

Senate Armed Services Committee
Advance Policy Questions for Dr. James H. Anderson
Nominee for Appointment to be
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Duties

Pursuant to section 137a of title 10, U.S. Code, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (DUSD(P)) serve as the first assistant to an Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and assists the Under Secretary in the performance of the duties set forth in section 134 of the code.

1. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the DUSD(P)?

My responsibilities as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (DUSD) is outlined by DoD Directive 5111.03. My role is as the principal assistant to and under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. As such the DUSD helps the Under Secretary carry out their responsibilities, functions, and authorities. Moreover, the DUSD advises and assists the Under Secretary in providing advice and assistance to the Secretary of Defense.

2. What is your understanding of the role of the DUSD(P) as “first assistant” to the USD(P)?

As first assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, I shall assist the USD(P) in the performance of the duties of that position and shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the USD(P) when he/she dies, resigns, or is otherwise unable to perform the functions and duties of the office.

3. If confirmed, what specific additional duties might you expect the USD(P) to prescribe for you, particularly in light of the lines of effort set forth in the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS)?

If confirmed, I expect that my duties and functions would include advising and assisting the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense on strategy formulation, contingency planning, and the integration of Department of Defense plans and policy. I expect that this would include involvement in the planning, programming, budgeting and execution (PPBE) system, and in major departmental reviews.

Qualifications

4. What background and experience do you possess that qualify you for this position?

I have extensive policy, academic, and executive experience in my three decades as a national security professional.

Most recently, I have served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities since September 2018. I also performed the duties of Deputy Under Secretary of

Defense for Policy from August 2019 to February 2020. Since March 2020, I have performed the duties of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

In my former capacity as Vice President for Academic Affairs at Marine Corps University, I served as the chief academic officer for educational programs that reach over 60 thousand Marines annually. My executive level responsibilities included ensuring accreditation for our three Master's degree granting institutions.

Earlier in my career, I worked defense issues as a Schedule C appointee in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (2001-2009). From 2003-2009, I worked in a demanding and fast-paced regional office – International Security Affairs, Middle East (ISA/ME). In this capacity, I first served as Country Director, Israel, and then Director for Middle East.

I have also authored (or co-authored) nearly one hundred monographs, articles, and Op-Eds on a wide range of strategy-related topics during my career. These topics include theater and national missile defense; the importance of security alliances, to include bilateral and multilateral alliances; security threats in the Middle East, Indo-Pacific, and European theaters; and national defense strategy and policy.

Finally, I have lived overseas and taught at the George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies. In this capacity, I developed a deep appreciation for the importance of security cooperation. I taught military and civilian security officials from a wide range of European countries, and traveled extensively throughout the region to participate in a wide range of defense cooperation activities.

5. Specifically what leadership and management experience do you possess that you would apply to your service as DUSD(P), if confirmed?

I have served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities since September 2018. I also performed the duties of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from August 2019 to February 2020. Since March 2020, I have performed the duties of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

In my former capacity as Vice President for Academic Affairs at Marine Corps University, I served as the chief academic officer for educational programs that reach over 60 thousand Marines annually. My executive level responsibilities included ensuring accreditation for three Master's degree granting institutions.

If confirmed as DUSD(P), I would apply the leadership and management experience I have accrued in these positions.

6. Are there any actions you would take to enhance your ability to perform the duties and exercise the powers of the DUSD(P)?

If confirmed, I seek guidance from my chain of command on how to improve my performance as a senior DoD leader. I will also take advantage of senior level professional development opportunities to improve my ability to be an effective DUSD(P).

Major Challenges and Priorities

7. What do you consider to be the most significant challenges you would face if confirmed as the DUSD(P)?

If confirmed, I would consider continued implementation of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) to be my number one priority. Major challenges include crafting and implementing strategic guidance and reforms, supporting programmatic options, and ensuring planning processes allow DoD to apply resources as efficiently as possible in a more competitive and dangerous security environment. It is also a major challenge to ensure that our efforts to modernize U.S. nuclear forces meet policy and strategy requirements in a timely and cost-effective manner.

8. If confirmed, specifically what actions would you take, in what order of priority, and on what timeline—to address each of these challenges?

If confirmed, I would work with the Joint Staff to promulgate strategic guidance in alignment with NDS priorities and to infuse this guidance into processes and decision-making fora throughout DoD. It would also be my priority to ensure our nuclear forces remain safe, secure, and effective and that they are planned, postured, operated, and modernized in accordance with policy guidance, to include the timelines outlined in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.

9. If confirmed, what innovative ideas, if any, would you consider providing the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense regarding the organization and operations of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P))?

If confirmed, I would share my ideas on organizational reforms aimed to make Policy more effective and efficient. I would also provide my thoughts on streamlining procedures and implementing best practices in order to make Policy a more responsive and agile organization.

Torture and Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

10. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, *The Department of Defense Detainee Program*, dated August 19, 2014?

Yes, I support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3 (September 2006), and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, *The Department of Defense Detainee Program* (August 19, 2014).

11. If confirmed, what role will you play in the ongoing triennial review and revision of FM 2-22.3 mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2016?

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security is the lead for conducting the triennial review and revision of FM 2-22.3. If confirmed, I look forward to providing a policy review of any proposed revisions to this critical document.

12. Are there certain policies or processes set forth in FM 2-22.3 that in your view are in particular need of revision? Please explain your answer.

I'm not aware of any policies or processes that are in need of revision, but if any are identified during the review, I will work with the USD(I&S) to revise them, if I am confirmed.

Continuing Use of Guantanamo Bay Naval Station as a Detention Center

13. More than seventeen years have passed since the first detainee in the global war on terrorism arrived in Guantanamo Bay Naval Station. At the height of operations, Guantanamo held almost 800 detainees. Today, only 40 remain. Estimates of the cost of maintaining an individual detainee at Guantanamo are as high as \$8 million annually.

What are your views on the continued use of the detention facility at Guantanamo? Should use of the facility be expanded or terminated?

If confirmed, I will support the continued operations of the detention facility at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, which is the Department's only long-term law of war detention facility. I will also ensure the continued safe, humane, and lawful care and treatment of detainees through Joint Task Force – Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO).

Commander, US Southern Command, is currently exploring options to right-size JTF-GTMO. Although the facility will remain open, DoD seeks to operate it more efficiently.

14. If confirmed, would you advise the President to transfer additional detainees to Guantanamo? If so, what criteria would you apply to inform the President's transfer decision? If not, why not?

The detention facility at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as DoD's only long-term detention facility, plays an important role in our enduring counterterrorism campaign. Combatant Commanders have been instructed regarding the process and common-sense considerations for any recommendation to transfer an individual to the custody of JTF-GTMO.

15. In your view, what should be the Defense Department's long-term detention strategy?

Detention is necessary for those detainees who, if not detained, would pose a continuing threat to the security of the United States. We should also continue to conduct a review process using available information to determine whether a detainee no longer poses a continuing threat to the security of the United States and whether there is a suitable country to which to transfer such a detainee.

16. The Periodic Review Board (PRB) process enacted in law by section 1023 of the FY 2012 NDAA “to determine whether certain individuals detained at [Guantanamo] represent a continuing significant threat to the security of the United States such that their continued detention is warranted”, appears to be stalled. What is your understanding of the cause of this standstill?

The periodic review process continues to operate for those detainees who have not previously been recommended for transfer or release. Transferring or releasing a detainee pursuant to a recommendation from that review process depends on identifying a country that is suitable and willing to receive the individual. Such determinations are made only after detailed, specific conversations with the receiving country about the potential threat a detainee may pose after transfer and the measures the receiving country will take in order to mitigate that threat sufficiently. Once a country accepts a detainee for repatriation or resettlement, we ensure the transfer can be effectuated consistent with our post-transfer humane treatment policy. The State Department is the lead agency for conducting detainee transfer negotiations.

17. In your view, should the PRB process and the transfer of detainees to other countries, be continued or terminated? Please explain your answer.

I believe that the Periodic Review Board interagency process as established by Executive Order 13567 is the best means available to assess whether to recommend the continued detention or transfer of detainees to other countries with appropriate security and humane treatment assurances.

18. Do you think the U.S. Government should continue the PRB Board Process and continue to transfer detainees to other countries, subject to the restrictions currently in law or should the process be modified in any way?

We should continue to conduct a review process using available information to determine whether a detainee no longer poses a continuing threat to the security of the United States and whether there is a suitable country to which to transfer such a detainee. In my opinion, the Periodic Review Board Process is currently the best means available for making such determinations in a systematic manner.

Department of Defense Reforms

19. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 included an increase in the number of personnel authorized to be assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(No Response Required)

20. Do you believe that an increase in the number of personnel assigned to the OUSD(P) is necessary and appropriate? To what missions and functions would you apply such an increase, if confirmed?

The OUSD(P) organization has undertaken a 25 percent reduction in civilian and military

personnel over the past five fiscal years. Yes, an increase in the number of billets assigned to OUSD(P) would better enable the organization to support the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and broader Department with Policy's mission contributions, which include support to civilian control of the military. However, the authorization of additional personnel was not accompanied by an appropriation to fund these billets. If confirmed, I would allocate additional billets to Policy's key strategic planning nodes and priority issues as identified in the 2018 National Defense Strategy. OUSD(P) will also need to staff a new Assistant Secretary for Space and a Principal Information Operations Advisor, positions that were established by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020.

21. In your view, would an increase in the number of personnel assigned to the OUSD(P) enhance civilian control of the military? Please explain your answer.

Yes, an increase in the number of personnel assigned to OUSD(P) would strengthen civilian control of the military. Additional personnel would enable the organization to provide more oversight of military component activities, including to assess implementation of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, conduct robust reviews of contingency plans and posture initiatives, and manage security relationships with partners and allies in line with defense policy priorities. If confirmed, I would seek for OUSD(P) to sustain a leadership role in the Department's discussions on the strategic use of the current and future joint force.

22. What were the effects of the Defense Wide Review on the mission and functions of the OUSD(P)? If confirmed, how would you address and mitigate these impacts?

OUSD(P) is diligent every year in applying our limited resources to the most critical mission sets – those where we cannot risk failure. The Defense-Wide Review (DWR) process reinforced this annual process and resulted in a useful delineation of essential and nonessential mission areas, the latter of which could be reduced or reassigned. We were able to reduce the Combatting Terrorism Technical Support Program by 25 percent (\$23.5M), reduce the DoD Rewards Program by 10 percent (\$680K), and reduce the Policy Management Office's Contract Support by 10 percent (\$1.4M), and to reassign the Humanitarian Demining Program to the Army (\$8.5M) after reducing the program by 20 percent (\$2.1M). If confirmed, I would review the effects of DWR implementation on the organization's ability to carry out its mission and functions.

National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy

23. What areas of NDS implementation cause you the most concern and what would you do about each of these concerns, if confirmed?

I am most concerned about the pace of the Department's efforts to build greater lethality into the Joint Force and the need to collaborate even more closely with allies and partners; both are central to our ability to implement the NDS. If confirmed, I would continue to advocate for the rapid acquisition of combat-credible capabilities in multiple fora and through strategic guidance that Policy develops for the Secretary, such as the annual

Defense Planning Guidance. I would also continue to advance ongoing work the Secretary of Defense has directed to focus the Department on our global network of allies and partners. Such initiatives seek to better orient the entire Defense Enterprise on critical defense relationships through senior leader engagements and other activities to implement the NDS.

24. If confirmed, what steps would you take to increase the quantity and quality of analytic capability required to support informed assessment and decision making in the OUSD(P)?

If confirmed, I will continue to be a strong advocate for and provide support to the ongoing Department-wide effort to enhance analytic support to senior leader decision processes. I will seek to leverage all of the Department's capability resident within OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Services, as well as with our Federally Funded Research and Development Centers and University Applied Research Centers, as a means to make the best-informed decisions for our Nation and the Department.

25. What is your assessment of the ability of DOD modeling and simulation capabilities to support policy missions, for example in modeling the impacts of financial market uncertainties on military operations?

My initial sense is that the Department has sufficient capability in the field of modeling and simulation. I will, however, continue to advocate to the organizations within the Department that conduct Modeling and Simulation to leverage cutting-edge tools and techniques, both within the public and private sectors, to ensure that we are providing our decision-makers with the best possible analysis to inform their decisions.

26. What is your view of the role that social science research, such as that previously funded under the DOD Minerva program, has supported and could support defense policy objectives?

I believe it is important that DoD seek to understand better the interaction between the geostrategic environment, our competitors, our allies and partners, and functional areas such as deterrence, to navigate the challenging terrain of great power competition. In many cases, basic and applied social science research offer insights into these subjects that cannot be found elsewhere. Social science research and community interactions are a unique resource to further our understanding on these issues, as they directly connect policymakers with the best social scientists in the field, and provide a way to focus their efforts on the most challenging problems facing DoD. If confirmed, I would continue to advocate for such research and would seek to create more opportunities for Policy to make use of it.

27. In its 2018 report, Providing for the Common Defense, the National Defense Strategy Commission observed, “[t]he United States needs more than just new capabilities; it urgently requires new operational concepts that expand U.S. options and constrain those of China, Russia, and other actors. Operational concepts constitute an essential link between strategic objectives and the capability and budgetary priorities needed to advance them.”

What is your view of the Commission’s conclusions on the importance and function of operational concepts?

I fully agree with the NDS Commission’s assessment of the importance of operational concepts. They provide the bridge between our strategic priorities and our capability investments, and ensure those investments are informed by the ways we are adapting our warfighting approach. As China and Russia seek to challenge U.S. military overmatch, it is essential that we seek new and innovative ways of applying our military resources to meet these evolving challenges and preserve favorable regional balances of power and warfighting advantage. This linkage is one reason why DoD is investing significant energy in a virtuous circle of experimentation, exercises, and analysis to develop and assess innovative operational concepts for potential future warfights in line with NDS priorities.

28. What do you see as the role of the OUSD(P) in the development of operational concepts?

OUSD(P) develops and maintains the NDS-aligned Defense Planning Scenarios, used to develop and evaluate new operational concepts. OUSD(P), in collaboration with CAPE and the Joint Staff, also provides both guidance on strategic priorities and analytic oversight of concept development to help ensure that concepts being developed align with National Defense Strategy objectives. If confirmed, I will continue to promote collaboration with our CAPE and Joint Staff partners.

29. What key elements, in your opinion, must operational concepts include in order to effectively guide capability and budgetary priorities?

Because the future is uncertain, robust operational concepts cannot be single-point solutions focused on a singular threat. Concept development must clearly articulate risks and interdependencies across a range of possible alternative concepts and provide senior leaders with options for employing the Joint Force across an array of scenarios. By assessing and understanding risks and trade-offs among alternative concepts, including comparative impacts on effectiveness, costs, and theater constraints, our concepts can better inform how we prioritize our investments in future capabilities.

U.S. Military Force Sufficiency

30. The United States likely will never have a sufficient number of forces to meet the requirements submitted by the combatant commands, which leads the Department to apportion forces in operations planning. How important are the military’s global power projection capabilities in ensuring that the U.S. remains a global power?

The ability to project power worldwide is critical to U.S. national security and our role as a global power. The 2018 NDS highlights the increasing risk to U.S. military operations due to the maturation of Chinese and Russian capabilities. To sustain U.S. warfighting advantages over rivals, the NDS prioritized modernization of U.S. capabilities over force size (capacity) to sustain joint force lethality and present senior leaders with options for deterring and responding to aggression across multiple threat scenarios. Power projection

capabilities able to credibly challenge adversary aggression, even in contested environments, remain central to the U.S. approach to deterrence.

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that we bolster power projection capabilities in order to protect our national interests, reassure allies and partners, and uphold a rules-based international order that underwrites global security.

31. In your opinion, what improvements must be made to U.S. capabilities to be able to operate in the new era of “contested logistics”?

The Joint Force has become accustomed over the last 30 years to uncontested logistics operating at ever increasing levels of efficiency to improve performance while cutting costs. This period is over. The current and future operating environments will not afford the luxury of long, unprotected logistical lines. The Department needs to change its logistics mindset, looking for redundant and resilient means to provide sufficient support to fielded forces to achieve deterrence and warfighting missions, particularly in contested environments.

We must prepare to conduct sustainment operations in contested domains utilizing a systems-based approach. These systems include command and control, electronic warfare, and control of cyberspace to ensure accurate reporting and situational awareness; air and missile defense systems to provide force protection of operational logistical units; and ongoing security engagements with partners and allies to employ strategically positioned supplies required for sustainment of operations. The Department is constantly reviewing these systems. Additionally, we must work with our interagency partners to coordinate national efforts that minimize dependence on foreign sources for strategic materials, defense industrial production, and supply chain distribution.

32. In light of current and future threats to the United States’ strategic interests, do you believe the U.S. military must have the capacity to fight two wars simultaneously? If not, what do you think the appropriate force-sizing construct should be?

The NDS highlights that during wartime, the Joint Force must be militarily capable of defeating aggression by a great power adversary while also having sufficient capability and capacity to deter opportunistic aggression elsewhere in the world. I agree with this construct. As such, I believe DoD should continue to adhere to that principle in its efforts to size and shape the future force. Our top priority should be to develop innovative concepts and capabilities that will enable us to defeat any challenger in potential future warfights, while reserving the capability to deter opportunistic aggressors.

33. In your opinion, what parts of the FY 2021 defense budget request are most critical for making adjustments to better align U.S. force structure to implement the 2018 NDS?

The FY2021 DoD budget advances priority investments in the most critical areas for NDS implementation, with an overall focus on all-domain operations. The budget request continues to strengthen the Services’ military readiness and invest in the modernization of a more lethal force. It correctly focuses on investment in joint enablers and dominance

across all domains: Air, Land, Sea, Space, and Cyber. The budget also necessarily prioritizes nuclear deterrence recapitalization and strengthens homeland missile defense, and advances development of critical technologies.

Specific lethality investments crucial to NDS implementation include space investments in GPS follow-on satellites and space-based missile warning; cyber investments in cybersecurity capabilities to reduce risk to DoD networks; air domain procurement of 4th/5th generation aircraft; maritime investments in submarines and UUVs, advanced preferred munitions, and undersea nuclear strike capabilities; and land domain investments in combat and tactical motorized vehicles.

Critical technologies important for NDS implementation are advanced capability enablers such as hypersonics, microelectronics/5G, autonomy, and artificial intelligence.

34. The report by the Commission on the National Defense Strategy provides that “[a]cross all theaters . . . America will need to improve its capabilities in key cross-cutting areas such as munitions, missile defense, electronic warfare, space, cyber, and air and sealift.”

In your view, do each of these capabilities require increased attention from the Department? What elements of the FY 2021 defense budget address these cross-cutting issues?

The FY 2021 defense budget request provides renewed emphasis and funding in these areas. For example, the request includes \$18B for space, \$9.8B for cyber, and \$21.3B for munitions.

Cyber Policy and Authorities

35. In your view, what cyber actions by an adversary would constitute an act of war?

My understanding is that such a determination would be made by the President on a case-by-case basis. However, malicious cyber activity need not be considered an “act of war” to merit a response. If confirmed, I am committed to working with other elements of the government to build upon the progress made in recent years to enable U.S. Government departments and agencies to respond effectively to challenges in the cyber domain.

36. What are the top five gaps in the 2018 Cyber Strategy that DOD should prioritize? If confirmed, and as compared to current actions to address these gaps, what would you do differently?

The Department must continue working to ensure that we have all the necessary authorities, policies, processes, organizational constructs, and operational readiness to execute the full spectrum of cyberspace operations to meet current and emergent national security challenges. The Department also continues to strengthen the security and resilience of its networks and systems, and is further focused on protecting and advancing DoD’s competitive advantage through engaging with the private sector and operationalizing international partnerships with foreign partners and allies to detect and counter foreign

influence operations. In addition to securing our networks, ensuring our warfighting systems can function in a cyber-contested environment is critical.

37. Do you foresee delegation of cyber execution authority to tactical levels such as with conventional forces, or do you envision more centralized control of execution authority at the Commander-in-Chief level, similar to nuclear weapons? Please explain your answer.

The 2018 DoD Cyber Strategy calls for a proactive and assertive approach to respond to increasingly assertive cyberspace activities by our adversaries. Just as we do on land, in air, and at sea, the Joint Force conducts cyber operations to identify and understand foreign cyber threats, to shape the environment, and, when called upon, to degrade or disrupt those threats before they cause harm. Consistent with this approach and pursuant to the Secretary's authorities, the Joint Force conducts certain cyber operations and intelligence collection, authorized at the tactical level.

In 2018, the President established a new policy for cyber operations, enabling timely, well-coordinated, and risk-managed cyber effects operations executed by U.S. Government departments and agencies, pursuant to delegated authority from the President and the heads of those departments and agencies. In accordance with statute, the Department notifies Congress when the President delegates authority to the Secretary of Defense for military operations in cyberspace and when the Secretary approves campaign plans pursuant to such delegated authorities.

38. In your opinion, what is the appropriate role for DOD in protecting national critical information infrastructure and defending against cyber-attacks?

The role of the Department of Defense is to defend the United States, its people, and its interests from foreign attack. Critical infrastructure must be defended, and any foreign aggressor should know that we will respond strongly to attacks on such infrastructure. DoD works closely with the Department of Homeland Security, which plays the lead role in protecting, mitigating, and recovering from domestic cyber incidents, and with the Department of Justice, which plays the lead role in investigating, attributing, disrupting, and prosecuting cybercrimes.

The Department has a variety of capabilities that can be used to defend the Nation from foreign attacks in cyberspace, and, if confirmed, I would prioritize the readiness of those capabilities. I would also engage the Intelligence Community, the Department of Homeland Security, and other departments and agencies to ensure close cooperation and support as each carries out its respective responsibilities.

39. What is your view on cyber deterrence, specifically “deterrence by punishment”? What is the appropriate role for DOD’s in cyber “deterrence by punishment”, in your view?

The National Cyber Strategy, the DoD Cyber Strategy, and the Cyber Posture Review outline the Department of Defense’s strategy for deterring cyber threats. DoD’s strategy is a combination of strengthening the cybersecurity of our networks, ensuring the resilience of the networks supporting our military forces operating in a cyber-contested environment, denying cyber threat actors the benefits they seek in conducting malicious cyber activities, partnering

with other like-minded nations, promoting norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, and degrading or disrupting the ability of adversary cyber forces and their sponsors when needed. The Federal Government's Cyber Deterrence Report, responding to the President's Executive Order 13800, Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure, details our approach to deterrence.

Spectrum

40. In what ways does DOD rely on spectrum to support warfighter requirements? What future spectrum warfighter requirements are essential to competing with Russia and China?

To meet warfighter mission requirements and to train and equip our forces, spectrum access is imperative for DoD operations. DoD must have the ability to gain and maintain an advantage in the electromagnetic spectrum when and where it is needed. To meet national security and homeland defense missions, the Department uses the spectrum to provide command and control; communications; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); advanced threat detection and targeting systems; electronic attack and electronic protection; and battlefield situational awareness and protection.

For future requirements, military operations will see the integration of all domains (air, land, sea, space, and cyber) and the widespread use of all-domain sensors, radars, and cloud-based systems leveraging advanced quantum computing, artificial intelligence, and machine learning for near-real-time assessment and decision making. Winning in the future battlefield requires the ability to see and strike adversaries first, which requires effective and efficient spectrum use.

41. Secretary Esper has stated that DOD is willing to share spectrum with 5G networks in the "mid-band" (3 to 4.2 gigahertz). What policy implementation concerns are associated with addressing this issue as Secretary Esper indicates?

DoD conducts operational missions, warfighting exercises, training, and testing in the 3.1-3.55 GHz spectrum range using a variety of land, air, and sea weapons systems, and command and control platforms. These capabilities do not tune to other parts of the spectrum to accommodate vacating the 3.1-3.55 band. Because industry wants this band quickly and DoD fully supports U.S. leadership in 5G and its economic potential, we recognize the reasonableness and are willing to share the spectrum band.

DoD originally selected the 3.1-3.55 GHz band for the operation of certain mission-critical capabilities such as radars for various reasons. Today, there are a limited number of bands with similar physical characteristics for relocation, and many are either already intensely used or have been identified for study for reallocation. This is one consideration to take into account regarding sharing.

42. If confirmed, how would you work to address Electronic Warfare (EW) shortfalls that have been identified in many recent DOD reports and studies? What entity in DOD is responsible for central management and advocacy of EW requirements and capabilities? In your view, should the OUSD(P) take a more prominent role in this effort?

If confirmed, I would work with my partners within the Department, particularly the Joint Staff; the Chief Information Officer; the Under Secretaries for Research and Engineering, Acquisition and Logistics, and Intelligence and Security; and the Military Departments. In addition, I would look to the Principal Information Operations Advisor Cross Functional Team to support oversight to ensure that Electronic Warfare (EW), Space, Cyberspace, and Information Operations remain key components of our warfighting operations and to ensure that our EW requirements are met.

Space

43. There is growing concern about the vulnerability of our nation's space-based systems and supporting architectures.

If confirmed, what policies would you recommend to address these vulnerabilities?

If confirmed, I would recommend policies that contribute to deterring attacks against our nation's space-based systems and supporting architectures. We must seek to assure the availability of space systems and services through resilient architectures and the ability to protect and defend DoD space capabilities, while also developing options to respond to hostile uses of space by potential adversaries.

44. If confirmed, what changes to national security space policy, organization, and programs would you propose?

If confirmed, I would review this issue in more detail. The Department is in the midst of the most significant reorganization of the national security space enterprise in our history. In the past year, we have established a new unified Combatant Command focused on space, U.S. Space Command, and with the authorization of Congress, established a new branch of our Armed Forces focused on space, the U.S. Space Force. We must ensure these new organizations help to focus our efforts on the development and employment of space forces, while updating our policies, strategies, investments, and programs to account for space as a warfighting domain.

45. The FY 2020 NDAA established the U.S. Space Force. Implementation of the new military service has been halting, however.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to accelerate the pace of U.S. Space Force standup?

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 (Public Law 116-92) established the U.S. Space Force within the Department of the Air Force. If confirmed, I would support the exceptional efforts of the Secretary of the Air Force to move with alacrity in standing up the U.S. Space Force. Specifically, I would ensure that the Department of the Air Force has the necessary policy and strategy guidance with regard to space to allow the new Military Service to set its priorities, develop new space warfighting doctrine, and expand the space-focused expertise our Nation needs.

46. The FY 2020 NDAA authorized a position within the OUSD(P) to address space issues. Yet no one has been nominated for this position. Do you believe this position is necessary? If confirmed, what rationale would you use to advocate for an expeditious nomination to fill this position?

Yes, I believe this position is necessary. The Department is undergoing an historical transformation in the national security space enterprise. Congress rightly recognized that this transformation will require policy support and designated one of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense (ASD) as the ASD for Space Policy. If confirmed, I would support the effort to identify a suitable individual for Presidential nomination to this position.

Middle East

47. The summary of the NDS states that the “long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are the principal priorities for the Department,” while concurrently maintaining favorable balances of power in the Middle East and other regions. This implies that counterterrorism and deterring rogue regimes requires a more efficient approach.

How does U.S. defense posture in the Middle East impact the Department’s efforts to compete with China and Russia in the region and more broadly?

To address competition with China and Russia now and in the future, we must adjust our posture and avoid prioritizing near-term problems at the expense of building readiness and capacity for potential high-end conflict. As we do so, we must deter and confront adversaries, while avoiding miscalculation or escalation that would distract and ultimately undermine our national security interests.

DoD continues to focus on strengthening in the region to enable the Department to focus on NDS priorities in other parts of the world.

48. What measures should the Department take to ensure that the United States remains the security partner of choice in the Middle East?

In the Middle East, we seek to address shared security threats with partners and allies, while maintaining the ability to act unilaterally, if and when necessary. This approach takes several forms. In the D-ISIS campaign, the United States has remained a security partner of choice for 77 nations and 5 international organizations in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, demonstrating strong U.S. military and diplomatic leadership to execute a specific mission to defeat ISIS.

More broadly, the Department must ensure the United States remains the security partner of choice by enhancing the capabilities and capacity of our partners to provide for their own defense and address regional problems. Unlike our competitors in Russia and China, the United States, and specifically the DoD, provides quality defense equipment, and a commitment to build partner capabilities. The United States also has the transparency, accountability, and predictability of clear policies and processes.

49. In written testimony submitted to this committee, the USCENTCOM Commander, General McKenzie, stated, “[a]djustments in U.S. global force posture to support the [National Defense Strategy] compels the U.S. to accept greater risk in the CENTCOM AOR.”

What are the Department’s top priorities in the Middle East?

The United States' strategy in the Middle East seeks to ensure the region is not a safe haven for terrorists, is not dominated by any power hostile to the United States, and contributes to a stable global energy market. For the Department of Defense, this translates into the following six objectives: (1) Utilize a dynamic U.S. military presence with strategic depth to deter and, if necessary, respond to aggression; (2) Strengthen the defensive capabilities of regional partners; (3) Advance partnerships and burden-sharing with allies and partners to address shared security concerns; (4) Protect freedom of navigation; (5) Deny safe haven to terrorists that threaten the homeland; and (6) Mitigate WMD threats.

50. In your judgment, should the Department accept greater risk in the CENTCOM AOR?

The President has been clear that the United States will defend our interests whenever and wherever necessary. To that end, the Department is focused on ensuring the CENTCOM AOR can achieve continued success in our campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and al-Qa’ida (AQ), while strengthening deterrence and defenses in the face of Iranian aggression, and competing with China and Russia for regional and global influence.

51. How could such risks be mitigated, in your view?

The Department must constantly review the tools available to succeed in our strategy. In the Middle East, this requires investing in sustainable partnerships to reduce the vulnerabilities of partner states as part of a whole of government effort to enhance stability in the region. The Department remains committed to working alongside our Allies and partners to deter malign activities and to be prepared for contingencies should deterrence fail. We must continue to employ a whole of government strategy to counter Russia, China, Iran, and ISIS’s destabilizing activities and proxy networks by supporting our partners and allies, and ensuring that the Department of Defense retains the ability to respond to any eventuality.

Iraq

52. What, in your view, are the primary goals of our current military posture in Iraq?

The Department’s current military posture in Iraq aims to achieve the primary objectives outlined in the 2018 National Defense Strategy and the enduring defeat of ISIS.

53. If the U.S. withdrew from Iraq today, how would it impact the fight against ISIS?

The ability to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS would be degraded if U.S. forces withdrew from Iraq at this time. The United States provides important enabling abilities to the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) to include training, advising, and assisting ISF on missions against ISIS.

While the ISF has made incredible gains in its Counter Terrorism (CT) capabilities, a strong CT and security partnership between the U.S. and Iraq is still needed. In addition, the United States provides capabilities to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS/Da'esh partners in Iraq to include command and control, ISR, logistics, air defense, and other important functions.

54. Do you believe the United States should continue to provide security assistance to Iraq following the defeat of the so-called physical caliphate of ISIS? If so, for what purposes?

Security assistance enables the U.S. to build relationships with partners around the world and develop their capabilities to assist in achieving U.S. strategic objectives. Our security partnership with Iraq advances U.S. interests in the region.

55. How should the United States regularize security assistance to Iraq in future years?

The Department is transitioning security assistance for Iraq from its current focus on funding through the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) to a security cooperation framework where the majority of assistance derives from programs such as FMF and FMS.

Iran

56. In your view, what role do conventional military troops play in deterring conventional attack from Iran, and in dissuading asymmetric attacks and malign Iranian behavior below the level of open conflict?

Our conventional forces, including those in the region and those that can rapidly deploy in the event of a crisis, send a clear message that the United States has the will and the capability to defend our partners and U.S. national interests. Our forces have demonstrated that the United States can respond quickly and decisively to asymmetric attacks and impose great costs on Iran and its proxies, should we choose to do so. Our force posture also allows us to expose a range of Iranian malign behavior, including regional weapons proliferation, attacks on civilian shipping, and direct attacks on energy infrastructure. This exposure increases the cost of Iran's destabilizing activity and factors into Iranian decision making on the advisability of further malign behavior.

That said, the Department recognizes the limitations of conventional forces to dissuade deniable activity by proxy forces and thus works with the interagency and partners to address this such threats using a range of tools.

57. How is our military strategy in the Middle East linked to the diplomatic and economic strategy of "maximum pressure"? In what ways can the military play a beneficial role in enabling de-escalation, should that become a viable option?

The Department of Defense supports the maximum pressure campaign to bring Iran to the negotiating table to conclude a comprehensive, enduring deal that addresses Iran's nuclear program, its ballistic missile development and proliferation, its support for terrorism, and other malign activities. This strategy at its core is an economic and diplomatic one, but the military remains ready to defend U.S. forces and interests in the region.

Our military strategy in the Middle East is calibrated to defend our forces and interests, deter attacks by Iran and its proxies, and, if necessary, respond decisively. Our military enables de-escalation by maintaining our deterrent posture and escalation dominance, being judicious about when and how we use force, and clearly messaging that we will respond forcefully if required, but will de-escalate when appropriate.

Afghanistan

58. What is your assessment of al-Qaeda's strength in Afghanistan today? What about ISIS?

Al-Qaeda and ISIS in Afghanistan are degraded but not defeated. The Afghanistan-Pakistan border region remains a sanctuary for various terrorist groups, including al-Qa'ida (AQ) core and its regional affiliate al-Qa'ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). AQIS's interest in attacking U.S. forces and other Western targets in Afghanistan and the region persists. However, Coalition pressure has reduced AQIS's ability to conduct operations.

Since Autumn 2019, ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K) has been degraded somewhat in Afghanistan due to the loss of its territorial base in southern Nangarhar Province. ISIS-K remains the strongest of the ISIS branches, and continues to seek external support and to conduct attacks throughout Afghanistan. In recent months, ISIS-K has carried out high-profile attacks against Bagram Airfield and against civilian targets in Kabul.

59. How would you characterize the current relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaeda?

The Taliban and al-Qa'ida relationship dates to the founding of both organizations. AQIS maintains close ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan, likely for protection and training.

60. According to the February 29, 2020, agreement with the Taliban, U.S. and coalition forces will completely withdraw from Afghanistan within fourteen months if the Taliban abides by its counter-terrorism commitments.

If the U.S. reduces or withdraws its forces from Afghanistan in accordance with the recently signed agreement, how will this impact al-Qaeda's strength in Afghanistan? What can be done to keep the pressure on al-Qaeda and its associates with a smaller U.S. Force, or without U.S. or coalition forces in country, in your view?

The Secretary has made clear that the United States' implementation of the U.S.-Taliban peace agreement is contingent upon Taliban adherence to the February 29 Agreement. In that Agreement, the Taliban made commitments to ensure that Afghanistan will not be a safe haven for terrorists to threaten the United States. We expect the Taliban to live up to its commitments. The Secretary has stated that the drawdown of our forces, in coordination with the Coalition, will be conditions based. One of those conditions is the degree to which international terrorist organizations operate within Afghanistan threaten the U.S., its citizens, or our allies.

61. What is your understanding of the U.S. military's role in monitoring and evaluating Taliban compliance with the agreement?

The Administration has set up an interagency team, led by the Departments of State and Defense, to monitor implementation of the February 29 Agreement and verify Taliban compliance. United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) is also part of this interagency team. USFOR-A also maintains a channel with the Taliban in Doha, Qatar to communicate on all aspects of the agreement.

62. Do you believe it is possible to carry out such evaluations while also conducting a force reduction or withdrawal?

Since February 29 we have been able to execute a reduction in forces while collecting sufficient information to monitor Taliban compliance with the Agreement, in coordination with the intelligence community. We do not expect monitoring capabilities to be negatively impacted at a presence of 8,600 troops. The Secretary has directed that reducing beyond 8,600 must be calibrated to conditions, among which are Taliban compliance with reduction in violence, CT assurances, and progress on Intra-Afghan Negotiations.

63. According to the U.S.-Taliban agreement, the Taliban were to open inter-Afghan negotiations by March 10, 2020. However, no such meeting has taken place.

Do you believe the Taliban are in breach of the agreement? If so, do you believe this should have an impact on the 14-month timetable set forth in the agreement?

There are multiple reasons for the delay in the start of the Intra-Afghan Negotiations. We are working with both sides to advance the process, including on confidence building measures like the release of prisoners by both sides. More broadly, a categorical judgment about whether the Taliban are or are not living up to their commitments in the agreement is premature. We are concerned that while the Taliban have ceased almost all attacks against U.S. and Coalition forces, and attacks in cities, they continue attacks against Afghan forces, placing peace efforts at risk. In terms of timing, Secretary Esper has been clear that our withdrawal will be conditions based.

64. If the Taliban does not honor its commitments and, as a result, U.S. forces remain in Afghanistan beyond fourteen months, what do you expect the Taliban reaction will be?

I do not want to speculate on future decisions. What I can say is that our focus is on achieving an enduring political settlement in Afghanistan. The best way to achieve this is by ensuring Taliban compliance with the agreement and assuring the Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan take the necessary steps toward Inter Afghan Negotiations. Our troop presence in Afghanistan has always been conditions based and if conditions are met, we will be prepared to reduce our presence.

65. Is the current Afghan government capable of maintaining the country's stability without a U.S. presence, in your view?

Afghan forces have made significant strides in capability, especially Afghan special forces and the Afghan Air Force, but U.S. combat enablers remain central to Afghan forces' success in maintaining the country's stability. The February 29 Agreement is intended to set security and

political conditions under which, after a 14-month process, Afghan forces could maintain stability on their own, albeit with continued U.S. and Coalition funding.

66. What can be done to bolster the Afghan government and security forces ahead of any reduction of U.S. forces below 8,600 or other withdrawal, in your view?

It is my understanding that U.S. forces' authorities for providing combat enabler support to the Afghan forces have not changed as a result of the agreement with the Taliban and the United States will continue to defend Afghan forces if attacked. If confirmed, I will provide recommendations to the Secretary to provide sufficient support to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF).

Pakistan

67. What is your view of the current state of the U.S.-Pakistan security relationship?

Pakistan is a key partner in achieving U.S. interests in South Asia, including implementing the political settlement in Afghanistan; defeating al-Qa'ida (AQ) and ISIS-Khorasan; providing logistics access into Afghanistan; and enhancing regional stability. As Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, my objective would be to preserve the security relationship between the United States and Pakistan.

68. What policy changes, if any, would you recommend for U.S. relations with Pakistan in terms of military-to-military relations and in light of the U.S.-Taliban agreement?

Pakistan has provided important support to the Afghan peace process and has taken initial steps against anti-Indian groups, such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, that threaten regional stability. DoD should continue to stress that Pakistan's military leaders must take action against threats to the United States and its interests.

69. U.S. security assistance and other support to Pakistan is designed to foster greater cooperation in areas of mutual security interest.

I agree with this statement.

70. Do you support this approach as a construct for future assistance to Pakistan?

Yes.

71. What changes, if any, would you recommend in security assistance to Pakistan?

If confirmed, I will work with the State Department to evaluate and adjust, as necessary, the Administration's current approach to Pakistan security assistance. As part of that approach, I would advocate for defense cooperation in targeted areas that advance U.S. interests.

72. What do you consider to be of areas of shared security interest between the United States and Pakistan?

The United States and Pakistan are focused on implementing the political settlement in Afghanistan; defeating al-Qa'ida (AQ) and ISIS-Khorasan; providing logistics access into Afghanistan; and enhancing regional stability.

Yemen

73. In your view, how can the U.S. military best support an enduring resolution to the conflict in Yemen?

The Department of Defense has long-standing relationships with the governments of the Saudi-led coalition, to include Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The U.S. military can leverage these relationships to encourage peaceful resolution and provide advice to facilitate de-escalation. These efforts compliment ongoing political negotiations, led by the United Nations Special Envoy to Yemen, Martin Griffiths.

74. In your view, what role, if any, should the United States play in supporting the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen?

The United States must do what it can to ensure the conflict in Yemen does not spill over into neighboring countries and trigger broader regional destabilization. To that end, U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen includes the provision of limited intelligence-sharing and advice to help our partners defend themselves from aerial and maritime attacks on their sovereign territories. We believe maintaining this posture in the Yemen conflict is appropriate, while also providing military advice to facilitate a cessation of conflict in concert with United Nations and State Department diplomatic efforts.

75. If the U.S. ceased to provide intelligence support and military advice to the Saudi-led coalition, would potential collateral damage increase or decrease in your assessment? Do you think the effectiveness of military operations against al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups would increase or decrease?

Without speculating on hypotheticals, it is fair to say that the Saudi-led coalition perceives the conflict in Yemen as an existential threat to their security and would be engaged in this conflict with or without U.S. assistance. DoD's engagement with the Saudi-led coalition provides opportunities to positively influence the execution of their military operations over time.

Our engagement with the coalition allows us to keep an open dialogue with our partners and shared battlefield visibility concerning the nature of the terrorist threat in Yemen. We work closely with our Saudi and Emirati partners to prosecute the threat from al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups.

76. What is your assessment of the reasons for the recent breakdown in the United Nations-led Yemen negotiations? In your opinion, how might U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition encourage those talks to get back on track?

Despite Saudi Arabia's declaration of unilateral ceasefire, the Houthis have continued and, in some areas, increased their military campaign. U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition can

continue to be used to encourage the coalition to seek a peaceful settlement.

Syria

77. What are the U.S. national security objectives in Syria? To what extent does continued U.S. force presence in Syria support those objectives?

The U.S. national security interests in Syria are to: (1) eliminate safe havens from which terrorist organizations can breed regional instability and threaten U.S. and partner interests around the globe; (2) prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and (3) counter the nefarious activities of Iran and its proxies in Syria. Our operations in Syria have proven critical in eliminating ISIS's hold on territory. As a direct result of our partnership with vetted local forces, including the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), ISIS can no longer terrorize populations that once lived under its so-called caliphate. We continue that partnership today to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS, which includes degrading ISIS capabilities to retake territory and reclaim resources and revenue it previously used for global attacks and to administer its so-called caliphate. The U.S. military presence in Syria also has other benefits as we seek an end to Iran's destabilizing activities in Syria and find a political solution to the Syrian conflict.

78. To what extent should the United States continue to provide support to the Syrian Democratic Forces?

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are our strongest partners in Syria in the fight against ISIS. Preserving our partnership with vetted local forces, including the SDF, remains an essential element of our ability to execute this mission to achieve a lasting defeat of ISIS in Syria. I thank Congress for its steadfast support to this campaign—in supporting the necessary authorities and in appropriating the funding required to train, equip, advise, assist, and accompany our vetted partners to execute this critically important mission.

79. What should DOD do to facilitate the transfer and repatriation of ISIS foreign terrorist fighters that are currently being held by the Syrian Democratic Forces?

While the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) continue to secure ISIS fighters as a benefit to global security, detained Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) are a global problem that requires global cooperation to solve. The Department of State, the Department of Defense, and other interagency partners have encouraged countries to take responsibility for their citizens in Syria by repatriating and prosecuting them. Many countries have declined to repatriate their FTFs to date. While the United States will continue to support the SDF, States need to follow the example of those who have responsibly repatriated their citizens and not look to others to solve the problem for them.

80. What do you see as the key U.S. interests at stake in Idlib? What should the United States do to respond to the situation in Idlib?

The United States remains extremely concerned about the situation in Idlib because of the grave humanitarian, political, and security challenges. We welcome any reduction of violence in

Syria, but are under no illusion that the Syrian regime and Russia intend to abide by the March 5 ceasefire. The Syrian regime, fully backed by Russia, killed or injured thousands of civilians, displaced nearly one million people, and destroyed a significant amount of civilian infrastructure. We also remain concerned about the terrorist groups operating in Idlib, especially ISIS and al-Qaeda, and continue to target these groups to prevent them from using Syria as a safe haven. The United States continues to call for a diplomatic solution to end the conflict in Syria, centered on a credible, negotiated political settlement in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2254.

81. Do you believe that the friction between Turkey and Russia in Idlib presents an opportunity to advance U.S. interests?

We are under no illusion that the Syrian regime and Russia intend to abide by the March 5 ceasefire. The most recent offensive in Idlib demonstrated—once again—that Russia cannot be trusted. Russia broke its previous arrangement with Turkey by supporting the Syrian regime’s brutal operation in northwest Syria, further demonstrating that Russia is committed to a military solution to the Syrian conflict. Russia will, no doubt, continue to pursue its goals in Syria by military means, which will aggravate the humanitarian crisis, spur mass migration flow into Turkey and likely Europe, and prevent a diplomatic resolution to the Syrian conflict under UN Security Council Resolution 2254. The Department of Defense continues to work with Turkey to strengthen our alliance and hopes that Russian actions in Idlib encourage Turkey to rethink its policies regarding the acquisition of the S-400 system.

Russia

82. The NDS requires “urgent change at significant scale” to prepare the U.S. military for the realities of great power competition.

Where do you see the greatest need for change in the Joint Force in order to adjust to the realities of strategic competition with Russia?

Russia and China are seeking to compete simultaneously across all warfighting domains, including maritime, land, air, cyber, and space, as well as through gray zone activities below the level of war. Recognizing the NDS focus on China and then Russia, the most pressing need in the Joint Force is to develop and implement a new Joint Warfighting Concept which integrates key supporting concepts, including joint command and control, logistics, joint fires, and information advantage in contested environments, and provides the foundation for specific budget and acquisition strategies.

83. The Department of Defense is currently engaged in the development of a new Joint Warfighting Concept.

In what ways does Russia pose a threat to the previous “American way of war”? Why is a new Joint Warfighting Concept necessary to overcome the strategic and operational challenges posed by Russia?

We know that our adversaries, particularly China and Russia, have closely studied our military operations, and that they have been purposeful in developing concepts, capabilities,

and doctrine to counter our military strengths. To maintain U.S. military overmatch, we must pursue innovative technologies as well as new operational concepts and capabilities, as the Department is seeking to do through the ongoing Joint Warfighting Concept development effort.

84. Since 2015, the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) has provided more than \$20 billion to improve U.S. force posture and capabilities in Europe.

Do you agree the funding provided by the EDI has significantly enhanced EUCOM's ability to perform its mission to deter and, if necessary, defeat Russian aggression in Europe?

EDI funding continues to provide important capabilities and capacity to EUCOM that are essential for maintaining a combat-credible force in Europe to deter and, if necessary defeat aggression against the U.S. or our Allies. EDI enabled DoD to increase our force presence in Europe, improve critical capabilities, establish pre-positioned equipment sets, and execute readiness-building exercises, all of which have contributed greatly to EUCOM's warfighting capabilities.

85. Do you support continued U.S. security assistance to Ukraine? If so, how does the provision of such assistance contribute to a broader U.S. regional security strategy?

Yes. The Department's ongoing train, equip, and advise efforts are building the capacity of Ukraine's forces to help preserve and enforce its territorial integrity. These programs, combined with efforts to improve the readiness and responsiveness of U.S. forces in Europe through programs like EDI, help to deter further Russian aggression in the region.

86. Is providing lethal defensive security assistance to Ukraine in the interests of the United States, in your view? Please explain your answer.

Yes. The provision of lethal assistance for defensive purposes is an essential component of our efforts to build the capacity of Ukraine's forces to defend effectively and deter against further Russian aggression. Ukraine is a critical partner on the frontline of our strategic competition with Russia. Supporting a strategic partner that is defending our shared values and the universal principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity enhances U.S. security.

87. In your view, what are the key elements of a strategy to counter Russian hybrid tactics that employ both hard and soft power and present attribution challenges?

Russia has repeatedly sought to advance its strategic objectives through the use of hybrid and malign influence tools. These tools are intended to achieve Russia's objectives without provoking armed conflict with the United States and its Allies. Key examples include cyber attacks against Estonia, the 2008 invasion of Georgia, and the 2014 attempted annexation of Crimea. Effectively countering Russian hybrid threats requires: strong intelligence to maintain awareness of Russian hybrid activities; partner capacity building to promote resilience among Ally and partner countries who are threatened; building and maintaining the posture of U.S. forces in Europe to maintain deterrence, in coordination with our Allies and

partners; attributing Russian hybrid activities early and effectively; and imposing costs for these activities in concert with our Allies and partners.

88. What is your assessment of the Russian malign influence threat, and what recommendations, if any, would you have for the role of the U.S. Government, and DOD, in particular, in countering that threat?

In an effort to achieve its strategic objectives without provoking a conventional military response from the United States and its Allies, Russia has invested heavily in malign influence tools. Russia conducts hostile information operations, builds influence networks in foreign countries, and develops cyber influence tools, in turn employing these tools within the territories of our Allies and in the United States, including most significantly to attempt to undermine free and fair democratic processes. Efforts to respond to the Russian threat must draw on the full range of U.S. Government tools, including intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement, financial, and defense. Overall, our strategy to address Russian malign influence should focus on improving U.S., Allies, and partners' resilience, publicly attributing malign Russian actions, imposing costs in response to these actions, and deterring future malign influence activities.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

89. In your opinion, does the NATO Alliance benefit the national security interests of the United States?

Yes. In addition to its traditional role, NATO Allies are supporting U.S. policy objectives in Afghanistan, the Middle East, and recently agreed to consider the increasing challenges presented by China. As Secretary Esper has argued, a strong network of like-minded nations that are willing and able to fight together is an advantage that our adversaries do not possess. NATO has exemplified such a network for the past 70 years.

90. What should the major strategic objectives of the NATO Alliance be in the coming years?

NATO's top strategic objectives are deterring aggression, defending Allied populations and territory if deterrence fails, and projecting stability beyond NATO's borders. Allies agreed to a number of priorities at the 2018 Brussels Summit, which they reinforced at the London Leaders' Meeting December 2019, that will support these objectives.

91. In your opinion, what are the greatest challenges for NATO? What are the most important capability improvements that the Alliance must make to deal with the accelerated and growing threats it faces?

NATO faces an era of increasing great power competition, marked also by emerging and disruptive technologies. Allies must continue to increase the readiness of their existing forces, and to improve capabilities like precision strike and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, in order to maintain the ability to deter and defeat a sophisticated adversary in a contested environment.

92. In the aftermath of Russia's development of the SSC-8 ground-launched cruise missile, which led to the end of the INF Treaty, what are some of the ways NATO force posture could adapt to Russia's missile threat?

NATO has and will continue to respond in a manner that is balanced, coordinated, and defensive. We will continue to adapt our ability to deter and defend with an appropriate mix of other nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities. These threats are considered in the context of NATO's 360-degree approach to Alliance security.

93. Beyond the 2% of GDP goal, what are the other valuable measurements of allied commitments to carrying the burden of common security and collective defense?

The 2% of GDP benchmark is a major Summit-level commitment within NATO, and rightly a primary focus for Allies. There is much progress to show, with \$130 billion total additional spending planned from 2016 through 2020 -- but still much more needed. That said, other aspects of burdensharing include the actual defense capabilities Allies produce, and their contributions of forces to operations and missions.

94. In your view, is there a continuing requirement for U.S. nuclear weapons to be deployed in NATO countries?

Yes. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. A robust deterrence and defense posture strengthens NATO cohesion and provides an essential transatlantic link between North America and Europe. The strategic forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, along with the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, are the supreme guarantee of Alliance security. NATO's nuclear deterrence posture also relies on United States' nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe and the capabilities and infrastructure provided by Allies concerned. National contributions of dual-capable aircraft to NATO's nuclear deterrence mission remain central to this effort.

95. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to support the fielding of the dual capable F-35 modifications for the United States and its allies in the shortest feasible time?

NATO continues to face a dangerous, unpredictable, and fluid security environment with enduring challenges and threats from all strategic directions. Modernization of NATO's nuclear deterrence capabilities is critical to ensure the Alliance is able to adapt to this evolving environment. The F-35 will incorporate nuclear capability to be used by the United States and NATO allies as a replacement for aging dual-capable aircraft. The dual-capable F-35 is key to NATO's adaptation. I will work closely with Congress, DoD Components and the Air Force on continued funding for timely nuclear certification and fielding of the aircraft to U.S. forces in Europe, and to other select NATO allies to ensure the broadest possible participation in NATO's nuclear burden-sharing arrangements.

Balkans

96. Is the security and stability of the Balkans a U.S. national security interest?

Yes. Countering malign influence, strengthening alliances and partnerships, and supporting Balkan countries' national goals for Euro-Atlantic integration remain U.S. national security priorities.

97. How would you describe today's threats to the security and stability of the Balkans?

The Balkans, specifically the Western Balkans, have made significant progress on Euro-Atlantic integration since the wars of the 1990s and early 2000s. Four of these countries are now NATO allies, recently Kosovo stated its intention to join the Alliance, Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted its Reform Program to NATO, and Serbia, although not intending to join NATO, maintains its position of partnership and military neutrality.

This Western integration and strengthened cooperation runs counter to the interests of malign actors such as Russia and China, which continue to exploit ethnic divisions, endemic corruption, and weak rule of law to threaten Balkan nations. Their tactics of disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, political subversion, and economic manipulation represent a strategy designed to undermine regional stability and hinder further Euro-Atlantic integration. We expect to see this malign influence continue just below the threshold of armed conflict, although we do not underestimate the risk of renewed violence in the region. DoD is working with interagency and international partners to bolster Balkan nations through security cooperation and capacity-building initiatives to counter these threats effectively.

98. Does KFOR continue to play a viable role in maintaining security and stability in Kosovo and the wider region? Please explain your answer?

Yes. The Kosovo Force (KFOR) remains vital to ensuring a safe and secure environment, in Kosovo and throughout the region. KFOR is the "third responder" to security threats, behind the Kosovo Police and the European Union Rule of Law Mission. NATO presence in KFOR enables Serbia and Kosovo to pursue a path towards normalized relations. KFOR also provides a credible deterrent to malign actors that would seek to undermine Kosovo's current stability. Although Special Presidential Envoy Ambassador Grenell and the Department of State, alongside EU counterparts, have made strides towards restarting Kosovo-Serbia negotiations, KFOR's mission is incomplete until comprehensive normalization takes place.

99. What role do U.S. troops participating in KFOR play in ensuring the credibility and success of the KFOR mission, in your view?

The almost 650 U.S. military personnel currently deployed as part of KFOR play an important role in ensuring the success of the KFOR mission by providing a credible deterrent to ethnic violence and interference by malign actors. Engagement by our Allies and partners continues to build on U.S. efforts—twenty-seven other countries currently contribute to the more than 2,800 military personnel to KFOR's stabilizing mission, making up 80 percent of the total force.

100. The Department of Defense describes the Indo-Pacific as its “priority theater.”

In practical terms, in what ways does the Department of Defense prioritize the Indo-Pacific above other theaters—and what is the evidence of this prioritization?

Per the NDS, the Department is focused on the “central problem” of arresting the erosion of military advantage against our primary competitors in three key theaters, including in the Indo-Pacific. DoD seeks to resolve this central problem through a range of initiatives, which include, but are not limited to: future force development investments; development of new operational concepts; posture initiatives; major exercises and demonstrations; and increased collaboration and exchanges with allies and partners, to include intelligence sharing. DoD is pursuing initiatives in all of these areas, and others, for the Indo-Pacific region, as part of the Secretary’s focus on implementing the NDS.

101. What is the biggest change you have observed in the Indo-Pacific as a result of the NDS?

The NDS refocuses the Department on Great Power Competition and prioritizes readiness in the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, the NDS reinforces the United States' commitment to the Indo-Pacific, our allies, and the need for a network of like-minded partners that are capable, and willing, to defend our shared interests. By doing so, it provides the foundation we need to better align our strategic priorities and deepen cooperation across all domains with key allies such as Japan, Australia, and the Republic of Korea, while at the same time strengthening relationships with like-minded partners such as Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, India, and the Pacific Islands.

102. The report of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy states, “[i]n the Western Pacific, deterring Chinese aggression requires a forward deployed, defense-in-depth posture, buttressed by investments in capabilities ranging from undersea warfare to strategic airlift.”

Do you think the current U.S. force posture in the Indo-Pacific is adequate to deter and if necessary win against China in the 2025-2030 timeframe? If not, what adjustments or investments need to be made in your opinion?

In accordance with the NDS, DoD is focused on adapting to a battlefield where U.S. operations will be challenged in all domains — air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace — with increasing speed and reach. If left unaddressed, these trends would erode our military advantage and challenge our ability to deter aggression, potentially in the Indo-Pacific region.

To counter these trends, DoD is emphasizing investments in capabilities and posture able to deploy, survive, operate, and maneuver while under attack. These include: survivable and resilient communications and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems; survivable long-range strike platforms and munitions; cost-effective missile defenses capable of defeating sophisticated air, cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic threats; and smaller, more dispersed and resilient bases that incorporate active and passive defenses.

103. The Department of Defense is currently engaged in the development of a new Joint Warfighting Concept.

In what ways does China pose a threat to the previous “American way of war”? Why is a new Joint Warfighting Concept necessary to overcome strategic and operational challenges posed by China?

The scope and scale of China’s rapid military modernization, its growing ability to project power beyond the Western Pacific and across multiple warfighting domains, and its emerging operational concepts all call into question the viability of traditional U.S. warfighting concepts. The Joint Warfighting Concept is necessary to provide the entire Department with a common approach to future force development that informs effective and efficient investment decisions and guides how we will organize, train, and equip the Joint Force going forward.

104. In your opinion, is the conventional military balance in the Indo-Pacific stable, increasingly to the advantage of the U.S. advantage, or increasingly to the advantage of China? Please explain your answer.

The 2018 National Defense Strategy identifies the erosion of longstanding U.S. military advantages in the face of China’s rapid military modernization as among the most significant security challenges the United States faces today. While I believe the current military balance in the region continues to favor the United States within the context of the potential contingencies we could face, this margin of advantage is eroding. Reversing this trend remains a focus for the Department of Defense and one that I will continue to advance if confirmed.

105. Do you believe current U.S. force design and force posture in the Indo-Pacific region is sufficient to meet the objectives of the NDS through 2030?

Since the military threat in the Indo-Pacific is evolving rapidly, I do not believe that today’s force and posture, if left static, would be equal to the changing threat over the next decade. The NDS directs DoD to adapt its forces and posture to meet this challenge, and DoD is taking significant steps in this direction. Adapting our current posture concentration in Northeast Asia to a broader, more distributed posture is an important element of the Department’s strategic objective of denying adversaries sustained air and sea dominance in the region. If confirmed, I will continue to fully support DoD modernization in line with the NDS.

106. The NDS specifically calls for modernizing “forward force maneuver and posture resilience.” In your opinion, what does this mean in the Indo-Pacific region?

In accordance with the NDS, DoD seeks to prioritize investments in forces that can deploy, survive, operate, and maneuver while under attack. DoD will also seek to reduce its reliance on large, fixed, unhardened infrastructure and shift toward smaller, more dispersed and resilient bases that incorporate active and passive defenses.

107. The NDS specifically calls for modernizing “resilient and agile logistics.” In your opinion, what does this mean in the Indo-Pacific region?

In conjunction with the development of the Joint Warfighting Concept, DoD is evaluating multiple means of improving the resilience and agility of our logistics in the Indo-Pacific region.

Options may include, for example, increasing the capacity and survivability of prepositioned forward stocks and munitions; increasing the capacity and capability of mobility assets; and allied and partner support.

108. In your opinion, what is the biggest challenge the Department faces in implementing the NDS in the Indo-Pacific?

The challenges in the Indo-Pacific are dynamic, so the Department remains prepared to adapt its approach in light of continuing changes in the environment. In my view, the most critical challenges the Department will face in implementing the NDS in the Indo-Pacific include: survivable communications and sensing; effective logistics networks that perform while under attack; sufficient numbers of long-range strike platforms and munitions; and cost-effective missile defenses. In addition, we must continue to support and strengthen our network of allies and partners. While this network is a tremendous advantage, care and attention is required to ensure our friends continue to provide the support DoD needs to help advance U.S. interests.

109. In your assessment, what are the priority investments the Department of Defense could make that would best address these challenges and improve the military balance in the Indo-Pacific?

In my view, the most critical investments for increasing the effectiveness of the joint force and improving the military balance in the Indo-Pacific include: survivable and resilient communications and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems; survivable long-range strike platforms and munitions; and cost-effective missile defenses capable of defeating sophisticated air, cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic threats. DoD will have to make significant investments to maintain and extend the joint force's advantages, especially in the undersea, air, space, and cyber domains.

110. How do you assess the strength and health of our alliances in the Indo-Pacific region?

The Department continues to prioritize our Indo-Pacific alliances as they remain the bedrock of our strategy in the region. Deepening interoperability through the expansion of our training/exercises, planning efforts, and working with our allies to ensure they receive the capabilities they need are all core priorities and areas where we continue to see success. We also continue to leverage the strength and strategic alignment in our relationships to attract new partners in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Islands to forge the regional network needed to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific.

111. Many allies and partners say they do not want to be forced to choose between the United States and China. In your view, what variables are driving the choices made by countries in the Indo-Pacific?

Economic, security, and political factors drive the strategic choices of nations in the Indo-Pacific. We believe, however, that promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific, which reinforces the international rules based order, provides these countries the freedom they need to make their own choices through a stable security environment, freedom of navigation and movement in international commons, and free, fair, and reciprocal trade and economic relationships.

China

112. Secretary Esper has described America’s principal challengers as “China, then Russia.”

Do you agree that China is the principal challenger to the United States?

I agree with Secretary Esper’s comments regarding the 2018 National Defense Strategy that states we are now in an era of Great Power competition, with our principal challengers being China, then Russia.

113. What aspect of China’s rapid military modernization do you believe poses the greatest challenge for the Joint Force?

The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) emerging operational concepts, military doctrine, and growing joint integration poses the greatest challenge to the Joint Force. In addition, the technological advances the PLA has made as part of its modernization efforts also poses a serious challenges to the Joint Force’s longstanding capability advantages.

114. What is your assessment of the strategic and military implications of China’s Belt and Road Initiative?

The aim of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a global network of countries aligned with PRC foreign policy objectives and ideology. Although the U.S. does not oppose high-quality development based on fair, transparent international standards, we are concerned by investments that do not meet those standards or could otherwise be used to compromise sovereignty and security. Given China’s demonstrated history of using economic leverage to exact political retribution against other countries, BRI projects may increase countries’ exposure to coercion and affect the security of critical infrastructure. Chinese Communist Party leaders also increasingly frame BRI as a mechanism for expanding the PRC’s overseas military presence and bilateral defense ties, which could provide another lever for the PRC to pressure countries that disagree with its policies.

115. How do you assess the current military balance across the Taiwan Strait? Is the military balance trending in favor of Beijing or Taipei?

I assess that China’s military modernization has eroded Taiwan’s longstanding military advantages and that the military balance is clearly trending in favor of China. Taiwan is taking important measures to address this imbalance such as investing in asymmetric capabilities and concepts to leverage its favorable geography. However, these improvements only partially address Taiwan’s declining defensive advantages.

Japan

116. What is the value of the U.S.-Japan alliance for U.S. security and interests?

The U.S.-Japan Alliance is the cornerstone of peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. Japan continues to provide valuable access to U.S. forces, as we have more than 54,000 U.S. forces and some of our nation's most advanced capabilities stationed in Japan. Access to Japan is not only key to upholding our Alliance commitments, but also ensures that the United States can maintain the geographically distributed and operationally resilient force we need to deter, and if necessary, respond to challenges that threaten the interests of the American People and those of our allies and partners.

117. Can the United States be successful in strategic competition with China without a strong U.S.-Japan alliance?

The U.S.-Japan Alliance is indispensable to peace and security in the region and in strategic competition with China. Alliances are an asymmetrical advantage for us. Ready and capable U.S. Forces based in Japan complicate any strategic or operational designs of our competitors in the region such as China, Russia and North Korea.

118. In your view, what would be the strategic effect were the upcoming U.S.-Japan negotiations over a new Special Measures Agreement to become acrimonious or lead to a prolonged standoff?

The U.S.-Japan Alliance remains ironclad and our shared national security interests will remain the priority throughout the upcoming negotiations. The Department remains committed to reaching an agreement with Japan that is fair, achieving equitable burden-sharing between the United States and the Government of Japan, and that supports the Administration's expectation for allies accept a larger, more equitable share of the burden of the cost of stationing U.S. forces.

Korean Peninsula

119. How would you describe the value of the U.S.-South Korea alliance for U.S. national security interests?

Through the Alliance, we continue to work together toward the security of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the stability of the Indo-Pacific region. The Alliance is the linchpin of peace and security in the region. The U.S-ROK combined force – unique among bilateral U.S. military relationships – is a robust deterrent to aggression on the Korean Peninsula. As we sustain readiness for any conflict, the United States and the ROK also remain committed to the final, fully verified denuclearization of North Korea and enduring peace on the Korean Peninsula.

120. In your opinion, does a prolonged negotiation over a new Special Measures Agreement pose any risk to the strength and health of the U.S.-South Korea alliance?

The United States and the ROK have periodically engaged in tough negotiations to conclude new SMAs that help offset the cost of stationing U.S. military forces on the Korean Peninsula. The ROK contributions to the Alliance over the last few decades are commendable, including the support the ROK provided through previous SMAs. However, looking to the future, we must be prepared to face more numerous and complex challenges together. To adapt and prepare for these challenges, the United States is investing more robustly in our combined defense, and we are asking the ROK to shoulder a larger, more equitable share of the burden of

maintaining peace and security in an evolving strategic environment. Though we are engaged in tough negotiations, we remain committed to reaching a mutually beneficial and equitable agreement that will strengthen the Alliance and our combined defense.

121. Based on the conventional threat posed by North Korea, would you recommend a reduction of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula at this time?

Our presence on the Peninsula is calibrated to address the threats, capabilities, and concerns of our allies. If confirmed, I will continue to advocate for U.S. force presence on the Korean Peninsula, as I would anywhere, to ensure that it aligns with the requirements of our strategy and where applicable, our treaty obligations.

122. Notwithstanding continuing denuclearization talks continue, are North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile development and production efforts remaining stable, increasing, or decreasing? Please explain your answer.

North Korea continues to make significant advancements to both its nuclear and missile programs, posing a real threat to the United States and our allies and partners. I would be happy to go into further detail in a classified setting.

Africa

123. What are the Department's top priorities in the Africa?

The Department's top priority in Africa is supporting security activities through a whole-of-government effort. These activities include enabling war plans and contingencies by maintaining U.S. Government access and influence, combatting violent extremist organizations, and executing crisis response activities.

124. In your judgement, should the Department accept greater risk in the AFRICOM AOR? If so, where and how can such risks be mitigated?

The Department is aligning its posture, resources, and activities with the priorities of the NDS. DoD is also working to identify opportunities globally to reduce costs, and rebuild force readiness. In the AFRICOM AOR, the Department works by, with, and through partners and allies to achieve our priorities. As part of the ongoing Defense Wide Review and USAFRICOM's Blank Slate Review, we are reviewing our approach to ensure posture, resources, and activities align with the NDS. The Secretary has not yet completed this review. The Department's risk management decisions in Africa will continue to be informed by intelligence community assessments as well as our African partners' willingness and capability to combat identified threats.

125. What is your assessment of current U.S. counterterrorism efforts and the related strategy they support in Africa? What are the associated policy objectives and, in your view, and is our current approach meeting those policy objectives? What changes, if any, would you recommend?

The Department's current counterterrorism strategy effectively meets our current policy

objective of degrading violent extremist organizations from attacking the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests. We continue to assess and look for ways to work by, with, and through our partners and allies to improve our Africa strategy and efficiently meet our policy objectives. As part of the ongoing Defense Wide Review process and USAFRICOM's Blank Slate Review, we are reviewing our approach and looking at the options. However, the Secretary of Defense has not made any decisions.

126. What is your assessment of Chinese and Russian strategic objectives in Africa? In what ways, if any, do these objectives conflict with those of the U.S.?

The United States encourages partners to help develop Africa's economic, infrastructure, humanitarian, and security sectors to the benefit of all Africans. However, malign actors that flout international norms and professional military standards potentially threaten many African countries' stability. Africa offers high partnership returns for low investment costs, as such, both countries view Africa as a testing ground for exerting themselves globally. However, the scale, focus, range, and interests vary between China and Russia.

Russia's efforts are comparatively smaller than China's across the continent. Russia has attempted to present itself as a security solution, providing training and equipment in exchange for natural resource rights and geostrategic access through partnerships with African nations bordering the Mediterranean and Red Seas. Russia's efforts are furthered through the presence of private military companies (PMCs) in a handful of African countries.

China views Africa as an integral component of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and offers incentives to African countries, such as building infrastructure, through high-interest loans to integrate the Chinese economy with Africa's. China is converting its first overseas military base in Djibouti into a power projection platform and has expressed interest in opening more bases and leveraging commercial seaport investments in East Africa and Southern Africa to increase China's geopolitical influence throughout the continent. As a result, a large majority of African countries vote in line with Chinese interests within the United Nations and other international organizations. Growing Chinese interests in Africa means the People's Liberation Army will likely increase its regional basing and military presence, which threatens the United States' freedom of movement.

127. What should be the DOD role in supporting U.S. strategic objectives in Africa? What should be the role of DOD with regard to China and Russia in Africa?

Consistent with the NDS, we continue to strengthen relationships with our defense partners in Africa to achieve our goals on the continent, including long-term strategic competition with China and Russia and combatting violent extremist organizations. We continue to use a variety of tools to work closely with our African and other international partners to achieve these policy goals and address African security concerns through capacity-building programs, security assistance, military equipment sales, education, and exercises. DoD supports a whole-of-government approach and support the White House's Prosper Africa initiative.

128. The cancellation of the Redesigned Kill Vehicle program last summer has resulted in an anticipated gap of at least 10 years before the deployment of modernized ground-based interceptors for homeland ballistic missile defense.

(No Response Required. Lead in for questions.)

129. Should DOD undertake a program to fill that gap, in your view? If so, would you recommend the deployment of a layered solution, including ground-based SM-3 IIAs and/or THAAD batteries, a partial upgrade of the ground-based interceptors, or both?

Today, the U.S. is defended by the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system which includes 44 Ground-based Interceptors (GBIs). To improve the current GMD system, we are requesting funds for improving existing sensors, building a new discrimination radar in Alaska, and refurbishing the COBRA DANE radar.

To strengthen the defense of the homeland, DoD is examining options for a layered homeland missile defense architecture. Within a layered defense architecture, the SM-3 Block IIA could offer additional opportunities to defeat missile threats in the late mid-course phase to augment the existing GMD system. In addition, MDA is exploring the possibility of utilizing a prototype THAAD system as a “terminal” phase capability. With these efforts, the United States will be better postured to effectively meet the evolving missile threats to the homeland.

130. In your view, would this layered approach require a change in policy with respect to the types of interceptors used, the defended area, and the specific threats they are deployed against?

This layered approach is in line with the 2019 Missile Defense Review, and is consistent with long standing U.S. policy recognized by previous administrations dating back to the early 2000s. This layered homeland defense architecture is designed to counter threats from rogue nations. We will continue to rely on nuclear deterrence to counter Russia’s and China’s strategic forces.

131. Missile and rocket attacks by Iran and Iranian-backed proxies in the Middle East in recent months highlight the shortage of Theater Integrated Air and Missile Defense (TIAMD) assets available to protect deployed U.S. forces. This shortage is more acute in EUCOM and INDOPACOM, where the missile threats are much more sophisticated. Air defense units remain the highest-demand, lowest-density forces in the Army.

Do you believe DOD should expand theater missile defense capabilities (improvements to existing or development of new systems), capacity (increased procurement of existing systems), or both? How would you recommend doing so?

Both. Potential adversaries are developing new, more lethal regional ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic offensive missiles to strike regional U.S. forces, allies, and partners. These missile capabilities support A2/AD strategies designed to contest U.S. and allies’ ability to respond to regional aggression, inhibit our freedom of maneuver, and erode our ability to reinforce allies in crisis or conflict. In response, the U.S. is modernizing and increasing its regional missile defense posture by: increasing our capacity by procuring additional Patriot, THAAD, and sea-

based SM-3 and SM-6 interceptors; fielding additional mobile platforms, including more BMD-capable Aegis ships, to better respond to crises or conflicts; and integrating U.S. regional systems to expand the area that can be defended and employ interceptors more efficiently.

Additionally, U.S. geographic combatant commands are developing forward-looking IAMD road maps that will guide future missile defense architectures and cooperation strategies with allies and partners. The objective of these roadmaps is to develop and deploy, with our allies and partners, interoperable and integrated missile defense sensors, interceptors and command and control. For example, EUCOM is helping NATO Allies improve their IAMD capabilities so that they can contribute more to the defense of the Alliance from regional air and missile threats from any direction.

132. Do you believe the United States should encourage regional allies and partners to increase their missile defense capabilities to contribute to regional security and help reduce the burden on U.S. forces and requirements? If confirmed, specifically what would you do to encourage our allies and partners to do so?

We must continue working together with allies and partners to enhance our regional missile defense efforts in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. Our cooperation strengthens deterrence and provides assurance essential to the unity of our alliances which are threatened by missile coercion and attacks. Many of our Allies and partners are acquiring advanced maritime and land-based air and missile defense systems that will contribute to collective security. If confirmed, I will encourage them to continue these efforts, while seeking to opportunities to deepen interoperability with the U.S. and regional partners.

Nuclear Weapons

133. In your view, is the sustainment and timely modernization of the three legs of the nuclear triad essential?

Yes. Nuclear deterrence is the highest priority mission of the Department of Defense. Our nation's nuclear weapons play a critical role in deterring nuclear attacks and preventing large-scale conventional warfare between nuclear-armed States today and for the foreseeable future. After more than 25 years of life-extending and sustaining Cold War-era nuclear delivery systems and command, control and communications systems, repeated decisions to defer modernization and recapitalization of U.S. nuclear weapons have caught up with us. To maintain credible deterrence in the face of growing nuclear threats, the United States must concurrently modernize each leg of the strategic nuclear triad while also sustaining our aging legacy systems until modernized replacements are available—further delay is not an option.

134. Do you support the supplemental capabilities recommended by the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, including the deployed low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile and possible return of a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile to the force? Please explain your answer.

Yes, I support the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review's recommendation to strengthen deterrence by supplementing current U.S. nuclear forces with the low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile and nuclear sea-launched cruise missile. These are measured responses to address gaps

in regional deterrence resulting from increasing Russian and Chinese capabilities. These supplemental capabilities do not require us to develop new nuclear weapons, do not violate arms control treaties, and do not require nuclear explosive testing. They strengthen deterrence by ensuring the United States has effective and credible options at any level of escalation in the face of improving adversary air and missile defenses. They send a clear message that adversaries should not employ nuclear weapons because we have a range of credible response options.

(134 B) If confirmed, would you recommend any significant change in U.S. nuclear posture or declaratory policy, including reducing alert status of ICBMs or adopting a “No First Use” policy? Please explain your answer.

No, I would not recommend any significant change in U.S. nuclear posture or declaratory policy. For more than six decades, the U.S. has emphasized the need for a nuclear force that credibly deters adversaries, assures allies and partners, and would achieve U.S. objectives should deterrence fail. Because each leg of the U.S. nuclear triad provides unique and complementary attributes, no adversary can be confident that launching a strategic attack against the United States will eliminate our ability to respond and inflict unacceptable damage.

Regarding the alert status of ICBMs, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review stated that the United States will maintain a portion of its nuclear forces on alert day-to-day, retaining the option of launching those forces promptly. Reducing the alert status of ICBMs would create instability by rendering them vulnerable to a potential first strike and compelling the United States to rush to re-alert in a crisis or conflict. U.S. ICBMs are not on “hair-trigger alert,” as sometimes mistakenly is claimed. The bipartisan 2009 Perry-Schlesinger Commission report stated that hair trigger alert “is simply an erroneous characterization of the issue. The alert postures of both countries [the United States and the Russian Federation] are in fact highly stable.”

Finally, the U.S. has never adopted a policy declaring it would not use nuclear weapons first in a conflict. Today, the U.S. rightly continues its longstanding policy of retaining some degree of ambiguity regarding the precise circumstances that might lead to a U.S. nuclear response. The 2018 NPR is consistent with the 2010 NPR in stating that U.S. nuclear capabilities and doctrine deter not just nuclear but also chemical, biological, and other non-nuclear strategic attacks. Adopting a “No First Use” policy would not decrease the risks of nuclear war, but would increase the risk of nuclear use by signaling that the United States would not employ nuclear weapons when its vital interests, or those of its allies, are put in jeopardy.

135. Would you recommend extension of the New START Treaty with Russia before its expiration in early 2021?

Any decision on whether or not to extend the New START Treaty should support the President’s call for a broader nuclear arms control framework, encompassing both Russia and China. Additionally, Russia’s large arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons must be addressed.

Defense Assistance to Civil Authorities for COVID-19 Response

136. What types of support to civil authorities is the Department of Defense best

suited to provide during the coronavirus crisis? Are there any types of support that the Department of Defense should not provide, in your view?

DoD has substantial capabilities and capacities, both of which can be – and are in fact being – made available as part of the Federal Government’s support to State and local authorities in the fight against COVID-19, as permitted by law. Examples include: medical support; engineering support (e.g., alternate care facilities); aviation support; strategic airlift; installation support; contracting support; lab support (e.g., testing and medical countermeasures); and mortuary affairs. DoD would evaluate any request or proposal for support to ensure that it is within DoD authorities and is permitted by law.

137. DOD health system leaders have indicated that military treatment facilities are beginning to be stressed by the effects of COVID-19 on the Department’s beneficiaries.

In your view, how should the Department balance the on-call operational medical capabilities required by the NDS with support to the medical requirements of civil authorities here in the United States?

DoD continues to meet its mission requirements to support civil authorities in the fight at home against COVID-19, work with allies and partners to defend our nation overseas, and ensure that the Department’s beneficiaries receive the medical care they need by using established processes to manage all required capabilities and mitigate emerging risks. For example, we are fortunate that military installations are welcome and closely interconnected within communities throughout our nation. Because of these established relationships, DoD can refer beneficiaries to comparable civilian medical treatment facilities in the community, if circumstances require it.

138. Does the Department have the resources to support both missions simultaneously?

It is my understanding that DoD continues to meet its mission requirements to support civil authorities in the fight at home against COVID-19, work with allies and partners to defend our Nation overseas, and provide DoD beneficiaries needed medical care. DoD will continue to make the risk-informed decisions necessary to use DoD’s finite resources to protect our Nation and its citizens effectively.

139. To what extent does providing defense support to civil authorities during the coronavirus crisis impact readiness? How should the Department think about these tradeoffs?

As stated in the National Security Strategy, the U.S. Government’s “fundamental responsibility is to protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life.” When faced with hurricanes and other emergencies at home and contingency operations abroad, DoD has worked with its partners and allies to execute its fundamental responsibilities to respond to both swiftly and effectively. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of the Military Departments to ensure that DoD continues to fulfill its fundamental responsibilities and to closely monitor readiness and, if necessary, take actions to manage risk.

140. What should be done to minimize the risk to Department personnel who are tasked with providing defense assistance to civil authorities during the coronavirus crisis?

Protecting our people has remained Secretary Esper’s top priority from the start. All DoD personnel who are providing assistance to civil authorities are provided with CDC-recommended PPE in sufficient quantities for the duration of the mission. Upon return to their home station, personnel must comply with all DoD testing, screening, and restriction of movement procedures as directed by DoD guidance to minimize the risk of unwittingly exposing other DoD personnel, their families, or their local community to COVID-19.

Foreign Disinformation on COVID-19

141. China, Russia and other nations are disseminating disinformation and false narratives relating to COVID-19, to advance their strategic interests.

What role, if any, should the Department play in countering disinformation and false narratives relating to COVID-19?

The Department of Defense plays an important role in supporting whole-of-government efforts to recognize, understand, expose, and counter propaganda and disinformation efforts that undermine security and stability. One way that the Department has countered disinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic is by maintaining consistent, reputable, and transparent lines of communication with our allies and partners around the world while utilizing a free and open press to explain and clarify our actions. Our forward-leaning posture and readiness to respond to any crisis ensures regional stability and provides space for nations to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic internally.

Defense Security Cooperation

142. What is the appropriate role of the Department of Defense in the conduct of security sector assistance?

DoD helps achieve U.S. political-military objectives in priority theaters by implementing Title 22 programs and leading Title 10 efforts to conduct security cooperation initiatives that enable the Geographic Combatant Commanders to set the theater, deter conflict, or prevail in conflict alongside our partners and allies, if necessary.

143. What should be the Department’s relationship with the Department of State in the conduct of these activities?

DoD activities always align with broader U.S. foreign policy. This alignment requires thorough coordination and collaboration with the State Department through the interagency process and robust engagement between the two departments at all levels.

144. Are the current security sector assistance authorities available to DOD sufficient to accomplish the objectives of the NDS? What changes, if any, would

you recommend in this regard?

Through the FY 2017 NDAA's security cooperation reforms and other legislation, Congress has provided the Department authorities to address capability and capacity shortfalls among allies and partners to ensure partners are able to operate alongside or in lieu of U.S. forces. The Department has made significant strides implementing these reforms in recent years through aligning security cooperation activities with NDS objectives and utilizing the full range of available authorities for building partner capacity. Additionally, the Department's active duty and civilian personnel are benefiting from the provisions included in the FY 2017 NDAA with regards to security cooperation workforce development and certification.

Special Operations Forces

145. The NDAA for FY 2017 included provisions to enhance the oversight of and advocacy for special operations forces (SOF) by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SOLIC)). These reforms established an administrative chain of command from the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command through the ASD(SOLIC) to the Secretary of Defense, mirroring the relationship between the Secretaries of the Military Departments, their service chiefs, and the Secretary of Defense. These reforms effectively “dual-hatted” the ASD(SOLIC) by making the position both: (1) the principal staff advisor and direct report to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary for “service secretary-like” matters relating to SOF; and (2) subordinate to the USD(P) for policy and operational matters.

What is your understanding of the scope of the “service secretary-like” responsibilities of the ASD(SOLIC) in regard to special operations forces?

As prescribed in 10 U.S.C. 138 and 167, the ASD SO/LIC's “service secretary-like” responsibilities include the exercise of authority, direction, and control with respect to the special operations-peculiar administration and support of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), including the readiness and organization of special operations forces, resources and equipment, and civilian personnel. That responsibility includes the oversight of USSOCOM's annual budget submission for SOF (known as Major Force Program-11); the development of SOF-peculiar capabilities, including validating requirements; and SOF training, exercises, and other military and civilian personnel matters.

146. In your view, does existing DOD policy and guidance provide sufficient clarity on how these “service secretary-like” responsibilities are distinguished from and balanced with other ASD(SOLIC) responsibilities for policy and operational matters?

No, the last substantive change to the SO/LIC charter (DoDD 5111.10), which prescribes the ASD (SO/LIC)'s roles and responsibilities within the Department, was approved in October 2011. The SO/LIC charter is currently under revision, primarily to distinguish the ASD SO/LIC's resourcing and administrative oversight responsibilities more clearly from his/her role as an advisor to the SecDef and USD(P) for irregular warfare,

combatting terrorism, and other special operations-related functions. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the ASD (SO/LIC) to complete the revision.

147. If confirmed, what actions would you take to affirm the independent role of the ASD(SOLIC) as the “service secretary-like” civilian for SOF, including supporting the administrative chain of command running from the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command through the ASD(SOLIC) to the Secretary of Defense?

If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the ASD(SO/LIC) to ensure that U.S. special operations activities support the Department’s broader policy objectives and are consistent with DoD authority, strategy, and policy.

148. In your view, does the USD(P) have any role with respect to the budget, personnel, or activities of the Secretariat for Special Operations, which was established to provide dedicated support to the ASD(SOLIC) in exercising his or her independent role as the “service secretary-like” civilian for SOF?

Yes. Because the Secretariat for Special Operations continues to fall under the USD(P) organizationally, USD(P) is responsible for budgetary, personnel, and administrative support for the Secretariat. If confirmed, I will continue to work to ensure the office has the personnel, office space, and other administrative support necessary to assist the ASD(SO/LIC) in his/her administrative oversight responsibilities.

Sexual Harassment

149. In responding to the inaugural DOD Civilian Employee Workplace and Gender Relations survey administered in 2016, 14.2 percent of female and 5.1 percent of male DOD employees indicated that they had experienced sexual harassment and/or gender discrimination by “someone at work” in the 12 months prior to completing the survey.

If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to receive or otherwise become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or discrimination from an employee of the OUSD(P)?

I do not condone any type of sexual harassment or discrimination in the workplace. Throughout my career, I have addressed sexual harassment issues and if confirmed, I will continue to promote a culture of dignity and respect. I will also work with stakeholders to ensure employees who believe they have been sexually harassed feel safe to come forward without fear of retaliation.

Relations with Congress

150. What are your views on the state of the relationship between the OUSD(P) and the Senate Armed Services Committee, in particular, and with the Congress in general?

I am committed, if confirmed, to ensuring a proper, collegial, and responsive relationship between OUSD(P) and the Congress, and in particular with this Committee. Having worked on Capitol Hill, I am acutely aware that the Department of Defense and the Congress are partners in ensuring U.S. national security and I am committed to fostering that partnership.

Congressional Oversight

151. In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer yes or no.

Yes; in accordance with applicable laws and long-standing Department and Executive Branch practice.

152. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.

Yes; in accordance with applicable laws and long-standing Department and Executive Branch practice.

153. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.

Yes; in accordance with applicable laws and long-standing Department and Executive Branch practice.

154. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer yes or no.

Yes; in accordance with applicable laws and long-standing Department and Executive Branch practice.

155. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.

Yes; in accordance with applicable laws and long-standing Department and Executive Branch practice.

156. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer yes or no.

Yes; in accordance with applicable laws and long-standing Department and Executive Branch practice.

157. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer yes or no.

Yes; I agree to protect DoD personnel from unlawful retaliation.