Introduction

Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify before you today on the Department’s missile defense strategy, policies, and programs.

As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, I am responsible for the overall supervision of Department of Defense (DoD) policy pertaining to strategic capabilities essential for integrated deterrence including space, cyber, missile defense, nuclear weapons, and countering weapons of mass destruction.

I am honored to appear alongside General Glen VanHerck, Commander, United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), Vice Admiral Jon Hill, Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), Lieutenant General Daniel Karbler, Commander of the U.S. Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC), and Dr. David Honey, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (DUSD R&E).

Adversary advances in missile technologies, the marked increase in deployed systems, and the documented use of missiles in conflicts around the world show that missiles have become a common and expected facet of modern warfare. This makes our missile defeat and missile defense efforts more important than ever.
In this testimony I will examine how the missile threat has evolved; provide an update on U.S. missile defense policy as informed by the 2022 Missile Defense Review (MDR); and discuss the path forward to address growing missile threats in the Department’s FY 2023 budget.

**Missile Threat Evolution**

Offensive missiles are increasingly weapons of choice for Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, for use in conflict and to coerce and intimidate their neighbors both in peacetime and crisis.

- **People’s Republic of China (PRC):** As Secretary Austin has stated, China is the Department’s pacing threat. China has dramatically advanced its development of conventional and nuclear armed ballistic and hypersonic missile technologies and capabilities over the last twenty years, through intense and focused investment, development, testing, and deployments. China is using increasingly sophisticated and proliferated space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and improved command and control (C2) systems, to drive better precision and accuracy of its missiles. Many of China’s systems are intended to deter and counter U.S. forward presence, force projection, and operations, especially in the Western Pacific region and give China the ability to further intimidate and threaten its neighbors, including Taiwan.

- **Russia:** Over the last ten years, Russia has prioritized modernization of its intercontinental range missile systems. Russia is developing, testing, and deploying new, diversified capabilities that pose new challenges to U.S. missile warning systems. Russia’s regional missile arsenal underpins its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategies that are designed to undermine NATO’s ability to project force in response to crisis or conflict. Russia has developed and fielded a suite of advanced precision-strike missiles
that it has employed with devastating operational and tactical effect in conflict including in Ukraine and Syria. In Ukraine, we have witnessed Russia employ over 1,500 missiles of all types, often targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure, as part of its unprovoked campaign that has caused the deaths of thousands of innocent men, women, and children.

- **North Korea**: North Korea continues to improve, expand, and diversify its conventional and nuclear missile capabilities, posing an increasing risk to the U.S. homeland and U.S. forces, allies, and partners in the region. Most of North Korea’s ballistic missiles have an assessed capability to carry nuclear payloads. North Korea has accelerated its missile testing in recent months that included the launch of a long-range missile.

- **Iran**: Iran maintains a large and growing regional missile and UAS capability, which it leverages via its regional proxy groups to coerce and threaten its neighbors, and ensure regime survival. Iran’s proxy wars in Yemen against Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and in Gaza and Lebanon against Israel, further demonstrate its willingness to use missiles and UAS capabilities to strike targets of any type including civilian populations. Iran’s nascent space program could shorten its pathway to a future long-range missile capability.

- **Non-State Actors**: Non-state actors also pose a threat to U.S. regional interests, including our allies and partners. On today’s battlefields, non-state actors are employing increasingly complex offensive UAS, rocket, and missile capabilities. State sponsors are proliferating technology and weapons systems to non-state groups, which have used them indiscriminately against innocent civilians. The recent attack on an oil facility in Saudi Arabia is just one example of this emerging threat.
The Department reassessed its missile defense policy as part of the 2022 MDR, which DoD provided in full to Congress in classified format on March 28 as an integrated element of the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS).

It is important to underscore the fully integrated approach that DoD took to conducting the 2022 MDR as part of the development of the NDS and alongside the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). This approach ensured tight linkages between these key elements of our strategy and our allocation of related resources. The NDS establishes four priorities for the Department:

1. Defending the homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain threat posed by the PRC.
2. Deterring strategic attacks against the United States, our allies, and our partners.
3. Deterring aggression – while being prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary – prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo-Pacific region, then the Russia challenge in Europe.

The 2022 MDR was developed over a nearly year-long process. It incorporates inputs from civilian and military stakeholders throughout the Department and across the interagency, and takes into account viewpoints solicited during extensive consultations with our allies and partners.

Missile defenses represent a key element within an integrated deterrence framework that weaves together all instruments of national power. It does this by:
• providing resilience to our deterrence and defense posture through both active (e.g., kinetic and non-kinetic intercept systems) and passive (e.g., redundancy, hardening, dispersal) means of defense;
• complicating adversary attack plans and reducing confidence of attack success;
• raising the threshold for potential conflict;
• offering leverage for diplomatic efforts and assuring allies and partners;
• providing military options that may be less escalatory than employing offensive systems;
• and limiting damage from attacks, thus expanding the decision making space for senior leaders.

Missile defenses and nuclear capabilities remain complementary. U.S. nuclear weapons present the credible threat of a robust response and overwhelming cost imposition, while missile defenses contribute to deterrence by denial. If deterrence fails, missile defenses can potentially mitigate effects from an attack.

As the scale and complexity of the missile threat increases, the Department recognizes that to stay ahead we need to implement a comprehensive missile defeat approach which includes missile defense but is complemented by the credible threat of direct cost imposition through nuclear and non-nuclear means. Missile defeat encompasses a range of activities in all domains designed to counter the development, acquisition, proliferation, potential and actual use of adversary offensive missiles of all types, and to limit damage from such use.

**Homeland Defense**

Our missile defense policy guided the development of the FY 2023 Missile Defeat and Defense budget submission. In line with the NDS, our top priority is to defend the homeland and deter attacks against the United States. To achieve this strategic objective, the President’s
Budget requested $2.8 billion to fully fund efforts to improve the capability and reliability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system. These efforts include the development of the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) to augment the existing the Ground-based Interceptor (GBI). The GMD system offers an important measure of protection for the United States. GMD also contributes to reassuring our allies and partners that the United States will not be coerced by threats to the homeland from states like North Korea.

The United States of course maintains the right to defend itself against attacks from any source, but GMD is neither intended for, nor capable of, defeating the large and sophisticated intercontinental ballistic missile, air-launched ballistic missile, or sea-launched ballistic missile threats to the U.S. homeland from Russia or China. The United States relies on strategic deterrence to address these threats.

The Department is taking necessary action in our FY 2023 budget to enhance our domain awareness and warning capabilities. The President’s Budget request funds a number of defensive measures including $278 million for new over-the-horizon radars to improve our ability to detect and decrease the risks from cruise missile strikes against U.S. critical assets. The President’s Budget request also includes $4.7 billion to fund the transition to a new, resilient missile warning and missile tracking architecture that will both improve our capability to warn against and track new types of missile threats while also improving our resilience against growing counter-space threats.

Guam, like all U.S. territories, is unequivocally part of the U.S. homeland, and a missile strike against Guam would be a direct attack against the United States. After assessing the increased missile threat to Guam, the Department requested $892 million in its FY 2023 budget for the Missile Defense Agency, the Army, and the Navy to develop and field missile defense
capabilities to augment the existing Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery currently emplaced on the island. This will contribute to the overall defense of Guam and bolster U.S. military posture in the Indo-Pacific region.

**Regional Defense**

The Department evaluated the regional missile threat to our deployed forces and allies and partners, and concluded that we must strengthen our regional missile defenses to counter all missile threats – including hypersonic threats – regardless of origin. The United States must continue to develop defenses against regional hypersonic missile threats, to include building a persistent and resilient sensor network to characterize and track all hypersonic threats, improve attribution, and enable engagement. The President’s Budget request makes significant investments in regional ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missile defense capabilities to accomplish these objectives. The transition to a resilient missile warning and missile tracking architecture supports missile defense of the homeland as well as regional missile defenses.

U.S. deployed forces, allies, and partners face the proliferation of lower-tier threats, such as rockets and armed UAS. Our adversaries will continue to seek ways to use these relatively inexpensive, flexible, and expendable systems. The Department is working to field technical and integrated counter-UAS solutions to ensure we can collectively meet the range of threats and appropriately hedge against future advancements.

**Strengthening International Cooperation with Allies and Partners**

The United States is committed to working with NATO and our other allies and partners to maintain a credible level of regional defensive capability against all missile threats from any adversary. This means we must continue to look for new ways to protect our collective forces,
preserve our freedom of maneuver, and strengthen our security commitments. Over the next year, we intend to focus on:

- Identifying opportunities to coordinate on national missile defense policies;
- Aligning operational planning to maximize U.S., ally and partner capabilities;
- Capturing lessons learned from both real and simulated events such as exercises;
- Sharing information on air and missile threats;
- Developing and exchanging missile defense visions;
- Improving information protection efforts; and
- Supporting ally and partner missile defense modernization and capability development.

We view the missile defense capabilities of our allies and partners as indispensable contributions to our shared defense and integrated deterrence interests.

**Conclusion**

The sobering reality of the tragic events in Ukraine, in which Russia has used a broad array of missiles to attack and, in my opinion, terrorize civilian populations, highlights the extent to which adversaries are prepared to employ missiles in conflict. The centrality of missile attacks as a component of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine is not an isolated occurrence – the use of missiles is becoming increasingly commonplace in conflicts worldwide.

Missile defenses are a critical capability for defending the U.S. homeland, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners. Missile defenses are also an important contribution to the Department’s broader integrated deterrence framework. The United States remains committed to improving our homeland and regional missile defenses as we work to
deter conflict, and to prevail in conflict if deterrence fails. I look forward to working with the Congress to advance this shared goal.

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions.