Advance Questions for General Vincent K. Brooks, USA
Nominee to be Commander, United Nations Command,
Commander, Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command,
and Commander, United States Forces Korea

Defense Reforms

The Senate Armed Services Committee has initiated an intensive review of the organization of the Department of Defense—both military and civilian, including the elements created by the Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, in order to enhance the effectiveness of the Department of Defense to execute the National Military Strategy in the 21st Century.

Based on your experiences as a senior officer, what challenges have you observed with the current organizational structure, with particular focus on warfighting capabilities, and what modifications, if any, do you think are necessary to the current organizational structure including any Goldwater Nichols Act provisions?

The professional military education and acquisition certification requirements have been effective in establishing a new baseline for common understanding of joint operations and military acquisition. With that baseline established, it is worth looking ahead to future joint education needs and what constitutes joint credit. Many operations happen today in a joint and multinational context, yet others in interagency and intergovernmental contexts. Consequently, the experiences and exposures of today’s military professionals far exceed what was contemplated, and that is good. However, restrictions on what comprises qualification disregard large portions of the experience. This is worth reviewing to ensure we are developing the right kinds of leaders for the future.

In your view, what modifications to the Unified Command Plan, if any, would enhance the warfighting effectiveness of the Department of Defense?

The reviews of the Unified Command Plan being undertaken are timely. The Unified Command Plan has served us well and placed the United States in a unique position of being able to simultaneously control military operations around the globe. The boundaries are worthy of a review to determine if there is a need to adjust based on changing relationships with countries and within sub-regions that before were necessarily separated. Any adjustment should be viewed as not only a streamlining or reorganizing, but also, as a statement of future interest. Accordingly, a thoughtful review and an equally thoughtful strategic narrative should accompany one another.

Duties and Qualifications

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea and what is your understanding of how these different command responsibilities interrelate?
In the most basic sense, they are three related commands with shared staffs but very different authorities. The United Nations Command is the multinational command. The Combined Forces Command is the bilateral/bi-national command. The United States Forces Korea is the unilateral/national command for U.S. joint forces in Korea.

In greater detail, The United Nations Command helps ensure peace and stability on the peninsula and was created by United Nations Security Council Resolution 84 in 1950. It is the international symbol and vehicle by which UN nations assisted the Republic of Korea (ROK) to repel the North Korean attack and restore peace and security to the Peninsula. Today, the United Nations Command still implements the provisions of the 1953 Armistice Agreement. Moreover, it remains the unified command that United Nations military forces and assistance would fall under to assist the ROK in its defense.

Combined Forces Command (CFC) is the standing bilateral command between the United States and the ROK to deter external provocation, prepare for potential instability, and defend the ROK in case of war. To accomplish these missions, CFC plans in conjunction with the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, conducts exercises to validate the readiness of the forces, and executes wartime Operational Control over U.S. and ROK forces.


The UNC, CFC and USFK Commander is responsible for organizing, training and equipping U.S. forces, developing multiple combined plans to defend the ROK, ensuring the readiness of U.S. and ROK forces to execute those plans, continuing to enforce compliance with the 1953 Armistice Agreement, and preparing to receive and employ United Nations forces that will help defend the ROK if deterrence fails.

What background and experience, including joint duty assignments, do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

My career has been varied in that I have served in or in direct support of all of the geographic combatant commands except Africa Command. And I have served in the Joint Staff and the Army Staff as a general officer. Within a 36 year career, 16 years have been in command, at multiple levels from company to theater, and included operations in multinational commands and combatant commands, in combat and in peace support operations abroad. With respect to Korea, 2 years of infantry battalion command in the Republic of Korea near the demilitarized zone; and nearly 3 years of commanding U.S. Army Pacific the Army component of United States Pacific Command which supports United States Forces Korea provide me with a deep well of first hand experiences and relevant insights, as well as an array of strong personal relationships with senior military leaders globally, most notably in the Republic of Korea, Japan, China, and Australia.
Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea?

Yes, in preparation for confirmation and, if confirmed, consulting others with more experience and deeper perspectives will enhance my expertise to perform the duties required. I look forward to the opportunity to learn more about the nuances of the situation in Korea so that I may be better enabled to provide sound military advice and options.

Relationships

Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea with the following officials:

The Secretary of Defense:

The Commander, United Nations Command, reports to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and through the Secretary of Defense to the President of the United States, while at the same time keeping the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), informed of any communications with U.S. national authorities. A validated combined U.S.-ROK document provides further guidance on the Commander, Combined Forces Command’s unique relationship with the ROK National Command and Military Authorities and the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense:

The Deputy Secretary of Defense is delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense and to exercise the powers of the Secretary on any and all matters for which the Secretary is authorized to act pursuant to law. The UNC/CFC/USFK Commander coordinates and exchanges information with the Deputy Secretary on matters delegated by the Secretary, while keeping the PACOM Commander informed. My anticipation is that, if confirmed, most of my interaction with the Deputy Secretary of Defense will be in the area of resourcing critical warfighting capabilities and mitigating existing risks.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy:

A direct command relationship between the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the UNC/CFC/USFK Commander does not exist. However, the UNC/CFC/USFK Commander regularly interacts, coordinates and exchanges information with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on policy issues relating to U.S.-ROK, North Korean, and Northeast Asian affairs.
The Commander directly communicates with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on a regular basis.

**The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence:**

There is not a direct command relationship between the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the UNC/CFC/USFK Commander. However, the UNC/CFC/USFK Commander regularly interacts with, coordinates, and exchanges information with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence on intelligence related matters.

**The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:**

The Chairman functions under the authority, direction, and control of the President and Secretary of Defense. The Chairman transmits communications between the President and Secretary of Defense and the UNC/CFC/USFK Commander, as well as oversees the activities of the UNC/CFC/USFK Commander as directed by the Secretary of Defense. As the principal military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman is a key conduit between the Combatant Commander, Interagency, and Service Chiefs.

The UNC/CFC/USFK Commander keeps the Chairman informed on significant issues regarding UNC, CFC, USFK, and the Korean Theater of Operations. The Commander directly communicates with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a regular basis.

**The Secretaries of the Military Departments:**

The Secretaries of Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of forces that are assigned or attached to the USFK Commander. The Secretaries fulfill their responsibilities by exercising administrative control (ADCON) through the Service Component Commands assigned to USFK and to United States Pacific Command.

**The Chiefs of Staff of the Services:**

The Chiefs of Staff of the Services are responsible for the organization, training, and equipping of the Services under Title 10, United States Code (USC). Their support is critical to meet readiness needs. The Service Chiefs of Staff also provide military advice to the President of the United States, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The USFK Commander coordinates with the PACOM Commander to coordinate with the Chiefs of Staff of the Services on matters related to staffing, training, and equipping forces necessary to perform their roles and missions.

**Commander, United States Pacific Command:**

The USFK Commander, as commander of a sub-unified command of PACOM, reports directly to PACOM Commander on matters directly pertaining to USFK responsibilities and on
the transitions to and from crisis. As UNC/CFC Commander, he keeps the PACOM Commander informed of any communications with U.S. national authorities.

Other Combatant Commanders:

Formal relationships between the USFK Commander and the geographic and functional Combatant Commanders derive from command authority established by title 10 USC, section 164. Combatant commanders closely coordinate as necessary to accomplish all assigned missions. Recognizing the key role played by global combatant commanders, and by adjacent geographic combatant commanders, coordination will be a key to success.

Major Challenges and Problems

In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea?

I believe the next Commander of UNC/CFC/USFK will be confronted with multiple challenges which include an intensifying North Korean threat, leading a major repositioning of U.S. forces on the peninsula, and continuing to work the Conditions-Based Operational Control Transition Plan, or COT-P. While maintaining readiness on the Peninsula we must simultaneously be able to respond to an evolving asymmetric threat from nK that will result in less unambiguous warning. The changing relationships in the region may add new challenges in preserving stability in Korea.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges and problems?

If confirmed, I will sustain and enhance the deep trust-based relationships that have proven critical to our Alliance’s success for more than six decades. This includes ensuring that our robust and deliberate crisis planning efforts are sustained, continuing our comprehensive exercise program, and maintaining our “fight tonight” capability. Simultaneously, we will work with PACOM and DoD to contribute to the whole-of-government approach already underway in terms of deterrence, defense, ability to compel and strategic shaping. Specifically, I will continue the practice of cooperating closely with the offices of the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the ROK Ministry of National Defense in the execution of our Alliance bilateral tailored deterrence strategy. Additionally, I will continue to move forward developing and preparing to implement the 4D Strategy to Detect, Defend, Disrupt, and Destroy the North Korean missile threat. I will also identify additional initiatives that I feel are required to not only address our challenges, but to capitalize on emerging, perhaps fleeting opportunities to achieve our Alliance objectives. Among these opportunities is the increasing emphasis on the role of UN Command and the contributions made by sending states.

North Korea

North Korea represents one of the greatest near term threats to regional security and stability. The seriousness of the threat is seen by North Korea’s continued pursuit of
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Even without these capabilities, however, North Korea’s conventional military force coupled with its history of aggressive and unpredictable behavior underscore the dangerousness of the situation.

What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula?

Kim Jong Un’s assumption of power following his father’s death in December 2011, has led to a more aggressive and unpredictable North Korea. He exercises complete dominion over his subordinates in a humiliating and brutal fashion including purges, public demotions and re-promotions of military leaders, and brutal public executions. He canonized his nuclear program into the North Korean Constitution, restarted the production of plutonium, refuses to engage the U.S. in discussions pertaining to his uranium centrifuge programs, and flagrantly flouts United Nations Security Council Resolutions limiting his missile launch activities. Additionally, he recently threatened pre-emptive nuclear strikes against the United States and other countries in the region.

North Korea’s large, conventional forces remain forward deployed near the DMZ. Equipment for these forces remains badly outdated and a poor economy means the KPA lacks the logistical support necessary to sustain a large scale attack. Nevertheless, the size and location of the KPA forces requires Alliance readiness to counter this conventional threat as reminded by the 2010 Cheonan sinking and shelling of YongPyong-do, and the August 2015 landmine incident. These incidents have incensed the ROK public and have added pressures to the ROK military to forcefully respond to any future North Korean provocations. This raises our concern for the increased likelihood a small incident could quickly escalate to a much larger miscalculation by one or both sides.

The UN Commission of Inquiry report from Feb 2014 documented well the North's horrific Human Rights policies and abuses. Pyongyang has shown to be particularly sensitive to this criticism especially when it focuses on Kim Jong Un as a responsible actor. Continuing efforts to indict or recommend Kim Jong Un be referred to the International Criminal Court will continue to draw sharp criticism from Pyongyang.

Kim Jong Un uses the perception of external threats to better control the Party, KPA, and citizenry. By hyping the threat of the ROK-U.S. Alliance, the regime justifies the complete militarization of the economy and population. Under Kim Jong Un, the North’s propaganda is emphasizing economic progress while increasing their nuclear arsenal.

Kim Jong Un’s despotic leadership increases the risk for instability, we expect additional pressures—domestic and international—as a result of his nuclear and missile programs, and economic and food supply improvements are not likely. His conventional and asymmetric capabilities always provide threatening options for provocations to counter or respond to these pressures.

What is your assessment of the threat posed to South Korea, Japan, and the United States by North Korea's ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction capabilities?
Ballistic Missiles

North Korea’s inventory of ballistic missiles includes several hundred short range ballistic missiles (Toksa, SCUD), and medium range ballistic missiles (No Dong) available for use against targets on the Korean Peninsula and Japan.

The developmental intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) (Musudan), though untested and potentially unreliable as a weapon, could also be launched at targets in the region. North Korea has also displayed an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) (KN08) during military parades, which is capable of targeting the U.S.

In Feb 2016, North Korea successfully conducted another Taepo-Dong 2, satellite launch vehicle (SLV) launch. Developing an SLV significantly contributes to North Korea’s long-range ballistic missile development, since they have many shared technologies.

Since at least May 2015, North Korea has been developing a submarine launched ballistic missile capability, which highlights its commitment to diversifying its missile forces and nuclear delivery options, while strengthening missile force survivability. If this system becomes operational, it will have a security impact to the Pacific Region.

WMD

North Korea continues to develop its nuclear weapons capability. They’ve demonstrated this through four underground nuclear tests (2006, 2009, 2013, 2016) and the continual production of fissile material. Given the amount of time and resources the regime devotes to nuclear and missile programs, we must assume North Korea has the technical capability to mount and deliver a nuclear warhead using ballistic missiles.

North Korea has a longstanding chemical weapons (CW) program with the capability to produce and stockpile several CW agents. North Korea could employ CW agents by modifying a variety of conventional munitions, including artillery and ballistic missiles capable of targeting the ROK and potentially Japan or China.

North Korea’s current biological research infrastructure combined with its weapons industry gives them a potentially robust biological warfare capability. The capability to successfully conduct a biological weapons attack would put the entire Korean Theater of Operations (KTO) at risk.

What is your assessment of North Korea's conventional capabilities and readiness?

It is my assessment that budget constraints, shortages of fuel, outdated equipment, a broken supply chain and conflicting economic requirements have forced NKPA conventional forces to experience a degree of atrophy over the past several years. North Korea’s ability to conduct offensive operations is also severely impacted by the inability of their logistics systems to sustain operations over a long period of time. Additionally, over the years we have observed reduced levels and complexity in overall training, especially within North Korea’s mechanized and armor
forces which significantly impacts their ability to conduct synchronized combined arms maneuver and large scale operations. The majority of its combat systems are antiquated, with many of the weapons systems dating from the 1960s, 70s and 80s.

The most credible NKPA threat comes from its large inventory of Long Range Artillery (LRA) and Multiple Rocket Launchers (MRL) which can range well into the ROK. Additionally, there are over 300 LRA systems, 240mm MRLs and 170mm Koksan Guns that can range the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area with conventional and chemical munitions. Pyongyang has made some improvements in the quality of its MRLs, Air Defense systems and Artillery in recent years. However, in the end North Korea must rely on the brute force of numbers against the superior U.S. ROK Alliance.

**What, if anything, should be done to strengthen deterrence on the Korean Peninsula?**

Attention to encouraging a strong and cohesive alliance, with patient and deliberate responses to provocations, and an broadening group of like-minded nations who view North Korean actions unacceptable, will strengthen deterrence. The Alliance’s Deterrence Strategy Committee is continuously identifying and pursuing initiatives to strengthen deterrence based on our bilateral tailored deterrence strategy. If confirmed, I will lead the continued training and modernization of our forces, to be ready with the capability to impose great costs on North Korea should they engage in large-scale military aggression or use weapons of mass destruction. More efforts by the United States and the ROK to further improve our missile defenses, as well as our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and the overall interoperability between forces will strengthen deterrence. Finally, an emphasis on regional relationships to broaden the array of countries who cooperate in deterring North Korea.

**What capabilities are the most critical to mounting an effective defense against a North Korean move across the DMZ?**

I believe there are several aspects to this. First, particularly in the initial stages of hostilities, is having trained and ready ROK forces as the principle ground force. Secondly, having the critical enablers brought to bear by the U.S., like: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, C4I, and joint operational fires in support of the Alliance, to include Patriot BMD, MLRS for the Counterfire Fight, and aircraft and precision munitions for Joint Fires. Due to the limited warning we expect to receive prior to a North Korean attack, we need sufficient quantities of these capabilities readily available prior to the start of hostilities. In addition, U.S. augmentation of in-place USFK capabilities also remains an essential component to defeating North Korean aggression and restoring stability on the Korean Peninsula.

**Do you support the formal consultation between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and U.S. regarding the deployment of a Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to the Peninsula?**

Yes. On 7 February 2016, after the North Korean TD-2/Space Launch Vehicle event, the ROK and U.S. jointly announced bilateral consultations to assess the feasibility of deploying a THAAD system to the ROK. These consultations are ongoing between the ROK and the U.S.,
and will provide an assessment and recommendations on the feasibility of deploying a THAAD system in defense of the ROK against North Korean ballistic missile threats. These discussions are a crucial bilateral effort.

What do you perceive are the differences, if any, between Kim Jong Un and his father?

I believe Kim Jong Un (KJU) is very different from his father. Kim Jong Un demands to be the center of attention during his guidance visits, enjoys the spotlight, routinely gives speeches and displays gregariousness, openness, and energy in contrast to his more serious and much less active father. His emphasis on public projects such as the amusement park, aquarium, and ski resort initially resonated positively with the people. However, his public humiliation of his uncle and subsequent executions of those associated with that uncle, along with other purges and executions, appear to have tempered earlier enthusiasm and we now see greater potential for instability as a result of Kim Jong Un’s behaviors and the absence of advisers he is willing to consult.

Compared to his father, Kim Jong Un is more aggressive with advancing the North’s nuclear program and ignoring international concerns. His father was more willing to offer negotiations probably to ease Chinese and other international pressures. Kim Jong Un’s approach clearly is to refuse to negotiate and to publically emphasize that refusal.

Kim Jong Un also appears to be more risk-tolerant, arrogant, and impulsive than his father, raising the prospect of miscalculation. This is most evident in his bellicose statements threatening the U.S. and ROK and his willingness to aggressively publicize his nuclear weapons program.

What is your assessment of China’s role in managing North Korean behavior and ambitions?

It is my assessment that China is in fact frustrated, yet unwilling to apply pressures that could threaten the viability of the North Korea and its regime. Fear of instability is a core concern for PRC leaders, and fear that the ROK may seize control over a destabilized North Korea are more threatening to Beijing than a North Korean nuclear program.

The PRC will likely continue to apply limited pressure on the North to resume dialogue on denuclearization while maintaining its “no war, no instability, no nukes” policy for the peninsula. The PRC agrees with the North that the U.S. Hostile Policy toward the North needs to be addressed as part of any final denuclearization deal. The PRC, DPRK, and Russia all share similar goals concerning U.S. military activity in the region and on the peninsula.

How stable is the current North Korean regime?

The North Korean regime is presently stable. Kim Jong Un is the unchallenged leader and has complete control of the military as the head of the National Defense Commission (NDC), the government, and the ruling Korean Worker’s Party (KWP). There have been no significant signs
of instability that would indicate a collapse of the regime despite the numerous leadership, organizational, and policy changes Kim Jong Un has made during his leadership.

As evidence of his complete control, Kim Jong Un has removed, dismissed or executed several senior military and political leaders with no discernible backlash from the ruling elites. Furthermore, Kim Jong Un appears to be firmly driving all provocations during the current period of tension, which began with North Korea’s 4th nuclear test in Jan.

**North Korean Nuclear Program**

In 2010, North Korea disclosed that it has a functioning uranium enrichment program and in 2015 announced its intention to restart plutonium production at Yongbyon. These developments, coupled with its underground nuclear tests – the fourth of which was conducted earlier this year – make it clear that North Korea is determined to pursue nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. Moreover, North Korea has a history of proliferating missile and nuclear technology. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a means to interdict suspect shipments, including shipments of nuclear or missile items to and from North Korea.

In your view, are there additional steps that DOD could take, including with our allies and partners, to ensure that North Korea does not proliferate missile and nuclear technology to countries such as Syria, Iran and others?

In my view, recent UNSC imposed sanctions, as well as those unilaterally imposed by the U.S. through Congressional and Executive Branch actions, are unprecedented and enjoy broad international support. These new sanctions will require broad and consistent implementation from China, Russia, and other regional and international actors. It is too early to determine how effective this latest round of sanctions will be and we need to closely monitor to determine whether additional actions are necessary to pressure the North Korean regime, its client states, and those states not aggressively supporting the sanction protocols. USFK will coordinate closely with PACOM and DoD to contribute USFK capabilities and resources as appropriate to prevent further proliferation.

In your view, how does the lack of progress in diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program inform or guide U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy in the region?

In my view, ever since we initiated negotiations with North Korea in 1988, multiple Administrations have tried a variety of diplomatic approaches to seek a resolution to North Korea’s nuclear program. Threats, generous economic and humanitarian aid, and refusing to respond to the North’s bad behaviors are all tactics our government has used in an attempt to resolve the nuclear issue. USFK’s role is to maintain an Alliance that is capable and ready. By doing so, we have deterred North Korea for more than 60 years. The ROK’s concerns have grown with the North’s increased nuclear capabilities and the Alliance will need to increasingly consider appropriate actions and steps to ensure nuclear deterrence along with our conventional deterrence capabilities.
Would you recommend any improvements to the organization or capability of the PSI member nations to improve the ability to interdict prohibited shipments to and from North Korea?

The Proliferation Security Initiative involves multiple countries and is rightly the responsibility of the PACOM Commander. USFK has a supporting role in this context. With strong international support for the recently imposed, tougher, UN Sanctions regime, countries in the region are likely to be more supportive when we have clear information a prohibited shipment is occurring. If confirmed, and should such opportunities surface, I look forward to garnering ROK assistance and supporting the PACOM Commander in his efforts to interdict as directed by OSD.

**USFK Ballistic Missile Defense Priorities**

Recent developments in the North Korean ballistic missile program – the successful space launch of a satellite in February 2016, the display of a road-mobile missile launcher during a parade last year, the launch of short-range ballistic missiles during U.S.-ROK joint exercises in March 2016 – coupled with the unpredictability of the North Korean regime place a premium on a robust, coordinated missile defense capability in the region.

In your view, what are the highest priority missile defense needs of U.S. Forces Korea and Combined Forces Command?

As I understand it, the ROK-U.S. Alliance is making progress in its ballistic missile defense capabilities as demonstrated by the ROKs ongoing efforts to upgrade its Patriot missile systems from PAC II to PAC III; however, there remains work to be done. One important area is achieving BMD interoperability and a common operating picture across the Alliance for BMD. If I am confirmed this will be one of the first areas that I focus on. Additionally, the Alliance would greatly benefit from an Upper Tier ballistic missile defense capability such as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in order to fully address the advancing capabilities of the North Korean missile threat. Additionally, the early deployment of more Patriot Systems in the event of crisis is critical to the defense of critical assets on the Peninsula.

What missile defense capabilities do you believe are needed in the near term to meet the operational needs of these commands, and what systems are available to provide such capabilities?

I believe the evolving ballistic missile threat in Korea requires an interoperable layered ballistic missile defense. The addition of an upper-tier intercept capability such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) would complement the Patriot’s existing terminal defense capability and enhance ballistic missile defense on the Peninsula against North Korean missile threats. Furthermore, I believe that the U.S. and ROK continue to identify potential improvements to Alliance missile defense capability. If confirmed, I will conduct a thorough review of the missile defense capabilities to ensure we are as prepared as possible to defend against the North Korea ballistic missile threat, and I will seek to have any emerging capabilities committed first to the Korean peninsula.
In addition to the deployment of Patriot, THAAD, and Aegis BMD capable ships to the Pacific, what other steps, if any, do you think are necessary to provide adequate protection for U.S., partner, and allied assets?

I believe we must continue to enhance the interoperability of the ROK and U.S. BMD capabilities to ensure the rapid and seamless sharing of ballistic missile warning, tracking, and engagement information.

Other steps include encouraging the ROK to continue developing its indigenous ballistic missile defense capabilities and to ensure they are interoperable with U.S. capabilities. This effort should also focus on ROK procurement of sufficient BMD-capable munitions to enhance its own defensive capabilities and contribution to Alliance BMD. Progress in this area would directly contribute to the ROK meeting one of the conditions for OPCON transition.

Further, encouraging the ROK to participate in U.S. – ROK – Japan trilateral BMD-link exercises and discussions will improve protection. I understand that the 2014 Trilateral Information Sharing Agreement provides a framework for trilateral discussions and information exchanges with regard to the NK nuclear and ballistic missile threat.

**Extended Nuclear Deterrence**

Are there additional steps that DoD could take to reassure allies and counter North Korean nuclear provocations by improving the readiness, training, and effectiveness of U.S. nuclear forces assigned to support the nuclear deterrence mission in the Pacific?

I believe that continued engagement by DoD through our force posture, exercise program, and additional flexible deterrent measures assures our partners in the region while deterring North Korean aggression. I support diplomatic efforts to denuclearize North Korea, and if confirmed, I would ensure that we are prepared to deter and defend against any North Korean nuclear threat through training and readiness.

**Role of Other Regional Countries**

North Korea’s provocative behavior threatens not just security and stability on the Korean Peninsula, but also the security and stability of the entire region.

In your view, what are the roles and responsibilities of other regional countries in helping to manage the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs?

From my perspective it is imperative that all United Nations members vigorously apply United Nations Security Council Resolution 2270, particularly China and Russia. As the Commander of U.S. Army Pacific, I developed relationships with military leaders in most of the regional countries (less Russia). Each can play an important role in deterring North Korea and in responding to a crisis. Cooperation among regional countries, can signal to North Korea that is increasingly isolated, and this isolation can impose costs on the regime. If confirmed, I would
seek to leverage the relationships to strengthen military cooperation and to increase collective efforts to deal with the North Korean threat, and to set conditions for future stability and prosperity.

**United States - Republic of Korea Alliance**

Since the end of World War II, the U. S. - ROK alliance has been the linchpin of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. This relationship has gone through periods of inevitable change.

**What is your impression of the current U. S. security relationship with the ROK?**

My experience and impression today as the USARPAC Commander is that the current U.S. security relationship with the ROK is very strong, based on mutual respect and trust, and grounded in the Mutual Defense Treaty.

The recent 47th Republic of Korea (ROK) and United States (U.S.) Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) held in Seoul on 2 Nov 2015 reaffirmed the commitment of the ROK and U.S. Presidents to continue to build a comprehensive strategic alliance of bilateral, regional and global scope based on common values and mutual trust, as set forth in the June 2009 "Joint Vision for the Alliance of the Republic of Korea and the United States of America" and reiterated in the May 2013 "Joint Declaration in Commemoration of the 60th Anniversary of the Alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America."

I’m convinced that the ROK-U.S. security relationship remains one of the strongest in the region, and will continue to grow stronger in the coming years.

**If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to improve the U.S.-ROK security relationship?**

If confirmed, I will continue the work of previous leaders to build and maintain strong ties with ROK leadership, including the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff and Operational Commands, the Ministry of Defense, and other vital ROK Ministries responsible for both internal and external security. ROK-U.S. relationships are critical, so routine engagement on a daily basis is the key to success in the ROK-U.S. Alliance at every level.

If confirmed, I will also continue to develop expanded engagement between U.S. Forces and the local and provincial communities throughout the peninsula. Cultural exchanges are vital to enhance mutual understanding between our diverse communities, both civil and military, and build the foundation for lasting relationships at every level. Military exchanges at every level improve our interoperability and create synergy across the joint and combined force. I will inculcate an appreciation by every Service member in USFK that each of us has a responsibility to nurture the Alliance in how we interact with the ROK communities and that we all serve as Ambassadors of the US to the ROK citizens.
Lastly, I will work closely with the U.S. Ambassador to Korea and other elements of the U.S. government to collaboratively design and implement Alliance-building initiatives that promote the continuation of a strong U.S.-ROK security relationship.

**What is your assessment of ROK warfighting capability trends with regard to the modernization and capability improvements in ROK equipment and training?**

It is my assessment that the ROK military remains a capable and motivated force that continues to transform to meet emerging threats and changes in the region. However, I understand they need to continue to reduce critical capabilities gaps and to prepare for an eventual conditions-based assumption of operational control in the future. I believe the ROK government is committed to modernizing their force and addressing these capability gaps. If confirmed, I will work closely with ROK leaders to continually assess their progress during our annual combined and joint exercises, annual conferences focused on selected capability gaps, and through continued engagement with joint and combined force commanders.

**What is your understanding of the command relationships between U.S. and ROK forces?**

It is my understanding that the U.S.-ROK command relationships are structured to address the distinct requirements of Armistice, crisis, and wartime conditions. They provide very close cooperation, collaboration, and transparency to fully leverage joint and combined capabilities, and provide the required flexibility to allow a tailored Alliance response to military crises on the Peninsula. Today, the ROK Chairman is responsible for the conduct of ROK forces and the defense of South Korea during Armistice conditions. In wartime, the current Alliance command relationships dictate that a U.S. General, the Commander of CFC, exercises operational control of selected U.S. and ROK forces.

Since the 2010 North Korean attacks against the ROK – the sinking of the South Korea Navy ship CHEONAN and the artillery attacks on Yeonpyeong island – South Korea has been adamant that it will responded “firmly” to the next such provocation. A main topic during subsequent U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meetings has been the development of a joint counter-provocation plan, which was formalized earlier this year. Since the formalization of the counter-provocation plan there was a summer 2015 landmine attack that injured 2 South Korean soldiers.

**What is your understanding of how the attacks on the Cheonan, Yeonpyeong Island, and the recent landmine attack changed the ROK and U.S. security posture on the Peninsula?**

It is my assessment that these attacks are examples of the continued threat from North Korea as they seek opportunities to create a crisis situation during Armistice to create instability, and attempt to gain concessions from the ROK and the international community. The Command has since signed a combined Alliance counter-provocation contingency plan that improved the readiness posture and allows for a timely, decisive, proportionate, and coordinated Alliance response to future provocations. CFC/USFK/UNC lines of communication with ROK JCS, U.S.
DoD, and U.S. National Command Authority (NCA) have been improved and exercised as a result of these most recent provocations.

Each time these attacks occur, though unfortunate, they exercise and strengthen the resolve of the ROK-U.S. Alliance. If confirmed, I would continue such efforts to ensure we are always improving deterrence and, in the event of another provocation, improve our ability to support our ROK Allies, react to the provocation, and rapidly deescalate the situation to return to a stable environment.

**What is your understanding of the U.S. obligations in the event of an attack on South Korea by North Korea, and under what circumstances do you believe the U.S. armed forces should be committed to engage North Korean forces in response to an attack on South Korea?**

Based on the Mutual Defense Treaty, our Alliance has deterred a major North Korean conventional attack, and maintained our commitment to defend South Korea from external aggression. There are a number of plans that outline specific U.S. commitments and South Korean obligations to coordinate responses to North Korean provocations or attacks.

**Transfer of Wartime Operational Control**

In his statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee in February on the posture of USFK, General Scaparrotti stated that the path for the transfer of the operational control of combined forces on the Korean Peninsula from the United States to the ROK will be based on ROK’s development of relevant capabilities for wartime OPCON and the security environment on the Peninsula and the region.

**What is your understanding of the ROK’s current and projected military capabilities and the ability of ROK forces to assume a greater role in the defense of their homeland including responsibility for command and control of the readiness, operations and war fighting of their own forces in wartime?**

The ROK maintains a highly trained, modernized, and capable military that is continuously improving. Their ground force is fully capable of defending the ROK from aggression and defeating a NK conventional attack.

ROK Naval forces are highly trained and rapidly expanding capabilities to operate in deeper waters. The addition of AEGIS-class destroyers aids their ability to control local seas and also improves ballistic missile defense. The ROK Air Force has made great progress in both training and capability in recent years and is fully able to integrate with the U.S. Air Force to form a decisive team that provides our largest advantage over our adversary. Additionally, both ROK Marines and ROK Special Forces have increased their capability and capacity levels, enabling an even more lethal joint and combined team.

In short, the ROK military is highly capable and will only increase its capabilities as it continues to modernize and interoperable with U.S. forces in Korea. The ROK military’s
continued focus and effort to increase its capabilities will ensure that the ROK is able to achieve the conditions for the transfer of wartime OPCON and lead the combined defense against any NK aggression.

**How can U.S. Forces Korea assist the ROK to develop these capabilities in the near-to-medium term?**

USFK can assist the ROK in developing these capabilities in the near-to-medium term through our robust training and exercise program at the tactical level in unit field training exercises, and at the theater level in our two annual command post exercises, ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN and KEY RESOLVE. These training events and exercises enable both the ROK and U.S. forces to hone capabilities, enhance interoperability, and test new processes and procedures. Moreover, increased contact at multiple echelons of command can assist in developing further the interoperability and strength among the two forces. I welcome initiatives like the Combined ROK-US 2nd Infantry Division.

Through the Conditions-Based OPCON Transition governance process, USFK and ROK leaders continually and bilaterally meet to discuss progress, issues, and the way ahead for the ROK to assume operational control of its armed forces. The U.S. forces will continue to be the honest broker to ensure that our ROK counterparts are able to “Fight Tonight.” Through the Conditions-based OPCON Transition Program (COTP), the ROK and the U.S. have bilaterally agreed to specific metrics that will assist us in determining when the ROK has obtained the capabilities and capacity to assume control.

The ROK can also develop these capabilities by continuing to invest in their defense by acquiring the capabilities needed for OPCON transfer. These include continued acquisitions in intelligence, surveillance & reconnaissance (ISR), ballistic missile defense (BMD), critical munitions, and C4I.

**Consolidation of U.S. Forces**

The Land Partnership Plan (LPP) is consolidating the combat brigade and supporting elements of the 2nd Infantry Division in and around Camp Humphreys, south of Seoul. U.S. costs associated with implementing the LPP are estimated at $3.2 billion, and that does not include hundreds of millions of dollars in transition costs for sustaining facilities until the move is completed. The Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) proposes to move most of the U.S. forces currently stationed at Yongsan compound in Seoul to Camp Humphrey as well. The YRP relocation is to be largely funded by the Republic of Korea Government, but the United States will face potentially significant costs as well.

What is the current status of the two consolidation plans and the timeline for completion?

The Yongsan Relocation Plan / Land Partnership Plan (YRP/LPP) program is 73% complete with CY15-16 being the largest years of construction placement. We currently estimate substantial completion of the YRP/LPP construction programs for the end of CY18.
However, some unit relocation will occur beyond CY18 due to retaining U.S. counter-fire forces north of Seoul and the Combined Forces Command HQ in Seoul until OPCON transition occurs.

In 2003 there were 174 U.S. sites located across the ROK. To date, the U.S. returned 49 sites to the ROK. As we continue to consolidate under the YRP/LPP programs, we will eventually return an additional 29 sites with an enduring end state of 96 sites, generally located within the two enduring hubs of Humphreys and Daegu.

**In your opinion, does the consolidation better support the warfighting mission? If so, how?**

The completion of the LPP/YRP programs consolidates mission command and intelligence assets which will streamline communications, enabling a more rapid response to warfighting mission execution. Consolidation also allows better force protection, and the centralization of facilities and services also improves quality of life for service members.

The consolidation of forces triggers consolidation of all combat support and combat service support elements. It enhances force protection by reducing the footprint necessary for ballistic missile defense (BMD) and by locating a larger number of non-combatants south of the Han River, simplifying evacuation operations during contingency and crisis operations.

Operational efficiencies will also be realized; this has and will continue to reduce the infrastructure footprint and strategically save valuable sustainment, restoration, and maintenance (SRM) costs. Planning assumptions also take into account that consolidation of other installation support services such as medical, in/out processing, training, schools, finance, and others will garner future cost savings and efficiencies. Consolidation of facilities, services, and people, along with energy efficient buildings, will reduce future operating costs.

**What do you anticipate to be the total costs, including transition costs, to be incurred by the U.S. Government to carry out the two consolidations?**

Transformation and Re-stationing is a $10.7B project consisting of two programs, Yongsan Relocation Program (YRP) and the Land Partnership Program (LPP). Out of the total $10.7B, the ROK is funding approximately 91%, with the U.S. funding 9%. The YRP program is largely funded by the ROK. Under the LPP, if the ROK requests the U.S. to vacate a facility or installation, the ROK pays the relocation costs. Conversely, if the U.S. chooses to relocate an installation or facility it is required to fund the costs. Host nation burden sharing contributions received from the ROK under the Special Measures Agreement will fund the majority of U.S. LPP construction obligations. The remaining costs associated with transition were POM’d by the relocating organizations.

**Given that the US-ROK Status of Forces Agreement states that the US is not obligated to restore facilities and areas to their original condition when they are returned to the ROK, to what extent do you believe the United States should compensate the ROK for the costs related to environmental clean-up at bases being vacated as a result of the LPP?**
Under SOFA Article IV, the ROK is not obligated to compensate the U.S. for improvements to facilities and areas and the U.S. is not obligated to restore them to their previous condition, when they are returned.

I believe this long standing arrangement is balanced. Both governments recognize the importance of environmental protection in the context of defense activities in Korea. In addition, DoD policy requires prompt action be taken by commanders to address a substantial impact to human health and safety due to environmental contamination caused by DoD activities and is located on a DoD installation.

Environmental clean-up according to domestic Korean law for conditions other than those needed to address a substantial impact to human health may be undertaken by the Korean Government.

**Host Nation Burden-Sharing Programs**

The United States and ROK currently operate under a “Special Measures Agreement” (SMA) in which the ROK contributes toward U.S. costs associated with maintaining U.S. forces in the country.

The U.S. and ROK signed a new SMA on 2 February 2014 which constitutes a 5-year agreement through 31 December 2018. The current SMA agreement increases ROK SMA contributions annually by the previous year's ROK Consumer Price Index. The CY2015 and CY2016 ROK Consumer Price Index increased by 1.3% which amounted to SMA contributions totaling 931 billion won (~$808M) in 2015 and 944 billion won (~$819M) in 2016. These funds are spread across three cost sharing categories of labor, logistics, and construction.

The labor cost sharing program accounts for up to 75% of the salary for approximately 8,600 Korean National employees directly supporting U.S. forces. The Korean National employees provide significant contributions to mission accomplishment, particularly with bilingual language capability and continuity.

The logistics cost sharing program allows for in-kind contribution for supplies and services along ten categories which include munitions storage, equipment maintenance, warehousing, transportation, sustainment services, and base operations support. The program allows the U.S. to solicit and recommend the contractor with the ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) serving as final arbiter.

The ROK Funded Construction program allocates funding in cash and in-kind construction for military construction to include associated design and project oversight. Projects are restricted to mission essential military construction and cannot be used to build recreational facilities. The program allows the U.S. to select projects but requires consultation with the ROK MND.
**What is your assessment of the current level and quality of the burden-sharing arrangement?**

It is my understanding that the ROK pays approximately 50% of the cost to station U.S. forces on the peninsula through the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) which is negotiated every five years. Due to fiscal challenges we face as a nation, this is a very important agreement and if confirmed I will be intimately involved in its negotiations.

**Training of U.S. Forces in the Republic of Korea**

One of the challenges for the U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula is training, particularly the access to training ranges for large ground unit maneuver and fires and for close air support missions.

What is your understanding of the training challenges for U.S. forces in the ROK, including the availability and access to training ranges for large ground unit maneuver and fires, close air support, and other Air Force training requirements?

Due to limitations on the Korean peninsula, it is necessary for the U.S. Air Force to utilize off-peninsula training opportunities to meet some Operations Plans training requirements. Some of these requirements are to maintain proficiency on CAS, Interdiction, and Suppression of Enemy Air Defense competencies. Robust range capabilities that realistically replicate the NK air defense and electronic warfare threat in a contested environment are essential to gaining and maintaining these capabilities and are generally not available on The Peninsula.

Ground unit maneuver and fires training rely heavily upon U.S. exclusive and ROK Land Partnership Program (LPP) shared training facilities. The combination of these two sets of training facilities meet the U.S.-standard training requirements in order to maintain proficiency in ground combat operations, particularly artillery and maneuver training. Air-ground integration with maneuver forces are limited in scenario development due to range limitations and restricted surface danger zones, thereby inhibiting scale of exercises to platoon/company levels.

**In your view, are the ranges in Korea adequate to meet the training requirements of U.S. forces?**

Yes, and if confirmed I commit to evaluating the options available for training to refine my view. However, given the limitations of both air and ground Service Components to conduct realistic live fire and maneuver training, the ranges in Korea are not as capable when compared to range capabilities available to most CONUS-based units and require some training to take place outside the ROK. The limited availability of land for maneuver, live fire, and situational training exercises limits training to platoon/company-level training events. Higher echelon headquarters such as battalion and brigade can conduct training using multi-echelon techniques by combining live, virtual, and constructive exercise design to mitigate the impact of training area limitations. Although less than optimal, air-to-ground limitations have been mitigated by taking advantage of high-quality off-peninsula exercises such as RED FLAG Alaska.
How will the overall readiness reduction of U.S. forces due to budget cuts and sequestration, as forecast by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Service Chiefs, impact U.S. force capabilities in Korea?

Existing budget cuts and sequestration effects if fully implemented will reduce resources available to maintaining training and equipment readiness for all forces committed to Korea. This will increase the need for prioritizing capabilities and elevating risk in others. Moreover, the availability of forces to reinforce the forward deployed and stationed forces, in periodic exercises and in crisis response will be strained in each service of the U.S. military. Finally, the necessary modernization to find replacements to key munitions that are reaching an end of life cycle, and aging combat vehicles and aircraft that are in use, and to introduce emerging capabilities that are needed to offset numerical advantages belonging to North Korea will be severely challenged under the forecasted cuts and effects of sequestration.

The strength of the U.S. and ROK Alliance remains the cornerstone of deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. Like other commands, USFK faces many challenges to maintain our readiness in a resource constrained environment. These challenges create risk in several areas. Although USFK has taken steps to mitigate those risks, fully addressing these challenges requires allocation of resources over an extended period of time.

Examples include the need to refurbish our M1A2 tanks and Assault Breaching Vehicles that are part of the Korea Enduring Equipment Set. Additionally, The USFK strategic backbone communications infrastructure is beyond end-of-life and requires an equipment refresh and upgrade in order to ensure the ability to "Fight Tonight." The replacement of the existing Asynchronous Transfer Mode/Secure Optical Network (ATM/SONET) and transition to the Internet Protocol/Multi-Protocol Label Switching (IP/MPLS) are necessary efforts to modernize the strategic communications equipment within the Korean Peninsula, and align the communications infrastructure with the Department of Defense Joint Information Environment (JIE) initiatives. Funding delays will impact the ability to enable Mission Command.

Future budget cuts and sequestration will ultimately degrade the overall readiness of USFK and its ability to execute the Operations Plan (OPLAN). Our current posture and presence has a significant reassuring effect on the domestic population while also deterring North Korean aggression. Increased fiscal constraints negatively impact the readiness of on-peninsula, and especially, follow-on forces--creating further degradation in capability to respond to North Korean aggression. Any degradation in capability increases risk to the force and risk to mission success.

Quality of Life

Through investment in quality of life amenities, to include housing, health care, and recreation, the Department has worked to achieve the goal of making South Korea an "assignment of choice" for U. S. Forces.
What do you consider to be the most essential quality of life programs for soldiers and their families stationed in Korea and, if confirmed, what would be your goals in this regard?

I would like to touch on two quality of life areas that I consider most essential. The first is access to high quality medical care and, second, the education of our children. We have an incredible team of medical professionals and educators that provide world class support to our military members and their families every day.

High quality and readily available medical care is an essential component of our community. The medical care our Service members and their Families receive in the ROK is high quality, safe, and meets their access to care needs. Our military healthcare system is augmented by more than 40 ROK network hospitals, managed by the TRICARE Overseas Program. Each of these network hospitals strives to provide healthcare in a familiar environment, most with a well-resourced International Health Clinic that provide our beneficiaries high quality care with transportation, language, and escort support.

There are over 4,500 students enrolled in 12 Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) facilities across the peninsula. All of the schools are fully accredited under the AdvancED program.

In addition to the existing 12 facilities, there are additional schools under construction and planned to open within the next 18 months. At Camp Humphreys, new middle and elementary schools will begin classes in January and August 2017, respectively.

If confirmed, my intent is to maintain the level of access and high quality of both of these critical areas.

What is your understanding of the capacity of DOD schools in South Korea to accommodate the increase in families/children associated with tour normalization?

Tour normalization is an outdated concept that is no longer used. I believe this question addresses the concerns involved with the consolidation of forces and installations. We have the capacity to meet the needs of our families. For example, Osan Air Base Elementary school opens in August 2016 and will be the first DoD Education Activity school in the Pacific that incorporates the new 21st Century design. This new design will be the template for all future schools. Daegu Middle High opens in August 2017 after construction completes this spring.

In locations with limited population or education services, there are programs and mitigations in place to meet the needs of students. We provide transportation for students to attend nearby DoDEA schools. For instance, we plan to transport 6-8 students from Chinhae to Daegu Middle High beginning in August 2017. For locations where transportation is not feasible, we work with our DoDEA partners through the Non-DoD Schools Program (NDSP). The NDSP is a program within the Department of Defense Education Activity that provides educational support and financial assistance to defray costs of education and to facilitate educational continuity in international locations where there is no DoDEA school.
Medical Care for U. S. Forces in Korea

One of the most important quality of life issues in Korea is ensuring access to high quality medical care for service members of all military branches and their families. Separate medical chains of command responsible for providing health care, and the presence of non-command-sponsored family members who need health services, among other factors, have presented challenges.

If confirmed, how would you assess the management and delivery of health care services in South Korea for both command and non-command sponsored family members?

It is my understanding that USFK health care services receive the resources to provide adequate levels of care to Service Members and command-sponsored family members. If confirmed, I will monitor the management of these resources which enable USFK to provide basic health care maintenance, and serve our population well. High quality medical care availability is a top priority and is integral to our military readiness.

When more advanced care is required, we rely on Korean network hospitals managed by the TRICARE Overseas Program. This network enables USFK to meet TRICARE care standards for our population, which includes emergency response services and access to more routine and specialty care when needed.

USFK closely manages patient care by monitoring access, quality, and safety. This same medical care system provides support to our non-command sponsored family members on U.S. installations on a space-available basis and off-installation at the same Korean TRICARE network facilities used by all other beneficiaries. Assessment of the management and delivery of health care services is an ongoing process using the same The Joint Commission (TJC) accreditation standards and evaluation used in the U.S.

Prevention of and Response to Sexual Assaults

What is your assessment of the problem of sexual assaults at USFK?

Progress is being made but sexual assault remains a challenge throughout our military. Within USFK, there are challenging conditions that must be countered through engaged leadership and through cultivating a culture of intolerance to sexual assault or harassment. Among the conditions are: 1) the demographics of USFK’s military population; for example, a population that is 10% higher in first term enlistees than CONUS installations. 2) a high population of personnel who are on unaccompanied tours as geographic bachelors. 3) the rotational nature of service in Korea whether in individual rotations or in collective unit rotations. Although these conditions create a challenge, USFK continues to make progress in its efforts to prevent sexual assault. The number of founded penetrative offenses (the most serious offense) are tracking lower in FY16 than the previous year.
What is your assessment of USFK’s sexual assault prevention and response program?

Although much work remains to be done in order to eliminate the scourge of sexual assault from our ranks, USFK and its components implement strong programs which are showing positive results. The number of founded penetrative offenses (the most serious offense) are lower than the previous year while the reporting of these most serious offenses is up over the past year. This indicates training is effective and USFK personnel are comfortable with reporting allegations of sexual assault, confident in their chain of command, know they will get the help they need, and know their reports will be thoroughly and fairly investigated. There are many “best practices” emerging in Korea and, if confirmed, I would highlight and encourage initiatives that change the culture and reduce the frequency.

What is your view of the provision for restricted and unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults?

I view the provision for both types of reports to be useful and worth sustaining. While restricted reporting is frustrating from a command desire to relentlessly pursue any all reports and to ensure perpetrators do not have latitude to become repeat offenders, this provision clearly considers the needs and desires of individual victims where our first obligation is met. Some victims require medical treatment, or perhaps information on services available to them, but they do not want to speak with law enforcement personnel or undergo the rigors and publicity that may go along with an investigation and a trial. It is proper that we allow these victims to make restricted reports, so that we can protect their privacy, but still provide them the services they need. The investigative process after an unrestricted report mandates the safety of the victim and provides the military with the ability to hold offenders accountable.

What is your view about the role of the chain of command in providing necessary support to victims of sexual assault?

Sexual assault is a crime that violates basic human dignity and the standards of decency which we must uphold and protect. Engaged leadership by the chain of command must lead efforts to provide support to victims of sexual assault in unrestricted cases. Working with their trained victim advocates and response coordinators, the chain of command must ensure that all necessary resources are made available to victims. Leaders have the responsibility to ensure victims of sexual assault receive timely care and support and are protected from being re-victimized as a result of reporting the incident. Leaders ensure that victim-blaming does not occur within the organizational culture. Moreover, leaders ensure there is balance in protecting the rights of accused and victims, while concurrently addressing organizational culture and values. The chain of command is the quintessential integrator of all aspects of the system of prevention and response. If confirmed, I will continue to focus on achieving the goal of zero incidents and 100% reporting as I have focused in my last three commands.

What is your view of the adequacy of resources and programs in USFK to provide victims of sexual assault the medical, psychological, and legal help they need?

The resources and programs in USFK provide appropriate medical, psychological, and
legal help to victims of sexual assault. It is assessed that USFK’s reported sexual assaults increased last year due to the education among our people concerning resources and reporting options available to them, and the confidence that they will receive the compassionate and professional help they require if they report an allegation. This trend is reflective of increased confidence in the chain of command taking appropriate action and increased knowledge of the program as a result of the training.

**What is your view of USFK initiatives to prevent additional sexual assaults?**

USFK and its components actively implement dynamic and engaging training. The training includes hands on interactive role-playing, drama, mentoring, and communication training. For example, USFK is developing training which is specifically targeted at our most at risk population, our younger military personnel. This training teaches our younger personnel how to understand and better communicate with the opposite sex, in order to set conditions that prevent sexual assault.

USFK and its components have also increased active and passive safety measures – including increased patrols, CCTV cameras, and enhanced locks and lighting in the dormitories.

**What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources available to USFK to investigate and prosecute allegations of sexual assault?**

USFK investigative and prosecutorial resources are adequate. Criminal investigative agencies prioritize sexual assault cases and thoroughly investigate all allegations of sexual assault. With increased training and specialization, both investigators and prosecutors are becoming increasingly skilled in dealing with these types of cases, which can often be complex and challenging by their nature.

**What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults occur?**

If sexual assault is to be eliminated, our military culture must support an environment that does not tolerate sexual assault. The chain of command, at all levels, must be fully engaged and lead this cultural change. Commanders must lead and support all of our prevention programs, which are designed to eliminate sexual assault and harassment within our ranks and sustain an environment of trust for our Service members, Civilians, and families. Engaged leadership must be nested from senior commanders down to the first line supervisor to establish and maintain a climate where any sex crime within our ranks is viewed as unacceptable by everyone in the military.

**Surveys report that up to 62 percent of victims who report a sexual assault perceive professional or social retaliation for reporting.**

**If confirmed, what will you do to address the issue of retaliation for reporting a sexual assault?**
If confirmed, I will ensure that leaders understand retaliation against those who report sexual assault will not be tolerated. We will pursue every allegation and ensure it is thoroughly and professionally investigated, and—if necessary—take appropriate action. Preventing retaliation must be a key part of all training and every service member, civilian, and family member must be fully educated on the reporting options and resources available to them. Additionally, communication within the command, particularly from previous victims of sexual assault to other members of the command, on the realities of whether or not they felt retaliation will be important to drive away the anticipation of retaliation.

**Sexual assault is a significantly underreported crime in our society and in the military. If confirmed, what will you do to increase reporting of sexual assaults by military victims?**

USFK has seen an increase in reporting because military personnel are well-trained, and commanders strongly support those personnel who make reports. During the most recent USFK Commander-directed IG Pulse Inspection, the following are some of the findings:

97% of service members (SMs) could define sexual assault (SA) concepts and their reporting options correctly. Command teams indicated that they have trained their subordinates regularly on the subject and feel confident they would know how to properly report an incident. 91% of SMs stated that they would report SA incidents to their chain of command because they trust them and have witnessed cases being handled properly. 91% of SMs believed their chain of command would take SA reports seriously and would protect their individual safety as a component of their responsibility.

To sustain U.S. forces in Korea, if confirmed, we will continue to focus on proper command climates, enforce discipline, and emphasize comprehensive fitness and wellness. We will also focus organizational effort on our leader development programs that emphasize the character development and values of every Service Member assigned to USFK. Particularly in the areas of preventing crime, sexual harassment, and sexual assault, we will take proactive steps that continue a downward trend in substantiated cases. Prevention of sexual assault and crime is vital to readiness and discipline, building trust, and ultimately prevailing in combat. I will continue to encourage pursuit of the goal of zero incidents and 100% reporting.

**In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a judge advocate outside the chain of command, instead of a military commander in the grade of O-6 or above as is currently the Department’s policy, to determine whether allegations of sexual assault should be prosecuted?**

Commanders are passionate about eliminating sexual assault because this offense tears at unit cohesion, good order, and discipline. A judge advocate from outside the chain of command will not have the same authority, resources, and experience as a commander who is intimate in the knowledge of his unit and responsible for maintaining the good order and discipline of his or her unit. Removing responsibility outside the chain of command would not help to ensure fair and just treatment of all victims and all accused personnel. I believe it would undermine the commander’s authority and ability to maintain good order, discipline, and readiness in his
formation. It is critical for the commander to be the center of gravity for both setting standards and enforcing discipline within their formations. Ultimately, it is the Commander who has the authority and responsibility for the command climate, good order and discipline, and morale of the unit they command. Granting decision authority to a judge advocate from outside the unit, who does not have an understanding of the unit’s command climate, morale, good order, and discipline, will undermine the social fabric of the unit and its overall effectiveness.

**What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to address the problem of sexual assaults at USFK?**

If confirmed, I will assess initiatives that reinforce the need for all members to be fully committed to creating a positive climate—one of trust and respect in which every person can thrive and achieve their full potential. Particularly in the areas of preventing crime, sexual harassment, and sexual assault, we will take proactive steps that continue a downward trend in incidents, including regular sensing sessions to provide insights on what leaders need to be most aware of for effective prevention strategies. I will also lead by example, personally exhibiting caring and compassion for victims, and high expectations and active engagements to prevent further assaults. Moreover, I would seek to positively reinforce creative leaders who get results in building trust.

**What is your assessment of the effect, if any, of recent legislation concerning sexual assault on the capability of USFK commanders to prosecute sexual assault cases?**

Much of this legislation has been useful; however, some time may be required to assess its effectiveness. One initiative that has already proven highly effective has been the establishment of the Special Victim Counsel. These counsel listen to victims, educate them on the complexities of the justice system, and ensure that the rights of victims are protected throughout investigations and trial. Representation by the Special Victim Counsel has ensured that victims are properly heard throughout the judicial process. This has led to fair and just results at trial.

**In your view, what is the appropriate role for a U.S. military commander who is working with coalition partners, when that U.S. officer becomes aware of allegations sex trafficking or of child abuse by members of that coalition force?**

In my view, the U.S. military commander must immediately report the allegations up the chain of command of the coalition partner and must direct full cooperation by U.S. investigators and legal personnel with coalition investigators and prosecutors. If the commander has a counterpart commander, he or she should seek out that commander and inform them of the allegation while continuing to monitor what is done with the report.

**If confirmed, what direction would you give to U.S. personnel assigned to your command who become aware of such allegations?**

If confirmed, my standing direction will be for all members of the command to immediately report these types of egregious incidents. USFK's policy of zero tolerance for human trafficking activity and sexual assault/harassment/abuse of any kind will remain
unchanged for all service members, civilians, and contractors. We will constantly work to improve discipline and ensure service members conduct themselves beyond reproach, both on and off duty. Human trafficking activity and sexual assault/harassment/abuse are incompatible with our military core values. These activities have direct and negative impacts on our ROK-U.S. Alliance; combat readiness; Service Member, Civilian, and Family morale; and community health issues.

Under what circumstances would you expect U.S. personnel under your command to intervene to stop such misconduct if they suspect it or observe it?

If confirmed, I would expect all U.S. personnel under my command to immediately step in to stop or prevent sexual assault if it is observed or suspected. In order to prevent sexual assault, every member of the command and community must be committed to advancing an environment where sexist behaviors, sexual harassment, and sexual assault are not tolerated, condoned, or ignored. Every member of the command must add their voice to call an end to this crime and assume responsibility to intervene and report when misconduct is observed.

North Korea-POW-MIA Recovery Efforts

From 1996-2005, the United States worked with the North Korean military to recover and repatriate the remains of American service-members who perished on the Korean peninsula.

In your opinion, under what conditions should the United States work with North Korea to repatriate the remains of American service-members found in North Korea?

For some time, the US has separated recovery repatriation operations from other policy and political issues. I agree with this from a humanitarian perspective, and as a condition of armistice.

However, to work with North Korea in this regard requires confidence of a stable and secure environment in which to work, as well as confidence that both parties will uphold their responsibilities in such an arrangement. These conditions are not present at this time.

Until the political and military situation on the Korean peninsula improves appreciably, the possibilities for resuming remains recoveries in NK remains bleak. With the potential for additional nuclear and missile tests in the near future, and direct threats against the U.S., the environment is not conducive for cooperative discussions between our government and NK on joint recovery operations. If confirmed, I pledge my full support to the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency (DPAA), the U.S. lead for remains recovery, to accomplish their noble and important mission.

ROK-Japan Relationship

The ROK and Japan are two of our most important bilateral alliances, but historical issues have prevented cooperation and integration between them to this point. The recent
Comfort Woman agreement between Tokyo and Seoul was an important step for moving forward on this issue.

What is your assessment of the ROK-Japan relationship?

In my current role commanding U.S. Army Pacific I have participated actively in advancing the ROK-Japan relationship and am pleased that there is increasing progress, albeit measured. From first-hand experience in collective venues, as well as in one-on-one discussions with military leaders of both countries, I know that the United States is viewed as the honest broker in enabling the repair of a centuries-old strained relationship with deep and highly emotional roots. Positive signals include continuing efforts to resolve the Comfort Women issue, and recent statements by President Park and Prime Minister Abe at the Nuclear Summit agreeing to increase security cooperation to encourage North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program.

The United States will continue to play an integral role in facilitating this relationship, and if confirmed, I will continue to support and nurture the creation of mutual trust in conjunction with the service staffs, the Joint Staff, the DoD, and Department of State to maintain this path.

What opportunities for cooperation do you foresee for the bilateral (ROK-Japan) and trilateral (ROK-Japan-US) relationships?

Korea and Japan have signaled strong interest in increased cooperation for Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief, maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) operations, and anti-piracy efforts. However, the primary catalyst for improvement in the ROK-Japan relationship is the evolving nuclear and ballistic missile threat from North Korea. This security concern presents tremendous opportunities for enhanced military-to-military cooperation, and we are working alongside Pacific Command to facilitate trilateral missile warning exercises in the near future.

Additionally, General Lee and Admiral Kawano joined General Dunford via video teleconference for the second Trilateral Chiefs of Defense (Tri-CHOD) conference in February of this year (the first was in Japan in July 2014) to further efforts on trilateral information sharing and collaboration in light of increasing North Korean nuclear and missile threats. They agreed to coordinate further on mutual security issues to enhance peace and stability in the region, and are tentatively scheduled for another trilateral meeting later this summer.

I feel confident that we are on the right trajectory for increased cooperation, and as always, we stand by ready to support all efforts to improve trilateral relationships.

Regional Posture

In your opinion, how should the U. S. employ its forces in ROK to provide for regional presence and engagement, and to best respond to regional threats, provide support for out-of-area contingencies, and maintain readiness?

In my opinion, the increasing use of high readiness forces on operational deployments to Korea is to be sustained. Additionally, the periodic increases in presence, through exercises,
visits, alert deployments is improving readiness while also sending a signal of continued commitment. If confirmed, I would rely on USPACOM to develop the regional relationships through their Theater Security Cooperation programs, while USFK concentrates on connecting those relationships to the three missions on the Korean peninsula (USFK, CFC, UNC).

If confirmed, I will work to consider the potential to use forces on the peninsula for other mission sets, and perhaps explore with the ROK the prospect for using combined forces off peninsula. This will have to be done in a very deliberate manner due to the diplomatic issues involved, and will primarily involve PACOM or other U.S. commands depending on the location and nature of the activities.

**What adjustments, if any, do you anticipate having to make to your strategy if current budget cuts and sequestration cuts remain in place?**

USFK continues to be second only to Afghanistan for resources. However, as was the case with my predecessor, General Scaparrotti, I am concerned about the readiness of follow-on forces required to prosecute our operational plan. If the cuts remain in place, we will have to factor them into our operations plans. Additionally, we will have to assume higher risk in terms of North Korea perceiving the opportunity to successfully conduct provocations and aggression, as well as the speed and effectiveness of our responses. I have concern about the ability of the DoD to develop and deliver emerging capabilities quickly enough under sequestration, particularly in protective systems that can counter rockets, artillery and mortars and to counter the cyber and asymmetric threats. Conventional resources will have to be dedicated to these purposes, and tactics may be required to mitigate the risks that emerge from under-resourcing.

**What additional strategic risks do you think you will have to assume over the next five years in your area of responsibility if the current budget cuts and sequestration cuts remain in place?**

I anticipate that the next five years will see additional advances in North Korea’s asymmetric capabilities. Unfortunately, we cannot dismiss the prospect that they would engage in a large-scale act of aggression or potentially experience significant internal instability. I am also concerned that North Korea could misperceive that it has opportunities to use military adventurism to serve its interests during the U.S. or South Korean presidential transitions.

However, more than anything else, I am concerned about the strategic risk that would come from continued budget cuts and sequestration cuts. My concern centers on the effect of cuts to military capabilities and forces available to me as commander, should I be confirmed. Additionally, I am worried about the perception or reality of U.S. fiscal challenges eroding U.S. influence overall, and that this situation may provide encouragement to our competitors and adversaries to continue to challenge U.S. interests.
**Congressional Oversight**

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

I do.

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

I do.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea?

I do.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

I do.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

I do.