Department of Defense Reforms

Previously, you have answered this Committee’s policy questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. You indicated that you did not see a need to modify the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of these reforms changed since you testified before the Committee at your last confirmation hearing?

Yes. The reforms enacted last year by Congress as a result of the review of Goldwater-Nichols were positive, but I do have recommendations that, at a minimum, memorialize internal initiatives such as our work on Global Integration of the Joint Force. Additionally, we are conducting a full assessment of the Joint Professional Military Education continuum. I plan to establish a commission to review the current model and identify key road blocks to assist in designing a more effective model for the challenges we face today.

In light of your experience as Chairman, do you see any need for modifications to Goldwater-Nichols? If so, what modifications do you believe would be appropriate?

Yes. We are currently assessing our joint force development model against the skills and attributes that we feel will be needed in future operating environments. Part of this effort will include a review of joint professional military education and changes to the joint officer qualification process. As we complete our assessment we will work with the committee with any required legislative changes.

Duties

Based on your experience during your tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, what recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties and functions set forth in sections 152 through 155 of title 10, United States Code, and in regulations of the Department of Defense, that pertain to the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the organization and operation of the Joint Staff in general?

I recommend Congress adopt the Senate's FY 17 NDAA proposed change to section 113. The change would allow the Secretary of Defense to delegate to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff limited authority for the worldwide reallocation of a limited number of military assets. Any reallocation would be on a short-term basis and be consistent with the Secretary’s policy guidance and the national defense strategy. The proposed change would allow the Chairman to better assist the Secretary with the global integration of military capabilities to effectively address transregional, multi-functional, and multi-domain threats.

Major Challenges and Priorities

What do you consider to be the most significant challenges you expect to face if you are
confirmed again?

In today’s extraordinarily dynamic and complex world, the United States faces simultaneous challenges from Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and violent extremist organizations. We have made significant progress against ISIS in Iraq and Syria but much work remains to be done. We are also in the midst of a critical transition in Afghanistan. While dealing with these pressing challenges, we are faced with the need to modernize the Joint Force. Over the last decade, sustained operational commitments, budgetary instability, and advances by our adversaries have threatened our ability to project power and resulted in our loss of advantage in key warfighting areas.

If confirmed again, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

If reconfirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Secretary of Defense and combatant commanders to improve global integration and to ensure the right balance between today’s operational requirements and making the investments necessary for tomorrow.

Recognizing that challenges, anticipated and unforeseen, will drive your priorities to a substantial degree, if confirmed again, what other priorities, beyond those associated with the major challenges you identified above, would you set for your second term as Chairman?

My priority will be ensuring that the Joint Force maintains the strength, agility, and resilience required to fight and prevail against any potential adversary. To that end, I will focus on developing and advancing the capabilities, posture, operating concepts, and human capital necessary to assure allies and partners, deter adversaries, compete on a day-to-day basis, and respond across the spectrum of conflict. Particular areas of concern are our cyber and space capabilities, modernization of the nuclear enterprise, and ensuring our ability to project power across all domains, when and where needed.

Advice of the Service Chiefs, Combatant Commanders, and Chief of the National Guard Bureau

Section 163 of title 10, United States Code, provides that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the conduit for transmitting communications from the Combatant Commanders, especially on the operational requirements of their commands. Section 151 of title 10 provides for the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit their advice or opinion, in disagreement with or in addition to the advice or opinion of the Chairman, and requires the Chairman to provide that advice at the same time that he presents his own advice to the President, National Security Council, or Secretary of Defense.

Based upon your experience and observations in your first term as Chairman, what changes to section 151 or 163, if any, do you believe may be necessary to ensure that the views of the individual Service Chiefs, Combatant Commanders, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau are presented and considered?

I do not believe we need to make changes to sections 151 and 163 of Title 10 at this time. I communicate regularly and meet personally with Service Chiefs, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and Combatant Commanders to capture all sides of an issue when crafting military advice to civilian leaders.
U.S. Military Force Sufficiency

The United States will likely never have the resources to assign all the forces each Combatant Commander believes they need, which leads the Department of Defense to apportion forces in operations planning. As U.S. military forces are already severely challenged in terms of capacity, there are consequences when it comes time to allocate them for a given contingency.

If we remain a global power, does our niche remain our global power projection capabilities?

By definition, a global power must be able to promptly and decisively project military power. In fact, we identify this ability as the Joint Force’s operational center of gravity in the National Military Strategy.

Do you believe the United States must retain the capability to strike any global target (hold any target at risk), both in the nuclear and conventional sense, and use it if our strategic vital interests are threatened?

Yes, the United States must maintain a credible ability to hold any target in the world at risk and be willing to strike decisively if our strategic vital interests are threatened.

In your opinion, does power projection include our ability to deploy and sustain forces anywhere on the planet, across the full range of military operations? Do you believe this is a unique characteristic of U.S. war planning?

Power projection is just that, the ability to deploy and sustain forces to meet the full range of military operations. The Joint Force must be capable of global power projection, given our broad obligations and global network of allies and partners.

Do you believe we must also have a sufficient strategic and operational reserve, national mobilization capability, and robust defense industrial base to provide a second echelon of follow-on forces if a contingency arises in a particular region, especially against a near peer, great power state?

Yes. Any conflict with a near-peer competitor will require follow-on forces. In a major contingency, our formations will almost certainly face battlefield attrition. To sustain a fight and see it through to conclusion on favorable terms, we will have to have additional forces available to maintain the initiative. This will assuredly draw on our strategic and operational reserves, test our national mobilization capability, and place demands on our defense industrial base as spare parts, end items, and critical munitions are consumed or destroyed.

In light of current and future threats to the United States’ strategic vital interests, what do you believe should be the U.S. military’s posture and capacity to address these threats?

Today’s Joint Force must be able to assure, deter, compete and respond to challenges ranging in scope, threat, and geography, in all domains. To enable this, we ensure our forces are postured to maintain readiness, flexibility, access, and capability at the right time and place.
U.S. Military Capability Dominance

The Committee has received sobering briefings on the status of the United States’ military technological lead over potential adversaries that have “gone to school” on the way our military has conducted warfare over the past quarter century, and are rapidly closing the gap in various capability areas where we previously enjoyed a large overmatch.

In your view, what are the top operational challenges our warfighting commanders are facing currently, and will face in the future?

Our Commanders are challenged across the full spectrum of Joint Force capabilities by multiple adversaries who have enjoyed the time and space to study, plan for, and resource counter-capabilities in every domain. Our adversaries are actively competing with us below the level of armed conflict in order to counter our historic conventional advantages. Additionally, our technological overmatch is decreasing as near-peer adversaries increase their capability and capacity. The Joint Force's ability to project power during an "away game" and sustain operations during conflict is, and will continue to be, threatened by our adversaries’ capability and capacity in ballistic and cruise missile technology, electronic warfare, space, and cyberspace. These elements, coupled with their ability to target our integrated air and missile defenses, will force Commanders to preposition assets earlier or move logistics operations further and further away from the most effective locations, leading to increased risk to the Joint Force.

What is your assessment of the capability and capacity of our current and planned military forces to achieve success with respect to these operational challenges?

Our Joint Force is the most professional and capable military force in the world and can defeat any adversary, destroy violent extremist organizations, and defend our nation's shores. The ability of the Joint Force to compete below the level of armed conflict and respond to multiple, simultaneous contingencies has become more challenging. While we have identified areas in which we have limited capacity, the larger issues are that our technological overmatch is eroding and our adversaries' speed in narrowing capability gaps is accelerating; increasing capacity alone will not reverse these issues. Sustained innovation and capability advances are required to maintain our overmatch against many potential adversaries.

Do you believe our military is shaped properly to achieve success with respect to these challenges with respect to the optimal size and mix of long-range versus short-range, stand-off versus stand-in, and manned versus unmanned capabilities?

At present, the Joint Force is shaped appropriately to achieve success against our adversaries. However, U.S. overmatch in global power projection and our current precision, long-range, stand-off, and manned capabilities have diminished as our adversaries' Anti-Access and Area Denial capabilities have increased. Aging logistics infrastructure (i.e. roads, rails, ports, bases), along with an increasingly brittle defense industrial base have long-term consequences that limit our ability to sustain a protracted or simultaneous conflict. We must continue to make adjustments and adapt the force to remain competitive.
**Budget Control Act**

How would our Armed Forces be affected if Congress fails to repeal the budget caps in the 2011 Budget Control Act?

BCA funding levels are insufficient for the Joint Force to accomplish assigned missions. If the funding trends created by BCA continue, the Joint Force will see continued erosion in the size and capability of the force.

How would our Armed Forces be affected if Congress does not conform to the budget caps of the 2011 Budget Control Act and sequestration is triggered?

The effects of sequestration would be disastrous for the Joint Force, as the required cuts are applied indiscriminately across the budget. In addition, since BCA level funding does not provide enough money to sustain the current Joint Force, the Joint Force’s competitive advantage against potential adversaries will continue to erode.

How would our Armed Forces be affected if Congress passes a continuing resolution, instead of a Fiscal Year 2018 appropriation bill?

If DoD had to operate under a year-long Continuing Resolution (CR) in FY18, the base level funding would match FY17 levels ($524B), in effect nearly matching Budget Control Act levels ($523B for FY18). This level of funding is not sufficient to maintain the current Joint Force. In addition to the impacts of inadequate funding, a CR would impose further restrictions on the Joint Force, including delaying critical new start programs and production increases, and cancelling major training events.

**Middle East / Strategy to Defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)**

How do you define the “defeat” of ISIS?

We will consider ISIS defeated when the threat of external operations is extinguished, the group is controllable through local law enforcement and national security forces, and they no longer control territory.

In what ways does the U.S. strategy to defeat ISIS take into account the Syrian regime, Iranian-backed forces, and Russia?

As the Defeat ISIS campaign progresses, we find ourselves converging with the Syrian Regime and the pro-Regime, Iranian-backed, and Russian forces supporting them. Our military mission in Syria remains the defeat of ISIS. We have developed deconfliction procedures with the Russian military forces, who then communicate with and can influence the Regime and pro-Regime forces.

Apart from the counter-ISIS campaign, what are U.S. objectives in Syria with respect to the civil war and regional security?

The U.S. Government has a number of objectives in Syria beyond the defeat of ISIS. The civil
war must be de-escalated and the humanitarian crisis addressed. We are supporting the U.S. interagency towards these objectives. Additionally, we are focused on helping our regional partners and allies secure their borders to ensure regional stability. Finally, we support the U.S. Government efforts to seek a political transition in Syria that will allow the Syrian people to select their own leadership. I can provide more specific details on our objectives in a closed door setting.

**Do you believe the military should have a role in increasing pressure on the Assad regime with the goal of bringing about a political solution in Syria? If so, what are the benefits and risks of such an approach?**

The military’s assigned objective in Syria remains the defeat of ISIS. We have partnered with and support local forces to achieve this objective. We support the U.S. Government’s diplomatic efforts to resolve the political situation in Syria.

**Do you believe that the United States and Russia have the same objectives in Syria?**

Russia has worked to de-escalate the civil war through the Astana process with Turkey and Iran. However, U.S. and Russian interests diverge in the military and financial support the Russians provide to the Assad Regime in order to prevent a Western-led regime change, support to other elements fighting on behalf of the Syrian Government, and active targeting of Syrian opposition groups, to include groups supported by the U.S., in order to weaken credible opposition to the Assad Regime.

**Iraq**

The Iraqi Security Forces, with significant enabling support by U.S. and coalition forces, have made great progress over the past year in liberating territory controlled by ISIS. However, significant questions about the presence and role of U.S. troops remain.

**What do you envision the roles and missions of U.S. forces in Iraq will need to be in the short, medium, and long term in order to prevent the resurgence of ISIS and emergence of other destabilizing groups?**

In the short and medium term, I envision the primary roles and missions of U.S. forces will remain the same: training, advising, and assisting the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to militarily defeat ISIS. Securing liberated areas in order to facilitate the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) is critical to our strategic success. In the long-term, U.S. forces will continue to build Iraqi Security Forces capacity, specifically the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) and Iraqi Army, so that they are the security force of choice in Iraq able to defend against both internal and external threats.

**What is the appropriate size and composition of an enduring U.S. presence in Iraq given these roles and missions?**

We are developing the details of our enduring presence in conjunction with the Government of Iraq.
How does U.S. strategy seek to mitigate Iranian malign influence in Iraq?

A strong bilateral relationship between the United States and Iraq is one of our best tools to mitigate Iranian malign influence in Iraq. This is a whole-of-government effort and clearly goes beyond just security cooperation. Another critical component to mitigating Iranian influence is Iraq’s reintegration in the region, highlighted most recently by diplomatic and economic initiatives between Iraq and Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

Afghanistan

On August 21, 2017, President Trump delivered a speech announcing a new U.S. strategy for the conflict in Afghanistan, including a transition from “a time-based approach to one based on conditions.”

What is your understanding of the new strategy’s objectives? How will we measure progress towards accomplishing those objectives?

The new strategy applies multi-faceted pressure on the Taliban to incentivize them to participate in a peace process that brings about political resolution of the conflict. Near-term, the strategy has the objectives of enabling the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) to be able to conduct increased offensive operations and secure more of the population from Taliban influence and control. The strategic objectives also envision more effective Afghan counter-corruption actions, reduction in Pakistani safe havens, and successful Afghan elections in 2018 and 2019. Indicators of progress longer-term include a decline in violence in Afghanistan, and the Taliban participation in peace talks.

What are the key military dimensions of this strategy, and how do they differ from previous efforts?

The new strategy removes restrictions on military authorities and force levels in order to reinforce our relationship with Afghan forces in support of a peace process. Specifically, we’re shifting from a timeline to a condition-based approach, and we are adjusting our authorities to increase the effectives of our train, advise, and assist efforts with the Afghan forces. Key military aspects of our new strategy that differ from previous efforts are the initiatives to enhance Afghan enablers such as the capabilities of the Afghan Air Force and Afghan Special Services Forces and broadening our train, advise and assist efforts.

What is your understanding of the main pillars of the strategy with regard to other countries in the region, in particular Pakistan, India, China, Russia, and Iran?

The new strategy includes building broad consensus for a stable Afghanistan, de-escalating tensions between regional states, and emphasizing regional integration and cooperation. It is critical that Pakistan and other neighboring countries support the legitimate Afghan Government, the United States and NATO missions, and take positive steps to fight terrorism and achieve stability in the region. The strategy places especial emphasis on influencing Pakistan to change its policies which are detrimental to US, NATO, Afghan, and even Pakistan's own interests.
With regard to India, the President called on India to invest more in development projects in Afghanistan. India appears eager to do more beyond the roughly $3 billion in development assistance it has provided since 2001. From the military dimension, I believe India has the capacity to provide additional training and equipment to build capacity of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces.

China has invested significantly in western Afghanistan, particularly in mining infrastructure to support their One Belt One Road initiative; however their security investments have thus far been minimal. Under the new strategy, we look to increase Chinese investment in areas that support the legitimate Afghan government.

With regard to Russia, our interests diverge on many issues, yet we share common interests such as countering transnational terrorism and stabilizing Afghanistan. Under the new strategy, our efforts will look to advance our mutual interests in ways that do not cede diplomatic space or allow Russia to adversely affect our efforts to stabilize Afghanistan.

With regard to Iran, the new strategy seeks to counterbalance Iranian influence in Afghanistan while continuing engagement in regional forums and encouraging Iran to support the Afghan Government and overall stability in Afghanistan.

**What is your understanding of the integration of the non-military aspects of this strategy?**

This strategy was developed with the support of the interagency. The strategy represents a whole-of-government consensus that our ultimate goal in Afghanistan is a sound political order, enabled by a peace process that includes the Taliban. Reaching this goal will require the full integration of different U.S. levers of influence, including military, diplomatic, and economic.

**Do you commit to briefing the strategy, as well as periodic updates on progress being made, to the Committee?**

Yes.

Much has been made of the potential increase in U.S. troops in Afghanistan to accompany the new strategy. At the same time, however, numerous diplomatic positions remain unfilled.

In your view, what are the ramifications to our mission in Afghanistan of allowing State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development efforts to be under-manned and under-resourced? Do you believe that the diplomatic and development missions in Afghanistan are under-resourced?

Under-resourcing State Department and USAID efforts in Afghanistan would undermine our overall strategy. State and USAID are critical components to supporting the Government of Afghanistan efforts to establish a stable political order and pursue reconciliation with the Taliban.

I cannot speak for other agencies and defer to State and USAID to provide an assessment of their respective resources and missions.
How do you assess high profile terrorist attacks in Kabul by the Taliban and similar attacks by ISIS elsewhere in the country? Do they signal that these organizations are increasing in strength? What is your plan for reducing or eliminating these terrorist attacks? Will that effort be bolstered by the new strategy announced by the President?

While counterterrorism pressure has impacted the Taliban and eroded some of ISIS-Khorasan's safe havens, both groups continue to maintain the capability to conduct high-profile attacks, allowing them to garner media attention, foster the perception of insecurity, and undercut the legitimacy of the Afghan Government. Such attacks demonstrate the groups’ ability to adapt. The new strategy will address these attacks by enabling the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) to be able to conduct increased offensive operations and secure more of the population from Taliban influence and control.

In your view, what should be the role of the United States in any reconciliation negotiations with the Afghan Taliban and other insurgent groups?

Our role is to help facilitate the peace process and a political resolution of the conflict. The USG supports an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned peace process, and continues to work with the Afghan Government and regional nations to bring about political reconciliation in Afghanistan.

What additional steps, if any, should the United States take to advance the reconciliation process?

We should strongly signal publicly and privately our resolve and that the only solution to the conflict is through a political settlement. The United States continues to support an Afghan-led political process to determine the future of their country, and continues to support the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) through train, advise, and assist missions in order to enable stability and set conditions for a political solution to end the conflict. We need to continue to reinforce to the Taliban and regional nations that we are in Afghanistan for the long-term, as our new strategy reaffirms, and that reconciliation is the only viable way forward.

What is your assessment of the Taliban’s willingness to engage in reconciliation talks? Is that a realistic goal for the political process in Afghanistan?

The Taliban wants to be recognized as a legitimate and independent political actor in Afghanistan, and may be willing to engage in reconciliation talks when they are convinced they cannot succeed by pursuing their political objectives with violence.

Iran

In your view, what is the nature of the threat posed by Iran?

Iran seeks to reduce U.S. influence and become the dominant regional power in the Middle East. Iran tries to achieve its regional objectives by projecting power using proxy forces, supporting Shi'a movements, and promoting pro-Iranian elements throughout the region. Additionally, Iran attempts to deter U.S. action by developing conventional weapons, including advanced missile systems and a more capable naval presence, could be used to threaten the Arabian Gulf region and Strait of
Hormuz in the event of conflict.

**What is the role of our Armed Forces in countering Iran’s proxy networks specifically, and Iran’s malign influence more broadly, throughout the Middle East?**

The role of our Armed Forces in countering Iran's malign influence throughout the Middle East is to support diplomacy, assure key allies and regional partners, and to build partners' capabilities so they can defend themselves against Iranian destabilizing activities. Throughout the broader Middle East, the U.S. Armed Forces maintain the plans, posture, and preparations to assure our partners and respond to Iranian activities and/or those of its proxy network that threaten the interests of the United States.

**In your view, is Iran complying with its obligations under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)?**

The briefings I have received indicate that Iran is adhering to its JCPOA obligations.

**Do you believe that the JCPOA has decreased the nuclear threat from Iran?**

Yes, the JCPOA has delayed Iran’s development of nuclear weapons.

**Since the signing of the JCPOA, do you believe there has been any change in Iran’s malign activities?**

No, Iran has not changed its malign activity in the region since JCPOA was signed.

**Yemen**

The war in Yemen is a complex conflict involving different Yemeni factions backed by the Gulf States and Iran, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and other actors.

**What are U.S. interests in Yemen and what role do U.S. forces play in safeguarding those interests?**

U.S. interests in Yemen include defense against attacks on the homeland and U.S. citizens from terrorist and violent extremist organizations, maintaining freedom of navigation through the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb, and promoting greater regional stability. Our military forces support our Gulf partners and the international community in their drive to deny safe havens for terrorists and restore security in Yemen, complementing the broader U.S. Government effort.

**Do you believe a political resolution to the situation in Yemen is necessary and, if so, what needs to occur for such a resolution to be achieved?**

Yes, in order to achieve lasting progress against the threats to U.S. interests and effectively address the humanitarian situation in Yemen, a stable government must be established through political negotiations. We continue to work with our regional partners to reduce ungoverned spaces and deny safe haven to terrorists. U.S. forces continue to work to maintain pressure on Al-Qa’eda in the Arabian
Peninsula and the Islamic State in Yemen, to contain threats to freedom of navigation in the Bab Al-Mandab, and to influence all parties to engage in good faith negotiations for a political resolution.

**What is the nature of U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition and what is being done to help the coalition minimize civilian casualties and suffering as a result of the conflict?**

The U.S. supports the Saudi-led coalition through limited support to operations including aerial refueling, intelligence sharing, and operational advising, as well as sales of military hardware and institutional advice and assistance. The U.S. continues to provide training and advice on targeting processes and law of armed conflict compliance to the Saudi Air Forces in order to minimize civilian casualties.

**Russia and Europe**

At your prior nomination hearing, you were asked what you considered the greatest threat to our national security. You said, “My assessment today, Senator, is that Russia presents the greatest threat to our national security.”

Do you still agree with your prior assessment that Russia is the “greatest threat to our national security”?

As a military, we do not have the luxury of focusing on only one challenge. However, today Russia does present the greatest array of military challenges and remains the only potential existential threat to the United States. They continue to invest in a full-range of capabilities designed to limit our ability to project power into Europe and meet our alliance commitments to NATO. These capabilities include long-range conventional strike, cyber, space, electronic warfare, ground force and undersea capabilities. Russia is also modernizing all elements of its nuclear triad. These modernization efforts must also be viewed in the context of their activities in the Ukraine, Crimea, and Syria. Russia’s operations, capability development, and asymmetric doctrinal and strategic approaches are designed to counter NATO and U.S. power projection capability, and undermine the credibility of the NATO alliance.

If so, why in your view is Russia the greatest threat compared to China, North Korea, Iran, and ISIS?

What currently makes Russia a more formidable threat is its nuclear capability, cyber capabilities, propensity to demonstrate aggressive behavior, and its willingness to employ military force. While North Korea, Iran, and ISIS pose regional as well as global threats, and clearly demonstrate malign influence, none of these pose an existential threat to our Nation. Russia and China are in a different category. They continue to invest in a full-range of modern capabilities, and are capable of engaging the U.S. across the full spectrum of nuclear and conventional conflict.

**How do we deter Russian aggression and defend the NATO alliance?**

The U.S. calculus for deterring Russian aggression entails appropriately postured and capable nuclear and conventional forces, building allied and partner capacity, and an effective whole-of-
government approach to deal with destabilizing activities beneath the level of armed conflict. The United States’ steadfast commitment to Article 5 and our readiness to commit U.S. forces to defend an ally that has been attacked serves as the greatest deterrent to Russian aggression against the Alliance.

**Russia Deterrence Concept**

During your prior nomination hearing, you said, “We frankly need an effective deterrent model for the 21st century to deal with the kind of threats that we are now seeing in Russia because, quite frankly, I think that kind of asymmetric threat is one we will continue to see in the future and certainly we are going to continue to see that in the European context.”

Do you still agree with your prior assessment on the need to “update our deterrence and response model to deal with the kind of threat that we have today, which has been described as a hybrid threat from Russia”?

Yes.

**What has been done to update our deterrence and response model to deal with the Russian hybrid warfare and asymmetric threats?**

To deny the Russians the benefits of their malign activities and to impose costs for disruptive and destabilizing Russian behavior, we continue to enhance and refine our capability to compete beneath the level of armed conflict in the diplomatic, information, and economic realms. We have also enhanced our military capabilities for protecting U.S. interests, and our allies have done the same. Finally, we have also improved our forward posture and capacity to reinforce allies in the event of conflict.

In your view, what more needs to be done in this regard?

We continue to refine our strategy for countering Russian malign influence operations. Responding to hybrid warfare remains an inherently whole-of-government proposition. In conjunction with the interagency, we are building partner capacity while ensuring our allies are resourced and focused on the Russian hybrid threat. We must continue to improve our cyber and information operations capabilities.

**Russia’s Violation of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty**

Russia’s deployment of a nuclear ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) in violation of the 1987 INF Treaty: 1) potentially poses a risk to our NATO allies and U.S. forces in Europe; and 2) is part of a wider modernization of Russian sea, air, and ground-launched nuclear capable missiles. General Selva told the House Armed Services Committee on March 8, 2017, that “we believe that the Russians have deployed a land-based cruise missile that violates the spirit and intent of the [INF] Treaty…the system itself presents a risk to most of our facilities in Europe…I don’t have enough information on their intent to conclude other than that they do not intend to return to compliance….”
How should the United States address the military implications of this new nuclear ground-launched cruise missile?

We must continue to engage Russia, both directly and together with our allies to encourage them to return to full and verifiable compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty. The status quo, in which we are complying with the treaty and they are not, is untenable. The violating missile and launcher contribute to Russia’s broader set of nuclear and conventional strike capabilities that pose a threat to U.S. forces and our allies in the European and the Pacific Theaters. We will work with our allies and Congress to ensure we have the capabilities, both offensive and defensive, to ensure Russia does not gain a military advantage from violating the treaty.

Should we initiate a program to determine the need for strike systems comparable to the GLCM?

The Administration has been conducting an extensive policy review of Russia’s ongoing INF violation. This policy review will result in recommendations of an appropriate U.S. response, which will include potential military measures to increase pressure on Russia to return to full and verifiable compliance with its treaty obligations. We are working with the Administration to provide greater detail in the coming weeks on our strategy to respond to Russia’s INF violation.

Should we increase NATO’s defenses against these new ground-based cruise missiles, as well as Russia’s air and sea-launched cruise missiles? Do you believe NATO will accept such defenses? If so, please specifically describe systems being considered.

Russian investments and demonstrated cruise missile capability in the Syrian conflict highlight the need for the United States and NATO to increase defenses against the cruise missile threat. The U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) is examining all threats—North Korea, Iran, China, and Russia—and will address requirements to meet these threats. Based on the BMDR recommendations for regional missile defense, we will work with our NATO allies to determine the defenses required to address Russia's threat systems in Europe.

U.S. Force Posture in Europe

General Breedlove told the Committee in 2015 that, “our current force posture in Europe has been based on Russia as a strategic partner....” In 2016, General Scaparrotti’s written testimony stated, “the ground force permanently assigned to EUCOM is inadequate to meet the Combatant Command’s directed mission to deter Russia from further aggression.”

What changes have we made and should we make to our current military posture in Europe to adjust to the current threat reality?

Under the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), the Army has deployed a rotational Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) and a rotational Combat Aviation Brigade to Europe. Additionally, Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) enable the Army to quickly deploy additional heavy forces into a heavy division configuration poised to respond. The APS includes a Division HQ, a Fires Brigade, and an ABCT. Enablers such as Air Defense, Engineers, and Logistics will be added in coming years. EDI has also funded construction of facilities that improve the reception, staging, on-ward movement
and integration of follow on forces arriving in Europe.

We need to continue building the APS sets to allow the rapid deployment of a complete Army Division to Europe. This will also build needed support and enabling forces, including air defense units and long range precision fires. The APS build is scheduled through 2020. Finally, the infrastructure improvements need to continue as planned, expanding to include Navy and Air Force capabilities to allow a rapid buildup of forces in Europe in the event of a contingency deployment.

Will you revisit the European Infrastructure Consolidation (EIC) initiative that was developed prior to the resurgence of Russian adventurism to determine whether its implementation remains consistent with our efforts with the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) to bolster military capabilities and reassure our allies?

We continue to assess the strategic situation with our allies and regularly review plans and basing.

**Russian Activities Outside Europe**

What is your assessment of Putin’s objectives in North Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia?

Russia seeks to expand its influence and presence in North Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia, and is using operations in Syria to bolster its reputation as a reliable defense and counterterrorism partner. At the same time, it is posturing itself as an alternative to the U.S. as a regional powerbroker to counterbalance U.S. leadership and influence.

Are the Russians sincere about cooperating against ISIS in Syria?

Russia values our deconfliction procedures and shares a mutual objective of ensuring the safety of our respective forces operating in close proximity to one another.

**Ukraine Lethal Assistance**

Do you believe we should provide lethal assistance to Ukraine?

The U.S. Government is reviewing the policy for the provision of defensive weapons to Ukraine in light of continuing Russian aggression. From a military perspective, lethal assistance to Ukraine would enable Ukraine to better deter Russia and defend against the further loss of territory to Russian-led separatist forces.

**NATO**

Ahead of the NATO Defense Ministers meeting in February, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg said, “After many years with steep cuts in defense spending, we have turned a corner,” announcing that defense spending in real terms increased by 3.8% or about $10 billion in 2016 among our NATO allies, but qualifying it with, “This makes a difference but it is absolutely vital that we keep up the momentum.”
From your perspective, what are the other dimensions of burden sharing, besides the 2% of GDP defense spending, that are important to keep in mind when discussing defense contributions of our allies and partners?

A key component of burden sharing is contributing to operations, both NATO and non-NATO in and outside of Europe. Over the last 20 years, NATO allies and partners have served alongside with the United States in combat operations in Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and other locations. Their contributions continue today across the spectrum - military, economic, and humanitarian - and are essential to our success. Furthermore, our continuing access to allied and partner bases and facilities is a critical component of our ability to project power globally.

If Turkey purchases a Russian or Chinese air and missile defense system, how would that affect its ability to be integrated into NATO’s air and missile defense architecture?

Turkey's purchase of a Russian or Chinese air and missile defense system would cause significant integration challenges with NATO systems. Given NATO's existing infrastructure, current air defense architecture, and counterintelligence risks, integrating a Chinese or Russian system into NATO would be disruptive.

Asia and the Pacific

The Defense Department’s January 2012 strategic guidance, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century,” states, “while the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.” Likewise, the 2010 report of the Quadrennial Defense Review states that the United States needs to “sustain and strengthen our Asia-Pacific alliances and partnerships to advance mutual security interests and ensure sustainable peace and security in the region,” and that, to accomplish this, the Department “will augment and adapt our forward presence” in the Asia-Pacific region.

Would you recommend the current administration continue the rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region? If so, what does the term “rebalance” mean to you in terms of force structure, posture, basing, capabilities, and funding?

In a way that complements all other aspects of U.S. engagement (across the diplomatic, economic and information instruments), the Joint Force will continue to sustain and strengthen our approach toward the Asia-Pacific, reaffirm commitment to key bilateral relationships, and provide support to key multilateral institutions in the region. Posture adjustments include plans to home-port 60 percent of our naval and air assets in the Asia-Pacific by 2020; bolstering our ballistic missile defense posture throughout the region; realigning U.S. Marines to be more geographically distributed including Okinawa, Guam, Hawaii, and Australia; and positioning 70,000 soldiers in the region and maximizing presence through the U.S. Army’s Pacific Pathways initiative. Our initiatives in the Asia-Pacific also include posturing our most capable assets in the region, including: P-8A maritime patrol aircraft, Global Hawk UAVs and other advanced ISR systems, submarines, CV-22 Ospreys, B-2s and B-52s, F-22s, and F-35 Joint Strike fighters. Finally, our initiatives in the Asia-Pacific also enhance the capabilities of our allies and partners. For example, the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative
allots $425 million over five years to help key countries around the South China Sea build enhanced maritime security and domain awareness capabilities.

**How do you assess the strength and health of our military alliances in the region? Are they on solid footing or do we have reason to be concerned?**

Our five formal mutual defense treaty alliances in the region (Japan, Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand) provide the bedrock for our engagement and our ability to protect U.S. national interests across the region. The strength and health of our military alliances in the region remain on solid footing and provide the basis to manage short term friction.

**There are increasing calls from members of Congress for an Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative, similar to the European Deterrence Initiative. Would you recommend such an Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative?**

The Joint Staff supports efforts to improve and reinforce U.S. military capabilities across the Asia-Pacific and strengthen our alliances, build partner capacity, and interoperability with our partners.

**If so, what would be the objectives and priorities and how would you recommend the Department use the funding, if appropriated?**

If appropriated, the Joint Force will use funding in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act to invest in operationally relevant infrastructure, increase air and maritime assets available in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, improve resiliency, expand and diversify critical munitions, and enhance capabilities to improve and reinforce U.S. military capabilities across the region.

**North Korea**

The deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system to South Korea is a highly visible and concrete action to counter the North Korean missile threat.

**If deterrence fails with North Korea, can we respond decisively and win?**

Yes. While the fight would not be easy, I can assure you that the United States military, in coordination with our allies, is prepared to respond decisively and win should deterrence with North Korea fail.

**What other steps would you recommend we prepare to take to deter Kim Jong-Un and ensure the safety and security of South Korea and U.S. forces stationed in the region?**

We have also made significant progress in promoting trilateral military cooperation and information sharing with Japan and South Korea and we continue to support them in strengthening our interoperability and their defense capabilities against the North Korean nuclear and missile threat.

**Are you satisfied with the planned flow of forces into the Korean peninsula in support of our current operational plans?**
I am satisfied with the planned flow of forces in support of operational plans. We conduct periodic reviews to adjust for changes in the operating environment and available force structure. However, the scarcity of high demand, low density capabilities such as tactical aircraft, ISR, ballistic missile defense, and special operations forces would incur risk to other global operations.

**China**

**What military actions do you recommend to deter war with China, maintain free passage through the global commons, and assure our Pacific allies and friends?**

We have a range of military options to support diplomatic efforts to influence Chinese behavior. The Joint Force is postured in the Asia-Pacific to reinforce efforts to protect U.S. national interests and respond to crises. The Joint Force has recently modified its posture - including forward positioning advanced capabilities and reinforcing the military capabilities of our allies and partners - to enhance U.S. deterrence and assurance efforts in the Asia-Pacific. Militarily, the Joint Force will engage with the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) within congressionally mandated limits, build alliance capacity through close cooperation, and maintain international law through appropriate operations.

**From your perspective, what effect is China’s expanding economy and growing military having on the region at-large and how does that growth influence the U.S. security posture in the Asia-Pacific region?**

The Chinese have shown a willingness to use economic leverage as a way to advance the Chinese Communist Party’s regional political objectives. As China’s military modernization continues, the United States and its allies and partners will continue to be challenged to balance China’s influence.

**What can the United States do, both unilaterally and in coordination with allies and partners, to militarily counter the increasing challenge posed by China in the East and South China Seas?**

Long-term, sustained presence is critical to demonstrating that the United States is committed to the region. The United States will continue to develop a security network through multilateral partnerships and build interoperability and partner capacity to help allies and partners stand up to Chinese coercive behavior. Unilaterally, we will continue to develop capabilities to counter China’s improving military capabilities.

China’s defense budget seems to be increasing at an alarming rate year after year. However, China’s plans and strategies do not seem aimed at military domination outside of its immediate neighborhood.

**How do you explain this discrepancy and why China is engaged in such a massive military build-up?**

China is developing capabilities to deter or defeat third-party intervention in a regional conflict and is focusing on asymmetric capabilities to target key U.S. military advantages. As China's
international economic presence has expanded through initiatives such as "One Belt, One Road," China is increasing its ability to respond to global contingencies and protect its interests, such as sea lanes, abroad.

**Freedom of Navigation Operations**

While we have continued conducting freedom of navigation operations, the Committee has heard from several high-ranking officials from within the Pentagon and Combatant Commands that they are constrained from carrying out critical tier three freedom of navigation operations because of the lack of a timely decision-making and approval process in Washington. While the Committee understands the need to have broad interagency agreement on such operations to ensure they are effective and not counterproductive, extended delays for approval of these requests seems excessive.

Can increased authority be delegated to Combatant Commanders to carry out freedom of navigation operations? If not, what can be done to streamline the process to prevent unnecessary delay in considering such requests?

Current processes and authorities enable the Joint Force to effectively conduct freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS). This was confirmed by a secretariat-level review that occurred this year.

**India**

Congress and this Committee strongly support an enhanced defense relationship between the United States and India. Over the coming years, India could be one of our strongest and most dependable military partners in the region. Bolstering and strengthening the relationship, and encouraging enhanced engagement by India in the Asia-Pacific region should be a top priority of the Defense Department.

What is your view of the current state of the U.S.-India military cooperation relationship?

The U.S.-India military relationship is strong and getting stronger. Our two countries cooperate through complex exercises such as MALABAR in the Bay of Bengal as well as robust engagement through defense trade and technology cooperation.

What are your recommendations for bolstering the overall defense relationship between our two countries?

A long term strategic security relationship with India is critical to ensuring freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean. The United States and India should continue to expand cooperation in areas of mutual interest like maritime security. We should also continue to strengthen our defense relationship by pursuing opportunities to co-develop and co-produce defense technology under the U.S.-India Defense Technology and Trade Initiative.

**Pakistan**
What changes, if any, would you recommend for our military-to-military relations with Pakistan?

The goals of our mil-to-mil relationship with Pakistan are to improve their capacity to fight terrorist organizations and to enhance security along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, in order to help achieve stability in this region. Our mil-to-mil relations with Pakistan are characterized by maintaining lines of communication between our respective leaders, and conducting specific engagements and providing specific support where it serves US interests. I recommend continuing our relations along those broad lines, continually assessing our results and adjusting specific initiatives accordingly.

**Increased Role of Ground Forces in the Pacific**

Admiral Harris, the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, and former Deputy Secretary Work, repeatedly articulated a need for the Army to develop myriad capabilities to “project power” beyond the ground domain into the air and maritime domains to anchor defenses in the Pacific, and provide mutually supporting relationships among ground, naval, and air forces in the theater. The ability of ground forces to hold at risk adversary ships and aircraft; intercept missiles aimed at our ships, and at airfields, ports and other fixed facilities; and to provide electronic warfare and communications support for our air and naval forces could enable the United States to present adversaries with our own “anti-access/area denial” (A2/AD) challenge.

Do you believe U.S. defense policy would be better served if the Army were to develop the capabilities and operational concepts for such a role, both for the European and the Pacific theaters?

Yes, developing new and innovative approaches and concepts for all components of the Joint Force improves our ability to project power, defend forces, and address threats in all domains.

Do you believe our current ground forces posture in the Asia-Pacific region is adequate? If not, what actions would you recommend to improve it?

Our ground forces in the Asia-Pacific are postured appropriately to meet today’s challenges and potential contingencies. However, we continuously assess the evolving threat environment in order to ensure our posture stays relevant and effective.

**Western Hemisphere**

What roles do U.S. forces play in addressing transregional threats in the Western Hemisphere, including the threats posed by transnational criminal networks and terrorist groups?

U.S. forces protect the United States and U.S. territories from any nation state attack against our homeland. When requested, and within the scope of applicable law, U.S. forces can provide support to U.S law enforcement and other federal agencies responsible for addressing threats to our homeland by criminal networks and terrorist groups. The department provides aerial and maritime detection and monitoring of illicit trafficking into the United States to support interdiction and apprehension by law enforcement organizations.
In the Western Hemisphere, U.S. forces provide support to our allies and partners, to facilitate their efforts to deny terrorist groups from exploiting criminal and other threat networks. U.S. forces build the capacity and professionalism of partner nation security forces by providing equipment, training, infrastructure and intelligence to assist their efforts in countering shared transnational threats. U.S. forces also builds partner capacity through training, conferences, information sharing, and exercises to counter threat networks in the Western Hemisphere.

Readiness of the Armed Forces

How would you assess the current state of readiness?

Today the Joint Force is facing a readiness challenge. The Services are managing significant readiness challenges from manpower, maintenance, and training shortfalls, as well as delays in infrastructure investment required to provide fully capable combat ready forces. While we maintain a competitive advantage over any potential adversary in the world, that advantage is eroding and the Joint Force is challenged to meet operational requirements while sustaining investment in capabilities. Absent significant investments, our comparative advantage against our adversaries is at risk.

How would you plan to restore full spectrum readiness and under what timeline? Additionally, how would you enforce those timelines to ensure that goals are met?

Predictable and sufficient funding, and time are key ingredients to restore full spectrum readiness. The FY17 appropriation addresses the Department's most pressing near-term readiness requirements and places us in a better position to restore readiness within the Joint Force in FY18. The FY18 budget supports ongoing operations and continues to rebuild warfighting readiness by increasing funding for critical training, depot maintenance, and munitions with the purpose of restoring capacity and lethality. With sustained funding, in FY19 we will begin to realize readiness recovery across the spectrum of capability, capacity, and infrastructure. The Department has instituted a Readiness Recovery Framework (R2F) to manage and enforce the readiness recovery timelines and goals.

Special Operations Forces

What is the appropriate role of special operations forces (SOF) in the U.S. global counterterrorism campaign?

Special operations forces (SOF) provide the nation with a unique tool for the conduct of global counter-terrorism (CT) operations. At the strategic level, the U.S. Special Operations Command serves as the Department of Defense’s coordinating authority for countering Violent Extremist Organizations. In this capacity, USSOCOM leverages its global reach and transregional approach to analyze and assess current CT efforts, and then provides recommendations to DoD senior leadership on next steps in the overall campaign. At the tactical level, SOF continues to pursue both direct and indirect approaches to finding, fixing, and finishing CT networks. Our recent operations in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan have placed more emphasis on working through capable partners, and this by, with and through approach offers a more enduring solution.
In your view, has U.S. counterterrorism policy become over-reliant on SOF and unilateral direct-action operations?

No. I believe that our counterterrorism policy strikes the proper balance between unilateral direct action and deliberate activities conducted by, with, and though partners. Although our preference is to facilitate and empower host nation action, we should preserve and maintain the ability to conduct U.S. direct action counterterrorism operations with global reach. Our U.S. counterterrorism policy relies on working with allies and partners to degrade the enemy by removing key leaders, technical experts, external operators, and to deny physical and virtual safe havens. Although we rely on special operations personnel to conduct counterterrorism operations, our global campaign plan fully integrates the entire joint force, including conventional forces and interagency partners, to achieve unified action with a whole of government approach to counter terrorism.

Defense Security Cooperation

What is the appropriate role of the Department of Defense in the conduct of security sector assistance?

The DoD plays a critical role in strategic planning, assessment program design, and implementing security sector assistance programs, and supports the interagency processes by providing relevant expertise and information on U.S. national defense objectives.

What should be the strategic objectives of the Department of Defense’s efforts to build the capabilities of a partner nation’s security forces?

Our strategic objectives are focused on deterring adversaries, preventing conflict and enhancing the stability and security of our partner nations. These efforts bolster partner nations’ capacity to manage and maintain their own forces and provide security, safety, and justice for their people independent of sustained U.S. government efforts.

Is the Department of Defense appropriately organized and resourced to effectively conduct such activities? If not, what changes would you recommend?

Yes, the FY17 NDAA, Chapter 16, Security Cooperation reforms improve DoD authorities for conducting mil-to-mil engagements, training with foreign forces, support for operations, capacity building, and education and training activities. Assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of our activities is embedded in the reform to ensure resources are aligned to the overall military strategy thus ensuring maximum effectiveness of future security sector programs. I do not recommend any changes at this time to allow the DoD time to incorporate the reforms into our programs and processes.

Countering Cyber-Enabled Information Operations

Russia has conducted ambitious and aggressive cyber-enabled information operations against the United States and our European allies aimed at influencing election outcomes, and undermining democracy and collective security. Since the attack on America’s 2016 election, the U.S. election systems and networks have been designated as critical infrastructure. General Rogers, Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, has testified to this Committee that he has not
been tasked to counter such operations.

Do you believe that U.S. Cyber Command should be prepared to take action against foreign actors attempting to influence the 2018 U.S. election cycle through cyberspace?

The DoD must be prepared to defend the U.S. homeland and its vital interests from disruptive or destructive cyberattacks of significant consequence as outlined in the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy. However, any U.S. response should involve a whole-of-government approach to take advantage of all the available tools at our disposal.

The Defense Science Board Task Force on Cyber Deterrence testified to the Committee that the best way to deter cyber-attacks and foreign information warfare operations is to demonstrably “hold at risk” those things that the elites in adversary nations value most highly. The Task Force specifically recommends that each Combatant Commander be tasked with developing a strategy for accomplishing this that is tailored to specific potential adversaries.

Do you agree with these conclusions and recommendations?

Yes.

Do you think that the Department of Defense needs to better integrate its capabilities and planning for cyber operations and information warfare?

Yes. The Department must improve our ability to exploit the potential of cyberspace as a pathway for Information Operations to drive adversary perceptions, decisions, and actions (or inaction) in ways favorable to our strategic ends. We must also improve our ability to reassure friends and support allied and partner military efforts to defend against and defeat adversary propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation, much of which is delivered via cyberspace.

If so, how would you recommend that this goal be achieved?

Cyberspace is one of many domains through which we can conduct Information Operations. In order to improve cyber-enabled Information Operations, we should continue to prioritize growing and maturing our cyber forces. We are working toward this goal by integrating our approach to the information fight from the ground up, building Information Operations and cyberspace doctrine, guidance, and tasks into our strategy development and execution orders, adopting an active and innovative approach to improving understanding and fluency in the domain, and developing new operational and organizational constructs and advanced tools designed to keep pace with the environment and the threat.

Officer Management Issues

As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you wield significant influence over joint officer management policies. Despite numerous changes in the law, the requirements and the process for attaining joint officer qualifications are still beset by systemic challenges. Some of these challenges require the Services to make officer assignments to “check the box” for joint qualifications at the cost of assignments to other career enhancing and professional development
opportunities. Also, officers assigned to a designated joint billet on an operational staff receive joint credit while other officers performing substantially the same duties supporting the same joint commander do not receive joint credit unless they submit a package to have their assignments qualify for joint service.

If confirmed again, what steps will you take to review the joint qualification requirements to ensure that the qualification process is matched to the increasingly joint service environment in which many officers serve throughout their careers?

I strongly believe that officers must be developed to successfully serve within and lead the Joint Force. The current joint officer qualification process has proven successful in developing skills necessary for success at the operational and strategic levels. However, as the operating environment changes, there is room for adaptation and improvement. A review is ongoing, and if reconfirmed, I will continue to work with the Services and Congress to refine the joint officer qualification requirements and process in order to develop joint officers who are best prepared to support operational requirements.

In your view, what is the impact of joint qualification requirements on the ability of the Services to select the best qualified officers for promotion and to enable officer assignments that will satisfy Service-specific officer professional development requirements?

The current joint qualification process produces a cadre of well-rounded and competitive officers capable of integrating Service functions with national directives in both strategic and operational environments, with minimal impact on Service-specific developmental opportunities. In my opinion, officers with these capabilities possess the greatest potential for success in positions of senior leadership, both in warfighting positions and enterprise management positions. As such, they are the most competitive for promotion within their Service and the most qualified to lead the Joint Force.

What modifications, if any, to the requirements for joint officer qualifications are necessary to ensure that military officers are able to attain meaningful joint and Service-specific leadership experience and professional development?

I believe a blend of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), combined with experience gained through joint assignments, joint training, and/or joint exercises, is necessary to prepare officers to effectively operate at both the strategic and operational levels. However, as the operating environment changes I believe the requirements for JPME should be continuously evaluated for efficiencies that allow for a streamlined curriculum and improved alignment with joint and Service requirements.

How would you assess the Department of Defense’s progress in providing the Services the force management tools necessary to meet the needs of the 21st century joint, all-volunteer force?

During the last decade, the Department, the Joint Staff, and the Services have successfully partnered to establish flexible and effective force management tools necessary to shape the Joint Force to meet the many challenges of the 21st century. If reconfirmed, I will remain open to Service requests and continue to assess the strategic environment to ensure that all force management tools remain
relevant to the readiness and lethality of the force.

Do you believe the current Department and Service procedures and practices for reviewing the records of officers pending nomination by the President are sufficient to ensure the Secretaries of the military departments, the Secretary of Defense, and the President can make informed decisions?

Yes, I firmly believe the Services maintain a rigorous process to properly evaluate officer qualifications, past performance, future potential, and any available adverse information to ensure the decisions made by senior leaders are well-informed.

In your view, are these procedures and practices fair and reasonable for the officers involved?

Yes.

Based on your assessment of the threats facing the United States now and in the near future, what knowledge, skills, and abilities will be required by future officers to succeed against the nation’s adversaries?

Future officers must have the competencies and experience to think strategically, build and lead diverse coalitions, and operate within a complex and rapidly integrating world.

Do you believe the military is able to recruit and retain officers who possess the necessary skills using today’s officer management policies? If not, what changes to these polices would you recommend?

We are currently achieving our recruiting goals and quantity and quality benchmarks at Service academies, ROTC, and Officer Candidate/Training Schools. We continue to have a generally strong officer retention rate, and we are closely monitoring those career fields that are in high demand: aviation, nuclear submarine and surface warfare, cyber, remotely piloted vehicle, and special operations career fields. I remain open to recommendations from Service Chiefs to improve recruiting and retention policies in those career fields and the broader force.

How do personnel policy considerations inform the development of the overall national defense strategy?

The fundamental principle to inform the National Defense Strategy remains the capability of the All-Volunteer Force to fight and win our nation’s wars. Recruiting, training, educating, and retaining only the very best is essential to serving this vital purpose. An All-Volunteer Force is the Joint Force’s greatest asset and remains the foundation of its warfighting competitive advantage.

Headquarters Streamlining

Congress has previously directed reforms to consolidate the headquarters functions of the Department of Defense and the military departments.

How would you describe your progress in identifying and implementing streamlining and
reductions in the Joint Staff?

Both the Joint Staff and Combatant Commands have taken the lead in applying Major DoD Headquarters Activities (MHA) reductions. Our re-baselining actions were conducted in accordance with the OSD MHA framework and, per the law’s direction, we will achieve compliance by FY20.

What Joint Staff areas, specifically and if any, do you consider to be the priorities for further consolidation or reductions?

The Joint Staff is currently reorganizing with the intent of meeting legislative guidance on MHA reductions and authorized personnel, while simultaneously supporting my responsibility for Global Integration. While I do not believe there are any additional areas for further consolidation or reduction within the Joint Staff at this time, my direction to the staff is to constantly review our structure and processes to improve integration in support of the Secretary of Defense.

Defense Acquisition Reform

Over the past two years, Congress has implemented a number of acquisition reform measures designed to reduce the costs and development timelines of major systems to improve the process of moving programs from Department research efforts into operational capabilities, and to streamline access to innovative commercial technologies and systems. The Department has been slow to implement most of these reforms.

What are your views regarding acquisition reform and the need for improvements in the Defense acquisition process?

I am in full support of Congress’s efforts to reform the DoD acquisition system via the 2016 & 2017 NDAA’s. Further reform may be needed; however, we should first baseline the modifications put in place and evaluate their effect on major defense weapon system outcomes before considering additional significant structural or process changes.

If confirmed again, what actions would you take from your position to accelerate the implementation of these reforms?

If reconfirmed, I intend to first assess whether the acquisition reform put in place by NDAA 2016 and 2017 achieves the expected goal of speeding capability delivery to the warfighter and reining-in cost and schedule growth. If further reform is needed, it should be based upon the following key principals: 1) Responsibilities and authorities are clearly identified; 2) Warfighter involvement is integral to capability development and delivery; 3) Continued emphasis is placed on efficiency across the defense enterprise.

If confirmed again, what actions would you propose, if any, to ensure that requirements are realistic, technically achievable, and prioritized?

I believe recent legislation improves alignment of responsibility for performance requirements with Service and Joint priorities. If reconfirmed, I will work to ensure the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System accomplishes the goals of the legislation and remains a solid foundation for
validating realistic, technically achievable, and prioritized capability requirements.

**What should be the role of the Combatant Commanders, Service Chiefs, and Joint Staff in the acquisition process?**

Combatant Commanders, Service Chiefs, and the Joint Staff each play an important role in combat capability development: Combatant Commanders in identifying specific capability gaps and needs, Service Chiefs in identifying, innovating, and balancing the programs to meet those needs, and the Joint Staff in ensuring the Joint Force can operate in an integrated and lethal manner on the global scale. All stakeholders need to stay engaged and work with Service and Defense Acquisition Executives throughout the acquisition process.

**Are there specific new roles or responsibilities that should be assigned to the Service Chiefs or Combatant Commanders in the acquisition process?**

I am fully supportive of changes that increase Service Chief accountability in weapon system development outcomes and reduce bureaucratic barriers. However, we should assess the results achieved from the 2016 and 2017 NDAAAs before further alterations are contemplated regarding roles and responsibilities of Service Chiefs or Combatant Commands in the acquisition process.

**In what ways do you believe the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System needs to be reformed in order to better respond to rapid changes by our competitors and the pace of technological change more generally?**

Until we evaluate the recent changes made for the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), I do not recommend additional modifications.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 made a number of changes in the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the role of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including elevating the role of the Vice Chairman to be the principal adviser to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on joint military capabilities and joint performance requirements.

**To what extent have these changes been implemented?**

The Joint Staff is updating the JROC and JCIDS guidance documents to implement the Congressionally-directed modifications to the requirements process. The Services are currently implementing their requirements pilot programs, which accommodate all aspects of the Acquisition Agility Act - promoting interoperability of technology with emphasis on Modular Open Systems Architecture. I expect policy revisions to be completed by Spring 2018.

**What is your assessment of the positive and negative impacts of these changes?**

As implementation is in its early stages, it is too early to assess the impact of these changes. If reconfirmed, I look forward to briefing the committee on my assessment of the impacts and provide recommendations as required.
Do you recommend making additional changes to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and Defense Acquisition Board in terms of composition and staffing, authority, scope of responsibility, and associated processes?

Until the current changes are further implemented and the Department has time to evaluate the results of those changes, I do not recommend making any additional changes to the requirements or acquisition processes.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 made a number of changes in acquisition policy, allowing the Department to take greater advantage of rapid prototyping opportunities.

To what extent have these changes been implemented?

Current initiatives and future opportunities are aggressively being evaluated for rapid prototyping applicability by all Services. Policy to address these new authorities is also in final draft form, and will soon be entering DoD-wide coordination. It should be expected that as the Department becomes increasingly accustomed to the use of rapid prototyping to speed technology and capability to the field, the number of rapid prototyping opportunities will increase.

What is the appropriate role that prototyping should play in helping to establish better requirements, more rapidly, for the acquisition process? Are there additional reforms you believe are required to capitalize on the opportunities associated with prototyping for improved requirements definition?

The effective use of prototyping to reduce system-level risk to major defense acquisitions, explore requirements trade-space, and accelerate low-risk commercial off-the-shelf systems to the field will play an important role in ensuring requirements are realistic and technically achievable. If reconfirmed, I look forward to evaluating the impact of these changes and providing feedback to Congress to fine-tune the authorities as needed.

What steps will you take to ensure that systems are not prematurely deployed before they have had their technical risk removed and before they have been tested and found to be operationally effective and suitable for operational use?

I will continue to advocate for systems, regardless of their acquisition path, that continue to meet current practices and standards that ensure they are operationally suitable, effective, and reliable.

Research, Technology, Innovation, and Testing Capabilities

The Department of Defense has a number of organizations and thousands of technical personnel working on internal and contracted research programs to develop next generation warfighting capabilities. These include the $13 billion science and technology programs, the $1 billion Small Business Innovation Research program, and the network of over 50 Department labs and test ranges that develop and test all systems before they are deployed. It also includes newer efforts at prototyping in the Strategic Capabilities Office and outreach to commercial companies through DARPA and the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx).
Are you satisfied with the quality of the facilities and workforce at the Department’s labs and test ranges?

The quality of the facilities and workforce at the Department's labs and test ranges is without equal. As new technologies proliferate and we modernize the Joint Force, it is important that these capabilities keep pace with emerging threats and opportunities.

What steps will you take to improve the effectiveness of the Department’s technology development and testing community to support near term and future operational needs?

If reconfirmed, I will continue to place special emphasis on the prioritization of science and technology that supports our warfighters both today and in the future fight. I am also fully supportive of our developmental and operational test community’s continuing efforts to leverage mutually advantageous test events and results in order to streamline weapon system fielding.

Space

The House-passed version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 contains a provision directing the establishment of a separate Space Corps within the Department of the Air Force.

What are your views on the establishment of such a corps?

Our recently completed review of the Department’s space enterprise indicates that establishing a space corps at this time will not address the root causes of concern over our readiness to deter, to defend against, and ultimately to prevail in conflict that extends into space. Any reorganization of the DoD space enterprise must enhance the capability, readiness, and operational agility and lethality of the Joint Force. Establishing a space corps at this time would disrupt current operations, distract from ongoing reorganization efforts and upend current resourcing priorities.

Do you support making the Air Force Space Command a subordinate Unified Command of the U.S. Strategic Command with joint staffing?

Yes. USSTRATCOM already has taken the logical and incremental first steps toward a sub-unified command with its recent establishment of a Joint Force Space Component Command, with a four-star commander who is dual-hatted as the Commander of Air Force Space Command.

If you oppose such a move, what actions would you recommend to improve perceived issues with the management and operations of the national security space enterprise from a military perspective?

I support creation of a sub-unified command.

Commercial Space Capabilities
In support of the Department of Defense’s technology innovation agenda, and to address reconnaissance needs in Northeast Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Deputy Secretary of Defense have sponsored through DIUx a two-part effort with small, innovative commercial space companies to try to: (1) build very inexpensive radar imaging satellites that could be deployed in large numbers to provide nearly constant coverage of specific areas of interest; and (2) make effective use of such collection capabilities, and exploit advances in artificial intelligence and machine learning software to determine “patterns of life” and automated detection and identification of mobile targets.

What do you intend to accomplish with this initiative and when do you expect to have results?

This initiative seeks to leverage less expensive radar imaging satellites to fill gaps in space-based reconnaissance through commercial development in space-based radar imaging. The initiative would enable the deployment of the correct capability a situation demands, allow adaptation to a threat, and improve response times across an increasingly contested space environment. However, commercial radar imaging does not obviate the need for more capable government satellites; rather, it improves capacity to identify indications and warnings and to tip other assets or posture forces.

Nuclear Deterrence

Do you support the current triad of delivery systems?

Yes.

Do you support the timely replacement for the AGM-86 cruise missile? If so, why?

Yes. The Air Launched Cruise Missile provides a formidable nuclear asset for the United States but it is now well beyond its intended service life. The Department has undertaken several life extension programs to keep the system viable, but they will not allow it to perform its intended mission against future threats. It is critical that we begin developing and fielding a replacement system that will ensure the effectiveness of the air leg of the triad far into the future.

Do you support the timely replacement of the LGM-30 Minuteman III system? If so, why?

Yes. The current Minuteman III weapons system is over 45 years old and contains subsystems that are from the 1960s. To provide credible deterrence into the coming decades we have to invest in recapitalization and modernization efforts now. The Ground Based Strategic Deterrent will replace the Minuteman III and provide a fully integrated weapon system to include new flight systems, command control sub-systems and launch systems.

Do you support the timely replacement of the E-4B National Airborne Operations Center? If so, why?

Yes, I do. As the most survivable command center within the National Military Command System, the National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC) is a critical capability that enables uninterrupted command and control for the Secretary of Defense and the President in a time of crisis. The E-4B fleet of aircraft that supports the NAOC mission is facing availability issues due to aircraft
age, and efforts are beginning to replace the aging fleet.

Do you support the Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System? If so, why?

Yes, I do. The VCJCS is Co-Chair of the Council and is my primary advisor regarding the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System. I fully support the Council’s responsibilities to provide oversight, integration, and advocacy across the DoD and with other agencies.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response

What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources the Services have in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?

The Services are continually improving the capabilities of their sexual assault prevention and response programs and have recently established a worldwide 24/7 response capability for our service members. These programs provide oversight to ensure effective training and the appropriate resources to respond to incidents and allegations of sexual assault.

What is your assessment of the potential impact, if any, of proposals to remove the disposition authority from military commanders over violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, including sexual assaults?

Commanders’ legal authority to dispose of misconduct is a vital part of their moral authority to command effectively. Removing a military commander’s authority to dispose of misconduct would reduce the efficiency of our military justice system and erode the ability of commanders to appropriately address misconduct in their units. Disposition decisions are best made by commanders who are properly advised by their judge advocates. Commanders ensure their disposition decisions are both fair and just, and they are in the best position to take action that is appropriate for both offenders and victims of crime. I fully support the central role of commanders in ensuring the good order and discipline of their units – which is an integral part of looking after the welfare of the men and women they lead.

What is your assessment of the military’s protections against retaliation for reporting sexual assault?

The Joint Force is steadfast in protecting from retaliation those service members who report sexual assault. The Department and Services continue working to develop policies and procedures that appropriately implement the retaliation-related notification, training, and reporting requirements required by NDAA FYs 16 and 17 to protect those who report sexual assault.

What is your view of the role of the chain of command in maintaining a command climate where sexual harassment and sexual assaults are not tolerated?

The chain of command plays a vital role in every aspect of the command climate and maintenance of good order and discipline, ensuring sexual harassment and sexual assault are not
tolerated. Commanders at all levels are expected to promote an environment of dignity and respect that is free from unlawful discrimination, sexual harassment, and sexual assault, and commanders are accountable for the command climate they foster.

**How are commanders held accountable for failing to adequately address the command climate with respect to sexual harassment and sexual assault?**

DoD policy requires the military departments to hold accountable those commanders who fail to establish positive command climates. Accountability for command climate takes different forms and depends on the unique circumstances of each command. A commander who becomes the subject of a complaint to the commander’s chain of command, an Inspector General, or even the Service Secretary, will be appropriately investigated. The process of fully investigating and resolving such complaints puts personnel actions on hold, including promotion nominations, and often takes several months. Commanders who fail to adequately address their command climate could face a range of consequences, for example, counseling and informal corrective measures, adverse evaluations, administrative actions such as relief for cause, or punitive action.

**Can commanders be held accountable for failing to bring perpetrators to justice without exercising unlawful command influence?**

Yes. Commanders are responsible and accountable for sexual assault prevention and response as well as the maintenance of good order and discipline in their commands. This includes ensuring each report of sexual assault is taken seriously and investigated, making appropriate disposition decisions on unrestricted reports of sexual assault, and reporting their disposition actions up the chain of command. Commanders’ disposition decisions are discretionary judgements, made within the boundaries set by the Manual for Courts-Martial, and must be free of actual or apparent unlawful command influence. In addition, should senior officers in the chain of command want to personally handle particular offenses they may lawfully withhold disposition authority at their level for certain types of cases.

**In your view, do military and civilian leaders in the Department of Defense have the tools and resources needed to hold commanders accountable for these issues? If not, what additional authority do they need?**

Yes. In my view, DoD leaders have the tools and resources to both support and hold accountable commanders who are responsible for combating sexual assault, sexual harassment, retaliation, and other misconduct that negatively impacts good order and discipline in the ranks.

**Abusive Online Conduct**

This Committee has considered testimony on reports that certain members of Marines United, an unofficial Marine Corps Facebook group, were found to be posting degrading comments and sharing nude photos of female service members. Members of the group included a number of active-duty service members, former military members, and military retirees from all of the Services.

**In your view, are the Services’ policies adequate to address abuses such as what occurred in the**
**Marines United incident?**

Each of the Service Chiefs directly addressed Marines United with their force, and I have confidence in their ability to enforce good order and discipline within their ranks. The Service Chiefs reviewed and amplified existing guidance, or published, additional guidance, targeting the elimination of the types of misconduct involved. All Services have made social media conduct and the values of dignity, respect, and trust emphasis items for Commanders.

**If confirmed again, what action would you take to ensure that military personnel are not subjected to abusive online conduct?**

I believe we are addressing the problem the right way. The Service Chiefs have clearly communicated social media policies to the Force, and commanders are currently able to use Service regulations and their existing authorities under the UCMJ to address this type of conduct.

**In your view, does the military have sufficient legal authority to hold offenders accountable for such misconduct?**

Yes, Service regulations and existing UCMJ articles provide commanders sufficient authority to hold accountable those service members who commit misconduct such as the inappropriate sharing of intimate images.

**What legislative authorities, if any, do you believe are necessary to address this problem?**

New legislative authorities could provide commanders with additional tools to address this type of misconduct. However, commanders are currently able to use Service regulations and their existing authorities under the UCMJ to address inappropriate sharing of intimate images.

**Suicide Prevention and Mental Health Resources**

**The numbers of suicides in each of the Services continue to concern the Committee.**

**In your view, what role should the Joint Chiefs of Staff play in shaping policies to help prevent suicides both in garrison and in theater and to increase the resiliency of all service members and their families, including members of the reserve components?**

Suicide prevention and awareness are critically important, and the Service Chiefs have remained engaged in the process of enhancing and providing tools to strengthen the capability of our members of the Armed Services and their families to fight and resist the stressors that may lead to suicide. The Service Chiefs lead from the front, and have taken an enterprise-level approach, partnering with Joint Staff, OSD, Defense Agencies, the private sector, and local civilian organizations to better understand factors that lead to suicide and the most effective prevention techniques. Our focus remains on continuing to enhance accessibility and effectiveness of support, whenever and wherever it is needed.

**What actions have been taken since your last confirmation to reduce the stigma associated with service members seeking mental health care? In your view, are these actions sufficient, or must**
more be done to encourage service members to seek mental health care when needed?

The Department has taken multiple steps to reduce the stigma associated with mental health care. For example, the Services embedded behavioral health specialists within operational units. These embedded specialists are readily trusted agents that are accessible to service members before. The Department has seen increased provider-patient contacts since embedding these specialists and decreased behavioral health hospitalizations. If reconfirmed, I will continue to support and develop actions to maintain progress in this critical area.

If confirmed again, what additional actions will you take to ensure that sufficient mental health resources are available to service members in theater, and to the service members and their families, including Guard and Reserve members, upon return to their home stations?

I will continue to support the Department and the Services as they enhance ready access to embedded licensed professional behavioral health specialists, emphasize areas that build resilience among service members and families, and improve early identification of struggling service members.

Military Quality of Life

The Committee is always concerned about the sustainment of key quality of life programs for military families, such as family support, child care, education, employment support, health care, and morale, welfare and recreation services.

After the experience of your first tour as Chairman, what further enhancements, if any, to military quality of life programs would you consider a priority in an era of intense downward pressure on budgets?

Quality-of-life programs directly support and improve the resilience of our Service members and their families. Their top concerns include child care, spousal employment, and special-needs family members. If reconfirmed, I will continue to support programs that address the greatest needs of Service members and their families.

In a constrained budget environment, should the Services downsize or eliminate certain legacy quality of life programs that are less important to service members and their families in the 21st century?

Quality of life programs are important to the service member and their family and contribute to readiness and retention. I recognize that the needs of our Service members and their families vary greatly from installation to installation. We should continually review existing programs and, with proper analysis, seek efficiencies in existing legacy programs, eliminate redundancies and tailor them to best meet the needs of our Service members and families.

Audit, Financial Management, and Oversight

The Department of Defense has been incapable of obtaining a clean audit opinion for over 25 years, despite billions of dollars being spent on the effort. The Department is also on a number of GAO High Risk lists for management failures, including in financial management, weapons
systems acquisition, and supply chain management. The Department is also in the midst of a number of investigations regarding waste, fraud, and abuse, as well as continuing to be unable to assert control over millions of dollars in improper and unauthorized payments.

Should it be a priority for the Department to address these management issues, especially in times of perceived budget constraints?

Yes, addressing our management challenges is a top priority for the Department, especially in these times of constrained budgets.

How should Congress view these financial management weaknesses when contemplating increased budgets for the Department?

I understand and appreciate the importance of making sure the American people get the most for every tax dollar. The Department continues to make and prioritize business transformation and financial management improvements. These improvements increase the Department's ability to make sound decisions through improved data accuracy and accountability. Despite progress, there is more work to be done. If confirmed, I will remained focused on addressing these challenges.

What steps will you take to improve financial management within the Department?

I will continue to support financial management improvements and the transformation of business processes by continuing to work with the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Service Chiefs. Specifically, I will continue to address a DoD-wide audit, financial management certification, and implementation of initiatives that ensure effective use of resources.

Operational Energy

In his responses to the advance policy questions from this Committee, Secretary Mattis talked about his time in Iraq, and how he called upon the Department of Defense to “unleash us from the tether of fuel.” He stated that “units would be faced with unacceptable limitations because of their dependence on fuel” and resupply efforts “made us vulnerable in ways that were exploited by the enemy.”

Do you believe this issue remains a challenge for the Department?

Yes, operational energy logistics was a formidable challenge for warfighters throughout the 20th century, and it remains so whenever we take the fight to our enemies.

If confirmed again, what specific steps will you take to unleash the Department from the tether of fuel?

If reconfirmed, I will continue to assess and manage energy-related risks to operational readiness as related to personnel, equipment, platforms, and support-infrastructure in my annual Chairman’s Risk Assessment. I will ensure joint wargames and exercises provide actionable assessments of the energy demand and logistics supportability of the globally integrated Joint Force. Through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, I will continue to ensure that new capabilities are
assessed for energy supportability and have valid energy performance parameters.

If confirmed again, what priorities would you establish for defense investments in and deployment of operational energy technologies to increase the combat capabilities of warfighters, reduce logistical burdens, and enhance mission assurance on our installations?

If reconfirmed, I will focus on fielding military capabilities that provide competitive advantage across all regions, domains, and functions and whose energy demands are well understood by the Joint Logistics Enterprise. I fully support the goals and objectives of our mature, comprehensive operational energy program. We will continue to assess alternative energy sources as well as improvements in the use of petroleum-based fuels to improve operational reach and reduce vulnerabilities to the warfighter while making our installations energy resilient.

If confirmed again, how will you consider operational forces’ energy needs and vulnerabilities during training exercises, operational plans, and war games?

I will continue to implement the strategy set forth in the 2016 Operational Energy Strategy for the Department of Defense (DoD) that recognizes the crucial role of energy in enabling our forces to perform assigned missions worldwide. Campaign analyses, wargames, and decades of operational experience have demonstrated the tradeoffs and risks that accompany the need for such large amounts of energy. I will continue to emphasize DoD initiatives (for example, use of existing renewable energy technologies, integration of lithium batteries and fuel cells with greater energy storage densities, alternative fuels for our ships and aircraft) across the force to reduce our fossil fuel dependence and increase future warfighting capability.

Energy and Acquisition

How can our acquisition systems better incorporate the use of energy in military platforms, and how, if at all, are assessments of future requirements taking into account energy needs as a key performance parameter?

In the requirements process, energy will remain a key performance parameter that must be considered in the review and validation of future capability requirements. This level of attention conveys the importance of considering the use of energy in military platforms as a significant characteristic in design, development, production, and sustainment.

Energy Resiliency in the Fight Against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)

Back in July 2016 after a coup attempt, the Turkish Government cut off power to Incirlik Air Base, which is the primary platform for launching coalition airstrikes in the fight against ISIS. For roughly a week, deployed units had to operate relying on backup generators, which is expensive and is certainly not the preferred method of operation given the demanding tempo of sorties against ISIS. Recently, the Air Force described an incident in the past (via open source) in which a remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) mission based in the United States was flying a targeting mission overseas. Because of a power outage stateside, the RPA feed temporarily lost visual and the target was able to get “away and is able to continue plotting against the United States and our allies.”
If confirmed again, how will you specifically address and make energy resiliency and mission assurance a priority for the Department of Defense, to include acquiring and deploying sustainable and renewable energy assets to improve combat capability for deployed units on our military installations and forward operating bases?

I will continue to implement the strategy set forth in the 2016 Operational Energy Strategy for the Department of Defense (DoD) that recognizes the crucial role of energy in enabling our forces to perform assigned missions worldwide. Campaign analyses, wargames, and decades of operational experience have demonstrated the tradeoffs and risks that accompany the need for such large amounts of energy. I will continue to emphasize DoD initiatives (for example, use of existing renewable energy technologies, integration of lithium batteries and fuel cells with greater energy storage densities, alternative fuels for our ships and aircraft) across the force to reduce our fossil fuel dependence and increase future warfighting capability.

Do you support the J-4’s enforcement of the energy supportability key performance parameter in the requirements process?

Absolutely. The energy key performance parameter is critical to ensuring the combat capability of the force by balancing system energy performance and the provisioning of energy to sustain systems/forces. Therefore, it is imperative that the Joint Force continues to emphasize the energy key performance parameter throughout the requirements process.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed again, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed again, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate committees in a timely manner?

Yes.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with this
Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.

Do you agree to answer letters and requests for information from individual Senators who are members of this Committee?

Yes.

If confirmed again, do you agree to provide to this Committee relevant information within the jurisdictional oversight of the Committee when requested by the Committee, even in the absence of the formality of a letter from the Chairman?

Yes.