Senate Armed Services Committee
Advance Questions for Admiral Christopher W. Grady
Nominee for Appointment to be Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Duties and Responsibilities

Section 154 of title 10, U.S. Code, establishes the position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and provides that the Vice Chairman performs the duties prescribed as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in addition to such other duties as may be prescribed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. Furthermore, other provisions of law and Department of Defense issuances assign to the Vice Chairman a breadth of duties and responsibilities.

1. What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the nation's second-highest ranking military officer and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and is responsible for overseeing joint military requirements, providing advice and recommendations, and performing other duties as directed by the Chairman.

2. What background and experience do you possess that qualify you to perform the Vice Chairman’s duties and responsibilities?

I have been honored to serve our nation for 37 years. I believe my command experiences as Commander of U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Naval and Joint Forces Maritime Component Command Strategic Command, Naval Forces Northern Command, Commander, Sixth Fleet, Commander, Striking and Support Forces NATO, Commander, Naval Surface Forces Atlantic, as well as the director of the Maritime Operations Center for the Pacific Fleet have prepared me for the duties and responsibilities of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, particularly the role that the Vice Chairman plays in managing military requirements.

Multiple global deployments, service in senior Joint Staff and OPNAV staff billets, including on the National Security Council in the White House, and command of a Carrier Strike Group have also prepared me to work collaboratively across the joint force, the interagency, whole of government, and closely with our allies and partner nations.

3. Do you believe that there are any steps you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
I believe I am prepared to perform the duties and responsibilities of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chief. I will continue to maintain an open mind for thoughtful and diverse insight to ensure our military forces are positioned to serve our nation.

4. What other duties do you anticipate the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs would prescribe for you, if confirmed?

The Chairman, General Milley, has indicated he does not intend to expand the Vice Chairman’s duties beyond what is stipulated in statute.

If confirmed, I expect to continue to emphasize efforts to strengthen the readiness of our military and reform Department business practices for increased effectiveness and affordability.

5. Are there other roles or responsibilities that should be assigned to the Vice Chairman, in your view?

I do not believe there are any additional duties to assign to the Vice Chairman, beyond those stipulated in statute. If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman and the Director of the Joint Staff, if necessary, to ensure the Joint Staff’s effectiveness.

6. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure that your tenure as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff epitomizes the fundamental requirement for civilian control of the Armed Forces embedded in the U.S. Constitution and other laws?

The Constitution and applicable laws clearly articulate that we are a nation under civilian control; it is one of the foundational principles of our great nation. If confirmed as the Vice Chairman, I will make it my priority to ensure military options are aligned with a whole of government approach and in full support of our civilian leadership. Civilian control of the military is a bedrock principle of our country, and I will do everything in my power to ensure it is upheld to the fullest extent.

Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff often partner to lead the Department in addressing emergent issues and policy challenges that require the integration of civilian and military expertise and perspective.

7. If confirmed, how would you structure your relationship with the Deputy Secretary of Defense?

If confirmed, I will work hand-in-hand with the Deputy Secretary of Defense to foster and build a strong and collaborative relationship. Activities will include participation in multiple meetings each week on critical issues for the Joint Force and the nation, both
senior leader forums that provide guidance to the Department, and issue-focused engagements to advance new opportunities and stem emerging challenges.

8. If confirmed, how would you expect responsibilities to be allocated between the Deputy Secretary of Defense and yourself as co-chairs of the Deputy’s Management Action Group?

I view the Deputy Secretary of Defense as a close and complementary partner in managing the agenda and execution of the Deputy’s Management Action Group. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Deputy Secretary of Defense on a wide variety of issues to include the full range of strategy, policy, resourcing, and management issues impacting the Department.

9. In your view, can the Deputy’s Management Action Group be more effective in ensuring that issues with resource management, and broad policy implications are addressed in a manner that aligns with the Secretary of Defense’s priorities and the Department’s planning and programming schedule? Please explain your answer.

The Deputy’s Management Action Group is a critical forum for sharing information, creating alignment across civilian and military components, exercising effective civilian control and oversight of the Department, and making decisions on major issues. One way to make this forum more effective is to identify additional lower-level forums which are working on issues that would benefit from a higher-level review to broaden information sharing, remove obstacles, and bring decisions to closure.

Major Challenges and Opportunities

10. What do you consider to be the most significant challenges you will face if confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Our military’s challenge over the coming years is to fully transform and adapt in the context of a constantly evolving threat environments our nation faces from our pacing threats Russia and especially China. As we transform, we must also set a high priority on maintaining our close cooperation with our allies and partners to address various security challenges and increase our collective strength. Also, while our focus must be on our pacing threats, we still face challenges from Iran, North Korea, and violent extremist organizations. In order to effectively address all the threats we face, we must continue to modernize our military, and, maintain its readiness to engage anywhere and anytime our nation’s leaders choose.

11. What plans do you have for addressing each of these challenges, if confirmed?

If confirmed, I intend to work alongside the Chairman, combatant commanders, and the Services to ensure we are effectively executing the strategy our nation’s leaders set out.
The Joint Staff will collaborate with interagency partners and Congress to assess the global security challenges and provide a flexible, agile Joint Force that leverages fresh concepts and robust capabilities to offer the broadest possible set of operational options to decision-makers.

12. To the extent that the Joint Staff performs functions that overlap with those of other DOD components, what would be your approach, if confirmed, to consolidating and reducing those redundancies?

If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman to ensure that the Joint Staff continues to identify and mitigate unnecessary redundancies consistent with law and policy.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Section 921 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 made changes to section 151 of title 10, U. S. Code, concerning the service of members of the Joint Chiefs (other than the Chairman) as military advisors to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

13. What is your assessment of the authorities and process by which members of the Joint Chiefs (other than the Chairman) provide military advice and opinions to the President, National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and civilian leadership of the Department of Defense?

Existing authorities and processes facilitate the flow and exchange of advice and opinions to senior leaders. If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman to facilitate any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, either individually or collectively, in providing their advice directly to the President, National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, the Secretary of Defense, and Congress. Additionally, I will foster a collaborative environment that promotes respect for dissent and strengthens our national security in a very complex security environment.

14. Will you commit that, if confirmed, you would always provide your best military advice to the President, the National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, and civilian leadership of the Department of Defense, even when your advice and opinions differ from those of the Chairman or the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Yes, if confirmed.

National Defense Strategy and Interim National Security Strategic Guidance

The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) focused U.S. strategic priorities on a rising China, an aggressive Russia, and the continuing threat from rogue regimes and global terrorism. In March 2021, the Biden Administration issued its
Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG), which sets out the national security priorities for the Administration. The Administration has initiated the process of preparing a new NDS, which is to be completed in 2022.

15. Do you believe that the 2018 NDS and the INSSG accurately assess the current strategic environment, including the most critical and enduring threats to the national security of the United States and its allies?

Yes, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Force provided their best military advice during the development of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). The INSSG provides adequate guidance until the release of the 2022 NDS. Both have accurately assessed the strategic environment and articulated the position of the Joint Chiefs with appropriate focus on great power competition.

16. Do you support the national security priorities set out in the 2018 NDS and INSSG?

Yes, I support the national security priorities set out in the 2018 NDS and INSSG. They provide necessary strategic direction to the Joint Force. The Secretary’s emphasis on China as the pacing threat is aligned with both documents. The shift from a Counter-Violent Extremist Organization focus to one centered around what the 2018 NDS referred to as Great Power Competition was an important shift for the Joint Force. The 2018 NDS’ emphasis on Allies and Partners and Reform were also important pillars that the 2022 NDS and NMS will continue building upon.

17. If confirmed, what changes or adjustments, if any, would you advise the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make to the 2018 NDS or in the Department’s implementation of the 2018 NDS and INSSG?

If confirmed, I would want to first thoroughly review the strategy development work already under way for the 2022 NDS and 2022 National Military Strategy (NMS). Based on that review, I would make an assessment and offer any recommendations that seemed appropriate and in alignment with the Administration’s strategic direction, as currently laid out in the INSSG and in the soon to be released National Security Strategy (NSS).

18. In your view, do the 2018 NDS and INSSG correctly specify the priority missions of the DOD and the capabilities by which DOD can achieve its objectives in the context of the current strategic environment? What do you perceive as the areas of greatest risk?

Yes, the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), as amplified in the INSSG, correctly prioritizes the Department of Defense’s mission. China and Russia’s growing capabilities pose the greatest risk to our nation and strategic stability. China and Russia pose truly existential challenges that we must address in defense of the Homeland, in the emerging domains of space and cyber, in the conduct of contested logistics, and across all dimensions of national security.
19. In your view, are the plans and programs of the Commanders of the Combatant Commands appropriately focused, scoped, and resourced to counter the threats and achieve the national security objectives identified by the 2018 NDS and INSSG?

Combatant Command Contingency Plans (CONPLANs) and Operational Plans (OPLANs) are necessary but not sufficient to capture the full scope of operations across the globe. In response, the Joint Force has developed Global Integration Frameworks (GIFs) for each of the priority challenges. GIFs use the capstone OPLAN to prioritize military objectives across the globe, identify global campaigning activities, and achieve the NDS’s and INSSG national security objectives.

20. If confirmed, what changes might you propose to the missions, responsibilities, and force structure allocated to the Combatant Commands, best to implement the 2018 NDS and INSSG? Please explain your answer.

The DoD consistently seeks to improve our combatant commands’ ability to achieve military objectives in support of National Security aims. If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman to review the relevant studies regarding combatant commands’ roles and missions, consider how we might further global integration to best address the global nature of the challenges we face in the 21st century, and offer my recommendations accordingly.

National Military Strategy

The Committee remains concerned that the processes for translating the explicit and implicit priorities reflected in the National Military Strategy into the budget proposals submitted by the military services are not as effective as they need to be.

21. In your view, does the Defense Planning Guidance consistently and clearly set priorities for joint capabilities that emerge from the National Military Strategy and the Joint Military Net Assessment?

Yes, the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) consistently and clearly sets priorities for joint capabilities that emerge from the National Military Strategy (NMS) and the Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA).
22. In your view are the Chairman’s Annual Joint Assessment and Annual Program Assessment effective in aligning service budget proposals with joint priorities?

Yes. That does not mean there is no room for improvement. If confirmed, through these documents, chairmanship of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and co-chairmanship of the Deputy’s Management Action Group, I will encourage all elements of the Joint Force to continually assess opportunities to improve our ability to efficiently and effectively invest in emerging and modern capabilities and technologies that truly address our greatest threats and challenges.

23. What are your views on the current version of the Joint Warfighting Concept as it supports the National Military Strategy?

The Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) is an important document for the Joint Force. It provides a vision of the future Joint Force and describes how that Force must fight in order to be successful. Through learning and experimentation, the JWC will serve as an important roadmap to modernize capabilities and address gaps.

**DOD Readiness**

24. How would you assess the current readiness of the DOD—across the domains of materiel and equipment, personnel, and training—to execute the NDS, INSSG, and Combatant Commanders’ associated operational plans?

I am confident today we can protect the homeland, meet our alliance commitments, and maintain a competitive advantage over any potential adversary. With stable, predictable, adequate, and timely funding, we are working to improve readiness and modernization across the joint force in order to increase our lethality, flexibility, and resilience.

25. In what specific ways have the Combatant Commands utilized their increased budgetary authority to foster readiness recovery?

The Services are leading the charge in utilizing their increased budget authority to foster readiness recovery. The increased budgetary authority granted to restore core readiness was necessary and an important step. The Combatant Commands’ role continues to highlight to the Services areas of critical concern for mission execution. The Combatant Commanders have been staunch resources and readiness advocates to their service partners.

26. What is your assessment of the risk the Combatant Commands and the Combat Support Agencies have accepted in regard to their readiness to execute operational plans in furtherance of the NDS and INSSG?
Restoring warfighting readiness, both current and future, is a key priority of the 2018 NDS and INSSG. With stable, predictable, adequate, and timely funding, we have been able to address risk in force readiness and are restoring capability to respond to contingencies. The Joint Force continues to face challenges in rebuilding future readiness, and, looking out to 2025, the ability to project power and achieve superiority in multiple domains. Our competitive advantage has eroded over time because of two decades of continuous operations exacerbated by sequestration and fiscal uncertainty. With sustained, predictable, adequate, and timely funding we can continue to improve readiness and build the future force that maintains our competitive advantage.

27. If confirmed, what role would you play in restoring joint force readiness?

Our nation faces very real and significant challenges, and we must continue to invest in the future. Stable, predictable, adequate, and timely funding help us maintain our qualitative and quantitative competitive advantage. Additionally, we must recapture our ability to go faster than our adversaries and take informed risks to maintain our competitive advantage. This includes inserting speed into acquisition, research and development, and our technology and innovation processes to ensure capabilities are delivered faster. If confirmed, as the JROC Chairman and DMAG Co-Chair, I will advocate for these efforts to ensure we continue to improve joint readiness and the developing and fielding of warfighting capabilities.

National Defense Budget

In its 2018 report, the National Defense Strategy Commission recommended that Congress increase the defense budget at an average rate of three to five percent above inflation through the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).

28. Do you believe that sustained real growth in the defense budget is necessary to achieve the aims of the existing NDS without incurring significant risk?

Yes. I believe sustained real growth in the face of evolving long term economic pressure is necessary to achieve the aims of the existing NDS without incurring buying power risk to FY22 dollars. The Department’s $715 Billion budget requires hard choices in terms of prioritization, but it is sufficient to meet the requirements of the current NDS. If confirmed, I will be an advocate for stable, predictable, adequate and timely defense budgets.

29. If confirmed, by what standards would you measure the adequacy of the DOD budget?

If confirmed, I would measure the proposed budget against the National Defense Strategy’s required tasks, missions, and capabilities. PB22 supports a more lethal, ready, and partnered force by funding efforts to modernize capabilities, expand warfighting capacity, and restore readiness.
Use of Military Force

30. In your view, what factors should be considered in making recommendations to the President for the use of military force?

Recommendations on the use of military force should be consistent with U.S. domestic and international law. Additionally, such recommendations should consider the probability of success, cost in terms of casualties, and strategic risk.

31. In your view, what is the appropriate role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in establishing policies for the use of military force and the rules of engagement?

The President, as Commander-in-Chief, determines when to use military force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense and should actively advise on the policies for the use of military force and the rules of engagement.

32. Are you satisfied that current legal authorities, including the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, provide sufficient authority for the Department to conduct counterterrorism operations and activities as necessary and appropriate to protect U.S. national security interests?

I agree that the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force provides a legal basis for operations against violent extremist organizations and is consistent with the policies of current and past administrations expressed in the report on the Legal and Policy Frameworks Guiding the United States Use of Military Force and Related National Security Operations.

33. In your view, what operational factors should Congress take into consideration in assessing whether a “new” Authorization for the Use of Military Force is needed at this time? Please explain your answer.

I believe the current Authorized Use of Military Force (AUMF) is sufficient in providing legal basis for the Department’s current counterterrorism activities. However, I support Congress considering, as the President has stated, the terrorist threat as it exists today versus the threat that existed when the 2001 AUMF was enacted.

Updating the AUMF may improve our approach to counterterrorism by aligning our resources to evolving threats, but there are also risks to changing an authority which is sufficient and works. A new AUMF must account for all terrorist organizations which threaten U.S. national interests and provide the latitude for the U.S. to use both kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities of the Joint Force to ensure the safety of these interests. As the President has pointed out, the U.S. will lead first with diplomacy and leverage America’s unmatched network of alliances and partnerships.
34. In your view, are existing policies and processes for determining if and when the forces of other nations are eligible for Collective Self-Defense by U.S. forces adequate and appropriate?

Yes. In all cases where U.S. forces are authorized to use force to defend foreign forces or individuals in the context of armed conflict, or a significant threat from an organized armed group, the authorization comes from the President, whether expressly or implicitly in authorizing or directing U.S. forces to participate in multinational military operations. The Secretary of Defense approves military orders (rules of engagement) implementing that authorization, and in many instances the Geographic Combatant Commanders are responsible for identifying and designating specific foreign forces or individuals to be defended.

Chain of Command

Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S. Code provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commands. Section 163(a) of title 10 further provides that the President may direct that communications between the President or the Secretary of Defense and the Commanders of the Combatant Commands be transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and may assign duties to the Chairman to assist the President and the Secretary in performing their command function.

35. Do you believe that these provisions of law enact a clear and effective chain of command?

Yes.

36. In your view, do these provisions properly effectuate civilian control of the military? Please explain your answer.

Yes. The chain of command originates with the President and runs through the Secretary of Defense, and from the Secretary to the commanders of the combatant commands. If confirmed, I will be dedicated to participating in the decision-making process and executing lawful orders as given by my civilian leadership.

37. Are there circumstances in which you believe it appropriate for U.S. military forces to be under the operational command or control of an authority other than the chain of command established under title 10, U.S. Code?

Normally, our armed forces operate under the established Title 10 chain of command. There may be instances for the President to establish other temporary command relationships for certain sensitive military operations. Regardless of the command relationship, U.S. military personnel are still accountable to the Title 10 chain of command and are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Furthermore, our armed forces must act consistent with the law of war in all military operations.
Alliances and Partnerships

The 2018 NDS and INSSG stress that mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are crucial to U.S. success in competition with, deterrence of, and potential conflict against long term strategic competitors.

38. What is your view of the continuing strength of our current alliances, relationships, and partnerships, and the trust our partners have in the United States to meet its obligations? What do you see as the role of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in enhancing that trust?

From a Joint Force perspective, confidence and trust in the U.S. military among our Allies and Partners remains strong. We continue to be actively engaged and synchronized with our Allies and Partners in our operations around the globe. The role of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is uniquely suited to complement the Chairman’s engagements with Allies and Partners to reassure them of the U.S. commitment to a rules based international order.

I will continue, and expand as necessary, the Vice Chairman’s role in direct bilateral consultations on key issues of importance with my counterparts. These consultations could take the form of Counterpart Visits, less formal office calls on the margins of other Ally and Partner visits to the United States, traveling to Ally and Partner countries for engagements with their leadership and staff, or direct phone calls.

39. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to strengthen existing U.S. alliances and partnerships in each combatant commander’s geographic AOR for long-term strategic competition?

If confirmed, I will ensure that the Joint Force, through the execution of our Global Campaign Plans, continues to strengthen alliances and partnerships, build new partnerships, and leverage new opportunities for international cooperation.

Specifically, the Joint Force does this through close consultation and coordination with Allies and Partners in a number of routine bilateral and multilateral relationships that include, but are not limited to, our key Allies in the Indo-Pacific, NATO Allies, the FVEY nations, the Quad, ASEAN’s Defense Ministers Meeting-plus framework, and Coalition partners. These fora enable us to engage and collaborate with our Allies and Partners to achieve mutual military objectives and desired strategic effects related to competition with China and Russia, while enabling their capabilities to counter violent extremist organizations. Most importantly, within bilateral engagements and multilateral fora, we increase our communications and take action to include Allies and Partners earlier in our planning processes to enable their national enterprises greater opportunity for integration and collaboration.
40. How would you characterize your familiarity with the military leaders of the Armed Forces of other nations, international consultative forums, and processes for enhancing interoperability between Allies and Partners?

Allies and Partners are critical in responding to mutual threats, preserving our shared interests, shaping the strategic environment, and are one of the greatest asymmetric advantages the United States has over potential adversaries. In my career, I have had the opportunity to meet and get to know military leaders from many of our Ally and Partner Armed Forces.

I am familiar with, and will support as necessary, the Chairman’s regular consultations and meetings with Allied and Partner Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) in several multilateral fora such as the NATO Military Committee in Chiefs of Defense Sessions and others. These consultations are essential to enhancing interoperability between Allies and Partners.

41. In your view, what kinds of activities or engagements with Allies and Partners are most effective at enhancing those relationships and in case of crisis and conflict are most likely to elicit their defense cooperation and support?

Building and enhancing relationships with Allies and Partners is a continuous activity, and the Joint Force is best served by a comprehensive relationship-based approach. Key leader engagements are vital, as are exercises and training, personnel exchanges, partnering for technology development, and a host of other security cooperation activities. Of course, the appropriate frequency and scope of each activity will depend upon the relationship in question, the goals set by policymakers, as well as the specific campaign, contingency, and crisis action plans our commanders have in place.

Defense Security Cooperation

DOD supports a wide range of programs and activities including foreign military sales, security assistance to build the capabilities of foreign security forces, exercises and training events, military-to-military exchanges, and partnering to develop key technological capabilities.

42. Do you believe the Department of Defense has an effective security cooperation strategy for long-term strategic competition with near-peer rivals?

Yes, I believe the DoD has an effective security cooperation approach for long term strategic competition with near peer rivals. Our existing security cooperation programs and activities, as led and managed by OSD Policy, DSCA, the Joint Staff J5/J7, and the Combatant Commanders are critical in bolstering the network of alliances and partnerships necessary to compete with near-peer rivals. Security Cooperation success depends in large part on collaboration with our interagency counterparts under the guidance of documents like the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG), to
ensure that DOD’s security cooperation activities support U.S. foreign policy objectives more broadly.

43. What should be the primary objectives of Department of Defense security cooperation programs and activities, in your view?

The primary objectives of DoD security cooperation actions and activities employed by Combatant Commanders are to build and develop allied and partner security capability and capacity for self-defense and multinational operations. These same activities provide the Joint Force with the access and relationships necessary to promote access and shared security interests.

44. Is the Department of Defense appropriately organized and resourced to execute security cooperation programs and activities effectively? If not, what changes would you recommend, if confirmed?

The DOD is well organized to execute security cooperation through a network of experts in the Combatant Commands and Services, at U.S. Embassies, within the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and elsewhere. While it is clear the DoD cannot rely on enormous investments in the national security forces of other governments to guarantee the security of the American people, it is also apparent that security cooperation activities often pay large dividends.

If confirmed, I aim to collaborate with all stakeholders to assess and evaluate our security cooperation programs to ensure they meet the needs of our operational commanders and are achieving the goals our national security policy makers.

The Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)

The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a member of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), the DOD acquisition system’s senior advisory board. The DAB reviews and advises the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment on Major Defense Acquisition Programs—the most complex and expensive DOD acquisition projects.

45. What is your understanding of the Vice Chairman’s role as a member of the DAB?

The Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) is the senior advisory board for defense acquisitions in the Department of Defense. The board is chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and includes the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Secretaries, and a number of Under Secretaries of Defense. The DAB plays an important role in the Defense Acquisition System. Members of this board are responsible for approving the Major Defense Acquisition Programs and serve as the most important executive review of critical acquisition projects that have large impacts on the capacity and capabilities of the force.
If confirmed, I intend to work in close partnership with the Board’s members to assure alignment with the stated goals of the Chairman’s Planning Guidance and National Military Strategy.

46. Do you believe that the Vice Chairman’s role in the DAB should be modified to enhance the Board’s effectiveness? If so, how?

Not at this time, but I will look for opportunities to increase the flexibility and the speed at which we acquire systems and warfighting capabilities.

**Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)**

The Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) established the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) as “the principal advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs on joint military capabilities or joint performance requirements” enabling the JROC Chairman to recommend requirements to the Chairman without the concurrence of the members of the JROC.

47. If confirmed, do you intend to take full advantage of your authority as the JROC Chairman to recommend requirements to the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense for capabilities that derive from commercial technology and technology developed in DOD organizations independently of the military services?

If confirmed, I plan to execute the mission set by Congress in Title 10 Section 181. This mission is best achieved with the active support of the Services that make up the JROC membership. I anticipate that in the current technological environment the entities that procure capabilities to fulfill those requirements will draw from technologies that derive from the Services, private industry, and other DOD organizations.

48. If confirmed, do you intend to exercise this authority to establish requirements for joint capabilities, such as Joint All-Domain Command and Control?

Yes, I will exercise the capability requirements authority. Modern warfare demands unprecedented levels of interoperability, integrated systems-of-systems kill chains, and joint command and control, for which no single Service is responsible.

49. Do you believe that this problem can be addressed through the JROC requirements process?

Yes, the requirements for such joint capabilities can and should be addressed through the JROC.
Born out of numerous failures in interoperability, the JROC and its requirements process were created to enforce interoperability between critical systems across the joint force.

50. If confirmed, what other steps would you recommend to address this deficiency?

If confirmed, I would continue to support my predecessor’s efforts to seek consensus on issues for which no single Service has responsibility and work to address those issues through the JROC Strategic Directives. I also support the use of the Joint Warfighting Concept to assign matters of Joint interest to a lead Service with an appropriate supporting Joint Staff directorate.

51. Do you believe the JROC has responsibility to ensure that the services are meeting their joint warfighting obligation with their assigned roles and missions?

The JROC’s responsibilities, as established in Title 10 Section 181, are to support the National Defense Strategy by assessing joint military capabilities, prioritizing efforts to fill any gaps, and validating joint military requirements. It is incumbent on the Services to achieve their joint warfighting obligations, and to inform the JROC when they are unable to do so.

Currently, strategic capability gaps derived from exercises and experiments as they are applied to helping refine the Joint Warfighting Concept are being used by the JROC to deliver strategic direction and joint capability requirements to the Services.

52. Do you agree this is an effective methodology for providing strategic direction to the Services?

JROC Strategic Directives (JSDs) are aligned to Joint Concepts and focus on cross-cutting capabilities that the Joint Warfighter of the future will need to satisfy the strategic guidance within the NDS. JSDs achieve this by setting clear and strategic requirements to ensure interoperability across the Joint Force.

53. What is your understanding of how this strategic direction is to be enforced by the Department to ensure the Services fulfill joint capability requirements?

JROC Strategic Directives (JSDs) will inform the Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR) and the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). In turn, the directives will inform Service POMs and the development of the President’s Budget. I support the current plan that each year the JROC – including the Vice Chairman and each of the Services – will assess how the Services are progressing in meeting the JSD requirements.

54. With respect to Integrated Air and Missile defense, do you believe the JROC should play a role in ensuring the Joint Force has the ability to protect itself in the near term and future from supersonic cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons?
Yes. The JROC’s responsibilities, as established in Title 10 Section 181, are to support the National Defense Strategy by assessing joint military capabilities, prioritizing efforts to fill any gaps, and validating joint military requirements. This responsibility exists across all domains and all capabilities.

55. If confirmed, what action would you take to ensure this capability is developed and fielded?

The JROC will continue to monitor and manage the progress of the program through its established bodies and processes to include validation of changes to requirements documents and the annual Capability Portfolio Management Review.

Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2), and the Assault Breaker II initiative from DARPA are two prominent examples of joint capabilities in development for which there is no obvious transition path. In the case of JADC2, the Joint Staff is taking the lead in coordinating development.

56. In your view, is this an important issue? If so, do you have thoughts about how to address it if you are confirmed?

JADC2 is an important developing joint capability, critical to the success of the Department. JADC2 is not a joint product or program of record but rather a capability delivery framework to modernize and accelerate the fielding of material and non-material C2 capabilities. DSD stood up the JADC2 Cross-Functional Team (CFT) to oversee implementation of the Secretary’s JADC2 Strategy. The CFT has been charged with highlighting “best of breed” capabilities and ensuring the possible transition or integration of joint C2 initiatives. If confirmed, I will aggressively monitor CFT progress to assure timely introduction of these important capabilities to the joint force.

Commercial industry investment in research and development exceeds that of DOD and the technology emerging from industry is expected to drive military capabilities globally. For this reason, some recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)) should be made a member of the JROC.

57. Currently, USD (R&E), USD (A&S), and DOT&E serve in the JROC in prominent advisory roles. What are your views on adding the USD(R&E) as a voting JROC member?

I believe that it is important for the JROC to provide the military’s findings on future requirements from a warfighting perspective. There is wisdom in Congress’ creation of a cross-Service body to perform this function. Indeed, the JROC’s current composition of voting members includes General/Flag Officers from each service component. USD(R&E) has an important responsibility for the advancement of technology and innovation throughout the DoD, and is invited to participate in every
JROC meeting. The JROC values the recommendations of all its advisors, taking them into serious consideration. While I do not currently see a need to add USD(R&E) as a voting JROC member, it is also critical to retain USD(R&E)’s contribution as an advisory member.

58. Do you believe that the Vice Chairman, as the Chairman of the JROC, should work to develop requirements based on technological opportunities emerging from the private sector and DOD advanced research organizations, such as DARPA and the Strategic Capabilities Office?

Yes. Title 10 Section 181 charges the JROC to identify new joint military capabilities based on advances in technology and concepts of operation. In the current technological environment, it would be impossible to fulfill this mission without direct engagement with advanced research organizations and awareness of private-sector innovation. USD(R&E) provides a critical link to these emerging technological opportunities.

59. In your opinion, does the JROC staff, with USD (R&E), USD (A&S), and DOT&E at the table to provide advice, possess the technical expertise and capacity to identify mature, high-payoff technologies that should form the basis for new military requirements?

Yes.

60. In your view, is the JROC staff, with USD (R&E), USD (A&S), and DOT&E at the table to provide advice, able to effectively assess whether requirements proposed by the military services are technically realistic?

Yes.

The Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA directed the Secretary of Defense to “ensure that analytical organizations within the Department of Defense, such as the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, provide resources and expertise in operations research, systems analysis, and cost estimation to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council to assist the Council” in generating and approving requirements. Despite this mandate, the Joint Staff still lacks operations research-related expertise and capacity.

61. In your opinion, has this mandate has been fulfilled? Please explain.

Yes. While the JROC still relies on CAPE for cost assessment and program evaluation, expertise resident within the Joint Staff J8 Functional Capability Boards support operations research and systems analysis. Additional cost estimation expertise within the JROC would be duplicative of CAPE, which already serves in an advisory role to the JROC.
62. In your view, should the JROC have its own operations research and systems analysis staff?

No. The Joint Staff J8 provides operations research and systems analysis support to the JROC via the Functional Capabilities Boards.

According to Section 181 of title 10, U.S. Code, “The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that, in the case of a recommendation [of a requirement] by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary that is approved by the Secretary, oversight information with respect to such recommendation that is produced as a result of the activities of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council is made available in a timely fashion to the congressional defense committees.”

63. Do you commit, if confirmed, to provide such information to Congress when requested?

If confirmed, yes.

The JCIDS process was established partially to address overlap and duplication in Military Services’ programs. JCIDS is intended to provide the information the JROC needs to identify the capabilities and associated operational performance requirements needed by the joint warfighter.

64. In your view, is the JCIDS process effective in providing information the JROC requires to anticipate both the current and the future needs of the joint force?

Yes.

65. How does the JROC intersect with the Deputy’s Management Action Group (DMAG) and to what degree and how does that intersection allow enforcement of JROC strategic direction to the Services?

The VCJCS serves as Chairman of the JROC and as a co-chair of the DMAG. These combined roles provide the opportunity to provide advice to policy-makers based in the analysis and findings of the JROC, and to present recommendations that align DMAG actions with JROC strategic direction, in particular by deepening the alignment between requirements and budgeting.

66. If confirmed, how would you drive the development and articulation of future joint concepts from which each Military Service’s concept development, requirements generation, and acquisition processes will derive?

The Joint Warfighting Concept is a framework to align Joint Force requirements and guide future acquisition decisions. The findings of this concept provide the basis for JROC requirements and strategic directives. If confirmed, through the ongoing
Functional Capabilities Board processes, I will continue to review Joint Force capabilities and capability requirement gaps and prioritize efforts.

67. In your view, does DOD have the requisite modeling, simulation, and analytic capabilities to develop and assess future joint concepts, and the associated capabilities and force structure?

Our data, infrastructure, policy, tools, and staffs are challenged to keep pace with the ideas, concepts, and capabilities shaping our planning and programming. Fortunately, the Department has recognized these challenges and established an Analysis Working Group (AWG), co-chaired by the Deputy Secretary and Vice Chairman. The AWG is led by OSD (CAPE), OSD (Policy), Joint Staff J7 and J8, and the Chief Data Officer (CDO) and is working these challenges in conjunction with the Services and other key stakeholders in the Department.

68. If confirmed, what is your view on the appropriate role of Combatant Commanders in the JCIDS process? How would you improve the effectiveness of the process in identifying both the near-term and long-term needs of the Combatant Commander?

It is a team effort. Combatant Commanders serve as advisors to the JROC when matters related to their area of responsibility or function are under consideration. Combatant Commanders serve a critical role in developing requirements and identifying capability gaps. The Combatant Commanders specifically identify risks and evaluate their Global Campaign Plan objectives via the Annual Joint Assessment and the Capability Gap Assessment processes.

If confirmed, I will ensure the JROC continues to seek and consider input from the Combatant Commanders. I will evaluate the needs of the Combatant Commanders, the realities of Service budgets, and the priorities of DoD leadership before determining any necessary adjustments to improve effectiveness.

69. In your view, are the JROC and JCIDS processes sufficient to identify where opportunities for multi-Service collaboration exist, or where programs could or should be modified to take advantage of a related acquisition program?

Yes.

70. Do you have any recommendations for changes to the structure, authority, or processes of the JROC or the JCIDS?

No, not at this time.

71. The streamlined middle-tier acquisition authorities enacted in Section 804 of the FY 2016 NDAA seek to speed fielding of advanced technologies and systems by waiving the JCIDS process.
72. What do you perceive as the downsides of not using the formal JCIDS process?

Not using JCIDS creates three issues that impact joint interoperability: vital program interoperability may be impacted; proper program prioritization may be missed, slowing down vital warfighting capability reaching the Joint Force; and efforts may be duplicated across the services when procuring vital warfighting equipment.

If confirmed, I intend to continue efforts between the Joint Staff and USD (A&S) to incorporate Middle Tier Acquisition (MTA) into the JCIDS process in order to address these concerns while maintaining Congress’s intent to increase the speed and efficiency of the requirements process.

73. What is your opinion of DOD’s initial efforts to use section 804 authorities?

Use of section 804 authorities has been successful. From my perspective, as Commander, Fleet Forces Command, I am pleased to see the depth and breadth of activities looking to accelerate the delivery of warfighting capabilities to the force. If confirmed, I will continue to work with key stakeholders to evaluate the use of 804 authorities and provide feedback as necessary.

Aircraft

Even if all of the current aircraft modernization programs execute as planned, the average age of the tactical, strategic, and tanker fleets will continue to increase. Aging aircraft require ever-increasing maintenance, which incurs ever-increasing costs. Nonetheless, readiness levels continue to decline.

74. What are your views on balancing current aircraft capacity and future capability to meet expected threats?

It is critical to continue acquiring and modernizing our 5th generation fighter platforms for potential operations against near-peer competitors. However, adapting the force we have today, while we design the force needed for tomorrow’s challenges requires a mix of capabilities within the Tactical Fighter portfolio. In the short term, recapitalizing a portion of our 4th generation aircraft fleet provides essential capacity to improve readiness and meet Joint Force demands while we field new 5th generation aircraft, modernize our existing 5th generation aircraft, and develop new technologies to maintain the Joint Forces competitive advantage.

Nuclear Policy

75. Do you agree with the assessment of the past five Secretaries of Defense that nuclear deterrence is DOD’s highest priority mission and that modernizing our
Nation’s nuclear forces is a critical national security priority? Please explain your answer.

Yes. I believe nuclear deterrence is the Department’s highest priority mission. Maintaining a safe, secure, and effective U.S. nuclear deterrent is the only effective way to counter that threat. Modernizing our nuclear forces is a critical national security priority.

76. What is your understanding of the role of nuclear weapons and the importance of nuclear deterrence to U.S. national security and the defense of allies?

U.S. nuclear weapons have long played an important role in deterring nuclear and non-nuclear attack against the United States, our forces deployed abroad, and our allies. An effective U.S. nuclear deterrent is critical to maintaining strategic stability. That same nuclear deterrent adds extra pause between nuclear-armed adversary’s decisions to start a conventional conflict.

77. Do you agree that a triad of land, air, and sea based nuclear delivery systems is consistent with an effective deterrent posture in an era of increasing nuclear threats to the United States and its allies?

Yes. The flexible, survivable, and responsive nuclear triad has underpinned strategic deterrence for more than 60 years and is the bedrock of our national defense. It remains essential to ensure no adversary believes it can ever employ nuclear weapons for any reason, under any circumstances against the United States or our Allies or partners without risking devastating consequences.

78. Do you believe the U.S. should maintain an effective intercontinental ballistic missile force capable of responding to strategic attacks and of sufficient size to ensure that the United States could not be disarmed by an adversary’s first strike?

Yes. Our pacing threats are pursuing a diversified set of advanced nuclear weapons systems. The size and geographic dispersion of the ICBM force presents an intractable targeting problem that complicates a first-use attack. A maintained, modernized, and highly responsive, ICBM force is a crucial component of the Triad.

The 2010 and 2018 Nuclear Posture Reviews concluded that the United States will maintain a substantial portion of its nuclear forces on continuous alert, including keeping nearly all ICBMs on alert, and maintaining a significant number of SSBNs at sea at any given time.

79. Do you agree with that conclusion? Please explain your answer.

Yes. The threat environment has grown increasingly complex. The alert posture we maintain is a critical deterrent and necessary to address current and future threats.
80. Do you believe that the alert levels for the intercontinental ballistic missile force should be reduced, potentially requiring the United States to completely absorb a large-scale nuclear strike before it will be able to respond?

No. ICBMs complicate an adversary’s targeting and decision calculus. Without ICBMs on alert, China would be able to instantly adopt a counterforce strategy, and it would give Russian nuclear forces the strategic upper hand.

The Commander of U.S. Strategic Command has referred to reports of China’s nuclear force expansion as “breathtaking” and contends that China’s efforts to become a nuclear peer to the U.S. and Russia is a “strategic breakout,” which represents an unprecedented threat to global stability.

81. Do you agree with this assessment?

Yes.

82. What is your understanding of how Russia and China have expanded and modernized their nuclear force capabilities?

The United States has never faced the challenge of two near-peer nuclear armed nations such as China and Russia. China is rapidly expanding and diversifying its nuclear capabilities. This includes construction of missile silos that could launch nuclear weapons once completed. Russia is also advancing its already considerable nuclear capabilities and continues to develop and field nuclear capable weapons and systems not accountable under the New START Treaty.

83. In your view, do these capabilities pose an increasing threat to the United States and its allies?

Yes.

84. Do you believe Russia has or is willing to employ nuclear coercion as a means of advancing its military and foreign policy goals?

Yes. The expansion and modernization of Russia’s nuclear arsenal indicates a willingness to employ nuclear coercion as a means of advancing their military and foreign policy goals. Russia’s significant expansion in non-strategic nuclear weapons exacerbates this concern. These weapons are not accountable under New START. The potential employment of these weapons poses miscalculation risk. Russia may miscalculate the capability and resolve of the United States and our allies to deter and defend against Russian limited nuclear use.
85. Do you agree with DOD’s assessment that China intends to double or triple the size of its nuclear arsenal over the next decade?

Yes, I agree with that assessment.

86. Do you believe that as China completes its build out of a triad of delivery platforms it will adhere to the full meaning of “no first use”?

A fully functional nuclear triad, in any capacity, creates a challenging security environment for the United States and its Allies and partners. As China’s nuclear doctrine evolves under this reality, it is crucial that we maintain an understanding of how China intends to adhere to a “no first use” policy. The United States nuclear deterrent must remain whole and modernized to meet this potential threat.

87. Do you support the policy of “no first use”, i.e., a commitment that the United States will never use nuclear weapons first in a future conflict?

From a military perspective, I do believe in giving the President as many options as possible, and that maintaining calculated ambiguity complicates an adversary’s decision calculus. I would not advocate for any change that would simplify an adversary’s decision-making, particularly if our adversaries are increasing their reliance on nuclear capabilities.

88. Do you support the policy that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is only to deter against other nations’ nuclear weapons?

I believe that maintaining calculated ambiguity complicates an adversary’s decision calculus. I would not advocate for any change that would simplify an adversary’s decision-making, particularly if our adversaries increase their reliance on nuclear capabilities.

89. What is your understanding of allies’ perspectives on potential U.S. adoption of a no-first-use or sole-purpose nuclear declaratory policy?

I believe our alliances are our strategic center of gravity. Any potential changes to our nuclear declaratory policy must be carefully crafted and communicated to ensure that we maintain close alignment with our allies.

Extended nuclear deterrence assurances provided to our allies have been called one of the U.S. most important and most effective tools for stemming the further proliferation of nuclear weapons technologies.

The extended nuclear deterrence assurances the United States provides to its allies have been called one of the U.S. most important and most effective tools for stemming the further proliferation of nuclear weapons technologies.
90. Do you believe U.S. extended nuclear deterrence assurances are effective in reassuring allies that they do not need to pursue their own nuclear arsenals to ensure their national security?

Yes. Extended nuclear deterrence assurances provided to our allies are one of the most important and effective tools for stemming the further proliferation of nuclear weapons technologies.

A number of recent press reports have highlighted NATO and allied concerns regarding the credibility of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence assurances, and some – particularly South Korea – have seen increased calls to develop their own independent nuclear deterrent as a means of offsetting reduced confidence in U.S. assurances.

91. Do you believe that the risk of nuclear proliferation will increase if U.S. allies lose confidence in our extended nuclear deterrence assurances?

Yes. Effectively assuring our Allies of the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence mitigates the risk of nuclear proliferation. Our alliances are one of our greatest strategic advantages, and if confirmed, I look forward to closely engaging with our Allies on these issues.

92. Do you believe China or Russia would view U.S. adoption of a no-first-use or sole-purpose nuclear declaratory policy as credible?

No, I do not.

93. What are your views of changing our declaratory policy for NATO with respect to Britain and France and their declaratory policy?

U.S. nuclear forces, along with the independent strategic forces of the UK and France, remain the supreme security guarantee of NATO Allies. This force is an essential component of the Trans-Atlantic military link that should be maintained to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression. It is important to maintain Alliance cohesion and unity regarding declaratory policy.

Prior to the current iteration, the Joint Staff has played a significant leadership role in the conduct of each incoming presidential administration’s Nuclear Posture Review. In structuring its own review, the current administration elected to diverge from past practice, and removed the Joint Staff from its typical co-chair position.

94. If confirmed, what do you understand will be your role as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Staff in the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review?
If confirmed, I will fulfill my duties and responsibilities as the Vice Chairman to ensure the military equities of the Joint Force are adequately considered and represented when presented to the Secretary of Defense and the President. These equities include the military’s perspective on the current and projected threat environment, and military advice on the implications of potential policy decisions, including nuclear strategy, posture, and acquisition programs.

95. Do you believe the Joint Staff should play a significant leadership role in future Nuclear Posture Reviews?

Yes.

Nuclear Modernization

If confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you will serve as a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council. As a member of the Council, you will work closely with the National Nuclear Security Administration to coordinate policies and align resources for DOD and Department of Energy nuclear programs.

96. If confirmed, what would be your priorities for the work of the Nuclear Weapons Council?

The Nuclear Weapons Council’s (NWC) enduring priority is maintaining a safe, secure, effective, and ready nuclear weapon stockpile able to deter adversaries and assure Allies and global security partners. Close collaboration between the DoD and our National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) partners has proven successful in sustaining legacy weapons and moving forward with critical modernization efforts.

Continued success is contingent on building a robust and resilient infrastructure to include plutonium pit production, uranium and lithium processing, and increased non-nuclear production capabilities. Maintaining confidence in our weapons hinges on having the necessary modern facilities and skilled workforce to sustain the deterrent force.

97. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend to the membership and responsibilities of the Nuclear Weapons Council?

If confirmed, I would continue to foster the strong inter-agency partnership and would not recommend any changes to the membership or responsibilities of the NWC.

98. In your view, does the Stockpile Stewardship Program provide the tools necessary to ensure the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile without testing? If not, what tools are needed?

Yes, the rigorous Stockpile Stewardship Program has developed the computational and experimental tools needed to certify the current stockpile without the need for full-scale
nuclear weapons testing. The program relies on state-of-the-art supercomputers, large-scale scientific facilities, and workforce expertise. Continued support for the National Laboratories is crucial for the viability of the Stockpile Stewardship mission.

U.S. nuclear forces are nearing the end of their useful lives. These capabilities must be updated over the next 20 years if the United States is to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent.

99. What is your understanding of the state of U.S. nuclear forces, its global nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) architecture, and the supporting weapons sustainment and production capabilities within the National Nuclear Security Administration?

Although our nuclear forces remain safe, secure, and effective, we have greatly exceeded their intended design life and they are showing their age. Deferred modernization has removed margin and there is no longer room for delay. Diminished and outdated DoD industrial base capability to service and deliver nuclear platforms and NNSA production capabilities and infrastructure, some of which date back to the Manhattan Project, exacerbate this challenge.

100. Do you believe the current program of record is sufficient to support the full modernization of the nuclear triad, including delivery systems, warheads, command and control systems, and infrastructure?

Yes.

101. What are your ideas for working across the Joint Force to mitigate the risk that all three legs of the nuclear triad will “age out” simultaneously at the end of the 2020s?

If confirmed, I would continue to keep senior leadership across the Department informed and engaged on the transition from legacy to modernized nuclear delivery platforms and weapons. I believe such engagement is necessary to hold ourselves accountable for addressing these risks in a coherent and responsible manner.

102. More specifically, do you support the following DOD modernization programs of record? Please be specific.

- Ground Based Strategic Deterrent
- B-21 Bomber
- Columbia-class Submarine
- Modernization of the ground, air and space based Nuclear Command, Control and Communications Systems (NC3)
- Production capabilities to produce cryptographic products for NC3
- Long Range Stand Off Weapon
- Sea Launched Cruise Missile
• Upgrades to the B-52 to include radar, engines, electronic warfare, survivable long wave frequency waveforms, Family of Advanced Line of Sight Terminals
• Addition of nuclear capability to the F-35A aircraft

While I support DoD nuclear modernization programs of record, the Nuclear Posture Review will conclude how the programs of record will support our strategy going forward. I recognize there is a lot of risk in executing these programs concurrently, but I believe these programs are necessary to maintain a safe, secure, and effective U.S. nuclear deterrent in an increasingly complex security environment. If confirmed, I commit to helping the Department manage the transition risk appropriately.

103. Do you support the following National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) modernization programs of record? Please be specific.

• W80-4 warhead
• W87-1 warhead
• W93 warhead
• B61-12 gravity bomb
• B83 gravity bomb life extension
• The capability to produce at least 80 plutonium pits per year
• Modernizing the production capability for depleted uranium and lithium
• Restoring the production capability to produce high enriched uranium for defense needs

I fully support the W80-4 warhead required to support the Long-Range Stand-Off cruise missile, the W87-1 warhead required to maintain the land leg of the nuclear deterrent with GBSD, the W93 warhead required to modernize the sea leg and potentially alleviate over-reliance on a single warhead, and the B61-12 gravity bomb which consolidates four weapon types and provides our Allies confidence in our extended deterrence.

I am open to the possibility of forgoing a life extension of the B83 gravity bomb if there are more effective ways to replace the capability it provides. I support the need to produce at least 80 plutonium pits per year and the modernization of production capability for lithium and depleted and high enriched uranium to enable modernization of our aging stockpile.

104. What are your greatest concerns with respect to the DOD and NNSA modernization programs?

My greatest concerns with the DOD and NNSA modernization programs are: 1) ensuring sufficient investment across the U.S. industrial base to execute the modernization programs and enable responsiveness to address unforeseen challenges; and 2) maintaining necessary funding to develop, produce, and sustain a modernized nuclear force and stockpile.
Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications

The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the co-chair of the Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System.

105. If confirmed, how would you use this role to advocate for the modernization of NC3 systems?

If confirmed, modernization of Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) would remain a top priority. As co-chair of the Council on National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications Systems, I would work to ensure NC3 capabilities meet national objectives, are adequately resourced, and stay synchronized with senior leader and continuity of government communications efforts. Additionally, as chair of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), I would work closely with CDR USSTRATCOM and the Services to ensure efficient validation of NC3 modernization requirements and advocate for the rapid delivery of threat-based NC3 capabilities that empower our triad of nuclear capabilities.

106. If confirmed, what actions will you take to assess the cyber security of the NC3 system on an enduring basis?

Section 1651 of the 2018 NDAA requires the Commanders of USSTRATCOM and USCYBERCOM to submit an annual joint assessment of the cyber resilience of the nuclear command and control system to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for submission to Congress. If confirmed, as a co-chair for the Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communication System, I will review the NDAA-mandated report for action prior to providing it to Congress.

107. If confirmed, what would be your role on the Joint Staff for NC3 operations?

If confirmed, my role as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would include duties as prescribed by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, I would act to support the Chairman as he exercises approval authority for the CDR USSTRATCOM recommended changes to Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) systems that affect the operational configuration of the National Military Command System (NMCS).

108. In your view, should senior leaders across the Executive Branch regularly take part in NC3 exercises and, if so, why?

Yes. The Department is supportive of senior advisors to the President participating in, or observing, large-scale exercises involving nuclear command, control, and
communications systems. Participation at this level would enhance support to the President during the nuclear decision-making process.

**Missile Defense**

The United States enjoys a measure of protection against ballistic missile threats from rogue nations like North Korea and Iran, but the threat from Russian and Chinese ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles against U.S. forces, allies, and the U.S. homeland continues to grow. The 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) codified existing policy on missile defense and endorsed follow-on actions to improve U.S. capability.

109. If confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, what priorities would you recommend for U.S. missile defense capabilities for the homeland?

If confirmed, my top priority is the improvement of the U.S. missile defense architecture by ensuring the full integration of a persistent and integrated network of sensors. These sensors provide real-time detection, tracking, and targeting information that is critical to policymakers during a crisis. The existing DoD global network of sensors on land, at sea, and in the air and space domains is highly complex and must be improved to increase operational awareness and decision making. If confirmed, I will work within the Department to ensure this element of the U.S. missile defense architecture is prioritized.

110. What are your views on the relationship between missile defense and nuclear deterrence?

Missile Defense is a key piece of our integrated deterrence strategy. U.S. policy for defense of the homeland requires a commitment to stay ahead of rogue nation missile threats while continuing to rely on nuclear deterrence to address the large and more sophisticated Russian and Chinese ICBMs. A robust and credible, layered missile defense system paired with our conventional and nuclear force capabilities provides the ability to deter strategic attacks and impose costs against any potential adversary.

111. In your view, do you believe missile defense policy should be limited to countering only rogue nations, such as North Korea and Iran?

Yes. I believe U.S. homeland missile defense policy should remain focused on defending against comparatively limited state ballistic missile attacks from rogue nations like North Korea and Iran. To address the threat of a comprehensive and technologically sophisticated strategic missile attack by China or Russia, the United States should continue to rely on the same strategy it has employed for more than half a century – i.e., nuclear deterrence.
112. If so, what role do you believe integrated air and missile defenses should play in defending limited areas and defeating smaller scale cruise or hypersonic glide missile attacks by larger threats, such as Russia and China?

Defending the U.S. homeland against non-strategic missile attacks by pacing threats such as China or Russia remains a difficult problem. U.S. missile defenses cannot defend against every threat. It is simply one of many tools in our toolkit to protect against the growing number of advanced missile threats. I understand the Department is examining ways to enhance its missile defense architecture against conventional missile threats. If confirmed, I would support continuing improvements to our homeland missile defense architecture.

113. Do you support the Next Generation Interceptor program, and once deployed, the regular testing of it?

Yes. I support the Department’s decision to move forward with development and future testing of the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI), as well as the additional on-going efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the existing Ground-based Midcourse Defense System (GMD). GMD protects the United States homeland against limited ICBM threats from North Korea. If confirmed, I will support efforts to ensure that the homeland missile defense architecture remains effective as one of the important components to our integrated deterrence approach.

114. Do you support using Aegis Destroyers as a layer of our homeland defense architecture?

Any decision to bolster homeland defense with new or existing capabilities will require weighing a variety of factors such as cost, feasibility, and potential impacts on strategic stability against the potential added benefit to security. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Joint Force has the proper mix of capabilities to defend the homeland.

115. Do you support a layered and dispersed missile defense architecture for the defense of Guam, and if so, why?

Yes. I agree with the INDOPACOM Commander that ensuring Guam has sufficient defenses is critical. Active missile defenses that enable INDOPACOM to sustain military operations during a conflict are one important component of what should be an integrated approach. If confirmed, I will work with INDOPACOM to ensure that it has the right combination of capabilities to defend Guam, including active missile defenses, to enhance the U.S. regional deterrence and defense posture, assure allies and partners, and increase readiness to contribute to a free and open Indo-Pacific region.

116. Do you support a long range homeland defense radar capability in Hawaii?
Hawaii, as well as the rest of the United States, is protected against the limited ICBM threat from North Korea and, if confirmed, I will work with INDOPACOM to support continued improvements to our homeland missile defense architecture, including our missile defense sensor network. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing Department assessments that inform future budget decisions and potential siting locations of any additional sensors.

The global U.S. architecture for detecting and tracking threat missiles is a highly complex maritime, terrestrial, airborne, and space-based system of systems, with the constituent pieces managed and sustained by a number of different DOD components.

117. Do you believe these various systems are appropriately integrated and provide operational commanders with a holistic threat picture capable of supporting real-time operational decisions?

Yes, but there is still room for improved integration. A strategy supporting layered networks of dispersed terrestrial/space-based sensors integrated with layered kinetic and non-kinetic weapon systems provide our best and most cost-effective defense. I believe we took an important step towards improving our integration of these critical but often disparate or multi-mission sensors by assigning USSPACECOM as our Global Sensor Manager. If confirmed, I will endeavor to improve our ability to seamlessly integrate our networks across all domains and regions to enable a “best sensor, best shooter” capability.

118. In your view, is a space-based sensor layer a required “next step” in enabling a wide variety of missile defense capabilities, including improved tracking and targeting of advanced threats?

Yes. A space-based sensor network can monitor, detect and track missile launches from locations almost anywhere on the globe – they enjoy a measure of flexibility of movement that is unimpeded by the geographic constraints imposed on terrestrial sensors. Space sensors can provide “birth to death” tracking of advanced missile threats and enable a layered defense architecture that can engage threats in the boost, midcourse, and terminal phases of threat missile flight.

119. What are your views on the efficacy of boost-phase intercept and space-based intercept programs?

U.S. policy is to hedge against unexpected adversary developments by investing in advanced technology so the United States, its allies, and its partners can defend against strategies of coercion or attack. I believe we should examine and exploit every practical opportunity to detect, disrupt, and destroy a missile threat prior to and during all phases of its flight. If confirmed, I will advocate for investing in advanced technologies that contribute to a flexible, layered, and cost-effective missile defense architecture that improves the overall likelihood of successfully countering offensive missile attacks.
What is your understanding of DOD’s efforts to develop and implement operational concepts, plans, and policies appropriate to the governance and utilization of such programs? If confirmed, what would you do to address this issue?

I believe the Department must invest in advanced technologies to meet the increasingly complex threats posed by larger missile inventories and improved countermeasures. If confirmed, I will review appropriate operational concepts and policies that govern the utilization of any advanced defensive technologies.

Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) is being considered as a fifth initiative for strategic direction from the JROC.

In your view, why is it important that IAMD become a fifth initiative and do you support this going forward?

Over time, the JROC should provide strategic direction on the requirements for each of the key capabilities for the future Joint Force. Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) is certainly a critically important capability and therefore an essential topic for JROC action.

Nuclear Enterprise Review

In 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel directed a comprehensive review of the DOD nuclear enterprise in response to adverse incidents involving U.S. nuclear forces and their senior leadership. The review culminated in numerous recommendations to address concerns identified. Responsibility for monitoring the implementation of corrective actions has been transferred from OSD to the Military Services.

Do you believe the Military Services are maintaining the appropriate focus on implementing the corrective actions required by the Nuclear Enterprise Review?

Yes. I believe the Services remain actively engaged in addressing the items identified in the 2014 Nuclear Enterprise Review.

Arms Control

Do you support the New START Treaty, and if so, why?

Yes, I support the New START Treaty (NST). NST provides much needed stability and an avenue of cooperation for the U.S.-Russia political-military relationship. More importantly, the mutually verifiable constraints in types and numbers of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems agreed to in NST have facilitated drastic reductions in both U.S. and Russian weapon arsenals since 2011.
124. What are your views on the potential for arms control measures to address the security threat from Russia’s tactical nuclear forces, which are not covered by strategic arms control agreements?

I applaud verifiable arms control as a method to reduce nuclear risks. Certainly, Russia’s numerical advantage in non-strategic nuclear forces is a concern and a priority for any bilateral arms control initiatives. I believe this is a prudent approach that will maintain strategic stability with Russia and help to achieve the Administration’s goals of reducing the role of nuclear weapons.

125. During his confirmation hearing, Secretary Austin voiced his agreement that any future reductions in U.S. nuclear forces should only be taken within the context of a formal, verifiable arms control agreements with adversaries, rather than by unilateral actions. Do you agree with this statement?

Yes, there is no evidence that unilateral disarmament by the United States would inspire Russia or China to reciprocate. It would only weaken the U.S. position for future arms control negotiations.

126. Do you support additional efforts for nuclear arms control? If so, with which countries, and in what specific areas, and why?

Yes. I believe arms control advances U.S. national security interests. If confirmed, I would support efforts to negotiate multilateral agreements that are verifiable and that make the United States and its allies and partners more safe and secure. Russia and China are near-peer countries of interest for arms control efforts due to their ongoing nuclear weapon modernization and expansion.

127. Do you believe that the United States should consider accepting limitations on its missile defense, cyber, or conventional power projection capabilities as part of an agreement with Russia or China on nuclear weapons’ reductions?

The U.S. must carefully consider our Arms Control options and what systems and capabilities we are willing to accept limitations on. Options that are considered must be reciprocal, verifiable, enhance strategic stability, mitigate the risk of strategic escalation, and enhance U.S. national security and that of our allies and partners.

128. In your assessment, how would delaying or cancelling current nuclear modernization plans and programs affect our arms control negotiation leverage with near-peer and peer competitors?

Russia and China are expanding and modernizing their nuclear weapon stockpiles. As Secretary Austin has stated, our nuclear triad is long past the point where it must be modernized. If we do not modernize our nuclear forces, we may not be able to negotiate from a position of credibility and strength in future treaty negotiations.
129. Do you believe it is important to have a strategic stability dialogue with China, and if so, why?

Yes. Strategic stability dialogues help participants understand each other’s nuclear doctrine and national security interests and helps to reduce misunderstandings and miscalculation that can lead to unintended escalation. Historically, China has resisted any formal discussion of strategic issues and the lack of transparency surrounding its nuclear forces and doctrine remains a significant concern. Any dialogue which enables open and frank discussions can help participants better understand each other’s respective risk perceptions, increase transparency, and reduce nuclear risks.

130. What are your views with respect to long range prompt strike weapons and strategic stability?

Developing and fielding long range prompt strike capabilities is critically important. If confirmed, I would work with the Department, the interagency, and allies and partners to assess opportunities to improve strategic stability and reduce the risk of conflict.

Space Program

The United States is increasingly dependent on space, both economically and militarily—from the Global Positioning System on which many industries and military capabilities rely, to the missile warning systems that underpin U.S. nuclear deterrence. Our strategic competitors – China and Russia – are engaged in a concerted effort to leap ahead of U.S. technology and impact U.S. freedom of action in the space warfighting domain.

131. In your view, how would you characterize the level of risk China and Russia pose to U.S. space-based assets?

Risk to U.S. space-based assets from China and Russia continues to increase and expand. Over the past two decades, Russia and China have continued to improve their space weapons capabilities and enacted military reforms to better integrate space, cyberspace, and electronic warfare into both offensive and defensive military operations. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency's "Challenges to Security in Space Report," both Russia and China have potential counter-space assets on the ground and in orbit today. Both nations will continue to develop, exercise, and integrate these capabilities into war plans. We must improve our space-based capabilities’ resilience and protection in the face of these advancing threats.

132. If confirmed, how would you assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in improving situational awareness of space and appropriately prioritizing the protection of U.S. space-based assets?
We must expand our allied and commercial partnerships in Space Situational Awareness (SSA). We must ensure joint requirements drive toward adoption of common data standards and machine-to-machine interfaces/automation. Improvements in SSA will enable us to better determine intent, provide positive attribution of space events, and enable the employment of defensive and offensive space control capabilities within clearly laid out authorities.

Space systems that support strategic warning and communications must remain a top priority. Many of our other space systems provide services, which have elements critical to our national civil, economic, and military interests. In recognition of this, we must pursue protection capabilities and techniques, which maximize flexibility, allowing us to respond to adversary threats against any U.S. or allied space system.

133. In your view, what are your greatest concerns as the Space Force continues to operationalize across the DOD for the development of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities?

The Space Force exists to address threats and challenges in space and enable effective warfighting and deterrence operations in all domains. My greatest concern is that space has become a contested domain and the United States must move faster than the threat. China and Russia are making significant advances in their space capabilities that will continue to challenge our access and freedom of maneuver in space. If confirmed, I would prioritize the development and fielding of a more robust and resilient space architecture, including doctrine, organization, training materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities.

134. What are your views on how to best achieve deterrence in space when so many space control systems are highly classified?

It is difficult to achieve deterrence when numerous systems remain highly classified, limiting communication with the public and our partners. If confirmed, I would work with the Department, the IC, and Congress to identify programs and systems, or discreet areas of programs or systems that could be appropriate for reclassification.

135. As Space Force is the title 10 provider of forces and capabilities to the combatant commands for space operations, do you believe they should be developing a tactical ISR space capability no different than other services and their military doctrine and capabilities?

It is within the scope of Space Force’s authorities to provide Tactical ISR to support the warfighter. The National Reconnaissance Office meets most of the strategic and operational needs for space-based ISR. That does not mean that there is not a need for additional ISR capacity. In those cases, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) will need to ensure that the overall space-based ISR architecture is examined to ensure needs are appropriately met and capabilities from the interagency and private sector are considered and leveraged.
136. Do you believe the Chief of Space Operations in their title 10 role should be the principal force design architect for space systems and operations?

Yes. Designating the CSO as the principal force design architect is essential to efficiently and effectively moving toward a more resilient space architecture that will meet warfighter requirements and be available to those warfighters across the spectrums of competition and conflict.

137. The reason for the creation of the space force was to consolidate disparate space capabilities while balancing the need of other services to utilize space within their doctrine and operations. Do you support that objective?

Yes. I support that objective.

138. If confirmed, do you support moving the Space Development Agency to the Space Force?

Yes, I do.

139. If confirmed, how would you ensure that commercial technology and mission support is incorporated into Space Development Agency products and SPACECOM mission execution at acceptable risk levels? What particular challenges do you perceive to increasing collaboration between the private sector and DOD in the acquisition of space systems and launch options?

The U.S. commercial space sector leads the world in the innovation of space systems. From design to mission execution, DOD must properly leverage this relationship to meet ever-increasing challenges in the space domain. If confirmed, I will ensure that we incorporate commercial capabilities where appropriate, with calculated, acceptable risk levels, through my role on the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. Further, if confirmed, I will work with partners inside and outside of government to identify barriers to deepen collaboration in this important sector.

140. What role should the JROC have in the Intelligence Community capabilities in Space given that the DOD is responsible for defending the capability during conflict?

The DoD and IC partner closely to establish joint priorities within the space domain. The JROC serves a vital function to endorse future IC space-based requirements. This close partnership is critical to ensuring DoD space-based ISR architecture is resilient and survivable.

**Access to Radio Frequency Spectrum**
141. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to ensure that the Department continues to have access to the radio frequency spectrum necessary to train and conduct operations?

Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority is of critical importance to the national security of the nation. To ensure superiority, we must have an integrated approach to governance that effectively prioritizes EMS through DoD requirements, resourcing, workforce, and operations. If confirmed, I will work with all stakeholders—including the Chief Information Officer and appropriate combatant commands—to ensure the Joint Force is positioned to conduct operations.

142. Are you concerned about recent actions taken by the FCC to supporting licensing ground operations in spectrum band close to the GPS signal? Please be specific.

GPS signal is of great consequence to the Department of Defense and our national security. If confirmed, I am committed to reviewing the status of these recent actions and potential implications for the Joint Force and providing my best military advice.

143. Are you concerned about recent actions to have the DOD vacate portions of the 3.1-3.45 MHz spectrum, and if so, why? Please be specific on implications for force readiness.

Yes, this is an area of concern for me. Frequency bands of dual use can adversely impact DoD operations, from training and readiness to real-world operations. Cooperation between the Department and Industry is required to balance public and private concerns. If confirmed, I look forward to providing leadership on these crucial dual-use questions.

Information Operations

The Committee remains concerned that, five years after the Russian Federation first successfully executed an aggressive, large-scale influence operation against the United States and our European allies, the Department of Defense does not yet have an effective management structure or strategy for information warfare that integrates across cyber, electromagnetic spectrum operations, and information operations that is conducted at the strategic level.

144. Do you share this concern? If not, why not?

I am concerned about state and non-state actors' capability to successfully execute large-scale influence operations against the United States, our Allies, and Partners. The information domain is a complex theater of modern operations that requires close study and a deep understanding. If confirmed, I will be supportive of all efforts to assure our competitiveness and protect our vital national interests.
145. If confirmed, what actions, in your view, could the Vice Chairman take to help solve this important problem that handicaps our ability to deter and compete with adversaries?

An era of strategic competition requires us to address a number of significant challenges and rapidly evolving threats. Our current and future warfighting capabilities must be measured against their ability to address and outpace those threats. Specifically, to deter our adversaries we need to clearly communicate, through both what we say and what we do—that if they attack the United States or our Allies they will fail to achieve their objectives and they will incur costs that far exceed any gains they can achieve. If confirmed, I will advocate for opportunities to apply speed, innovation, technology, and integration in how we manage acquisitions and develop and deploy existing and new warfighting capabilities.

146. What are your views on whether there is a need to operationally integrate all of the elements of information warfare?

Similar to the integration of air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace operations, the integration of elements of information warfare is not unique to any one command. If confirmed, I will help the Chairman ensure that each Combatant Command has the necessary resident authorities and guidance to execute their UCP missions.

I will seek to improve the integration of all information capabilities and activities against all problem sets during competition, crisis, and conflict. If confirmed, I will help the Joint Force in its effort to revamp its operations and planning doctrine to holistically integrate and synchronize the Information Warfare elements across joint force operations. This intentional process will assure unity of effort.

Cybersecurity

The United States has been rocked by a series of significant ransomware attacks affecting critical infrastructure and organizations. These attacks have been facilitated or conducted by large, sophisticated criminal enterprises that are tolerated, or even encouraged by, the leadership of the countries from which they operate. These ransomware enterprises could cause substantial damage to critical infrastructure in peacetime or in a future crisis or conflict, and therefore pose a clear national security threat. These enterprises may be beyond the reach of law enforcement and unaffected by at least some forms of sanctions. United States Cyber Command is among the few government organizations with the authorities and capabilities to directly diminish this threat and thereby establish a degree of deterrence.

147. What are your views on the foreign-based ransomware threat from large criminal organizations?
Ransomware threats emanating from criminal organizations present a significant threat to the United States. They have the potential to disrupt the daily activities of the American people as well as threaten the military’s ability to execute its mission. If confirmed, I will take an active role in supporting the Administration’s whole of government counter ransomware campaign.

148. What are your views on the role that the Cyber Mission forces could play in imposing costs on such activities, as one aspect of a larger, whole-of-government response?

USCYBERCOM Cyber Mission Forces possess unique authorities, training, and capabilities to support the US Government’s response to counter ransomware threats. The Department continues to support the U.S. whole of government effort to impose costs through the disruption of ransomware actors and their networks.

DOD is conducting a mandatory cyber posture review. The Committee believes that the previous posture review was a success largely because the Principal Cyber Adviser and supporting cross functional team tracked implementation tasks and progress, and reported regularly to senior leaders.

149. What role do you believe the Joint Staff should play in the cyber posture review, gap analysis, and oversight of implementation?

I believe that the Joint Staff should continue to proactively support the Principal Cyber Advisor’s Office in the development and implementation of the cyber posture review.

It is widely expected that adversaries will conduct cyber-attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure in conflict and even in crises prior to kinetic warfare. It is also commonly assumed that the United States would respond accordingly, so that adversaries do not perceive that there is a gap in our deterrence capabilities. However, the Cyber Solarium Commission, whose members included DOD and other senior executive branch officials, explicitly rejected the targeting of adversary critical infrastructure, on the grounds that it would be immoral and contrary to the laws of armed conflict.

150. In your view, is it necessary for adversaries to know that the United States can and will respond reciprocally to cyber-attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure?

Adversaries need to know that the United States takes cyber-attacks on our critical infrastructure very seriously and that we reserve the right to respond to these attacks at the time, place, and in the domain of our choosing.

151. If confirmed, will you review existing policy, requirements, and capabilities to achieve this deterrence capability?
Yes, if confirmed. I anticipate that the Department will take a holistic review of our cyber policies, requirements, and capabilities in line with the development and release of the new National Defense Strategy, Cyber Posture Review, and Defense Cyber Strategy.

At the request of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in 2017 two former senior government officials with extensive cyber expertise, in consultation with members of a Defense Science Board cyber task force, produced a report that recommended a near-term ending of the dual-hat arrangement whereby the Command of United States Cyber Command also serves as the Director of the National Security Agency. The report presented substantive arguments that splitting these positions would be in the interest of both organizations.

152. What are your views as to whether the “dual hatting” of the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command as the Director of the National Security Agency should be maintained or terminated?

The “dual hat” configuration between U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency remains fit for purpose and should be maintained.

153. In your opinion, are the conditions for ending the dual hat established in the Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act close to being met?

NSA intelligence capabilities remain critical to the Title 10 Cyber mission. Any decision on this topic requires a deliberate, step-by-step assessment, which is informed by CYBERCOM and NSA’s combined efforts over the last two years. Previous assessments conducted in response to the 2017 Conditions predate the adversaries increase in scale, scope, and sophistication of cyber activity we have experienced over the last 2 years. Any decision based on dated, incomplete analysis will undermine military effectiveness and create unacceptable risk to the United States national security interests.

154. Do you think that the positions should be split if those conditions are met?

When Congress authorized the establishment of USCYBERCOM as a Unified Combatant Command, the Secretary of Defense directed the Department of Defense to undertake an assessment of the conditions under which a split could possibly occur, the associated operational implications and an assessment of the required distribution of resources. In the absence of up-to-date analysis of the current operational relationships among NSA, CYBERCOM, the other combatant commands and foreign intelligence community, as well as the current cyber threat, I need to defer a final position on this question.

Moreover, I have absolute faith in the professionalism and objectivity of the CYBERCOM CDR/DIRNSA to provide strategic direction and make balanced and objective decisions without prejudice towards his Title 10 or Title 50 responsibilities.

Science, Technology, and Innovation
U.S. superiority in key areas of innovation is decreasing or has disappeared, while our competitors are engaging in aggressive military modernization and advanced weaponry development. DOD has identified ten key areas in which investment to develop next generation operational capabilities is imperative: hypersonics; fully networked C3; directed energy; cyber; space; quantum science; artificial intelligence (AI)/machine learning; microelectronics; autonomy; and biotechnology. Much of the innovation in these technologies is occurring outside of the traditional defense industry.

155. In your opinion, what are the most significant challenges (e.g., technical, organizational, or cultural) to U.S. development of these key technologies?

In developing next generation operational capabilities, three leading challenges often addressed are the adequate protection of our intellectual property, insufficient integration between civilian and defense industry, and cultural risk aversion that leads to a lack of agility in the development of key technologies.

156. In your view, has DOD properly integrated and synchronized investments in these technologies across all components?

We have made good progress recently, but need to do much more. American innovators – both within the military and outside – are achieving path-breaking technological advances, but the Joint Force’s absorption of these advances is too limited. The Joint Warfighting Concept has driven new processes to align the services towards strategic competition and defeating peer and near-peer adversaries. These new processes should be continued and strengthened to make the Joint Force more capable in the coming years.

157. What is your understanding of how the Department is balancing revolutionary capability advancements as compared to “quick win” incremental improvements that can be rapidly fielded?

The Department balances revolutionary capability developments with rapidly fielded advancements through focused analysis and assessment. This enables DoD to make informed tradeoffs and decisions where there are uncertainties associated with increasing adversary military capabilities, changes in the strategic environment, and emerging technologies for future military operations.

158. In your opinion, is DOD doing enough to identify new technologies developed commercially by the private sector and apply them to military and national security purposes? What are the challenges that you perceive to increasing collaboration between the private sector and DOD?

The DoD has multiple initiatives within the defense research enterprise specifically focused on identifying commercial technologies currently in the private sector that have potential uses for national security and warfighter purposes. The establishment of the Innovation Steering Group this year has helped in mapping the innovation ecosphere.
Many organizations exist to drive rapid technology development and commercial sector partnership. If confirmed, I will continue to leverage the Innovation Steering Group to set priorities for innovation in the DoD.

159. In your view, are there steps that should be taken to ensure that the Department has the research and testing infrastructure and equipment to maintain pace with, or surpass the investments being made in emerging technology by our peer adversaries?

Test infrastructure recapitalization has been one of the lines of effort for the Innovation Steering Group. The effort to identify areas of improvement and possible solutions to bring the facilities up to commercial standards is important work that needs to continue. If confirmed, I will work with OSD and the relevant DoD stakeholders to ensure the test community collects operationally relevant data as early as possible during system development, by using a combined testing approach.

One of the main objectives of the defense research enterprise is to develop advanced technologies that will be of benefit to the warfighter. In this regard, it is critical that advancements quickly transition from the development phase into testing and evaluation, and ultimately into a program of record for the deployment of capability to the warfighter.

160. What are the challenges you perceive to effectively transitioning technologies from research programs into programs of record?

Transitioning technologies into programs of record must be a consideration at the beginning of any development effort. Successfully transitioning technologies requires many different collaborators (e.g., acquisition community, warfighting community, industry) and includes explicit agreements with the Services up front. New DoD initiatives like the Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve are aimed to achieve this goal. If confirmed, I will continue to support the work of the organizations within the DoD innovation ecosphere that strive to achieve this goal.

161. If confirmed as Vice Chairman, what specific steps will you take to ensure that all of the Military Services are benefitting more quickly and directly from research being performed across the defense research enterprise?

If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, the Service Chiefs, and Congress to continue development of rapid prototyping and rapid fielding efforts, in order to decrease the time it takes to get innovative technologies from research labs into the hands of the warfighter. It is important to understand that classification concerns can stifle the dissemination of important scientific research. Ensuring appropriate level of classification can help to breakdown stove-piping of information.
Joint Officer Management

162. If confirmed, what modifications to law and policy would you suggest to provide DOD and the Military Services the force management and talent management tools necessary to recruit, develop, sustain, and retain a 21st century joint, All-Volunteer Force?

If confirmed, I will assess talent management strategies required to maintain our competitive advantage over our adversaries. I believe the FY19 NDAA talent management strategies moved the Department in the right direction through the enhancement of constructive service credit, alternative promotion authority, and reordering of a promotion list based on merit. If confirmed, I will continue to work with OSD and the Service Chiefs as we implement these authorities and assess the effects these programs have on maintaining a ready force.

163. In your opinion, are current DOD and Military Service procedures and practices for reviewing the records of officers pending the President’s nomination for promotion or assignment sufficient to enable fully-informed decisions by the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President?

Yes, the Services thoroughly evaluate officer qualifications, past performance, future potential, and any available adverse or reportable information, and each service has a rigorous process in place to ensure all decisions are fully informed.

164. In your view, are these procedures and practices fair to the individual military officers proceeding through the promotion or assignment process?

Yes. I believe these procedures and practices are fair and reasonable for the officers involved.

165. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the FY 2017 modifications to the JQO system?

The two significant modifications from the FY17 NDAA provided the Department additional flexibility in the Joint Qualification System. The expansion of the “joint matters” definition ensures the ability to award joint duty credit to additional officers making contributions to the development and achievement of strategic objectives. Additionally, the reduced statutory tour length required for joint duty credit provides the Services additional flexibility in officer assignment for tightly managed career timelines and milestones. Given the timing of the change, along with standard tour lengths, additional time is needed to have a full picture of the overall impact of the tour length reduction.
166. In your view, are the requirements associated with becoming a JQO, and the link between attaining joint qualification and eligibility for promotion to General/Flag officer rank, consistent with the operational and professional demands of Service line officers?

Yes. Although careers are tightly managed to Service-specific milestones and operational demands, the 24-month minimum joint tour and associated JPME completion for joint qualification enhance an officer’s perspective and knowledge to perform at the GO/FO level.

167. In your view, what additional modifications, if any, to JQO prerequisites are necessary to ensure that military officers are able to attain both meaningful joint and Service-specific leadership experience and adequate professional development?

The existing joint officer qualification requirements provide a tested and flexible means to ensure officers develop the skills necessary for successful service at the operational and strategic levels. I do not believe additional modification to the JQO system is necessary at this time.

168. What are your ideas for improving the JQO system better to meet the needs of Reserve Component officers?

Major changes to the JQO system were made in 2007 to incorporate Reserve Component officers. In 2018, the Reserve policy was adjusted to increase joint qualification opportunities for Reserve Component officers. I do not recommend changing the JQO system with respect to the Reserve Component.

169. In your view, should the requirement to be a JQO be eliminated as a consideration in selecting officers for promotion and assignment?

No. Meeting the JQO requirement enhances the ability of senior officers to operate effectively in the joint environment at the operational and strategic levels. Officers who meet the requirement provide benefit to the Services, joint organizations, and the Department, and this requirement should be maintained.

170. In your opinion, should more be done to improve the JQO system given the substantial resources invested in developing officers to lead or support joint forces? In your view, is there another system that would be more effective?

No, not at this time. The changes made by the FY17 NDAA have greatly benefited our development of JQOs and provided a balance between the needs of the Services and joint missions.

171. Do you consider the board selection process required by section 156 to be an effective and efficient process for selecting an officer to serve in this critical joint position?
Yes, the board selection process is both effective and efficient, and typically runs no more than one or two days. Since each Military Department has their own personnel system, the process to convene a joint selection board can present challenges. However, in order to conduct a joint selection board, the planning and preparation begins well in advance with each Service providing qualified candidates for consideration.

172. What lessons, if any, have been captured from this joint process that could improve the selection board processes used by the Military Services?

The Department incorporated the Services’ best practices into the joint selection board processes. Further, the Services continually review their board processes to incorporate best practices and improve with each iteration.

173. Would you support expanding application of the process employed to select the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to other joint officer positions? Why or why not?

If confirmed, I will look into this issue, but at this time I do not have an informed opinion.

**Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)**

The 2018 NDS asserts that JPME has stagnated—that it focuses on the accomplishment of mandatory credit at the expense of lethality and ingenuity.

174. Based on your assessment of the threats facing the United States, now and in the future, what knowledge, skills, and abilities will officers need to succeed in strategic competition against the nation’s adversaries?

Military leaders will require exceptional competence in joint warfighting, and demonstrate flexibility, toughness, and ability to think through uncertainty. Future leaders will need to conceive, design, and implement strategies and campaigns that integrate global capabilities to defeat competitors in contests we have not yet even imagined, and respond to activities short of armed conflict in domains that are already being contested. Key attributes of Joint Officers will include highly developed critical thinking and problem-solving skills while operating with ambiguity, rising above disrupted communications, ensuring resiliency, and always demonstrating irreproachable ethical conduct.

175. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to enhance DOD’s JPME system to ensure that it fosters the education and development of a cadre of strategic thinkers and planners with the intellectual acumen, military leadership proficiency, and sound judgment to lead the joint force in a transregional, multi-functional, multi-domain “Whole of Government” environment?
If confirmed, I will work with the Services to oversee JPME curriculum development that educates future joint force leaders to build the attributes of strategic thinking, advising, and planning. This curriculum will not only be threat informed, but it will also provide joint leaders an understanding of transregional, multi-functional, and multi-domain environment to be experts on the operational level of war. To enable this study, Service institutions require broader instruction in classified environments with the appropriate facilities to enable this education.

176. In your view, to what degree does the Secretary of Defense Strategic Thinkers Program, established by Directive-type Memorandum-19-001, address the JPME concerns documented in the 2018 NDS? What does this program add to the current PME system?

We need to delineate between "strategists" - those who can imagine and write strategy from a blank page, and the "strategically-minded" - those who can effectively execute strategy through campaigns and operations. The former are rare and the new Defense Strategic Thinkers Program will help develop such individuals. The NDS language refers to the latter, the development of which is a responsibility of the larger JPME system. The inaugural execution of this program has promise, and if confirmed, I look forward to ensuring its success.

DOD Senior Official Education and Training

177. In your view, do a sufficient number of General/Flag officers and members of the Senior Executive Services (SES) have the advanced training, academic degrees, and expertise in scientific and technical disciplines needed to lead the future joint force and the scientific and technical civilian workforce?

Yes, but I am concerned about our ability to continue to attract and retain the highest quality talent necessary to achieve the National Defense Strategy. To do that, in addition to investing in our service members, we must compete with the public and private sectors for talent in some very small talent pools. It is essential we attract and develop talent with expertise in quantum computing, AI/ML, space, cyber, and data science, for example, to maintain competitive advantage.

178. Do you believe the career paths for General/Flag officers and SES with technical skills are sufficient to ensure that DOD and its components can develop capability performance requirements that will counter rapidly changing technological threats, execute complex acquisition programs, and make informed investment decisions? If not, what would you do to address this deficiency, if confirmed?

Yes, we have an incredibly talented workforce, but we must continue to evolve as our industrial and technology bases evolve. If confirmed, I will work with stakeholders to ensure our senior joint leaders continue to receive the training and development required to be successful.
179. In your view do current General/Flag officer and SES assignment policies incentivize highly qualified senior leaders to serve in acquisition programs? Do established tour lengths enable and empower senior leaders so assigned to manage effectively the long-term acquisition programs under their purview? If not, what changes do you believe are necessary to improve the effectiveness of the senior leaders assigned to such positions and duties?

Yes, we have a very robust acquisition corps with Department level priorities engaging our general/flag officers at strategic levels of implementation. Our tour lengths are designed to ensure long-term acquisition systems are managed in an effective and efficient manner. In my judgment, the Department’s biggest civilian workforce challenge is ensuring we continue to attract and retain the highest quality talent necessary to achieve the National Defense Strategy. To do that, we must compete with the public and private sectors for talent, and further establish the Department as an employer of choice, by effectively describing the importance of the Nation’s defense to prospective employees. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff, OSD, and other DoD stakeholders to ensure our senior leaders continue to receive the training, advice, and assistance they need to continue do so.

180. Are you satisfied that OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Military Services have in place sufficient ethics training and resources to provide General/Flag officers and members of the SES the training, advice, and assistance needed to perform their duties in an ethical manner? Please explain your answer.

Yes. Sufficient training and resources are in place to provide senior military and civilian leaders the training, advice, and assistance they need to “play the ethical midfield.” The ability to make ethical decisions is identified as a specific Desired Leader Attribute for leaders throughout the military and is foundational to all Joint and Service developmental efforts. The ethical foundation is laid at the outset of these individuals’ careers and is further developed and reinforced in formal education and training throughout their careers.

Joint Operations

Military operations are increasingly joint: the Marine Corps plans to deploy in larger numbers and on a wider range of Navy ships; the Army and Air Force invest in counter-maritime capabilities; and both air and naval forces continue to develop and implement capabilities to defeat anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) networks.

181. In your view, which other Military Service doctrines and capabilities offer the greatest opportunity for synergy in joint operations?

Globally conducted Joint operations require integration of the space and cyberspace domains. Both domains offer opportunities to build synergy and asymmetric advantage in
joint operations. U.S. Space Command and U.S. Cyber Command are working to operationalize our advantages in these critical domains.

182. If confirmed, what innovative ideas would you propose to increase Service interdependence and interoperability to accomplish missions and tasks in support of joint operations, to include logistical operations?

If confirmed, I would increase emphasis on interdependence and interoperability through joint training at the tactical and operational levels of warfare to strengthen our ability to conduct joint operations. I would also consider developing joint readiness goals, objectives, and metrics to achieve statutory guidance and assess synchronization of Service goals and objectives to ensure proper alignment with DoD goals and objectives.

183. In your opinion, what are the most critical shortfalls in capabilities to support the joint force?

Emerging technologies being developed and employed by our pacing threats have altered the operating environment on a global scale at an unrelenting pace. These challenges require lethal and non-lethal capabilities that are interoperable across all Services and allow us the ability to share information faster than our adversaries.

184. Do you believe the respective services are on the correct path to modernize and overcome those shortfalls?

The Services have aligned their modernization efforts with the objectives outlined in the National Defense Strategy. If properly funded and executed, the Services’ modernization efforts place the Department on a trajectory to achieve these objectives.

185. How would you use your unilateral authority as Chairman of the JROC if needed to correct such shortfalls?

If confirmed, I will only utilize this unilateral authority when absolutely necessary. It would be my role to build consensus among the members in assuring our warfighters are the most lethal they can be in these changing times. My position is to lead the Council in the review and decision with regard to the critical warfighting gaps facing the Joint Force. The goal is to reach consensus, when able, through subordinate level discussions, and by making deliberate decisions among the JROC members regarding requirements to close or mitigate these capability gaps. I will strive to reach consensus amongst the JROC members in all decisions, however, any dissenting position will be made clear to the Chairman as a matter of course. From what I understand, this seldom, if ever, has been the case for a JROC decision.

186. There has been much discussion about the importance of networking and connecting Service capabilities across air, land, and sea platforms operating across multiple domains.
187. What is your understanding of how DOD intends to execute joint airborne battle management in a high-end fight?

Executing joint airborne battle management command and control relies on two main elements: 1) timely (speed of relevance) decision-quality information, and 2) effective communication defined as Commander’s intent via machine-to-machine and/or verbal authority. The Department is focusing on JADC2, the USAF’s contribution of ABMS, the Navy’s Project Overmatch, and the Army’s Project Convergence, to deliver target quality tracks in order to rapidly complete the Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Assess (F2T2EA) targeting cycle, ultimately for the high-end fight.

188. What is DOD doing to make machine-to-machine command and control, across multiple domains, a reality?

The Joint Staff J6 conducted a study of all AI and Machine Learning tools across the entire Department to identify tools that can be used as enterprise solutions across single, multiple, or all-domains. Some of these programs and initiatives include: the Artificial Intelligence Data Accelerator Initiative (ADA), Advancing Analytics Platform (ADVANA), and Service and Joint Staff efforts to develop and demonstrate JADC2. Their study and research will help identify tools the DoD can leverage for multi- and all-domain C2.

189. In your view, are the Services doing enough to ensure airborne data links are interoperable and resilient against peer competitors?

Yes, but they can do more. Interoperable and resilient airborne tactical data links are the bedrock for achieving victory against a peer competitor. Ongoing cryptographic modernization efforts across the family of data links as well as the incorporation of advanced capabilities will allow the Joint Force to field a more resilient capability in the face of peer competitors.

190. In your view, how successful has the Joint Staff and the Department of Defense been at developing and refining the joint operational concepts that will govern this integrated fight?

The Joint Staff and the Department of Defense has been successful at developing joint operational concepts. The Joint Force has developed a threat-informed Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) to address future great power conflict. The JWC is a global concept that describes an operational approach to defend the U.S. and maintain overmatch defeat strategic adversaries.

The JWC guides how the U.S. will organize, train, educate, and equip the future Joint Force, and it communicates a Department-wide campaign of learning informed through coordination with Services, Combatant Commands, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Future JWC efforts include developing, testing, and maturing JWC ideas through Joint and Service training, exercises, experiments, and doctrine development.
If confirmed, I will do my part to accelerate JWC development efforts to ensure the future Joint Force will have the appropriate personnel, training, equipment, and doctrine in place to deter war and, if necessary, win future wars.

191. Do you think that there needs to be a different or tailored joint operational concept for the European and Indo-Pacific theaters? Why or why not?

No, I do not. Ultimately, we have one joint force that will need to adapt to all threats environment to achieve national security objectives. If confirmed, I will use my role to ensure a common approach to joint operations in both the European and Indo-Pacific theaters, and to further tailor the joint force to respond appropriately to changing threats and environments.

**Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Capabilities**

Demand for ISR capabilities of every kind has grown exponentially in recent years, largely due to the enhanced situational awareness and targeting capabilities they afford commanders. Almost all of the geographic Combatant Commands have validated ISR requirements that are not being met.

192. What is your assessment of DOD’s current disposition of ISR assets across the Combatant Commands?

Demand for ISR continues to outpace available supply. To meet competing demands, the Department reviews the combatant commands’ standing and emerging requirements and routinely reprioritizes capacity to meet warfighter needs. This global force management process is led by the Joint Staff, but also takes into account services and force provider considerations to meet command requirements while balancing risk and readiness challenges. The disposition of ISR across the commands is constantly changing in order to keep pace with our dynamic geopolitical situation. If confirmed, I look forward to participating in the global force management process and working to support the Chairman as he makes recommendations to the Secretary for allocation decisions.

193. What do you perceive as the most concerning shortfalls in both the capability and availability of ISR assets? If confirmed, what steps would you take to correct these deficiencies?

The appetite for ISR capacity continues to grow beyond the Department’s currently fielded, and even planned availability. Even a large increase in ISR inventory will not mitigate shortfalls. Additional capacity will require investments in mechanics, operators, analysts, linguists, and expanded basing options. In order to mitigate the shortfalls and better equip our commands with the intelligence support they need, I believe we require an approach that provides broader investments in platforms, sensors, command and control, architecture, and analytics that can penetrate and survive in high-threat, denied
environments. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to build on Gen Hyten’s commitment to reform the JROC process.

As the Vice, if confirmed, I would serve as head of the Joint Requirements Council (JROC), helping to define and prioritize the capabilities the Joint Force needs, to include ISR. Additionally, I would sit on a number of different Pentagon committees that review budgets, acquisitions, force design, and force development.

**Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program**

The CTR program, which has focused historically on accounting for, securing, or eliminating Cold War era weapons of mass destruction and materials in the states of the former Soviet Union, has expanded its focus to other countries. As part of this expansion, the CTR program is widening its focus to biological weapons and capabilities, including biological surveillance and early warning, and encouraging the development of capabilities to reduce proliferation threats.

194. In your view, how could coordination of the CTR program across U.S. Government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts (i.e., the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the State Department) be improved?

The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program is a critical and effective effort that contributes to the safety and security of the United States and our allies and partners. It is imperative that national governments have capabilities to counter WMD threats. Proliferation is a global problem that cannot be resolved by the United States alone. The Joint Force and DOD will continue to collaborate across the interagency to ensure a whole of government approach in the application of the CTR program. DOS, DOE, and the CDC are part of the planning process to determine CTR priorities on a recurring basis.

Notwithstanding the use and proliferation of chemicals documented recently in Libya and Syria, about 60% of CTR resources are allocated to biological programs.

195. Do you believe this shift in focus to biological programs accurately reflects the current threat?

Yes. The current focus on biological programs resulted from a surge designed to address specific threats, to include the need for increased partner detection capabilities and security of sensitive biological facilities. The Department reviews threats on an annual basis and reprioritizes activity when required. CTR's capabilities and authority to work directly with our partners' civilian and military establishments provides flexibility to adapt to changes in the operating environment.

196. If confirmed, would you recommend adjustment in the allocation of CTR resources? If so, what adjustments would you recommend?
If confirmed, I will review CTR resource allocations and make recommendations as appropriate to policy-makers to ensure CTR efforts are supportive of our national Counter WMD strategies and Combatant Command plans. CTR efforts will continue to be synchronized with interagency partners who have different roles, authorities, and responsibilities in countering WMD threats.

**Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs)**

197. What is your understanding of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy and the role of DOD in supporting that strategy?

The National Strategy for Counter Terrorism provides a holistic, whole of government approach to countering violent extremist organizations (VEOs). The DoD is involved in several lines of effort including a leading role in strengthening the counterterrorism abilities of international partners and conducting military operations overseas to disrupt terrorist networks.

198. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy in addressing the threat posed by VEOs?

The 2018 National Strategy for Counter Terrorism will take time to realize results. Given the long-term horizon to counter violent extremism, the Department will measure effectiveness based on trends associated with the strategic objectives. For example, we continue to successfully diminish the capacity of terrorists to directly attack the homeland. However, we struggle as an interagency to effectively curtail radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization of some organizations. If confirmed, I'll work with the Chairman and interagency to routinely assess our progress of the strategy to address violent extremist threats and identify areas for adaptation.

199. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the strategy and its associated measures of effectiveness? Should efforts to prevent the underlying causes of extremism be a component of our counterterrorism strategy?

If confirmed, I will work with the joint stakeholders and agencies to monitor our strategic measures of effectiveness in order to ensure we are working towards a desired end state with the understanding that progress will require strategic patience. Efforts to prevent underlying causes of extremism are key components of our counterterrorism strategy, especially as we prioritize resources and focus to threats against the U.S. homeland and other national interests.

200. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to promote a more resource sustainable approach to counterterrorism?

If confirmed, I would support the ongoing evaluation of DoD's counter-terrorism campaigns in USAFRICOM, USCENTCOM, USINDOPACOM. This approach seeks to balance resources and outcomes. This force optimization will enable more effective
operations to defeat trans-regional threat networks. I will continue to advocate for improved collaboration and integration within the DoD, interagency, and our multinational allies and partners to maximize resource sustainable approaches to CT.

**Countering ISIS in Iraq and Syria**

**201. What is your assessment of the current threat posed by ISIS?**

ISIS remains one of the primary transnational terrorist threats to the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests overseas. ISIS continues to encourage its networks, branches, and supporters to inspire, enable, direct, and conduct attacks worldwide and will use their media capability to preserve global brand appeal despite territorial losses. ISIS is likely exercising patience and adapting to its restrained operational environment to pursue their goal of establishing a global caliphate. Inspired attacks are the principal method ISIS is projecting power globally as CT pressure in the region and plot disruption in Western countries have temporarily limited their ability to resource external networks.

**202. In your view, what are the U.S. national security objectives in Syria? To what extent does continued U.S. force presence in Syria support those objectives?**

The U.S. military mission in Syria remains the enduring defeat of ISIS. We continue to work by, with, and through our partners and allies. U.S. immediate priorities in Syria include:

- Expand humanitarian access
- Sustain the campaign against ISIS in partnership with the Syrian Democratic Forces
- Support international norms to promote human rights and accountability
- Sustain local ceasefires across Syria

These priorities are the necessary building blocks for eventual progress on the political track to end the Syrian conflict. U.S. and Coalition forces enable the second priority, to sustain the partner-based campaign against ISIS.

**203. In your view, should U.S. troop levels in Syria be tied to the achievement of certain conditions on the ground? If so, what conditions do you believe should factor into decisions about U.S. troop levels in Syria?**

U.S. forces have drawn down to a minimal presence in Syria to maintain counterterrorism and security operations. U.S. and Coalition forces should remain in Syria until partner force capacity and will is sufficient to defeat ISIS without significant external support. Any future troop level or capabilities changes would have to be assessed based on the progress of our partner-based strategy. A partner-based approach provides an effective and efficient way to counter ISIS while minimizing risk to U.S. forces, and it presents the best long-term solution to ensure ISIS remains territorially defeated when U.S. forces depart.
204. What is your understanding of the current U.S. strategy and objectives in Iraq?

The U.S. military strategy seeks the enduring defeat of ISIS, by, with, and through the Iraqi Security Forces and Kurdish Peshmerga forces. To achieve this objective, the coalition provides advice, assistance, and intelligence to the Iraqi Security Forces in support of their defeat of ISIS operations.

205. The Administration announced the transition of combat forces from Iraq. Going forward, what do you envision to be the missions and size of the U.S. military presence in Iraq?

In accordance with the Joint Communiqué and July 2021 Strategic Dialogue, CJTF-OIR is transitioning to an advise and assist role aimed at supporting the Iraqi Security Forces in their defeat-ISIS campaign. U.S. forces remain in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government. We do not foresee significant changes to our current force posture in Iraq.

206. What steps would you recommend for normalizing security assistance to the Iraqi Security Forces in the coming years?

To normalize security assistance to the ISF, the DoD is enacting a plan of action that will occur in three conditions-based phases:

- Phase 1 calls for the appointment of a Senior Defense Official/Defense Attache which is complete.
- Phase 2 will transition tasks from CJTF-OIR to OSC-I which transitions activities from CJTF-OIR to a normalized Security Cooperation Office.
- Phase 3 will seek implementation of permanent OSC-I billeting/staffing. This will be conditions based and characterized by the cessation of major combat operations against ISIS and the implementation of a Joint Manpower Validation Board to source requirements for OSC-I with permanent staffing.

At the end of these phases, the Senior Defense Official/Defense Attache and Security Cooperation Construct will be fully normalized with permanent manning and stable, reliable funding streams that support long-term U.S. national security interests in Iraq.

207. In your view, what should the United States do regarding the repatriation of ISIS prisoners currently detained by the Syrian Democratic Forces?

It is critical to leverage all appropriate military and diplomatic levers to address the threat of ISIS. In my current capacity, I do not have access to information to fully assess this issue. If confirmed, I would work to understand the specifics and provide my best military advice.

208. In your view, what are the U.S. national security interests in Yemen?

Yemen and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

208. In your view, what are the U.S. national security interests in Yemen?
Three U.S. National Security interests exist in Yemen:

- Denying a safe haven for AQAP and ISIS affiliates to plan and execute attacks against the U.S., our allies, and interests.
- Preserving the freedom of navigation through the Bab al-Mandeb and Red Sea - the Red Sea is vital for the free flow of global commerce and energy.
- Reducing malign Iranian influence - Iranian shipments of arms to the Houthis have been used to attack Saudi citizens and civilian infrastructure as well as threaten the peace and stability across the Arabian Peninsula and surrounding maritime areas.

To protect these interests, the U.S. military supports diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict in Yemen by supporting Saudi Arabian armed forces to defend their territory and protect their citizens from Iran-backed Houthi attacks. Furthermore, a small number of U.S. deployed forces advise, assist, and train partner forces to conduct counter-terror operations.

209. What do you see as the implications of the Biden Administration’s decision to cease offensive support operations to the Saudi-led coalition?

There is not a military solution to ending the conflict in Yemen. I support U.S. Special Envoy to Yemen Lenderking’s attempts to facilitate an UN-brokered diplomatic resolution. However, as President Biden indicated in his policy statement, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia faces a persistent threat from Iranian-supplied cross-border attacks by the Houthis. U.S. Joint Forces continue to help Saudi Arabia defend its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and its people.

210. In your view, what role, if any, should the United States play in supporting the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen?

Consistent with the decision to cease military support for offensive operations by the Saudi-led Coalition in Yemen, the U.S. provides military training and intelligence support to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to defend against Houthi cross-border (unmanned aerial vehicle, ballistic missile and unmanned maritime) attacks. The U.S.’s chief role is supporting the international diplomatic efforts to end the conflict in Yemen.

211. What threat do the Houthis pose to freedom of navigation in Bab al-Mandeb, in your view, and what can the U.S. do to mitigate that threat more effectively?

The Houthis possess Iranian supplied missiles, explosive-laden unmanned maritime vessels, mines, and armed/explosive unmanned aerial vehicles which pose a threat to freedom of navigation in the Bab al-Mandeb and Red Sea. The Houthis have demonstrated a willingness to attack military and commercial vessels as evidenced by the Houthi attempted attacks against USS MASON and USS PONCE in 2016, as well as commercial vessels in Jeddah Port, Saudi Arabia in 2020.
Working with the international community to halt the illicit supply of arms to the Houthis, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2216, is an important step toward maintaining freedom of navigation. For example, USS MONTEREY and USS WINSTON CHURCHILL both seized Iranian-provided arms headed to the Iranian-backed Houthis. The U.S. Joint Force works with partner nation militaries to implement this UNSCR, all toward facilitating a swift end to the conflict in Yemen. To that end, the U.S. military supports these diplomatic and international efforts, led by Special Presidential Envoy Lenderking, to create a lasting and effective peace in Yemen.

Preserving the freedom of navigation through the Bab al-Mandeb and Red Sea is vital for the free flow of global commerce and energy. We must reduce the malign Iranian influence - Iranian shipments of arms to the Houthis have been used to attack Saudi citizens and civilian infrastructure as well as threaten the peace and stability across the Arabian Peninsula and surrounding maritime areas.

**Afghanistan**

*Reflecting back on the mission in Afghanistan, what do you see as some of the major strategic missteps? How would you apply those lessons learned in future military operations?*

It is clear the war in Afghanistan did not end on the terms we wanted. However, every service member and civilian who served there for the past 20 years protected our country from attack by terrorists. For that they should be forever proud, and we should be forever grateful.

Understanding our engagement in Afghanistan will take time and thoughtful analysis of key questions; there are many lessons learned. The Department of Defense is committed to doing the work to fully understand our 20-year involvement in Afghanistan.

**213. What factors do you assess as leading to the Taliban’s ultimate success in returning to power in Afghanistan?**

This issue requires significant analysis, research, and understanding to gain more clarity. As we study this matter, it will be absolutely critical to understand strategic lessons of our involvement in Afghanistan and integrate and apply lessons-learned with respect to our doctrine and training. If confirmed, I will be committed to carefully reviewing this matter to ensure we learn and improve from this experience.

**214. In your opinion, what are the implications of the collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) for future advise, train and assist missions?**

Our experience in Afghanistan provides key lessons on how we establish priorities for future train, advise, and assist missions, and match those to the resources required; how
we take account of regional and local politics and conflict dynamics; how we study and re-evaluate a country’s institutional and logistical capacity to absorb our assistance; and especially how we cultivate a sense of local ownership and accountability.

215. As the military mission in Afghanistan has concluded, what do you view as U.S. strategic interests in Afghanistan?

The President has made clear that the primary vital national interest in Afghanistan is to make sure Afghanistan can never be used again to launch an attack on our homeland.

216. Can the United States conduct effective “over the horizon” counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan without a partner force on the ground? Please explain your answer.

The United States conducts counterterrorism operations all over the world in places where we do not have a partner force on the ground. We are actively setting the conditions in coordination with partners in the region to ensure we remain situationally aware and are postured to mitigate and neutralize developing terrorist threat streams. Further details on this issue need to be discussed in a classified setting.

Iran

217. What is your assessment of the current military threat posed by Iran?

Iran is our nation’s most formidable threat in the CENTCOM AOR. Iran’s conventional military strategy is primarily based on deterrence and the ability to retaliate against an attacker. It also cultivates non-state violent proxies and militias to project power and build regional influence. Iran’s primary military capabilities are missiles, UAVs, naval forces, and unconventional forces.

Iran also holds the region’s largest surface-to-surface missile (SSM) arsenal, including both ballistic and cruise missiles that serve as its primary strategic deterrent. SSMs in Iran’s inventory have a range of up to 1300 miles. Further, Iran’s naval forces are the Arabian Gulf’s strongest and feature many small boats and naval mines to complicate adversary freedom of movement in a conflict.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps – Qods Force (IRGC-QF) maintains ties to Shia militia groups across the region to advance Iran’s interests. Iran-backed proxies give Iran unconventional options for operations in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain and globally. The IRGC-QF also has longstanding ties to select Sunni groups, including Palestinian Islamic Jihad, HAMAS, and the Taliban. Regular Iranian ground forces continue to focus on internal security and territorial defense.

Iranian leaders likely seek to avoid direct conventional conflict with a superior military force but maintain capabilities to impose significant cost through retaliatory strikes and covert proxy attacks.
218. Are U.S. military forces and capabilities currently deployed to the CENTCOM AOR adequate to deter and, if necessary, respond to threats posed by Iran?

It is critical for the United States to deter aggressive and destabilizing actions by Iran and to maintain the capability and capacity to respond to credible threats in the region when necessary. In my current capacity, I do not have access to information to adequately assess the position of military forces in the CENTCOM AOR. If confirmed, this is an issue I would work to understand further.

219. What is your assessment of U.S. national security interests associated with the growth of Iranian influence in the Middle East?

In my current capacity, I do not have access to information to adequately assess the growth and impact of Iranian influence in the Middle East. If confirmed, I would work with the appropriate Combatant Commands to assess the specific impacts of Iranian influence in the region.

220. If the U.S. relieved sanctions on Iran, do you assess that there is a risk that Iran would use that sanctions relief to further its malign activities in the region?

In my current capacity, I do not have access to information to adequately assess the impact of sanctions relief on Iran’s malign activities in the region. If confirmed, this is an issue I would work to understand further.

China

221. How would you characterize the current U.S. relationship with China?

The Department of Defense is taking a concerted approach to position for long-term competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This approach prioritizes China as the Department of Defense’s (DoD) primary pacing challenge. Simultaneously, DoD seeks a constructive, stable, results-oriented defense relationship with the People’s Liberation Army that helps set U.S.-PRC relations on a path of transparency and non-aggression and welcomes collaboration when interests align, for instance on climate change.

222. What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-China military-to-military relations? What do you believe should be the objectives of U.S.-China military-to-military dialogue? What are the limitations on this kind of dialogue?

DoD’s defense contacts and exchanges with the PRC prioritize crisis prevention and management, risk reduction, and limited cooperation in areas where national interests align, in order to advance a constructive, stable, results-oriented defense relationship with the PLA. These exchanges with the PRC are conducted in accordance with the statutory limitations of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, as amended.
Our increasingly competitive relationship with the PRC requires we maintain regular communication channels to prevent crisis and ensure pathways for timely communications so we can communicate with the PLA should a crisis occur.

I support dialogue that enables us to challenge PRC behaviors inconsistent with the free and open international order; gain insight into China’s strategic intent; manage differences; and cooperate in areas where national interests align.

223. What do you believe are the objectives of China’s steady increase in defense spending and its overall military modernization program? In what technology areas are you most concerned about the erosion of U.S. advantages?

The PRC’s long-term goal is to create an entirely self-reliant defense-industrial sector—fused with a strong civilian industrial and technology sector—that can provide the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with a “world class military” by 2049. In the interim, China’s objective is to meet two intermediate military modernization milestones: 1) accelerate integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization related to a potential Taiwan contingency by 2027, and 2) complete all military modernization goals as outlined by the CCP by 2035.

Concerning to me is that the PRC is investing in, and acquiring, technologies that will be foundational for future military innovations including artificial intelligence, robotics, autonomous vehicles, and quantum computing. I agree with this assessment and, if confirmed, I will continue to monitor and address these issues.

224. What is your assessment of China’s increasing military presence overseas, including installations like its bases in Djibouti and across Africa, as well as other infrastructure projects across the Indian Ocean?

The PRC is seeking to establish a more robust overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA to project and sustain military power at greater distances globally, based on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) China’s base in Djibouti and its military presence in Africa enable forward deployment of PLA forces and support military conflict, diplomatic signaling, political change, bilateral and multilateral cooperation, and training. They also suggest that a military logistics network could enable intelligence monitoring of the U.S. military, interests, and other assets. China’s military presence is also furthered enabled through its peacekeeping operations in Africa.

225. What is your assessment of the strategic and military implications for the United States of China’s Belt and Road Initiative? What are the strategic and military implications for other countries in the Indo-Pacific?

China uses the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to support its strategy of national rejuvenation by expanding global transportation and trade linkages. This works to support its development and deepen economic integration with nations along its periphery.
including the Indo-Pacific region. The PRC’s overseas development and security interests under BRI drive the PRC towards expanding its overseas military footprint to protect those interests.

The PRC attempts to use the economic influence it accrues in the Indo-Pacific region through BRI to encourage participating countries to support Beijing’s priorities and objectives on a range of other matters including its diplomatic, economic, and military objectives in the region.

The smaller number of nuclear weapons possessed by China relative to the United States and Russia is often cited as an impediment to nuclear arms control talks with China.

226. What are the strategic implications of the rapid modernization of Chinese nuclear weapons that are set to at least double by 2030, and what approach should the United States take to address those implications, in your view?

We will soon find ourselves faced with two nuclear peer nations. Given the current state of our defense industrial base for nuclear delivery platforms and the condition of some of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s production capabilities and infrastructure, we must begin preparing for this challenge now. To do so, I believe we must continue executing our current nuclear modernization programs, evaluate whether current programs of record are sufficient to fill any potential deterrence gaps, and engage China in discussions on strategic stability issues and arms control.

227. What do you think could motivate China to participate in nuclear arms control negotiations in a genuine and meaningful way?

Consistent strategic messaging from key U.S. and international political leaders for China to not just follow international norms in the area of nuclear arms control, but to participate in substantive discussions on risk reduction and strategic stability.

228. In your view, with the rapid development in both quantity and quality of Chinese nuclear capabilities, how does U.S. nuclear posture, and nuclear doctrine need to change to account for the existence of two near-peer nuclear strategic competitors?

I understand the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review will formulate a strategy for deterring both China and Russia. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the Chairman in providing his military advice on how U.S. nuclear posture and doctrine may need to change to account for the existence of two near-peer nuclear strategic competitors.

229. As Chinese aggression and nuclear capabilities both increase, do you assess that we have adequate military and national security crisis communication channels with senior Chinese leadership to avoid or at least mitigate the threat of rapid strategic escalation?
U.S. leadership has the ability to communicate with senior PRC and PLA leadership. These channels could be used to deescalate tension in the bilateral relationship and mitigate the threat of rapid strategic escalation during a crisis.

**U.S. Capabilities and Force Posture in Europe**

230. **In your assessment, are there capability and/or capacity shortfalls in the current joint force that present a challenge to addressing threats in Europe? If so, what specific enhancements would you recommend to joint force capabilities and force posture in Europe in each military domain?**

We should continue to enhance our long-range precision fires, undersea and anti-submarine warfare, integrated air and missile defense, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. In terms of infrastructure, storage for prepositioned equipment and munitions, airfield upgrades, and capacity for joint reception, staging, and onward integration remain priorities. These are not solely U.S. issues, and we will explore with our Allies and partners, bilaterally and through NATO, how they can leverage and align our respective investments to meet our shared requirements.

231. **In your assessment, does the United States have sufficient air and missile defense capability and capacity to defend critical infrastructure in the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), such as command and control locations and air bases, against cruise missile attack?**

Air and missile defense is a priority for us globally and in Europe. Adversaries are aggressively developing and fielding advanced air and missile capabilities with increased capacity, representing a threat to NATO and partner nations within the USEUCOM AOR. With NATO and partner support, USEUCOM has Land, Air, and Maritime capabilities to defend against missile threats.

However, NATO and USEUCOM require a credible, Integrated Air and Missile Defense capability, to include a robust command and control architecture capable of creating a fully integrated air and missile threat picture able to transition from peace through crisis to conflict. This will enable effective operations against combined attacks involving aircraft, cruise and ballistic missiles, and hypersonic vehicles.

We are continuing to improve our air and missile defense capability and capacity in the EUCOM area of responsibility. Right now, we are fielding new short-range air defense systems to Army units in Germany, and the Air Force just activated an F-35 squadron in the United Kingdom. Multinational exercises like ASTRAL KNIGHT and FORMIDABLE SHIELD are building not only U.S. readiness but are enhancing our ability to defend against air and missile threats in conjunction with Allies and partners.
232. Do Chinese investments in European infrastructure pose threats to U.S. operations there? What other Chinese activities or investments should be cause for concern with regard to our security and that of our Allies and partners in Europe?

Chinese investments in European infrastructure do pose a threat to U.S. operations in Europe. The United States and our European allies and partners should be alert to Chinese malign influence, particularly with regard to 5G technology and financial investment in critical infrastructure, including port and rail facilities, that could impact U.S. or alliance military planning, mobility, and enablement. Allies should also be aware of China’s opaque economic practices and coercion that create inroads to European infrastructure.

233. In your view, do large-scale military exercises such as DEFENDER EUROPE 2021 serve to reassure Allies and deter adversaries such as Russia? Do you support continuing a robust level of exercises with our European Allies and partners?

Combined, complex training with our Allies and partners builds readiness and improves interoperability. At the same time, these exercises demonstrate to Allies and adversaries our capability to command and control operations across all domains and multiple continents. They allow us to validate the same processes and procedures we would use in the event of a crisis in Europe, and at scales that stress the system and enable real growth. Collectively, they are concrete displays of U.S. and Allied resolve and capacity to impose costs on potential aggressors.

234. The Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan helped build interoperability with numerous NATO Allies and partners. What are ways we can maintain that level of interoperability going forward?

Combined exercises are interoperability laboratories that test our ability to shoot, move, and communicate with Allies and partners under pressure. The enduring presence of U.S. forces builds mutual familiarity between our forces and those of our host countries in Europe. We support efforts by NATO and U.S. European Command to define interoperability objectives and promote interoperability through training and exercises, equipment standardization, and NATO Centers of Excellence and NATO’s multinational command and control structures.

235. What is your assessment of military-to-military relations with Turkey at present?

Our military-to-military relationship with our strategic ally Turkey remains as strong, and we continue to work every day bilaterally and through NATO to address a range of issues vital to both of our national interests. Areas of divergence between our two countries are primarily in political channels, and the Turkish military has signaled a willingness to focus on the positive aspects of our relationship to address our mutual concerns related to regional instability and the threats posed by U.S. competitors. Relations between the Turkish Armed Forces and the U.S. military remain close, professional, and
complementary, as evidenced by our recent coordination in Afghanistan, and we will continue to build upon this cooperation in several key regions.

Although our two countries do not always agree, Turkey continues to contribute positively to a variety of NATO missions to include Baltic Air Policing and support for Bomber Task Force missions. It is evident that Turkey’s military capability and geographic location make it a key stakeholder in U.S. responses to regional events and within the NATO Alliance. Therefore, it is critical the U.S. military continue to execute and advocate for fundamental security cooperation activities with Turkey such as Professional Military Education, exercises, and Foreign Military Sales. These actions directly advance U.S. interests by preventing the deterioration of an ally’s military capabilities, strengthen NATO interoperability, and help enable U.S. force projection with access to key regions in support steady-state operations and contingences.

**Russia**

236. In your view, which aspects of U.S. and NATO force posture in Europe are most effective in deterring Russian aggression and mitigating threats to our NATO Allies and partners? What has worked in the past? Are there additional measures that the U.S. and NATO should consider?

Deterring Russian aggression and supporting NATO’s defense of the Euro Atlantic area remain as challenges facing USEUCOM. These complex and interrelated challenges require coordination with other U.S. Government Agencies, the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, allies and partners in Europe. Russia’s “malign influence campaign” seeks to confound our coordination efforts and weaken the Alliance’s integrity.

If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman, Commander, U.S. European Command, other combatant commanders and interagency stakeholders to establish credible deterrence to Russian aggression and ensure it’s a collective NATO alliance responsibility.

Continued integration with DOD efforts to address global requirements is essential to address trans-regional threats that span the conflict spectrum. Synchronized efforts by the combatant commands, overseen by OSD and the Joint Staff, are crucial to our success. We will continue to work closely with Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (R&E) and the Joint Staff to streamline the development and fielding of warfighting capabilities and concepts.

Further, I will continue advocating for resourcing solutions to address emerging requirements such as: enhanced and expanded Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR); anti-submarine and undersea warfare; Integrated Air and Missile
Defense (IAMD); hypersonics; cyber operations and a secure, resilient Information Technology theater infrastructure.

Russia has taken provocative action in the Black Sea region over the past year, including a military buildup around Ukraine and threats to Allied warships in the sea.

237. Are there additional efforts the U.S. military should undertake with Black Sea Allies and partners to advance our security interests and deter Russia?

The U.S. military must continue to work with our allies and partners - especially those bordering the Black Sea - to ensure that norms and activities are maintained with respect to the rules-based order. Efforts are already in place to increase interoperability, improve maritime domain awareness, and strengthen allied and partner capability to resist Russian coercion and deter malign influence in the region. If confirmed, I would ensure these ongoing efforts continue, and accelerated wherever possible.

238. Given advances in Russian attack submarine capability what additional capabilities or capacity are most important to maintaining the U.S. advantage in undersea warfare? What are the different capabilities that are necessary to address this in different parts of the world such as the North Atlantic Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, and elsewhere?

A robust Theater Anti-Submarine Warfare (TASW) capability requires investment in the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS) that uses the Fixed Surveillance System (FSS), Fixed Distributed System (FDS), and the Advanced Deployable System (ADS). A robust presence of fast attack submarines, guided-missile cruisers and destroyers, and Maritime Reconnaissance and Patrol Aircraft are instrumental in maintaining U.S. advantages in undersea warfare. We must maintain acoustic superiority.

239. In your assessment, does DOD currently have a mature joint concept of operations and the necessary capabilities in sufficient capacity to overcome advanced Russian anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) capabilities? If not, what additional capabilities or capacity are required in Europe to ensure U.S. forces are able to achieve operational freedom of maneuver?

We are making progress on a new Joint Warfighting Concept focused on ways the Joint Force can maintain a global advantage to project power and defend critical infrastructure. As Russia increases quantity and quality of advanced A2AD capabilities, the Joint Force requires new capabilities and increased capacity to defend our logistics infrastructure, our static bases, and forward positioned forces against the A2AD threat. Without modernization the United States’ critical power projection platforms and bases, along with forward deployed forces, would be under threat from advanced Russian capabilities.

240. What is your assessment of EUCOM and NATO’s readiness to detect, deter, and respond to Russian influence operations, including in the cyber domain?
Russian malign influence is not only a regional problem; it is global in nature. The scale and scope of this problem impacts each of the combatant commands, the IC, the interagency along with our allies and partners. EUCOM’s continued engagement and leadership in a variety of counter Russian influence venues has been essential to recognizing and responding to malign Russian Activity. The dynamic information environment requires us to constantly upgrade our approaches to detect this activity.

241. In your view, what additional military and non-military capabilities are required for the United States to counter effectively Russian hybrid operations below the level of military conflict?

Additional information operations capability would benefit EUCOM in countering Russian’s malign influence campaign. If confirmed, I will look very closely at our capabilities and capacity, especially counter Russian hybrid operations across the spectrum of conflict.

NATO Alliance

242. In your view, how important is the NATO Alliance to advancing U.S. national security interests?

Our commitment to NATO and particularly our obligations under Article 5, are crucial to U.S. strategic interests. Article 5 obligations are the linchpin of defense and deterrence against adversaries threatening the U.S. homeland and our vital interests in Europe. NATO’s strength is our mutual trust, commitment, and cohesion to collectively deter threats or respond to attacks.

243. How important is NATO’s Concept for the Deterrence and Defense of the Euroatlantic Area to the U.S. from an operational perspective? What other NATO priorities will the Joint Staff emphasize most in coming years?

Operationally, maintaining Alliance momentum on the implementation of NATO’s Concept for Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) is vitally important. The delivery in September of SACEUR’s AOR-Wide Strategic Plan provides military strategic direction to respond through the coordinated delivery of national, regional, and AOR-wide multi-domain effects to prevent a crisis from deepening. The Joint Staff will now emphasize further implementation through the on-going development of the DDA family of subordinate strategic and regional plans through the coming years. The development of those plans will lead us to a force structure that is responsive and fit for purpose. Most importantly, DDA implementation facilitates alignment between NATO and U.S. plans and activities.

244. How important is the update to NATO’s Strategic Concept for the NATO Military Committee?
Anchoring NATO’s continued military adaptation in an updated Strategic Concept is very important to the NATO Military Committee. The Military Committee’s agreements on Deterrence and Defense need to be central to the Strategic Concept. These include agreement on the threats, agreement on NATO’s purpose across the spectrum of competition and conflict, and agreement on how to manage deterrence and defense in the 21st Century. The Strategic Concept will also need to address China and their systematic challenges to the rules-based international order and relevance to Alliance security will also need to be addressed in the next Strategic Concept.

245. What do you see as the proper role for NATO in the strategic competition with Russia and China?

While Russia remains NATO’s immediate primary concern, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) presents a growing challenge, not least because it aims to complete military modernization by 2035 and transform the People’s Liberation Army into a “world-class” military by the end of 2049. Since Beijing likely seeks to develop a security cooperation architecture that would rival the Alliance, the Alliance must take account of not only Russia’s direct military impact on Euro-Atlantic security but also the PRC’s potential military influence on the Euro-Atlantic area.

246. If confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, what actions would you recommend to maintain momentum on the capabilities, readiness, and military mobility of the NATO Alliance in order to deter aggression?

The Alliance has created significant momentum through its ongoing military adaptation as part of the implementation of the Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area and SACEUR’s AOR-Wide Strategic Plan. These efforts, coupled with the NATO Readiness Initiative (NRI), directly build critical capabilities and improve readiness across the Alliance. If confirmed, I will continue to push for full implementation of the DDA and SASP to solidify these efforts, and emphasize the importance of NRI as a culture of readiness for the Alliance.

If confirmed, I will also encourage synchronization and cooperation with the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation mobility projects, which will be critical in improving and enhancing military mobility in the European AOR. The recent approval of the EU Administrative Arrangement negotiating mandate is an important step forward in this effort.

As recently as the June 2021 Summit, NATO Allies have declared “…that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.” The alliance’s Secretary General reiterated this point at the recent meeting of defense ministers in October, stating that a “…world where Russia, China, and countries like North Korea have nuclear weapons, but NATO has none, is simply not a safer world.”

247. In your view, should NATO remain a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist?
Yes. Nuclear deterrence is a key component of the Alliance’s deterrence and defense and must remain its highest priority mission for deterrence and defense.

248. Do you believe that the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe is an essential component of NATO’s nuclear posture?

Yes. U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe contribute to the deterrence of Russian limited nuclear use, provide NATO with credible capabilities to respond if deterrence fails, and serve as a tangible demonstration of Alliance unity.

249. In your view, is there a continuing requirement for U.S. nuclear weapons to be deployed in NATO countries?

Yes. U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe underpin the deterrence of Russian limited nuclear use, provide NATO with credible capabilities to respond if deterrence fails, and serve as a tangible demonstration of Alliance unity. Therefore, there is a continuing requirement for U.S. nuclear weapons’ deployment within NATO.

250. At the NATO Summit in Brussels this past year, Allies pledged to “ensure a flexible, agile, and resilient multi-domain force architecture” to meet deterrence and defense needs. How do you envision NATO Allies’ military efforts aligning with the U.S. Army’s Multi Domain Task Force?

The U.S. Army’s tenants for Multi-Domain Operations parallel similar concepts found in NATO’s Military Strategy, the Concept for Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA), SACEUR’s AOR-wide Strategic Plan and the associated subordinate family of DDA plans, and the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept, all centered on the development and adaptation of the Alliance’s Military Instrument of Power. Therefore, we envision that calibrated force posture, multi-domain formations, and the integration of capabilities in all domains will align with the Alliance’s development of multi-domain operations concepts and force architecture.

The Korean Peninsula

251. How would you assess the continuing value of the U.S.-South Korea alliance to U.S. national security interests?

For nearly 70 years, the U.S-ROK alliance has been a core pillar of the U.S national security architecture in Northeast Asia. The alliance has successfully deterred the North Korean threat since 1953. It plays an integral role in managing potential tensions in the region. The U.S.–ROK Alliance has also strengthened our collective security, economic ties, and societal relationships.
252. Do you believe it important that the United States and the Republic of Korea resolve fairly and amicably their negotiation of a new Special Measures Agreement for 2020 and beyond? If so, why?

The ROK and the United States ratified the Special Measure Agreement in August. This new agreement will contribute to long-term stability of our force posture in Korea for years to come. I welcome this historic agreement.

253. In your assessment, what is the value of combined joint exercises for maintaining the readiness of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula?

Exercises and training are the routine activities of militaries around the world. The U.S. military conducts exercises and training at multiple echelons, at home and in every Geographic Combatant Command region of the globe. Each exercise or training event on the Korean Peninsula is agreed upon by both the United States and South Korea as an integral part of maintaining combined forces warfighting readiness to fight tonight.

254. In your view, are there additional steps that DOD could take to improve U.S. and allied defenses against North Korea’s missile capabilities?

We will continue to monitor the situation regarding DPRK missile capabilities in order to protect U.S. interests and the security of our allies and partners. The Department of Defense remains postured to detect and respond to North Korean missile threats but must continue to improve regional interoperability, pursue improvements in allied missile defense capabilities, and adapt existing and emerging capabilities—particularly omnidirectional threats like cruise missiles—to strengthen our defenses. We must prioritize the next generation of advanced ground and space-based sensors to better detect, track, and discriminate enemy missile warheads and concurrently develop an effective, robust layered missile defense system to ensure defense of our homeland and forces abroad.

255. In your view, are there additional steps that DOD could take to ensure that North Korea does not proliferate missile and weapons technology?

The United States, in close coordination with allies and partners, has a vital interest in limiting the reach of the DPRK’s dangerous weapons programs and proliferation activities. Addressing this issue will take a whole of government approach to ensure North Korea does not proliferate missile and weapons technology. Furthermore, the United States will continue to work closely with all countries and jurisdictions to promote full implementation of DPRK-related U.N. Security Council resolutions.

256. If South Korea and North Korea were able to negotiate a peace deal, how do you assess that would impact U.S. force posture on the peninsula as well as the legal status of the UN force?
While the Department of Defense supports diplomatic efforts to engage North Korea, U.S. force posture is a critical backstop to our diplomatic efforts to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and maintain our ability to defend the ROK. We constantly assess our force posture to ensure that we are calibrated against the current threat as it evolves. The threat and our Alliance commitments will continue to be our guiding principles.

**General/Flag Officer Reductions**

The FY 2017 NDAA directed DOD to reduce the number of general and flag officer (G/FO) billets by 110 by 2022.

257. What is your understanding of the progress Joint Staff has made in reducing its number of G/FO in accordance with Department-wide plans?

The Joint Force will successfully meet the requirements of the NDAAs; however, emerging requirements may require future adjustments to GO/FO positions.

The Joint Staff contributed to an approximate 10% SES reduction in that time. Additionally, the Joint Staff scheduled and identified by-year reductions throughout CY22. The Joint Staff also identified 78 General Officer/Flag Officer positions for reduction in conjunction with the FY17 NDAA. To date, the Joint Pool reduced from 310 positions to 280 positions and plans will reduce further to 232 by December 31, 2022. In coordination with this reduction and FY17 NDAA, there is a plan to establish an Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) account of not more than 30 billets.

258. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to ensure the Joint Staff is successful in meeting these reduction mandates on time?

The Joint Staff is on track to meet the reduction mandates on time. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Combatant Commanders, and leaders of Defense Activities to ensure we remain on track. The Department has established a General Officer/Flag Officer reduction plan timeline for each position identified for removal. The Joint Staff reviews the plan regularly and provides updates to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on a quarterly basis, or more frequently as needed. Regarding SES management, if confirmed, I will continue to execute the DoD SES Reduction Plan to meet the goals of the Department while ensuring the mission and integrity of the Joint Force.


Officials of the Department of Defense, including previous Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have advocated for accession to the Law of the Sea Convention.

Yes. Like my predecessors, I support joining the Convention. Being a party to the Convention enhances the United States’ security posture by reinforcing freedom of the seas and rights vital to ensuring our global force posture. The Convention provides legal certainty in the world’s largest maneuver space.

260. In your view, what impact, if any, would U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention have on ongoing and emerging maritime disputes such as in the Indo-Pacific region and the Arctic?

Acceding to the Convention would strengthen our credibility and strategic position on issues pertaining to these regions. While we do not take sides in the various territorial disputes in the South China Sea, we do have a national security interest in ensuring disputes are resolved peacefully, that countries adhere to the rule of law, and that all nations fully respect freedom of the seas. However, we undermine our leverage by not signing up to the same rule book which we are asking other countries to accept. As for the Arctic, the other Arctic coastal nations (Russia, Canada, Norway and Denmark (Greenland)) understand the importance of the Convention and are in the process of utilizing the Convention’s procedures to establish the outer limits of their extended continental shelves (ECS) in the Arctic. The United States has a significant ECS in the Arctic Ocean and is also working to secure international recognition of its ECS. We should put our rights on a treaty footing and more fully and effectively interact with the other seven Arctic Council nations who are parties to the Convention.

Guantanamo Bay Naval Station

261. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014?

Yes, I support the standards for detainee treatment in the Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014, and required by section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92). Individuals in the custody or control of the U.S. Government may not be subjected to any interrogation technique or approach, or any treatment related to interrogation, that is not authorized by and listed in the Army Field Manual.

Fewer than forty detainees remain at the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station.

262. What are your views on the continued use of the detention facility at Guantanamo?
The detention facility at Guantanamo is DoD’s only long-term law of war detention facility. The continued use of this facility is ultimately a policy decision.

The Periodic Review Board (PRB) process, enacted in law by section 1023 of the FY 2012 NDAA, is conducted “to determine whether certain individuals detained at [Guantanamo] represent a continuing significant threat to the security of the United States such that their continued detention is warranted”.

263. Do you support the PRB process and the continued transfer of detainees to other countries based on the PRB’s determinations, subject to the restrictions currently in law?

The Periodic Review Board (PRB) process, enacted in law by section 1023 of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), is conducted “to determine whether certain individuals detained at [Guantanamo] represent a continuing significant threat to the security of the United States such that their continued detention is warranted.” Should I be confirmed, I will continue to support the PRB process, subject to existing legal restrictions.

264. In your view, what standard should apply to medical care provided to detainees at Guantanamo?

I believe that DoD should continue to provide adequate and humane care for detainees consistent with the standards of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and, to the extent practicable, medical treatment guided by standards similar to those applied to U.S. Armed Forces personnel stationed at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay.

Insider Threat

DOD has experienced devastating attacks from insider threats—attacks that have led to the death and injury of DOD personnel, as well as to the loss of highly-classified information critical to national security. The National Insider Threat Task Force published the Insider Threat Program Maturity Framework in November 2018.

265. In your view, has DOD’s Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), better postured the Department to deter, detect, and mitigate insider threats before they reach a critical point and potentially harm national security.

As Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, the question of implementing the newly-designated Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) has not been my responsibility. If confirmed, I will review the issue as required.

266. What can the Department do to ensure that senior leaders in each DOD Component—not only the intelligence or counterintelligence communities—are fully
invested in protecting their people, facilities, information from insider threats as a core mission objective?

The insider threat is a challenging problem that all senior leaders in DOD must be aware of. As Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, I worked diligently with subordinate commanders to ensure we took an active role in protecting our people, facilities and critical information from the insider threat. This was Commander’s Business. If confirmed, I will assist the Chairman, the Combatant Commanders and the Services in all manners possible to continue with this approach.

**Congressional Oversight**

In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

267. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes, if confirmed.

268. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes, if confirmed.

269. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes, if confirmed.

270. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Yes, if confirmed.

271. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes, if confirmed.

272. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes, if confirmed.

273. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes, if confirmed.