HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON WORLDWIDE THREATS

Tuesday, May 10, 2022

U.S. Senate
Committee on Armed Services
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jack Reed, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Committee Members Present: Senators Reed [presiding], Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Manchin, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Blackburn, and Hawley.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED, U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE ISLAND

Chairman Reed: Good morning. The committee meets today to receive testimony on the worldwide threats facing the United States and our international partners.

I would like to welcome Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines and Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency Lieutenant General Scott D. Berrier. Thank you both for joining us, and please convey the committee's gratitude to the men and women of the Intelligence Community for their critical work.

We must start by addressing the illegal war Vladimir Putin is waging in Ukraine. Over the past 2 1/2 months, Russia's unprovoked aggression has inflicted horrific suffering upon innocent civilians in Ukraine, threatened European security, and caused serious consequences for the global economy. In the face of this senseless violence, the Ukrainian military has performed tremendously, supported by the United States and the international community. A formidable array of our global allies and partners have joined in solidarity to impose severe sanctions on Russia and provide support to Ukraine. We cannot overstate the scale and importance of this unity.

I want to commend the Biden administration and the leaders of the Intelligence Community for the unprecedented
and skillful release of intelligence over the last several months that exposed Russia's aggressive intentions and deceitful activities ahead of its invasion of Ukraine. Intelligence officials are understandably cautious about revealing hard-won insights on adversaries, but this strategy has proven highly effective in strengthening the international community's response and creating dilemmas for Vladimir Putin. This is a great example of competing effectively in the information domain, and I hope we will continue to make use of this kind of creative tradecraft.

With that in mind, Russia's strategy in Ukraine seems to be evolving. Director Haines, General Berrier, I would ask for your assessment of the Ukraine conflict in the larger context of the evolving international order, as well as the implications for the United States' approach to security in the European theater going forward.

We must also stay focused on our long-term strategic competition with China. In addition to its economic and socio-political growth, China has studied the United States' way of war and focused on offsetting our advantages. Beijing has made concerning progress in this regard and holds its own expansive geostrategic ambitions. As we speak, China is watching how the nations of the world respond to Russia. In considering a potential invasion of Taiwan, President Xi is scrutinizing Putin's playbook and
the international response.

However, there is broad consensus that our comparative advantage over China is our network of partners and allies in the region and globally. Strengthening that network should be at the center of any strategy for the Indo-Pacific region, and the maturation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or "Quad," involving the United States, Japan, India, and Australia, presents a strategic opportunity to establish a durable framework.

I would ask our witnesses to share what military and non-military factors are most likely to impact Chinese decision-making with respect to potential action against Taiwan.

Turning to Iran, in the 4 years since then-President Trump pulled out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, Iran has made key nuclear advances. It has decreased "breakout time" to several weeks, from a year under the agreement. It has increased uranium enrichment to 60 percent, instead of just under 4 percent allowed under the agreement. Iran has hardened its infrastructure and replaced damaged equipment with more advanced models. And while negotiations to return Iran to the JCPOA are in the final stages, the final outcome has not yet been determined.

Beyond its nuclear advances, Iran and Iranian proxies continue to mount drone and rocket attacks in the region,
including against bases in Iraq and Syria with a U.S.
military presence. Saudi Arabia, and now also the United
Arab Emirates have also come under attack. Director Haines,
given these current dynamics I would like your thoughts on
how to best de-escalate tensions with Iran while preserving
space to return to the JCPOA.

Finally, this year's threat assessment again highlights
the challenges posed by environmental degradation from
climate change. I understand it is the DNI's view that
climate change will increasingly exacerbate risks to U.S.
national security interests, as issues like rising
temperatures, poor water governance, pollution, changing
precipitation patterns, and other climate effects are likely
to lead to an array of human challenges, such as food and
water insecurity and threats to human health.

We live in a complex and dangerous global security
environment. From Russia's aggression in Europe to China's
influence in the Indo-Pacific to countless other malign
actors around the world, prevailing in this environment will
require resolute, thoughtful strategies.

I look forward to our witnesses' insights into these
issues, and I thank them again for their participation.

Let me now turn to the ranking member, Senator Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR FROM OKLAHOMA

Senator Inhofe: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our witnesses.

When our witnesses testified before this committee last year, they provided a dire assessment of the threats to our national security. It is clear and, I really cannot overstate this, the security situation we face today is significantly more dangerous and complex than it has ever been, or certainly was a year ago. The Chinese threat is beyond anything we ever dealt with before. This year, Beijing announced a 7.1 percent defense budget increase. They have had two decades of real growth with no signs of slowing down and, as the chairman alluded to, Putin's unprovoked aggression against Ukraine shows the danger posed by the nuclear-armed Russia to our security, those of our allies, and international order.

Iran's malign behavior continues throughout the Middle East, and terrorist groups like ISIS and al Qaeda are growing in strength across Africa. Despite this reality, President Biden's budget request is inadequate. It does not deliver the real growth the military needs, and that is the 3 to 5 percent increase that we established some 5 years ago. And as I have said it before, inflation is the new sequestration that we consider today, and it is making
everything we do more difficult.

So I look forward to hearing from both of you about how our threats have evolved ever since last year and how the Intelligence Community is changing to respond to the national security strategy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe. Now let me recognize Director Haines.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE AVRIL HAINES, DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Ms. Haines: Thank you very much, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today and to provide testimony alongside General Berrier on the intelligence community's annual assessment of worldwide threats to U.S. national security.

Before I start I just want to take a moment to publicly thank the men and women of the Intelligence Community for their extraordinary work to keep us safe. I know how privileged I am to be part of this community of truly talented people, to be given a chance to do something useful in service to my country, and I thank you for support for their work.

Broadly speaking, this year's assessment focuses, much like last year's assessment, on adversaries and competitors, critical transnational threats, and conflicts and instability, and these categories often overlap. Cybercrime, for example, is a transnational threat while also being a threat that emanates from state actors. One of the key challenges of this era is assessing how various threats and trends are likely to intersect so as to identify where their interactions may result in fundamentally greater risk to our interests than one might otherwise expect or
where they introduce new opportunities. This year's Annual
Threat Assessment highlights some of these connections as it
provides the IC's baseline of the most pressing threats to
U.S. national security.

The assessment starts with threats from key state
actors, beginning with the People's Republic of China, which
remains an unparalleled priority for the Intelligence
Community, and then turns to Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
All four governments have demonstrated the capability and
intent to promote their interests in ways that cut against
U.S. and allied interests.

The PRC is coming ever closer to being a peer
competitor in areas of relevance to national security, is
pushing to revise global norms and institutions to its
advantage, and is challenging the United States in multiple
arenas -- economically, militarily, and technologically.
China is especially effective at bringing together a
coordinated, whole-of-government approach to demonstrated
strength and to compel neighbors to acquiesce to its
preference, including its territorial and maritime claims
and assertions of sovereignty over Taiwan.

A key area of focus for the IC is President Xi
Jinping's determination to force unification with Taiwan on
Beijing's terms. China would prefer coerced unification
that avoids armed conflict, and it has been stepping up
diplomatic, economic, and military pressure on the island for years to isolate it and weaken confidence in its democratically elected leaders. And at the same time, Beijing is prepared to use military force if it decides this is necessary.

The PRC is also engaged in the largest-ever nuclear force expansion and arsenal diversification in its history. It is working to match or exceed U.S. capabilities in space and presents the broadest, most active and persistent cyber espionage threat to U.S. government and private sector networks.

And Russia, of course, also remains a critical priority and is a significant focus right now in light of President Putin's tragic invasion of Ukraine in February, which has produced a shock to the geopolitical order with implications for the future that we are only beginning to understand but are sure to be consequential. The IC, as you know, provided warning of President Putin's plans, but this is a case where I think all of us wish we had been wrong.

Russia's failure to rapidly seize Kyiv and overwhelm Ukrainian forces has deprived Moscow of the quick military victory that it had originally expected would prevent the United States and NATO from being able to provide meaningful military aid to Ukraine. The Russians met with more resistance from Ukraine than they expected, and their own
military's performance revealed a number of significant internal challenges, forcing them to adjust their initial military objectives, fall back from Kyiv, and focus on the Donbas.

The next month or two of fighting will be significant as the Russians attempt to reinvigorate their efforts, but even if they are successful we are not confident that the fight in the Donbas will effectively end the war. We assess President Putin is preparing for prolonged conflict in Ukraine, during which he still intends to achieve goals beyond the Donbas. We assess that Putin’s strategic goals are probably not changed, suggesting he regards the decision in late March to refocus Russian forces on the Donbas as only a temporary shift to regain the initiative after the Russian military’s failure to capture Kyiv.

His current near-term military objectives are to capture the two oblasts in Donetsk and Luhansk with a buffer zone, encircle Ukrainian forces from the north and the south to the west of the Donbas in order to crush the most capability and well-equipped Ukrainian forces who are fighting to hold the line in the east, consolidate control of the land bridge Russia has established from Crimea to the Donbas, occupy Kherson, and control the water source for Crimea that is to the north. And we also see indications that the Russian military wants to extend the land bridge to
Transnistria.

And while the Russian forces may be capable of achieving most of these near-term goals in the coming months, we believe that they will not be able to extend control over a land bridge that stretches to Transnistria and includes Odessa without launching some form of mobilization. And it is increasingly unlikely that they will be able to establish control over both oblasts and the buffer zone they desire in the coming weeks.

But Putin most likely also judges that Russia has a greater ability and willingness to endure challenges than his adversaries, and he is probably counting on U.S. and EU resolve to weaken as food shortages, inflation, energy prices get worse.

Moreover, as both Russia and Ukraine believe they can continue to make progress militarily, we do not see a viable negotiating path forward, at least in the short term. The uncertain nature of the battle, which is developing into a war of attrition, combined with the reality that Putin faces a mismatch between his ambitions and Russia's current conventional military capabilities likely means the next few months could see us moving along a more unpredictable and potentially escalatory trajectory. At the very least, we believe the dichotomy will usher in a period of more ad hoc decision-making in Russia, both with respect to the domestic
adjustments required to sustain this push as well as the military conflict with Ukraine and the West.

The current trend increases the likelihood that President Putin will turn to more drastic means, including imposing martial law, reorienting industrial production, or potentially escalatory and military actions to free up the resources needed to achieve his objectives as the conflict drags on or if he perceives Russia is losing in Ukraine. And the most likely flashpoints for escalation in the coming weeks are around increasing Russian attempts to interdict Western security assistance, retaliation for Western economic sanctions, or threats to the regime at home.

We believe that Moscow continues to use nuclear rhetoric to deter the United States and the West from increasing lethal aid to Ukraine and to respond to public comments that the U.S. and NATO allies that suggest expanded Western goals in the conflict. And if Putin perceives that the United States is ignoring his threats he may try to signal to Washington the heightened danger of its support to Ukraine by authorizing another large nuclear exercise involving a major dispersal of mobile intercontinental missiles, heavy bombers, strategic submarines.

We otherwise continue to believe that President Putin would probably only authorize the use of nuclear weapons of he perceived an existential threat to the Russian state or
regime, but we will remain vigilant in monitoring every aspect of Russia's strategic nuclear forces. With tensions this high there is always an enhanced potential for miscalculation, unintended escalation which we hope our intelligence can help to mitigate.

Beyond its invasion of Ukraine, Moscow presents a serious cyber threat, a key space competitor, and one of the most serious foreign influence threats to the United States. Using its intelligence services proxies, wide-ranging influence tools, the Russian government seeks to not only pursue its own interests but also to divide Western alliances, undermine U.S. global standing, amplify discord inside the United States, and influence U.S. voters and decision-making.

And to finish with our state actor threats, the Iranian regime continues to threaten U.S. interests as it tries to erode U.S. influence in the Middle East and trends its influence and project power in neighboring states and minimize threats to regime stability. Meanwhile, Kim Jong-un continues to steadily expand and enhance Pyongyang nuclear and conventional capabilities, targeting the United States and its allies, periodically using aggressive, potentially destabilizing actions to reshape the regional security environment in his favor and to reinforce its status quo as a de facto nuclear power.
The assessment continues to focus on a number of key global and transnational threats, including global health security, transnational organized crime, the rapid development of destabilizing technologies, climate, migration, and terrorism. I raise these because they pose challenges of a fundamentally different nature to our national security than those posed by the actions of nation states, even powerful ones like China and Russia.

And we look at the Russia–Ukraine war and can imagine outcomes to resolve the crisis and the steps needed to get there, even though unpalatable and difficult, and similarly we view the array of challenges Chinese actions pose and can discuss what is required, how we think about tradeoffs. But transnational issues are more complex, require significant and sustained multilateral effort, and though we can discuss ways of managing them all of them pose a set of choices that will be more difficult to untangle and will perhaps require more sacrifice to bring about meaningful change. This reflects not just the interconnected nature of the problems but also the significant impact increasingly empowered non-state actors have on the outcomes and the reality that some of the countries who are key to mitigating threats posed by nation states are also the ones we will be asking to do more in the transnational space.

For example, the lingering effects of the COVID-19
pandemic is putting a strain on governments and societies, fueling humanitarian and economic crises, political unrest, and geopolitical competition. Low-income countries with high debts face particularly challenging recoveries, now exacerbated, in some cases, by increasing food security resulting from the Russia-Ukraine crisis, and these shifts will spur migration around the world, including on our southern border.

The economic impact has set many poor and middle-income countries back years in terms of economic development, and is encouraging some in Latin America, Africa, and Asia to look to China and Russia for quick economic and security assistance to manage their new reality. We see the same complex mix of interlocking challenges stemming from the threat of climate change, which is exacerbating risks in U.S. national security interests across the board but particularly as it intersects with environmental degradation and global health challenges.

And terrorism, of course, remains a persistent threat to U.S. persons and interests at home and abroad, but the implications of the problem are evolving. In Africa, for example, where terrorist groups are clearly gaining strength, the growing overlap between terrorism, criminal activity, and smuggling networks has undermined stability, contributed to coups and an erosion of democracy, and
resulted in countries turning to Russian entities to help manage these problems.

Global transnational criminal organizations continue to pose a direct threat to the United States through the production and trafficking of lethal, illicit drugs, massive theft including cybercrime, human trafficking, and financial crimes, and money-laundering schemes. And in particular, the threat from illicit drugs is at historic levels, with more than 100,000 American drug overdose deaths for the first time annually, driven mainly by a robust supply of synthetic opioids from Mexican transnational criminal organizations. In short, the interconnected global security environment is marked by the growing specter of great power competition and conflict while transnational threats to all nations and actors compete not only for our attention but also for finite resources.

And finally, the assessment turns to conflicts and instability highlighting a series of regional challenges of importance to the United States. Iterative violence between Israel and Iran and conflicts in other areas, including Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, have the potential to escalate or spread, fueling humanitarian crises and threatening U.S. persons. Africa, for example, has seen six irregular transfers of power since 2020, and probably will see new bouts of conflict in the coming year as the region
becomes increasingly strained by a volatile mixture of democratic backsliding, intercommunal violence, and the continued threat of cross-border terrorism.

And finally, most important of all we are focused on our workforces and their families. The IC continues to contribute to the government-wide effort to better understand potential causal mechanisms of anomalous health incidents and remains committed to ensuring afflicted individuals receive the quality care they need. The safety and well-being of our workforce is our highest priority, and we are grateful to members of this committee for your continued support on these issues.

Thank you for the opportunity to present our assessments, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Haines follows:]
Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Madam Director.

General Berrier, please.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL SCOTT BERRIER,
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

General Berrier: Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished members of this committee, it is a privilege to testify today as part of the Intelligence Community's 2022 assessment of worldwide threats to U.S. national security. On behalf of the Defense Intelligence Agency I want to express how much we appreciate your support and partnership. Thank you.

DIA fills a unique intelligence role by providing strategy, operational, and tactical intelligence to our warfighters, defense planners, policymakers, and the acquisition community. We examine conflict across all warfighting domains to assess foreign capabilities and understand our adversaries' intent. DIA's dedicated professionals, in partnership with our Intelligence Community colleagues, allies, and foreign partners, deliver timely and relevant intelligence on the threats and challenges facing our nation. DIA has a highly resilient workforce that has overcome difficult challenges posed by the pandemic. Today my goal is to convey DIA's insights to you, and the American public, on the evolving threat environment as we understand it.

As I look at the global landscape today, I want to begin with Russia and its invasion of Ukraine, which is now
in its third month. Russian military capabilities have been used to violate the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and they pose an existential threat to U.S. national security and that of our allies. The invasion has demonstrated Russia's intent to overturn the U.S.-led, rules-based, post-Cold War international order, expand its control over the former Soviet Union, and reclaim what it regards as its rightful position on the world stage.

Moscow's underestimation of Ukraine's effective resistance, Russia's substantial battlefield losses, and Western resolve to support Ukraine, has undermined Moscow's assault on Kyiv and improved prospects that Ukraine can successfully defend its sovereignty. Moscow has now shifted its focus to eastern Ukraine, where it appears to be prioritizing defeating Ukrainian forces in the Donbas. In response to stiff Ukrainian resistance, Russia has resorted to more indiscriminate and brutal methods that are destroying cities, infrastructure, and increasing civilian deaths. Negotiations remain stalled as both sides focus on the outcome of the battle in the Donbas, while partnerships with Ukraine and warning of potential escalation remain key priorities for DIA.

Turning to China, it remains a pacing threat and a major security challenge. Beijing has long viewed the United States as a strategic competitor. China is capable
of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system. The PLA, which has already fielded sophisticated weapons and instituted major organizational reforms to enhance joint operations, is nearing the status of a global competitor to the United States, its allies and partners, and is a credible peer competitor in the region. China's current nuclear force expansion is historic.

The United States faces military and intelligence threats from competitors, particularly Russia and China, who have and are developing new capabilities intended to contest, limit, or exceed U.S. military advantage. State and non-state actors are selectively putting these capabilities into play globally and regionally. These capabilities also span all warfighting domains – maritime, land, air, electronic warfare, cyberspace, information, and space. They include more lethal ballistic and cruise missiles, growing nuclear stockpiles, modernized conventional forces, and a range of gray zone measures such as the use of ambiguous unconventional forces, foreign proxies, information manipulation, cyberattacks, and economic coercion.

Strategic competitors and other challengers are exerting increasing military pressure on neighboring states.
Russia has invaded Ukraine, China is threatening Taiwan, and Iran, through its proxies, threats neighbors in the Middle East and U.S. forces while also enriching uranium to new levels. North Korea continues to threaten South Korea, Japan, and the United States with nuclear-capable ballistic missiles of increased range and lethality.

Transnationally, the terrorist threat will also persist, and we need to understand more about the lessons learned from our experience supporting military and intelligence operations in Afghanistan and the Middle East.

Turning back to my own organization, I take the health, safety, and well-being of my workforce very, very seriously. DIA remains actively engaged in investigating Anomalous Health Incidents, AHIs. My agency has the process and procedures in place to quickly respond to reports from employees or their families who believe that they have been impacted by AHI. We are also partnering with other members of the IC to determine the origin and cause of the reported events.

I am honored to lead DIA. My intent in this hearing is that this helps Congress and our nation better understand the threats and challenges we face from foreign adversaries and competitors. I look forward to your questions, and thank you for your continued support.

[The prepared statement of General Berrier follows:]
Chairman Reed: Thank you, General.

Let me remind my colleagues that at the conclusion of this open session there will be a classified session in SVC-217, and the witnesses may defer some responses to that classified session.

Director Haines, your description of the unfolding battle in the Ukraine suggests that it is moving to a battle of attrition over a long term and that the objectives of the Russians are to destroy the Ukrainian forces and also disrupt the international coalition through economic pressures, gasoline prices, and other factors we are witnessing.

That leads us to, at least me, to the question of how effective are our economic sanctions and what more can we do to bring pressure to the people of Russia so that they are less supportive of this effort?

Ms. Haines: Thank you, Chairman. I think from our perspective the economic sanctions and the export controls have had a pretty significant impact on Russia, and among the indicators that one might look at are, for example, the fact that we are seeing close to about, we predict, approximately 20 percent inflation in Russia, that we expect that their GDP will fall about 10 percent, possibly even more over the course of the year.

We have seen not only the sanctions enacted by the
United States and Europe and other partners around the world having these impacts but also the private sector taking action on its own to remove itself. So things like the fact that oil production services and companies pulled themselves out will have an impact on Russia's capacity to produce, and that is a major revenue source, obviously, for Russia. We have seen other indicators of essentially the private sector impact in these areas, and on the export controls we are seeing how things like export controls on semiconductors and so on are affecting their defense industry.

So I think that is a very significant impact, essentially, although obviously time will tell as we move forward.

Chairman Reed: Are you sensing any popular unease, perhaps, in terms of these economic factors that could translate into a political resistance to the regime?

Ms. Haines: Well, I know many of us saw the protests that erupted after the invasion and then the crackdown that occurred, essentially, in Russia, including passing laws that would provide for very significant punishments in the event that one protested on these issues. And so we have seen those reduced, actually, and when we have looked at effectively polling and so on that indicates where it is that the Russian people are, what we see is that the majority of the Russian people continue to support the
special military operation. And I think it is just very hard, frankly, for information to get into Russia, to the Russian people. They have a very particular perspective that they are being fed by the government during this period.

Chairman Reed: Thank you.

General Berrier, what do you believe the Chinese are taking away from their close scrutiny of the Russian activities in Ukraine?

General Berrier: Senator, I think the Chinese are going to watch this very, very carefully. It is going to take some time for them to sort out all elements of diplomatic information, military, economic, that has occurred with this crisis.

I think they are thinking about future operations probably against Taiwan and how difficult that might be. They are probably also thinking about the scrutiny that they would come under should they entertain thoughts or operations like that.

Chairman Reed: Thank you.

And final question, Director Haines. I think you indicated in your testimony that cyber interference in our elections is a distinct possibility. Is that something that your agency, or the agencies, are following and taking preemptive steps?

Ms. Haines: Yes, absolutely, Senator. We are well
positioned to essentially monitor for the potential of
election influence, including efforts through cyber.

Chairman Reed: One other final, final question. Are
you surprised that the Russians have not used cyberattacks
against third parties or against the United States directly
up to this point? I think that was a concern we all had
from the beginning of this operation.

Ms. Haines: I think what we have seen is the Russians
have obviously attacked Ukraine, and we have attributed a
variety of attacks to them in that context, including, for
example, destructive wiper attacks against Ukrainian
government websites, DDoS attacks against their financial
industry. They also were engaged in attacks intended to get
at command-and-control communications in Ukraine during the
invasion. That attack had an outsized impact. In other
words, we assessed that they intended to focus in on
Ukrainian command and control but ultimately they ended up
affecting a much broader set of VSATs, essentially, you
know, very small terminals outside of Ukraine, including in
Europe.

And yet we have not seen the level of attacks, to your
point, that we expected, and we have a variety of different
theories for why that might be the case, including the fact
that we think that they may have determined that the
collateral impact of such attacks would be challenging for
them in the context of Ukraine, also that they may not have wished to essentially sacrifice potential access and collection opportunities in those scenarios.

And then in terms of attacks against the United States, I think they have had a longstanding concern about the potential for escalation in cyber, vis-à-vis the United States. That does not mean that they will not attack at some point, but it has been interesting to see that they have not during this period.

Chairman Reed: Thank you very much.

Senator Inhofe, please.

Senator Inhofe: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For both of you, the lack of an independent intelligence community significantly worsened Putin's decision-making in Ukraine. What do you think President Xi in China is learning about his intelligence communities? Both of you.

Ms. Haines: Thank you. Senator Inhofe, I think it is a really interesting question. I would prefer to answer it perhaps in closed session. Would that be all right, sir?

Senator Inhofe: That is fine. General, any comments to make in this open session?

General Berrier: Senator, I will take the DNI's lead on that.

Senator Inhofe: I suspected that. Thank you.

The Biden administration has offered Iran significant
sanctions relief in return to the 2015 Iran Nuclear Agreement. General Berrier, would you expect Iran to spend at least some of this sanctions relief on its terrorist proxies and missile programs? Do you agree that if the IRGC has additional money that they would increase their targeting of Americans and our allies? Let's say could they increase that targeting?

General Berrier: Yes, Senator, they could increase targeting against our partners in the region as well as U.S. forces if they had increased funding.

Senator Inhofe: I appreciate that very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.

Let me recognize Senator Shaheen, please.

Senator Shaheen: Thank you. Good morning and thank you both for your testimony this morning.

I returned a couple of weeks ago from the Western Balkans with Senator Tillis and Senator Murphy. We visited Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo. And one of the things we heard in that region was a great deal of concern about Russian meddling and the potential, particularly in Bosnia, for that to further destabilize the country. Are you all following what is going on in that part of Europe, and are you equally concerned?

Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator Shaheen. So I will
just start and obviously hand it over to my colleague as well, but yes, we are concerned about this. This is something we have been working with NATO on, in particular, to try to help them be more resilient in this context. And both information and cyber issues are obviously at stake, but I think managing how it is that Russia develops and what kind of activities they engage in worldwide during this crisis and beyond will be a critical aspect of our work moving forward.

Senator Shaheen: Can I just, before you begin, General, can I just ask you to speak to NATO and U4 in Bosnia, because as you know, the authorization for U4 is going to end this fall in Bosnia, and there is a real concern about Russia's willingness to allow that to continue. So what are we doing to ensure that the troops are not taken out of Bosnia and a void left that provides a real vacuum for instability?

General Berrier: Senator, I think that is a policy question and I would refer it to the Department of Defense. And Senator, to the earlier portion of your question, I believe this is a key component of strategic competition, and this is where I think with our partners and allies and certainly NATO we have to be able to identify that kind of malign activity and expose it and help our partners and future partners be aware of it and do more to counter it.
Yes, we are aware of it.

Senator Shaheen: Thank you. Well, I would say that policy decision needs to be viewed very closely by everybody so that we do not wind up with a vacuum there that we are not able to address.

I want to go to what is still happening with ISIS because, as you both know, we have thousands of ISIS family members who are still being held in camps in northern Syria. They are posing a persistent challenge, not only humanitarian but the potential breeding ground for terrorists. So are we watching closely what is going on there, and what are we doing to try and address what is happening in those camps?

General Berrier: From the perspective of the Department of Defense and DIA we are watching very, very closely what is happening in those camps, what has happened since the break-in, and really with our CENTCOM partners trying to monitor ISIS capability as it evolves over time and what is happening with those families and where they are moving. This is a problem that we partner with CENTCOM and the Defense Counterterrorism Center, and really the National Counterterrorism Center. It is a huge focus for everybody.

Senator Shaheen: And do we have a strategy for how to deal with it?

General Berrier: We have an intelligence collection
strategy to monitor it.

Senator Shaheen: And we are seeing the Taliban in Afghanistan renege on everything they said they would do post troop withdrawal. Obviously, one of those is continuing their relationship with al Qaeda and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan. How concerned are you that we might see terrorist activity spread out of Afghanistan to the rest of the world?

General Berrier: Senator, I am more concerned about ISIS-K in Afghanistan and the fact that they have had some successful and catastrophic attacks within Afghanistan, which does not portend well for the future. Al Qaeda has had some problems with reconstitution leadership, and to a degree I think the Taliban have held to their word about not allowing al Qaeda to rejuvenate so far. But it is something that we watch very, very carefully.

Senator Shaheen: And there was an election in the Philippines yesterday, and the winner of that election, Mr. Marcos, is not likely have as positive a view to the United States. Are you concerned that that is going to have an impact on how China is going to view activity in the Philippines, and do we expect there might be any spillover in terms of illegal substances from the Philippines now that Duarte is no longer doing his extra legal killing of people suspected of being drug kingpins?
General Berrier: Senator, I think it is early in the process with the elected Marcos to determine whether or not he will be anti-U.S. or pro-U.S. I know that we would like to have the Philippines as a key intelligence partner in the region. I think there is a lot of effort going on to do that. So we will wait to see what percolates in our relationship, and I will just end it there.

Senator Shaheen: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Shaheen.

Senator Fischer, please.

Senator Fischer: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to our panel today.

Last week, in the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Under Secretary of Research and Engineering Heidi Shyu stated, quote, "Strategic competitors of the United States are rapidly developing their nuclear arsenal in new and novel ways with a clear intent of increasing their reliance on these weapons in their security strategies," end quote.

Director Haines, do you agree with that statement?

Ms. Haines: Yes.

Senator Fischer: General, do you?

General Berrier: Yes.

Senator Fischer: Throughout the war in Ukraine, Putin and other Russian leaders have overtly threatened nuclear use, including the Russian state TV airing an animated video
showing the British Isles being completely destroyed by a nuclear attack.

General, in the United States we view nuclear weapons primarily as tools of deterrence, but do you think what we are seeing indicates Russian leadership views nuclear weapons as tools of coercion and intimidation?

General Berrier: Yes. I believe they view those as tools of coercion and intimidation.

Senator Fischer: Thank you. General, also, the Defense Intelligence Agency's 2021 report on China's military power states, quote, "The accelerating pace of the PRC's nuclear expansion may enable the PRC to have up to 700 deliverable nuclear warheads by 2027. The PRC likely intends to have at least 1,000 warheads by 2030, exceeding the pace and size the DoD projected in 2020," end quote.

I know what you say is limited in this setting, but is it your assessment that China's nuclear forces will stop expanding when it reaches that point of 1,000?

General Berrier: It is my assessment that they would continue to develop the weapons they have.

Senator Fischer: Director Haines, is that the view shared by the rest of the IC, that China's arsenal is going to continue to grow past that point in time?

Ms. Haines: I mean, our assessment basically says that China will continue to essentially expand their nuclear
arsenal and diversification for a period of time. It is unclear how long that will be.

Senator Fischer: But do you anticipate it will continue past the 1,000 warheads that we have looked at in the past?

Ms. Haines: I think for us to get into numbers we should do that in closed session.

Senator Fischer: Thank you.

General, as the statement notes, China's nuclear expansion is larger and more rapid than previous assessments projected. Admiral Richard has made a similar point noting, quote, "When I first testified here we were questioning whether or not China would be able to double that stockpile by the end of the decade, and they are actually very close to doing it on my watch," end quote.

What are the implications of the fact that this threat is evolving faster than we have anticipated, and how should we factor that in our assessments?

General Berrier: Senator, we can get into much more detail in the closed session, but I would just say from a strategic competition perspective and nuclear deterrence this makes it much more challenging for us to defend. And when you factor in Russian nuclear capability with Chinese capability, I think it is a problem for Strategic Command and the Department.
Senator Fischer: Thank you. Also, General, if we can move to a different theater now. If ISIS and al Qaeda are able to operate in Afghanistan without consistent or effective CT pressure how long does the Intelligence Community assess it will take for either organization to reconstitute their external attack capabilities?

General Berrier: We assess ISIS probably a year, slightly longer, and longer for al Qaeda.

Senator Fischer: Last October we heard from Secretary Kahl. He told the committee that we could see ISIS-K generate the capability in 6 to 12 months. And then in March we heard from General McKenzie that the capability might be 12 to 18 months. So I look forward to hearing more about how and why these intelligence estimates have shifted forward. I think that is important for this committee to know and it is important to understand when we look at the dramatic reduction we have seen in our intelligence collection in the region since our withdrawal. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Fischer.

Senator Gillibrand, please.

Senator Gillibrand: Director Haines, thank you so much for your testimony. I want to talk a little bit about advanced persistent threats, and I want to know what type of support are you providing, critical infrastructure
providers, to deal with APTs. Specifically, I am concerned if this war in Ukraine does escalate, that attacks from Russia will come to American businesses and our critical infrastructure. I know this is generally the job of CISA, but in your engagement with critical infrastructure providers what are the biggest areas of need that they have shared with you, and are there any additional authorities that would be helpful to you in enabling you to support critical infrastructure providers in securing their networks?

Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator, and I know this has been a major issue focus for you and, in fact, that you have supported some of the things that have been done in New York with Reserves, for example, in this area, which have been really effective. And I know that General Nakasone has been looking at expanding that around the United States in different ways.

I think for us we have, quite obviously, heightened awareness of cyber threats to critical infrastructure, and it has been a driving force behind a number of sorts of cyber defense measures that we have taken in the Intelligence Community to support, in effect, as you say, CISA and FBI and others in doing their work.

One is lowering thresholds for reporting. We have asked for network owners to really lower their threshold for
reporting suspected malicious activity. That is critical from our perspective in order for us to be able to identify what the threat is.

Another is just making more information publicly available. We are increasing the amount of information that we release to the private sector, both to help combat the rise in cybercrime, and recently in our efforts to posture industry for potential Russian cyberattacks, for example, something that we have been trying to get out to do significantly more briefings on and help industry, in effect, get ready for things so they can take action that would make them more resilient in these circumstances. And this includes some close-hold releases so as to dampen malicious cyber actors warning before mitigations can be put into place.

Another has been our significant outreach to the private sector. DHS partners held over 90 engagements with more than 10,000 partners, just even on the Russia piece, and it includes sharing preventative measures to help these partners mitigate vulnerabilities. Another has been facilitating hunt teams on networks. And we have also asked company owners to actively hunt for Russian techniques, essentially, on their networks and to facilitate those have provided lists of vulnerabilities, indicators of compromise to look for on a company's networks.
But those are just some of the things that are focused on helping on the infrastructure piece. Thank you.

Senator Gillibrand: Thank you, Director. Do you need any additional authorities or resources to amplify this effort?

Ms. Haines: So we have asked for resources in our fiscal year 2023 budget that are designed to help with this effort, and so absolutely in that sense. We have not identified particular authorities that we need, but I will tell you that we will come to you if we do. Thank you.

Senator Gillibrand: Thank you. Director Haines and General Berrier, I saw that the Annual Threat Assessment notes that advances in dual-use technology could, quote, "enable development of novel biological weapons that complicate detection, attribution, and treatment," end of quote.

I have advocated for a one-health security approach where we incorporate people across multiple disciplines, including the Intelligence Community to increase our biodefense and prevent the next pandemic.

In the context of ongoing biological threats, how would you suggest we develop a multidisciplinary approach like this? Where can we prepare and prevent both naturally occurring diseases but also deliberate threats?

Ms. Haines: I can start on this. I am very passionate
about this issue. I completely agree with you. I think we have not, in the Intelligence Community, been able to work with other parts of, for example, the Federal Government, even in the scientific community within the Federal Government as effectively as we need to.

And we have been developing mechanisms in the Intelligence Community to do some more. We are working more with the National Labs than we ever have before. We are working more with HHS, with CDC, with others, to try to make sure that we are also supporting their work and that we can understand some of the issues that they see as critical to our work. So that has been a big piece of our effort in the Intelligence Community within the national counterproliferation. And Senator, we have been doing a major effort on essentially working with global health and we actually now have a new national intelligence manager that works on these issues specifically and is hoping to support that kind of outreach on this. And I would be happy to give you a brief at some point in more detail if that is useful.

Senator Gillibrand: Thank you.

General Berrier: Senator, for DIA I think it is about partnerships. So it is a partnership between the National Center for Medical Intelligence, the Defense Counterproliferation Center, as well as NCPC. The role,
really, for DIA and NCMI is to provide warning on these pandemics. So I am passionate about it as well, and I think it is an area that is going to expand in the coming months and years as we look forward to this, and I look forward to engaging you, perhaps at DIA, on this topic.

Senator Gillibrand: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.

Senator Cotton, please.

Senator Cotton: General, what is your assessment on the state of the fighting between Russia and Ukraine in eastern and southern Ukraine today?

General Berrier: Senator, I think I would characterize it as the Russians are not winning and the Ukrainians are not winning, and we are at a bit of a stalemate here. And what has been the most interesting evolution for me, in watching how the Russian forces have misstepped, is really the lack of a non-commissioned officer corps. When I think about small unit tactics and how this has unfolded between Ukraine and Russia I think the NCO corps is a big piece of this, and I think the Ukrainians have that about right.

Senator Cotton: Who faces greater risk from a stalemate -- Russia or Ukraine?

General Berrier: I think we have to take a wait-and-see approach on how this evolves and what is in the decision
calculus for Putin and his generals as this unfolds.

Senator Cotton: A stalemate, to be clear, does not mean an armistice or peace. It means continued but indecisive fighting in which both sides are losing personnel, equipment, weapons, and vehicles. Right?

General Berrier: I think it is attrition warfare and it depends how well the Ukrainians can maintain what they have going on with weapons and ammunition and how the Russians decide to deal with that, either through mobilization or not, and decide to go with what they have in the theater right now.

Senator Cotton: Which side do you think, at this point, is more capable of generating additional combat power in the form of trained and motivated troops -- Russia or Ukraine?

General Berrier: Ukraine.

Senator Cotton: Even though it is one-third the size of Russia?

General Berrier: Yes.

Senator Cotton: Why do you say that?

General Berrier: Because I think the Ukrainians have it right in terms of grit and how they face the defense of their nation. I am not sure that Russian soldiers from the far-flung military districts really understand that.

Senator Cotton: Fighting to defend one's own home from
a war of aggression is a highly motivating factor, is it not?

General Berrier: Yes, it is.

Senator Cotton: And Russians probably are not terribly motivated to be the next wave of recruits into Vladimir Putin's war of aggression?

General Berrier: I would say not, based on what we have seen.

Senator Cotton: If that is the case, and this stalemate, as you call it, continues not just for weeks but for months, which side do you think faces the greater possibility of a decisive breakout -- the Russians, with their ill-trained and unmotivated troops, or the Ukrainians, with their supremely motivated troops?

General Berrier: Senator, I think right now with the stalemate and as it stands, if Russia does not declare war and mobilize this stalemate is going to last for a while, and I do not see a breakout on either side. If they do mobilize and they do declare war, that will bring thousands more soldiers to the fight, and even though they may not be as well-trained and competent they will still bring mass and a lot of more ammunition.

Senator Cotton: What are the prospects of a catastrophic collapse of morale and will among Russian forces?
General Berrier: It remains to be seen. I think the Russians still are a learning organization. If appropriate lessons could be applied with leadership you might see that turn around.

Senator Cotton: Do you know the current count on how many generals have been killed in Ukraine, on Russia's side?

General Berrier: I think the number is between eight and ten.

Senator Cotton: Do you know how many generals we lost in 20 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan?

General Berrier: Not many.

Senator Cotton: And those we lost were happenstance, right? The bad guys got a lucky shot at a convoy or helicopter.

General Berrier: Yes.

Senator Cotton: Does the fact that Russia is losing all these generals, and as you pointed out they have no trained NCO corps, suggest to you that these generals are having to go forward to ensure their orders are executed in a way that General Berrier never would have to go forward if he was in a combat command because he could count on the captains and lieutenants and the Sergeant Berriers to execute his orders?

General Berrier: Yes.

Senator Cotton: It sounds to me like the balance of
forces here are moving more decisively in Ukraine's factor
and will continue to over time as long as we continue to
support them with the arms and the intelligence that they
need.

General Berrier: Well-led forces that are motivated
and have what they need can do a lot.

Senator Cotton: Thank you.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Cotton.

Senator Blumenthal, please.

Senator Blumenthal: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want
to pursue Senator Cotton's line of questioning if I may. In
my exchange with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff several weeks ago I commented
that our approach to Ukraine seemed somewhat schizophrenic.
We say we want Ukraine to win but we are afraid of what
Putin may do if he loses. I have urged, since 2014, that we
provide more lethal weapons to Ukraine.

When I visited Ukraine recently with some of my
colleagues, a bipartisan trip, one of them asked President
Zelenskyy, "Are you fearful about the Russian prospect of
invasion?" It was a number of weeks before the invasion.
He said, "The Russians invaded us in 2014. We have been
fighting them since then." And in my view the implication is
that we have failed over a period of years, under different
administrations, to provide Ukraine with the arms that it
needs to counter and deter increased Russian aggression there.

So my question to you is, do you agree that we should increase the kind of military aid, as well as humanitarian assistance and economic sanctions, that we have been providing, by orders of magnitude that will enable Ukraine to win, and would you also agree that if we simply provide more of that kind of aid -- tanks, artillery, armored personnel carriers, even planes, Stinger and Javelin missiles, all of the arms that Ukraine needs to fight lethally and defensively -- that Putin may engage in sword-rattling and threats and implications of what he might do, but enabling Ukraine to win ought to be our objective.

Let me ask you first, General.

General Berrier: Senator, in your statement there it really gets at national level of decision-making on what our policy should be with regard to arming Ukraine. My role as the Director of DIA is to keep an eye on this conflict and provide information to decision-makers so that they can make those kinds of decisions.

In terms of what Putin might do to escalate, I think the best that we can do, rather than describing what those escalatory measures would be, would be to understand what they might do and be ready, in terms of indications and warning, to be able to notify decision-makers that that was
actually occurring or about to occur.

So I take an intelligence perspective of the conflict itself and leave the policy to decision-makers.

Senator Blumenthal: Do you -- and I will ask Ms. Haines the same -- think there is a serious, immediate prospect that Putin would engage in the use of tactical nuclear weapons?

General Berrier: Right now we do not see that, and I think that is a huge warning issue for us and something that we are very, very focused on.

Senator Blumenthal: Ms. Haines?

Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator. I think, on the first part of your question, you know, as General Berrier said, obviously we try to provide the intelligence to help policymakers like you make these decisions. And among the questions that come up in that discussion are whether or not, frankly, Ukraine can absorb additional assistance and how much of it, and that is very hard for us to tell. We have, in fact, more insight, probably, on the Russian side than we do on the Ukrainian side, but that is something, obviously, for the Defense Department to work through as they go through this.

But we also, obviously, get asked this question of whether or not certain actions will escalate things with Russia, as you indicate, and if so, how. And that really
gets to the second part of your question, because I think obviously we are in a position, as you have identified, where we are supporting Ukraine but we also do not want to ultimately end up in World War III, and we do not want to have a situation in which actors are using nuclear weapons.

Our view is, as General Berrier indicated, that there is not a sort of an imminent potential for Putin to use nuclear weapons. We perceive that, as I indicated in my statement, as something that he is unlikely to do unless there is effectively an existential threat to his regime and to Russia, from his perspective. We do think that that could be the case in the event that he perceives that he is losing the war in Ukraine and that NATO, in effect, is sort of either intervening or about to intervene in that context, which would obviously contribute to a perception that he is about to lose the war in Ukraine.

But there are a lot of things that he would do in the context of escalation before he would get to nuclear weapons, and also that he would be likely to engage in some signaling beyond what he has done thus far, before doing so.

Senator Blumenthal: Thank you. My time has expired.

Senator King: [Presiding.] On behalf of the chairman, Senator Blackburn.

Senator Blackburn: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you very much to each of you for being here today.
Ms. Haines, I want to come to you. We have talked a lot about Ukraine and Russia this morning, and I appreciate your frankness in this. But let me ask you about Wagner and the proxies and what you are seeing, not only in Ukraine but also what you are seeing when it comes to Libya and to other areas and the aggressiveness of the use of the proxies.

Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator. We can probably go into more detail in closed session.

Senator Blackburn: Okay.

Ms. Haines: But I could just say, more generally, that we do see Wagner being used, in effect, in Ukraine. We see that that is something --

Senator Blackburn: And how about Africa?

Ms. Haines: Yes, absolutely. Wagner has been historically present in Africa, and it is a more recent event, obviously, in the current crisis that Russia deployed them effectively in Ukraine.

Senator Blackburn: Okay. All right.

General Berrier, do you have anything you want to add on that?

General Berrier: Senator, we track ISIS in Africa, Syria, other places. I think we will get into a richer discussion in the closed session about Wagner operations in Ukraine.

Senator Blackburn: Okay. That is helpful. Let me ask
you also -- and by the way, thank you for the China map. I will say this. I think we could have a picture of the globe and say that is where China is seeking to be aggressive. It is something that is not lost on me, that they are anxious right now to expand their reach.

But let's talk about DIA and how is the DIA collaborating with our allies and our partners to counter Beijing's cyber espionage operations?

General Berrier: Senator, we are. We are closely collaborating with our Five Eyes partners, in this case, our Australian and New Zealand partners, on this very issue, along with our partners over at the National Security Agency with General Nakasone.

There is a concerted effort by the Five Eyes to understand these activities in cyberspace emanating from China. So we are working that very, very closely and we can provide more details in a closed session.

Senator Blackburn: And can you provide us with some of the lessons learned from the Russia-Ukraine conflict that help to inform some of this work?

General Berrier: Cyber activity?

Senator Blackburn: Yes, sir.

General Berrier: So I think the key there would be information operations and disinformation operations and their level of effectiveness on the Russian side, or
ineffectiveness on the Russian side, and then looking at the
level of effectiveness on the Ukrainian side. When I
compare and contrast information operations I think the
Ukrainians have been much more successful in the information
operations and space. Russians have had some success with
cyber activities in the Ukraine, and I think the PRC and Xi
are looking at all of that as they sort of unwind this
conflict and learn lessons from that.

Senator Blackburn: And Ms. Haines, how is the intel
community utilizing AI and machine learning as they look at
applications, look at how Beijing is continuing to move
forward? So how are you preferencing some of the new
technologies that can help us in this effort?

Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator. We are using
artificial intelligence, and in particular, machine
learning, across the board for our mission set. And just to
give you an example of the kind of things that we are able
to do with it, I think it has been extraordinary in terms of
helping us with analysis, being able to focus in on certain
datasets that we are able to effectively manipulate more
easily and without as many human resources, effectively to
identify patterns. We are able to use that then, have
analysts that are educated and experts take that information
and use it in their analysis in different ways.

We have something called an Artificial Intelligence
Unit Project that is really looking at across the Intelligence Community at different applications of artificial intelligence and machine learning and then trying to leverage those so that we can actually allow other elements to build off of the work that is being done by another element that they might not have thought of before and also doing it at sort of a cheaper cost and so on.

So there are a variety of ways in which we are doing it. It is hard to talk about it in an unclassified way, but certainly this is a major area of effort and investment, and we can provide you with further details if that is useful.

Senator Blackburn: Thank you. My time has expired. I will come to you for a written response on the recent article that quoted a senior intel source, about referencing the uptick in Al-Shabaab activity. So thank you very much.

Senator King: On behalf of the chair, Senator Warren.

Senator Warren: Thank you, Senator King.

It is paramount to our national security that we keep our most sensitive secrets properly protected and classified, particularly when protecting sources and methods. But I am very concerned about the levels of over-classification and pseudo-classification that we are seeing across the Federal Government. Everyone understands the need to protect information about most sensitive capabilities from our enemies, but our classification system
has spiraled out of control, when it means, for example, that our own four-star generals cannot share information with their fellow three-stars. It is hard to see how that level of classification is making America safer.

So over-classification also reduces public scrutiny of important issues and it can hamper accountability. Director Haines, you lead the Intelligence Community. You have years of experience in these matters. Do you think that over-classification is a national security problem?

Ms. Haines: I do, Senator. I have stated this explicitly. I do think it is a challenge. As long as I have been in government, frankly, there have been blue-ribbon commissions that have looked at this, have said there is significant over-classification. This is a challenge, as you indicate, from a democratic perspective but it is also a challenge from a national security perspective because if we cannot share information as easily as we might otherwise be if it were appropriately classified then that obviously affects our capacity to work on these issues.

It is a very challenging issue, as I know you know well. In other words, there are technical aspects to it. There are cultural aspects to it.

Senator Warren: So let us talk about that just a little bit, and I want to say I agree with you that over-classification has been a problem across administrations.
The Obama administration put out two different Executive orders aimed at improving classification and information sharing, but that was more than a decade ago and obviously the problem persists.

So let me ask this a different way. Director Haines, would you support the Administration releasing a new Executive order on classification practices to ensure that we are protecting national security information while keeping our commitments to open government?

Ms. Haines: Without knowing exactly what it would say it is sort of hard for me to say I would support an Executive order on that subject. I mean, I am constantly looking for additional ways in which we might try to help address this issue, and we have a number of ways that we are investing in the Intelligence Community issues. But, yeah, I --

Senator Warren: I appreciate that, and I am not asking you to sign a blank check here.

Ms. Haines: No. Fair enough.

Senator Warren: But you are the President's principal advisor on intelligence matters, and I am just asking if you would be supportive if the President wanted to take that step.

Ms. Haines: Well, I am supportive of what the President wants to take steps within his authority, and it
is an appropriate policy to do, so yes, in that sense I
would be.

Senator Warren: Okay. So let me ask this then from
one more perspective, and that is during the Ukraine crisis
we have seen that a well-functioning, declassification
system can be incredibly powerful. The work by the Biden
administration to expose what the Intelligence Committee
knew about Putin's plans seriously hurt Russia's credibility
and it strengthened our response to an illegal and immoral
war. My understand is that it took reshuffling of resources
to make that happen, and I applaud that, but we need more of
it.

The most recent numbers that I have seen is that we
spend $18 billion protecting the classification system and
only about $102 million -- do the math fast in your head,
about 5 percent of that number -- on declassification
efforts, and that ratio feels off in a democracy.

So with that in mind, Director Haines, are there any
lessons learned from Ukraine about how we can expedite
declassification when there is a compelling reason to do so?

Ms. Haines: I think there are lessons to be learned
from Ukraine, and it will be easier to talk about this in
closed session, but I think there is some value that we
could discuss in closed session on those issues.

I do think it has helped to help other people
understand the value of ensuring that we are classifying
things at the appropriate level and how declassification can
support foreign policy in different ways. So I think that
is all to the good.

Senator Warren: Good. You know, in a democracy we
have a duty to be accountable to the public, and when we
keep secrets from Americans there needs to be a compelling
public interest in doing so. And in too many cases it seems
that public officials err on the side of secrecy because the
information could be embarrassing, or even worse, just
because it is easier not to be accountable to the American
people.

So I urge all of our agencies to address this problem,
and I look forward to working with you on it. Thank you.

Senator King: On behalf of the chairman, Senator
Tuberville.

Senator Tuberville: Thank you, Senator. Good morning.

Director Haines, in your best assessment does Russia
intelligence closely monitor our Secretary of Defense?

Ms. Haines: I think Russian intelligence tries very
closely to monitor all of our senior leaders.

Senator Tuberville: Thank you. So you believe that,
noted, that when he said that Russia weakened and that the
U.S. will move heaven and earth to arm Ukraine, do you
believe that is right he should say that?
Ms. Haines: Yes. I think the Secretary of Defense --

Senator Tuberville: Do you believe Russia blames the U.S. Intelligence Community for helping Ukraine shoot down a Russian plane carrying hundreds of people?

Ms. Haines: I am sorry, sir. Can you repeat the question?

Senator Tuberville: Do you believe Russia blames us, our intelligence agency, for Ukraine shooting down a plane with hundreds of troops on board? Do you think Russia blames us for that?

Ms. Haines: Which plane are you thinking of?

Senator Tuberville: There was a plane recently that was shot down, a Russian plane, that 100 troops. Do you believe that they blame our intelligence agency for that?

Ms. Haines: I do not know, sir.

Senator Tuberville: Okay. Do you believe that Russia blames our U.S. intelligence for sinking their flagship, Moskva? Do you think they blame us for that?

Ms. Haines: I do not know, sir. We have not seen any direct reporting.

Senator Tuberville: To what extent do you assess that Russia believe it is at war with the West and the United States? Do you think that they believe they are at war with us?

Ms. Haines: Russia has historically believed that they
are in a conflict, in effect, with NATO and the United States on a variety of issues, including in cyber and so on.

Senator Tuberville: So you believe that they are fighting us -- that they are fighting us as well as they are fighting Ukraine. Correct?

Ms. Haines: In a sense. Their perception --

Senator Tuberville: Yeah. Yeah, because we are arming them and we are talking. Okay.

General Berrier, does the United States or Ukraine have air superiority over the war zone? Which one has air superiority?

General Berrier: Senator, I would call that an air standoff right now. I mean, the Russians can fly a tactical aircraft over the line of troops in a local area but they cannot expand into western parts of Ukraine without coming under an air threat.

Senator Tuberville: But Ukraine is more than we are, the United States, obviously, because we not involved in their air space.

General Berrier: No, we are not involved.

Senator Tuberville: Would you say that Russia possess strong air defenses?

General Berrier: I think the Russians have very credible air defense systems.

Senator Tuberville: Does Ukraine have any counter
measures to thwart Russia artillery rockets? Does Ukraine have any air defenses?

General Berrier: Ukraine has air defenses. They also have counter-battery radars that allow them to defend themselves from incoming artillery, or at least see it.

Senator Tuberville: Would you agree that anyone in Ukraine right now is under serious threat? Obviously they are. Correct?

General Berrier: I would agree they are.

Senator Tuberville: Okay. In the past 2 weeks we have seen several high-profile visitors take trips to active war zone. Our Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Speaker of the House, First Lady. This is for both of you. What is our Intelligence Community doing to lessen the risk of a high-ranking official -- how are we protecting these people going to Ukraine, our people going to Ukraine?

General Berrier: Senator, I think that would be a discussion for the closed session.

Senator Tuberville: Okay. So we could guarantee that the First Lady was safe when she went to Ukraine. We could guarantee that, 100 percent. Correct? Both of you. I am just asking.

General Berrier: I would not say that, no. I would not say that.

Senator Tuberville: Thank you. Is it your best advice
that we do not go to Ukraine right now, any of us, any of us in here?

General Berrier: Senator, I would not say that. I would say with proper planning and coordination that it is possible.

Senator Tuberville: General, 100 percent. One hundred percent, can we guarantee going into a war zone -- our Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State went on a train.

General Berrier: Senator, I do not think we can ever guarantee anything 100 percent.

Senator Tuberville: Thank you. Well, that is kind of the point I am making. You know, we are kind of poking the bear here, saying, you know, we are bragging about it. And even President Biden said today, "Wait a minute. We have got to cut back on this pointing that, you know, how many generals have been killed and we are part of it." I totally agree with that. I totally agree that, hey, we want to help Ukraine. Obviously, we all do. But we do not want to take that step forward to where we get a lot of our men and women involved in this. And it looks like to me we that we are taking way too many changes of sending people over there for a photo op other than doing the right thing, which we are doing. But we just do not need to step over that path.

Thank you for what you are doing, but I think all of us need to look at that point of, hey, there is a point of no
return here if we cross that line. And if we were on the other side, the same way, and we had somebody helping, we had a plane shot down, a ship sink, and then bragging about killing generals, as Senator Cotton said, you know, we are walking a tightrope here.

And that is just the only point I want to bring up.

Thank you very much.

Senator King: On behalf of the chair, Senator Kelly.

Senator Kelly: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director Haines, again, looking at your office's 2022 Annual Threat Assessment it is clear there is a lot going on in the world right now, and I understand that resources are finite and tradeoffs often have to be made. That is in, a large part, what makes your job very challenging. Clearly the situation in Ukraine is taking up a lot of bandwidth right now, and I would presume that INDOPACOM requires significant amount of resources as well to fully understand the threat environment, and these two things are obviously related.

But what about some other regions in the world? In light of the worldwide threats you have articulated here today do you feel the Intelligence Community has the necessary resources in place to confidently understand the threat environment in other places, such as Afghanistan, northern Syria, Pakistan, and Iran?
Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator. I mean, I think, you know, like all good bureaucrats that we could spend more money on these issues. There is no question. I think certainly that is true. But we are doing our very best, as you indicate, to ensure that we are not taking our eye off the ball, essentially across the globe, on issues that are also of critical importance among the ones that you have identified.

Senator Kelly: Thank you. I want to ask a specific question about the MQ-9, the Reaper drones. So the Air Force has been reluctant to invest in upgrading the platform and proposes to retire it, potentially like in 2035, even as the demand from combatant commanders for the system remains high. You know, their argument has been that the platform is not survivable in China-Russia scenario. I think it is pretty clear that it would be survivable in a Russian scenario now.

Do you have an opinion on the continued utility of reconnaissance platforms such as the MQ-9, particular as we face increased activity in the so-called gray zone, below the threshold of armed combat?

Ms. Haines: Yeah.

General Berrier: Go ahead.

Ms. Haines: No, no.

General Berrier: Senator, I have been the beneficiary
of MQ-9 operations for the last 20 years. It is an outstanding platform. It has done great things. With increasing threats emanating from China and their ability to reach out and touch those kinds of things I totally understand why the Air Force wants to divest of that platform. The efficacy of that in the coming years in low-intensity conflict, counterterrorism operations, it will always be useful in a low air defense kind of environment, but in the high-end environment I do not think it is very survivable.

Senator Kelly: But we have looked at the Russian surface-to-air missile threat environment as high end. It turns out like a lot of things, day 1 of the war is much different than day 60 or 90 or 180, of any conflict. So I am concerned that not only this platform but sometimes we look at divesting, you know, from platforms that could provide incredible utility further along in the timeline.

General, I have got another question for you here in my last minute, anti-satellite ban on ASAT testing. The Administration recently announced this. It is a policy I agree with. Russia, China, they do not share this goal, nor do they abide by any kind of similar policy. The Russians and the Chinese both, over the last, about decade and a half, have performed ASAT tests, the Russians more recently.

The DIA's 2022 report on challenges to security in
space lists orbital debris as a significant challenge to space operations and concluded that the debris endangers spacecraft of all nations in low-earth orbit, including astronauts and cosmonauts aboard the ISS, but also China has a space station as well.

Given the fact that both the Russians and Chinese conduct manned space operations what would be your assessment as to why they continue to put their people in harm's way by conducting these dangerous tests?

General Berrier: Senator, I think they value that capability in space as an asymmetric advantage over our superior technology and continue to pursue those kinds of capabilities. Whether or not they would actually use it is another discussion.

Senator Kelly: Do you expect them to do more anti-satellite tests?

General Berrier: We have not seen evidence that they plan, in the near future, of doing more, but I would expect as they go through their development processes they will do more tests.

Senator Kelly: All right. Thank you, General, and thank you, Director Haines.

Chairman Reed: [Presiding.] Thank you, Senator Kelly.

Senator Rounds, please.

Senator Rounds: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin
by thanking both of you for your continued service to our country.

Director Haines, in April, Secretary Blinken told Congress that Iran's attempts to assassinate former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo were real and ongoing, and this month Israeli press reported that an agent for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard's Quds Force was thwarted from an assassination attempt on a U.S. general in Germany.

Why is Iran apparently so emboldened right now and how can the Intelligence Community and national security communities at large change this dangerous trend and deter Iran from these malicious actions?

Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator. So I think we should probably pick this up in closed session. What I think I can say in open session is a fair amount of their motivation in this area we assess to be in relation to Soleimani as part of their sort of efforts for revenge, and it is a particularly challenging area, I think, to deter them from action in this space. But we can discuss more specifics, I think, in closed session. Thank you, sir.

Senator Rounds: Very well. Director Haines once again. The crisis at the United States southern border has literally exploded under this Administration and continues to deteriorate. Reuters reported that U.S. officials at the Department of Homeland Security are preparing for as high as
9,000 arrests per day. As the economic and political conditions in Latin America continue to spark waves of migration that put pressure on our southern border, how serious does the Intelligence Community see this as a threat to our country, and also, how and to what degree is the Intelligence Community shifting resources to address the surge at our southern border?

Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator. We have stood up a migrant crisis cell, which is essentially a cell that helps to bring together intelligence from across the community to support DHS's efforts, and it is really looking south of the border at effectively migrant movements that may be coming towards the southern border, so that we can help them to prepare, in effect, for encounters on the border.

Senator Rounds: Are you in agreement with the assessment that there could be as many as 9,000 arrests a day? Is that an assessment that you would concur with?

Ms. Haines: Sir, I do not look at those particular questions. That is within the Department of Homeland Security.

Senator Rounds: I am just curious because when you are doing your planning to determine what your needs are, clearly in order for you to do the planning you have got to have an assessment of what the expected flow would be. I am just curious. It is not meant as a gotcha question.
Ms. Haines: No, no, no. Of course. So we do not assess our needs along the border because we do not actually have needs along the border. In other words, that is sort of the DHS role is to figure out how can we plan for the number of incidents or encounters that they will have on the border. And for us, what we are trying to do is understand what are the drivers, what are the ultimate flows that are likely to occur, and we try to set up intelligence so that we can actually provide some indication and warning of here is where you are likely to see an increase in the flow, either south or north or how it is and where it is coming from, ultimately. Does that make sense?

Senator Rounds: It does. It just catches me a little bit by surprise that in your planning that most certainly you have to have a good communication with Homeland Security. I am assuming there is a good communication there --

Ms. Haines: Of course.

Senator Rounds: -- and that based upon what their needs are is really what you are doing, is providing them with additional resources. And you are also, at the same time, gathering intel based on the possibility, the strong possibility that individuals would try to come in through the southern border. And based upon that I was just curious, and I know that we are in a public discussion, but
nonetheless I think it is something that has been talked about publicly, and the fact that we have got folks from all over the world that are using that as an entryway into the United States, and most certainly you are aware of that.

Ms. Haines: Absolutely. No, I am not trying to sort of duck the question or anything. I think, you know, we see a very high flow. There is no question. What happens is the Department of Homeland Security, we have somebody who is a liaison that sits within their sort of spaces that tells here are the requirements, and they basically are looking for indications and warning of, you know, we are likely to see a flow along this part of the border, that sort of thing, as opposed to us being able to help them determine, okay, today you are going to see X number of people coming through the southern border as a whole.

Senator Rounds: Thank you. Just one other quick question. The Intelligence Community and Congress are working to flesh out the Foreign Malign Influence Center's mission, the budget and size, among other issues. But with the 2022 midterms almost here we are probably behind the curve a little bit.

What are the major roadblocks stopping the IC from standing up this intelligence center?

Ms. Haines: We have just gotten appropriations, basically, through the fiscal year 2022 budget, which has
been great, and we are currently building up the Foreign Malign Influence Center. We already have the Election Threat Executive so we have been doing work on what the threats might be to our elections. That is now pulled into the Foreign Malign Influence Center, and we effectively have the budget for up to 12 people in the Foreign Malign Influence Center under this context and we have asked for funding for fiscal year 2023, essentially to be able to expand it by about three people but also to allow us to access expertise and knowledge that we think is critical, and really just to help facilitate what the community is doing across the board on these issues.

Senator Rounds: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My time has expired.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Rounds.

Senator Kaine, please.

Senator Kaine: Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thanks to our witnesses. I want to ask about two items. The first is undersea cables. Ninety-five percent of global communication rely on a robust undersea cable network, 500,000 miles across the sea floor globally. Internet, global banking transactions, the SWIFT system, diplomatic cables, encrypted military communications are a few of the myriad applications that rely on this network.

Two NATO commands, the Joint Support and Enabling
Command in Ulm, Germany, and Joint Force Command in Norfolk are monitoring threats against undersea cables in the Atlantic, but the vast majority of these cables are controlled by private sector companies. In the U.S., France, Spain, Japan, China, these companies and contractors who work with them, such as Google and Amazon, oversee the planning, production, design, deployment, and maintenance of the cables.

To what extent is the DoD and IC looking at integrating and communicating with these private actors so that we can monitor threats to the cables?

General Berrier: Senator, I am going to take that one for action and do a little homework to get you a fulsome answer.

Senator Kaine: And I would like, additionally, to know whether China, Russia, or other malign actors have an organic capability to map our networks, to cut into or tap into them, to listen to military or other government communications. So I would like a response back to that.

Here is my second question, unless, Director Haines, you have something to offer on the undersea cable.

Ms. Haines: Thank you, sir. I actually would love to do it in closed session if that is all right.

Senator Kaine: I will look forward to that.

Ms. Haines: Okay.
Senator Kaine: Now a question about intelligence estimates of the strength of other militaries. I think there were a number of estimates that the Afghan military would perform much better than they did, and there were a number of estimates that the Russian military was much stronger than it has proven to be. So what are we doing to assess why we overestimated the strength of both of those militaries and recalibrating the way we assess military strength of other nations?

General Berrier: Senator, I will start. We are taking a holistic view of how we do analysis and evaluate foreign militaries. You know, it start with the relationships that we have with our foreign partners, understanding their militaries, understanding their understanding of adversary militaries, and working an all-source assessment to have granularity inside the capabilities of these militaries. Certainly the ANDSF was an issue. Certainly the overestimation of Russian capability was an issue. But if you back up, if you look at Russia's growth since the early 2000, their war in Chechnya, their war in Georgia, what they did in Ukraine, their operations in Syria, and you understand the reforms that they went through, we saw that from the outside. What we did not see from the inside was sort of this hollow force, lack of NCO corps, lack of leadership training, lack of effective doctrines. So those
are the intangibles that we have got to be able to get our arms around as an Intelligence Community to really understand.

Senator Kaine: Thank you. I yield back.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Kaine.

Senator Wicker, please.

Senator Wicker: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Berrier, let me quote from your prepared statement.

"Beijing appears willing to defer the use of military force as long as it considers that unification with Taiwan can be negotiated and that the cost of conflict outweigh the benefits."

General Berrier, I believe the United States should prepare Taiwan and send a clear message to Beijing that a military invasion would be too costly. I also believe the primary objective of the United States and its allies, with regard to Taiwan, should not be so much to repel a Chinese attack but to prevent it from ever occurring.

So, General, from your assessment of China's capabilities and timeline as well as Taiwan's current defensive posture, what needs to be done? What can the United States be doing for or supplying to Taiwan in order to prevent a Chinese attack from ever occurring?

General Berrier: Senator, thank you for that question. First I would say that I believe the PRC would rather not
do it by force. I think they would rather do this peacefully, over time. There are some things that we can do with Taiwan. I think they are learning some very interesting lessons from the Ukrainian conflict, like how important leadership is, how important small-unit tactics are, how important an NCO corps is, and really effective training with the right weapon systems and what those system, with the right people, would be able to do to thwart that.

So I think we have to engage with our INDOPACOM partners within the Department of Defense, the Taiwan military and leadership, to help them understand what this conflict has been about, what lessons they can learn, and where they should be focusing their dollars on defense and their training.

Senator Wicker: Is their NCO corps where it should be at this point?

General Berrier: They have a largely conscript force. I do not believe it is where it should be.

Senator Wicker: And so the volunteer part of their armed forces, is that where it should be, the non-conscript?

General Berrier: They have a very short enlistment period. I can provide you additional details in a written response.

Senator Wicker: Okay. You also have written that the
PLA Navy is the largest navy in the world and has the capability to conduct long-range precision strikes against land targets from its submarine and surface combatants. You later have written that Russia is fielding its new, quote, "ultra-quiet" submarine, capable of threatening North America from the Pacific Ocean.

General, do you assess that China and Russia will continue to grow both of their naval fleets and invest in new capabilities?

General Berrier: Yes, I do believe they will both invest in new capabilities and grow their fleets.

Senator Wicker: And is the United States on pace to build and commission as many ships as China is building?

General Berrier: I would refer that question to the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator Wicker: But surely the Intelligence Community has an assessment of that.

General Berrier: DIA has an assessment of Russian naval capabilities and Chinese PLAN capabilities.

Senator Wicker: And DIA is familiar with what the public plans of the Navy are at this point.

General Berrier: Probably, but I think the Navy will make those investment decisions based on how they perceive the threat as well, and we will certainly collaborate with our partners in the Navy on any of that.
Senator Wicker: Let me switch to Afghanistan.

Director Haines, you submitted the 2022 Office of Director of National Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment. On Afghanistan, the report says that the Taliban takeover threatens U.S. interests, that 500,000 Afghan refugees could attempt to cross into surrounding countries, and that almost certainly terrorist groups will establish and expand safe havens from which to plot attacks.

So, Madam Director, given these assessments in your office's Annual Threat Assessment, would you assess that the chaotic U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan has left the homeland more susceptible to terrorist attacks?

Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator. I agreed with what General Barrier indicated earlier on about the threat, essentially, that we are seeing from al Qaeda and from ISIS-K, which is to say that we see ISIS-K as the more concerning threat. At this point, we do not assess that they currently have the capability to essentially affect external attacks directed from Afghanistan to the United States at this stage, but they could build that capability over time, and they certainly have the intent to do so.

With al Qaeda, we are not seeing as much of a threat, and that does not mean that it could not grow over time, and that is obviously something that we are monitoring during this period.
Senator Wicker: General Berrier, has the exit from Afghanistan left our homeland more vulnerable?

General Berrier: Senator, I would not more vulnerable, but this is certainly an issue that the Intelligence Community has to keep on the warm plate, if you will, to make sure that we can monitor those networks, what they are doing, and where they are migrating to.

Senator Wicker: Thank you both.

Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Senator Wicker.

Senator King, please.

Senator King: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Director, I am concerned about the leaks last week, the details of intelligence that is being shared with the Ukrainians, both in terms of sources and methods, alerting the Russians, what we know, perhaps how we know it, and also feeding Vladimir Putin's paranoia about conflict with the West. Are you actively pursuing the source of those leaks from last week?

Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator. We obviously always actively pursue any information that we have that indicates that anybody may be disclosing classified information, you know, without authorization.

Senator King: I hope you will pursue that because I think sometimes leaks are embarrassing. We do not worry too much about them. But I think in this case they were
harmful, and I hope that this will be an active
investigation.

A question to both of you. We all believe that the
Intelligence Community did a really excellent job of
predicting the invasion, alerting the world as to what was
going on, what the disposition of Russian troops were, the
involvement of Belarus, all of that. What we missed was the
will to fight of the Ukrainians and the leadership of
Zelenskyy. And we also missed that in Afghanistan. Within
12 months we missed the will to fight. We overestimated the
Afghans' will to fight, underestimated the Ukrainians will
to fight.

I realize will to fight is a lot harder to assess than
number of tanks or volume of ammunition or something, but I
hope that the Intelligence Community is doing some soul-
searching about how to better get a handle on that question,
because we had testimony, in this committee and in the
Intelligence Committee, that Kyiv was going to fall in 3 or
4 days and war would last 2 weeks, and that turned out to be
grossly wrong. Are you looking at this question of how to
assess will to fight and domestic leadership?

Ms. Haines: Yes, Senator. You heard from General
Berrier, obviously, a number of things that DIA is doing.
For the Intelligence Community writ large we have a process
at the National Intelligence Council taking a look at these
issues. I would say that it is a combination of will to fight and capacity, in effect, and the two of them are issues that are, as you indicated, quite challenging to provide effective analysis on. And we are looking at different methodologies for doing so.

Senator King: This is your lane, assessing military capability, and a big part, as you testified earlier, the reason the Ukrainian war is going the way it is is that the Ukrainians are fighting for their land and the Russians do not have the same will to fight.

I hope that this is something you are focused upon, because again, I think we failed on this question in Afghanistan. And in Afghanistan we had testimony over and over that the government would last 6 months or a year beyond the departure of U.S. troops. It lasted minus 2 weeks. Is this something that you are focused upon?

General Berrier: Senator, I am focused on it, and I really appreciate this dialogue because I think there is an important nuance that we have to discuss. One is the will to fight and the other is the capacity to fight. In closed briefings we talked about this capacity to fight, and given the correlation of forces that the Russians had and what the Ukrainians had, it was the thought of senior analysts that it was not going to go very well, for a variety of factors.

But there was never an Intelligence Community
assessment that said the Ukrainians lacked the will to fight. Those assessments talked about their capacity to fight --

Senator King: Yeah, but there was not an assessment that they did either. The assessment was Ukraine would be overrun in a matter of weeks. That was grossly wrong.

General Berrier: Grossly wrong but not a question of will to fight. It was capacity at that time, as the DNI just said.

So we are taking a look at that, and we are --

Senator King: Are you saying Ukrainians' will to fight has not been an important part of this struggle?

General Berrier: No, I am not saying that. I think it has been everything.

Senator King: And that is what we did not know. Correct?

General Berrier: Well, we assessed their capacity to face the size of the Russian forces that were amassed on their border was going to be very difficult for them.

Senator King: Well, I all I am saying is the Intelligence Community needs to do a better job on this issue.

General Berrier: I think the Intelligence Community did a great job on this issue, Senator, and we will --

Senator King: General, how can you possibly say that
when we were told, explicitly, Kyiv would fall in 3 days and Ukraine would fall in 2 weeks? You are telling me that was accurate intelligence?

General Berrier: So we were really focused on the Russian forces at the time, and so when we backed --

Senator King: And we were wrong about that too, were we not? We overestimated the Russians.

General Berrier: Well, the Intelligence Community did a great job in predicting and talking --

Senator King: And I acknowledged that at the beginning of my question. I understand that. Yes, they did. What they failed at was predicting what was going to happen after Russia invaded.

General Berrier: So as I look at the totality of the entire operation I think the enormity rests on the predictions of what the Russians were going to do versus whether or not the Ukrainians were going to be successful.

Senator King: Well, if you do not concede there was a problem on this then we have got a problem.

General Berrier: Senator, I did not say that. We are going to take a hard look at this, but I think in the totality of the entire operation there were a lot more successes than failures.

Senator King: I will not argue that point. I am just trying to make a point that I think there was a major issue
that we missed that had a significant influence on how this has unfolded, and had we had a better handle on the prediction we could have done more to assist the Ukrainians earlier.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Hawley, please.

Senator Hawley: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director Haines and General, is it your sense that Beijing thinks that it has a window of opportunity to invade Taiwan before Taiwan and the United States modernize and get into better position to deter any such invasion? Let us start with you, Director.

Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator. It is our view that they are working hard to effectively put themselves into a position in which their military is capable of taking Taiwan over our intervention. We can talk in closed session about timelines and so on for how quickly they think they may be able to achieve that, but I think that is something that they are trying to achieve, even as, what General Berrier stated earlier is true, which is to say that they would prefer not to have to use military force to take Taiwan. They would prefer to use other means.

Senator Hawley: General, do you want to comment on this?
General Berrier: Well, I know there are a lot of dates out there, Senator -- 2027, 2030, 2049. Certainly it is on their mind. We are not really sure what lessons Xi Jinping is taking away from this conflict right now. We would hope that they would be the right ones. But I think it is going to take some time to sort out whether or not he believes this is a window or that his timeline would extend.

Senator Hawley: Let me ask you about something that Admiral Davidson said when he was Commander of PACOM. He told the committee last March that he worried about a Chinese invasion of Taiwan in the next 6 years. That is his testimony. His successor, Admiral Aquilino, has similarly said that he views the timeline to be shrinking.

Based on the indicators -- Director, let me start with you on this -- based on the indicators available to the Intelligence Community, do you agree that the threat to Taiwan is acute between now and 2030?

Ms. Haines: Yes. I think it is fair to say that it is critical or acute between now and 2030. I think that is absolutely fair. What is hard to tell is how, for example, whatever lessons China learns coming out of the Russia-Ukraine crisis might affect that time, as well as, as you indicated, whether or not our capabilities, Taiwan's capabilities, other decisions that will have to be made between now and then that will affect the timeline.
Senator Hawley: General, you said just a second ago that you hoped China would learn some lessons from the Ukraine conflict. What is it that you are hoping that they take away?

General Berrier: Just how difficult a cross-strait invasion might be and how dangerous and high risk that might be. We saw --

Senator Hawley: Sorry. But do you not think that the Chinese military is significantly more capable than the Russians? As it turns out, just to pick up what Senator King was pressing you on, we pretty dramatically overestimated the strength of the Russian military. I would be surprised, for one, if China's military strength proves to so attenuated. I mean, do you not think that we are dealing with a significantly more formidable adversary in China?

General Berrier: I think China is a formidable adversary.

Senator Hawley: So, I mean, back to lessons learned. Unfortunately, I think one lesson they can draw from the Ukraine conflict is that deterrence did not work in Ukraine. I mean, Russia invaded Ukraine. I, for one, do not want to be having this conversation about Taiwan in any period of years, not next year, not in 5 years, not in 10 years.

So my sense of urgency on this is we better figure out
how deterrence is going to work in Taiwan, because if China is successful in a fait accompli that is going to look a lot different than a Russian scenario in Ukraine. Would you not agree with that?

General Berrier: I do agree with that.

Senator Hawley: So just to that end, Director, let me come back to you. One of the things that the Intelligence Community was able to give us lead time on was a potential Russian invasion of Ukraine. I mean, we are very clear on that, that there was a strong likelihood of that, and you had that month in advance, actually.

I am curious if you think that we would get similar strategic warning about a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan?

Ms. Haines: I mean, it is too early to tell, honestly, whether or not that would be the case, and obviously, you know, in a kind of classic intelligence way we would sure as hell not promise anything at this stage.

Senator Hawley: General, let me ask you about something that has long been a concern of mine, and even more so now, and that is what I think of as the simultaneity problem, simultaneous conflicts in Western Europe, with Russia and with China.

So do you worry that Beijing might see an opportunity to invade Taiwan in the very near future, should the United
States get drawn into an actual conflict, a kinetic conflict with Russia?

General Berrier: I think that is a remote possibility.

Senator Hawley: Which part is remote?

General Berrier: The part that China would see that as a window to open to take advantage of that, based on the fact that they probably are not ready to do that right now.

Senator Hawley: So you do not think they have the capacity right now to invade Taiwan?

General Berrier: I did not say that.

Senator Hawley: Well, I am trying to drill down on what you mean when you say that they would not do it.

General Berrier: I think they probably have -- actually, could we take this into the closed session?

Senator Hawley: Sure. Yeah, absolutely. And my time has expired so I will take it up with you then.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Hawley.

Senator Manchin, please.

Senator Manchin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Sir, just real quick, back on Taiwan again. Do you think Taiwan is prepared to defend itself? In your evaluation of what Taiwan has been doing, the only thing I keep seeing is they want more F-16s, and we think they are going to be able to go to air war with China and defend
Taiwan? I do not think so.

General Berrier: I think Taiwan could do more, sir.

Senator Manchin: Are you all strategically giving them different things that they can use, whether it be in the sea or on land, to protect their island?

General Berrier: I think they are in close consultation with our partners in INDOPACOM and within the Department of Defense.

Senator Manchin: Mm-hmm. How about Ukraine? Can Ukraine win now that we have, as Senator King so rightfully pointed out and Senator Hawley followed up on, we misread that one. Are we reading it now, they have the ability to win if we continue to support, without us being pulled into a land war with them? On their own, can they win?

General Berrier: I think that is a difficult prediction to make. Right now I think where the agency is at is a prolonged stalemate should no factor change on either side. In other words, the Russians continue to do what they are doing, and we continue to do what we are doing for the Ukrainians. I see that as a stalemate, not a --

Senator Manchin: Director Haines, how do you evaluate this? I am sure that you have been kept up to speed on this and evaluating them. My other concern you might want to answer is our ability to maintain and manufacture the weapons that are needed to not only help Ukraine, not only
to backfill our allies, but also keep our own supply chains up. Are we running critically low? Could it be that we could put ourselves in a dangerous situation?

Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator. So I think a few things. One is, just taking your last question first, something we can do maybe a little bit in closed session is talk about not just our military assistance to Ukraine but also a number of other countries that have provided military assistance to Ukraine.

Senator Manchin: -- ask the question, are you concerned about the ability to have the supplies that are needed for us, for our allies, and what Ukraine is going to need to sustain and hopefully win this war?

Ms. Haines: So that is why I was talking about the allies piece. No, I am not concerned because I think, frankly, between all of us there is the capacity to provide the kind of assistance that they are asking for.

Senator Manchin: Okay. And can you identify the hot spots we are very much concerned about, other than China, because we know China is the challenge we have. Other hot spots that we are worried about that could rise up during this very difficult time, and the geopolitical interests that we have in the world. I mean, in Iran? North Korea? Some of the one you are more watching and concerned about.

General Berrier: The agency is worried about North
Korea for sure, and their ballistic missile development timeline, as well as potential nuclear testing. We are always thinking about Iran and the actions that they have to pull malign influence within the region against our neighbors and certainly U.S. forces there. We are always thinking through how to sustain partnerships to be able to keep a beat on these threats.

Senator Manchin: Director Haines, are you concerned about basically the tensions that we have with UAE and with Saudis and also their more visual movements, intentional movements towards China for support or basically the yuan being used now as the currency that they are accepting for payment of energy, things of this sort that could also put us in a more precarious situation with UAE and Saudis?

Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator. I mean, obviously, as you indicate, we are always looking at efforts that both China and Russia make to try to make inroads with partners of ours across the world, and UAE and Saudi Arabia are examples of that in both respects.

Senator Manchin: Cybersecurity is my final one for you all. Right now it seems like it is a convoluted area where people would report, whether it is private companies in America that are getting hacked and what is going on but also who is in charge? Where do they go? What is the chain right now within the Federal Government, in military
especially, on cyber, that you consider the premier spot that we should be working with, or are we putting things together? Are we still so fragmented throughout our agencies?

Ms. Haines: I mean, my experience is it has gotten better over the years. I would never say it is perfect. It is one of those things that continues to be worked through. But there is a very clear chain of command with respect to taking action --

Senator Manchin: Who is taking the lead? Who takes the lead?

Ms. Haines: When it comes to offensive cyber operations to defend the country, obviously the Department of Defense does so. When it comes to defending, you know, helping to defend the infrastructure and critical -- right, exactly, resilience -- it is the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI, and everybody has a role to play, and we obviously support, in the Intelligence Community, all of them in the work that they are doing.

Senator Manchin: What about the National Cybersecurity -- how about the center? How do you all evaluate the National Cybersecurity Center?

Ms. Haines: You mean the National Cybersecurity Director, the new position --

Senator Manchin: All the stakeholders are involved in
that. That is why I am saying it is convoluted. Who is
taking the lead? Who is the lead person? Who is the lead agency?

Senator King: CISA.

Ms. Haines: Yeah, CISA is the main --

Senator Manchin: How do you evaluate that?

Ms. Haines: I think they are doing very well, yeah.

Senator Manchin: Okay. No further questions.

Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Senator Manchin.

Senator Sullivan, please.

Senator Sullivan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want
to thank the witnesses for their hard work during a challenging time. I want to focus a lot on the issue of energy, and I will relay a story I had with Senator McCain and a Russian dissident who has now been arrested, Vladimir Kura-Murza. He is in jail right now in Russia.

About 4 years ago, I asked him what was the number one thing we could do to undermine the corrupt Russian regime, to undermine Vladimir Putin, and he said, "The number one thing? That is easy, Senator. Produce more American energy." Produce more American energy.

So I want to talk a little bit about that. In your assessment, is energy independence -- so a couple of years ago we were the largest producer of natural gas in the world, the largest...
producer if renewables in the world -- is that good for America's national security, General?

General Berrier: Senator, thanks for the question. As we have watched this conflict unfold what we --

Senator Sullivan: I have a got a lot of questions. I gave you a softball. Can you answer the question? Is that good for America's national security to be energy independent and the world's energy superpower?

General Berrier: Certainly energy independence is a good thing.

Senator Sullivan: How about you, Director?

Ms. Haines: Yes.

Senator Sullivan: Okay. Thank you for the straightforward answer.

Now, in this conflict with Ukraine, what does our ability to produce energy, how do the Russians view that and how do our allies view that? We all know Vladimir Putin uses energy as a weapon. How are you assessing the ability of the United States to fill the void that the Germans and others have with regard to getting energy from Russia to now get it from the United States? Is there a lot of interest in that and is that a good thing for our national security?

General?

General Berrier: I certainly believe that our European allies see this as a national security issue for sure, and
they are thinking through new ways of developing and getting
after their energy needs, for sure.

Senator Sullivan: How about getting some from the
United States?

General Berrier: If the United States had excess
capacity I am sure that would be something that they would
welcome.

Senator Sullivan: Do you see that, Director,
similarly?

Ms. Haines: Yes.

Senator Sullivan: Let me ask with regard to China.

Almost 70 percent of China's crude oil supply came in the
form of imports. What is your assessment of how China's
energy dependence could or would impact its military
operations during a potential cross-strait conflict? In
your assessment, when you read up on China's weaknesses, are
they concerned about their energy dependence with regard to
national gas and oil being a major, major importer?

General Berrier: If there is a way we could take this
into the closed session to discuss that, that would be
better, Senator.

Senator Sullivan: Okay.

General Berrier: I do believe they are concerned about
their dependence on energy.

Senator Sullivan: Director?
Ms. Haines: Yes, absolutely.

Senator Sullivan: Do you see that as a strategic advantage we have in our great power competition with China and Russia, the fact that we cannot only produce energy for our own country -- and I am talking all of the above -- renewables, oil, gas. Do you see that as a strategic advantage for our nation?

General Berrier: I see it as an advantage.

Ms. Haines: Yeah. I mean, I think, frankly, our capacity to work with our allies on this issue has been a strategic advantage, and our ability to work with them in order to actually help to mitigate against Russia using energy as a weapon has been a major issue.

Senator Sullivan: And China's dependence on energy, should there be some kind of conflict between us and China?

Ms. Haines: Yes. The relationship with Russia will be relevant under those circumstances, obviously.

Senator Sullivan: Let me ask one final question, and it is not really a question on intel. You know, we are getting ready to vote here on a $40 billion package. My team and I are looking through it. It is a lot. How do you assess our NATO partners' commitment, finally, to hitting 2 percent of their GDP for their annual military budgets? I mean, we have now 100,000 troops over in Europe. I fully support what the President has been doing in that regard.
But if there was ever a time that countries had to kind of wake up and say, you know what, for 40 years we promised it at 2 percent. The wolf is at the door, or maybe the bear is at the door, or the dragon is at the door, whatever metaphor you want.

Are you seeing a shift? Because the Germans made a big announcement. My understanding is Canada still will not even hit 1 percent of GDP for their defense budget. Are you seeing a shift in our NATO allies to say, you know what, it is time for us to pull our own weight here. The Americans are doing it, once again. And look, I support everything we are doing, but, you know, $40 billion, that is a lot of money. My constituents have got a lot of needs too, and we still have NATO allies, Canada one, who just freeload, and it is getting a little tiring.

What is your assessment of our NATO partners' commitment to finally hitting 2 percent now that it is very clear that there is a brutal dictator on their doorstep?

Ms. Haines: I think we have seen, obviously, as you indicated in the opening to your question, just a number of countries now announce an increase in their defense budget, and I think that is something that we are going to see them follow through on, at least in part.

Senator Sullivan: General?

General Berrier: And I think this has had a
galvanizing effect on our NATO partners, and I think most of
them will come around.

Senator Sullivan: Thank you. And again, I did not
start by saying the intel you were providing us and
everybody else prior to the war was exceptional, and the
intel ops that you did were also really impressive. So I
appreciate that.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Sullivan.

Senator Peters, please.

Senator Peters: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director Haines, the 2022 Annual Threat Assessment
states, quote, "China presents the broadest, most active and
persistent cyber espionage threat to the U.S. government and
private sector networks," end of quote. The assessment
specifically discusses the capacity for China to conduct
surveillance as well as disrupt critical infrastructure.

My question for you, ma'am, is does the ODNI believe
that China would use their cyber capacity to shape other
countries' decisions such as the Russians are known to do?
Do you believe that is in the cards as well?

Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator. Yes. I mean, I think
in the sense that, in particular, our assessment is that
China is pursuing significant cyber capabilities, in this
area in particular, to deter the United States from taking
action in the event of a conflict, for example, in their
region.

Senator Peters: Thank you. Media coverage during the weeks leading up to Russia's invasion often used open-source evidence to support the Administration's intelligence estimates. Examples here range from images provided by Maxar's commercial satellite network to Russian military communications that were intercepted by tech-savvy civilians.

My question for you, General Berrier, is how is the proliferation of technology and information accessibility for average citizens impacting the realm of professional intelligence work within your agency?

General Berrier: From the perspective of this war between Russia and Ukraine the plethora of open-source data that is available to enrich our assessments has been amazing. Just think of the third-party damage assessment work that is happening right now using images because most Ukrainian citizens have a cellphone. It has been really, really rich. And then you combine it with the other open-source data that is available, publicly available, and can be purchased.

For us it has been enlightening and will probably shape how we do intelligence operations and analysis going forward in the future. We just have to be careful that we use the right rules at the right time to make sure that we are
safeguarding information and that we are not violating any laws or policies.

Senator Peters: That actually leads to the next question, and you mentioned you are looking at how you integrate that into how you collect information. Is there anything that Congress should be doing to help you better enable your abilities to harness the potential for open-source information?

General Berrier: I think we are budgeted for it, Senator, and we are looking forward to the work ahead as we go forward on this issue.

Senator Peters: Good.

Director Haines, the Biden administration has done an admirable job certainly of crafting a coalition of nations to impose sanctions, enforce export controls against Russia for their illegal invasion. This includes our trans-Atlantic partners, many of them who are now giving up on Russian hydrocarbons, something that I think we all would have thought was absolutely unthinkable just a short while ago, as well as our global partners, Japan and Taiwan, actively engaged.

What has been noticeable, though, is to see that much of the world is still not with us. They may not be with Russia, and I am not saying they are with Russia, but they are not subscribing to our call for a global coalition of
democracies to stand against Ukraine. This includes India, Indonesia, Nigeria, South Africa, and particularly other nations in the global south in which the U.S. certainly has very friendly relations with but we have not yet been able to get them to join the Ukrainian cause.

As the U.S. will need to certainly build an even more robust coalition of nations in the future to counter potential Chinese aggression, I believe it is imperative that the U.S. understand how to win over these non-aligned nations living certainly in a multi-polar world.

So my question to you, in your view what steps should the U.S. take to build a broader coalition for potential future conflicts, similar to what we are seeing right now?

Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator. From the Intelligence Community perspective we have done a lot of thinking about how we can help to facilitate, frankly, the policy community in this area, to your point, and one of the things that we did in the context of Ukraine that I think is possible for us to do in other areas, and that we have discussed with the policy community about, is basically working key allies and partners who are influencers, in effect, within specific regions, to try to get out to them as much intelligence as we can, obviously being mindful of sources and methods. But just to lay the groundwork so that then the policy community can work with those countries to effectively provide for the
kind of coalition that you describe.

And I do think it is an absolutely fundamental piece.

I mean, the fact that the U.N. General Assembly managed to garner 141 votes, I think it was, against Russia on the Russia-Ukraine piece was pretty extraordinary. And I do think that our capacity to share intelligence in advance of that moment was critical to getting that kind of coalition together, and I hope we can do that in the future.

Senator Peters: Great. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Peters.

Senator Rosen, please.

Senator Rosen: Thank you, Chairman Reed, and I really appreciate the witnesses. I appreciate you both for being here today and for your service.

Director Haines and General Berrier, given that the Annual Threat Assessment was written before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, has Russia's loss and expenditure of military equipment, personnel, and resources in Ukraine, coupled with their, frankly, poor performance, changed our overall threat of Russia and their military capabilities, and -- like I said, this was written before that -- how do you assess we may need to adjust our planning going forward, seeing as what we are learning?

General Berrier: I will start with that one, Senator.
I think, you know, as we have watched the Russians falter here and the losses that they have sustained we believe that they are going to be set back conventionally for a number of years as they try to recoup these losses and replace all of the equipment and soldiers that they have lost.

So I think we should back up our assessment really for NATO and what that threat really looks like, also factoring in their nuclear capabilities and what that means for NATO going forward.

Ms. Haines: So I will just add to this. I think, you know, as we talk to the analysts about this, and obviously before each of the threat hearings we discussed this because the threat hearings came after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and as you indicate the assessment was done beforehand, and I think the overall threat level has not so much changed as it is the question of how it is evolving, to General Berrier's point.

I think our view is that the ground combat forces have been degraded considerably. It is going to take them years to basically manage, to the extent that they are able, to rebuild that, in effect, and that may end up meaning that they have greater reliance, in effect, on asymmetric tools during this period. So they rely more on things like cyber, nuclear, precision, et cetera, and that is obviously a shift in the way in which they are exercising their efforts for
influence, and so on.

Senator Rosen: Well, and knowing that we also know, to everyone else's point here too, that the world is watching. So Director Haines, how do you assess the threat level to Taiwan? Has it increased? Does China feel more emboldened now that Russia has invaded Ukraine? And then I will give the second part of that to you, General. Does China see this as an opportunity, maybe this period, to invade Ukraine as we might be distracted, the world might be distracted with the Ukraine crisis?

Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator. It is hard to tell, honestly, at this stage. What we see is evaluating what is happening in the Russia-Ukraine crisis. They are still evaluating. The crisis obviously still continues. So what lessons they learn during this period is not really concluded yet, and so it is a little bit harder to tell whether or not is an increased threat of accelerating their efforts toward Taiwan or less so.

I would say that thus far the IC has not assessed that the Russia-Ukraine crisis is likely to accelerate their plan, vis-à-vis Taiwan, and the kinds of lessons that we think are possible that are relevant, just to give you maybe two, one is they were surprised by the degree to which the United States and Europe came together to enact sanctions, and that is something, obviously, they are going to be
looking at in the context of Taiwan.

And the second one, I think, is this point that really General Berrier made earlier a little bit, which is to say that one of the issues for them is the confidence they have that they are able militarily to take action in Taiwan over our intervention. That will play into their decision-making over time, we think, and seeing what happened in Russia, that might give them less confidence, in some respects, over what it is that is likely to happen.

General Berrier: Senator, the only thing that I would add is on a day-to-day basis with Chinese military activity I am not seeing anything that would tell me that they are thinking about trying to take advantage of this time that they think that they might have.

Senator Rosen: Let me ask one additional follow-up on that. What is your assessment of our ability to conduct military operations in both theaters should something occur?

General Berrier: We have significant capabilities in both theaters. It would depend on what the variables were with each situation and what that meant. But that is why we have four-star combatant commanders in USEUCOM and INDOPACOM.

Senator Rosen: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Senator Rosen, and thank you, Madam Director and General. We have a vote
scheduled at 11:45. We will reconvene in SVC-217 for the
classified session at noon, 12 o'clock.

And at this time I will recess or adjourn the open
session. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]