

Advance Policy Questions for James Geurts
Nominee for Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition)

Department of Defense Reforms

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included the most sweeping reforms since the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

Do you support these reforms?

Yes. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the Navy and the leadership of the Department to implement the reforms enacted in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 within the Department of the Navy, in concert with the reforms enacted in the NDAA for FY 2016. These reforms provide the Service Acquisition Executives of the military departments with valuable tools to increase innovation, efficiency, and effectiveness in responding to the needs of the warfighter.

What other areas for defense reform do you believe might be appropriate for this Committee to address?

If confirmed, I will be closely involved in the implementation of the reforms enacted in the NDAA for FY 2017 and the assessment of their impact to the Department of the Navy. Further, I will assess the operations of the Department of the Navy research, development, and acquisition enterprise, and will make recommendations for further reforms to the Secretary of the Navy in cases where I find that such reforms are necessary or beneficial.

Section 911 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 required the Secretary of Defense to establish cross-functional teams to address critical objectives of the Department.

Do you agree that the Department must be able to integrate its diverse, functional capabilities well in order to successfully defend the nation from increasingly complex and dynamic security threats? Will you meet this requirement to the best of your abilities?

Yes. Given the increasingly complex range of threats to national security, and the dynamic nature of those threats, the Department should always seek to better integrate diverse capabilities in order to optimize lethality and agility. If confirmed, I will meet this requirement to the best of my ability.

What are your views on the potential focus areas and uses for future cross-functional teams?

Cross-functional teams can be a very effective tool for improving the collaboration between the research, development, and acquisition enterprise and other functional components of the Department. If confirmed, I will support the Secretary of the Navy and Under Secretary of the Navy in advising the Secretary of Defense regarding how the Department of Defense can best leverage cross-functional teams in order to increase lethality and agility across the full spectrum of missions, as well as assess the opportunities to increase the implementation of cross-functional teams within the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN/RDA).

The Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009 established a set of program management and systems engineering practices that have attempted to better control acquisition costs and schedule.

What is your assessment of the reforms established under WSARA?

If confirmed, I will analyze the impact of WSARA and subsequent, related legislation on Department of the Navy acquisition programs. In more recent defense acquisition legislation, Congress has made significant progress in codifying and refining those provisions of WSARA that are beneficial to the Department, while repealing or modifying provisions that have been less effective.

Duties

Section 5016 of title 10, United States Code, states the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary of the Navy may prescribe and that the principal duty of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN(RDA)) shall be the overall supervision of research, development, and acquisition matters of the Department of the Navy.

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the ASN(RDA)?

It is my understanding that the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN(RDA)) serves as the Service Acquisition Executive for the Department of the Navy with the authority, responsibility, and accountability for all acquisition functions and programs within the Department, and for enforcement of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) procedures. As such ASN(RDA) represents the Department of the Navy to USD(AT&L) and to Congress on all matters relating to acquisition policy and programs, establishes policies and procedures, and manages the Navy's Research, Development and Acquisition activities in accordance with governing statutes, Department of Defense policies, and Navy regulations. ASN(RDA) serves as the Milestone Decision Authority on Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1C programs and recommends decisions on ACAT ID

programs. The ASN(RDA) also leads the Department of the Navy acquisition workforce, ensuring that the Department recruits, trains, develops, certifies, and retains the skills and expertise required to execute the mission.

What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties and functions of the ASN(RDA), as set forth in section 5016 of title 10, United States Code, or in Department of Defense regulations pertaining to functions of the ASN(RDA)?

At this time I do not currently recommend modifications to the duties and responsibilities of ASN(RDA). If confirmed, I will review the statutes and regulations and recommend any changes to the Department that may warrant consideration.

If confirmed, what additional duties, if any, do you expect will be prescribed for you?

If confirmed, I expect the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy to assign me the duties and functions corresponding to the ASN(RDA) position and any other duties they deem appropriate.

Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the ASN(RDA)?

I believe that the breadth of my military and civilian career has prepared me to perform the duties of ASN(RDA). If confirmed, I intend to maintain a close working relationship with the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and USD(AT&L) and their respective organizations to foster increased collaboration on acquisition matters.

Qualifications

What background and experience do you have that qualify you for this position?

Throughout my 30 year career I have been privileged to serve as both an active duty member of the armed forces and as a Department of Defense civilian in the field of acquisition, including a significant portion in joint acquisition positions. This range of experience has provided me engineering and program management leadership roles on numerous weapon systems including intercontinental ballistic missiles, surveillance platforms, tactical fighter aircraft, advanced avionics systems, stealth cruise missiles, training systems, and manned and unmanned Special Operations aircraft. As the Acquisition Executive for U.S. Special Operations Command, I have gained critical insight into the need to create flexible business models and work with the private sector and operators in the field to innovate and adapt to changing operating environments. If confirmed, I am confident that my strong technical background, leadership skills, and experiences will provide a solid foundation to serve as ASN(RDA).

Major Challenges and Priorities

In your view, what are the major challenges that you would confront, if confirmed?

If confirmed, there will be numerous challenges that will confront me as the Service Acquisition Executive for the Department of the Navy. The most critical of these challenges will be balancing the immediate need to ensure a ready and lethal combat force and to grow and modernize the Navy and Marine Corps to meet the needs of the ongoing Strategic Defense Review. These challenges will require me, if confirmed, to ensure the Department of the Navy has the processes and culture to take advantage of the many new acquisition authorities Congress has enabled, has the processes and tools needed to effectively acquire capabilities at the pace of technological change, can maintain competition to more affordably procure weapon systems in an environment with fewer quantities, can ensure and sustain a healthy industrial base (to include at the supplier level), and can maintain the robust and well-trained acquisition workforce needed to meet the challenging demands of the future.

If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Addressing these challenges will require an intent-based, mission-focused, adaptable, and empowered organization which is operating with a sense of urgency. Throughout my career, I have effectively led organizations by focusing on a clear communication of intent, instilling a culture aligned with the needs of the customer and training/empowering the workforce needed to achieve the mission. If confirmed, I will assess the current capabilities, processes, workforce, and culture of the Department of the Navy research, development, and acquisition enterprise to address the numerous aforementioned challenges. I will ensure that the workforce is properly trained, incentivized, fully empowered to meet their responsibilities, and accountable for their performance. I will evaluate the best practices from USSOCOM, as well as from my experiences as a joint acquisition officer, to ensure the Department of the Navy is fully leveraging the numerous new authorities Congress has provided for the Department, and aggressively pursuing the organizational changes needed to be relevant in the challenging future. I will critically assess the organization with the goals of removing waste, streamlining oversight, increasing the velocity of decision-making, and aligning accountability with responsibility. I will work closely with USD(AT&L) to identify opportunities to further delegate acquisition oversight to the Department of the Navy and eliminate non-value added processes or oversight. I will accomplish these actions while ensuring full transparency, proactive engagement, collaboration, and communication at all levels.

What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the ASN(RDA)?

From my career as a senior acquisition professional and my role as the Acquisition Executive at USSOCOM, I have found the most serious problem to be balancing requirements and resources to ensure timely delivery of the most highly capable

equipment to the warfighter. This requires frequent and frank dialogue between the ASN(RDA) organization and the warfighting customers they support in the Navy and Marine Corps.

If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would you establish to address these problems?

If confirmed, I will immediately begin to assess the situation to better understand the existing organizational culture, identified shortfalls, and opportunities. I will initially focus on the current capabilities, processes, workforce and culture of the organization. As I identify capability gaps or improvement opportunities, I will establish focused initiatives with time-phased steps to address the problems and capture the opportunities. I will establish a process to measure the progress versus planned steps, as well as the outcomes of each of the initiatives, similar to the process I have used as the Acquisition Executive at USSOCOM. While it is premature to discuss the specific management actions and timelines without a complete understanding of the issues, if confirmed, I expect some of my initial areas of focus would be assessing the skills of the Department of the Navy workforce versus anticipated future needs, assessing the readiness of the acquisition processes and organization to execute the ongoing Defense Strategic Review, and changes that might be required to fully implement the acquisition reform changes and authorities provided in the 2016 and 2017 NDAA.

If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish and how will you measure progress in achieving these priorities?

If confirmed, I will propose priorities based on the Secretary of Defense guidance on October 5, 2017 to all members of the Department of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy's Mission, Vision and Priorities guidance established in August 2017. I will document these priorities and communicate them to the Department of the Navy acquisition enterprise to ensure a clear delineation of intent and priorities from the Secretary of the Navy, through ASN(RDA), down to each executing organizations. I will establish a disciplined set of performance metrics to measure progress in achieving those priorities.

Relations with Congress

What are your views on the state of the relationship between the Office of the ASN(RDA) and the Senate Armed Services Committee in particular, and with Congress in general?

I believe ASN(RDA) has had a positive relationship with the Senate Armed Services Committee in particular, and with Congress in general. I view this as an absolutely crucial relationship and the success of the Office of the ASN(RDA) depends on maintaining a trusting, collaborative, and transparent relationship with the Committee and Congress. Throughout my career, I have worked closely and collaboratively with the Senate Armed Services Committee and Congress to provide the most thorough and

timely information possible and achieve trust through transparency and clear communication. If confirmed, I look forward to achieving increased cooperation, coordination, and transparency in my role as ASN(RDA).

If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a productive and mutually beneficial relationship between Congress and the Office of the ASN(RDA)?

Congress has an absolutely critical role in the acquisition process and a trusting, proactive, and mutually beneficial relationship between Congress and ASN(RDA) is a critical element to enable effective delivery of capabilities to the operational force. I assure you that, if confirmed, I will work closely with Congress on all matters relating to acquisition policy and programs. I will foster open lines of communication in order to be proactive and responsive in my interactions with Congress.

National Security Budget Reductions/Sequestration

The original discretionary caps imposed by the Budget Control Act (BCA) will be in effect for Fiscal Years 2018 through 2021, unless there is agreement to change budget levels.

In your assessment, what would be the impacts of continued implementation of the BCA discretionary caps through 2021 on the Department of the Navy and national security?

Secretary Mattis probably said it best: “...*No enemy in the field has done more harm to combat readiness of our military than sequestration*” He also observed that there is nothing in the BCA that helps our national security. I agree with the Secretary - The BCA caps and continuing resolutions (CRs) continue to be very harmful to the Department of the Navy’s warfighting readiness and modernization and negatively impact our national security. It is my understanding from senior Department of the Navy leadership that there are immediate readiness shortfalls that need to be remedied in order for the Navy and Marine Corps team to support the missions required by the military strategy and combatant commanders. It is highly unlikely these shortfalls can be addressed if there is a continued implementation of the BCA discretionary caps, much less the Department of the Navy’s modernization requirements to meet future demand. From my experience as a DoD Senior Acquisition Executive, I have found that discretionary caps contribute to acquisition program instability, research and development and procurement cost growth, and schedule delays. These unnecessary burdens create additional workload for the already-pressed acquisition workforce. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of Defense, to provide this Committee and Congress with the acquisition requirements needed to support the Department of Defense and Department of the Navy strategy.

If confirmed, by what standards would you measure the adequacy of Department of the Navy funding for programs under your purview?

I believe we must provide affordable and effective weapons, systems, and platforms for the men and women of the Navy and Marine Corps. Fleet readiness, or the ability to carry out missions using these systems, is an immediate concern, but cannot be the sole concern. Accordingly, if confirmed, I will focus my attention on utilizing funding to make investments that provide the maximum capability while working with the Navy, Marine Corps, Department of Defense and Congress to ensure the highest state of warfighting readiness. Additionally, if confirmed, I will execute a multi-year plan to build a more lethal force, strengthen alliances with key partners, and develop business reform within the Department of the Navy acquisition processes. I will measure the adequacy of funding for programs under my purview through the dual lens of current readiness and lethality, as well as future capability to meet the Combatant Commander's needs.

Acquisition Reform

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2016 and 2017 enacted sweeping reforms of the defense acquisition system and organizational structure. These reforms restructured the Office of the Secretary of Defense, particularly with respect to the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; returned more authority to the Services for program management; and created additional acquisition pathways. Many of these reforms will affect your role as the Service Acquisition Executive for the Navy if you are confirmed.

What is your understanding of these major reforms?

It is my understanding that these reforms aim to enhance agility and innovation within defense acquisition, as well as affordability and transparency across the acquisition lifecycle. The reforms enhance the role of the Chiefs of Staff of the armed forces in the acquisition process and increase both the authority and the accountability of the Service Acquisition Executives with respect to major defense acquisition programs. In addition to creating new acquisition pathways for rapid prototyping and rapid fielding of capability, the reforms enhance the military departments' ability to use existing tools, such as broad agency announcements and other transactions, to meet warfighter needs. The reforms also aim to increase utilization of nontraditional defense contractors in defense acquisition. Taken as a whole, they aim to improve the ability of the Department of the Navy to improve acquisition program outcomes. If confirmed, I intend to leverage these important changes to improve the ability of the Department of the Navy to deliver programs more affordably, to respond more quickly to warfighter needs, and to leverage the technologies and capabilities from a wider network of providers.

What is your understanding of the reforms you will be responsible for implementing, if confirmed?

If confirmed, I will be responsible for implementing all reforms for which authority and responsibility for implementation is assigned to the military departments, as well as implementing Department of Defense guidance within the Department of the Navy. I

will also support USD(AT&L), and the successor Under Secretaries, in their efforts to implement the reforms for which USD(AT&L) has implementation authority and responsibility.

The Department of Defense has been slow to act on many of these reforms. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Department of the Navy conforms with, and implements, these reforms?

If confirmed, I will make it a priority to implement and utilize to the greatest extent possible reforms for which implementation authority resides with the Department of the Navy. For those reforms which implementation authority resides outside the Department of the Navy, I will, if confirmed, work closely with the USD(AT&L) and the successor Under Secretaries to support implementation of the reforms.

If confirmed, you will be the first ASN(RDA) to serve since the major acquisition reforms of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2016 and 2017.

In what ways would you use these new authorities to fulfill the duties of the ASN(RDA) differently than your predecessors?

These new authorities will provide ASN(RDA) with greater flexibility than predecessor Service Acquisition Executives in determining the appropriate strategy, oversight, and management for Department of the Navy research and development projects and acquisition programs. If confirmed, I will ensure that all Department of the Navy acquisition officials identify and utilize the new and enhanced authorities that will most benefit their projects and programs. If confirmed, I will also assess the sufficiency of the training to the Department's acquisition workforce to ensure they are fully trained to enable the Department of the Navy to successfully leverage these new authorities to deliver improved program outcomes.

What changes, if any, would you recommend to these reform-related statutory provisions?

If confirmed, I will assess the effectiveness and utilization of the reform-related statutory provisions within the Department of the Navy. I will make recommendations for changes to these provisions to the Secretary of the Navy and the USD(AT&L) in cases where I find that such changes will better enable implementation and utilization of the reforms within Department of the Navy projects and programs. A key issue I will focus on is how to best train the Department of the Navy workforce in the use of these new authorities, as the authorities will not be fully successful until the workforce is trained on how to best use them. Until we can get the training to occur at the pace of the implementation of reform-related statutory provisions, the Department of Defense will not be able to capture the full benefit these new authorities provide.

If confirmed, what steps will you take to improve accountability in acquisition management?

If confirmed, I will be accountable for all Department of the Navy acquisition programs and I will instill the Secretary of the Navy's culture of accountability throughout the acquisition enterprise. I will ensure that programs are closely managed with clear lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability throughout the acquisition lifecycle. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department of the Navy has highly-trained, accountable acquisition personnel to manage, execute, and oversee its acquisition programs.

How would you propose to hold acquisition officers accountable for failing to follow acquisition laws and regulations?

If confirmed, I will emphasize that compliance with law and regulation is paramount to the Department of the Navy's ability to effectively fulfill the needs of the warfighter. I will consider an acquisition official's failure to follow law or regulation to be a failure to perform the duties and responsibilities of their position, and I will utilize all available authorities to remedy such failures.

If confirmed, what steps will you take to improve oversight in the requirements determination, resource allocation, or acquisition management processes?

If confirmed, I will continuously engage with the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), and Department of the Navy acquisition officials, to identify potential improvements in the requirements determination, resource allocation, and acquisition management processes. When potential improvements are identified, I will ensure, in coordination with the CNO and CMC that recommended changes are communicated to USD (AT&L) and the successor Under Secretaries, and to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. When appropriate, I will ensure that recommended changes are coordinated for implementation in Department of the Navy policy.

What best practices, policies, or authorities that you used while at Special Operations Command would you like to have at your disposal at the Department of the Navy?

If confirmed, I will assess the application of the best practices, policies, and authorities utilized at the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to Department of the Navy acquisition processes, programs and workforce. While USSOCOM has no unique acquisition authorities per se, the close connection between the operator, acquirer, and technologist, the ability to field products incrementally, and the sense of urgency increase the operational responsiveness of the acquisition system. USSOCOM also employs very streamlined processes, short chains of command, and empowerment to the lowest levels to improve acquisition velocity. I would also look to take best practices from USSOCOM's innovation models such as SOFWERX to ensure the Department of the Navy engages with the widest set of traditional and non-traditional suppliers possible. Finally, USSOCOM's focus on workforce development has been a key enabler for success and I would apply those best practices to Department of the Navy acquisition workforce where applicable. I am confident that my experience at USSOCOM will

enable me to increase the agility and efficiency of Department of the Navy acquisition.

Cost and Schedule Estimates

The Government Accountability Office has reported that the use of unrealistically optimistic cost and schedule estimates by the Navy and the other military departments is a major contributor to cost growth and program failure.

Do you believe that the use of unrealistically optimistic cost and schedule estimates leads to program disruptions that drive up program costs and delay the fielding of major weapon systems?

Yes.

What steps do you believe the Department of the Navy should take to ensure that cost and schedule estimates are fair and independent, and provide a sound basis for Navy programs?

I believe the steps necessary to ensure cost and schedule estimates are fair and independent include ensuring the groups responsible for these efforts are staffed with a skilled and experienced workforce whose accountability is distinct from the program office and who are utilizing the appropriate cost models, informed by accurate data and assumption sets. In formulating estimates for major programs, it is prudent to seek multiple independent estimates, compare the estimates, understand the differences, and ensure that the risk highlighted by this approach is either included in the program budget or mitigated through the programs contract strategy and risk management plan.

What measures did you implement as the Acquisition Executive for the Special Operations Command to ensure the use of fair and independent cost estimates?

The measures I used as the Acquisition Executive at the United States Special Operations Command to ensure the use of fair and independent cost estimates were consistent with the standard processes in the Defense Acquisition enterprise. The USSOCOM cost estimation methodology used the GAO's "Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide" as a reference and slightly tailored the approach depending on the specific type of capability USSOCOM was pursuing. USSOCOM also partnered closely with the Services for cost estimates in the cases where the capability USSOCOM was estimating was closely linked to an existing Service capability (e.g. modifying a Service-common platform) or where the Service has particular and unique domain expertise. Once completed, if there was an issue between the cost estimate for a program and the funding available, the balance between capability and cost was adjudicated through the SOCOM Strategic Planning Process where I, if needed, could engage directly to ensure a program was not initiated that did not have sufficient funding as determined by the cost estimate.

Rapid Prototyping, Experimentation, and Development and Maritime Accelerated Capabilities Office

The Department of the Navy has recently created the Rapid Prototyping, Experimentation, and Development (RPED) process and the Maritime Accelerated Capabilities Office (MACO).

What is your understanding of the RPED process and MACO initiatives?

It is my understanding that RPED and MACO are two accelerated acquisition pathways to resolve priority naval needs when those needs cannot be addressed through our traditional Global Force Management (GFM) process and Programming, Planning, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES). As the USSOCOM Acquisition Executive, I found that it was ineffective to only have one acquisition process for every requirement and that often the process to develop or test a prototype didn't match well to the traditional acquisition program approach. If confirmed, I look forward to understanding these processes in more detail and apply applicable lessons learned and best practices from USSOCOM.

How do the RPED process and MACO differ from the traditional acquisition system?

It is my understanding that RPED and MACO programs differ from traditional acquisition approaches by fast-tracking prototype development and fielding for validated urgent or emergent needs from our warfighters. It is also my understanding that these efforts target key performance characteristics to achieve speed commensurate with the urgency of the need. As programming and budgeting mechanisms and joint requirements management process converges on an enduring capability, RPEDs may transition to a traditional acquisition approach. In the case of MACOs, I am told that these are programs where there are known requirements and an appropriate material solution to meet emergent needs. If confirmed, I will look to better understand the Navy's rapid acquisition programs, determine their effectiveness, and explore options to leverage these processes into existing acquisition programs where they make sense. If confirmed, I will assess the potential application of the best practices and policies utilized at the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) for rapid acquisition programs.

What programs or projects are you aware of that are being pursued via the RPED process, MACO, or a similar effort?

It is my understanding that the Navy has accelerated four capabilities through the MACO and RPED processes:

- 1) MQ-25 Carrier Based Unmanned Aerial System to address organic fuel tanking

capability (MACO);

2) Large Displacement Unmanned Underwater Vehicle to address long endurance intelligence preparation of the environment (MACO);

3) Navy Laser Family of Systems to accelerate laser technologies onto surface ships (RPED); and

4) Expeditionary Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System to expand Theater Anti-Submarine Warfare capability (RPED).

If confirmed, I will work with Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to assess the effectiveness of these programs under the rapid acquisition process and identify other opportunities where they may make sense.

Do you support the RPED process and MACO?

If confirmed, I support the acceleration of capabilities that enable naval forces to maintain their operational and technological superiority over potential adversaries, where it makes the most sense. These pathways provide the Department of the Navy the ability to achieve speed when the warfighter requires, however, every program is different and must be evaluated individually. Accelerated acquisition authorities are just another tool in the “tool bag” to ensure Services effectively respond to warfighter needs. As the USSOCOM Acquisition Executive, I found that it was ineffective to only have one acquisition process for every requirement and that often the process to develop or test a prototype didn’t match well to the traditional acquisition program approach.

If confirmed, how would you balance the need to undertake prototyping, experimentation, and rapid acquisition with the demands of managing the execution of the Navy’s Major Defense Acquisition Programs?

If confirmed, I will balance the need for rapid acquisition with the urgency of the warfighting needs. I will work to foster a strong partnership with the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to help us determine the best process to address those needs. Although the goal is to anticipate needed capabilities through the Defense Acquisition System as designed, there are instances that demand examining accelerated acquisition processes. If confirmed, I will partner with the Service Chiefs to help identify programs that would benefit from rapid prototyping, experimentation, and accelerated acquisition process to improve responsiveness to the warfighter.

How will you work with the sustainment and test communities to ensure that systems in rapid acquisition processes are operationally effective and sustainable?

A critical part of the rapid acquisition process is prototyping the capability to experiment in operationally relevant environments prior to committing to a defined enduring capability. If confirmed, I will engage the Navy and Marine Corps Operational Test communities during those experiments. This will enable the sustainment and acquisition community to learn from the prototyping and experimentation and will help develop

sustainment approaches of the limited capability or scale-up as part of a traditional acquisition.

Software Activities and Acquisition of Information Technology (IT)

Warfighting capabilities are increasingly software-reliant, and even software-defined. Business operations—financial management, personnel and pay, and travel—run on IT systems that have been predominantly reliant on software for some time. Despite these trends, and despite being given both the authority and direction to do so, the Department of Defense has struggled to implement changes to its acquisition processes that specifically support software activity and IT acquisition, for both warfighting and business operations. This has meant at times that the Department invests billions of dollars and 5-10 years on an IT program—for example, the Expeditionary Combat Support System and more recently the modernization of the Air and Space Operations Center—but delivers no useful capability at all.

Please describe your views on how the Department of the Navy should treat software—specifically, how it should be developed, acquired, produced, and sustained.

I agree that the Department of Defense has struggled to effectively develop, field, and sustain business systems and IT intensive weapon systems. In my view, two different approaches are required – one for business systems and one for tactical IT systems.

For business systems, I believe the Department of the Navy should buy commercial services vice products wherever practical. This provides more agility to maintain cyber posture, allows flexibility as technology rapidly changes, and reduces total ownership cost. This approach may require some policy reform, business process reengineering to change legacy processes, and configuration of the software to fit the Department’s needs.

For tactical IT systems, where the Department of the Navy needs a product developed or software customized, an agile software development process should be used. Commercial infrastructure, to include cloud based infrastructure, should also be considered for tactical IT systems.

In addition, how is/should it be different from hardware? How should the two be aligned for major efforts that contain both?

This may differ a bit for tactical afloat systems and shore-based business systems. If confirmed, I will explore separating hardware procurements from software application procurements. Given that software will continually evolve and be updated, the Department of the Navy should review traditional acquisition milestones for software dominant efforts. The concept of ‘Fully Deployed’ or ‘Full Operational Capability’ is a bit of a misnomer when software changes on a regular basis. Testing in this area also needs to be reformed to better align with the unique nature of software intensive products.

As technology continues to evolve quicker than our acquisition processes can keep pace, the government workforce will struggle to keep current on emerging technologies. If confirmed, I will assess the current capability of the Department of the Navy acquisition workforce to acquire software and business systems and implement initiatives to ensure the workforce has the skills required to acquire software intensive systems. Acquiring hardware, software, and the cloud as they are developed and sold; often as a service, may allow the Department to pace technology and maintain current with industry standards and best practices.

What do you understand the role of the ASN(RDA) with respect to IT acquisition and the software activities of the Department of the Navy?

As ASN(RDA), I understand that I will be responsible for IT acquisition and software acquisitions for the Department of the Navy.

What do you understand the role of industry to be in this area?

Industry involvement is essential. Unlike traditional Defense Systems, industry is making the investment to improve cyber and productivity innovations. There are few unique things the Department of Defense does in the area of IT and business systems, so it is paramount that the Navy partner with industry and leverage their investment and their expertise.

If confirmed, how do you plan to address systemic and persistent cultural, process, and technical barriers to improving the Department of the Navy's treatment of software activities and IT acquisition?

If confirmed, I will look to industry and other government agencies for best practices for application within the Department of the Navy.

How will you work with the testing community, the Navy's Chief Information Officer, and with the other Services—including their Chief Information Officers?

I believe testing of IT systems needs reform. Cyber testing should focus on a solid risk management framework process vice the traditional snapshot-in-time test of the product. Testing of commercial IT products (hardware, software and services) which have already received commercial certification should not require the same level of testing as something that is new. Additionally, products that have been previously certified and are considered cyber safe should not require lengthy retesting and recertifying when they migrate from a data center to the cloud.

The Chief Information Officer will be vital in working these streamlined certification process and reciprocity agreements across the other Services and Agencies. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Navy Chief Information Officer and those of the other Services and Agencies which impact the Department of the Navy.

What major improvements would you like to see made in the Navy's and Marine Corps' development and deployment of major IT systems?

Traditional government acquisition approaches have proved largely unsuccessful for IT and business systems. If confirmed, I would seek to reduce the number of unique development efforts, eliminate legacy proprietary/closed systems, adopt a greater number of commercial solutions built to open standards, adopt a greater acceptance of commercial best practices, and for those capabilities that require unique solution development, a focus on using modern agile software development strategies.

What are your highest priority IT or software-related initiatives?

If confirmed, my highest software-related initiatives would be to develop an enterprise service model approach to the Department of the Navy's shore and afloat networks, maximize the use of commercial products and best practices, collaborate with the Department to implement a Department-wide data strategy, and develop an improved human capital strategy that aligns with the changing business model.

If confirmed, how will you encourage process and cultural change in organizations so that they maximize the benefits that new enterprise IT systems can offer in terms of cost savings and efficiency?

A modern enterprise IT system, coupled with easily configurable tools, a broad set of applications, ready access to data sources, and a trained workforce, can enable large increases in productivity and improve the effectiveness of the organization. If confirmed, I will assess the culture, processes, and skills of the organization and take initiatives to transform the organization to a more data-informed and IT enabled culture.

What is the appropriate relationship between the Department of the Navy's efforts to implement enterprise IT programs and supporting computing services and infrastructure to support Department of the Navy missions and efforts being undertaken by the Defense Information Systems Agency?

I believe Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) should be the provider of Department of Defense enterprise services and tools which all the Services leverage, as long as the enterprise services are cost effective and operationally responsive to the Department of the Navy. If confirmed, I intend review the specific arrangements in place between the Department of the Navy and DISA to ensure DISA is held to an agreed to performance standard at affordable costs

How will you ensure that appropriate business process reengineering is undertaken and accomplished before initiating new business systems, IT program development, and deployment?

In my experience, a business system is only as effective as the business process it supports. I believe that both the business system and business process it is designed to enable need to be reengineered together and assessed concurrently throughout the development process. If confirmed, I will assess the Department of the Navy's current approach to business system development and ensure business process reengineering is accomplished as a critical initial step in business system development.

What role will the Department of the Navy's research and testing enterprise play in the development and deployment of Navy and Marine Corps business IT systems?

I believe that the Department of the Navy must carefully look to see if commercial IT products can meet their needs, both from a functional and security standpoint. If commercial products are used, there should be less of a requirement for research and testing, enabling the Department of the Navy to reallocate research and testing resources to areas where no readily available commercial product exists, or to emerging areas of interest to include artificial intelligence, machine learning, and the use of advanced analytic analysis.

Multiyear Procurement Contracts

Section 2306b of title 10, United States Code, provides the criteria Congress expects will be met to exercise multiyear contract authority.

What types of programs are appropriate for the use of multiyear contracts?

Multiyear contracts are appropriate for programs that meet each of the criteria in 10 U.S.C. § 2306b(a)(1)-(6). In the case of a multiyear contract in the amount of \$678.5 million or more, which requires the program to obtain specific authorization for the contract in law, the program and the contract must also meet the conditions in 10 U.S.C. 2306(i)(3).

If confirmed, will you ensure that the Navy and Marine Corps fully comply with the requirements of section 2306b?

Yes.

What is your understanding of the requirement that a multiyear contract result in "significant savings" compared to the cost of carrying out a program through annual contracts?

What constitutes significant savings of the total anticipated costs of carrying out the program through annual contracts will vary for each individual program. It is my understanding that the "significant savings" standard is not based upon any particular percentage of savings.

What is your understanding of the requirements regarding the timing of a Department of Defense request for legislative authorization of a multiyear procurement contract for a particular program?

It is my understanding that, in the ordinary course, Department of Defense requests for statutory authority to enter into a multiyear procurement contract are submitted with the President's Budget either the fiscal year in which the contract will be initiated or in the year prior to initiation.

Technology Transition

The Department of Defense continues to struggle with the transition of new technologies into existing programs of record and major weapons systems and platforms. Further, the Department also has struggled with moving technologies from the Department's programs or other sources rapidly into the hands of operational users.

What impediments to technology transition do you see within the Department of the Navy?

My experience as a senior leader in DoD acquisition is that many of the roadblocks to change and rapid transition of new technologies are self-imposed, culturally driven, and firmly entrenched. Some of these impediments include clear recognition of technology trends (particularly when they are commercially driven), overly focusing on one single acquisition process versus having multiple pathways to acquire a capability, a risk averse culture, overly prescriptive processes, and lack of training in the acquisition workforce. Recent authorities in FY 2016 and 2017 NDAA's provide pathways to prototyping technologies outside programs of record which enable much more rapid prototyping and product evaluations. If confirmed, I will assess the factors that hamper technology transition within the Department of the Navy, and work with the Naval Research and Development Establishment to investigate avenues to accelerate and transition technology to the warfighter.

If confirmed, what steps, if any, will you take to enhance the effectiveness of technology transition efforts?

I understand the Navy has a Rapid Prototyping, Experimentation and Demonstration process and policy in place. If confirmed, I will assess the Department of the Navy processes in place to ensure effective dialogue between the Naval Research and Development Enterprise and the acquisition programs of record to enhance the effectiveness of the technology transition efforts. I will also assess which USSOCOM best practices would be applicable to accelerate the pace of placing technology into the hands of the warfighter. Finally, I will review the training of the Department of the Navy acquisition workforce to ensure the workforce has the training needed to effectively

transition technologies into acquisition programs.

What can be done from a budget, policy, and organizational standpoint to facilitate the transition of technologies from science and technology programs and other sources, including small businesses, venture capital funded companies, and other non-traditional defense contractors, into acquisition programs?

In recent years, Congress has given the Navy additional authorities needed to facilitate technology transition from the Science and Technology community to acquisition programs and the warfighters. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Naval Research and Development Enterprise, industry, and acquisition programs to assess the processes in the Department of the Navy to ensure these new authorities are being fully utilized to facilitate greater collaboration and to ensure the warfighters maintain technological superiority.

Defense Capabilities

What is your opinion on the necessity to modernize Navy and Marine Corps weapons systems in light of current and emerging threats?

It is essential that the Department continue to modernize current systems and procure new systems in a manner that ensures our Navy and Marine Corps have the necessary capabilities to defeat current and emerging threats. The Secretary of the Navy stated that the Department of the Navy has both a capacity and capability challenge in this regard. Effective modernization will require not only fielding new systems, but also ensuring the Department of the Navy is rapidly modifying fielded systems to provide ready and lethal forces while the new systems are being produced. Innovative approaches such as the Strategic Capabilities Office and SOFWERX will also be critical to regain/maintain the Department of the Navy's ability to adapt quickly to emerging needs and capitalize on asymmetric opportunities while the Department of the Navy modernizes. If confirmed, I will work to develop, implement and execute acquisition plans to affordably modernize and procure those systems required to meet objectives of the Navy and Marine Corps.

What are the most critical capabilities the Department of the Navy needs to prioritize over the next 10 years?

Secretary Spencer has testified that over the next 10 years the Navy and Marine Corps must prioritize the procurement of ships, advanced sensors, combat systems, weapons, advanced intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and command and control systems. If confirmed, I will work within the framework of the Secretary's priorities to manage acquisition programs that maximize readiness, increase lethality, modernize the force, and build capacity within the Department of the Navy.

If confirmed, how will you contribute to keeping Navy and Marine Corps acquisition costs under control and ensure the U.S. taxpayer receives the best defense capabilities for their precious and scarce defense dollars?

It is my understanding that the Department of the Navy has directed that acquisition costs be defined alongside and managed with the same discipline as traditional requirements. Properly defining the operational and technical requirements, performing to stable acquisition and budget plans, leveraging investments, and procuring at efficient rates are all critical to controlling costs. If confirmed, I will review acquisition policies, processes, standards and practices to identify opportunities for improvement and will work within the Department to implement appropriate solutions.

Navy Shipbuilding

President Trump has vowed to rebuild the Navy toward a goal of 350 ships. In December 2016, the Navy set the current Force Structure Assessment (FSA) requirement of 355 ships. The previous FSA requirement was 308 ships. The Navy's current naval battle force contains only 278 ships, and will not achieve a force level goal of 308 ships until 2021, even though various individual requirements are not met. The Navy has not announced a plan for reaching the 355-ship force structure or delivered a Fiscal Year 2018 shipbuilding plan.

In a November 2016 report, the Congressional Research Service found that achieving and maintaining a notional 349 ship force structure would require adding on the order of 45 to 58 ships to the Navy's Fiscal Year 2017 30-year shipbuilding plan, or an average of about 1.5 to 1.9 additional ships per year, at a cost of roughly \$3.5 billion to \$4.0 billion per year over the 30-year period.

In your view, how large a Navy, consisting of what mix of ships, will be needed in coming years to adequately perform Navy missions?

I am aware that the most recent Force Structure Assessment in 2016 recommends 355 ships and I support this recommendation. I also understand that the 2018 National Defense Strategy will include recommendations regarding the desired force structure, which will help further define the characteristics required to perform the Navy missions. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Department of the Navy is working towards not only an achievable, but also affordable, mix of ships which will deliver the capabilities required to answer today's global security challenges. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with Congress to develop the acquisition programs needed to achieve the desired end-state to ensure the Navy can remain a lethal force in the future.

What steps would you recommend evaluating to achieve a 355-ship Navy, particularly related to additional ship procurement and the funding required?

Achieving a 355-ship Navy will require multiple parallel lines of effort including extending the life of in-service ships, increasing the capacity to build additional ships, and evaluating the viability and cost/benefits of returning ready reserve ships back to service. I support the current priorities to improve the maintenance and sustainment of the Navy's existing in-service ships, which will also enable the Navy to extend their service lives in order to achieve the Navy's goal earlier and more affordably than through increased ship procurements alone. If confirmed, I will also work closely with both the Department and industry to identify innovative ways to deliver ships faster and more affordably. However, building a larger Navy will also require increases in the defense spending caps and for that reason, I support congressional action to amend the Budget Control Act.

The Navy has begun acquiring the replacements for the *Ohio*-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The new *Columbia*-class boats are projected to have an acquisition cost of \$10 billion per ship. The Navy has stated publicly that it could not afford to buy both the new SSBNs and maintain other required procurements under Defense Department budget top lines that would be consistent with the defense discretionary spending caps within the Budget Control Act.

What steps do you believe will be necessary to enable the Navy to expand to a 355-ship fleet, while also procuring the *Columbia*-class SSBNs?

If confirmed, I will support the COLUMBIA Class Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) Program as the Navy's top acquisition priority. The Navy has stated that the shipbuilding industrial base can support increased ship procurements while also procuring the COLUMBIA Class SSBNs, however, I believe this will require increasing ship construction funding during the years of COLUMBIA Class SSBN procurement, as was done previously during SSBN procurement periods.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the United States procured the current *Ohio*-class SSBN submarines within the Navy's shipbuilding (SCN) account. In 2015, Congress created a special fund, the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF), for procurement of *Columbia*-class SSBNs.

Do you have a view on how the cost of *Columbia*-class SSBNs should be funded—solely from Navy resources, from a combination of Navy and other-than-Navy (e.g., OMB and other Defense) sources, or with a different approach? If so, please explain.

I support the acquisition authorities provided by Congress, which are allowing the Navy to build the COLUMBIA Class SSBNs more affordably. If confirmed, I will work with Congress and the Department to determine the best approach to funding the COLUMBIA Class SSBN program, to include if additional authorities are required.

Aircraft Carriers

After more than \$2 billion in cost growth in each of the first three *Ford*-class aircraft carriers, the costs of these ships range from \$11.4 billion to \$12.9 billion.

In your view, should the Navy and Marine Corps explore options to complement *Ford* and *Nimitz*-class aircraft carriers and/or increase the lethality and survivability of amphibious ready groups with smaller, less expensive aircraft carriers?

I believe the future environment will be dynamic, global, and require many different capabilities to ensure the proper balance of lethality, survivability, and affordability across a very wide operational spectrum. As such, I believe that all force structure options should be considered and assessed thoroughly, including the potential for smaller, less expensive aircraft carriers to complement, not replace, the *Ford*-class carriers. If confirmed, I will review Navy studies on smaller aircraft carriers, work with the Chief of Naval Operations, and make recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy.

When the construction contract was signed in 2008, the planned delivery date of the USS *Gerald R. Ford* (CVN-78) was September 2015 at a cost of \$10.5 billion. The ship was delivered in May 2017 at a cost of \$12.9 billion.

What is your understanding of the reasons behind the CVN-78 delivery delay and cost overrun?

I understand that the USS GERALD R. FORD (CVN 78) was delivered on May 31, 2017, 20 months behind the original delivery date and significantly over budget. I have not reviewed a detailed analysis of the issues which drove the cost and schedule overruns, but I understand her delivery was delayed due to a number of factors, including the integration and test of several new and unproven technologies. If confirmed, I will review those issues in detail to ensure the Department of the Navy is taking full advantage of lessons learned to deliver subsequent carriers at a lower cost and on schedule.

What lessons should the Navy learn from the CVN-78 experience?

Lessons learned from CVN 78 design and construction should drive down cost for follow ships, particularly with regard to reducing construction man-hours through optimizing the ship construction process and shipbuilder facilities, capitalizing on technological improvements, and efficiencies gained in the test program. If confirmed, I will review in detail how the Navy is applying lessons learned to ensure they are being utilized to the fullest extent to drive down the cost of follow-on ships

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and FFG(X)

In February 2016, the Secretary of Defense announced his decision to down-select to a single LCS variant and reduce the procurement quantity to a combination of 40 basic variant LCS and frigate variants of LCS, as codified in revision 3 of the LCS acquisition strategy signed in March 2016. Section 123 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 prohibits revisions or deviations from this acquisition strategy unless the Secretary of Defense submits a certification to the congressional defense committees. In the President's Budget for Fiscal Year 2018, the Navy indicated the frigate requirements were being reviewed to increase lethality and survivability and that the frigate competition (FFG(X)) would be full and open to existing U.S. and foreign frigate designs, which would be built in the United States.

What is your view of the LCS program?

It is my understanding that the LCS program is an important program to the Navy. The Navy's 2016 Force Structure Assessment revalidated the warfighting requirement for a total of 52 Small Surface Combatants (SSCs). The Navy intends to fulfill the SSC requirement with a combination of LCS and its successor, the Frigate.

It is also my understanding that the Frigate will further augment the SSC force with improved lethality and survivability. If confirmed, I will ensure the mix of LCS and Frigates is aligned with warfighting needs, while also ensuring that there is a viable SSC industrial base with which to meet the 52 SSC requirement in an affordable manner. I will also, if confirmed, ensure that there is a sound acquisition strategy to ensure that the Frigate development program incorporates lessons learned from previous acquisitions to deliver the required capability on cost and on schedule.

What is your understanding of the FFG(X) program and how it will differ from LCS?

I understand that the FFG(X) will be a multi-mission ship capable of operating in more severely contested environments than LCS. I understand that it will be designed to have the ability to better protect itself and others with improved air defense capability and more shock-hardened systems for decreased vulnerability when compared with LCS. I understand the acquisition strategy is being crafted to ensure full and open competition and leverage mature designs and technologies, including potential foreign designs. If confirmed, overseeing this program will be a key focus area of mine to ensure it delivers the needed warfighting capability within cost and schedule.

What is your understanding of the current LCS acquisition strategy, which transitions from LCS to FFG(X) procurement in Fiscal Year 2020?

The Navy's FY 2018 budget deferred the first year of Frigate procurement from FY 2019 to FY 2020 with additional LCS being procured in FY 2018 and FY 2019. It is my understanding that this is necessary in order to allow for sufficient time to define the Guided Missile Frigate (FFG(X)) requirements, mature the FFG(X) design, and thoroughly evaluate design alternatives. In addition, I also understand the FFG(X) award will be a full and open competition. If confirmed, I will ensure this program achieves its needed milestones to deliver important capability to the Navy on cost and schedule.

Do you support the current LCS acquisition strategy, which includes the transition to FFG(X) in Fiscal Year 2020?

Yes.

LCS mission modules give the current LCS vessels their primary mission capability. The initial operational capabilities for the 3 LCS mission modules have been delayed by a cumulative of 27 years—5 years for the surface warfare package (occurred 2015), 9 years for the anti-submarine warfare module (expected 2019), and 13 years for the mine countermeasures package (expected 2021)—creating a significant mismatch between the 27 LCS on contract and their ability to deploy combat capabilities.

Do you consider it acceptable to have 27 LCS on contract with little ability for these ships to deploy with their primary combat capability?

No, I do not consider it acceptable that the LCS delivered or on contract are unable to deploy yet with their primary combat capability. It is my understanding that although LCS procurements to date have yielded positive results (stable ship designs, improved yard facilities, and a qualified work force with both shipyards in full serial production) and ships are now being delivered in an affordable manner, the mission packages have not kept pace to deliver to their originally promised schedules. If confirmed, I will work to understand the issues to ensure the Navy's acquisition strategies are sound and that both the seaframes and the mission packages are delivering needed capability to the Fleet both affordably and on time.

Would you consider halting procurement of further LCS seaframes or maintaining procurement at only the minimum sustaining rate at least until all three modules have achieved an initial operational capability?

Yes. If slowing or halting procurement of LCS is the most effective solution to delivering capability to the fleet, I would make that recommendation to the Secretary of the Navy. If confirmed, you have my commitment to closely review the Navy's acquisition strategies to ensure we are delivering needed capability to the Fleet, while at the same time ensuring a viable SSC industrial base is maintained.

Naval Aviation

What is your assessment of the most important challenges facing Naval aviation? If confirmed, what steps would you take to meet those challenges?

After providing for the safety of our Sailors and Marines, I understand that the most important challenges facing Naval Aviation are readiness and growing the force. If confirmed, I will work to deliver the most effective Naval Aviation capabilities and capacity while striving for the highest yield on invested resources. This requires managing the need to improve readiness while balancing the modernization of aging aircraft to meet the next generation of security challenges.

Does the Navy have a sufficient number of strike-fighter aircraft? If not, if confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure they do?

It is my understanding from previous leadership testimony that the Department is challenged with the number of available strike-fighter aircraft. If confirmed, I will review, in support of the Secretary, the current strike fighter inventory and projected procurements to determine the strategies needed to achieve sufficient numbers of strike fighter aircraft to execute our National Security and National Military Strategies, both current and future.

What is your understanding of the physiological episodes that the Naval aviation community is confronting and plans to address such episodes?

The Chief of Naval Operations recently stated that pilot Physiological Episodes in F/A-18 and T-45 aircraft is Naval Aviation's number-one safety issue. It is my understanding the Naval Aviation Enterprise is currently addressing hypoxia and decompression events as the two most likely causes of the recent episodes in naval aviators. If confirmed, I intend to be fully engaged in efforts to ensure the necessary resources are provided to mitigate risk and to resolve this issue as quickly as possible for the safety of our Sailors and Marines.

Marine Corps Aviation

What is your assessment of the most important challenges facing Marine Corps aviation? If confirmed, what steps would you take to meet those challenges?

In my assessment the most important challenges facing Marine Corps aviation are readiness and keeping our Marines safe in a growing force. If confirmed, I will address these issues while striving for the highest yield on invested resources to deliver the most effective Marine Corps aviation capabilities and capacity.

Is Marine Corps aviation readiness at an acceptable level? If not, if confirmed, what steps would you take to improve aviation readiness?

While I do not know the specific details of Marine Corps aviation readiness levels, I am aware that budget caps and prolonged wartime operational tempo have adversely impacted aviation readiness. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to ensure readiness accounts are adequately funded and that investment accounts are sufficiently resourced to maintain transition timelines out of old and difficult to support aircraft.

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

What is your assessment of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter? If confirmed, what changes would you seek to implement in the program?

I know that both the Navy and Marine Corps are fully committed to F-35 as this 5th generation aircraft provides the necessary capabilities to ensure we maintain air superiority and provide global precision attack against current and emerging threats. I am not aware of the detailed status or risks of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter therefore cannot provide a comprehensive assessment of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program at this time. If confirmed, I will review this program to assess its overall status and make any necessary recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy.

In your view, are there alternatives for the Department of the Navy worthy of exploring other than purchasing 340 F-35C fighter aircraft, such as purchasing advanced fourth generation fighters still in production, such as enhanced F-18s, or developing a next generation fighter aircraft beyond the F-35's capabilities? What would be the best arguments for and against such an alternative?

I believe a mix of 4th and 5th generation fighters provides the best opportunity to ensure both needed lethality and affordability for the wide range of Naval aviation missions. If confirmed, I will support the Navy continued examination of the best 4th/5th generation strike fighter mix based on the output of the ongoing Strategic Defense Review.

Carrier Air Wing

Do you believe the Navy's carrier air wing is designed to provide the capability we expect it to contribute to the carrier strike group? Specifically, will the projected air wing have sufficient available strike range, available payload, electronic warfare capability, and command and control capability? Why or why not? If not, if confirmed, what steps would you take to address any gaps?

The Carrier Strike Group (CSG) or Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) is often the first responder to any crisis. While I believe the carrier air-wing (CVW) has been designed

with the right mix of capabilities it is critical that those capabilities continue to be reviewed and modernized to stay ahead of the threat. If confirmed, I will review CVW capabilities to ensure they are adequately meeting current requirements, as well as review the sufficiency and timing of modernization plans to ensure the CVW will remain lethal and viable against future threats and fulfill the needs of the Combatant Commanders.

Unmanned Aviation

What is your assessment of the appropriate role unmanned aviation should play in Naval and Marine Corps aviation? If confirmed, what steps would you take to achieve that vision?

My experience at USSOCOM has shown me the incredible value unmanned systems bring to the modern fight. As such, I believe that unmanned systems will play a critical role in Naval Warfare across all domains. In particular, I believe that Unmanned Aviation will play a key role not only for Carrier Strike Group and Marine Air Ground Task Forces but throughout all Naval operations. I also believe unmanned families of systems will not only make the Department's manned systems more effective by extending their range and endurance, but they will play key roles in all missions, including forward presence, counter-terrorism, crisis response, strike warfare and security cooperation. If confirmed, I intend to assess how unmanned systems, working in collaboration with manned systems and other unmanned capabilities, can provide our Navy and Marine Corps further strategic and tactical advantage.

CH-53K King Stallion

The CH-53K is vital to the Marines' modernization plan, but has been hampered by delays and cost growth.

What is your understanding of the CH-53K acquisition strategy?

I understand that the CH-53K program seeks to develop a substantially more capable and modern aircraft than the CH-53E that it will replace. I also understand that the development was done under a sole source, cost type contract. If confirmed, I will ensure that acquisition strategies are appropriate for program risks and contracts are structured to align incentives with desired program outcomes.

What is your understanding of the causes for and magnitude of schedule delays and cost growth?

I do not know the detailed causes of the cost growth and schedule delays of the development phase but understand that tripling of aircraft range and lift capacity greatly increased the design and manufacturing complexity of the aircraft's dynamic components. With the aircraft now beginning production, if confirmed, I will pursue means to reduce the cost of producing these aircraft that are critical to supporting forward deployed Marines.

Amphibious Combat Vehicle

Since canceling the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) in 2011 after spending \$3 billion, the Marine Corps has chosen to pursue a more measured multi-phase acquisition strategy to fulfill their amphibious combat vehicle (ACV) modernization requirements.

What is your understanding of the ACV acquisition strategy?

With the cancellation of the EFV Program in 2011, I understand the Marine Corps shifted its strategy to focus on mature commercially available technologies for the ACV program. It is my understanding that the first phase concentrates on a personnel variant with shore to shore water swim capability for riverine and littoral operational movement. Follow-on phases will incorporate technologies to field communication and recovery variants in addition to expanding water capability to perform ship to shore operations.

Do you support this acquisition strategy?

Yes, the acquisition strategy for the ACV program is an example of expeditiously executing a competitive major acquisition program to provide the warfighter a much needed capability. If confirmed, I will support the fielding of ACV and pursuing future enhancements for the system.

Ground/Air Task-Oriented Radar (G/ATOR)

With development initiated more than a decade ago, the Marine Corps is moving forward with a long-delayed and expensive radar system, the Ground/Air Task-Oriented Radar (G/ATOR), which will replace a number of older radars and will protect Marines from rockets, artillery, cruise missiles, and UAVs while also serving as an air-traffic control system.

What is your understanding of the G/ATOR acquisition strategy?

It is my understanding that the G/ATOR program will provide a next generation radar using one hardware configuration for multiple operational capabilities. The Air Surveillance/Air Defense and Counter-fire capabilities will begin fielding in 2018 and 2019 respectively.

Do you support this acquisition strategy?

Yes. I understand that the acquisition strategy for the G/ATOR program has developed a state of the art radar that is providing the Marine Corps an enhanced multi-function capability. If confirmed, I will support the Full Rate Production of this program and pursue the future Air Traffic Control capability when required.

Munitions

Munitions inventories, particularly those of precision guided munitions, have declined significantly due to high operational usage, insufficient procurement, and a requirements system that does not adequately account for the ongoing need to transfer munitions to our allies and operations short of major combat, such as in the current operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure we have sufficient inventories of munitions to meet our combatant commanders' needs?

It is my understanding that weapons and munitions inventories have been challenged by several years of budget reductions and instability, while at the same time being required to employ strike weapons in combat against ongoing threats. This unhealthy combination of events tended to place our weapons inventories at higher risk. In managing within the Budget Control Act and Bipartisan Budget Act funding levels for the last five years, the Department has been compelled to take risk in the munitions area. This issue was compounded by the need to transfer munitions to our allies to support our operations in the CENTCOM Area of Operation

If confirmed, and consistent with Secretary Mattis' direction, I will ensure readiness recovery and restoral of these pressing shortfalls is a high priority in the Department. I will also, if confirmed, aggressively review the industrial base and the Department of the Navy acquisition programs to ensure we understand the opportunities to increase the production capacity of these critical munitions.

Cruise Missiles

In your view, how serious is the cruise missile threat to the Navy?

As the USSOCOM Acquisition Executive I am familiar with the very serious threat that cruise missile present to our forces. Not only is the technology rapidly accelerating making these weapons more advanced, they are easily proliferated, providing greater capabilities to lesser capable state and non-state adversaries.

What is your understanding of the Navy's cruise missile defense strategy?

I have not been briefed on the details of the Navy's cruise missile defense strategy. However, if confirmed, I will work across the entire acquisition portfolio to deliver credible and cost effective solutions that are capable of defeating current and future cruise missile threats.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that the Navy is adequately

addressing this threat?

If confirmed, I will review the latest threat assessments and the investments we have made to address this threat. I will work with the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations to ensure our strategic plan adequately addresses the threat and mitigates any deficiencies.

Navy and Marine Corps-Related Defense Industrial Base

What is your assessment of the current state of the industrial base that supports the Department of the Navy?

Maintaining a strong shipbuilding industrial base is a key element of our National Security. The stability in the shipbuilding industrial base requires continued close cooperation among the Navy, Congress and industry. Maintaining an adequate and stable shipbuilding industrial base is important to the Nation and the Department of the Navy, and is a key enabler of the Navy's Long Range Shipbuilding Plan to achieve an affordable and capable force structure. If confirmed, I will ensure to take careful consideration of the industrial base (to include suppliers) as part of acquisition strategy development and overall assessments of future shipbuilding plans.

The aviation industrial base is also a critical enabler to the Nation and Navy, but unlike the shipbuilding industrial base, supports the other military services and a large commercial market. Therefore, any issues are likely to be much narrower, though no less critical. If confirmed, I will be vigilant in identifying and avoiding gaps in military aviation unique industrial base capabilities.

What is your understanding and assessment of the systems and processes for identifying, evaluating, and managing risk among the entities that form the Navy and Marine Corps industrial base?

I believe that the Navy and Marine Corps should be mindful of how the industrial base is being used in both the near and mid-term. If a military-unique sector is without work for a period of time, that capability may no longer be available when the Department calls upon it in the future. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department of the Navy manages the risk associated with maintaining a healthy industrial base, to include the critical supplier base, when developing and executing our acquisition plans. If confirmed, I will also review the assessment tools and processes for identifying, evaluating and managing risk in the industrial base that supports the Department of the Navy to ensure these tools and processes are adequate. This may be an area where the Department of the Navy can adopt tools and best practices from the commercial industry and leverage modern analytics to more proactively identify potential issues and risks.

How should Department of the Navy acquisition leaders consider impacts on the industrial base when addressing requirements for recapitalization or modernization of major end items such as ships, aircraft, munitions, or key repair parts?

Maintaining a strong industrial base is a key element of our National Security and must be continually assessed and closely monitored. Consideration needs to be given to the apportionment and timing of workflow to the industrial base to ensure that all critical sectors remain viable. This becomes extremely challenging without stable, predictable, and timely funding. If confirmed, I will work with Congress, Industry, and within the Department to ensure industrial base implications are considered in the structuring of programs, budgets and acquisition strategies.

If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you pursue in systems and processes to improve identification, monitoring, assessment, and timely actions to ensure that risk in the Department of the Navy-relevant sectors of the defense industrial base is adequately managed in order to develop, produce, and sustain technically superior, reliable, and affordable weapons systems?

Adequately identifying, monitoring, assessing, and taking timely action on the industrial base can be very challenging, especially for especially large and complex weapon systems which have a large number of tiered suppliers. I am not familiar with the specific tools and processes the Department of the Navy uses to assess and manage the industrial base. If confirmed, I will review the current assessment tools and processes to ensure defense industrial base risks are adequately managed and seek opportunities to further reduce risk to enable the industrial base to optimally build and sustain affordable programs with the most efficient use of taxpayer resources.

What steps should the Department of the Navy take to maintain access to critical elements of the defense industrial base?

If confirmed, I will ensure that policies are in place to identify and monitor Navy's access to the critical supply chain. If required, I would also seek measures, in consultation with Congress, which would enable the Department to reconstitute critical industrial capabilities which may include the acquisition of intellectual property and special manufacturing equipment.

Science and Technology

What is your understanding and assessment of the role that science and technology programs have played and will play in developing capabilities for current and future Navy and Marine Corps systems?

Science and technology investment is critical to ensuring the Department continues to develop technology to outpace our adversaries and other threats to mission readiness. These programs are the source of both evolutionary capabilities for programs of record and revolutionary game changing capabilities for the Navy and Marine Corps. If confirmed, I will work across the broader Research and Development community of industry, academia and government to ensure the Department maintains its scientific and technical advantage.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that successful Navy and Marine Corps science and technology programs will transition to operational warfighting capabilities?

One of my key focus areas, should I be confirmed, will be to ensure a tight coupling between the science and technology community and the program managers who transition the technologies. In addition, building a strong foundation of research requires talented and committed people in the Department, and with partners in government, academia and industry. The goal that I would set, would be to continue to develop capabilities while reducing cost and increasing the speed of technology to the fleet and force.

If confirmed, what metrics would you use to judge the value and the appropriate investment level in Navy and Marine Corps science and technology programs?

I am not presently aware of how these programs are being evaluated in the Department of the Navy and what metrics are being used to determine their value. At USSOCOM, science and technology programs both support technology development needed for acquisition programs, as well as provide the opportunity to innovate through novel technologies or operational concepts. Science and technology programs enable low cost experimentation and can be used to encourage innovation, risk-taking, and less traditional approaches. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Navy's science and technology programs are closely aligned with the naval research and development establishment and funded accordingly.

Laboratories and Warfare Centers

What has been your experience in working with the Navy's labs and warfare centers?

The Naval Labs and Warfare and Systems Centers are a pillar of our national defense. As the USSOCOM Acquisition Executive, I sponsored many efforts conducted by these labs and warfare and systems centers, and am familiar with many of their capabilities. The labs and warfare centers have provided critical capabilities which the US Special Operations Forces have successfully employed in operations around the globe.

What steps will you take to assess and enhance the quality of the technical workforce at these organizations?

If confirmed, I will review the current state of the technical workforce across all career fields on an ongoing basis and address issues identified with Department leadership. I will utilize authorities provided by the FY 2009 NDAA Section 219, Acquisition Workforce Tuition Assistance Program, and Naval Acquisition Development Program to make any necessary adjustments to enhance their technical capabilities as needed.

What steps will you take to assess and enhance the research infrastructure and equipment at these organizations?

If confirmed, I will assess the infrastructure investments needed working with naval stakeholders like the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations and Environment to ensure support for the missions of these important organizations.

Test and Evaluation Efforts

In your opinion, what is the appropriate role that test ranges should play in ensuring that new technologies are ready for deployment? If confirmed, what steps would you take to achieve that vision?

Test ranges and facilities are critical in delivering new technologies that are proven and ready for deployment to the fleet. From my time as the USSOCOM Acquisition Executive and numerous joint assignments, I am aware that the Navy has several sites that serve as critical major test ranges for the test and evaluation of new technologies. If confirmed, I will continue to monitor and ensure that these sites as well as other required capabilities are adequately resourced and fully capable to support the development and test and evaluation of new technologies.

If confirmed, what metrics will you use to assess the quality of the Department of the Navy's Test and Evaluation infrastructure?

If confirmed, I will explore the best available tools and methodologies for assessing the Navy's Test and Evaluation infrastructure.

If confirmed, what steps will you take to reduce the burden of bureaucracy and red tape on Navy test ranges, laboratories, and warfare centers, especially with respect to personnel and management issues?

If confirmed, I will pursue the reduction of bureaucracy, especially in the hiring and management of critical personnel. Recent authorities such as Section 233 of FY 2017 NDAA provide such opportunities.

Investment in Infrastructure

Witnesses appearing before this Committee in the past have testified that the Services under-invest in both the maintenance and recapitalization of facilities and infrastructure compared to private industry standards. Decades of under-investment in Defense Department installations have led to substantial backlogs of facility maintenance activities, created substandard living and working conditions, and made it harder to take advantage of new technologies that could increase productivity. These challenges have

been exacerbated by current budget pressures.

What is your view of Navy and Marine Corps infrastructure investment?

I concur with the Secretary of the Navy that the Navy and Marine Corps investment in infrastructure is inadequate and is causing a rapidly growing liability and imposing a negative impact on readiness. It is my understanding that in recent years, given the strict limitation as imposed by the Budget Control Act, the Department of the Navy has been required to prioritize other higher priority warfighting requirements above necessary infrastructure investments. This has created a significant project backlog which is affecting current readiness and driving up long term lifecycle and sustainment costs for the infrastructure portfolio.

If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to increase resources to reduce the backlog and improve Navy and Marine Corps facilities?

If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations and Environment to strategically address the infrastructure support needs. I will also support the Secretary of the Navy in conducting a thorough review of all Department requirements to ensure the Navy and Marine Corps are focusing resources on the most critical and highest priority projects. Additionally, if confirmed, I will work with the Congress to address additional authorities, as needed, to help infrastructure needs.

Senior Military and Civilian Accountability

While representative of a small number of individuals in the Department of Defense, reports of abuses of rank and authority by senior military and civilian leaders and failures to perform up to accepted standards are frequently received. Whistleblowers and victims of such abuses often report that they felt that no one would pay attention to or believe their complaints. Accusations of unduly lenient treatment of senior officers and senior officials against whom accusations have been substantiated are also frequently heard.

What are your views regarding the appropriate standard of accountability for senior civilian and military leaders of the Department of the Navy?

My views are what they have been throughout my professional career; I have no tolerance for abuses of rank and authority in any context or at any level. Civilian and military senior leaders set the tone for the entire organization. Abusive behavior is demeaning, corrosive and detrimental to an effective organization. It will not be tolerated.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that senior leaders of the Navy and Marine Corps are held accountable for their actions and performance?

If confirmed, I will make certain that my standards, values and expectations are clearly understood by the entire organization. I will ensure that any leader, civilian or military, who engages in this type of behavior, is held accountable.

Management and Development of the Acquisition Workforce

The transformation of the armed forces has brought with it an increasing realization of the importance of efficient and forward thinking management of the acquisition workforce.

What is your vision for the management and development of the Navy and Marine Corps acquisition workforce, including the scientific and technical fields?

The acquisition workforce is the key to being able to effectively manage our Navy and Marine Corps programs. If confirmed, I will review the educational and training systems in place. My vision is to ensure that the entire acquisition workforce has the tools to effectively manage and deliver the Department of the Navy's complex and highly technical warfighting capability.

Do you believe that the Department of the Navy has an appropriately sized acquisition workforce, with the proper skills, to manage the Department into the future?

If confirmed, I will review and assess the adequacy of the acquisition workforce.

Congress has recognized the Department's need for a large, robust, highly qualified acquisition workforce, and provided much-needed legislative relief with the passage of Section 852 in the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and Section 219 in the 2009 NDAA, and support for the Department's desire to expand the Acquisition Demonstration Project to more of the Department of Defense acquisition workforce. These provisions, which have been amended several times, provide helpful authorities for acquisition workforce hiring, training, and retention, as well as budget authority dedicated to rebuilding the Department's in-house Science and Engineering foundation. These provisions are vitally important to the sustainability of the acquisition workforce.

Do you recommend any changes to the statutes, regulations, or policies regarding the Department of the Navy's acquisition workforce? If so, please describe.

If confirmed, and after thoroughly reviewing the acquisition workforce I will be better able to recommend any policy changes to benefit the acquisition workforce.

How will you work with the Defense Acquisition University and other educational institutions to improve the education and training of acquisition officials?

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Defense Acquisition University and other

educational institutions to seek their input on ways to improve the education and training of the acquisition workforce. One area I am currently working with the Defense Acquisition University on in my role as the USSOCOM Acquisition Executive is to ensure that DAU curriculum includes more training on emerging acquisition authorities enabled by the 2016 and 2017 NDAA to ensure the acquisition workforce is as capable in alternate acquisition pathways as they are in the more traditional acquisition approaches.

Anti-Access/Area Denial

Over the past few years, much has been made of the emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities of certain countries and the prospect that these capabilities may in the future limit the U.S. Navy's freedom of movement and action in certain regions.

Do you believe emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities are a concern?

The U.S. Navy is currently facing security threats that have become more sophisticated and widespread; threatening the Navy's access across multiple domains to include cyberspace, space, and the Navy's traditional domain of the oceans. The Navy must focus on access across all domains to sharpen their ability to defeat advanced technologies and strategies that would otherwise place U.S. forces at risk.

If so, what do you believe the Navy and Marine Corps need to be doing now and in the next few years to ensure continued access to all strategically important segments of the maritime domain?

The Department of the Navy must continue to develop and field next-generation platforms, sensors, and weapons to engage at extended ranges in contested environments. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to encourage innovation, making the necessary investments in enhanced agility and flexibility to retain and improve our warfighting advantages.

China and Russia

Senior U.S. military officials have said Russia and China are top potential threats to the United States.

Please describe the challenges U.S. Naval forces face from China and what steps may be required by Naval forces to address these concerns.

I believe that China represents a significant potential threat to U.S. naval forces and the ability of the United States and our allies to operate anywhere around the globe. As the margin of our technological advantage is reduced, it is important to routinely assess the Navy's readiness in force structure, capability, and the ability to execute operational plans against all potential adversaries. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the

Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, and Commandant of the Marine Corps to identify those investments that will maintain our technological superiority relative to our adversaries.

Please describe the challenges U.S. Naval forces face from Russia and what steps may be required by Naval forces to address these concerns.

I believe that Russia also represents a significant potential threat to U.S. naval forces and the U.S. homeland. As the margin of our technological advantage is reduced, it is important to routinely assess the Navy's readiness in force structure, capability, and the ability to execute operational plans against all potential adversaries. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, and Commandant of the Marine Corps to identify those investments that will maintain our technological superiority relative to our adversaries.

Iran

Iranian malign influence appears to continue to grow throughout the Middle East.

Please describe the challenges U.S. Naval forces face from Iran and what steps may be required by Naval forces to address these concerns.

I agree that the Iranian influence continues to grow throughout the Middle East and represents a regional threat, and a potential threat to the U.S. naval forces that operate in the region. As Iran evolves its capabilities and develops asymmetric tactics and procedures, the Navy and Marine Corps must be ready to respond with combat power that is credible, innovative and agile.

Operational Energy

In his responses to the advance policy questions from this Committee, Secretary Mattis talked about his time in Iraq, and how he called upon the Department of Defense to “unleash us from the tether of fuel.” He stated that “units would be faced with unacceptable limitations because of their dependence on fuel” and resupply efforts “made us vulnerable in ways that were exploited by the enemy.”

Do you believe this issue remains a challenge for the Department of the Navy?

Yes. The Department of the Navy must continue to pursue energy initiatives that improve readiness and reduce unit vulnerabilities. As I understand it, the Department currently funds research in promising energy technologies to meet critical naval needs and reduce one of the biggest costs for the Service. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, and Commandant of the Marine Corps to invest in research and development to pursue energy initiatives that will increase the Department of the Navy's long-term warfighting capability and reduce their vulnerabilities.

Energy and Acquisition

How can our acquisition systems better incorporate the use of energy in military platforms, and how, if at all, are assessments of future requirements taking into account energy needs as a key performance parameter?

An energy key performance parameter is currently mandatory as a matter of policy for most Department of Defense acquisition programs, unless it is waived by an appropriate requirements authority. It is my understanding that the Department of the Navy is currently formalizing the incorporation of energy considerations in its acquisition governance processes; enabling effective incorporation of energy factors in the design of Navy and Marine Corps platforms and systems. If confirmed, I will review those processes to ensure they are adequate to ensure effective incorporation of energy considerations in the acquisition programs.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the ASN(RDA)?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate committees in a timely manner?

Yes.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with this Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.

Do you agree to answer letters and requests for information from individual Senators who are members of this Committee?

Yes.

If confirmed, do you agree to provide to this Committee relevant information within the jurisdictional oversight of the Committee when requested by the Committee, even in the absence of the formality of a letter from the Chairman?

I agree to respond appropriately to requests for information from members of this Committee.