

Advance Policy Questions for Joseph Kernan
Nominee for Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

Department of Defense Reforms

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included the most sweeping reforms since the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

1. Do you support these reforms?

I support the Committee in its effort to reform the organization and management of the Department of Defense (DoD). I firmly believe that continuously examining DoD policies and processes to find ways to best accomplish its missions is an enduring imperative. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the armed services, intelligence, and defense appropriations committees on implementation of these reforms as they relate to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) and the defense intelligence enterprise.

2. What other areas for defense reform do you believe might be appropriate for this Committee to address?

I believe there is opportunity for continued reform within the Department of Defense and, if confirmed, I would look carefully across the organization, management, and activities of the defense intelligence enterprise to determine where improvements could be made to support defense and national security challenges and priorities. If confirmed, I will engage and consult routinely with the Committees to conduct defense intelligence enterprise activities in more efficient and effective ways.

Section 911 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 required the Secretary of Defense to establish cross-functional teams to address critical objectives of the Department.

3. Do you agree that the Department must be able to integrate its diverse, functional capabilities well in order to successfully defend the nation from increasingly complex and dynamic security threats? Will you meet this requirement to the best of your abilities?

Yes, I strongly agree with the need to integrate these capabilities, and if confirmed, I am committed to proactively meeting this requirement to the best of my abilities. Today's diverse threats cross all domains and require a whole-of-government approach to developing comprehensive responses. The use of cross-functional teams leverages expertise across the DoD, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, the Military Departments/Services and the combat support agencies. Bringing talent together from across the Department, soliciting innovative thinking and delivering integrated solutions are crucial to improving DoD's

ability to address threats to national security. As appropriate, I will as well advocate for cross-functional teams to include participants from other government agencies so that, collectively, we can better address national security challenges.

For example, I understand that the USD(I) has been tasked by the Deputy Secretary to oversee a cross-functional team focused on algorithmic warfare, and on leveraging technology to improve the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of full motion video collected from airborne platforms. That is a critical capability that would have been extraordinarily useful to me as a deployed special operations force commander and it remains so for our deployed military forces in harm's way.

4. What is your understanding of the attributes and characteristics of effective cross-functional teams?

My belief, and I understand this is the practice for DoD's cross-functional teams, is the inclusion of subject matter experts from across the Department with technical expertise, appropriate knowledge of policy, strategy, and operations and the commitment to collaboratively tackle our most important national security challenges is an important imperative.

5. What are your views on the potential focus areas and uses for future cross-functional teams?

I believe that we need to focus on and commit to drawing on cross-functional expertise from across the intelligence community. The ability of our joint force to integrate intelligence faster and more effectively than our adversaries will continue to drive U.S. competitive military advantage and better inform decision-making. Cross-government teams of this nature could be equally beneficial in bringing together solutions from across DoD and the Intelligence Community to address adversary threats. If confirmed, I will continue to support and promote participation in cross-functional teams.

Duties

6. What is your understanding of the role, duties, and functions of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I))?

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) is responsible for supporting the Secretary of Defense in discharging his intelligence and security responsibilities and authorities under Title 10 and Title 50 of the United States Code.

From DoD Directive 5143.01, I understand the responsibilities of the USD(I) to include: serving as the Principal Staff Assistant and intelligence advisor to the Secretary of Defense; exercising authority, direction, and control on behalf of the Secretary of Defense over the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency / Central Security Service, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Defense Security Service; establishing policy and priorities for, and providing oversight of, the defense intelligence enterprise; exercising oversight of

personnel policy to ensure that intelligence organizations in the Department of Defense are staffed, organized, trained, and equipped to support the missions of the Department; ensuring that the DoD intelligence components that are also elements of the intelligence community are responsive to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in the execution of the DNI's authorities; ensuring that the combatant commanders, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the civilian leadership of the Department are provided with appropriate intelligence support; ensuring that counterintelligence activities in the Department are conducted and managed efficiently and effectively; ensuring that other sensitive activities which the Department conducts or supports are conducted and managed efficiently and effectively; overseeing the implementation of assigned DoD security policies and programs to ensure efficiency and effectiveness; serving as the Program Executive for the Military Intelligence Program, and ensuring that the Department provides the U.S. Congress with information sufficient to execute its oversight responsibilities. I believe an implied responsibility of USD(I), when appropriate, beneficial, and lawful, is to collaboratively support the intelligence-related needs for the whole-of-government mission to protect our nation's security.

7. What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties and functions of the USD(I)?

At this time, I do not have specific recommendations for changes in the duties and functions of the USD(I). If confirmed, I will, as the Principle Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and his Deputy, carry out those aforementioned duties and functions contained in DoD Directive 5143.01. I would coordinate widely across the Department of Defense and Intelligence Community, and inform the Committee of any recommendations.

8. How do you view the relationship and division of responsibilities between the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)) and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?

Secretary Mattis has emphasized collaboration, partnerships, and reform of the Department. If confirmed, I would work closely and collaboratively with each of the Under Secretaries, their Principal Deputies, and other Department officials, recognizing the complementary perspectives each brings to the Department's mission. I believe that a close and continuing partnership between the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the USD(I) is essential to best align intelligence policies and capabilities with Policy objectives. Critically, and from my personal military career experience, I know that the key beneficiaries of this collaboration, strong relationship, and alignment between USD(P) and USD(I) are the warfighters, those in uniform that endeavor every day to support national security.

Qualifications

9. What background and experience, particularly in the area of intelligence matters, do you possess that qualify you to perform the duties of the USD(I)?

If confirmed, I believe I have the appropriate background and experience to effectively perform the duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

Over the course of my 36 years in uniform, predominantly as a Naval Special Warfare/SEAL officer, I was a collector, consumer, and user of intelligence from a multitude of intelligence sources.

The bulk of my military career was spent serving with Special Operations and Special Warfare units participating in operations and exercises globally on many levels. I commanded platoons at Underwater Demolition Team 12, SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team One, and SEAL Team Five. I commanded SEAL Team Two and the Naval Special Warfare Development Group (NSWDG).

Commanding NSWDG on 9/11, and subsequent Joint Task Forces through the initial operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, helped shape my knowledge of how special operators and other military combat forces depend on, and work effectively with, intelligence professionals.

The past 16 years of operations have brought intelligence and special operations professionals together in unique ways, with intelligence providing a battlefield advantage to both conventional and special operations forces and operators, and in return, providing intelligence officers the opportunity to validate and evolve their intelligence practices. This relationship is critical in how the United States will conduct conventional and irregular warfare operations in the 21st Century.

While serving in each of the geographic areas of responsibility for the Combatant Commands, on a Combatant Command staff, and deployed in support of named and contingency operations and exercises, I worked closely with intelligence professionals from the Joint Staff, Service components, Combat Support Agencies, the intelligence community, and law enforcement entities. Intelligence underpinned the planning and decision-making process of every operation. The fidelity of this intelligence directly correlated to mission success, mitigation of risk to our forces, and achievement of tactical to strategic objectives. The intelligence leveraged came not only from U.S. intelligence entities but from many ally and partner sources. I place a very high priority on the value of enduring collaboration and intelligence fusion.

While serving as the Deputy Commander of U.S. Southern Command, I observed how the Command's Joint Intelligence Operations Center and the Joint Interagency Task Force provided intelligence that drove defense, law enforcement and allied forces' activities to interdict illicit trafficking throughout the region. Additionally, I gained deep insights from my front row seat as the Senior Military Assistant to former Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, where I viewed the collaborative decision processes with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Services and the Combatant Commands and USD(I) efforts to coordinate intelligence community support to address defense intelligence needs.

Collectively, I believe these experiences both qualify me for, and would inform my efforts as, the USD(I), if confirmed. I would be honored to serve with our nation's intelligence professionals.

Relations with Congress

10. What are your views on the state of the relationship between the OUSD(I) and the Senate Armed Services Committee in particular, and with Congress in general?

I view the relationship between the OUSD(I) and the Committee as indispensable to building a more capable and responsive intelligence enterprise to meet our nation's security needs. I believe that a close and collaborative relationship between DoD and Congress is an obligation and essential for both to perform their duties. My experience has been that the Department and DoD components have been responsive to the Committee. If confirmed, I would seek to routinely engage the Senate Armed Services Committee and other committees of jurisdiction to strengthen OUSD(I)'s relationship with this Committee and Congress.

11. If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a productive and mutually beneficial relationship between Congress and the OUSD(I)?

If confirmed as USD(I), I would pursue an open, continuing, and forthright dialogue with Congress concerning issues vital to defense intelligence and national security. Furthermore, I would actively seek perspective, advice, and support from committees of jurisdiction; be forthcoming in explaining intelligence activities, programs, and budgets; seek to provide Congress with the information needed to carry out its Article I constitutional responsibilities; and be accountable to the Congress in carrying out my duties and responsibilities.

Major Challenges and Priorities

12. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the OUSD(I) and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise?

I believe the major challenges confronting OUSD(I) and the defense intelligence enterprise include adapting to and providing timely awareness and insights into a diverse, complex and ever-changing array of security challenges. The broad scope and fast pace of global operations will very likely be conducted with a smaller force and in a constrained fiscal environment. Despite these constraints, the obligations and increasing demands on the intelligence enterprise to support policy, operations, acquisitions and decision-making will not wane, and our posture and capabilities must continue to support the full spectrum of security challenges. We must prevent strategic and military surprises. While accepting this responsibility, the USD(I) must also address these challenges in an environment that requires better protection of our intelligence sources and methods, the networks on which we function, and from the full spectrum of threats—

from traditional espionage to insider threats and unauthorized disclosures, whether ideologically-motivated or inadvertent.

13. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

If confirmed, I would ensure that sufficient and available resources are devoted to the defense intelligence enterprise and pursue additional resources if there are critical shortfalls. I would seek to effectively implement the Secretary's priorities for the Department across the defense intelligence enterprise and ensure that comprehensive programs and policies are developed to support the execution of these priorities. The success of the defense intelligence enterprise depends on a workforce – a team of highly talented and experienced professionals with a wide range and depth of skill. If confirmed, I would pursue relentlessly those commercial technologies that show promise of rapidly advancing our intelligence superiority and advocate for initiatives. I would place a high priority on policies and programs that effectively recruit, train and retain the uniquely talented workforce required to advance the intelligence enterprises ability to mitigate, preempt, and respond to adversarial activities.

14. How would you anticipate developing priorities for allocating your time and resources as the USD(I)?

If confirmed, I would align my priorities with those of the Secretary of Defense: to support increasing the lethality of the joint force, cultivating partnerships, and reforming the Department. I would seek to ensure that resources are allocated strategically to, and across, the defense intelligence enterprise in full support of military forces.

In developing intelligence-centric priorities in support of the Secretary's priorities, I would closely collaborate with the uniformed and civilian leaders to ensure optimal support to priority intelligence requirements of the combatant commanders and the operational and military forces that they task and lead. Additionally, I would place a high priority on developing and acquiring intelligence capabilities to maintain and advance our technological superiority; improve the tradecraft of personnel working in the defense intelligence enterprise; and protect our infrastructure and technologies from external and internal threats. Finally, I would allocate the necessary time to ensure the proper management and activities of the OUSD(I) staff focus on efficiency and effectiveness in support of Department modernization efforts.

15. If confirmed, how would you balance the need to provide intelligence support to the warfighter with the need to provide intelligence support to policy makers?

My understanding and belief is that balancing these needs is one of the USD(I)'s primary responsibilities. If confirmed, I would work to ensure the defense intelligence enterprise continues to satisfy requirements for operationally-relevant intelligence that directly enables warfighter success, and I would work collaboratively across the Defense Department and with interagency partners to inform policy and military decision-making by our national leaders.

16. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the geographic combatant commands are adequately assessing and prioritizing their intelligence needs?

The last position I held before retiring from the U.S. Navy was as the Deputy Commander of U.S. Southern Command. Assessing and prioritizing intelligence needs was one of the most critical roles I had in that position. If confirmed, and in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other Department and interagency partners that work with and support Combatant Commands, I would seek to strengthen integration and collaboration between the geographic and functional combatant commands and the elements of the intelligence community. The intelligence picture and assessments created by the intelligence enterprise inform commanders in their requirements and priority deliberations. An unwavering commitment to providing definitive intelligence and capabilities will help shape combatant commander assessments and priorities.

Budget

17. What is your assessment of the impact of the budget caps required by the Budget Control Act on the capacity and capabilities of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise to meet requirements?

The impact has been significant on defense intelligence enterprise (DIE) readiness. I understand that the DIE has been inhibited by five consecutive years of one-year budget reductions to meet budget caps. This has stressed the ability of the DIE to optimally address warfighting requirements in South Asia and the Middle East and has a cascading negative impact in other regions. These constraints have forced tough choices on where to invest limited resources, such as between the competing requirements of intelligence support to counter-terrorism efforts and fortifying our intelligence capabilities against nations like Russia and China. The DIE has also experienced delays in system upgrades, facility maintenance and slowed the desired pace to address the emerging challenges presented by China's rapidly growing military and a resurgent Russia. I would expect that budget constraints will also limit investment in potentially enterprise-enabling technologies that could address complex intelligence needs. If confirmed, I will pay close attention to these areas and identify related issues and shortfalls.

Torture and Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

18. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014, and required by section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92)?

Yes. I fully support the standards on detainee treatment and intelligence interrogation laid out in the Army Field Manual, DoD policy, and the law. If confirmed, I will continue to

support and enforce these standards and I would expect all DoD personnel to be held accountable for doing so.

Management of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise

19. What is your understanding of the role of the OUSD(I) in overseeing and coordinating the efforts of the elements of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise?

I understand the USD(I) is responsible for supporting the Secretary of Defense, as his Principal Staff Assistant for assigned intelligence matters, in discharging his intelligence-related responsibilities and authorities under Title 10 and Title 50 of the United States Code. This includes exercising authority, direction, and control on behalf of the Secretary of Defense over the defense intelligence components of the Department of Defense and working closely with the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, Service components and the ODNI to develop effective policy, plans, programs, and priorities.

20. Are additional authorities, policy guidance, or resources necessary for effective oversight of the enterprise?

If confirmed, I would carefully assess the adequacy of the existing authorities, policies, and resources to determine what changes, if any, are needed for effective oversight of defense intelligence activities and to improve the performance of the enterprise. On behalf of the Secretary of Defense, I would work closely with the committees of jurisdiction to seek the support and resources necessary to execute effective oversight.

21. Are there opportunities to improve coordination with the National Intelligence Community to improve intelligence support to the warfighter and, if so, where are the opportunities?

From my experience in uniform, I believe there are always opportunities to improve collaboration across the intelligence community to better support the warfighter. If I am confirmed, I would engage early and often with the combatant commanders to improve my understanding of their needs and I would frequently engage leaders within the national intelligence community to obtain support to meet those warfighter needs. I am particularly interested in improving the integration of national and defense intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, and applying greater attention to faster, more agile and adaptive processing, exploitation, and dissemination of intelligence data to better support the warfighter and others that engage our adversaries at the tactical edge.

Background Investigations

The National Background Investigations Bureau at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is currently charged with conducting background investigations (BIs) for the Department of Defense. However, its ownership of this process has led to a backlog of over 600,000 cases, which is increasing by more than 10,000 a month. This has led to unacceptable delays for Department personnel and

programs as both are idled waiting for clearances. Secretary Mattis has indicated that he has made a decision in principle to transition from outsourcing BIs from OPM to having the Department of Defense conduct its own BIs. In addition, section 938 of S. 1519, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, as passed by the Senate Armed Services Committee, mandates this transition.

22. Do you support this transition?

Yes. I fully support this effort. The unacceptable backlog of more than 700,000 cases has a significantly negative impact on DoD mission readiness. Appropriately cleared personnel, uniformed, civilian and contractor, are critical to the day-to-day operations of the Department as well as our future readiness and capabilities. Of concern, individuals cleared on an interim basis do not have access to the full scope of information they need to perform their duties, and, without a completed background investigation, the Department is accepting increased risk. The Department needs to address these issues and build a program that is effective in both avoiding backlogs and minimizing risks to our security. If confirmed, these issues will have my full attention.

One objection to the transfer of Defense Department BIs from OPM to the Department is that OPM would lose its “economy of scale” (as the Defense Department comprises the vast majority of OPM’s investigations workload) and there would be yet more duplication of personnel security overhead than already exists today. A counter-argument is that the small remaining investigations workload at OPM could also be transferred to the Defense Department, in much the same way that the Defense Security Service today manages the industrial security program for almost the entire Federal Government.

23. What are your views on this issue?

My understanding is that the current OPM-led process is overwhelmed, and costs have spiraled in recent years. I would need a better understanding of the current program details and the concerns regarding economy of scale before I could provide my views. However, if confirmed, I would closely examine IT systems and the practices of OPM and DoD to conduct background investigations to ensure existing economies of scale are preserved and possibly improved. Additionally, I would ensure that any methods to reduce costs and develop improvements were shared, as appropriate, throughout the U.S. government.

Allocation of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Assets Through the Global Force Management Process

This Committee has expressed concerns about the process and underlying analysis supporting the allocation of ISR assets to the combatant commands under the Global Force Management Process (GFMAP). While these GFMAP problems are numerous, the Committee has noted in particular that, since the events of September 11th, U.S. Central Command has received the overwhelming share of ISR assets, to the point where the

Committee expressed doubt that “a rigorous analysis would consistently rank the lowest priorities of one or more combatant commands higher than the highest priorities of other combatant commands.”

24. What is your understanding and assessment of the adequacy of the process for allocating ISR capabilities under the GFMAP process?

The Global Force Management Process (GFMAP) was designed to allocate forces and capabilities across the Combatant Commands to best meet their prioritized requirements, including allocation of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. As the former Deputy Commander of U.S. Southern Command, I have personal experience competing with the U.S. Central Command and other Combatant Commands for limited ISR resources. While our troops fighting in active combat zones must always have priority for our resources, due consideration must be given to other security concerns. During my participation in the GFMAP process, I found that combatant commander requirements always exceeded the ISR assets available. If confirmed, I would closely coordinate with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to support a process that achieves an appropriate balance in ISR allocation so we ensure that our global security responsibilities are best met.

25. In your view, are modifications to the process warranted?

I am not aware currently of the exact distribution of ISR resources, but if confirmed, I would personally review current ISR allocations and participate, as appropriate, in the allocation process.

Cyber

26. How do you perceive the challenges we face in cyberspace?

I believe that the cyberspace domain offers a multitude of benefits, but it also poses one of the greatest threats to our nation’s security. DoD, like our nation, faces a daily and growing threat in cyberspace. In recent years, malicious cyber activities conducted by our adversaries, both state and non-state actors, are increasingly complex, technologically advanced, disruptive, and persistent. DoD continues to face challenges in protecting and securing its networks, systems, infrastructure, and in developing its overall cyber capabilities. If confirmed, and in close collaboration with both the government and civilian sectors, as well as Congress, I would be fully committed to addressing this challenge with both defensive and offensive measures.

27. Briefly describe what policy objectives the Defense Department should be seeking to achieve in the cyber realm and the strategy you think is necessary to address these challenges.

The Secretary has discussed the need for both a whole-of-government effort regarding U.S. responses to malicious cyber activity and hardening our information networks and

critical infrastructure, which I fully support. If confirmed, DoD's role in cyber will be one of my key focus areas, as the Department continues to support efforts to better assess the threat, bring technological and policy advancements to bear to deter our adversaries and protect our networks, support defensive and offensive cyber operations, fully develop the Cyber Mission Forces, and empower and resource U.S. Cyber Command.

28. What role should the OUSD(I) play in addressing challenges in cyberspace?

I believe that OUSD(I)'s role is to facilitate an integrated perspective on cyberspace as it relates to intelligence. This includes providing the Secretary and our national security leadership a holistic look at the capabilities, operations, personnel, and resources across the defense intelligence enterprise needed to provide more effective and efficient intelligence support to DoD cyber operations. If confirmed, I would foster a close and continuing partnership between OUSD(I), OUSD Policy, the Joint Staff, U.S. Cyber Command, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency as we must collectively work to operate freely and safely in this domain.

29. What is your understanding of the support that the OUSD(I) should provide to the Principal Cyber Advisor's cross-functional team under section 932 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014?

I understand that OUSD(I) supports the Principal Cyber Advisor cross-functional team through direct liaison and collaboration with the Director for Defense Intelligence that oversees defense technical collection and special programs. If confirmed, I will review the current level of support and identify any needed changes.

Information Operations

The Russian government conducted an aggressive information operations campaign against the United States in 2016 in an attempt to influence the presidential election and undermine faith in America's democratic system and institutions. The Russian government has been conducting similar operations for a number of years, including in 2017, against U.S. allies in Europe. The Department of Defense, and the Federal Government as a whole, was ill-prepared to detect, defend against, and respond to these operations, which have been conducted primarily, but not exclusively, through cyberspace. Section 1042 of S. 1519, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, as passed by the Senate Armed Services Committee, would require the Secretary of Defense to establish a cross-functional task force to integrate across the Department's capabilities and organizations to respond to and conduct information operations and cyber-enabled information operations.

30a. What are your views on the preparedness of the Department of Defense and the Federal Government as a whole to deter, defend against, and conduct integrated strategic information operations?

While I have been out of government for several years and have not been privy to the Department's progress in conducting information operations, I believe the ability of the Department of Defense and the Federal Government to understand, conduct, and deter strategic information operations falls short of what the nation needs. The 2016 Russian example is only one of many recent examples that highlight significant gaps in capability to counter strategic information operations and to develop an effective U.S. government-wide communications strategy. There is much work to do, including potential organizational reform and reallocation of resources. If confirmed, I would work closely with the other Primary Staff Assistants and the Joint Staff to understand how the intelligence community and defense intelligence enterprise can enhance operations in the information environment. This effort would include a review of OUSD(I)'s internal organizational structure. I understand that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently approved the introduction of a new, seventh Joint Function (information) that should serve as a springboard to better organize the entire Department to address strategic, operational, and tactical information operations.

30b. What is your assessment of section 1042?

If confirmed, I will commit to an extensive review of the potential implications of section 1042. If section 1042 is enacted into law, it may provide new opportunities to transform DoD information and cyber operations by prioritizing and integrating DoD efforts across the information environment. I would look forward to working closely and collaboratively with other stakeholders in the Department to ensure we have the requisite capabilities to operate effectively with speed and agility in the information environment and cyberspace domain. OUSD(I)'s internal organizational structure would also need to be examined to ensure that we are postured to meet the objectives of section 1042.

30c. What role would you foresee for the Defense intelligence components in supporting the task force proposed in section 1042?

If confirmed, I will ensure the defense intelligence enterprise is prepared to support the task force proposed in section 1042, if enacted into law. I foresee important roles for the defense intelligence components in supporting section 1042 objectives. Intelligence has always been a cornerstone of effective offensive and defensive operations in the information environment and thus a strong, impactful role for USD(I) to achieve the objectives outlined in section 1042 is appropriate. If the position of Defense Intelligence Officer for Information Operations and Cyber Operations was established in law, it may allow for substantial gains in effective, efficient, and proactive support for cyberspace operations, military deception, operations security, military information support operations, electronic warfare, and other indirect approaches that address the cognitive nature of war.

Space

31. What do you perceive as the threats to our national security space satellites?

The United States, its allies, and partners rely on space capabilities for their security and prosperity. Losing access to our space capabilities would have severe consequences on the battlefield and our way of life here at home. Our adversaries recognize this dependency and have invested in a range of anti-satellite capabilities, from kinetic weapons to be employed against our satellites to non-kinetic cyber weapons that can disable our satellite ground stations and jam command, control, and communications links. Additionally, space has become increasingly congested, with the number of objects in orbit steadily growing, threatening our ability to operate safely.

32. Briefly describe what policy objectives the Defense Department should be seeking to achieve and the strategy you think is necessary to address these threats.

If confirmed, I would support the Secretary and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in their articulation of the Department's space policy objectives. I believe that our defense intelligence enterprise must have the capabilities, personnel, and resources to adequately assess space threats and technology to better support the acquisition and operation of new space capabilities. Furthermore, I believe that OUSD(I) can work to better integrate intelligence with operations in protecting our space advantage, as well as increase the integration of space and airborne ISR in delivering intelligence advantage to our warfighters.

33. Given that the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) would be required to respond operationally to active threats to reconnaissance satellites by adversaries in a conflict, should the Department consider designating the NRO as a combat support agency?

If confirmed, I would look into what changes may be warranted to our overall space enterprise based on the current and predicted threat environment.

Relationship with Respect to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SOLIC)

34. How are responsibilities for the oversight of the activities and programs of special operations forces delineated between the OUSD(I) and ASD SOLIC?

Since 9/11, U.S. special operations forces have successfully integrated operations and intelligence at every level of tactical and operational command. To the extent that these forces engage in intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, or other intelligence-related activities, the USD(I) and the ASD(SO/LIC) share responsibility for overseeing those activities. If confirmed, I will continue to build upon the active partnership between the USD(I) and ASD SO/LIC teams to ensure collaboration that

strengthens the Department's oversight and effectiveness of special operations activities and programs.

35. Are there any programs that are currently overseen by the OUSD(I) that would be more appropriately overseen by ASD SOLIC?

I am not aware of any currently. However, I would need to better understand the full range of program oversight. If confirmed, I would work closely with ASD SO/LIC and the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command to help ensure that supporting activities and programs are in place and overseen to support the Special Operations Command's effectiveness, and aligned to ASD SO/LIC's roles and responsibilities.

Personnel Security and Insider Threats

The Secretary of Defense established the Department of Defense Insider Threat Management and Analysis Center (DITMAC) in 2014 to oversee the mitigation of insider threat risks to the Department and specific actions on insider threat cases. The Department faces technical, cultural, management, and organizational challenges in creating integrated, automated means to access data from, and make correlations across, the intelligence, counter-intelligence, law enforcement, physical security, cybersecurity, personnel security, and human resources organizations in all the military services, defense agencies, combatant commands, and Office of the Secretary of Defense, as well as the Department's contractor population. The USD(I) is the designated Department of Defense official accountable for managing and overseeing the Department's insider threat program.

36a. How, if at all, should the Department change its data ownership and governance policies to allow for DITMAC to accomplish its mission?

It is vital that the Department, and USD(I), as the accountable manager for the program, develop appropriate tools and propose policies to collectively mitigate risk and address threats. I believe the Department should take an innovative, directive approach, seeking to implement promising data management technologies that develop an "all source," shared picture of the potential insider threats. The threat is too significant to not aggressively resolve those other aforementioned issues that are within the Department's ability and responsibility to resolve. If confirmed, I will closely examine the Department's insider threat mitigation program, identify any policy constraints, and work closely with leaders and staffs across the Defense Department to propose those data ownership and governance policies that are in the best interests of mitigating insider threats.

36b. Does the OUSD(I) have the authority and technical expertise necessary to guide the development of a comprehensive insider threat capability that integrates all sources of information for identifying insider threats using modern information technology?

I believe that the Department's insider threat program is still developing. I understand that the Department is using a phased approach to implement capabilities that will integrate the latest technologies available. The goal is for the program to be comprehensive by aggregating and analyzing available information vital to timely awareness and action in countering insider threats. If confirmed, I would pursue the expertise and technology to optimize this goal from any appropriate source and I will assess whether additional authorities or other resources would be needed for OUSD(I) to optimally address this threat.

36c. Is it advisable and appropriate, in your view, for the DITMAC to have access or be integrated into the Defense Department contractors' human resource, cybersecurity, physical security, and personnel security data systems, given that contractors were responsible for multiple recent insider threats?

I believe insider threat programs should address threats in a comprehensive and integrated way that ensures effective mitigation of threats regardless of their origin. If confirmed, I would evaluate fully the options to address any information-sharing challenges, including potential use of contractor data. I would propose the necessary integration and access protocols that best mitigate the insider threat while protecting sensitive data where appropriate.

Personnel Security to Support the Department of Defense's Innovation Strategy

The Department of Defense is pursuing a wide-ranging strategy to engage with commercial entities engaged in cutting-edge research and development, including through the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUX). The Department's leadership recognizes that it needs new acquisition policies and practices to enable the Department to engage with this sector with the necessary speed, agility and flexibility. Two related obstacles are the time and difficulty involved in acquiring security clearances and the hurdles that non-traditional contractors face in getting access to data to test and demonstrate new information technology and software. The National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, for example, has concluded that it lacks the authority necessary to share even its unclassified imagery data with companies and universities it hopes can develop dramatically improved exploitation capabilities through machine learning-based artificial intelligence algorithms.

37. What are your views on the importance of, and potential approaches for, the Defense Department's security apparatus adapting and tailoring its requirements and procedures to better support the Department's innovation agenda?

It is vital that DoD innovation efforts are secure and protected appropriately from all threats, just as it is vital for the Department to pursue those capabilities that will markedly enhance critically important capabilities. It is my understanding that a provision of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 required the establishment of an Enhanced Security Program to Support the Department of Defense Innovation Initiative. If confirmed, I would work to ensure the effective implementation of this

program at DoD innovation hubs, such as DIUx. In addition, I would aggressively support continued outreach to industry and seek the means to safely and rapidly bring data exploitation and emerging machine learning and artificial intelligence capabilities to bear on national security challenges.

U.S. Special Operations Command Intelligence Operations

38. In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out by special operations personnel different from those carried out by others in the intelligence community?

In my experience, special operations missions require very precise and detailed intelligence to prepare the battlespace and ensure operations can be executed on short timelines and in high risk environments. This range of missions also requires access to agile and flexible intelligence-related infrastructure, tradecraft, and capabilities to meet operational requirements. Additionally, U.S. Special Operations Forces have trained and honed their skills to conduct meticulous site exploitations throughout the course of their operations. These have led to many follow-on successes against our adversaries. Sixteen years of close collaboration between the intelligence community and special operations forces has provided a critical battlefield advantage.

38a. If confirmed, how would you ensure intelligence activities carried out by special operations forces are adequately coordinated with other activities carried out by those in the intelligence community?

I recognize the importance of fully coordinating special operations forces' intelligence activities with those of the intelligence community. While I believe this coordination and collaboration is closer than at any time in our nation's past, I would, if confirmed, continue efforts to improve coordination and deconfliction and promote the leveraging of each other's activities to meet intelligence needs from the tactical to the strategic levels.

Need for Independent Intelligence Analysis

39. If confirmed, how would you ensure that intelligence analysts within the Defense Department, including those who may be seconded to offices that are not part of the Defense intelligence structure, are independent and free of pressure from influence from their chain of command to reach a certain conclusion, including a conclusion that fits a particular policy preference?

I am firmly committed to the principle of analytic integrity for defense intelligence analysts. Through my career experience, I understand how important it is that the unvarnished truth, no matter how unwelcome, always makes its way from the field to the headquarters and national leaders. If confirmed, I would fully support policies and programs that ensure defense intelligence analysis is objective and free from the personal or political biases of individual analysts or managers. I am aware of and fully support actions taken by OUSD(I) in light of recent recommendations made by the DoD

Inspector General to ensure analytic integrity, such as establishing an analytic ombudsman at each defense component that produces intelligence analysis and an analysis of alternatives to evaluate differing hypotheses when applicable.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

40. Do you agree, if confirmed for this position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Yes.

41. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the USD(I)?

Yes.

42. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate committees in a timely manner?

Yes.

43. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with this Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.

44. Do you agree to answer letters and requests for information from individual Senators who are members of this Committee?

Yes.

45. If confirmed, do you agree to provide to this Committee relevant information within the jurisdictional oversight of the Committee when requested by the Committee, even in the absence of the formality of a letter from the Chairman?

Yes.