

Advance Policy Questions for General Paul LaCamera, USA
Nominee to be Commander, United Nations Command,
Commander, Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command,
and Commander, United States Forces Korea

Duties and Qualifications

1. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea, and what is your understanding of how these different command responsibilities interrelate?

United Nations Command (UNC), Combined Forces Command (CFC), and United States Forces Korea (USFK) provide mutual support to each other and require constant and close interaction. However, they are distinct organizations with different missions, reporting chains, and authorities. The missions and staffs for these three organizations have been generally intertwined. I am aware of the recent efforts to separate both the tasks and the staffs of these three commands.

Below the Commander, the vast majority of each command's staff is now responsible for work in only their respective command. Additionally, in July 2018 the Deputy Commanders, and the Chiefs of Staff in United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea are separate General Officers.

United States Forces Korea is visible proof of the U.S. commitment to Korea. As America's contribution to the United States (U.S.) - Republic of Korea (ROK) Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953, United States Forces Korea trains and supports U.S. service members in Korea. The United States Forces Korea Commander operates under the authority granted under Title 10, Unified Command Plan, and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) Instruction 0530.1. The United States Forces Korea Commander has the responsibility to administer the U.S.-Republic of Korea Defense Treaty; to conduct reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of U.S. forces (as necessary during Armistice and war); to conduct Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations if necessary; and to coordinate all U.S. military support to the Republic of Korea.

Combined Forces Command remains essential to the ROK-U.S. Alliance. It is the bilateral warfighting command that successfully defended the ROK and deterred North Korea since establishing the command in 1978. Pursuant to the direction of the United States and Republic of Korea National Authorities, the Combined Forces Command Commander leads the combined military effort of the U.S. and the ROK to deter hostile acts of external aggression, and in the event deterrence fails, to defeat an external armed attack against the ROK.

United Nations Command represents the continuing international commitments to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. It implements United Nations Security Council Resolution 84 by maintaining the 1953 Armistice Agreement and serving as a platform for international contributions to Korea's defense in conflict. The United Nations Command Commander operates under the authority derived from the Terms of Reference from the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Furthermore, the United Nations Command Commander is responsible for enforcing the Armistice Agreement, leading multinational force support to and participation in Alliance operations during Armistice and war, and providing on-going International legitimacy to Armistice-associated activities and presence.

Not one of these three commands can operate alone in the overall mission and successfully advance security on the Korean Peninsula, without the other two. However, each of the three commands is increasingly focused on delivering its unique contribution to the overall mission.

2. What background and experience, including joint duty assignments, do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

I am honored to serve this great Nation for the last 36 years, and I look forward to the opportunity to continue serving, if confirmed as the Commander for USFK/CFC/UNC. COVID-19 hindered my ability to visit Korea more than once during my current assignment, but I have been stationed there and participated in multiple exercises in Korea.

I have commanded at every level from company command to my current position commanding U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), the Army Service Component Command of the United States Indo-Pacific Command (UNINDOPACOM), which includes supporting USFK. My current position as the USARPAC Commander provides me with extensive first-hand experience, knowledge, and insights into this priority theater, as well as a variety of strong personal relationships with senior military leaders in the region.

I have also commanded at every level in support of global deployments and combat operations serving in both conventional and special operations forces. This allowed me the opportunity to train, lead, and fight with combined and joint forces, interagency, and ally and partner nations across the globe. My experience as the Chief, Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq as part of the U.S. Embassy Country Team reinforced my appreciation for our interagency colleagues, their tremendous dedication, capabilities, and the important role we played in executing policy. Finally, I understand how to collaborate across the joint, combined, and interagency force towards integrated deterrence to support Department of Defense (DoD) guidance, the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the National Security Strategy (NSS).

If confirmed, I look forward to applying these experiences and partnering with this Committee, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Chairman Joint Chief of Staff,

Commander USINDOPACOM, and the Republic of Korea in continued service to the Army, and this great nation.

3. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea?

Yes. I am firm believer in lifelong learning. In preparation for this confirmation hearing, I consulted other leaders and professionals who have vast experience and deep regional knowledge. Taking into consideration their perspective enhanced my understanding of the capacity required to perform the duties of these three Commands. If confirmed, I am committed to furthering this type of consultation as I synthesize the facts on the ground. I look forward to the opportunity to learn more about the nuances of the situation in Korea so that I may provide sound military advice, options, and actions while in command.

Major Challenges and Problems

4. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea?

The next Commander of United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea will continue to encounter unique challenges. These include maintaining a robust, ready, and expert force that can deter adversaries from threatening the Republic of Korea, the region and our homeland. If required, we will defeat aggression while simultaneously supporting ongoing diplomatic efforts and the enduring work of Commander, USINDOPACOM. In this dynamic security environment, U.S. and Alliance forces must continue to be ready to execute a more expansive range of missions and provide military support to the other instruments of national power if necessary.

5. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges and problems?

If confirmed, in order to meet these challenges I will continue to work from previous lessons and will create opportunities that reinforce the enduring, central elements of success on the Korean Peninsula. First, the strength of the Republic of Korea (ROK)-U.S. Alliance is proven and will remain ironclad, with the Combined Forces Command as the capable and ready warfighter. In order to ensure the Combined Forces Command maintains and strengthens its capabilities going forward, it is crucial that the ROK and U.S. make verifiable progress on meeting all criteria of the Conditions-based Operational Control Transition Plan, which includes acquisition of 26 critical military capabilities, strategic strike, and missile defense systems. Second, the Combined Forces Command will focus on maintaining a combat credible force and the appropriate theater posture necessary to deter aggression and, if necessary, "Fight Tonight." A crucial part of

maintaining this combat power is rigorous, integrated, joint, and combined, training among all U.S. Services and our Korean Allies, maximizing our proficiency with the latest systems and tactics, and demonstrating our commitment to this unbreakable Alliance. Additionally, UNC/CFC/USFK will continue to fully support the State Department-led diplomatic effort to achieve North Korea's denuclearization. If confirmed, one of my top priorities will be to conduct an assessment of the readiness of the commands and their forces, ensuring there is the right balance between "Fight Tonight" readiness, modernization, and support for ongoing diplomatic efforts.

6. Other than the nuclear portfolio, what capabilities and capacities of the North Korean government and military give you the most concern as a military commander?

North Korea's conventional forces remain formidable, and its quantity has a quality of its own. North Korea maintains one of the numerically largest submarine forces in the world, and also has a wide variety of air defense weapons in its arsenal. North Korea also invests heavily in sizeable, well trained and equipped, Special Operations Forces.

Chain of Command

In accordance with title 10, U.S. Code, the President and Secretary of Defense exercise authority, direction, and control of the Armed Forces through two distinct branches of the chain of command. One branch runs from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, to the combatant commanders for the execution of missions with forces assigned to their commands. For purposes of organizing, training, and equipping forces, the chain of command runs from the President, to the Secretary of Defense, to the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

7. Do you believe this dual structure provides for clear and effective chain of command?

Yes. The dual structure provides for a clear and effective chain of command. I believe that is important to have one chain of command that is focused on executing missions and another chain of command focused on organizing, training, and equipping the forces. I am comfortable receiving missions from Commander, USINDOPACOM and sending a demand signal to the Service Chiefs for what forces, equipment, and capabilities are necessary to execute those missions. If confirmed, I look forward to working with both chains of command.

8. If confirmed, on what types of issues and decisions would you coordinate with the INDOPACOM, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and civilian officials within the Department of Defense?

The United States Forces Korea Commander, as commander of a sub-unified command of USINDOPACOM, reports directly to the USINDOPACOM Commander on matters pertaining to United States Forces Korea missions and functions. This role provides the

United States with the means to provide forces to Commander, United Nations Command (CDR UNC) or Commander, Combined Forces Command (CDR CFC) as required, and to support these forces with the required logistics, administration, and policy initiatives necessary to maintain readiness and meet our mutual treaty obligations with the Republic of Korea (ROK).

During armistice, as the Senior U.S. Military Officer Assigned to Korea (SUSMOAK), the USFK Commander represents the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (US CJCS) and the U.S. Department of Defense in all matters concerning U.S. interests in Alliance military affairs, keeping Commander, USINDOPACOM, US CJCS, and the Department informed.

The CDR CFC, as commander of a bi-national command and the centerpiece of the U.S.-ROK Alliance, supports Armistice Agreement compliance, deters hostile acts of external aggression directed against the Republic of Korea, and, should deterrence fail, defeat an external armed attack. In this position, the CDR CFC carries out the bilateral strategic guidance and direction provided by the Secretary of Defense and the ROK Minister of National Defense, as well as directives given by the bilateral U.S and ROK Military Committee.

The CDR UNC, serves as commander of a unified international military command and is responsible for maintaining the Armistice Agreement on the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. is the executive agent for UNC. The CDR UNC acts in accordance with directives from the United States government that are transmitted by the Secretary of Defense through the US CJCS, keeping the Commander of USINDOPACOM informed. The CDR UNC is responsible for the strategic direction, guidance, operational control of forces, and acceptance and integration of United Nations member nations' forces into alliance operations during contingencies. This includes enabling access to the seven UNC bases in accordance with the Agreement Regarding the Status of the United Nations Forces.

If confirmed, I will work with the USINDOPACOM Commander, the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the Secretary of Defense to ensure I have the guidance, direction, resources, and policy necessary to carry out the missions assigned. I will also maintain a close and coordinating relationship with USINDOPACOM Service Components concerning all matters relating to operations, specifically sustainment and command and control (C2), impacting forces assigned to the Korean Peninsula and the USINDOPACOM Theater of Operations.

USFK Priorities

9. In your assessment, what capability and/or capacity shortfalls in the current Joint Force present the most significant challenge to executing USFK's operational plans?

If confirmed, I will build upon efforts to close any capability and capacity gaps related to operational plans execution. I appreciate prior Congressional support that helped

resource the development of an integrated ballistic missile defense network which have been previously reported to USINDOPACOM and the Joint Staff through the normal and routine readiness reporting systems.

With the transitioning of the USFK, CFC, and UNC staffs, we must be very intentional about maintaining extremely close coordination among the staffs, and with our Korean allies as we train, exercise, and build the systems and infrastructure to execute operational plans and manage and adapt to an evolving security environment.

10. As diplomatic efforts continue, what military options should the United States explore to improve deterrence against North Korean aggression? In your assessment, what changes to U.S. force posture and activity in the Indo-Pacific region would improve U.S. deterrence against North Korea?

The diplomatic efforts among the United States, South Korea, and North Korea in 2018 reduced tension on the Korean Peninsula. As a result, it is essential that our military actions support continued diplomacy. The United States, in close coordination with South Korea and our other allies and partners in the INDOPACOM region, must continue to lead with policy, shape with diplomatic efforts, and follow with security using combat credible forces as a deterrent.

To deter North Korean aggression, if confirmed I would look to continue operations, activities, and investments along three lines of effort. First, any improvements in force posture should focus on early warning and missile defense. Second, we should continue to improve training and readiness of permanently stationed U.S. Forces in Korea, the rotating force, and those forces that would come from USINDOPACOM and the United States during crisis. Third, we should episodically return U.S. Strategic Assets to the Korean Peninsula, including Carrier Strike Groups, Bomber missions, and 5th Generation F-22 and F-35 Fighter aircraft. Integration and interoperability of these assets with both ROK and U.S. Alliance Forces, maximizes deterrence value and ensures a “Fight Tonight” preparedness.

The strategic and operational environments outlined in the National Defense Strategy clearly identify the importance of posturing a combat credible force capable of deterring potential adversaries, including North Korea. USINDOPACOM indicates an unequivocal intention to continue supporting the United States Forces Korea and the deterrence of North Korea through the use of a robust blunt force layer on the Korean Peninsula backed by timely and responsive surge forces.

If confirmed, I will assess the readiness and capabilities of the United States Forces Korea contact and blunt layers, currently constituted as a mix of assigned and rotational forces, and communicate to both USINDOPACOM and the Joint Staff any concerns I have over capability gaps and their impact on the ability to conduct effective deterrence operations, activities, and investments.

While United States Forces Korea already coordinates closely with United States Forces Japan and USINDOPACOM, if confirmed, I will continue to build trust with those commands, and additionally leverage their trust to expand the relations between South Korea and Japan. I will encourage our South Korean ally to conduct bi- and tri-lateral military domain activities with Japan. The effect of military cooperation between Japan and South Korea has a unique deterrent effect all its own. Deterrence is improved by not only maintaining ready and capable forces across the Korean and Japanese theaters, but also by continuing to set the theater as well. Strong, multilateral cooperation also has deterrent effects, so continuing to strengthen United Nations Command is an essential element.

11. In your view, what are the highest priority missile defense needs of U.S. Forces Korea and Combined Forces Command?

The 94th AAMDC, a theater enabling command of U.S. Army Pacific Command, gives me insight into this question. United States Forces Korea and Combined Forces Command face a large inventory of missile systems capable of complex attacks and the delivery of weapons of mass destruction. The Alliance's missile defense forces must defend the ability to: project combat power, receive additional forces from beyond the Korean Peninsula, secure Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation sites in Korea and Japan, defend U.S. and South Korean forces, personnel, families, and protect major Korean population areas. To do so, the Alliance must have the ability to neutralize North Korean missile threats before launch, and present a layered, effective defense of upper and lower-tier anti-missile capabilities during an attack. Our missile defense systems remain the finest in the world due to continuous upgrades and outstanding support from our partners in the defense industry. We must ensure they are also resourced effectively. Competing requirements in other theaters have the potential to impact our readiness by reducing the quantity of assets and resources available to our forces and those of our ROK partners. These resources include both follow-on forces and equipment, most notably the munitions needed to maintain both a qualitative and quantitative advantage over North Korea.

12. What missile defense capabilities do you believe are needed in the near term to meet the operational needs of these commands, and what systems are available to provide such capabilities?

The ability to integrate existing upper-and lower-tier systems has greatly improved through capabilities developed through the Joint Emergent Operational Needs Process in the past year. Capabilities have been fielded, or are in the process of being fielded, to the warfighter that promise to optimize our interceptor inventory.

Our joint and combined allies and partners continue to make progress in efforts to find and fix enemy systems prior to launch. These efforts would greatly enhance our overall defense against the missile threat and, if confirmed, I would continue to emphasize innovation in this critical area.

The ability to defend additional assets still depends on the flow of personnel, systems, and munitions into the Korean Theater of Operations. These assets are not solely dedicated to USFK or USINDOPACOM, but are called upon to support operations in other theaters as previously discussed. Additionally, forces already in Korea and USINDOPACOM have been discussed as options to support operations elsewhere. Any loss of forces and resources, either allocated or in theater, could negate the improved capabilities provided in recent years.

13. In your opinion, how should the U.S. employ its forces in ROK to provide for regional presence and engagement, and to best respond to regional threats, provide support for out-of-area contingencies, and maintain readiness?

Today, the Republic of Korea-U.S. Alliance is, and should remain, squarely focused on the immediate threat from North Korea. The Alliance constantly updates its posture and plans as the security environment evolves. Given the global role of the U.S. military and, increasingly, the international reach of the South Korean military, opportunities are emerging for Alliance cooperation beyond the Korean Peninsula. United States Forces Korea forces are uniquely positioned to provide the Commander USINDOPACOM a range of capabilities that create options for supporting out-of-area contingencies and responses to regional threats. If confirmed, I will advocate for inclusion of USFK forces and capabilities in USINDOPACOM contingency and operational plans supporting U.S. interests and objectives in the region.

North Korea

14. What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula?

In my current position, I receive region specific intelligence updates that include the Korean Peninsula. Currently, the Korean Peninsula is stable and tension is low, especially along the Demilitarized Zone and Northern Limit Line. However, North Korea's WMD program, asymmetric capabilities (to include cyber capabilities), and sizeable conventional military force remains a significant threat to South Korea, US and Allied forces in both South Korea and the region as well as the United States. These standing tensions require a combat credible force consisting of a strong, professionally trained, and equipped US-ROK Alliance to deter threats and to sustain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula in the face of a dangerous, and at times, unpredictable North Korea.

Currently North Korea is struggling with the COVID-19 pandemic, although they claim zero COVID cases within its populace. North Korea closed its borders and halted international commerce, which created significant economic challenges. North Korea is using the KPA military to support enforcing these border restrictions. Kim Jong Un continues to maintain a stable grip on the regime and control of the populace.

The Kim regime continues to tout the development of an unprecedented number of developmental weapon systems to threaten South Korea, regional allies and partners as well as the United States. Kim Jung Un continues to rebuff South Korea and perceives a new U.S. Administration as an opportunity to negotiate, but is prepared to take provocative and coercive steps with long-range missile tests or possibly even demonstrate its nuclear capability.

15. What is your assessment of North Korea's conventional capabilities and readiness?

North Korea's conventional forces remain formidable, while technologically inferior to the ROK and US. The KPA is a military where quantity has a quality of its own. North Korea maintains one of the world's largest conventional forces with over 1 million personnel. Roughly 70% of its forces are deployed forward near the demilitarized zone and maintains lethal asymmetric capabilities to inflict casualties against the Alliance if a conflict occurs. North Korea's universal conscription system requires men to serve ten years. Many of these soldiers spend their entire service in the same unit, which enables continuity.

While much of its equipment is considered obsolete by modern standards, North Korea continues to invest in improving its arsenal. North Korea has been improving their armor, artillery, and anti-tank guided missile technology. A significant amount of long-range artillery is positioned to range the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area (GSMA) with a population of 25 million. North Korea maintains one of the numerically largest submarine forces in the world, and also has a wide variety of air defense weapons in its arsenal.

North Korea's conventional force vulnerabilities include shortages in food, fuel, and supplies. In 2020, much of the military missed key training opportunities and were mandated to respond to national disaster recovery and relief efforts due to COVID-19, typhoons and floods.

In spite of these vulnerabilities, North Korea's training and investments across the conventional, asymmetric, and weapons of mass destruction forces leave little doubt that its conventional forces are ready for war should its leadership choose.

16. What is your assessment of the threat posed to South Korea, Japan, and the United States by North Korea's ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction capabilities?

These capabilities pose a serious threat that supports developing and deploying critical capabilities such as missile defense as we work closely with allies to defend, disrupt, and destroy North Korean missiles as early in the kill-web as possible. If confirmed, I will continue to strengthen Alliance deterrence, as well as the defense of our close allies in Japan and South Korea.

North Korea continues to pursue capabilities to hold key Alliance targets at risk. They threaten Korea and Japan with short and medium range missiles. During 2020, North Korea showcased newer and developmental missile systems and advanced ballistic fuel systems, some probably with nuclear capability. This past October, North Korea paraded 76 individual ballistic missile systems, displaying their ability to produce missiles and missile launchers despite economic challenges and sanctions. These systems represent advanced capabilities that offer greater range and accuracy while shortening the missile load and launch time than legacy North Korea ballistic missile systems.

North Korea also unveiled a new ICBM larger than the ICBMs tested in 2017. Kim's development and refinement of these capabilities suggest his intent to threaten the U.S. Between 2016 and 2017, North Korea expended great resources and effort to advance the full range of its ballistic missiles with the intent of eventually being able to target the U.S. North Korea conducted three nuclear tests to develop and demonstrate this capability. North Korea likely already possesses two types of ICBMs capable of reaching CONUS both tested in 2017. North Korea is expected to test and demonstrate advanced capabilities as the regime views these as critical to its survival.

North Korean Nuclear Program and Extended Deterrence

The North Korean regime is building nuclear weapons primarily to deter American attack and ensure regime survival. However, some experts also warn that the regime may seek to use its nuclear weapons to engage in coercive diplomacy to force eventual reunification on its own terms.

17. As far as you are aware, has North Korea taken any concrete steps toward complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization?

North Korea continues building its nuclear program and has not taken any concrete steps toward denuclearization. It seems that North Korea is unlikely to surrender its nuclear stockpile and production capabilities. In 2020, Kim stated he no longer feels bound by his self-imposed pause on nuclear and long-range missile tests. Kim's remarks demonstrate his strongest support for strategic weapons development and the nuclear industry. Kim also intends to produce nuclear-capable multiple re-entry vehicle warheads and hypersonic glide vehicles as well as a nuclear-powered submarine and sea-launched ballistic missiles.

18. What is your understanding of the motivations for North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons? And what implications do those motivations have for how the regime may seek to use its nuclear arsenal?

Kim's overarching motivation to maintain a nuclear program is to enable regime survival and relevance. Kim may use nuclear weapons, if he feels the regime's existence is threatened and on the verge of being eliminated. Kim also views nuclear weapons as a deterrent against foreign intervention as well as a means to gain international visibility.

Recent messaging suggests the regime may be setting conditions to escalate tensions through a range of actions, which could be nuclear weapons or ICBM testing to extract political concessions or sanctions relief. Regardless of Kim's calculus, a strong Korea-U.S. Alliance, demonstrated resolve, and the strength of our own extended deterrent are crucial to shaping Kim's views toward the possession and potential use of these capabilities.

19. The United States currently deters nuclear attack and/or nuclear coercion by Russia and China, countries with far greater nuclear capabilities than North Korea is ever likely to achieve. Are there unique challenges to deterring nuclear attack and/or nuclear coercion by North Korea that make deterrence a less effective policy option for the United States?

There are challenges for the U.S. in deterring all countries with nuclear weapons. The U.S. military is trained and prepared to respond to nuclear threats, including coercion from North Korea. I understand that this administration is currently reviewing its nuclear deterrence policy. If confirmed, and once published, I will fully support that.

20. Earlier this year, North Korea announced its intent to significantly expand its nuclear forces, including development of miniaturized, "tactical" nuclear weapons. If North Korea were to field such weapons, what impact would this have on the balance of forces on the peninsula and in the region?

In January of this year, Kim Jung Un announced plans and programs to expand its nuclear deterrent, specifically, the development of miniaturized nuclear warheads, tactical nuclear weapons, and even multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles. If confirmed, I would consult with intelligence experts to assess and analyze the capabilities and timeline for employment. After assessment, I would review potential requirements for any necessary capabilities and force structure changes on the peninsula.

21. Would you expect such a development to affect the ROK's calculus on pursuing its own nuclear capabilities? How would a shift in United States nuclear declaratory policies, such as adoption of a "no-first-use" policy, affect such decisions?

I do not want to speculate on future scenarios that have not come to fruition. However, I will say that during the 1978 Security Consultative Meeting, the United States committed to provide a nuclear umbrella to the ROK, a commitment which continues today. Regardless of the changes in the security environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula, the ROK is expected to fulfill its international obligation as a non-nuclear State, just as the United States is expected to execute its designated role in the defense of the ROK against external threats by providing extended deterrence.

22. Are there additional steps that DOD could take to reassure allies and counter North Korean nuclear provocations by improving the readiness, training, and effectiveness of U.S. nuclear forces assigned to support the nuclear deterrence mission in the Pacific?

USFK participated in the U.S. JCS-led strategic force exercises to ensure the effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent mission is maintained. If confirmed, I will continue to pursue opportunities to increase joint, combined, and interagency training to make certain I am satisfied with the readiness and training of the force. This also enables integrated deterrence throughout the region and further bolsters all of our combined capabilities, such as layered and effective integrated ballistic missile defense capabilities.

Additionally, DoD could pursue multilateral interoperability with allies and partners in the region to maintain superiority and be a partner for security in the Pacific. Emerging technology in the Ballistic Missile Defense Arena offers promising deterrent effects, and I will be a staunch advocate for first deployments of such capabilities to the Korean Peninsula.

23. In your view, are there additional steps that DOD could take, including with our allies and partners, to ensure that North Korea does not proliferate missile and nuclear technology to countries such as Syria, Iran, and others?

The Department of Defense plays a supporting role in a whole-of-government approach to preventing the proliferation of missile and nuclear technology. United States Forces Korea works with South Korea on this and other major security interests. If confirmed, I will continue this cooperation across the entire spectrum of threats facing the Alliance and ensure our Alliance remains ironclad and effective. I defer to the USINDOPACOM, Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to provide more thoughts on specific policy proposals.

24. In your opinion, will sanctions alone lead to the denuclearization of North Korea? If not, what other incentives or disincentives could help lead to better outcomes?

No. Economic sanctions must be combined with a whole of government approach including all elements of national power and the international community to convince the regime to return to meaningful negotiations.

While I do not know what will ultimately incentivize or dissuade the regime to denuclearize, maintaining a combat credible force that is regularly exercised at echelon is an essential tenant to engage North Korea from a position of strength in any discussion of incentives or disincentives.

Role of Other Regional Countries

25. What is your understanding of China's policy objectives as they relate to the Korean Peninsula? How would you describe China's strategy to achieve those objectives?

In general, my view is that China's policy in the region is to challenge the U.S. role and undermine its influence in Asia. China's strategy on the Korean Peninsula is similar to its efforts elsewhere, where China uses all elements of national power and coercion to advance its aims. Ultimately, they strive to diminish and undermine the Alliance by applying pressure to the South Korean economy and seek to weaken public support in Korea for the Alliance.

26. How would you assess the current state of China-North Korea relations?

It appears the relationship between China and North Korea is consistent with their modus operandi, while China supports with humanitarian, military information, and diplomatic aid under their terms. Recent high level visits between China and North Korea indicate improving relations, but fall short of what Kim Jong Un wants, which is additional economic aid and support to their nuclear weapon program. China wants a nuclear free Korean peninsula.

27. How would you assess the current state of China-South Korea relations?

The relationship between China and South Korea can be described as "delicate" but ripe with opportunity as both economies look to recover pandemic losses. Both countries greatly value their economic and trade relationship. China remains South Korea's top trade partner in both exports and imports, and 2021 discussions during a high-level summit indicates relationships are stable.

China will accept instability at times when they behave aggressively and punitively toward South Korea on security issues, as China perceives South Korea is impacting Chinese interests. For example, China's economic coercion toward South Korean equities in response to the deployment of our Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense system.

28. What are Russia's policy objectives as they relate to the Korean Peninsula? How would you describe Russia's strategy to achieve those objectives?

Russia desires stability on the Korean peninsula with deference to China's regional leadership. Russia remains opposed to North Korea's persistent provocations and their nuclear weapons program. Russians implemented and abides by some sanctions against Pyongyang but desires that North Korea remain a buffer state and is concerned about the spill-over of refugees or other collateral effects in the case of a conflict. Russia remains an engaged opportunist and refuses to take sides in the region.

Russia's strategy is to achieve stability through bilateral meetings, down playing sanctions, and providing aid or economic support. For example, Putin met with Kim for the first time in April 2019 and agreed to improve bilateral relations, which resulted in several follow on meetings between high-level defense leaders of both countries. North Korea enjoys Russia's support for easing sanctions pressure and has received tens of thousands of metric tons of food aid from Russia in 2020 alone. Thousands of North Koreans are also working in Russia. Russia is likely to support China on North Korean issues in international forums while stressing the importance of stability, non-interference in internal affairs, and diplomacy while downplaying the value of sanctions.

Chemical and Biological Weapons

29. What is your assessment of North Korea's Chemical and Biological Weapons capabilities and the ability of DOD and the interagency to counter such capabilities?

This question cannot be fully answered at the unclassified level.

According to the 2017 Department of Defense's report to Congress, in February 2017, North Korea likely assassinated Kim Jong Un's older half-brother Kim Jong Nam in a crowded Malaysian airport by using VX nerve agent, a Class I weapon under the Chemical Weapons Convention. The public assassination of Kim Jong-Nam in Malaysia indicates North Korea's willingness to use WMDs at a "surgical" level and may also indicate their willingness to have their use attributed to Pyongyang.

North Korea has the capability to produce nerve, blister, blood, and choking agents and has several thousand metric tons of them stockpiled. North Korea likely could employ chemical weapons agents by modifying a variety of conventional munitions, including artillery and ballistic missiles.

International treaties and organizations prevent the development, production, and use of WMD. North Korea's recent use of WMDs, albeit small-scale, indicates an erosion of international norms, which may change how the U.S. and its partners calculate the likelihood of future North Korean uses of WMDs. Defining the threshold will be key, and if confirmed, I look forward to entering that conversation.

If confirmed, I will check on the readiness and training required to counter these capabilities, and advocate for advances in the collective protection of our combat power, combatants, and non-combatants.

30. What is your assessment of the Joint Force's ability to secure North Korean weapons of mass destruction sites in the event of a contingency? What capability and/or capacity shortfalls present the most significant challenge to executing such an operation?

This question cannot be fully answered at the unclassified level.

At this classification, without transparency, and clarity into the North Korea's nuclear program, it is difficult to assess our ability to secure North Korean weapons of mass destruction sites in the event of a contingency.

If confirmed, I will review the major operational plans, contingency plans, training, and associated execution orders outlining the joint force's ability to counter and secure North Korean weapons of mass destruction in order to identify capability or capacity shortfalls. I will work with our regional partners and allies, interagency, and INDOPACOM Service Components to forge a comprehensive approach to addressing the North Korean nuclear, weapons of mass destruction, missile, and proliferation threats.

United States - Republic of Korea (ROK) Alliance

31. What is your assessment of the current U. S. security relationship with the ROK?

Our current relationship remains ironclad and as close as it has ever been. The security relationship benefits from Alliance staff mechanisms that facilitate on-going cooperation, coordination, and interoperability. Across the warfighting functions, the standing Republic of Korea-U.S. Alliance and its Combined Forces Command demonstrate the trust and strength between our two nations and our shared ability to provide security as an example of what two nations can accomplish together under the umbrella of a Mutual Defense Treaty.

32. If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to improve the U.S.-ROK security relationship?

If confirmed, I will continue to build on the lessons learned, trust, and capabilities my predecessors built. I will assess the current engagement strategy, forums, and security consultative meetings to reinforce and adjust as required. I recognize that strong relations are built through regular engagements.

33. What is your assessment of ROK warfighting capability and modernization efforts? Do you believe the ROK is investing appropriately in its defensive capabilities?

The Republic of Korea's military forces are combat credible, well-equipped, well-trained, and well-led. Our Korean allies continue to demonstrate their commitment to enhancing conventional deterrence through the development and procurement of modern and interoperable capabilities. Their defense expenditures remain the highest among our allies and partners as a percentage of their GDP. In 2021, the Republic of Korea will spend 2.7% of its GDP on defense. Further, South Korea's CY21-25 Mid-Term Defense Plan proposes 6% annual growth in spending.

Alliance requirements are not the sole driver of ROK defense spending but may appropriately support their long-term defense capabilities and economic security. The ROK prioritizes a substantial share of its resources to develop indigenous defense capabilities, industry, and export that all support ROK government economic objectives. ROK modernization efforts compete with other national security priorities and indigenous defense exports. These acquisitions compete with advancements that are a higher priority to Alliance warfighting, such as improvements to command and control facilities and sustainment of current ROK defense systems.

ROK continues to maintain positive momentum toward transitioning wartime operational control (OPCON) to a ROK led Future-Combined Forces Command. Furthermore, South Korea's Defense Reform has improved our combined interoperability and enhanced the ROK's defense posture. The majority of their modernization efforts have advanced their Air Force and Navy warfighting capabilities with their purchase of advanced platforms and munitions. ROK modernization efforts include acquisition of military capabilities necessary to fulfill the conditions based operational control transition plan.

34. What is your understanding of the command relationships between U.S. and ROK forces?

The existing command relationship enables the dual mission of deterring North Korea and defending South Korea. In Armistice, the ROK CJCS has Operational Control (OPCON) of ROK armed forces and the USFK CDR has OPCON of U.S. forces. If during a crisis the Alliance National Command Authority decides to raise the DEFCON level, then the ROK and U.S. armed forces in the Korean Theater of Operations will be OPCON to CFC. As a bilateral warfighting command, the Combined Forces Command receives its policy direction, mission, and guidance from bilateral ministerial and bilateral general officer level forums. Commander, Combined Forces Command, does have the authority to prepare both South Korean and U.S. forces through planning, training, and development of combined doctrine within the Alliance to include formalized and mutually agreed crisis action procedures for transitioning from Armistice to war including the associated shifting of command and control.

Additionally, formal command relationships are reinforced through informal trust building opportunities such as daily meetings, regular exercises, and ongoing cooperative work. The Alliance relationships are ironclad allowing the Command to act with unity and shared purpose.

Transfer of Wartime Operational Control

35. Do you believe the transfer of operational control should be conditions-based?

Yes, I support the bilaterally agreed-upon Conditions-based Operational Control Transition Plan.

If so, under what conditions do you believe must be achieved?

I firmly believe all three conditions of the bilaterally agreed-upon Conditions-based Operational Control Transition Plan must be fully met before the Alliance changes to a ROK four-star led Command. Although I understand that the Alliance continues to make progress working through the conditions, I would caution against any effort to apply a time-based approach to this important endeavor.

The three conditions are:

- (1) Acquire ROK Military Capabilities Required to Lead the Combined Defense, which includes 26 discreet critical military capabilities.
- (2) Develop and Acquire Comprehensive Alliance Response Capabilities against North Korean Nuclear and Missile Threats, which includes 14 specific capabilities.
- (3) A Security Environment on the Korean Peninsula and in the Region that is Conducive to a Stable Transition of Wartime Operational Control.

36. What is your understanding of the ROK's current and projected military capabilities and the ability of ROK forces to assume a greater role in the defense of their homeland including responsibility for command and control of the readiness, operations, and war fighting of their own forces in wartime?

The Republic of Korea military continues progress to assume a greater role in the defense of their homeland. The Republic of Korea continues development efforts, but understands there remains considerable work to be done to completely acquire the military capabilities necessary to meet critical combined defense leadership roles and correct current capability gaps to conduct specified and implied tasks.

The U.S. currently provides the support to mitigate many of these gaps, and the expectation is that the ROK takes concrete steps to address these shortfalls and assume a greater role in the defense of their homeland. Many of the requirements associated with meeting the conditions of the Conditions-based Operational Control Transition Plan are designed to accomplish this. If the ROK completes all these requirements, which USFK expects will take several years, I expect that ROK forces will have significantly greater ability to deter, fight, and win against North Korea, even with less support from the U.S.

37. How can U.S. Forces Korea assist the ROK to develop these capabilities in the near-to-medium term?

If confirmed, my staff and I will work closely with our Republic of Korea (ROK) counterparts to identify capability gaps by using combined assessments, joint studies, and senior-level discussions. Our goal of reducing these gaps will inform how the U.S. and ROK pursue acquisition strategies, including potential FMS cases, training, and logistics support. It is imperative that any solutions are sustainable, interoperable, and effective in the combined defense.

Host Nation Burden-Sharing Programs

38. In general, do you believe the ROK has equitably shared the burden of defense and deterrence on the Korean Peninsula in recent years?

I understand there are several variables and potential costs that both the U.S. and ROK may consider when defining what is equitable for purposes of burden sharing.

In my current capacity I have not studied all these variables. However, I did support 8th Army when the SMA lapsed. I appreciate the efforts of both Nations to reach a multi-year SMA that will reduce uncertainty once ratified.

39. To what extent is an active multi-year Special Measures Agreement necessary to ensure appropriate burden-sharing by the ROK?

In general, burden sharing agreements with allies and partners demonstrate the importance and strategic value these countries place upon U.S. force posture. Shared resourcing solutions greatly benefit the Department of Defense and the U.S. taxpayer, and these effects are only amplified with stable, predictable, multi-year agreements. The recently concluded U.S.-ROK six-year cost sharing agreement represents the ROK Government's commitment to the stable stationing of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula. This agreement ensures stable resourcing for USFK's Korean National workforce, the Command's multi-year Facilities Construction program, and the enabling logistics support contracts, all essential to maintaining U.S. commitments under the Mutual Defense Treaty.

ROK-Japan Relationship

The ROK and Japan are two of our most important bilateral alliances, but historical issues have sometimes prevented cooperation and integration between the two countries.

40. What is your assessment of the ROK-Japan relationship?

The ROK-Japan relationship continues to grow, although historical sensitivities have impacted progress over the past few years. The U.S. should continue to promote bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral cooperation with both South Korea and Japan and take on a leadership role that can move the ROK-Japan relationship forward. We can identify shared threats and challenges and can identify areas where cooperation would make all three countries and the region safer. We should encourage and amplify positive gains so that the relations among the three countries provide a foundation for strength and stability in the region that will ensure prosperity and security. If confirmed, I will pursue collaboration and cooperation within the military domain between these important allies, to foster stability in the region and enhance deterrence against the DPRK.

41. What opportunities for cooperation do you foresee for the bilateral (ROK-Japan) and trilateral (ROK-Japan-US) relationships?

Multilateral cooperation is key to the security and prosperity of the region. If confirmed, I will pursue areas of mutual interest that promote interoperability and enhance security for our allies and partners. Some examples include combined humanitarian and disaster relief efforts, search and rescue, ballistic missile defense in-depth, planning to counter unconventional attacks, and anti-submarine warfare. I will also seek out opportunities to involve other partners in the region in multilateral cooperation.

Training of U.S. Forces in the Republic of Korea

42. In your assessment, what is the value of regular, large-scale exercises for U.S. and ROK forces?

Regular large scale exercises provide essential benefits to the combined defense posture of the Republic of Korea and the United States. These exercises are a venue to test and refine the Alliance and combined coordination procedures for the Republic of Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff, United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea.

Regular large scale exercises provide an opportunity to train on wartime operational procedures through a rigorous and challenging scenario that yields increased cooperation and "Fight Tonight" readiness. This "Fight Tonight" readiness is vital for these headquarters as well as for the subordinate ground, air, naval, marine, and special operations component forces.

Finally, large scale exercises provide shared challenges that the training audiences must overcome. This presents an unparalleled opportunity to bolster combined relationships at all echelons resulting in a stronger U.S.-ROK Alliance.

43. In your assessment, has USFK participated in any exercises in recent years that were provocative?

When the situation requires clear provocation, exercises and the associated messages should be provocative. I do not believe USKF exercises in recent years were provocative, but I cannot to speak to how our adversaries may have perceived them.

44. In your opinion, has the suspension or scaling back of exercises in recent years negatively impacted the readiness of U.S. or ROK forces?

I do not have complete visibility on how the suspension or scaling back of exercises may have impacted the U.S. and ROK forces. I am more familiar with U.S. forces given my current position, as the USARPAC Commander, and have used exercises in Korea to test and build readiness.

If confirmed, I will immediately and continuously assess the relationship between the exercise program and the maintenance of combat readiness. I will provide my best military advice to policy makers and look for every opportunity to sustain readiness and support diplomacy.

45. In your estimation, on balance, do military exercises that demonstrate readiness and interoperability between U.S. and ROK forces do more to deter North Korean aggression than they do to provoke it?

Exercises can both deter and provoke. The current environment will dictate how exercises are perceived, as either a deterrent or a provocation.

If confirmed, I will consult with both the ROK partners, Commander USINDOPACOM, and U.S. interagency partners to determine the appropriate scope and scale of an exercise designed to provide trade space to support the diplomatic goals.

46. What is your assessment of the adequacy of training opportunities for U.S. forces in the ROK, including the availability and access to training ranges for large ground unit maneuver and fires, close air support, and other training requirements?

I do not have sufficient visibility to make a complete assessment of the adequacy of joint training opportunities, the availability, and access to training ranges. Despite being among the best training areas in Asia, challenges stemming from Korea's significantly increased population and urbanization do exist. In my current position, I have supported 8th Army sending AH64 crews to the United States to complete live fire qualification, training formerly accomplished on the Korean Peninsula that can no longer be executed due to civilian obstruction of range access.

Existing military and civil-military channels are addressing these challenges. If confirmed, I will continue to assess these challenges and seek a mix of engagement, innovation, and investments in future training opportunities aligned with force relocation and urbanization trends as a means of ensuring range-related issues do not compromise readiness.

47. What opportunities do you see that could improve that access?

If confirmed, the best opportunities come from a whole of government approach in combination with our ROK partners and regularly scheduled diplomatic and military consultative venues associated with my position.

It is critical that we leverage other engagements between ROK and U.S. leaders. For example, individual meetings between policy makers, Congressional Delegations, and routine visits to the Republic of Korea made by U.S. government officials all provide an opportunity to communicate the pressing need to develop a solution to these readiness challenges.

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that Senior U.S. leaders are well informed concerning the readiness challenges USFK faces due to the lack of access and that a consistent message is being delivered by members of my staff that complement the efforts made in these engagements. The training areas required for U.S. forces assigned to the Korean Peninsula to increase their levels of readiness currently exist. A coordinated U.S. government approach that provides a consistent message can effectively encourage our Korean partners to ensure reliable access to training areas, live-fire ranges, and air-space.

Tour Length

48. In light of the security threat posed by North Korea, do you believe the Department should continue to encourage accompanied tours in South Korea?

The United States Forces Korea and the Department must continually assess the risk but should heavily weigh the decision in favor of accompanied tours. Accompanied tours come with a risk to the families but also an enduring strategic benefit. There is a risk to mission when increasing the number of personnel that may require movement in any future potential noncombatant evacuation and the risk to force with families who are within range of the threat posed by North Korea. However, this risk must be considered against the benefit of a command sponsored 24-36 month accompanied tour. Accompanied tours promote continuity, heighten levels of experience and proficiency, increase overall mission readiness, provide stability, convey commitment to the Republic of Korea, and provide family stability. Any decision to suspend command sponsored tours creates a risk of greater speculation regarding the likelihood of military operations and potential premature signaling to other groups that they should depart the Republic of Korea.

49. In your view, what would be the positive and negative impacts of adopting shorter, unaccompanied tours for military personnel in South Korea?

The primary positive impact of adopting shorter, unaccompanied tours would be seen in the cost savings resulting from the decreased infrastructure and personnel costs required to support dependents. This would include family housing, schools, Child Development Centers, and medical facilities. However, these cost savings would be partially offset by the greater need for additional unaccompanied quarters and barracks.

Adopting shorter, unaccompanied tours for military personnel would have several negative impacts. The high turnover rate would decrease readiness, increase PERSTEMPO for the entire force, and create additional instability for Service Members and their Families. Shorter tours would also negatively affect continuity and leader understanding of the North Korean threat and decrease our ability to develop the warfighting skills that are unique to the Korean theater.

If confirmed, I will remain committed to providing the best possible quality of life and safety for our Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, Airmen, and Guardians, their Families, and our

Civilians as they serve our nation stationed in South Korea. When it comes to strengthening our Alliances, there is no better commitment to our Alliance than a reassuring presence.

Quality of Life Issues

50. What is your assessment of housing available to both command and non-command sponsored family members in South Korea?

I currently do not have the requisite visibility on the housing available to both command and non-command sponsored Family Members in South Korea. However, if confirmed, I will review and assess the adequacy and availability of housing available for both command and non-command sponsored families both on and off post. Similarly, I will assess the on and off post housing. I want to understand both the adequacy of the inventory as well as the condition of the on post facilities and any potential need for sustainment, restoration, and maintenance investments. If confirmed, issues that I can resolve at my level, I will. Issues that require assistance from my higher headquarters, will be raised for their awareness and assistance, this includes working with the host nation and ROK.

51. If confirmed, how would you assess the management and delivery of health care services in South Korea for both command and non-command sponsored family members?

I take the delivery of healthcare to our Service Members and Families very seriously and it is a top priority of mine. If confirmed, I intend to conduct a full assessment of health care delivery across the Korean Peninsula. The healthcare provided by our military healthcare system is intended to ensure a “Medically Ready Force,” a “Ready Medical Force,” and access to high-quality, safe healthcare for all beneficiaries. However, military healthcare overseas, to include in South Korea, is scaled and scoped to meet the needs of active duty service members and their pre-screened family members. Military medical leaders in South Korea monitor the state of the healthcare system through contact with beneficiaries and unit leadership, measuring trends and metrics to ensure proper utilization of resources, and taking appropriate action to address concerns and improve our system. Active duty service members and their pre-screened family members in South Korea have access to the entire spectrum of healthcare services through Department of Defense Clinics, Department of Defense Hospitals, and the TRICARE Network. Healthcare for other TRICARE beneficiaries, including non-command sponsored family members, may be available in Department of Defense military medical treatment facilities on a space available basis if the facility has the type of care needed; however, these beneficiaries still have access to civilian host national healthcare using TRICARE benefits. TRICARE manages a network of Korean Host Nation Hospitals, Physicians, and other providers and actively assesses quality, safety, and customer service. Many TRICARE Network Hospitals have established liaison services in their facilities specifically designed to assist our beneficiaries. If confirmed, and pending the

outcome of my assessment, I will require quarterly updates from Component Commands and medical leaders on the trends, metrics, and actions taken to improve the delivery of healthcare to all beneficiaries.

Sexual Assault

The Department of Defense has developed comprehensive policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and response to incidents of sexual assaults, including providing appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault.

52. What is your view of the steps taken to prevent and respond to sexual assaults in USFK, including assaults by and against U.S. civilian and contractor personnel?

If confirmed, I will conduct an assessment and review the efficacy of United States Forces Korea's current prevention and response policies, measures, and procedures as they relate to assaults by or against our Service Members, Civilian Population, Families, and Contractors. I look to build upon the best practices of GEN Abrams for prevention and response.

53. What is your view of the adequacy of USFK policies and procedures to protect victims of sexual assault from retaliation for reporting the assault?

If confirmed, I will review United States Forces Korea's policies and procedures to protect victims of sexual assault from retaliation and will provide leadership emphasis to reinforce them during my command. While I have visibility of 8th Army's policies and procedures, I need to increase my understanding of the joint policies and procedures. Commanders have the tools necessary to take appropriate action to ensure that Service Members, family members, and civilians can report sexual assaults without fearing retaliation or other negative repercussions. I also believe that Service Members report when they have trust in their command. Compliance with the Department of Defense's strategy to track all retaliation allegations and their outcomes is essential as well. This data provides Commanders with key facts to emphasize and enforce the laws prohibiting retaliation, specifically the prohibition of retaliation against Service Members for reporting sexual assaults. I expect commanders to create a culture intolerant of retaliation and to earn and maintain the trust of our Service Members. Setting the right unit climate not only encourages the reporting of any crime or misconduct, but also eradicates retaliation. This combination is a crucial component of the effective elimination of sexual assault in the military.

54. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources in place in USFK to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?

I currently do not have the requisite visibility on USFK's training and resourcing of sexual assault response systems. However, if confirmed, I will immediately conduct an assessment of the adequacy of the training and resources required to properly investigate

and respond to allegations of sexual assault. I understand that all services have established guidelines to enable a 24/7 sexual assault response capability for victims at all locations. This is as a good start and, if confirmed, I will continue to ensure sufficient training and resources exist to support victims and investigators at all installations in Korea.

55. What is your view of the willingness and ability of military leaders to hold service members accountable for sexual misconduct?

If confirmed, I will be a General Court Martial Convening Authority (GCMCA), and I have served as a GCMCA for nearly 6 years of my military career. In this capacity, I have personally been both willing and able to hold Service Members accountable for sexual misconduct based on the facts of the individual case, and I have personally observed other commanders being both willing and able. If confirmed, I will continue to do so and will lead by example in this area with other military leaders. Further, I will establish clear policies and procedures for leaders at all levels to take action to prevent sexual assault, protect and support victims, and ensure a safe and healthy environment for those in their charge.

56. What is your understanding of the adequacy of the resources and programs in USFK to provide victims of sexual assault the medical, psychological, and legal help they need?

I currently do not have the requisite visibility on the adequacy of USFK's medical, psychological, and legal resources for sexual assault victims. In my current capacity, I have not received a demand signal from 8th Army for any additional resources. However, if confirmed, I am committed to reviewing the adequacy of all resources and programs for the joint force to support and assist victims in United States Forces, including Korea medical, psychological and legal resources. Without access to these resources, we cannot effectively assist victims on the path to surviving and ultimately thriving. If confirmed, I will make ensuring the adequacy of these resources and programs a priority.

57. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in providing necessary support to the victims of sexual assault?

The chain of command is critical to providing support to victims of sexual assault. The Army's Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) program is the Commander's program. Providing necessary support starts with building and maintaining trust within our formations. When trust exists, victims are more likely to report and receive all necessary support in a timely manner. Proactive and positively engaged commanders are vital to this process. Commanders must embrace their role and the associated responsibilities for the SHARP program. If confirmed, I will hold leaders and commanders accountable to set and foster the proper climate and fulfill their responsibilities for the SHARP program. Anything less will not be tolerated.

58. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults have occurred?

Commanders are responsible and accountable for maintaining a positive command climate where sexual assaults and sexual harassment are not tolerated. The Army's Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention program is the Commander's program and the commander must establish the right command climate, publish a policy on sexual harassment and sexual assault, and enforce training standards on awareness, prevention, and response. Commanders must also ensure that sufficient resources exist to implement this program fully. If confirmed, I will set command-wide expectations to establish and maintain a military culture grounded in our Department's core values, demand that subordinate leaders set the example, and proactively engage units to resolving command climate issues. Commanders will be held accountable for their units' actions or inactions.

To maintain trust with victims, we must continue to offer services and recognize their continued need for support even if a trial results in an acquittal. The results of a trial or length of the sentence does not erase their harm. Commanders must change how they view, care for and continue to treat victims to drive the necessary change in the military culture.

59. What is your assessment of the potential impact, if any, of proposals to remove disposition authority from military commanders over felony-level violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, including sexual assault?

I support the role which allows commanders the maximum amount of authority to provide a safe and secure environment and provide good order and discipline. I think commanders need this authority given our unique mission to fight and win the nations wars. Commanders must use this authority and all available tools appropriately. I agree that this approach has not always worked. In order to maintain our current role and authority, commanders must do better training subordinate commanders to have an appropriate judicial temperament. I also agree with Secretary Austin and Chairman Milley that that we must be open to any proven recommendations for change that will allow a victim of sexual assault to go from victim to survivor and ultimately thrive. I understand Secretary Austin directed an Independent Review Commission (IRC) and the results have not yet been published. I have not seen any data that analyzes the potential second and third order effects of removing disposition authority from the command for felony level violations but I would be open to seeing the results of this IRC, any available data, and updating my recommendation on this issue.

60. Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on restricted reporting, to be effective?

Restricted reporting allows victim care and privacy to be a top priority and enables the Department to better understand the scope of this scourge in our formations. Victims can report with confidentiality and receive needed medical and support services. I understand

that confidentiality is an important to some victims, and as such, I support maintaining a restricted reporting option. One challenge of restricted reporting, though, is that it limits the command's ability to take appropriate action to hold the perpetrator accountable and protect the formation from an offender. While we must maintain a restricted reporting option, I believe that it is equally important that Commanders establish and maintain a climate of trust where victims are comfortable in reporting their sexual assault in a way that enables their perpetrator to face appropriate accountability, but also enables the victim to report without fear of retaliation and provides them full access to the necessary support and services.

61. If confirmed, what actions will you take to reassess current policies, procedures, and programs and to ensure senior level direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond to sexual assaults in USFK?

The Sexual Harassment/Assault Response & Prevention (SHARP) is the Commander's program. If confirmed, I will review, assess, and take ownership of United States Forces Korea's policies, procedures, and programs with an emphasis on prevention to ensure they meet the needs for all Service Members, families, and civilians. I will also institute the same biannual Sexual Harassment/Assault Response & Prevention Review & Oversight Committee (SHARP ROC) meeting that I have implemented in both my current command as well as in my previous Command. In the SHARP ROC, all subordinate commanders brief their program, metrics, and friction points which enable me to provide direction and oversight. I will also leverage SHARP personnel to further my understanding and inform the direction and oversight I provide. I look forward to any additional recommendations from the current review and sharing best practices within the command.

62. What methods for monitoring overall trends and gauging the sufficiency of component commanders' efforts in preventing and responding to incidents of sexual assault do you consider appropriate and intend to implement as USFK Commander?

If confirmed, I will establish a culture where all subordinate commanders understand the importance of immediate reporting to enable shared understanding of the scope and severity of any issues and trends. Accurate timely reporting leads to better and more timely services for victims as well as better investigations. Furthermore, I will leverage SHARP personnel and other professionals (i.e. Equal Opportunity, IG, etc.) to provide me information on prevention and response issues and trends. I will be open to recommendations from subordinate commanders and experts across the command on how to improve data collection and monitor trends with an eye towards effectively preventing and responding to incidents of sexual assault.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

63. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes

64. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records (including documents and electronic communications), and other information as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes

65. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes

66. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes

67. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes

68. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual

Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes

69. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes