat of ISIS and we continue to work by, with, and through our partners and allies. U.S. strategic objectives in Syria are to:

- Achieve the enduring defeat of ISIS, AQ and other affiliates in Syria
- Reduce and expel Iranian malign influence from Syria
- Resolve the Syrian civil war on terms favorable to the U.S. and U.S. allies
- Deter the production, proliferation, and use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Regime and achieve the elimination of Syria's chemical weapons program
- Compel the Syrian regime to cease its sponsorship of terrorism and defend allies and partners from threats emanating from Syria
- Mitigate human suffering

From a DoD standpoint, what must be done to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS, in your view? What non-military efforts are necessary to sustain the enduring defeat of ISIS?

Following the defeat of the physical caliphate degrading ISIS' external operations capability must be our priority focus to continue to protect U.S. interests. Denying safe havens, limiting transregional capability, and denying opportunity for resurgence will rely on the effective targeting of their terrorist network enablers: financing, messaging, and foreign terrorist fighters. Degrading ISIS finance and messaging capability while addressing the root causes of radicalization relies on non-military means to maintain the pressure on ISIS and reinforce the recent success. If confirmed, I look forward to working with stakeholders including varying departments and congress to ensure an enduring defeat of ISIS.

What do you perceive to be the role of the Syrian Democratic Forces and Iraq Security Forces in countering ISIS, now that its caliphate has been eliminated?

While the physical caliphate of ISIS has been destroyed, it has not yet led to the enduring defeat of ISIS. Their ideology remains strong and U.S., coalition, and partner forces are actively maintaining pressure on ISIS cells, stabilizing liberated areas, and protecting our partners in the fight against ISIS.

The Coalition's hard-won gains must be consolidated by investing in, building, and training partner security forces capable of dealing with a localized insurgency, holding territory, and restoring basic services. Simultaneously, interagency efforts, precision counterterrorism, and a mobilized international community can prevent a return of the conditions that allowed ISIS to grow. The SDF and ISF continue to conduct operations every day to root out remaining ISIS cells, and the U.S. military advises and assists our partner forces with these operations.

In your view, should U.S. troop levels in Syria be tied to the achievement of certain conditions on the ground? If so, and if confirmed, what conditions would you factor into your recommendation to the Secretary of Defense on future troop levels in Syria?

The future operational environment in Syria remains uncertain and dynamic. U.S. forces have drawn down to a residual presence in Syria to maintain counterterrorism and security operations. Any potential future troop level or capabilities changes would have to be assessed based on numerous variables to include conditions on the ground. However, we should sustain the necessary U.S. and coalition capabilities to prevent an ISIS resurgence and secure our enemy's enduring defeat.

Earlier this month, Acting Assistant Secretary Kathryn Wheelbarger said, "Syria is a prime example of Moscow's efforts to influence world events for its own advantage and prestige in a manner that contributes nothing but additional instability to the region and beyond."

Do U.S. troops in Syria help "push back" Russian influence in the Middle East, in your view?

Syria remains a competitive space with Russia who is working to widen its influence in the Middle East. While U.S. troops are in Syria to defeat ISIS, our presence also denies Russia unchallenged access and influence.

What is your understanding of current U.S. strategy and objectives in Iraq?

The U.S. strategy seeks the enduring defeat of ISIS and rebuilding of independent Iraqi Security Forces. To achieve these ends, the coalition continues helping the Iraqi Security Forces to consolidate gains, improve their military and security capability, and evolve into a more professional and representative force that is capable of countering an ISIS insurgency.

What steps would you recommend for normalizing security assistance to the Iraqi Security Forces in the coming years?

To support enduring normalized security assistance to the ISF, the DoD is enacting a plan of action that will occur in three conditions-based phases:

Phase 1 calls for the appointment of a Senior Defense Official/Defense Attache which is complete.

Phase 2 will transition tasks from CJTF-OIR to OSC-I which transitions activities from CJTF-OIR to a normalized Security Cooperation Office.

Phase 3 will seek implementation of permanent OSC-I billeting/staffing. This will be conditions based and characterized by the cessation of major combat operations against ISIS and the implementation of a Joint Manpower Validation Board to source requirements for OSC-I with permanent staffing.

At the end of these phases, the SDO/DATT and Security Cooperation Construct will be fully normalized with permanent manning and stable, reliable funding streams that support long-term U.S. national security interests in Iraq.

Iran

What is your assessment of the current military threat posed by Iran?

Iran is the U.S.'s most formidable conventional and unconventional threat in the region. Its primary military capabilities are missiles, naval, and unconventional forces. Iran has the region's largest surface-to-surface missile (SSM) arsenal, including both ballistic and cruise missiles and mobile launchers. Some of the SSMs have a range of up to 2,000 kilometers. Iran's Navy is capable of only a limited menu of operations, but it is the Persian Gulf's preeminent naval force and features many small boats and naval mines to complicate adversary freedom of movement in a conflict. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps – Qods (IRGC-QF) maintains ties to Shia groups across the region to advance Iran's interests. Proxies give Iran unconventional options for operations in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain and globally. The IRGC-QF also has longstanding bonds with select Sunni groups, including Palestinian Islamic Jihad, HAMAS, and the Taliban. Regular Iranian ground forces continue to focus on internal security and territorial defense, while also deploying limited numbers to Iraq and Syria. Iranian military leaders probably recognize they could not defeat a modern advanced military but they could impose significant cost.

What is your understanding of the objectives of the “maximum pressure” strategy with respect to Iran? What is the role of the U.S. military in this strategy?

The “maximum pressure” campaign aims to change Iranian behavior and create conditions to negotiate a better deal with Iran than the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. It involves tenants derived from Secretary Pompeo's “12-points” (i.e., ensuring Iran will never have access to nuclear weapons, will cease terrorist operations and employment of ballistic missile launches, etc.). The campaign primarily applies diplomatic, information, and economic instruments with the military's ability to respond to Iranian aggression and malign activity underpinning the strategy.

If the current situation vis-a-vis Iran continues to escalate, what off-ramps exist for “dialing down” the tension, in your view?

The Department of State is leading the “maximum pressure” campaign and I defer to Secretary Pompeo for any realistic diplomatic off-ramps. That said, I think the President has been clear that he does not want war with Iran and is willing to speak with the regime without any pre-conditions.

Pakistan

If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend to U.S. relations with Pakistan, particularly in terms of military-to-military relations and International Military Education and Training?

The President's South Asia Strategy recognizes Pakistan as a key partner in achieving U.S. interests in South Asia, including developing a political settlement in Afghanistan; defeating al-Qa'ida (AQ) and ISIS-Khorasan; providing logistical access for U.S. forces; and enhancing regional stability. If confirmed as Chairman, my objective would be to preserve the defense relationship between the United States and Pakistan even as we press Pakistan to take action on U.S. requests. While we have suspended security assistance and paused major defense dialogues, we need to maintain strong military-to-military ties based on our shared interests.

Have you seen any change in Pakistan's cooperation with the U.S. since the U.S. decision to withhold security assistance to Pakistan in September 2018?

Pakistan has made positive contributions in support of Afghan Reconciliation. However, since the suspension of security assistance, Pakistan has also expanded its outreach to other countries, including Russia and China, to meet its security and economic assistance needs.

What other levers does the United States have to ensure Pakistani territory does not continue to be used as a sanctuary for militants and violent extremist organizations?

The U.S. relationship with Pakistan is part of a broader South Asia strategy with the State Department in lead and DoD in support. For additional levers besides the withholding of security assistance mentioned above, I defer to the Department of State.

U.S. European Command (EUCOM)

Implementation of the 2018 NDS

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 5, 2019, then-Commander, EUCOM, General Scaparrotti stated, "I am not comfortable yet with the deterrent posture that we have in Europe in support of the National Defense Strategy."

Do you agree with General Scaparrotti's assessment that the deterrent posture in Europe is not yet sufficient to support the 2018 NDS?

I agree with GEN Scaparrotti's assessment, but I think the current funding for EDI (through 2024) and associated Service investments have us moving in the right direction. If confirmed, I will continue to monitor progress and encourage our Allies to make additional investments as well and work with the committee to achieve the correct posture.

In your assessment, what capability and/or capacity shortfalls in the current Joint Force present the most significant challenge to addressing the threats in EUCOM?

From my current perspective, the most significant Joint Force shortfalls in the EUCOM AOR are Theater Anti-Submarine Warfare (TASW), 5th Generation fighters, and Joint Fires. If confirmed, I will work closely with the EUCOM Commander and update my assessment with the committee.

In your assessment, does the United States have sufficient air and missile defense capability and capacity to defend critical infrastructure in EUCOM, such as command and control locations and air bases, against cruise missile attack? What do you perceive as the areas of highest risk?

DoD has sufficient air and missile defense capability in the EUCOM AOR but in my view, it is not currently deployed in sufficient numbers to defend EUCOM's critical infrastructure against cruise missile attacks in large salvos. U.S. military capabilities, however, including Integrated Air and Missile Defense have improved in recent years through the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI). The highest risk includes Russia's broad military modernization efforts including long range cruise missiles, undersea, and cyber capability that threatens to erode U.S. military competitive advantage.

Last year, the Army proposed, and Congress supported the establishment of a Corps headquarters in Europe. The FY 2019 NDAA fully supported the Army's request for increased end strength, including 571 soldiers for a Corps headquarters assigned to U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR).

Do you believe the Army has sufficient warfighting headquarters elements to lead a large-scale contingency in Europe? Please explain your answer.

The Army has sufficient warfighting headquarters to lead a large-scale contingency in Europe. However, the problem posed by a large-scale contingency in Europe is more about location than inventory since such a contingency will likely involve a non-permissive environment which will impact

NATO and impede movement into Europe. We are studying the problem of location with EUCOM and considering a series of options to include stationing.

Do you support the activation of a Corps headquarters in Europe? Please explain your answer.

Yes, we have worked this with EUCOM over the last several years. The need for a Corps-level capability in Europe is clear. How we achieve that—Rotate Forward or Permanently Station, is under review. If confirmed, I will work with the committee as we complete the review and determine recommendations.

In his March 5 testimony, General Scaparrotti recommended adding two destroyers at Rota, Spain, stating, “in order to remain dominant in the maritime domain and particularly under sea [the United States] need[s] greater capability, particularly given the modernization and the growth of the Russian fleets in Europe.” During his confirmation hearing on April 2, 2019, current EUCOM Commander, General Wolters testified that he agreed with General Scaparrotti’s recommendation.

If confirmed, what specific enhancements to forward-deployed naval forces in Europe would you recommend?

The Navy routinely maintains and enhances our naval forces in USEUCOM. The Navy routinely forward stations and employs our most capable naval forces in such forward locations. If confirmed, I will review the status and make appropriate recommendations. I will inform the committee of my recommendations.

Given the deployment of the new Russian submarine *Severodvinsk*, what additional capabilities or capacity can or should the Navy provide to maintain the U.S. advantage in undersea warfare?

Currently, the Navy is investing in technological solutions in robotics and unmanned systems to supplement and ultimately improve our current ASW capabilities. In addition to a suite of asymmetric solutions, including advanced undersea mining capabilities, to counter Russian and Chinese advancements in undersea warfare capability.

NATO Alliance

In your view, how important to U.S. strategic interests is the U.S. commitment to its obligations under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty?

Our commitment to NATO, and particularly our obligations under Article 5, are crucial to U.S. strategic interests. Article 5 obligations are the linchpin of defense and deterrence against adversaries threatening the U.S. homeland and our vital interests in Europe. NATO's strength is our mutual trust, commitment, and cohesion to collectively deter threats or respond to attacks.

What do you view as the essential strategic objectives of the NATO Alliance in the coming years and what do you perceive to be the greatest challenges in meeting those objectives?

The essential strategic objective of NATO is to deter great power war on the European continent. It has been the NATO objective since 1949. The recently released NATO Military Strategy, the first in decades, recognizes the need to take a '360 degree approach' to best defend the Alliance and deter adversaries. This means greater defense spending, capabilities, and contributions by all Allies to address challenges from all directions. Increased commitment to defense spending, as agreed during the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, will modernize warfighting capabilities and increase the amount of ready forces available to confront security challenges of the future. It is critical that NATO Allies invest in, and make actual warfighting capability available to the Alliance at operationally relevant speeds, when required. If confirmed, I will work with NATO counterparts to ensure the Alliance carries out its commitments.

It is critical that NATO Allies invest in, and make actual warfighting capability available to the Alliance at operationally relevant speeds, when required. As part of the NATO Readiness Initiative, Allies have committed to a "Four Thirties" plan—30 battalions, 30 air squadrons, and 30 naval combat vessels—ready to use within 30 days.

If confirmed, what realistic plan would you propose to train, certify, and maintain the readiness and interoperability of these "Four Thirties" units?

We have an outstanding Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) who I trust will develop plans to best train, certify, and maintain readiness. If confirmed, I fully support the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) plans to build "Four Thirties" unit readiness. I will ensure SACEUR has our full support to validate the readiness and interoperability of the "Four Thirties" units.

In your view, is there a continuing requirement for U.S. nuclear weapons to be deployed in NATO countries?

Yes. As long as NATO is committed to a nuclear deterrence mission, it is important the U.S. maintain nuclear weapons forward deployed in NATO countries. These forward-based weapons contribute to U.S. extended deterrence,

enhance assurance guarantees to our NATO Allies, and demonstrate Alliance members' willingness to share defense burdens.

How will the new NATO Joint Force Command for the Atlantic in Norfolk, Virginia, and the Enabling Command in Ulm, Germany, enhance credible deterrence in Europe? How would you define and measure success for these new NATO commands, if confirmed?

Both commands are a part of an adaptive NATO Command Structure that will improve how the Alliance addresses challenges from a 360 degree perspective. I am encouraged by the progress in standing up Joint Forces Command (JFC) Norfolk and its ability to focus on the trans-Atlantic area. Working with our newly established U.S. Second Fleet, JFC Norfolk increased Allied maritime domain awareness. This command also leads focused exercises and operations in the Atlantic to maintain our sea lines of communications. Joint Support and Enabling Command in Ulm greatly assists the Alliance's ability to move, reinforce, and supply forces throughout the area of responsibility. Success is consistently improving our speed of response and capacity to enable.

Russia

What do you believe are appropriate objectives for U.S.-Russia security relations?

The State Department has overall lead for U.S.-Russia security relations, In my current opinion and from a military perspective, the U.S. should support strategic stability efforts that reduce the overall risk of military conflict with Russia. Key to this is a committed, credible and alliance-based deterrent. Additionally, carefully managed and focused military-to-military dialogue, through appropriate and lawful channels, is vital to mitigating the risk of unintended escalation and miscalculation.

In your view, which EUCOM and NATO activities are most important to deterring Russian aggression and mitigating the threat Russia presents to our NATO Allies and partners?

I believe our strategic nuclear deterrent allows us to deter nuclear war. In the conventional domain, our annual military exercises, rotational deployments, and security cooperation activities with our NATO allies and partners improves our deterrence posture and mitigates the Russian threat.

In your view, what are Russia’s strategic goals in the Black Sea and in the Mediterranean?

In broader Europe, including the Mediterranean Sea, Russia seeks to block NATO expansion in order to prevent the spread of Western political and military influence close to its borders. Russia also seeks to degrade the influence of trans-Atlantic institutions. It seeks a defensive buffer region in order to enhance the security of its territory.

Specifically in the Black Sea, Russia intends to legitimize its claim to Crimea, deter Ukraine from asserting its sovereign rights over territorial waters, and secure the Kerch Strait.

The NDS calls out Russia’s robust anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) capabilities and the challenges they pose for U.S. forces.

In your assessment, does the DoD currently have a mature joint concept of operations and the necessary capabilities in sufficient capacity to mitigate the challenge of Russian A2/AD capabilities? If not, what additional capabilities or capacity are required in Europe to ensure U.S. forces are able to achieve operational freedom of maneuver at decisive points?

My current assessment is we have the necessary joint concepts, capabilities and allies to defeat Russian A2/AD capabilities today. We are emphasizing future joint and multi-national concepts and capabilities to retain that overmatch. USEUCOM’s capability and capacity will continue to increase with the addition of permanent and rotational advanced land, sea, and air capabilities and our emphasis on interoperability of U.S. capabilities with our NATO Allies.

Russian tactics in eastern Ukraine have been called “hybrid”—combining hard power with soft power—including lethal security assistance to separatists, the use of special operations forces, extensive information operations and propaganda, withholding energy supplies, and economic pressure.

In your assessment, does DoD currently have sufficient resources to counter Russia’s hybrid warfare operations? If not, what additional capabilities or capacity are required to effectively counter these Russian hybrid operations below the level of military conflict?

DoD has sufficient resources to counter Russian hybrid operations below the level of armed conflict. However, additional information operations capability would

benefit EUCOM in countering Russian's malign influence campaign. If confirmed, I will look very closely at our capabilities and capacity.

How important is it that our campaign to counter Russian hybrid aggression reflect a “Whole of Government” approach? How important is that that the campaign be synchronized with the efforts of our allies and partners?

A successful campaign to counter Russian hybrid aggression demands a comprehensive approach involving allies and partners, the U.S. interagency, and even the private sector. The Joint Force must improve how it integrates and employs its capabilities, how it applies these capabilities more effectively, and how it empowers our allies and partners in the process. This requires a multi-domain effort, to include in law enforcement, intelligence, diplomacy, development, finance, stabilization, and security. Russia's hybrid warfare operations are multilayered and sophisticated. Whole of government synchronization enables us to develop tailored strategies that capitalize on the strengths of each agency while minimizing weaknesses and gaps. If confirmed, I look forward to having the discussions with the committee about the requirements to ensure a whole of government approach moving forward.

In FY 2019, for the first time in its existence, DoD's Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative will be used to provide lethal assistance to Ukraine.

In your assessment, should a greater proportion of Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative funding be dedicated to lethal assistance? What are the obstacles, if any, to providing increased lethal assistance?

I believe we currently have a good balance of lethal and non-lethal assistance for Ukraine now. Before we determine if we need to make further adjustments, we need to observe how Ukraine puts the capabilities we are providing to use and assess its ability to absorb and employ additional lethal assistance and equipment.

There is one change that I think is worth considering. One of our biggest challenges is that Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) funds have a one-year life span, meaning we have to obligate them before the end of the fiscal year in which they are appropriated. Technology release processes, contracting, and procurement timelines limit DoD's ability to provide Ukraine more advanced defensive lethal capabilities through USAI. While DoD is currently able to address most of Ukraine's priority operational needs through USAI, the ability to execute USAI funds over a two-year period could allow DoD to support more complex capabilities such as defensive lethal systems in the maritime domain.

If confirmed, what specifically would you do to incentivize Ukraine to expedite its progress toward defense reform?

Ukraine has made strides on reforming their Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces but work remains to be done. If confirmed, I will emphasize to the Ukrainian Chief of the General Staff my belief that the adoption of NATO standards will bolster Ukraine's ability to defend its territorial integrity and advance its membership aspirations.

To incentivize Ukraine, I would encourage their military to strive towards these critical defense reform standards to ensure they remain eligible for Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative funds.

Turkey

If Turkey accepts delivery of the Russian S-400 air and missile defense system, do you believe the United States should continue with plans to transfer F-35 aircraft to Turkey?

No. If confirmed, my recommendation would be to discontinue the transfer of F-35 aircraft to Turkey and unwind Turkey from the F-35 program if Turkey accepts delivery of the S-400. The S-400 is a Russian system built to shoot down aircraft like the F-35. If we allowed Turkey to receive and operate F-35s in close continuous proximity to the S-400, the S-400 radar system could provide the Russian military sensitive information on the F-35. The United States must remain committed to the long-term security of the program.

NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR)

KFOR includes approximately 650 U.S. service members.

In your assessment, is there a continuing role for KFOR in maintaining security and stability in Western Balkans?

There is a role for KFOR in maintaining security and stability in the Western Balkans. KFOR has proven essential to stability in the region. Recent events, to include the stalled European Union-led Kosovo-Serbia normalization dialogue, reinforce the necessity of KFOR as an impartial guarantor for a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement in Kosovo. Terminating KFOR's mission

in the near term would remove this key stabilizer in the Western Balkans. However, if confirmed, I will closely review the need to sustain this mission.

Do you believe the United States should maintain its commitment to KFOR?

The U.S. commitment to KFOR supports stability in Europe and increases deterrence against malign Russian influence in the Western Balkans. If confirmed, I will closely monitor conditions in the Balkans to determine if continued support to KFOR is in U.S. interests.

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDO-PACOM) and China

China

The 2018 NDS identifies China as a “strategic competitor” and describes China as pursuing a military modernization program that “seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future.”

Is the current posture of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific region sufficient to support the NDS? Please explain your answer.

Yes. My assessment is the current U.S. force posture in the Indo-Pacific region is sufficient to deter aggression, maintain peace and security, ensure a rules based international order, and enable our ability to rapidly respond to regional contingencies and crises. However, as the regional security landscape evolves and strategic competition with great powers intensifies, we must remain flexible in our ability to shape and realign our force posture in the Indo-Pacific, so that we can effectively and efficiently meet these challenges.

In your assessment, what are the priority investments DoD could make that would implement the NDS and improve the military balance in the Indo-Pacific?

The 2018 NDS highlights the return to great power competition with China. Investments in advanced technologies such as hypersonics, Artificial Intelligence, and robotics will be key to ensuring the U.S. maintains our competitive advantage versus China.

What are the key areas in which each Military Service must improve to provide the necessary capabilities and capacity to the Joint Force to prevail in a potential conflict with China?

The Joint Staff is creating a 2030 Joint concept of operations that builds upon

emerging concepts of each Service to address these challenges. The Joint Staff is working with Service futures offices to integrate and deconflict overlapping concepts into a joint concept-driven, threat-informed 2030 concept of operations to underpin Joint Force Design and Development. If confirmed, I intend to work with the Service Chiefs to continue these efforts and will keep the committee apprised of the efforts.

What is your view of the purpose and relative importance of sustained U.S. military-to-military relations with China?

One of the most far-reaching objectives of the National Defense Strategy is to set the military relationship between the U.S. and China on a long-term path of transparency and non-aggression. Our military-to-military relationship is centered on reducing risk and preventing/managing crises. Our sustained military-to-military engagements are designed to continue to encourage China to maintain regional peace and stability and support the rules-based international order instead of undermining it. When China and the PLA operate in a manner consistent with international norms and standards, the risk of miscalculation and misunderstanding is reduced. With this in mind, bilateral military engagements with China which include high-level visits, policy dialogues, and functional exchanges are centered on reinforcing the procedures necessary to reduce risk and prevent and manage crises.

Should the United States revisit or change its “one China” policy, in your view?

My current opinion is the United States should not change its “One China” policy. The One China Policy is based on the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and three U.S.-China Joint Communiques. The United States and Taipei maintain a substantive and robust unofficial relationship with Taiwan based on the Taiwan Relations Act. Taiwan's values reflect our own. It features an open economy with a free and democratic society that respects human rights and the rule of law.

China has embarked on a massive shipbuilding program. By 2030, China will have almost 100 more ships than the U.S. Navy; China will possess more major surface combatants and more attack submarines, most of which will be newer and more capable. And while all of China’s Navy will be focused on the Indo-Pacific, the United States maintains only about 60 percent of its fleet in the Pacific.

How should U.S. joint concepts of operations, force posture, and investments adapt to counter this shifting maritime balance in the Indo-Pacific, in your view?

In order to counter the shifting maritime balance in the Indo-Pacific, the Joint Force will continue to develop all-domain solutions that expand our advanced capabilities beyond the maritime environment to include new joint capabilities in

Space, Cyberspace, Air, electromagnetic spectrum, and Land, all working in unison. Our concepts must also incorporate asymmetric and irregular approaches that create dilemmas for adversaries on a global scale. We will prioritize the ability to exploit subsurface advantages and, when required, use standoff air and surface long range fires to hold surface combatants at risk. Working with our allies and partners, we will ensure freedom of navigation in peacetime and freedom of action in crises.

What should the United States do, both unilaterally, and in coordination with allies and partners, to counter the increasing challenge posed by China in the South China and East China Seas?

To counter the challenge posed by China, the United States must continue to participate in developing the economies, governance, and security of partners and allies in the region. In turn, as part of the whole of government effort, the Joint Force continues to support and develop the capabilities and capacity of our allies and partners through foreign military sales, exercises, and military exchanges. Further, the Joint Force supports the U.S. policy through continued modernization, operations, exercises, and engagements across the region.

What is your current assessment of the risk of a critical logistics failure in any conflict with China?

Any conflict with China poses formidable challenges to the joint logistics enterprise. Joint Force leadership understands that a critical logistics failure could lead to the failure of the United States to achieve its national security objectives and they are actively working to mitigate this risk. If confirmed, I will continue our Department's efforts to ensure that logistics challenges inherent to any conflict with China are addressed in the planning, programing, budgeting, and execution processes.

What is your assessment of China's increasing military presence overseas, including its base in Djibouti and other infrastructure projects across the Indian Ocean?

China is a strategic competitor that uses economic and security outreach in return for access to Africa's strategic locations, natural resources, and markets. Over the past decade, China has injected considerable financing into the African continent, including offering key loans to strategically located countries to include Djibouti. Chinese interests include expanded access to Africa's mineral and other natural resources, opening markets, and naval ports. Djibouti's increasing partnership with China across defense, trade, and financial sectors encroaches on and, at times, diminishes U.S. access and influence. Additionally, China's first overseas naval base in Djibouti poses challenges for all international partners.

The ability of U.S. ground forces to hold at risk adversary ships and aircraft; intercept missiles aimed at our ships, airfields, ports and other fixed facilities; and provide electronic warfare and communications support for our air and naval forces could enable the United States to present adversaries with our own “anti-access/area denial” (A2AD) challenge.

What should be the role of ground forces in creating an A2AD challenge for adversaries within the First Island Chain in the Indo-Pacific? What specifically should be the role of the Army?

Multi-Domain Operations require ground forces to enable the Joint Force’s penetration and dis-integration of adversary A2/AD systems. The Army has, and should continue to maintain critical roles in intelligence, cyber, space, electromagnetic warfare, long range fires, protection, vertical lift, and air and missile defense to help the Joint Force defeat adversary standoff.

Do you believe the current ground force posture in INDOPACOM is adequate? If not, what would you recommend to bolster it?

Yes. I believe our current ground force posture in the Indo-Pacific is sufficient to deter aggression, maintain peace and security, ensure a rules based international order, and enable our ability to rapidly respond to regional contingencies and crises. However, as the regional security landscape evolves and strategic competition intensifies, we must remain flexible in our ability to shape and realign our force posture in the Indo-Pacific, so that we can effectively and efficiently meet these challenges.

Do you support the Defense Posture Realignment Initiative (DPRI), including the realignment of some U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam and the build-up of facilities at other locations, such as Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan?

I understand that recent engagements among the Congress, the Department of Defense, the Department of the Navy, the Joint Staff, and USINDOPACOM highlighted some legitimate concerns regarding resilient basing, training areas, mobility, and other requirements that may warrant revision of the DPRI program of record. If confirmed, I will take a hard look at this topic and, if required, provide my recommendation for any changes to the program of record.

The Korean Peninsula

How would you describe the value to U.S. national security interests of the U.S. South Korea alliance?

For nearly 70 years, the U.S.-ROK alliance has been a core pillar of the U.S. national security architecture in Northeast Asia. The alliance has successfully deterred the North Korean threat since 1953, and plays an integral role in managing potential tensions in the region between South Korea, Japan, and China. The U.S.-ROK Alliance has also strengthened our collective security, economic ties, and societal relationships..

Do you believe the transfer of wartime operational control from the U.S. to the Republic of Korea should be conditions-based? If so, and if confirmed, what conditions would you recommend that the Secretary of Defense delineate as the threshold for transfer of control?

Yes, the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) should be condition-based. The U.S. and the ROK already have a plan in place that serves as the roadmap for OPCON transition. This conditioned-based plan ensures that prior to official transfer, the ROK has the required capabilities and that the security environment is also conducive for the ROK to assume the lead of the U.S.-ROK combined command.

In your assessment, what is the value of combined joint exercises for maintaining the readiness of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula?

The Department's combined joint exercises are an invaluable tool for increasing the readiness of Joint Forces on the Korean Peninsula. These exercises provide regular opportunities for the permanent party (1-2 year rotation), rotational (9 months), and supporting forces to hone their skills, maintain critical relationships and interoperability with our partners and allies. By exercising essential warfighting functions, the exercises promote mission success and protect American citizens living in Korea.

In your view, are there additional steps that DoD could take to improve U.S. and allied defenses against North Korea's missile capabilities?

Yes. Although I am confident we remain postured to detect and respond to a

North Korean missile threat, there are areas where we could improve our capabilities. The Missile Defense Agency continues to improve regional integration and advancement of allied missile defense capabilities, such as the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force Aegis. Additionally, the Department of Defense is adapting existing and emerging capabilities, such as integrating the F-35 Lightning II sensor systems into missile defense.

DoD policy constraining the use of certain cluster munitions went into effect on December 31, 2018. How will these constraints affect the ability of the U.S. military to meet requirements on the Korean peninsula?

The DoD Policy on Cluster Munitions (dated November 30, 2017) mitigates constraints placed on cluster munitions by retaining those currently in the U.S. inventory until we replace this capability with enhanced and more reliable munitions. Until that time, military planners may plan for the availability of cluster munitions to meet military objectives. The military also has the ability to still employ cluster munitions that do not meet the revised standards with the approval of the Combatant Commander.

India

What would be your strategy, if confirmed, for bolstering the overall defense relationship between the United States and India? What specific priorities would you establish for this relationship?

If confirmed, my strategy would be to continue to bolster and maintain continuity of the defense relationship with India through our existing bilateral military-to-military dialogues as well as participation in senior level meetings such as the 2+2 Ministerial. Specifically, I will prioritize increasing our interoperability and information-sharing capabilities with the Indian Armed Forces.

U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)

What threat, if any, do Russian and Chinese activities in the Arctic pose to U.S. interests?

In the Arctic, Russia is deploying surface vessels armed with land attack cruise missiles, and coastal defense cruise missiles that increase its ability to control a large stretch of the Northern Sea route and potentially strike the United States and Canada. China is less active in the Arctic, but it has taken actions to increase their naval and commercial presence in the region in order to gain access to shipping routes.

U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)

If confirmed, what recommendations would you make to the President and Secretary of Defense to deter Russian, Cuban, and Chinese influence in the SOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility?

The best way to deter Russian, Cuban, and Chinese influence in the SOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility is to maintain an active presence in the region. If confirmed, I would stress continuity and stability in military-to-military relationships. Additionally, I would advocate for continued engagement with our partners through traditional security cooperation tools such as personnel exchanges, exercises, and approved Foreign Military Sales. Finally, International Military Education and Training (IMET) is a proven program for demonstrating maintaining military-to-military relations. Foreign graduates from our Professional Military Education system often become senior defense leaders in their respective countries and maintain close ties to the U.S. Military.

Do you believe that these influences threaten hemispheric security and prosperity? Please explain your answer.

Russia and Cuba are destabilizing influences in the Western Hemisphere. They support regimes unfriendly to the United States.

China is the top trading partner for many countries in the region. However, China's influence presents security challenges because of the access Chinese infrastructure investments provide to strategic locations. These investments, paired with Chinese debt diplomacy, can undermine U.S. regional interests.

Detainee Treatment and Guantanamo Bay Naval Station

Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in Army Field Manual 2-22.3, *Human Intelligence Collector Operations*, issued in September 2006 and DoD Directive 2310.01E, *Department of Defense Detainee Program*, dated August 19, 2014, and required by Section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92)? If confirmed, how would you ensure that DoD detainee operations and interrogations comply strictly with these standards?

Yes. If confirmed, I will do my duty to ensure that all DoD policies and plans related to intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field Manual on Interrogations.

What are your views on the continued use of the detention facility at Guantanamo?

The detention facility at Guantanamo is DoD's only long-term law of war detention facility. The continued use of this facility is ultimately a policy decision; however, I believe we need a long-term facility for detainees who pose a continuing threat.

Cuba

Under what conditions would you recommend the establishment of military-to-military engagement between the United States and Cuba?

Cuba must demonstrate real reforms before we develop a military-to-military relationship based on our current policies with respect to the Cuban regime. The Cuban regime continues to suppress the Cuban people's freedoms and expound non-democratic ideals throughout the country.

Venezuela

What is your assessment of the current situation in Venezuela?

The Venezuelan crisis continues to worsen under the Maduro regime due to their authoritarian practices and failed economic policies. I assess that until the regime reforms, there is a compromise with the Interim President Guaido, or Maduro is separated from power, the crisis will remain at a high state of tension. We will likely continue to see significant refugee flows straining the region. The U.S. and its partners continue to apply diplomatic and economic pressure to the regime, and support Interim President Guaido's pursuit for a peaceful democratic transition.

To what degree is the illegitimate *Maduro* regime dependent on support from external actors like Russia, Cuba, and China?

The Maduro regime likely cannot sustain power without the assistance of foreign actors. Cuban advisors support Venezuela's intelligence services and numerous other government ministries, institutions, and state-run companies. Cuba provides hundreds of doctors, engineers, and teachers in exchange for oil. Russia provides military advisers and technicians and also supplies economic and humanitarian support. China has made several deliveries of various types of aid to help stabilize the regime.

What would be the threshold condition at which you would recommend U.S. military action in Venezuela, if confirmed??

It is difficult to provide a hypothetical threshold condition that would trigger military action. If confirmed, I would consider all security conditions at that time and give my best military advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense.

The U.S. and our partners continue to encourage a negotiated settlement. Ideally, the settlement results in a peaceful transition and the holding of free and fair elections.

U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM)

The United States is increasingly dependent on space, both economically and militarily—from the Global Positioning System on which many industrial and military capabilities rely, to the missile warning systems that underpin U.S. nuclear deterrence. Our great power competitors—China and Russia—are engaged in a concerted effort to leap ahead of U.S. technology and impact U.S. freedom of action in the space warfighting domain.

In your view, does the 2018 NDS accurately assess the strategic environment as it pertains to the domain of space?

Yes, the NDS's assessment of the increased competition in the space domain is accurate. As we experience the re-emergence of great power competition vis-a-vis Russia and China, our historic overmatch in space has eroded over time. We must no longer treat space as a sanctuary, and we must be prepared to defend our critical space sensors and increase the overall resilience of our space assets.

In your view, what will “great power competition” look like in space and to what extent do you view China's and Russia’s activities related to the space domain as a threat or challenge to U.S. national security interests?

Over the past two decades Russia and China have continued to improve their space weapons capabilities and enacted military reforms to better integrate space, cyberspace, and electronic warfare into both offensive and defensive military operations. Per the Defense Intelligence Agency's "Challenges to Security in Space Report," both Russia and China have potential counter-space assets on the ground and in orbit today. These capabilities will continue to be developed, exercised, and integrated into war plans. Because of these increased capabilities, our need to protect sensors and improve the resilience of our space-based capabilities will increase.

How would you assess current DoD readiness to implement the 2018 NDS and U.S. strategic objectives as they relate to the domain of space?

DoD is taking significant steps to implement our NDS and national objectives in space. The Senate confirmed Gen Jay Raymond as Commander of U.S. Space Command, where he will lead a joint command singularly focused on space as a warfighting domain. This new command will work to sustain our advantages in space, engage with allies and partners, and ensure that space remains a free and open domain.

The Senate version of the FY 2020 NDAA includes a provision directing the creation of a U.S. Space Force that is focused on warfighting in the space domain and charged to transform historically late-to-need processes for developing, procuring, and fielding space warfighting capabilities, without creating an extensive and unreasonably expensive new bureaucracy.

What is your assessment of the Senate’s “Space Force” legislation?

The SASC legislation puts us on the right track. Despite whatever final details emerge from the National Defense Authorization Act, the key is that we continue to drive towards a Space Force that delivers trained space warriors and capabilities to maintain U.S. advantages in space.

What is your view of the importance of including the Reserve Components as a part of the U.S. Space Force and as contributors to Joint Force space operations and activities?

The Reserve Components are integral to our space operations and activities today and will continue to be so in the future. Every day, a dozen Army and Air Force National Guard and Reserve units deliver critical space capabilities to the Joint Force, providing much-needed continuity of operations as they team up with active duty units. This role will only grow as the Space Force matures.

What is your view of the necessity of including the Commander, U.S. Space Force—first as an advisor to, and ultimately as a member of—the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

The leader of the U.S. Space Force will serve as the JCS expert on and advocate for space power. Space Force should have an independent role in appropriate DoD corporate processes to give space equal footing with other Service Chiefs advocating for domain-centric priorities.

The Presidential memorandum of December 18, 2018, directed the establishment of SPACECOM as a Unified Combatant Command, with responsibility for Joint Force space operations. The Commander, SPACECOM is responsible for the planning and execution of global space operations, missions, and activities in the space domain, the terrestrial domain, or through the electromagnetic spectrum; providing space-related support to other combatant commands and their operational plans; and the defense of space assets.

If confirmed, what would you expect of the Commander, SPACECOM as regards his role in leading Joint Force operations and activities in the space warfighting domain?

I expect Commander, USSPACECOM, to lead his new command to full operational capability. He will continue to transform the mindset of the Joint Force from one that views space operations as a purely support function to a recognition that space is a warfighting domain in which we must defend our nation's capabilities. He will integrate with our allies and partners and be the commander for military space operational matters to the U.S government and commercial entities. He will closely integrate with other space organizations such as the National Reconnaissance Office.

If confirmed, what would you expect of the Commander, SPACECOM as regards his role as Joint Force provider for space?

Although this is currently not one of Commander, U.S. Space Command's assigned functions within the Unified Command Plan, I fully expect USSPACECOM will soon fill the role of providing Joint trained space capabilities to the Combatant Commands. Ultimately I expect Space Force, once stood up, could fill this role.

Should there be a conflict in space or a related domain, what are your views on the importance of unity of command as compared to unity of effort between DoD and Intelligence Community assets, both in space on the ground?

The DoD and Intelligence Community each have distinct responsibilities and authorities in space. When it comes to protecting and defending our space capabilities, however, the two organizations must be in lock-step. Joint Task Force – Space Defense, a critical function within the new USSPACECOM, is an integrated DoD, NRO, and IC organization. It will serve as the mechanism to provide not only unity of effort for DoD and IC assets in defense of our on orbit assets, but to serve as a single command charged with the preservation of critical national capabilities with both military and civil objectives while taking advantage of DoD and IC unique authorities.

In your view, how could SPACECOM exploit commercial and other less expensive launch options to allow for more rapid replenishment and on-orbit employment of vital warfighting systems, while minimizing the risk of mission failure?

Operationally responsive replenishment capability is a priority for the Department. The rapid growth of commercial space in cheaper launch and proliferated satellite constellations is very promising. DARPA, the U.S. Air Force, and a number of defense organizations, are working to take advantage of the opportunities we see in the commercial market. My goal is to work with the Service Chiefs to ensure that warfighter requirements are met, regardless of the solution.

U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM)

In May 2018, the Cyber Mission Force achieved full operational capability. In September, DoD released its 2018 Cyber Strategy. The Strategy charges DoD to “defend forward, shape the day-to-day competition, and prepare for war” to compete, deter, and win in the cyber domain.

What do you envision as the role of DoD and the Cyber Mission Force in defending the Nation from an attack in cyberspace? In what ways is this role distinct from those of the homeland security and law enforcement communities?

When directed by the President or requested by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the DoD is prepared to assist DHS in the event of a significant cyber incident that exceeds their incident response capacity. The distinction in roles is that DHS and the law enforcement community operate under authorities that are domestically aligned, while DoD's focus is foreign state and non-state actors that threaten the interests of the United States.

How will operationalization of the “defend forward, shape the day-to-day competition, and prepare for war” concepts deter and disrupt Russia and China’s aggression in cyberspace?

Strategic competitors such as Russia and China are conducting persistent malicious cyber campaigns to erode U.S. military advantages, threaten our infrastructure, and reduce our economic prosperity. We are taking the initiative to deny, disrupt, degrade, and expose these malicious cyber activities which threaten the Department, U.S. interests, and the American people. This initiative includes collaboration with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, private industry, and international allies and partners to "defend forward" by preemptively responding to and disrupting these threats well before these activities reach their intended targets and cause harm. The operationalization of these concepts enable the Department to compete, deter, and win in the cyber domain.

Is it feasible, in your view, for DoD to operate in cyberspace below the level of armed conflict?

Operating in cyberspace below the level of armed conflict is both feasible and necessary. We need to compete daily by persistently engaging and defending forward to disrupt, deter, and deny malicious cyber activity. These operations range from intelligence collection and preparation to strengthening the security and resilience of our networks. The DoD can focus these efforts on adversaries that pose strategic threats to U.S. security and prosperity, while collaborating with our interagency, industry, and international partners.

What role should DoD and the Cyber Mission Force occupy in anticipating, preventing, or responding to attacks on commercial entities?

Through a series of partnerships with DHS and sector-specific agencies such as the financial and energy sectors, DoD should provide expertise and experience needed to support our critical infrastructure partners' efforts to anticipate, prevent, and respond to significant cyber incidents. Examples of this support include sharing of threat information and collaborative analysis of vulnerabilities and threats. Partnerships like these are expanding to other critical sectors where the DoD and the private/commercial entities have mutual equities.

What is your view as to whether the “dual hatting” of the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command as the Director of the National Security Agency should be maintained or terminated? Please explain your answer.

From my current viewpoint as Chief of Staff of the Army, the current “dual hat” configuration between U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency is working well and should be maintained. I understand that, if confirmed, my certification and that of the Secretary is required before the current dual-hat leadership arrangement can be terminated. If confirmed I will give this issue careful personal attention and provide my best military advice.

Russia has conducted ambitious and aggressive cyber-enabled information operations against the United States and our European allies aimed at influencing election outcomes, and undermining democracy and collective security. Since the attack on America’s 2016 election, the U.S. election systems and networks have been designated as critical infrastructure.

What role should DoD and the Cyber Mission Force occupy in combating foreign influence operations, particularly those conducted via cyberspace and social media??

We must take an active role within the bounds of U.S. Law, and any effort should be centered on consistent engagement with our Allies and partners. Currently, we are involved in a daily competition alongside our Allies and partners in Central America, Europe, the Pacific, and the Middle East to name a few regions. Our ability to reinforce them, and demonstrate in meaningful ways, our continued commitment to ensuring their safety and security is critical to our ability to defend forward. The DoD and the Cyber Mission Force represent key agencies for coordinating active and unified defenses of networks and our populations. Unique capabilities include: the global network of military-to-military partnerships, capacity for intelligence gathering and analysis, and the ability to plan and operate in a coalition environment.

In your view, should DoD better integrate its capabilities and planning for cyber operations and information warfare?

Yes. However, the first Line of Effort of the 2018 DoD Cyber Strategy is to empower timely integrated cyber operations. Objectives of this Line of Effort include establishing efficient and effective cyberspace processes; improving cyber mission force readiness to conduct full spectrum cyberspace operations; normalizing cyberspace operations across the Joint Force; and normalizing cyberspace operations and cyber mission force role in the defense support to civil authorities process.

Does DoD have sufficient authorities and resources to conduct such operations effectively? If not, what additional authorities and resources would you request, if confirmed?

Yes. DoD has an authorities framework that is scalable, and repeatable for integrating with whole of government cyber operations. However, if confirmed, I will work with the critical stakeholders to ensure DoD's processes are streamlined to enable operations and coordinate as required. If confirmed, I will make recommendations to the Secretary regarding force structure vs the strategic environment, acknowledging both budgetary considerations and increased threats borne in and through cyberspace.

The Air Force announced that in the summer of 2019, Air Combat Command would merge the Twenty Fourth and Twenty Fifth Numbered Air Forces, better to integrate cyber effects, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations, electronic warfare operations, and information operations.

In your view, are there other DoD component commands and organizations that should be merged similarly to increase unity of effort across such capabilities? Please explain your answer.

If confirmed, continuity will be a priority initially, but I will look across the DoD component commands and organizations and make recommendations to the Secretary to maximize unity of command and unity of effort as much as is practicable.

In 2015, Russian hackers gained access to the Joint Staff’s unclassified email system through a spearfishing attack; the email system was taken off-line for several weeks while hardware and software were replaced. In March 2019, the Secretary of the Navy’s *Cyber Readiness Review* presented a scathing assessment of the Department of the Navy’s approach to cybersecurity and hi-lighted the urgent need for the Navy to modify its business and data hygiene processes to protect data as a resource.

In your view, would the Joint Staff benefit from a “Cyber Readiness Review” similar to that of the Navy? Please explain your answer.

Yes. Readiness reviews, are in general, worthwhile and helpful in discovering discrepancies. If confirmed, I will look deeper into the necessity and timing of a cyber-protection readiness review for the Joint Staff.

The review conducted by the Navy in March of 2019 appropriately follows the Department of Defense 2018 Cyber Posture Review (CPR) submitted to Congress in August 2018. These reviews are very similar in intent, purpose, and findings. The Joint Staff was an equal partner with OSD in the formulation of the CPR and was able to account for the challenges the Joint Force must contend with in the cyber domain. If confirmed, I will ensure the Joint Staff remains decisively engaged in the implementation of the 2018 DoD Cyber Strategy, formulated specifically to address the gaps highlighted in the CPR.

If confirmed, specifically what measures would you take or direct to improve the cybersecurity culture across Joint Staff—military, civilian, and contractor? How would you empower and hold key leaders accountable for achieving and sustaining improvements in Joint Staff cybersecurity?

If confirmed, I would direct continued annual cybersecurity awareness training of all Joint Staff personnel (Military, Government Civilian and Contractors). Also, I will direct cybersecurity workforce improvement through cybersecurity professional certification and continuing education. A Commander’s Critical Information Report will be required for any breach and a monthly report on cyber protection status is also required. I will hold my key leaders accountable through the annual Federal Information System Modernization Act (FISMA) report to Congress which includes cybersecurity role-based tracking of all Military, Government Civilian, and Contractor personnel cybersecurity training and qualifications.

U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM)

*Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
(ASD(SOLIC))*

Section 922 of the FY 2017 NDAA empowered the ASD(SOLIC) to serve as the “service secretary-like” civilian official with responsibility for the oversight of and advocacy for special operations forces. Among other reforms, the law defined the administrative chain of command for U.S.SOCOM as running through the ASD(SOLIC) to the Secretary of Defense for issues impacting the readiness and organization of special operations forces, special operations-peculiar resources and equipment, and civilian personnel management.

If confirmed, how would you work with the ASD(SOLIC) to rationalize your respective responsibilities with regard to SOCOM?

In my current role I have observed the interactions of SOCOM and ASD(SOLIC) with the Services and the Secretary of Defense, and I think the organizational construct works well for their mission. If confirmed, I will coordinate closely with ASD(SOLIC) and SOCOM, just as I would with the Services and Combatant Commands.

Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs)

What is your view of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy and the role of the DoD in supporting that strategy?

In my view, the National Strategy for Counter Terrorism provides a holistic, whole of government approach to countering violent extremist organizations (VEOs). The DoD is involved in several lines of effort of the strategy, including a leading role in strengthening the counterterrorism abilities of international partners.

How would you assess the effectiveness of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy in addressing the threat posed by VEOs?

The recently published National Strategy for Counter Terrorism will likely take time to realize results. Given the long term horizon to counter violent extremism, the Department will measure effectiveness based on trends associated with the strategic objectives. For example, we continue to be successful diminishing the capacity of terrorists to directly attack the homeland. However, we struggle as an interagency to effectively diminish radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization of some organizations. If confirmed, I'll work with the interagency to routinely assess our progress and identify areas for adaptation of the strategy to address violent extremist threats.

What changes, if any, would you recommend to the strategy or associated measures of effectiveness? Should efforts to prevent the underlying causes of extremism be a component of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy?

Yes we should include the underlying causes of extremism in our CT strategy. Adjusting our approach, even in small amounts, will take time to manifest itself into tangible results, especially if we are looking to move to a greater balance between kinetic and non-kinetic means. If confirmed, I will work with the many joint stakeholders to monitor our MOEs against our strategy to ensure we are working towards a desired end state with the understanding that progress will require strategic patience. To articulate the effect appropriately, we should ensure that we better differentiate violent extremist organizations which pose a direct threat to our interests and those which are more local insurgencies with limited or no interest in directly targeting U.S. interests.

What is your assessment of the threat posed by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Al Shabab, and other VEOs, to U.S. interests in the regions in which each is active, to the U.S. homeland, and western interests, more broadly? Which group, in your view, presents the greatest threat to the United States?

ISIS, Al Qaeda, and their global networks retain the strategic intent to target the U.S. homeland, our allies and partners and regional U.S. interests. Persistent counterterrorism pressure has degraded these groups' capabilities to target the homeland, although most retain the capability for regional attacks. These groups will exploit regional instability and any decrease in pressure to rebuild their external operations capabilities and plot attacks.

ISIS's territorial and personnel losses have diminished the group's ability to direct attacks in the U.S. homeland. ISIS, however, will continue to facilitate attacks worldwide, encouraging its networks, branches, and supporters to conduct attacks against U.S. interests.

AQAP has a history of plotting sophisticated attacks against the U.S. homeland. Since the initiation of the Huthi conflict in Yemen, however, AQAP has prioritized its insurgency efforts in Yemen. Counterterrorism action over the last several years has also removed several key attack plotters.

Al-Shabaab poses a high threat to U.S. and regional interests in East Africa, most recently demonstrated by its January attack against a hotel in Nairobi, Kenya, which killed 21 civilians including an American citizen. Al-Shabaab has neither the near-term intent, nor the capability to target the U.S. homeland.

Despite suffering significant personnel and territorial losses, ISIS remains the greatest potential threat to the U.S. homeland. ISIS retains a cadre of technical

experts and battle-tested commanders whom the group could use to advance future plots.

If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to promote a “more resource sustainable” approach to counterterrorism, as directed by the 2018 NDS?

If confirmed, I would support the ongoing evaluation of DoD's counter-terrorism campaigns in USAFRICOM, USCENTCOM and elsewhere to optimize resources and personnel and achieve a more resource-sustainable approach. For instance, in USAFRICOM, this approach has included prioritizing U.S. national interests with a focus toward security cooperation programs, strengthening partner networks and reinforcing their operations to counter VEOs which in turn reduces our required posture in the region. USSOCOM is in the process developing a future global counter violent extremist (C-VEO) posture and operating concept which is sustainable, integrated with the interagency, partner supported and based around a globally connected means of information sharing. Additionally, this Force Optimization will enable more effective operations to defeat trans-regional threat networks. Additionally, if confirmed, I will advocate for continued and improved collaboration and integration with DoD, interagency, and our multinational allies and partners to maximize the use of command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence technologies.

How would you endeavor to manage risk under this “more resource sustainable” approach to counterterrorism?

Terrorism is a long-term challenge that we will face for the foreseeable future. While we may need to defeat particular terror groups, such as ISIS in Syria and Iraq, we will more often seek to disrupt terror groups' operations and contain their reach rather than defeating them decisively. We have made tremendous strides in our ability to detect and disrupt terrorists in the information space and this will further improve as we leverage machine-learning and artificial intelligence. We will continue to build on this success through improved information sharing with interagency and international partners and emphasizing a burden-sharing approach in which we work together with partners. Finally, we expect other countries to increase their role in counterterrorism efforts in those regions where their interests are held at greater risk.

Section 127e of title 10, U.S. Code, authorizes U.S. special operations forces to provide support (including training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations for the purpose of combatting terrorism. Section 1202 of the NDAA for FY 2018 authorizes U.S. special operations forces to provide similar support to forces or individuals supporting or facilitating irregular warfare operations.

What is your assessment of the national security utility of each of these authorities in the current strategic environment?

I see both authorities maintaining their utility for the foreseeable future. As the Department prioritizes great power competition over counterterrorism, Section 1202 authority could be extended and expanded.

Section 127e authority is a key tool that Combatant Commanders have repeatedly confirmed as essential to combating terrorism in their areas of responsibility. It is an efficient mechanism to increase burden sharing by our foreign partners and keep them on the front lines of the counterterrorism fight. It also provides DoD access to areas, people, and information that are denied to our forces but critical to tactical and strategic success.

Section 1202 authority also funds indirect action but can be applied against non-terrorist threats, including state actors. It is a highly useful tool for enabling irregular warfare operations in support of the NDS's emphasis on expanding the competitive space to deter and defeat coercion and aggression by revisionist powers and rogue regimes.

If confirmed, what criteria would you apply to the evaluation of proposals for the use of each of these authorities, with a view to mitigating the risks associated with the conduct of counterterrorism and irregular warfare activities below the level of traditional armed conflict?

Section 127e authority, or its predecessor Section 1208, has existed since 2005, and over the years, the Department has developed effective criteria to ensure foreign forces do not conduct escalatory or inappropriate actions. Section 1202, while modeled after the successful Section 127e authority, requires a careful assessment of benefits versus risk with respect to competition against adversaries below the level of armed conflict. Both programs involve comprehensive selection, screening, and vetting procedures for partner forces to ensure compliance with the laws of armed conflict. If confirmed, I will continue the high degree of scrutiny and oversight, in conjunction with the Department, to ensure these programs advance our aims while reducing risk of compromise or escalation.

U.S. Strategic Command

Nuclear Policy

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reaffirmed long-held American doctrine that includes limiting the use of nuclear weapons to “extreme circumstances” and the need to maintain the nation’s nuclear triad of land-, sea-, and air-based capabilities. The NPR also recommended the development of a low-yield nuclear weapon to deter threats from Russia, and potentially, the return of a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile to the Navy fleet.

How does the 2018 NPR fit within the framework of the 2018 NDS, in your view?

Both the 2018 NPR and 2018 NDS emphasize the challenge posed by the return of long-term strategic competition among great powers. The 2018 NPR fits within the framework of the 2018 NDS by clearly articulating the roles of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense strategy, our strategy for fulfilling those roles, and the capabilities required to enable our strategy.

Do you support changes to U.S. nuclear force structure recommended by the 2018 NPR?

Yes, I believe the NPR-recommended force structure changes, including the Low Yield Ballistic Missile warhead for the Trident D5 sea-launched ballistic missile and the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile, are necessary to enable our flexible and tailored deterrence strategy as we modernize aging nuclear forces and NC3, and enhance our hedging capability against an uncertain future.

Do you agree that modernizing each leg of the nuclear triad and the Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons complex is a critical national security priority?

Yes, and I think that modernizing the nuclear triad is critical to maintaining the effectiveness of our global nuclear deterrence. Each leg of the nuclear triad plays a unique and important role in the U.S. deterrence posture, and maintaining a robust triad and associated nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) is a critical national security priority. The systems in each leg of the triad are operating well beyond their designed lifetimes and must be replaced without further delay. Similarly, modernizing DOE's nuclear weapons complex, some of which date to the Manhattan Project, is equally critical. Without adequately modernizing DOE's nuclear weapons complex, the United States' ability to remain a nuclear armed state will erode.

Do you believe the current program of record is sufficient to support the full modernization of the nuclear triad, including delivery systems, warheads, and infrastructure?

The program of record, including the modest supplements prescribed by the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, is sufficient to support the full modernization of the nuclear force. Then Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan and General Dunford recently testified that the nuclear mission is the top priority for the DoD, and the funding needed to perform this crucial work is a small fraction of the DoD budget. I agree with that position, and that the cost to sustain the U.S. nuclear force is affordable given the critical mission of deterring our adversaries and assuring our allies.

What are your ideas for working across the Joint Force to mitigate the risk that all three legs of the nuclear triad will “age out” simultaneously at the end of the 2020s?

I agree with the Department of Defense's position that Nuclear modernization remains the number one modernization priority, and I will work closely with the Services, U.S. Strategic Command, and OSD to mitigate the concurrent risks across the three legs of the triad created by previous deferrals of nuclear modernization. I think that accelerating modernization, where possible and fiscally responsible, should be a major component of this mitigation.

Do you support and intend to advocate for the Long Range Stand-Off weapon

Yes, LRSO development and deployment is critical to replace the Air Launched Cruise Missile. The LRSO will address increasing challenges from potential adversaries' modern integrated air defense system and contribute to maintaining an effective air-leg of our nuclear triad.

Do you believe a nuclear “No First Use” policy would be appropriate for the United States? Please explain your answer?

No. In accordance with the NPR, the U.S. should continue its longstanding policy of retaining some degree of ambiguity regarding the precise circumstances that might lead to a U.S. nuclear response. Adoption of NFU could increase the risk of devastating conflict.

In your view, does the Stockpile Stewardship Program provide the tools necessary to ensure the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile without testing? If not, what tools are needed?

Yes, the Stockpile Stewardship Program has developed the computational and experimental tools needed to certify the current stockpile without the need for full-scale nuclear weapons testing. The program relies on state-of-the-art supercomputers, large-scale scientific facilities, and workforce expertise. Continued support for the National Laboratories is crucial for the viability of the Stockpile Stewardship mission.

Do you perceive utility in the work of the Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System? Please explain your answer.

Yes. The Council has utility, but its focus is shifting to a broader national command capability versus its historical Nuclear, Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) focus. Under the NC3 Governance Improvement (NGI) construct, CDR USSTRATCOM leads the NC3 enterprise on a day-to-day basis with support from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment. USSTRATCOM will address NC3 issues through the NC3 Enterprise Review and bring NC3 topics which overlap senior leader communications and Continuity of Operations (COOP) or Continuity of Government (COG) to the Council.

Arms Control

On February 2, 2019, after years of Russian treaty violations, Secretary of State Pompeo announced that the United States would suspend its participation in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, triggering the six-month withdrawal countdown.

How can DoD mitigate any negative consequences associated with withdrawal from the treaty, and reassure NATO allies regarding stability in Europe?

We and our NATO allies agree that unless Russia verifiably destroys all of its SSC-8 missile systems by 2 August 2019, Moscow will bear sole responsibility for the end of the treaty. The decision to withdraw was based in part on the fact that Russia's ongoing and expanding material breach of the treaty was creating untenable consequences for U.S. and allied security. If confirmed, I will work closely with our NATO allies to enhance deterrence and defense in a post-INF environment should Russia fail to adapt full and verifiable compliance. Also, we are focused on closely supporting the alliance's commitment to taking necessary steps that ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the alliance's overall deterrence and defense posture.

The New START entered into force in 2011 and will expire in 2021, but can be extended by up to five years by agreement between the United States and Russia. It covers long-range bombers, ballistic missile submarines, and intercontinental ballistic missiles, but does not cover new Russian strategic-range systems.

Do you believe it to be in the national security interests of the United States to extend the New START Treaty?

If confirmed, continuity is an initial priority. We are still evaluating this calculus in light of many factors, including Russia's pursuit of novel strategic-range nuclear systems not covered by the Treaty. Extending New START is in our interest only if the outcome improves the security of the U.S. and our allies and partners.

Can arms control measures adequately address the threat of Russian tactical nuclear forces not covered by the New START Treaty?

In theory, yes. However, Russia has shown itself to sometimes be an unreliable partner in arms control measures, as displayed by their years-long material breach of the INF treaty. Russia has rejected past U.S. efforts to include nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) in arms control treaties. I also remain concerned that Russian leadership may believe that limited nuclear first use, most likely with NSNW, can provide useful advantage over the U.S. and its allies.

Missile Defense

The United States enjoys a measure of protection against ballistic missile threats from rogue nations like North Korea and Iran, but the threat from Russian and Chinese ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles against U.S. forces, allies, and the U.S. homeland continues to grow. The 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) codified existing policy on missile defense and endorsed follow-on actions to improve U.S. capability.

What are your views on the relationship between missile defense and nuclear deterrence?

Missile defense contributes directly to tailored U.S. deterrence strategies. Missile defenses, in concert with U.S. conventional and nuclear forces, deters attacks against the United States and extends deterrence to our allies. Missile defenses help undermine potential adversaries' confidence, especially non-state or non-peer state actors, in their ability to achieve their intended political or military objectives through missile threats or limited attacks. Nuclear weapons are central to the deterrence of attack from the large and sophisticated nuclear arsenals of Russia and China, which U.S. missile defenses are neither intended to counter, nor capable of countering.

If confirmed as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, what would be your priorities for U.S. missile defense capabilities for the homeland?

The Missile Defense Review sets our priorities for missile defense. The first priority remains protecting the homeland from a rogue state ICBM attack. We will modernize and develop capabilities that enhance protection of the homeland, with the Ground-Based Midcourse-Defense system being the cornerstone for homeland missile defense. The Ground-Based Midcourse-Defense system contributes directly to the U.S. deterrence strategies for rogue state ICBM threats to the homeland and would defend against an ICBM attack.

Do you believe the U.S. ground-based interceptor fleet is appropriately sized to address potential ICBM threats from North Korea or other rogue nations?

Together, the planned increase in the ground-based interceptor fleet and the investment in sensor and interceptor capability appropriately addresses the potential ICBM threats from rogue nations. The ground-based interceptor fleet is one piece of the overall Ground-Based Midcourse-Defense system protecting the homeland. The investment in sensor and interceptor development and modernization complements the planned increase in deployed U.S. ground-based interceptors from 44 to 64.

Is a space-based sensor layer a required “next step” in enabling a wide variety of missile defense capabilities, including improved tracking and targeting of advanced threats?

Space based sensors can monitor, detect, and track missile launches from locations almost anywhere on the globe unimpeded by the constraints that geographic limitations impose on terrestrial sensors. Active U.S. missile defense will require the examination and possible fielding of advanced technologies to provide greater efficiencies for U.S. active missile defense capabilities, to include space based sensors and boost-phase defense capabilities. The exploitation of space provides a missile defense posture that is more effective, resilient and adaptable.

What are your views on the efficacy of boost-phase intercept and space-based intercept programs? Has DoD developed and implemented operational concepts, plans, and policies appropriate to the governance and utilization of such programs? What would you do to address this issue, if confirmed?

I assess that the efficacy of boost-phase intercept and space-based intercept programs is still an open question. While the concepts of boost-phase intercept and space-based intercept have great potential, the Department is exploring how to best resolve the challenges associated with them, as directed by the 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR). It is my understanding that USD R&E will provide an assessment of the cost, feasibility, practicality, and timelines on different architectures and programs; this analysis will be pivotal to whether these solutions are viable. I expect that there will be challenges in creating these programs on the scale to provide robust coverage of threat areas, and if confirmed I will remain involved in operational discussions with senior Department leadership to ensure a thorough examination of these concepts.

In your view, what should be done to improve the protection of deployed U.S. and allied forces from growing missile threats in operational theaters, particularly from advanced cruise missiles?

I think it is an imperative to modernize U.S. regional missile defense systems in order to meet adversary advancements in regional offensive missile systems. The Department of Defense continues to improve sensors' abilities to detect and track low observable cruise missiles and is developing low-cost defense systems to counter attacks by large numbers of unsophisticated cruise missiles. I think that allies and partners will also play an increasingly important role as they acquire interoperable U.S. missile defense systems to reduce their vulnerability while providing opportunities for cooperative burden-sharing and defense collaboration. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the stake holders to support the delivery of improved, interoperable air and missile defense warfighting capabilities to the combatant commanders to counter these threats.

Electronic Warfare and Spectrum Operations

How capable do you believe Russia and China to be in electronic warfare?

The People's Liberation Army's electronic warfare (EW) units are well-resourced, featuring strategic, operational, and tactical EW systems that even surpass some advanced foreign capabilities. PLA EW forces conduct the most extensive training of any EW force worldwide, and are led by officers who have received EW training and are expected to demonstrate proficiency.

Russia has attempted to prioritize modernization and development of EW systems as a critical asymmetric force enabler. Despite this, much of Russia's ground-based equipment still lags behind modern systems. They have been able to test these systems in combat, including operations in Syria, thereby gaining valuable operational experience

Has DoD adequately integrated electronic warfare into its joint concepts and operational plans?

Yes, DoD has adequately integrated electronic warfare (EW) into its joint concepts and operational plans, but there is room for improvement. The Joint Force's new focus on Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations reflects a shift in focus from individual platforms to a broader approach that includes new sensor capabilities, information management, and methods to utilize the Electromagnetic Spectrum as a weapon. Efforts are also underway to better assess the readiness of the Joint Force to operate in spectrally-contested environments.

What major issues attend the United States' conduct of joint electronic warfare operations?

There are several issues that impact the ability of the Joint Force to conduct electronic warfare operations. Rapid capability advancements by peer adversaries could complicate our ability to conduct multi-domain operations in a complex EW environment. Additionally, the Joint Force could improve overall electromagnetic governance, organization, and training. The Department is addressing these challenges through the EW Executive Committee and the congressionally mandated Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Cross Functional Team (EMSO CFT).

Does DoD have adequate simulation capability to experiment with and test joint electronic warfare concepts, in your view?

No. Current simulation capability does not provide the relevant and realistic environment needed to meet joint test, training and experimentation requirements. Multiple studies over the last year have identified these deficiencies and we are working to address the gaps we have in our simulation capability.

Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program

The CTR Program, which has focused historically on accounting for, securing, and eliminating Cold War era weapons of mass destruction and materials in the states of the former Soviet Union, has expanded its focus to other countries. In addition, the CTR Program is widening its focus to biological weapons and capabilities, including biological surveillance and early warning, and encouraging the development of capabilities to reduce proliferation threats.

What are your views on the efficacy of the CTR Program?

The CTR program is a critical and effective effort that contributes to the safety and security of the United States. It is imperative that national governments have capabilities to counter WMD threats as proliferation is a global problem that cannot be resolved by the United States alone. CTR's multi-year funding structure, rapid response capabilities, and authority to work directly with our partners' civilian and military establishments make it a unique tool to meet such emerging threats.

Notwithstanding the use and proliferation of chemical weapons documented recently in Libya and Syria, about 60% of CTR resources are allocated to biological programs.

Do you believe this shift in focus to biological programs accurately reflects the current threat?

Yes. The current focus on biological programs was a function of a surge that had been designed to address specific identified threats to include the need for increased partner detection capabilities and security of sensitive biological facilities. The Department reviews threats on an annual basis and reprioritizes activity when required.

If confirmed, specifically what would you recommend to ensure the CTR program is capable of meeting its mission to roll back the threat of weapons of mass destruction?

If confirmed, I will collaborate with the Department's stake holders to ensure CTR efforts are supportive of our broad Counter WMD strategies and Combatant Commands plans, and that they are synchronized with interagency partners who have different roles, authorities and responsibilities in countering WMD threats.

DoD Auditability

Since 1995, DoD's financial management has been on the Government Accountability Office's High-Risk list—identified as vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. Yet despite the Department's investment of significant effort and dollars, the FY 2018 DoD audit resulted in a disclaimer of opinion—auditors could not express an opinion on DoD financial statements because the financial information was not sufficiently reliable.

If confirmed, what specific actions would you take or direct to achieve better outcomes than have past initiatives intended to improve DoD auditability?

If confirmed, I will work with our partners to address issues identified in 2018 audit:

- Departmental Leadership commitment to standardizing processes to reduce waste and improve efficiency
- Legacy systems that are not audit compliant need to be replaced with systems that better support audit and accountability
- Leaders at every level of the chain of command need to be held accountable paying close attention to property, inventory and process

Tactical Fighters

The 2018 NDS provides that the United States must be capable of striking targets inside adversary air and missile defense networks. A major component of that ability is the F-35 which, after a painstakingly slow start, is now beginning to have a major impact on current operations.

Based on current and future threats outlined in the NDS, what are your views on the requirements and timing of the F-35 program?

I think that the F-35's requirements are appropriate and necessary for NDS implementation and will play a pivotal role in providing air superiority over the coming decades. F-35 production timing is a complicated system of interrelated variables and must continue to be systemically advanced to find an appropriate balance among budget, subcontractor component supply, and Service components' ability to field the aircraft. If confirmed, I will work with the Services and acquisition community to ensure that the critical requirements that the F-35 provides are delivered to the warfighter in a timely manner.

Even if all of the current aircraft modernization programs execute as planned, the average age of the tactical, strategic, and tanker fleets will continue to increase. Aging aircraft require ever-increasing maintenance, which incurs ever-increasing costs. Nonetheless, readiness levels continue to decline.

What are your views on balancing current aircraft capacity and future capability to meet expected threats?

Acquiring and modernizing our 5th generation platforms is vital for potential operations against near-peer competitors. In the short term, recapitalizing a portion of our 4th generation aircraft fleet provides essential capacity to improve readiness and meet NDS demands while we field new 5th generation aircraft, modernize existing 5th generation aircraft, and develop new technologies to maintain the Joint Force's competitive advantage. Adapting the force we have today, while we design the force needed for tomorrow's challenges, requires a mix of capabilities within the Tactical Fighter portfolio.

Science, Technology, and Innovation

U.S. superiority in key areas of innovation is decreasing or has disappeared, while our competitors are engaging in aggressive military modernization and advanced weaponry development. DoD has identified ten key areas in which investment to develop next generation operational capabilities is imperative: hypersonics; fully networked C3; directed energy; cyber; space; quantum science; artificial intelligence

(AI)/machine learning; microelectronics; autonomy; and biotechnology. Much of the innovation in these technologies that could prove suitable for national defense purposes is occurring outside of the traditional defense industry.

What do you see as the most significant challenges (e.g., technical, organizational, or cultural) to DoD's development of these key technologies?

As I understand it today, the three leading challenges are the adequate protection of our intellectual property, insufficient integration between civilian and defense industry, and cultural risk aversion that leads to a lack of agility in the development of key technologies.

Are the Department's investments in these technologies appropriately focused, integrated, and synchronized across all Military Departments and Agencies?

I think there is room for improvement in this area. If confirmed, I will work with stakeholders in congress and across the Department of Defense in order to better focus, integrate, and synchronize development of these key technologies.

In addition to the technologies identified in the 2018 NDS, are there other technology areas in which you believe DoD must invest to ensure that the United States maintains its technological superiority in the long-term?

Yes. Some additional technology areas the NDS does not explicitly highlight that are worthy of review for investment are Quantum Science, Microelectronics, next-generation information communications technology (e.g., 5G), and Biotechnology. If integrated with other advanced technologies, the capabilities could produce significant advantages for the Joint Force.

What efforts is DoD making to identify new technologies developed commercially by the private sector and apply them to national security and warfighter purposes?

DoD has multiple initiatives within the defense research enterprise that are specifically focused on identifying commercial technologies that are currently in the private sector but have potential uses for national security and warfighter purposes. Examples include Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), which accelerates technology interface, and DoD 5G initiative that is enabling collaboration with the private sector. A Service example includes the establishment of Army Futures Command, which is restructuring the Army's R&D, acquisition, and procurement activities.

One of the main objectives of the defense research enterprise is to develop advanced technologies that will be of benefit to the warfighter. In this regard, it is critical that technologies quickly transition from the development phase into testing and

evaluation and ultimately into a program of record for the deployment of capability to the warfighter.

What are the challenges you perceive to effectively transitioning technologies from research programs into programs of record or deployed capabilities?

Effectively transitioning technologies from a research program to a program of record can be difficult because it requires significant cooperation and mutual investment by the R&D community and the acquisition community and often times, the priorities of these two communities are not completely aligned.

If confirmed as Chairman, what specific steps would you take to ensure that the warfighter is benefitting more quickly and directly from research being performed across the defense research enterprise?

If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Defense, the Service Chiefs, and Congress to continue development of rapid prototyping and rapid fielding efforts in order to decrease the amount of time it takes to get innovative technologies from research labs into the hands of the warfighter.

If confirmed, what would you do to increase the interaction between DoD labs and the private sector, and between DoD labs and the rest of the DoD innovation enterprise (i.e., the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, the Strategic Capabilities Office, Defense Innovation Unit, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency)?

If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Defense and the Service Chiefs to encourage open dialogue between the private sector, DoD labs, and the rest of the DoD innovation enterprise. In my experience, open dialogue enables information sharing and rapid learning within organizations.

Some in the Department have directed efforts to realign the Strategic Capabilities Office within the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

If confirmed, would you support such realignment?

If confirmed, I would advise that any potential Strategic Capabilities Office reorganization should not detract from the office's current functions, especially its responsiveness to the Combatant Commands in prototyping and developing game-changing capabilities. Provided that functionality remains in place, the Office of the Secretary of Defense should maintain the flexibility to reorganize as it deems necessary in order to streamline its processes.

What benefits would accrue to the Combatant Commands under such a realignment, in your view?

I assess that there are ways to realign sensibly that would be transparent to the Combatant Commands.

In the past, for example in the Manhattan Project and the Space Race, the United States made great use of foreign technical talent to achieve national goals. Today, there is growing concern that China is making great progress in recruiting technical talent that has been trained at U.S. universities. The Chinese are also investing significant resources to provide funding and facilities to technical experts in critical fields to attract them to work in China.

What steps should the Department take to ensure that the foreign technical talent that we educate and support remains in here in the United States and commits to working on our high-priority national missions to maintain our technological superiority?

I agree that this is a national security issue, but I am unaware of any wholly sufficient steps that the Department of Defense could take alone that would mitigate this issue. Since World War II to today, the U.S. military's partnerships with academia and industry have been the foundation of our competitive advantage, but we must take action to stem the exportation of our intellectual property. If confirmed, I will work with the Congress and the Secretary of Defense to mitigate the risks associated with non-U.S. citizens studying and developing potential national security programs that are vulnerable to export to competitors.

How could we leverage our defense labs and DoD research funding programs to overmatch Chinese efforts by providing resources and facilities to attract technical talent to stay and work in the United States?

A key way to attract and retain technical talent within the United States is to encourage our defense labs to partner with universities and small businesses around the country. Our ability to tap into the intellectual capital of the American people, their innovative ideas, and our production capacity, has made, and will continue to give, the U.S. military competitive advantage.

Additionally, I fully support organizations such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) engaging directly with potential partners in industry and academia. These organizations have the ability to work relatively rapidly to deliver capability to the warfighter.

Joint Acquisition

What are your views regarding the efficacy of joint acquisition programs, such as the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, the Future Long Range Assault Aircraft, and Future Vertical Lift?

Developing, procuring, delivering, and sustaining our nation's needed joint warfighting capabilities and capacity requires the continued successes of joint acquisition programs. The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program provides the Joint Force with needed current capabilities. Additionally, the Future Vertical Lift family of systems will address a number of Joint Force requirements as the programs emerge.

What additional programs would you consider to be candidates for joint development and acquisition?

Given an increasing reliance on multi-domain capabilities, candidates for future joint development and acquisition will address requirements across functional capability areas, including command, control, communications, computers, cyber, logistics, and protection.

If confirmed, what role would you assign to yourself in ensuring that joint acquisition priorities are given full and fair consideration in Military Service budget processes?

If confirmed, I will give my best military advice to the Secretary of Defense on all matters, including the budget. The Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR) provides the Chairman with a formal mechanism to communicate statutory military advice on programs and budget issues, to include joint acquisition priorities.

Additionally, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, chaired by the Vice Chairman, assists the Chairman in assessing joint military capabilities, and identifies, approves, and prioritizes gaps in such capabilities in order to meet joint military requirements.

Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development Systems (JCIDS)

The JROC is vested with the responsibility to assess joint military capabilities; establish and approve joint performance requirements that ensure interoperability between military capabilities; and identify new joint military capabilities based on advances in technology and concepts of operation.

How would you assess the effectiveness of the JROC in establishing joint requirements for submission to the DoD acquisition process?

As I understand it, joint performance requirements (JPR) are a recent change to the JCIDS manual and it is too early to accurately determine the effects on acquisition. If confirmed, I will collaborate with the JROC to ensure it assesses the long-term effectiveness of JPRs, measures other parameters for effectiveness, and recommends changes as necessary.

In your view, have recent acquisition reforms that shifted authorities to the Military Services affected the JROC's ability to assess joint performance requirements? If so, how? If confirmed, how would you ensure that the JROC has the authority and information it needs to execute its statutory functions?

No. If confirmed, the JROC will continue to ensure joint interoperability during my tenure as Chairman. The Joint Performance Requirement (JPR) guidelines enable the JROC to delegate authorities where appropriate to support a streamlined and responsive system that retains the ability of the JROC to meet statutory responsibilities. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) manual was revised to address these shifting authorities. JCIDS specifies the JROC's oversight of the streamlined joint performance requirements enabled through rapid capabilities development programs such as JCTDs (Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations), RPFs (Rapid Prototyping Fund projects), RPPs (Rapid Prototyping Pathway projects), WLIF (Warfighting Lab Incentive Fund projects), etc.

The JCIDS process was established to address overlap and duplication in Military Services' programs. JCIDS is intended to provide the information the JROC needs to identify the capabilities and associated operational performance requirements needed by the joint warfighter.

Is the JCIDS process effective in providing the information the JROC requires to anticipate both the current and the future needs of the Joint Force?

Yes. The JCIDS process ensures concept-driven and threat-informed joint military capabilities meet requirements in the NDS. The JCIDS process enables evolutionary acquisitions that keep pace with evolving threats and advancing technologies. The current JCIDS process examines the current and future threat environments in the Initial Capabilities Document. Additionally there are safeguards in the system (tripwires) to alert people that the reality of the future environment might be different than what was anticipated in a document. This ensures that the system is responsive to changes in the threat.

We recently made process changes to examine alignment with Joint Concepts, including a more robust J7 review and adding the J7 at the Joint Capabilities Board. I will continue to encourage the Joint Staff to increase collaboration to ensure that future capabilities are concept-driven and threat-informed.

How would you, if confirmed, drive the development and articulation of future

joint concepts from which each Military Service's concept development, requirements generation, and acquisition processes will derive? Does DoD have the requisite analytic capabilities to develop and assess future joint concepts, and the associated capabilities and force structure?

If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Chiefs to drive the development of future joint concepts, continuing the work started by General Dunford on the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO). The CCJO calls for new approaches and capabilities to ensure we maintain our competitive advantage over peer adversaries.

Yes, I believe DoD has the requisite analytic capabilities to develop and assess future joint concepts, capabilities, and force structure.

How have recent acquisition reforms, including the implementation of rapid acquisition pathways in which requirement are not generated via JCIDS, affected the ability of the JROC to identify and advocate for joint requirements?

Recent acquisition reforms, including the implementation of rapid acquisition pathways have not affected the JROC's ability to identify and advocate for joint requirements. The JROC can still identify and advocate for joint requirements via Annual Joint Assessment and requirements that have joint performance parameters. While I applaud getting capabilities to the warfighter more quickly, We will continue to work with the Joint Chiefs to ensure that Service-controlled initiatives are not stove-piped or duplicated, and that all strive to present joint integrated solutions.

In your view, what is the appropriate role of Combatant Commanders in the JCIDS process? If confirmed, how would you improve the effectiveness of the process in identifying both the near-term and long-term needs of the Combatant Commander?

It is a team effort. Combatant Commanders serve as advisors to the JROC when matters related to their area of responsibility or function are under consideration. Combatant Commanders serve a critical role in developing requirements and addressing capability gaps. The Combatant Commanders specifically identify risk and what is hindering the accomplishment of their Global Campaign Plan objectives via the Annual Joint Assessment and the Capability Gap Assessment processes. If confirmed, I will ensure the JROC continues to seek and consider input from the Combatant Commanders.

If confirmed, I see my role as an integrator between the needs of the Combatant Commanders, the realities of Service budgets, and the priorities of DoD leadership. Additionally, I will need to evaluate the process before determining any necessary adjustments to improve effectiveness.

Do you believe that today's JROC and JCIDS processes are sufficient to identify where opportunities for multi-Service collaboration exist, or where programs could or should be modified to take advantage of a related acquisition program?

Yes. We bring senior leadership to the table at every phase of the requirements development process ensuring Service collaboration exists. There remains enough leniency in the process for Services to develop their own unique solution - provided the JROC approves. The JROC's focus on Joint Performance Requirements, instead of cost, enhances joint interoperability and fulfillment of capability gaps of more than one Service.

Do you have any recommendations for changes to the structure, authority, or processes of the JROC or the JCIDS?

Not at this time.

The streamlined middle-tier acquisition authorities enacted in Section 804 of the FY 2016 NDAA seek to speed fielding of advanced technologies and systems by waiving the JCIDS process.

What do you perceive as the downsides of not using the formal JCIDS process?

As I understand it, the JCIDS process was created to ensure joint interoperability, so avoiding JCIDS could put the onus of joint interoperability on the proposing Service.

What is your opinion of initial forays at using 804 authorities?

From my perspective as the Army Chief of Staff, I am pleased to see the depth and breadth of activities looking to accelerate the delivery of warfighting capabilities to the field. If confirmed, I will continue to work with stakeholders to evaluate the use of 804 authorities and provide feedback as necessary.

One of the challenges facing many acquisition programs—ranging from weapons systems to business systems—is unrealistic and infeasible technical requirements.

What best practices can the Department employ to generate realistic and technically feasible requirements, particularly in sophisticated, rapidly-evolving technical areas such as cybersecurity, hypersonics, and artificial intelligence?

The DoD requirements process must be informed by the results of its rapid prototyping authorities such as Section 804 to insure requirements are realistic and feasible. Additionally to the maximum extent possible, the DoD should require its systems to be open and modular to minimize upgrade costs as technology continues to rapidly evolve, especially in areas such as cybersecurity, hypersonics, and artificial intelligence.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to strengthen or support the technical knowledge and capabilities of personnel responsible for requirements generation?

If confirmed, I will continue to support efforts by OUSD (A&S) and the Defense Acquisition University to develop training programs for DoD personnel with the responsibility for developing requirements.

Test and Evaluation

A natural tension exists between the goals of major defense acquisition programs to reduce cost and accelerate schedule and the need to ensure performance meets requirements and specifications—the objective of the test and evaluation function.

Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it appropriate to procure weapon systems and equipment that have not been demonstrated through test and evaluation to be operationally effective, suitable, and survivable?

If confirmed, I would only advise the procurement of a weapon system that has not been demonstrated to be operationally effective, suitable, and survivable if the risk to the Joint Force is greater without the system than the risks assumed by fielding the system.

Are you satisfied with DoD's test and evaluation capabilities, including the test

and evaluation workforce and infrastructure of the Military Services? In which areas, if any, do you feel the Department should be developing new test and evaluation capabilities?

Yes. The DoD possesses robust test and evaluation capabilities. However, as Chief of Staff of the Army, I have observed areas where the Joint Force could advance. Emerging technologies in cyber, space, AI and quantum computing are potential growth areas and may need further test and evaluation capabilities.

If confirmed, how would you approach your relationship with the Director, Test and Evaluation, particularly in light of the independence and direct reporting relationships and responsibilities accorded the Director in law?

If confirmed, I will work to build a close working relationship with the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, to maximize the lethality, sustainability, and survivability of the Joint Force.

Operational Energy and Energy Resilience

The Department defines *operational energy* as the energy required for training, moving, and sustaining military forces and weapons platforms for military operations, including the energy used by tactical power systems and generators. As early as 2004, then-General Mattis testified before Congress that DoD must “unleash us from the tether of fuel” if U.S. forces are to sustain momentum and retain freedom of maneuver. He cautioned that “units would be faced with unacceptable limitations because of their dependence on fuel” and resupply efforts “made us vulnerable in ways that would be exploited by the enemy.” Today, DoD energy requirements are projected to increase geometrically due to technological advances in weapons systems and distributed operations over longer operating distances.

If confirmed, what would you do to harness innovations in operational energy and link them with emerging joint operational concepts?

Operational Energy remains one of the Departments greatest logistical burdens and largest vulnerabilities. To make the best use of technological innovations in this area, I would fast-track them through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process in each case where they offer solutions to emerging concept-required capabilities coming from joint operational concepts.

In what specific areas, if any, do you believe DoD needs to improve the

incorporation of energy considerations in strategic planning processes?

In my view, DoD can improve the incorporation of energy considerations in the following specific areas:

- 1) Ensure our fuel posture matches our military strategy with respect to Russia, China, DPRK, Iran and Violent Extremist Organizations.
- 2) The Joint Staff has been conducting readiness with a focus on fuel. These reviews are illuminating where we might be mal-aligned with energy, again a focus on fuel. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff and Services to address these and other related issues to ensure we have the right fuel at the right place at the right time within a geographic area of responsibility.
- 3) To safeguard our homeland defenses from potential cyberattacks on the US power grid, we are working with OSD Policy, DOE and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to make the grid more reliable and resilient.

How can DoD acquisition systems better address requirements related to a military platform's use of energy? In your view, should energy supportability be a key performance parameter in the requirements process?

If confirmed, specifically what would you do to prioritize energy resilience and mission assurance for DoD, including acquiring and deploying sustainable and renewable energy assets to support mission critical functions, and address known vulnerabilities?

Energy supportability is one of the four mandatory Key Performance Parameters (KPPs). The Joint Staff conducts an energy supportability analysis for all requirements documents when the JROC designates the energy KPP as a Joint Performance Requirement. If confirmed, I will continue to support the Joint Staff's role in prioritizing energy resilience.

Environmental Contaminants

According to GAO, DoD has identified 401 military installations affected by known or suspected releases of Perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS) and Perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA).

If confirmed, what actions would you take to address PFOS/PFOA contamination on DoD installations?

If confirmed, I will support the ongoing DoD actions to test, treat and monitor water sources around our 401 installations to address the 2016 U.S. EPA drinking water advisory on PFOS/PFOA. These compounds are constituents of aqueous film forming foam (AFFF) widely used in fighting petroleum fires. DoD proactively responded by limiting use of AFFF to emergencies vice training, addressing on and off-site drinking water impacted by PFOS/PFOA from DoD activities under the federal cleanup law, consistent with the EPA health advisory, and by researching alternative firefighting solutions. Much work remains, and DoD supports EPA efforts toward regulatory standards for PFOS/PFOA that ensure a consistent nationwide cleanup process.

If confirmed, what would be your approach to addressing the health concerns of service members and their families regarding alleged exposures to potentially harmful contaminants on U.S. military installations and in the context of performing military duties?

Several corrective actions are already underway to address members concerns including streamlining processes by which housing residents can raise health concerns to leadership, continuous testing of wells and water sources around our 401 installations with known or suspected releases of PFOS/PFOA, site cleanup, and ongoing action by our health providers to document and treat issues, as appropriate. Ultimately, our Service members and their families should not have to worry about their health while living in homes on U.S. military installations or when performing their military duties.

Readiness and Resource Impacts from Extreme Weather

In 2017, three hurricanes resulted in over \$1.3 billion in damage to military installations across the U.S. In 2018, extreme weather events caused roughly \$9 billion in damage at Tyndall Air Force Base, Camp Lejeune, and Offutt Air Force Base. Hurricane season for 2019 already has begun.

How would you assess the readiness and resource impacts on DoD from recent extreme weather events?

The impacts are significant. Over \$10 billion in two years creates a strain on our finite resources and forces us to make tough decisions if not supplemented with additional funding. Beyond the nominal cost, damages to infrastructure and delayed repairs also disrupted flight and ground training. It will take time to correct these training backlogs.

Based on these readiness and resource impacts, do you believe it necessary to use more resilient designs in DoD infrastructure?

DoD faces a long-term threat from extreme weather events, rising sea levels, and increased flooding at coastal locations. If confirmed, I will work with DoD's many stake holders in support of ongoing DoD actions to implement appropriate planning and design standards that account for projected sea level rise and extreme weather events.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

Many DoD officials, including previous Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have advocated for accession to the Law of the Sea Convention.

Do you support United States accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea?

Yes. Like my predecessors, I support joining the Convention. Being a party to the Convention enhances the United States' security posture by reinforcing freedom of the seas and rights vital to ensuring our global force posture. The Convention provides legal certainty in the world's largest maneuver space.

In your view, what impact, if any, would U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention have on emerging maritime disputes, such as in the South China Sea and in the Arctic?

Acceding to the Convention would strengthen our credibility and strategic position on issues pertaining to these regions. While we do not take sides in the various territorial disputes in the South China Sea, we do have a national security interest in ensuring disputes are resolved peacefully, that countries adhere to the rule of law, and that all nations fully respect freedom of the seas. However, we undermine our leverage by not signing up to the same rule book which we are asking other countries to accept. As for the Arctic, the other Arctic coastal nations (Russia, Canada, Norway and Denmark (Greenland)) understand the importance of the Convention and are in the process of utilizing the Convention's procedures to establish the outer limits of their extended continental shelves (ECS) in the Arctic. The United States has a significant ECS in the Arctic Ocean, but cannot avail itself of the Convention's mechanisms to gain international recognition of its ECS. We should put our rights on a treaty footing and more fully and effectively interact with the other seven Arctic Council nations who are parties to the Convention.

Defense Security Assistance

In your view, what is the appropriate role of the Department of Defense in the conduct of security sector assistance?

The DoD should ensure the conduct of Security Sector Assistance (SSA) aligns to our broader security cooperation (SC) efforts. Together, SSA and SC activities represent the ways and means by which we strengthen our network of allies and partners in support of our NDS.

What should be the strategic objectives of DoD's efforts to build the capabilities of a partner nation's security forces?

Aligned to the NDS, our security force assistance efforts should enable a partner's self-defense capabilities, ability to conduct operations as part of a multinational effort, and/or take actions in support of U.S. objectives.

Is DoD appropriately organized and resourced to execute security sector assistance effectively? If not, and if confirmed, what changes to defense security assistance organizations and processes would you recommend?

Yes. I assess DoD is appropriately organized and resourced to execute security sector assistance. However, if confirmed, I will work with the Department's many stakeholders and congress to closely evaluate as we fully implement NDAA 2017 reforms and better align SSA and broader security cooperation efforts.

Defense Department and Intelligence Community Collaboration

Since September 11, 2001, collaboration—both analytical and operational—between DoD and the Intelligence Community has grown increasingly close. On one hand, seamless collaboration is vital to an effective and rapid response to non-traditional threats, and bringing together the strengths of the full spectrum of defense and intelligence capabilities can generate more effective solutions to complex problems. On the other hand, without effective management and oversight, such collaboration risks blurring distinct agency missions, authorities, and funding, as well as creating redundant lines of effort.

In your view, are there aspects of the current relationship between the Department and the Intelligence Community that should be re-examined or modified?

In today's increasingly complex environment of great power competition and asymmetric threats operating across multiple domains, it is imperative for the DoD and the IC to maintain its close working relationship. It would be premature for me to make any statements regarding re-examining authorities and relationships without first engaging the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence on the current state of the relationship.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Capabilities

Demand for ISR of every kind has grown exponentially in recent years, largely due to the enhanced situational awareness and targeting capabilities they afford commanders. Almost all of the geographic Combatant Commands have validated ISR requirements that are not being met.

What is your assessment of DoD's current disposition of ISR assets across the Combatant Commands?

My assessment is that demand for ISR continues to outpace available supply. The Services continue to deploy ISR at maximum available capacity; therefore, sourcing for new requirements is a zero-sum game. To meet new demands, the Department primarily reallocates assets from other combatant commander operations and also plans to utilize elements of the ISR force within the Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) construct to mitigate strategic risk, respond to unforeseen crises, and provide flexibility for senior decision makers. The Department's ISR allocation strategy is driven by the 2018 NDS.

What do you perceive as the most concerning shortfalls in both the capability and availability of ISR assets?

Expanding the availability of ISR assets requires a holistic approach - simply purchasing more platforms will not necessarily expand the Joint Force's ISR availability. This requires more mechanics, operators, analysts and linguists - these are very talented and skilled service members who require lengthy, rigorous training before they can operate in the field. I plan to work with the Services to explore expanded ISR availability as well as broader investments in ISR platforms, sensors, and communications capabilities designed to penetrate and survive in high-threat and denied environments. I would be happy to discuss this further in a classified forum.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response

Despite significant efforts by the Military Services to enhance their prevention of, and response to sexual assaults, including measures to care for victims and hold assailants accountable, the *DoD Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military for Fiscal Year 2018* documented a statistically significant increase in past-year prevalence of sexual assault and unwanted sexual conduct, primarily for female service members aged 17 to 24. These findings echoed earlier reports of alarming increases in the prevalence of sexual harassment and assault at the Military Service Academies.

Do you believe the policies, programs, and resources that DoD and the Military Services have put in place to prevent and respond to sexual assault, and to protect service members who report sexual assault from retaliation, are working? If not, what else must be done?

One sexual assault in the Joint Force is too many. While we have put forward great effort and resources to prevent and respond to sexual assault and prevention, we recognize that we still have work to do and remain unsatisfied with results to date.

All of DoD and the Joint Force Leadership is committed to the safety of our men and women and will not relax our comprehensive efforts to combat sexual assault. Any form of retaliation goes against our core values and has no place in our military. The Military Services are committed to eliminating retaliatory behavior and have implemented a number of policies and procedures to address retaliation and work on understanding what causes this problem.

If confirmed, I will continue to support efforts to address chain of command accountability, prevent retaliatory behavior, reduce root causes, foster a culture of dignity and respect and one that is free from sexual assault and sexual harassment.

In your view, why hasn't the Department been more successful in preventing sexual assaults?

I believe that we must empower our commanders and hold them accountable for the command climate in their units. Additionally, we must ensure every Service member and new recruit adheres to a culture of professionalism and respect, which starts with the leadership.

What is your assessment of the potential impact, if any, of proposals to remove disposition authority from military commanders over felony-level violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, including sexual assault?

Commanders must retain the ability to hold all Service members in their formation accountable for their actions. The authority to discipline service members, to include convening courts-martial, is an important tool that enables commanders to fulfill their responsibility to their people and to establish an appropriate culture where victims are treated with dignity and respect. Commanders are crucial to our ability to effect institutional change and disposition authority is one of the most effective instruments available to them. Commanders are responsible for the good order and discipline of their units and removing their authority will undermine this long standing principle.

Why are the number of prosecutions for sexual assault and retaliation in all Military Services so low? Why are conviction rates so low?

The Department and the Services have worked with Congress to achieve significant progress in the advancement of military justice, including the January 2019 enactment of the Military Justice Act. I am committed to continuous improvement of the military justice system, ensuring that modifications are consistent with the overall goal of ensuring justice and fairness for both the victim and the accused, as well as, advancing a culture within the services where victims are treated with dignity and respect.

In your view, could the U.S. Air Force Academy's *Safe to Report* policy be extended to other types of units and organizations across the DoD? If confirmed, what would you recommend to the Secretary of Defense in this regard?

It is possible that the U.S. Air Force Academy Safe to Report policy, which addresses handling of victim and witness collateral misconduct, could be extended to other types of units and organizations across DoD. Current DoD policy provides commanders' flexibility to address victim's alleged misconduct. If confirmed, in consultation with the Service Chiefs, I will assess the impact of the policy before providing a recommendation to the Secretary.

If confirmed, what specific role would you establish for yourself in preventing sexual harassment in the armed forces and in the DoD civilian workforce?

If confirmed, I, will work with the Service Chiefs to continuously evaluate and refine prevention and response policies to improve oversight and accountability. I will also emphasize that Joint Force readiness depends on the readiness of our Service members and readiness is most prevalent in cohesive units with empowered chains of command.

Do you perceive that you need additional authorities from Congress to improve the Department’s programs to prevent sexual harassment and sexual assault?

Not at this time. We are still assessing the implementation of the Military Justice Act of 2016 and do not yet have sufficient analysis of those authorities. If we determine that additional policy or legislative action is required, we will seek additional assistance.

Active and Reserve Component End Strength

Active force end strength continues to grow across all Military Services.

What aggregate Active end strength do you believe is necessary to meet the demands placed on the Military Services by the 2018 NDS and associated operational plans?

The growth requested in the FY20 budget submission represents responsible growth across the services and supports the direction of the NDS. The services remain committed to “quality over quantity”. This force level meets the current operational needs.

If Active end strength is increased in FY 2020, what specific parameters would you use to determine what the corresponding Reserve Component end strength should be?

The Active and Reserve Component both play a very important role in executing the NDS. A balance is needed to achieve this end. We are committed to continually evaluate the balance in order to achieve our missions associated with the NDS.

In your view, do the Reserve Components serve as an operational reserve, a strategic reserve, or both? In light of your answer, should the Reserve Components be supported by improved equipment, increased training, and higher levels of overall resourcing for readiness going forward?

The Reserve Component is an integral part of the total force. The Reserve Component serves as both an operational and strategic reserve. The Reserves deserve to train on the best equipment possible in order to execute their key role.

Religious Accommodation

As mandated by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the NDAs for FYs 2013 and 2014, do each of the Military Service's policies and processes appropriately accommodate the religious practices of individual service members, in your view?

Yes. Each of the Services have demonstrated the importance of religious liberty training for Service members as well as for issues of religious accommodation.

Do you support a policy that allows a prospective recruit to request and receive an accommodation of religious practices prior to enlisting or accepting a commission in a Military Service?

Yes.

Do you support a policy that allows a service member's religious accommodation, once granted, to follow the member throughout his/her military career—no matter where he/she is stationed or the nature of his/her specific duties—unless it can be demonstrated that the accommodation adversely affects military mission accomplishment?

Yes.

In your view, do existing DoD policies and practices regarding public prayers offered by a military chaplain in both official and unofficial settings strike the proper balance between a chaplain's right to pray in accordance with the tenets of his/her religious faith and the rights of other service members who may hold with different beliefs, including no religious beliefs, who may be present in these settings?

Yes.

In your view, does a military climate that welcomes and respects open and candid discussions about personal religious faith and beliefs in a garrison environment contribute in a positive way to preparing U.S. forces to be effective in overseas assignments?

Yes.

Do you believe that allowing service members of certain faiths, such as Sikh, Orthodox Judaism, or Islam, to maintain beards or wear turbans or other religious headwear, while in uniform, strengthens or weakens the United States military's standing in areas of the world where such religions predominate? Would such allowance help or hurt our coordination and engagement with such foreign nations?

Yes, unless there is a specific operational or readiness reason not to. Accommodation of such religious practices would demonstrate the value and strength of diverse faiths in U.S. Forces. It would also strengthen our military's standing in other parts of the world and help our coordination and engagement with such foreign nations. Such actions bear testimony that we respect religious freedom and recognize religious faith and expression are not limited by national identity.

In your view, would a policy that discourages open discussions about personal faith and beliefs be more or less effective at preparing service members to work and operate in a pluralistic environment?

It would be less effective. Limiting open discussions about faith and beliefs do not prepare service members for working in complex environments. Religious faith and expression are integral parts of many cultures across the globe and our service members need increased understanding of religious faith and conversations to operate more effectively.

Military Quality of Life and Family Readiness

The Committee remains concerned about the sustainment of key quality of life programs for military families, such as family advocacy and parenting skills programs; child care; spouse education and employment support; health care; and morale, welfare and recreation (MWR) services.

If confirmed, what quality of life and MWR programs would you consider a priority?

In my current role as Chief of Staff of the Army, I have stressed that the most important aspects of service member quality of life are improved housing, first rate medical care, and high performing schools. Additionally, I will continue to encourage the advancement of MWR programs that both promote well-being while also adapting to the demands of our service members. These programs include outdoor recreation, sports and fitness, and childhood and youth programs.

If confirmed, I will work with all of the Service Chiefs to promote and sustain effective quality of life programs to meet the needs of our service members and their families.

What factors would you consider in assessing which MWR programs are ineffective or outmoded and thus potentially suitable for elimination or reduction in scope?

If confirmed, I would work with the Service Chiefs and look primarily at cost, benefit and usage metrics. The Services are committed in developing and sustaining key quality of life programs. These programs are critical recruiting and retention tools and must be adequately resourced to ensure a resilient force. If confirmed, I remain committed to working with the Service Chiefs to ensure the maintenance and the development of effective quality of life programs is a priority for our service members and their families.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that support related to mobilization, deployment, and family readiness is provided to Army Reserve and National Guard families, as well as to Active Army families who do not reside near a military installation?

If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize the value of the Total Force and will work with the Service Chiefs to ensure the unique family readiness needs of the Reserves and the geographically separated active component families are flexible and responsive. As the Department continues to emphasize Total Force policies, programs such as Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program, Military One Source, and others that addresses challenges unique to military service are vital in developing resilient Service members and their families. If confirmed, I remain committed to supporting proactive measures by the Services to recruit and retain ready, resilient Service members and families.

Women in the Service

Since 2015, all military occupations and units have been open to the assignment of any service member who can meet the occupational standards, including women.

What challenges still exist with regard to the assignment of women—to infantry and submariner occupations, in particular—and what proactive measures would you take or direct to address those challenges, if confirmed?

If confirmed, I will actively support the Service Chiefs' measures to integrate women into these specialties and address any challenges that may arise. To date, there is relatively limited data to determine significant challenges or trends. I have been deeply involved in this initiative as the CSA and will continue to monitor this area closely.

Should efforts to integrate women into Special Operations occupations be continued, in your view? Please explain your answer.

Yes. U.S. Special Operations Command is conducting a study on gender integration into previously closed Special Operations occupations and there is very limited data to make a definitive conclusion.

Earlier this year, the Marine Corps integrated 50 female recruits into a

historically all-male training battalion aboard recruit depot Parris Island.

As you understand it, how was Marine Corps acculturation and boot camp training affected by the integration of female recruits?

It is my understanding that the Marine Corps recruit training events are gender combined in that recruits of both genders train in the same locations, at the same time and with each other. Recruits are led and instructed by both male and female Marines. I am not aware of any significant negative impacts as a result of the integration.

In your view, how should the Marine Corps apply the lessons learned from this trial run going forward?

In my view, I would use the data collected to make informed decisions that increase the readiness and lethality of units.

Non-Deployable Service members

Recently, the Department published DoDI 1332.45, *Retention Determinations for Non-Deployable Service members*.

Do you agree that service members who are non-deployable for more than 12 consecutive months should be subject either to separation from service or referral into the Disability Evaluation System?

Yes, the Department's policy is a positive step toward increasing readiness and lethality. The goal is greater accountability with respect to medical readiness with a focus on returning members to a deployable status. The intent of the policy is not to separate members.

In your experience, are there some specialties in which service members are not required to deploy? If so, should service members with these specialties be subject to the same requirement for separation or disability processing if not deployable for 12 consecutive months?

Yes. All Service members are subject to the same requirement for separation or disability processing whether their current position requires worldwide deployability or not. The Services do retain the waiver authority for those with a medical condition.

If confirmed, and in light of your service as Chief of Staff of the Army, specifically what would you recommend to improve processing timeliness for both Active duty and Reserve Component service members at each phase of the multi-step disability evaluation process?

If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Services to attain the 180-day, end-to-end, disability evaluation system process goal. The Department has assigned several lines of effort to improve the timeliness of the process and we'll continue to focus on those efforts to return Service members to a deployable status and/or get them the care needed for a successful transition. These efforts include: ensuring Service members get their routine medical and dental checks in a timely fashion, providing wounded, ill and injured service members with the best medical care available and ensuring dental and Periodic Health Assessment (PHA) delinquencies are reported monthly and commanders are held accountable.

In your view, what is the percentage of service members in the Active force and the percentage of service members in the Reserve Components who can be non-deployable at any given time without adversely affecting the readiness of the Joint Force to execute the 2018 NDS and associated operational plans?

I believe the Department's 95% deployability goal will ensure we have the personnel resources needed for the Joint Force and execute the requirements of the NDS. Since June 2018, we have lowered the percentage of non-deployables from 6.4 to 5.2 – that means over 21,000 fewer non-deployable Service members. A 5% non-deployable rate is a reasonable risk and accomplishable goal based on historical data.

Military Health System Reform

Section 702 of the NDAA for FY 2017, as modified by Sections 711 and 712 of the NDAA for FY 2019, transferred the administration and management of military hospitals and clinics from the Military Departments to the Defense Health Agency (DHA), a Combat Support Agency.

In your view, in the aggregate, how many military medical providers and what medical capabilities, are required to support the Combatant Commanders' operational plans associated with the 2018 NDS?

From my current viewpoint, current total medical force end strength of roughly 178,000 is sufficient to execute operational plans and meet global medical demand. As we design a future force more focused on great power competition, the size and capability of our medical forces may need to be reexamined. If confirmed, I will work across DoD and with Congress on these efforts.

In your view, do military medical providers across the Military Departments possess today the critical wartime medical competencies required to save the lives of service members injured in combat or contingency operations?

Yes. I believe the joint medical force possesses the competencies necessary to save lives in a kinetic environment, as evidenced by their performance in overseas contingency operations over the last 18 years. As we begin to lose personnel with combat experience, it is imperative that we codify, train to, measure, and report the knowledge, skills, and abilities associated with wartime medical competencies. Additionally, we must embed medical capabilities far forward to increase survivability on a complex and contested battlefield of the future.

Would you see value in restructuring the DHA as a new combatant command—a Unified Medical Command?

I think it is too early to tell. We need to allow the DHA sufficient time to complete actions from NDAA 2017 and 2019 before we can assess the impact of transition and implementation. If confirmed, I will work with the Services and OSD to review.

Suicide Prevention

The number of suicides in each of the Military Services continues to concern the Committee.

If confirmed, what specific role and tasks would you establish for yourself and for the Joint Staff in furtherance of DoD's program to prevent suicide?

The health, safety, and well-being of our military community is essential to the readiness of the total force. If confirmed, I will ensure the Service Chief's and the Department's lines of effort encourage help-seeking behavior, minimize stigmas, and increase visibility and access to resource and communication tools. The Department is strongly committed to preventing suicides among our Service members and military families. Every single suicide impacts Joint Force readiness.

If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure that sufficient mental health resources are available to service members in theater, as well as to service members and their families at home station?

It starts with ensuring that Commanders have the training and resources they need to assess and address these issues in garrison and deployed environments. Embedding mental health resources and capabilities within deploying units has also shown to be effective. I support the services and their efforts to recruit and retain mental health specialists in support of our Service members and their families.

DoD has made great strides in reducing the stigma associated with help-seeking behaviors, but many service members remain concerned that their military careers will be adversely affected should their chains of command become aware that they are seeking mental or behavioral health care. At the same time, the military chain of command has a legitimate need to be aware of physical and mental health conditions that may affect the readiness of the service members under their command.

In your view, does DoD effectively bridge the gap between a service member's desire for confidentiality and the chain of command's legitimate need to know about matters that may affect individual service member and the unit readiness?

Yes, I believe the DoD has made significant strides to bridge the gap between service members' desires and the chain of command's legitimate need to know. There is more work to be done as we attempt to help those who struggle and deal with complex issues, while at the same time ensuring the readiness and lethality of a unit. I have mentioned in the past that these types of issues can happen to anyone, at any time. No one should hold a stigma against anyone seeking help and Service members need to know I support them fully on this front.

Service of Transgender Persons

Each of the Service Chiefs has testified before this Committee that in their personal experience, the service of transgender individuals in their preferred gender has had no negative impact on unit or overall military readiness.

In your personal experience, has the service of transgender individuals in their preferred gender had any negative impact on unit or overall military readiness?

I am not aware of significant impacts to unit readiness based on transgender persons serving in the Army.

In January of 2019, the Supreme Court issued an order allowing DoD to implement this Administration's policy prohibiting some transgender persons from joining the military. The new DoD policy took effect on April 12, 2019.

In your view, what would be the impact on readiness of requiring the separation of all transgender soldiers currently serving in the military?

Due to the policies that prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity and that protect the privacy of all persons, the Department does not track service members or applicants by whether they identify as transgender. It would be difficult to assess the impact on readiness without knowing the number of Transgender persons, which the Department does not track. However, any reduction in fully deployable service members that meet all medical standards would presumably have a detrimental effect on readiness.

In your view, what would be the impact on readiness of permitting the enlistment or accession into the military of otherwise qualified individuals who are stable in their preferred gender?

Fully deployable service members that meet all medical standards increase force readiness. Individuals who have a current diagnosis or history of gender dysphoria or who have undergone or need gender transition require a waiver from the Military Service. It is important to remember that similarly situated persons without a diagnosis or history of gender dysphoria but who have had or need similar medical treatment (e.g., hormone therapy or genital reconstruction surgery) for a different condition also require a waiver.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, and when asked before this committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate committees of Congress to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the position of the Administration?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress?

Yes.