

Stenographic Transcript
Before the

COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON
WORLDWIDE THREATS

Tuesday, May 10, 2022

Washington, D.C.

ALDERSON COURT REPORTING
1111 14TH STREET NW
SUITE 1050
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005
(202) 289-2260
www.aldersonreporting.com

1 HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON WORLDWIDE THREATS

2

3

Tuesday, May 10, 2022

4

5

U.S. Senate

6

Committee on Armed Services

7

Washington, D.C.

8

9 The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in
10 Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jack Reed,
11 chairman of the committee, presiding.

12 Committee Members Present: Senators Reed [presiding],
13 Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Warren,
14 Peters, Manchin, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer,
15 Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott,
16 Blackburn, and Hawley.

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED, U.S. SENATOR FROM
2 RHODE ISLAND

3 Chairman Reed: Good morning. The committee meets
4 today to receive testimony on the worldwide threats facing
5 the United States and our international partners.

6 I would like to welcome Director of National
7 Intelligence Avril Haines and Director of the Defense
8 Intelligence Agency Lieutenant General Scott D. Berrier.
9 Thank you both for joining us, and please convey the
10 committee's gratitude to the men and women of the
11 Intelligence Community for their critical work.

12 We must start by addressing the illegal war Vladimir
13 Putin is waging in Ukraine. Over the past 2 1/2 months,
14 Russia's unprovoked aggression has inflicted horrific
15 suffering upon innocent civilians in Ukraine, threatened
16 European security, and caused serious consequences for the
17 global economy. In the face of this senseless violence, the
18 Ukrainian military has performed tremendously, supported by
19 the United States and the international community. A
20 formidable array of our global allies and partners have
21 joined in solidarity to impose severe sanctions on Russia
22 and provide support to Ukraine. We cannot overstate the
23 scale and importance of this unity.

24 I want to commend the Biden administration and the
25 leaders of the Intelligence Community for the unprecedented

1 and skillful release of intelligence over the last several
2 months that exposed Russia's aggressive intentions and
3 deceitful activities ahead of its invasion of Ukraine.
4 Intelligence officials are understandably cautious about
5 revealing hard-won insights on adversaries, but this
6 strategy has proven highly effective in strengthening the
7 international community's response and creating dilemmas for
8 Vladimir Putin. This is a great example of competing
9 effectively in the information domain, and I hope we will
10 continue to make use of this kind of creative tradecraft.

11 With that in mind, Russia's strategy in Ukraine seems
12 to be evolving. Director Haines, General Berrier, I would
13 ask for your assessment of the Ukraine conflict in the
14 larger context of the evolving international order, as well
15 as the implications for the United States' approach to
16 security in the European theater going forward.

17 We must also stay focused on our long-term strategic
18 competition with China. In addition to its economic and
19 socio-political growth, China has studied the United States'
20 way of war and focused on offsetting our advantages.
21 Beijing has made concerning progress in this regard and
22 holds its own expansive geostrategic ambitions. As we
23 speak, China is watching how the nations of the world
24 respond to Russia. In considering a potential invasion of
25 Taiwan, President Xi is scrutinizing Putin's playbook and

1 the international response.

2 However, there is broad consensus that our comparative
3 advantage over China is our network of partners and allies
4 in the region and globally. Strengthening that network
5 should be at the center of any strategy for the Indo-Pacific
6 region, and the maturation of the Quadrilateral Security
7 Dialogue, or "Quad," involving the United States, Japan,
8 India, and Australia, presents a strategic opportunity to
9 establish a durable framework.

10 I would ask our witnesses to share what military and
11 non-military factors are most likely to impact Chinese
12 decision-making with respect to potential action against
13 Taiwan.

14 Turning to Iran, in the 4 years since then-President
15 Trump pulled out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,
16 or JCPOA, Iran has made key nuclear advances. It has
17 decreased "breakout time" to several weeks, from a year
18 under the agreement. It has increased uranium enrichment to
19 60 percent, instead of just under 4 percent allowed under
20 the agreement. Iran has hardened its infrastructure and
21 replaced damaged equipment with more advanced models. And
22 while negotiations to return Iran to the JCPOA are in the
23 final stages, the final outcome has not yet been determined.

24 Beyond its nuclear advances, Iran and Iranian proxies
25 continue to mount drone and rocket attacks in the region,

1 including against bases in Iraq and Syria with a U.S.
2 military presence. Saudi Arabia, and now also the United
3 Arab Emirates have also come under attack. Director Haines,
4 given these current dynamics I would like your thoughts on
5 how to best de-escalate tensions with Iran while preserving
6 space to return to the JCPOA.

7 Finally, this year's threat assessment again highlights
8 the challenges posed by environmental degradation from
9 climate change. I understand it is the DNI's view that
10 climate change will increasingly exacerbate risks to U.S.
11 national security interests, as issues like rising
12 temperatures, poor water governance, pollution, changing
13 precipitation patterns, and other climate effects are likely
14 to lead to an array of human challenges, such as food and
15 water insecurity and threats to human health.

16 We live in a complex and dangerous global security
17 environment. From Russia's aggression in Europe to China's
18 influence in the Indo-Pacific to countless other malign
19 actors around the world, prevailing in this environment will
20 require resolute, thoughtful strategies.

21 I look forward to our witnesses' insights into these
22 issues, and I thank them again for their participation.

23 Let me now turn to the ranking member, Senator Inhofe.

24

25

1 STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR FROM
2 OKLAHOMA

3 Senator Inhofe: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you
4 in welcoming our witnesses.

5 When our witnesses testified before this committee last
6 year, they provided a dire assessment of the threats to our
7 national security. It is clear and, I really cannot
8 overstate this, the security situation we face today is
9 significantly more dangerous and complex than it has ever
10 been, or certainly was a year ago. The Chinese threat is
11 beyond anything we ever dealt with before. This year,
12 Beijing announced a 7.1 percent defense budget increase.
13 They have had two decades of real growth with no signs of
14 slowing down and, as the chairman alluded to, Putin's
15 unprovoked aggression against Ukraine shows the danger posed
16 by the nuclear-armed Russia to our security, those of our
17 allies, and international order.

18 Iran's malign behavior continues throughout the Middle
19 East, and terrorist groups like ISIS and al Qaeda are
20 growing in strength across Africa. Despite this reality,
21 President Biden's budget request is inadequate. It does not
22 deliver the real growth the military needs, and that is the
23 3 to 5 percent increase that we established some 5 years
24 ago. And as I have said it before, inflation is the new
25 sequestration that we consider today, and it is making

1 everything we do more difficult.

2 So I look forward to hearing from both of you about how
3 our threats have evolved ever since last year and how the
4 Intelligence Community is changing to respond to the
5 national security strategy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

6 Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.

7 Now let me recognize Director Haines.

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE AVRIL HAINES, DIRECTOR OF
2 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

3 Ms. Haines: Thank you very much, Chairman Reed,
4 Ranking Member Inhofe, and members of the committee. Thank
5 you for the opportunity to speak with you today and to
6 provide testimony alongside General Berrier on the
7 intelligence community's annual assessment of worldwide
8 threats to U.S. national security.

9 Before I start I just want to take a moment to publicly
10 thank the men and women of the Intelligence Community for
11 their extraordinary work to keep us safe. I know how
12 privileged I am to be part of this community of truly
13 talented people, to be given a chance to do something useful
14 in service to my country, and I thank you for support for
15 their work.

16 Broadly speaking, this year's assessment focuses, much
17 like last year's assessment, on adversaries and competitors,
18 critical transnational threats, and conflicts and
19 instability, and these categories often overlap.
20 Cybercrime, for example, is a transnational threat while
21 also being a threat that emanates from state actors. One of
22 the key challenges of this era is assessing how various
23 threats and trends are likely to intersect so as to identify
24 where their interactions may result in fundamentally greater
25 risk to our interests than one might otherwise expect or

1 where they introduce new opportunities. This year's Annual
2 Threat Assessment highlights some of these connections as it
3 provides the IC's baseline of the most pressing threats to
4 U.S. national security.

5 The assessment starts with threats from key state
6 actors, beginning with the People's Republic of China, which
7 remains an unparalleled priority for the Intelligence
8 Community, and then turns to Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
9 All four governments have demonstrated the capability and
10 intent to promote their interests in ways that cut against
11 U.S. and allied interests.

12 The PRC is coming ever closer to being a peer
13 competitor in areas of relevance to national security, is
14 pushing to revise global norms and institutions to its
15 advantage, and is challenging the United States in multiple
16 arenas -- economically, militarily, and technologically.
17 China is especially effective at bringing together a
18 coordinated, whole-of-government approach to demonstrated
19 strength and to compel neighbors to acquiesce to its
20 preference, including its territorial and maritime claims
21 and assertions of sovereignty over Taiwan.

22 A key area of focus for the IC is President Xi
23 Jinping's determination to force unification with Taiwan on
24 Beijing's terms. China would prefer coerced unification
25 that avoids armed conflict, and it has been stepping up

1 diplomatic, economic, and military pressure on the island
2 for years to isolate it and weaken confidence in its
3 democratically elected leaders. And at the same time,
4 Beijing is prepared to use military force if it decides this
5 is necessary.

6 The PRC is also engaged in the largest-ever nuclear
7 force expansion and arsenal diversification in its history.
8 It is working to match or exceed U.S. capabilities in space
9 and presents the broadest, most active and persistent cyber
10 espionage threat to U.S. government and private sector
11 networks.

12 And Russia, of course, also remains a critical priority
13 and is a significant focus right now in light of President
14 Putin's tragic invasion of Ukraine in February, which has
15 produced a shock to the geopolitical order with implications
16 for the future that we are only beginning to understand but
17 are sure to be consequential. The IC, as you know, provided
18 warning of President Putin's plans, but this is a case where
19 I think all of us wish we had been wrong.

20 Russia's failure to rapidly seize Kyiv and overwhelm
21 Ukrainian forces has deprived Moscow of the quick military
22 victory that it had originally expected would prevent the
23 United States and NATO from being able to provide meaningful
24 military aid to Ukraine. The Russians met with more
25 resistance from Ukraine than they expected, and their own

1 military's performance revealed a number of significant
2 internal challenges, forcing them to adjust their initial
3 military objectives, fall back from Kyiv, and focus on the
4 Donbas.

5 The next month or two of fighting will be significant
6 as the Russians attempt to reinvigorate their efforts, but
7 even if they are successful we are not confident that the
8 fight in the Donbas will effectively end the war. We assess
9 President Putin is preparing for prolonged conflict in
10 Ukraine, during which he still intends to achieve goals
11 beyond the Donbas. We assess that Putin's strategic goals
12 are probably not changed, suggesting he regards the decision
13 in late March to refocus Russian forces on the Donbas as
14 only a temporary shift to regain the initiative after the
15 Russian military's failure to capture Kyiv.

16 His current near-term military objectives are to
17 capture the two oblasts in Donetsk and Luhansk with a buffer
18 zone, encircle Ukrainian forces from the north and the south
19 to the west of the Donbas in order to crush the most
20 capability and well-equipped Ukrainian forces who are
21 fighting to hold the line in the east, consolidate control
22 of the land bridge Russia has established from Crimea to the
23 Donbas, occupy Kherson, and control the water source for
24 Crimea that is to the north. And we also see indications
25 that the Russian military wants to extend the land bridge to

1 Transnistria.

2 And while the Russian forces may be capable of
3 achieving most of these near-term goals in the coming
4 months, we believe that they will not be able to extend
5 control over a land bridge that stretches to Transnistria
6 and includes Odessa without launching some form of
7 mobilization. And it is increasingly unlikely that they
8 will be able to establish control over both oblasts and the
9 buffer zone they desire in the coming weeks.

10 But Putin most likely also judges that Russia has a
11 greater ability and willingness to endure challenges than
12 his adversaries, and he is probably counting on U.S. and EU
13 resolve to weaken as food shortages, inflation, energy
14 prices get worse.

15 Moreover, as both Russia and Ukraine believe they can
16 continue to make progress militarily, we do not see a viable
17 negotiating path forward, at least in the short term. The
18 uncertain nature of the battle, which is developing into a
19 war of attrition, combined with the reality that Putin faces
20 a mismatch between his ambitions and Russia's current
21 conventional military capabilities likely means the next few
22 months could see us moving along a more unpredictable and
23 potentially escalatory trajectory. At the very least, we
24 believe the dichotomy will usher in a period of more ad hoc
25 decision-making in Russia, both with respect to the domestic

1 adjustments required to sustain this push as well as the
2 military conflict with Ukraine and the West.

3 The current trend increases the likelihood that
4 President Putin will turn to more drastic means, including
5 imposing martial law, reorienting industrial production, or
6 potentially escalatory and military actions to free up the
7 resources needed to achieve his objectives as the conflict
8 drags on or if he perceives Russia is losing in Ukraine.
9 And the most likely flashpoints for escalation in the coming
10 weeks are around increasing Russian attempts to interdict
11 Western security assistance, retaliation for Western
12 economic sanctions, or threats to the regime at home.

13 We believe that Moscow continues to use nuclear
14 rhetoric to deter the United States and the West from
15 increasing lethal aid to Ukraine and to respond to public
16 comments that the U.S. and NATO allies that suggest expanded
17 Western goals in the conflict. And if Putin perceives that
18 the United States is ignoring his threats he may try to
19 signal to Washington the heightened danger of its support to
20 Ukraine by authorizing another large nuclear exercise
21 involving a major dispersal of mobile intercontinental
22 missiles, heavy bombers, strategic submarines.

23 We otherwise continue to believe that President Putin
24 would probably only authorize the use of nuclear weapons if
25 he perceived an existential threat to the Russian state or

1 regime, but we will remain vigilant in monitoring every
2 aspect of Russia's strategic nuclear forces. With tensions
3 this high there is always an enhanced potential for
4 miscalculation, unintended escalation which we hope our
5 intelligence can help to mitigate.

6 Beyond its invasion of Ukraine, Moscow presents a
7 serious cyber threat, a key space competitor, and one of the
8 most serious foreign influence threats to the United States.
9 Using its intelligence services proxies, wide-ranging
10 influence tools, the Russian government seeks to not only
11 pursue its own interests but also to divide Western
12 alliances, undermine U.S. global standing, amplify discord
13 inside the United States, and influence U.S. voters and
14 decision-making.

15 And to finish with our state actor threats, the Iranian
16 regime continues to threaten U.S. interests as it tries to
17 erode U.S. influence in the Middle East and trends its
18 influence and project power in neighboring states and
19 minimize threats to regime stability. Meanwhile, Kim Jong-
20 un continues to steadily expand and enhance Pyongyang
21 nuclear and conventional capabilities, targeting the United
22 States and its allies, periodically using aggressive,
23 potentially destabilizing actions to reshape the regional
24 security environment in his favor and to reinforce its
25 status quo as a de facto nuclear power.

1 The assessment continues to focus on a number of key
2 global and transnational threats, including global health
3 security, transnational organized crime, the rapid
4 development of destabilizing technologies, climate,
5 migration, and terrorism. I raise these because they pose
6 challenges of a fundamentally different nature to our
7 national security than those posed by the actions of nation
8 states, even powerful ones like China and Russia.

9 And we look at the Russia-Ukraine war and can imagine
10 outcomes to resolve the crisis and the steps needed to get
11 there, even though unpalatable and difficult, and similarly
12 we view the array of challenges Chinese actions pose and can
13 discuss what is required, how we think about tradeoffs. But
14 transnational issues are more complex, require significant
15 and sustained multilateral effort, and though we can discuss
16 ways of managing them all of them pose a set of choices that
17 will be more difficult to untangle and will perhaps require
18 more sacrifice to bring about meaningful change. This
19 reflects not just the interconnected nature of the problems
20 but also the significant impact increasingly empowered non-
21 state actors have on the outcomes and the reality that some
22 of the countries who are key to mitigating threats posed by
23 nation states are also the ones we will be asking to do more
24 in the transnational space.

25 For example, the lingering effects of the COVID-19

1 pandemic is putting a strain on governments and societies,
2 fueling humanitarian and economic crises, political unrest,
3 and geopolitical competition. Low-income countries with
4 high debts face particularly challenging recoveries, now
5 exacerbated, in some cases, by increasing food security
6 resulting from the Russia-Ukraine crisis, and these shifts
7 will spur migration around the world, including on our
8 southern border.

9 The economic impact has set many poor and middle-income
10 countries back years in terms of economic development, and
11 is encouraging some in Latin America, Africa, and Asia to
12 look to China and Russia for quick economic and security
13 assistance to manage their new reality. We see the same
14 complex mix of interlocking challenges stemming from the
15 threat of climate change, which is exacerbating risks in
16 U.S. national security interests across the board but
17 particularly as it intersects with environmental degradation
18 and global health challenges.

19 And terrorism, of course, remains a persistent threat
20 to U.S. persons and interests at home and abroad, but the
21 implications of the problem are evolving. In Africa, for
22 example, where terrorist groups are clearly gaining
23 strength, the growing overlap between terrorism, criminal
24 activity, and smuggling networks has undermined stability,
25 contributed to coups and an erosion of democracy, and

1 resulted in countries turning to Russian entities to help
2 manage these problems.

3 Global transnational criminal organizations continue to
4 pose a direct threat to the United States through the
5 production and trafficking of lethal, illicit drugs, massive
6 theft including cybercrime, human trafficking, and financial
7 crimes, and money-laundering schemes. And in particular,
8 the threat from illicit drugs is at historic levels, with
9 more than 100,000 American drug overdose deaths for the
10 first time annually, driven mainly by a robust supply of
11 synthetic opioids from Mexican transnational criminal
12 organizations. In short, the interconnected global security
13 environment is marked by the growing specter of great power
14 competition and conflict while transnational threats to all
15 nations and actors compete not only for our attention but
16 also for finite resources.

17 And finally, the assessment turns to conflicts and
18 instability highlighting a series of regional challenges of
19 importance to the United States. Iterative violence between
20 Israel and Iran and conflicts in other areas, including
21 Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, have the potential to
22 escalate or spread, fueling humanitarian crises and
23 threatening U.S. persons. Africa, for example, has seen six
24 irregular transfers of power since 2020, and probably will
25 see new bouts of conflict in the coming year as the region

1 becomes increasingly strained by a volatile mixture of
2 democratic backsliding, intercommunal violence, and the
3 continued threat of cross-border terrorism.

4 And finally, most important of all we are focused on
5 our workforces and their families. The IC continues to
6 contribute to the government-wide effort to better
7 understand potential causal mechanisms of anomalous health
8 incidents and remains committed to ensuring afflicted
9 individuals receive the quality care they need. The safety
10 and well-being of our workforce is our highest priority, and
11 we are grateful to members of this committee for your
12 continued support on these issues.

13 Thank you for the opportunity to present our
14 assessments, and I look forward to your questions.

15 [The prepared statement of Ms. Haines follows:]

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1 Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Madam Director.
2 General Berrier, please.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL SCOTT BERRIER,
2 DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

3 General Berrier: Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe,
4 and distinguished members of this committee, it is a
5 privilege to testify today as part of the Intelligence
6 Community's 2022 assessment of worldwide threats to U.S.
7 national security. On behalf of the Defense Intelligence
8 Agency I want to express how much we appreciate your support
9 and partnership. Thank you.

10 DIA fills a unique intelligence role by providing
11 strategy, operational, and tactical intelligence to our
12 warfighters, defense planners, policymakers, and the
13 acquisition community. We examine conflict across all
14 warfighting domains to assess foreign capabilities and
15 understand our adversaries' intent. DIA's dedicated
16 professionals, in partnership with our Intelligence
17 Community colleagues, allies, and foreign partners, deliver
18 timely and relevant intelligence on the threats and
19 challenges facing our nation. DIA has a highly resilient
20 workforce that has overcome difficult challenges posed by
21 the pandemic. Today my goal is to convey DIA's insights to
22 you, and the American public, on the evolving threat
23 environment as we understand it.

24 As I look at the global landscape today, I want to
25 begin with Russia and its invasion of Ukraine, which is now

1 in its third month. Russian military capabilities have been
2 used to violate the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine,
3 and they pose an existential threat to U.S. national
4 security and that of our allies. The invasion has
5 demonstrated Russia's intent to overturn the U.S.-led,
6 rules-based, post-Cold War international order, expand its
7 control over the former Soviet Union, and reclaim what it
8 regards as its rightful position on the world stage.

9 Moscow's underestimation of Ukraine's effective
10 resistance, Russia's substantial battlefield losses, and
11 Western resolve to support Ukraine, has undermined Moscow's
12 assault on Kyiv and improved prospects that Ukraine can
13 successfully defend its sovereignty. Moscow has now shifted
14 its focus to eastern Ukraine, where it appears to be
15 prioritizing defeating Ukrainian forces in the Donbas. In
16 response to stiff Ukrainian resistance, Russia has resorted
17 to more indiscriminate and brutal methods that are
18 destroying cities, infrastructure, and increasing civilian
19 deaths. Negotiations remain stalled as both sides focus on
20 the outcome of the battle in the Donbas, while partnerships
21 with Ukraine and warning of potential escalation remain key
22 priorities for DIA.

23 Turning to China, it remains a pacing threat and a
24 major security challenge. Beijing has long viewed the
25 United States as a strategic competitor. China is capable

1 of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and
2 technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a
3 stable and open international system. The PLA, which has
4 already fielded sophisticated weapons and instituted major
5 organizational reforms to enhance joint operations, is
6 nearing the status of a global competitor to the United
7 States, its allies and partners, and is a credible peer
8 competitor in the region. China's current nuclear force
9 expansion is historic.

10 The United States faces military and intelligence
11 threats from competitors, particularly Russia and China, who
12 have and are developing new capabilities intended to
13 contest, limit, or exceed U.S. military advantage. State
14 and non-state actors are selectively putting these
15 capabilities into play globally and regionally. These
16 capabilities also span all warfighting domains - maritime,
17 land, air, electronic warfare, cyberspace, information, and
18 space. They include more lethal ballistic and cruise
19 missiles, growing nuclear stockpiles, modernized
20 conventional forces, and a range of gray zone measures such
21 as the use of ambiguous unconventional forces, foreign
22 proxies, information manipulation, cyberattacks, and
23 economic coercion.

24 Strategic competitors and other challengers are
25 exerting increasing military pressure on neighboring states.

1 Russia has invaded Ukraine, China is threatening Taiwan, and
2 Iran, through its proxies, threatens neighbors in the Middle
3 East and U.S. forces while also enriching uranium to new
4 levels. North Korea continues to threaten South Korea,
5 Japan, and the United States with nuclear-capable ballistic
6 missiles of increased range and lethality.

7 Transnationally, the terrorist threat will also
8 persist, and we need to understand more about the lessons
9 learned from our experience supporting military and
10 intelligence operations in Afghanistan and the Middle East.

11 Turning back to my own organization, I take the health,
12 safety, and well-being of my workforce very, very seriously.

13 DIA remains actively engaged in investigating Anomalous
14 Health Incidents, AHIs. My agency has the process and
15 procedures in place to quickly respond to reports from
16 employees or their families who believe that they have been
17 impacted by AHI. We are also partnering with other members
18 of the IC to determine the origin and cause of the reported
19 events.

20 I am honored to lead DIA. My intent in this hearing is
21 that this helps Congress and our nation better understand
22 the threats and challenges we face from foreign adversaries
23 and competitors. I look forward to your questions, and
24 thank you for your continued support.

25 [The prepared statement of General Berrier follows:]

1 Chairman Reed: Thank you, General.

2 Let me remind my colleagues that at the conclusion of
3 this open session there will be a classified session in SVC-
4 217, and the witnesses may defer some responses to that
5 classified session.

6 Director Haines, your description of the unfolding
7 battle in the Ukraine suggests that it is moving to a battle
8 of attrition over a long term and that the objectives of the
9 Russians are to destroy the Ukrainian forces and also
10 disrupt the international coalition through economic
11 pressures, gasoline prices, and other factors we are
12 witnessing.

13 That leads us to, at least me, to the question of how
14 effective are our economic sanctions and what more can we do
15 to bring pressure to the people of Russia so that they are
16 less supportive of this effort?

17 Ms. Haines: Thank you, Chairman. I think from our
18 perspective the economic sanctions and the export controls
19 have had a pretty significant impact on Russia, and among
20 the indicators that one might look at are, for example, the
21 fact that we are seeing close to about, we predict,
22 approximately 20 percent inflation in Russia, that we expect
23 that their GDP will fall about 10 percent, possibly even
24 more over the course of the year.

25 We have seen not only the sanctions enacted by the

1 United States and Europe and other partners around the world
2 having these impacts but also the private sector taking
3 action on its own to remove itself. So things like the fact
4 that oil production services and companies pulled themselves
5 out will have an impact on Russia's capacity to produce, and
6 that is a major revenue source, obviously, for Russia. We
7 have seen other indicators of essentially the private sector
8 impact in these areas, and on the export controls we are
9 seeing how things like export controls on semiconductors and
10 so on are affecting their defense industry.

11 So I think that is a very significant impact,
12 essentially, although obviously time will tell as we move
13 forward.

14 Chairman Reed: Are you sensing any popular unease,
15 perhaps, in terms of these economic factors that could
16 translate into a political resistance to the regime?

17 Ms. Haines: Well, I know many of us saw the protests
18 that erupted after the invasion and then the crackdown that
19 occurred, essentially, in Russia, including passing laws
20 that would provide for very significant punishments in the
21 event that one protested on these issues. And so we have
22 seen those reduced, actually, and when we have looked at
23 effectively polling and so on that indicates where it is
24 that the Russian people are, what we see is that the
25 majority of the Russian people continue to support the

1 special military operation. And I think it is just very
2 hard, frankly, for information to get into Russia, to the
3 Russian people. They have a very particular perspective that
4 they are being fed by the government during this period.

5 Chairman Reed: Thank you.

6 General Berrier, what do you believe the Chinese are
7 taking away from their close scrutiny of the Russian
8 activities in Ukraine?

9 General Berrier: Senator, I think the Chinese are
10 going to watch this very, very carefully. It is going to
11 take some time for them to sort out all elements of
12 diplomatic information, military, economic, that has
13 occurred with this crisis.

14 I think they are thinking about future operations
15 probably against Taiwan and how difficult that might be.
16 They are probably also thinking about the scrutiny that they
17 would come under should they entertain thoughts or
18 operations like that.

19 Chairman Reed: Thank you.

20 And final question, Director Haines. I think you
21 indicated in your testimony that cyber interference in our
22 elections is a distinct possibility. Is that something that
23 your agency, or the agencies, are following and taking
24 preemptive steps?

25 Ms. Haines: Yes, absolutely, Senator. We are well

1 positioned to essentially monitor for the potential of
2 election influence, including efforts through cyber.

3 Chairman Reed: One other final, final question. Are
4 you surprised that the Russians have not used cyberattacks
5 against third parties or against the United States directly
6 up to this point? I think that was a concern we all had
7 from the beginning of this operation.

8 Ms. Haines: I think what we have seen is the Russians
9 have obviously attacked Ukraine, and we have attributed a
10 variety of attacks to them in that context, including, for
11 example, destructive wiper attacks against Ukrainian
12 government websites, DDoS attacks against their financial
13 industry. They also were engaged in attacks intended to get
14 at command-and-control communications in Ukraine during the
15 invasion. That attack had an outsized impact. In other
16 words, we assessed that they intended to focus in on
17 Ukrainian command and control but ultimately they ended up
18 affecting a much broader set of VSATs, essentially, you
19 know, very small terminals outside of Ukraine, including in
20 Europe.

21 And yet we have not seen the level of attacks, to your
22 point, that we expected, and we have a variety of different
23 theories for why that might be the case, including the fact
24 that we think that they may have determined that the
25 collateral impact of such attacks would be challenging for

1 them in the context of Ukraine, also that they may not have
2 wished to essentially sacrifice potential access and
3 collection opportunities in those scenarios.

4 And then in terms of attacks against the United States,
5 I think they have had a longstanding concern about the
6 potential for escalation in cyber, vis-à-vis the United
7 States. That does not mean that they will not attack at
8 some point, but it has been interesting to see that they
9 have not during this period.

10 Chairman Reed: Thank you very much.

11 Senator Inhofe, please.

12 Senator Inhofe: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For both of
13 you, the lack of an independent intelligence community
14 significantly worsened Putin's decision-making in Ukraine.
15 What do you think President Xi in China is learning about
16 his intelligence communities? Both of you.

17 Ms. Haines: Thank you. Senator Inhofe, I think it is
18 a really interesting question. I would prefer to answer it
19 perhaps in closed session. Would that be all right, sir?

20 Senator Inhofe: That is fine. General, any comments
21 to make in this open session?

22 General Berrier: Senator, I will take the DNI's lead
23 on that.

24 Senator Inhofe: I suspected that. Thank you.

25 The Biden administration has offered Iran significant

1 sanctions relief in return to the 2015 Iran Nuclear
2 Agreement. General Berrier, would you expect Iran to spend
3 at least some of this sanctions relief on its terrorist
4 proxies and missile programs? Do you agree that if the IRGC
5 has additional money that they would increase their
6 targeting of Americans and our allies? Let's say could they
7 increase that targeting?

8 General Berrier: Yes, Senator, they could increase
9 targeting against our partners in the region as well as U.S.
10 forces if they had increased funding.

11 Senator Inhofe: I appreciate that very much.

12 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

13 Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.

14 Let me recognize Senator Shaheen, please.

15 Senator Shaheen: Thank you. Good morning and thank
16 you both for your testimony this morning.

17 I returned a couple of weeks ago from the Western
18 Balkans with Senator Tillis and Senator Murphy. We visited
19 Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo. And one of the
20 things we heard in that region was a great deal of concern
21 about Russian meddling and the potential, particularly in
22 Bosnia, for that to further destabilize the country. Are
23 you all following what is going on in that part of Europe,
24 and are you equally concerned?

25 Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator Shaheen. So I will

1 just start and obviously hand it over to my colleague as
2 well, but yes, we are concerned about this. This is
3 something we have been working with NATO on, in particular,
4 to try to help them be more resilient in this context. And
5 both information and cyber issues are obviously at stake,
6 but I think managing how it is that Russia develops and what
7 kind of activities they engage in worldwide during this
8 crisis and beyond will be a critical aspect of our work
9 moving forward.

10 Senator Shaheen: Can I just, before you begin,
11 General, can I just ask you to speak to NATO and U4 in
12 Bosnia, because as you know, the authorization for U4 is
13 going to end this fall in Bosnia, and there is a real
14 concern about Russia's willingness to allow that to
15 continue. So what are we doing to ensure that the troops
16 are not taken out of Bosnia and a void left that provides a
17 real vacuum for instability?

18 General Berrier: Senator, I think that is a policy
19 question and I would refer it to the Department of Defense.

20 And Senator, to the earlier portion of your question, I
21 believe this is a key component of strategic competition,
22 and this is where I think with our partners and allies and
23 certainly NATO we have to be able to identify that kind of
24 malign activity and expose it and help our partners and
25 future partners be aware of it and do more to counter it.

1 Yes, we are aware of it.

2 Senator Shaheen: Thank you. Well, I would say that
3 that policy decision needs to be viewed very closely by
4 everybody so that we do not wind up with a vacuum there that
5 we are not able to address.

6 I want to go to what is still happening with ISIS
7 because, as you both know, we have thousands of ISIS family
8 members who are still being held in camps in northern Syria.
9 They are posing a persistent challenge, not only
10 humanitarian but the potential breeding ground for
11 terrorists. So are we watching closely what is going on
12 there, and what are we doing to try and address what is
13 happening in those camps?

14 General Berrier: From the perspective of the
15 Department of Defense and DIA we are watching very, very
16 closely what is happening in those camps, what has happened
17 since the break-in, and really with our CENTCOM partners
18 trying to monitor ISIS capability as it evolves over time
19 and what is happening with those families and where they are
20 moving. This is a problem that we partner with CENTCOM and
21 the Defense Counterterrorism Center, and really the National
22 Counterterrorism Center. It is a huge focus for everybody.

23 Senator Shaheen: And do we have a strategy for how to
24 deal with it?

25 General Berrier: We have an intelligence collection

1 strategy to monitor it.

2 Senator Shaheen: And we are seeing the Taliban in
3 Afghanistan renege on everything they said they would do
4 post troop withdrawal. Obviously, one of those is
5 continuing their relationship with al Qaeda and other
6 terrorist groups in Afghanistan. How concerned are you that
7 we might see terrorist activity spread out of Afghanistan to
8 the rest of the world?

9 General Berrier: Senator, I am more concerned about
10 ISIS-K in Afghanistan and the fact that they have had some
11 successful and catastrophic attacks within Afghanistan,
12 which does not portend well for the future. Al Qaeda has
13 had some problems with reconstitution leadership, and to a
14 degree I think the Taliban have held to their word about not
15 allowing al Qaeda to rejuvenate so far. But it is something
16 that we watch very, very carefully.

17 Senator Shaheen: And there was an election in the
18 Philippines yesterday, and the winner of that election, Mr.
19 Marcos, is not likely have as positive a view to the United
20 States. Are you concerned that that is going to have an
21 impact on how China is going to view activity in the
22 Philippines, and do we expect there might be any spillover
23 in terms of illegal substances from the Philippines now that
24 Duarte is no longer doing his extra legal killing of people
25 suspected of being drug kingpins?

1 General Berrier: Senator, I think it is early in the
2 process with the elected Marcos to determine whether or not
3 he will be anti-U.S. or pro-U.S. I know that we would like
4 to have the Philippines as a key intelligence partner in the
5 region. I think there is a lot of effort going on to do
6 that. So we will wait to see what percolates in our
7 relationship, and I will just end it there.

8 Senator Shaheen: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

9 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Shaheen.

10 Senator Fischer, please.

11 Senator Fischer: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome
12 to our panel today.

13 Last week, in the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Under
14 Secretary of Research and Engineering Heidi Shyu stated,
15 quote, "Strategic competitors of the United States are
16 rapidly developing their nuclear arsenal in new and novel
17 ways with a clear intent of increasing their reliance on
18 these weapons in their security strategies," end quote.

19 Director Haines, do you agree with that statement?

20 Ms. Haines: Yes.

21 Senator Fischer: General, do you?

22 General Berrier: Yes.

23 Senator Fischer: Throughout the war in Ukraine, Putin
24 and other Russian leaders have overtly threatened nuclear
25 use, including the Russian state TV airing an animated video

1 showing the British Isles being completely destroyed by a
2 nuclear attack.

3 General, in the United States we view nuclear weapons
4 primarily as tools of deterrence, but do you think what we
5 are seeing indicates Russian leadership views nuclear
6 weapons as tools of coercion and intimidation?

7 General Berrier: Yes. I believe they view those as
8 tools of coercion and intimidation.

9 Senator Fischer: Thank you. General, also, the
10 Defense Intelligence Agency's 2021 report on China's
11 military power states, quote, "The accelerating pace of the
12 PRC's nuclear expansion may enable the PRC to have up to 700
13 deliverable nuclear warheads by 2027. The PRC likely
14 intends to have at least 1,000 warheads by 2030, exceeding
15 the pace and size the DoD projected in 2020," end quote.

16 I know what you say is limited in this setting, but is
17 it your assessment that China's nuclear forces will stop
18 expanding when it reaches that point of 1,000?

19 General Berrier: It is my assessment that they would
20 continue to develop the weapons they have.

21 Senator Fischer: Director Haines, is that the view
22 shared by the rest of the IC, that China's arsenal is going
23 to continue to grow past that point in time?

24 Ms. Haines: I mean, our assessment basically says that
25 China will continue to essentially expand their nuclear

1 arsenal and diversification for a period of time. It is
2 unclear how long that will be.

3 Senator Fischer: But do you anticipate it will
4 continue past the 1,000 warheads that we have looked at in
5 the past?

6 Ms. Haines: I think for us to get into numbers we
7 should do that in closed session.

8 Senator Fischer: Thank you.

9 General, as the statement notes, China's nuclear
10 expansion is larger and more rapid than previous
11 assessments projected. Admiral Richard has made a similar
12 point noting, quote, "When I first testified here we were
13 questioning whether or not China would be able to double
14 that stockpile by the end of the decade, and they are
15 actually very close to doing it on my watch," end quote.

16 What are the implications of the fact that this threat
17 is evolving faster than we have anticipated, and how should
18 we factor that in our assessments?

19 General Berrier: Senator, we can get into much more
20 detail in the closed session, but I would just say from a
21 strategic competition perspective and nuclear deterrence
22 this makes it much more challenging for us to defend. And
23 when you factor in Russian nuclear capability with Chinese
24 capability, I think it is a problem for Strategic Command
25 and the Department.

1 Senator Fischer: Thank you. Also, General, if we can
2 move to a different theater now. If ISIS and al Qaeda are
3 able to operate in Afghanistan without consistent or
4 effective CT pressure how long does the Intelligence
5 Community assess it will take for either organization to
6 reconstitute their external attack capabilities?

7 General Berrier: We assess ISIS probably a year,
8 slightly longer, and longer for al Qaeda.

9 Senator Fischer: Last October we heard from Secretary
10 Kahl. He told the committee that we could see ISIS-K
11 generate the capability in 6 to 12 months. And then in
12 March we heard from General McKenzie that the capability
13 might be 12 to 18 months. So I look forward to hearing more
14 about how and why these intelligence estimates have shifted
15 forward. I think that is important for this committee to
16 know and it is important to understand when we look at the
17 dramatic reduction we have seen in our intelligence
18 collection in the region since our withdrawal. Thank you.

19 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

20 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Fischer.

21 Senator Gillibrand, please.

22 Senator Gillibrand: Director Haines, thank you so much
23 for your testimony. I want to talk a little bit about
24 advanced persistent threats, and I want to know what type of
25 support are you providing, critical infrastructure

1 providers, to deal with APTs. Specifically, I am concerned
2 if this war in Ukraine does escalate, that attacks from
3 Russia will come to American businesses and our critical
4 infrastructure. I know this is generally the job of CISA,
5 but in your engagement with critical infrastructure
6 providers what are the biggest areas of need that they have
7 shared with you, and are there any additional authorities
8 that would be helpful to you in enabling you to support
9 critical infrastructure providers in securing their
10 networks?

11 Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator, and I know this has
12 been a major issue focus for you and, in fact, that you have
13 supported some of the things that have been done in New York
14 with Reserves, for example, in this area, which have been
15 really effective. And I know that General Nakasone has been
16 looking at expanding that around the United States in
17 different ways.

18 I think for us we have, quite obviously, heightened
19 awareness of cyber threats to critical infrastructure, and
20 it has been a driving force behind a number of sorts of
21 cyber defense measures that we have taken in the
22 Intelligence Community to support, in effect, as you say,
23 CISA and FBI and others in doing their work.

24 One is lowering thresholds for reporting. We have
25 asked for network owners to really lower their threshold for

1 reporting suspected malicious activity. That is critical
2 from our perspective in order for us to be able to identify
3 what the threat is.

4 Another is just making more information publicly
5 available. We are increasing the amount of information that
6 we release to the private sector, both to help combat the
7 rise in cybercrime, and recently in our efforts to posture
8 industry for potential Russian cyberattacks, for example,
9 something that we have been trying to get out to do
10 significantly more briefings on and help industry, in
11 effect, get ready for things so they can take action that
12 would make them more resilient in these circumstances. And
13 this includes some close-hold releases so as to dampen
14 malicious cyber actors warning before mitigations can be put
15 into place.

16 Another has been our significant outreach to the
17 private sector. DHS partners held over 90 engagements with
18 more than 10,000 partners, just even on the Russia piece,
19 and it includes sharing preventative measures to help these
20 partners mitigate vulnerabilities. Another has been
21 facilitating hunt teams on networks. And we have also asked
22 company owners to actively hunt for Russian techniques,
23 essentially, on their networks and to facilitate those have
24 provided lists of vulnerabilities, indicators of compromise
25 to look for on a company's networks.

1 But those are just some of the things that are focused
2 on helping on the infrastructure piece. Thank you.

3 Senator Gillibrand: Thank you, Director. Do you need
4 any additional authorities or resources to amplify this
5 effort?

6 Ms. Haines: So we have asked for resources in our
7 fiscal year 2023 budget that are designed to help with this
8 effort, and so absolutely in that sense. We have not
9 identified particular authorities that we need, but I will
10 tell you that we will come to you if we do. Thank you.

11 Senator Gillibrand: Thank you. Director Haines and
12 General Berrier, I saw that the Annual Threat Assessment
13 notes that advances in dual-use technology could, quote,
14 "enable development of novel biological weapons that
15 complicate detection, attribution, and treatment," end of
16 quote.

17 I have advocated for a one-health security approach
18 where we incorporate people across multiple disciplines,
19 including the Intelligence Community to increase our
20 biodefense and prevent the next pandemic.

21 In the context of ongoing biological threats, how would
22 you suggest we develop a multidisciplinary approach like
23 this? Where can we prepare and prevent both naturally
24 occurring diseases but also deliberate threats?

25 Ms. Haines: I can start on this. I am very passionate

1 about this issue. I completely agree with you. I think we
2 have not, in the Intelligence Community, been able to work
3 with other parts of, for example, the Federal Government,
4 even in the scientific community within the Federal
5 Government as effectively as we need to.

6 And we have been developing mechanisms in the
7 Intelligence Community to do some more. We are working more
8 with the National Labs than we ever have before. We are
9 working more with HHS, with CDC, with others, to try to make
10 sure that we are also supporting their work and that we can
11 understand some of the issues that they see as critical to
12 our work. So that has been a big piece of our effort in the
13 Intelligence Community within the national
14 counterproliferation. And Senator, we have been doing a
15 major effort on essentially working with global health and
16 we actually now have a new national intelligence manager
17 that works on these issues specifically and is hoping to
18 support that kind of outreach on this. And I would be happy
19 to give you a brief at some point in more detail if that is
20 useful.

21 Senator Gillibrand: Thank you.

22 General Berrier: Senator, for DIA I think it is about
23 partnerships. So it is a partnership between the National
24 Center for Medical Intelligence, the Defense
25 Counterproliferation Center, as well as NCPC. The role,

1 really, for DIA and NCMC is to provide warning on these
2 pandemics. So I am passionate about it as well, and I think
3 it is an area that is going to expand in the coming months
4 and years as we look forward to this, and I look forward to
5 engaging you, perhaps at DIA, on this topic.

6 Senator Gillibrand: Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
7 Chairman.

8 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.

9 Senator Cotton, please.

10 Senator Cotton: General, what is your assessment on
11 the state of the fighting between Russia and Ukraine in
12 eastern and southern Ukraine today?

13 General Berrier: Senator, I think I would characterize
14 it as the Russians are not winning and the Ukrainians are
15 not winning, and we are at a bit of a stalemate here. And
16 what has been the most interesting evolution for me, in
17 watching how the Russian forces have misstepped, is really
18 the lack of a non-commissioned officer corps. When I think
19 about small unit tactics and how this has unfolded between
20 Ukraine and Russia I think the NCO corps is a big piece of
21 this, and I think the Ukrainians have that about right.

22 Senator Cotton: Who faces greater risk from a
23 stalemate -- Russia or Ukraine?

24 General Berrier: I think we have to take a wait-and-
25 see approach on how this evolves and what is in the decision

1 calculus for Putin and his generals as this unfolds.

2 Senator Cotton: A stalemate, to be clear, does not
3 mean an armistice or peace. It means continued but
4 indecisive fighting in which both sides are losing
5 personnel, equipment, weapons, and vehicles. Right?

6 General Berrier: I think it is attrition warfare and
7 it depends how well the Ukrainians can maintain what they
8 have going on with weapons and ammunition and how the
9 Russians decide to deal with that, either through
10 mobilization or not, and decide to go with what they have in
11 the theater right now.

12 Senator Cotton: Which side do you think, at this
13 point, is more capable of generating additional combat power
14 in the form of trained and motivated troops -- Russia or
15 Ukraine?

16 General Berrier: Ukraine.

17 Senator Cotton: Even though it is one-third the size
18 of Russia?

19 General Berrier: Yes.

20 Senator Cotton: Why do you say that?

21 General Berrier: Because I think the Ukrainians have
22 it right in terms of grit and how they face the defense of
23 their nation. I am not sure that Russian soldiers from the
24 far-flung military districts really understand that.

25 Senator Cotton: Fighting to defend one's own home from

1 a war of aggression is a highly motivating factor, is it
2 not?

3 General Berrier: Yes, it is.

4 Senator Cotton: And Russians probably are not terribly
5 motivated to be the next wave of recruits into Vladimir
6 Putin's war of aggression?

7 General Berrier: I would say not, based on what we
8 have seen.

9 Senator Cotton: If that is the case, and this
10 stalemate, as you call it, continues not just for weeks but
11 for months, which side do you think faces the greater
12 possibility of a decisive breakout -- the Russians, with
13 their ill-trained and unmotivated troops, or the Ukrainians,
14 with their supremely motivated troops?

15 General Berrier: Senator, I think right now with the
16 stalemate and as it stands, if Russia does not declare war
17 and mobilize this stalemate is going to last for a while,
18 and I do not see a breakout on either side. If they do
19 mobilize and they do declare war, that will bring thousands
20 more soldiers to the fight, and even though they may not be
21 as well-trained and competent they will still bring mass and
22 a lot of more ammunition.

23 Senator Cotton: What are the prospects of a
24 catastrophic collapse of morale and will among Russian
25 forces?

1 General Berrier: It remains to be seen. I think the
2 Russians still are a learning organization. If appropriate
3 lessons could be applied with leadership you might see that
4 turn around.

5 Senator Cotton: Do you know the current count on how
6 many generals have been killed in Ukraine, on Russia's side?

7 General Berrier: I think the number is between eight
8 and ten.

9 Senator Cotton: Do you know how many generals we lost
10 in 20 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan?

11 General Berrier: Not many.

12 Senator Cotton: And those we lost were happenstance,
13 right? The bad guys got a lucky shot at a convoy or
14 helicopter.

15 General Berrier: Yes.

16 Senator Cotton: Does the fact that Russia is losing
17 all these generals, and as you pointed out they have no
18 trained NCO corps, suggest to you that these generals are
19 having to go forward to ensure their orders are executed in
20 a way that General Berrier never would have to go forward if
21 he was in a combat command because he could count on the
22 captains and lieutenants and the Sergeant Berriers to
23 execute his orders?

24 General Berrier: Yes.

25 Senator Cotton: It sounds to me like the balance of

1 forces here are moving more decisively in Ukraine's factor
2 and will continue to over time as long as we continue to
3 support them with the arms and the intelligence that they
4 need.

5 General Berrier: Well-led forces that are motivated
6 and have what they need can do a lot.

7 Senator Cotton: Thank you.

8 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Cotton.

9 Senator Blumenthal, please.

10 Senator Blumenthal: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want
11 to pursue Senator Cotton's line of questioning if I may. In
12 my exchange with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman
13 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff several weeks ago I commented
14 that our approach to Ukraine seemed somewhat schizophrenic.
15 We say we want Ukraine to win but we are afraid of what
16 Putin may do if he loses. I have urged, since 2014, that we
17 provide more lethal weapons to Ukraine.

18 When I visited Ukraine recently with some of my
19 colleagues, a bipartisan trip, one of them asked President
20 Zelenskyy, "Are you fearful about the Russian prospect of
21 invasion?" It was a number of weeks before the invasion.
22 He said, "The Russians invaded us in 2014. We have been
23 fighting them since then." And in my view the implication is
24 that we have failed over a period of years, under different
25 administrations, to provide Ukraine with the arms that it

1 needs to counter and deter increased Russian aggression
2 there.

3 So my question to you is, do you agree that we should
4 increase the kind of military aid, as well as humanitarian
5 assistance and economic sanctions, that we have been
6 providing, by orders of magnitude that will enable Ukraine
7 to win, and would you also agree that if we simply provide
8 more of that kind of aid -- tanks, artillery, armored
9 personnel carriers, even planes, Stinger and Javelin
10 missiles, all of the arms that Ukraine needs to fight
11 lethally and defensively -- that Putin may engage in sword-
12 rattling and threats and implications of what he might do,
13 but enabling Ukraine to win ought to be our objective.

14 Let me ask you first, General.

15 General Berrier: Senator, in your statement there it
16 really gets at national level of decision-making on what our
17 policy should be with regard to arming Ukraine. My role as
18 the Director of DIA is to keep an eye on this conflict and
19 provide information to decision-makers so that they can make
20 those kinds of decisions.

21 In terms of what Putin might do to escalate, I think
22 the best that we can do, rather than describing what those
23 escalatory measures would be, would be to understand what
24 they might do and be ready, in terms of indications and
25 warning, to be able to notify decision-makers that that was

1 actually occurring or about to occur.

2 So I take an intelligence perspective of the conflict
3 itself and leave the policy to decision-makers.

4 Senator Blumenthal: Do you -- and I will ask Ms.
5 Haines the same -- think there is a serious, immediate
6 prospect that Putin would engage in the use of tactical
7 nuclear weapons?

8 General Berrier: Right now we do not see that, and I
9 think that is a huge warning issue for us and something that
10 we are very, very focused on.

11 Senator Blumenthal: Ms. Haines?

12 Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator. I think, on the first
13 part of your question, you know, as General Berrier said,
14 obviously we try to provide the intelligence to help
15 policymakers like you make these decisions. And among the
16 questions that come up in that discussion are whether or
17 not, frankly, Ukraine can absorb additional assistance and
18 how much of it, and that is very hard for us to tell. We
19 have, in fact, more insight, probably, on the Russian side
20 than we do on the Ukrainian side, but that is something,
21 obviously, for the Defense Department to work through as
22 they go through this.

23 But we also, obviously, get asked this question of
24 whether or not certain actions will escalate things with
25 Russia, as you indicate, and if so, how. And that really

1 gets to the second part of your question, because I think
2 obviously we are in a position, as you have identified,
3 where we are supporting Ukraine but we also do not want to
4 ultimately end up in World War III, and we do not want to
5 have a situation in which actors are using nuclear weapons.

6 Our view is, as General Berrier indicated, that there
7 is not a sort of an imminent potential for Putin to use
8 nuclear weapons. We perceive that, as I indicated in my
9 statement, as something that he is unlikely to do unless
10 there is effectively an existential threat to his regime and
11 to Russia, from his perspective. We do think that that
12 could be the case in the event that he perceives that he is
13 losing the war in Ukraine and that NATO, in effect, is sort
14 of either intervening or about to intervene in that context,
15 which would obviously contribute to a perception that he is
16 about to lose the war in Ukraine.

17 But there are a lot of things that he would do in the
18 context of escalation before he would get to nuclear
19 weapons, and also that he would be likely to engage in some
20 signaling beyond what he has done thus far, before doing so.

21 Senator Blumenthal: Thank you. My time has expired.

22 Senator King: [Presiding.] On behalf of the chairman,
23 Senator Blackburn.

24 Senator Blackburn: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
25 you very much to each of you for being here today.

1 Ms. Haines, I want to come to you. We have talked a
2 lot about Ukraine and Russia this morning, and I appreciate
3 your frankness in this. But let me ask you about Wagner and
4 the proxies and what you are seeing, not only in Ukraine but
5 also what you are seeing when it comes to Libya and to other
6 areas and the aggressiveness of the use of the proxies.

7 Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator. We can probably go
8 into more detail in closed session.

9 Senator Blackburn: Okay.

10 Ms. Haines: But I could just say, more generally, that
11 we do see Wagner being used, in effect, in Ukraine. We see
12 that that is something --

13 Senator Blackburn: And how about Africa?

14 Ms. Haines: Yes, absolutely. Wagner has been
15 historically present in Africa, and it is a more recent
16 event, obviously, in the current crisis that Russia deployed
17 them effectively in Ukraine.

18 Senator Blackburn: Okay. All right.

19 General Berrier, do you have anything you want to add
20 on that?

21 General Berrier: Senator, we track ISIS in Africa,
22 Syria, other places. I think we will get into a richer
23 discussion in the closed session about Wagner operations in
24 Ukraine.

25 Senator Blackburn: Okay. That is helpful. Let me ask

1 you also -- and by the way, thank you for the China map. I
2 will say this. I think we could have a picture of the globe
3 and say that is where China is seeking to be aggressive. It
4 is something that is not lost on me, that they are anxious
5 right now to expand their reach.

6 But let's talk about DIA and how is the DIA
7 collaborating with our allies and our partners to counter
8 Beijing's cyber espionage operations?

9 General Berrier: Senator, we are. We are closely
10 collaborating with our Five Eyes partners, in this case, our
11 Australian and New Zealand partners, on this very issue,
12 along with our partners over at the National Security Agency
13 with General Nakasone.

14 There is a concerted effort by the Five Eyes to
15 understand these activities in cyberspace emanating from
16 China. So we are working that very, very closely and we can
17 provide more details in a closed session.

18 Senator Blackburn: And can you provide us with some of
19 the lessons learned from the Russia-Ukraine conflict that
20 help to inform some of this work?

21 General Berrier: Cyber activity?

22 Senator Blackburn: Yes, sir.

23 General Berrier: So I think the key there would be
24 information operations and disinformation operations and
25 their level of effectiveness on the Russian side, or

1 ineffectiveness on the Russian side, and then looking at the
2 level of effectiveness on the Ukrainian side. When I
3 compare and contrast information operations I think the
4 Ukrainians have been much more successful in the information
5 operations and space. Russians have had some success with
6 cyber activities in the Ukraine, and I think the PRC and Xi
7 are looking at all of that as they sort of unwind this
8 conflict and learn lessons from that.

9 Senator Blackburn: And Ms. Haines, how is the intel
10 community utilizing AI and machine learning as they look at
11 applications, look at how Beijing is continuing to move
12 forward? So how are you preferencing some of the new
13 technologies that can help us in this effort?

14 Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator. We are using
15 artificial intelligence, and in particular, machine
16 learning, across the board for our mission set. And just to
17 give you an example of the kind of things that we are able
18 to do with it, I think it has been extraordinary in terms of
19 helping us with analysis, being able to focus in on certain
20 datasets that we are able to effectively manipulate more
21 easily and without as many human resources, effectively to
22 identify patterns. We are able to use that then, have
23 analysts that are educated and experts take that information
24 and use it in their analysis in different ways.

25 We have something called an Artificial Intelligence

1 Unit Project that is really looking at across the
2 Intelligence Community at different applications of
3 artificial intelligence and machine learning and then trying
4 to leverage those so that we can actually allow other
5 elements to build off of the work that is being done by
6 another element that they might not have thought of before
7 and also doing it at sort of a cheaper cost and so on.

8 So there are a variety of ways in which we are doing
9 it. It is hard to talk about it in an unclassified way, but
10 certainly this is a major area of effort and investment, and
11 we can provide you with further details if that is useful.

12 Senator Blackburn: Thank you. My time has expired. I
13 will come to you for a written response on the recent
14 article that quoted a senior intel source, about referencing
15 the uptick in Al-Shabaab activity. So thank you very much.

16 Senator King: On behalf of the chair, Senator Warren.

17 Senator Warren: Thank you, Senator King.

18 It is paramount to our national security that we keep
19 our most sensitive secrets properly protected and
20 classified, particularly when protecting sources and
21 methods. But I am very concerned about the levels of over-
22 classification and pseudo-classification that we are seeing
23 across the Federal Government. Everyone understands the
24 need to protect information about most sensitive
25 capabilities from our enemies, but our classification system

1 has spiraled out of control, when it means, for example,
2 that our own four-star generals cannot share information
3 with their fellow three-stars. It is hard to see how that
4 level of classification is making America safer.

5 So over-classification also reduces public scrutiny of
6 important issues and it can hamper accountability. Director
7 Haines, you lead the Intelligence Community. You have years
8 of experience in these matters. Do you think that over-
9 classification is a national security problem?

10 Ms. Haines: I do, Senator. I have stated this
11 explicitly. I do think it is a challenge. As long as I
12 have been in government, frankly, there have been blue-
13 ribbon commissions that have looked at this, have said there
14 is significant over-classification. This is a challenge, as
15 you indicate, from a democratic perspective but it is also a
16 challenge from a national security perspective because if we
17 cannot share information as easily as we might otherwise be
18 if it were appropriately classified then that obviously
19 affects our capacity to work on these issues.

20 It is a very challenging issue, as I know you know
21 well. In other words, there are technical aspects to it.
22 There are cultural aspects to it.

23 Senator Warren: So let us talk about that just a
24 little bit, and I want to say I agree with you that over-
25 classification has been a problem across administrations.

1 The Obama administration put out two different Executive
2 orders aimed at improving classification and information
3 sharing, but that was more than a decade ago and obviously
4 the problem persists.

5 So let me ask this a different way. Director Haines,
6 would you support the Administration releasing a new
7 Executive order on classification practices to ensure that
8 we are protecting national security information while
9 keeping our commitments to open government?

10 Ms. Haines: Without knowing exactly what it would say
11 it is sort of hard for me to say I would support an
12 Executive order on that subject. I mean, I am constantly
13 looking for additional ways in which we might try to help
14 address this issue, and we have a number of ways that we are
15 investing in the Intelligence Community issues. But, yeah,
16 I --

17 Senator Warren: I appreciate that, and I am not asking
18 you to sign a blank check here.

19 Ms. Haines: No. Fair enough.

20 Senator Warren: But you are the President's principal
21 advisor on intelligence matters, and I am just asking if you
22 would be supportive if the President wanted to take that
23 step.

24 Ms. Haines: Well, I am supportive of what the
25 President wants to take steps within his authority, and it

1 is an appropriate policy to do, so yes, in that sense I
2 would be.

3 Senator Warren: Okay. So let me ask this then from
4 one more perspective, and that is during the Ukraine crisis
5 we have seen that a well-functioning, declassification
6 system can be incredibly powerful. The work by the Biden
7 administration to expose what the Intelligence Committee
8 knew about Putin's plans seriously hurt Russia's credibility
9 and it strengthened our response to an illegal and immoral
10 war. My understand is that it took reshuffling of resources
11 to make that happen, and I applaud that, but we need more of
12 it.

13 The most recent numbers that I have seen is that we
14 spend \$18 billion protecting the classification system and
15 only about \$102 million -- do the math fast in your head,
16 about 5 percent of that number -- on declassification
17 efforts, and that ratio feels off in a democracy.

18 So with that in mind, Director Haines, are there any
19 lessons learned from Ukraine about how we can expedite
20 declassification when there is a compelling reason to do so?

21 Ms. Haines: I think there are lessons to be learned
22 from Ukraine, and it will be easier to talk about this in
23 closed session, but I think there is some value that we
24 could discuss in closed session on those issues.

25 I do think it has helped to help other people

1 understand the value of ensuring that we are classifying
2 things at the appropriate level and how declassification can
3 support foreign policy in different ways. So I think that
4 is all to the good.

5 Senator Warren: Good. You know, in a democracy we
6 have a duty to be accountable to the public, and when we
7 keep secrets from Americans there needs to be a compelling
8 public interest in doing so. And in too many cases it seems
9 that public officials err on the side of secrecy because the
10 information could be embarrassing, or even worse, just
11 because it is easier not to be accountable to the American
12 people.

13 So I urge all of our agencies to address this problem,
14 and I look forward to working with you on it. Thank you.

15 Senator King: On behalf of the chairman, Senator
16 Tuberville.

17 Senator Tuberville: Thank you, Senator. Good morning.

18 Director Haines, in your best assessment does Russia
19 intelligence closely monitor our Secretary of Defense?

20 Ms. Haines: I think Russian intelligence tries very
21 closely to monitor all of our senior leaders.

22 Senator Tuberville: Thank you. So you believe that,
23 noted, that when he said that Russia weakened and that the
24 U.S. will move heaven and earth to arm Ukraine, do you
25 believe that is right he should say that?

1 Ms. Haines: Yes. I think the Secretary of Defense --

2 Senator Tuberville: Do you believe Russia blames the
3 U.S. Intelligence Community for helping Ukraine shoot down a
4 Russian plane carrying hundreds of people?

5 Ms. Haines: I am sorry, sir. Can you repeat the
6 question?

7 Senator Tuberville: Do you believe Russia blames us,
8 our intelligence agency, for Ukraine shooting down a plane
9 with hundreds of troops on board? Do you think Russia
10 blames us for that?

11 Ms. Haines: Which plane are you thinking of?

12 Senator Tuberville: There was a plane recently that
13 was shot down, a Russian plane, that 100 troops. Do you
14 believe that they blame our intelligence agency for that?

15 Ms. Haines: I do not know, sir.

16 Senator Tuberville: Okay. Do you believe that Russia
17 blames our U.S. intelligence for sinking their flagship,
18 Moskva? Do you think they blame us for that?

19 Ms. Haines: I do not know, sir. We have not seen any
20 direct reporting.

21 Senator Tuberville: To what extent do you assess that
22 Russia believe it is at war with the West and the United
23 States? Do you think that they believe they are at war with
24 us?

25 Ms. Haines: Russia has historically believed that they

1 are in a conflict, in effect, with NATO and the United
2 States on a variety of issues, including in cyber and so on.

3 Senator Tuberville: So you believe that they are
4 fighting us -- that they are fighting us as well as they are
5 fighting Ukraine. Correct?

6 Ms. Haines: In a sense. Their perception --

7 Senator Tuberville: Yeah. Yeah, because we are arming
8 them and we are talking. Okay.

9 General Berrier, does the United States or Ukraine have
10 air superiority over the war zone? Which one has air
11 superiority?

12 General Berrier: Senator, I would call that an air
13 standoff right now. I mean, the Russians can fly a tactical
14 aircraft over the line of troops in a local area but they
15 cannot expand into western parts of Ukraine without coming
16 under an air threat.

17 Senator Tuberville: But Ukraine is more than we are,
18 the United States, obviously, because we not involved in
19 their air space.

20 General Berrier: No, we are not involved.

21 Senator Tuberville: Would you say that Russia possess
22 strong air defenses?

23 General Berrier: I think the Russians have very
24 credible air defense systems.

25 Senator Tuberville: Does Ukraine have any counter

1 measures to thwart Russia artillery rockets? Does Ukraine
2 have any air defenses?

3 General Berrier: Ukraine has air defenses. They also
4 have counter-battery radars that allow them to defend
5 themselves from incoming artillery, or at least see it.

6 Senator Tuberville: Would you agree that anyone in
7 Ukraine right now is under serious threat? Obviously they
8 are. Correct?

9 General Berrier: I would agree they are.

10 Senator Tuberville: Okay. In the past 2 weeks we have
11 seen several high-profile visitors take trips to active war
12 zone. Our Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Speaker
13 of the House, First Lady. This is for both of you. What is
14 our Intelligence Community doing to lessen the risk of a
15 high-ranking official -- how are we protecting these people
16 going to Ukraine, our people going to Ukraine?

17 General Berrier: Senator, I think that would be a
18 discussion for the closed session.

19 Senator Tuberville: Okay. So we could guarantee that
20 the First Lady was safe when she went to Ukraine. We could
21 guarantee that, 100 percent. Correct? Both of you. I am
22 just asking.

23 General Berrier: I would not say that, no. I would
24 not say that.

25 Senator Tuberville: Thank you. Is it your best advice

1 that we do not go to Ukraine right now, any of us, any of us
2 in here?

3 General Berrier: Senator, I would not say that. I
4 would say with proper planning and coordination that it is
5 possible.

6 Senator Tuberville: General, 100 percent. One hundred
7 percent, can we guarantee going into a war zone -- our
8 Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State went on a train.

9 General Berrier: Senator, I do not think we can ever
10 guarantee anything 100 percent.

11 Senator Tuberville: Thank you. Well, that is kind of
12 the point I am making. You know, we are kind of poking the
13 bear here, saying, you know, we are bragging about it. And
14 even President Biden said today, "Wait a minute. We have
15 got to cut back on this pointing that, you know, how many
16 generals have been killed and we are part of it." I totally
17 agree with that. I totally agree that, hey, we want to help
18 Ukraine. Obviously, we all do. But we do not want to take
19 that step forward to where we get a lot of our men and women
20 involved in this. And it looks like to me we that we are
21 taking way too many changes of sending people over there for
22 a photo op other than doing the right thing, which we are
23 doing. But we just do not need to step over that path.

24 Thank you for what you are doing, but I think all of us
25 need to look at that point of, hey, there is a point of no

1 return here if we cross that line. And if we were on the
2 other side, the same way, and we had somebody helping, we
3 had a plane shot down, a ship sink, and then bragging about
4 killing generals, as Senator Cotton said, you know, we are
5 walking a tightrope here.

6 And that is just the only point I want to bring up.

7 Thank you very much.

8 Senator King: On behalf of the chair, Senator Kelly.

9 Senator Kelly: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

10 Director Haines, again, looking at your office's 2022
11 Annual Threat Assessment it is clear there is a lot going on
12 in the world right now, and I understand that resources are
13 finite and tradeoffs often have to be made. That is in, a
14 large part, what makes your job very challenging. Clearly
15 the situation in Ukraine is taking up a lot of bandwidth
16 right now, and I would presume that INDOPACOM requires
17 significant amount of resources as well to fully understand
18 the threat environment, and these two things are obviously
19 related.

20 But what about some other regions in the world? In
21 light of the worldwide threats you have articulated here
22 today do you feel the Intelligence Community has the
23 necessary resources in place to confidently understand the
24 threat environment in other places, such as Afghanistan,
25 northern Syria, Pakistan, and Iran?

1 Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator. I mean, I think, you
2 know, like all good bureaucrats that we could spend more
3 money on these issues. There is no question. I think
4 certainly that is true. But we are doing our very best, as
5 you indicate, to ensure that we are not taking our eye off
6 the ball, essentially across the globe, on issues that are
7 also of critical importance among the ones that you have
8 identified.

9 Senator Kelly: Thank you. I want to ask a specific
10 question about the MQ-9, the Reaper drones. So the Air
11 Force has been reluctant to invest in upgrading the platform
12 and proposes to retire it, potentially like in 2035, even as
13 the demand from combatant commanders for the system remains
14 high. You know, their argument has been that the platform
15 is not survivable in China-Russia scenario. I think it is
16 pretty clear that it would be survivable in a Russian
17 scenario now.

18 Do you have an opinion on the continued utility of
19 reconnaissance platforms such as the MQ-9, particular as we
20 face increased activity in the so-called gray zone, below
21 the threshold of armed combat?

22 Ms. Haines: Yeah.

23 General Berrier: Go ahead.

24 Ms. Haines: No, no.

25 General Berrier: Senator, I have been the beneficiary

1 of MQ-9 operations for the last 20 years. It is an
2 outstanding platform. It has done great things. With
3 increasing threats emanating from China and their ability to
4 reach out and touch those kinds of things I totally
5 understand why the Air Force wants to divest of that
6 platform. The efficacy of that in the coming years in low-
7 intensity conflict, counterterrorism operations, it will
8 always be useful in a low air defense kind of environment,
9 but in the high-end environment I do not think it is very
10 survivable.

11 Senator Kelly: But we have looked at the Russian
12 surface-to-air missile threat environment as high end. It
13 turns out like a lot of things, day 1 of the war is much
14 different than day 60 or 90 or 180, of any conflict. So I
15 am concerned that not only this platform but sometimes we
16 look at divesting, you know, from platforms that could
17 provide incredible utility further along in the timeline.

18 General, I have got another question for you here in my
19 last minute, anti-satellite ban on ASAT testing. The
20 Administration recently announced this. It is a policy I
21 agree with. Russia, China, they do not share this goal, nor
22 do they abide by any kind of similar policy. The Russians
23 and the Chinese both, over the last, about decade and a
24 half, have performed ASAT tests, the Russians more recently.

25 The DIA's 2022 report on challenges to security in

1 space lists orbital debris as a significant challenge to
2 space operations and concluded that the debris endangers
3 spacecraft of all nations in low-earth orbit, including
4 astronauts and cosmonauts aboard the ISS, but also China has
5 a space station as well.

6 Given the fact that both the Russians and Chinese
7 conduct manned space operations what would be your
8 assessment as to why they continue to put their people in
9 harm's way by conducting these dangerous tests?

10 General Berrier: Senator, I think they value that
11 capability in space as an asymmetric advantage over our
12 superior technology and continue to pursue those kinds of
13 capabilities. Whether or not they would actually use it is
14 another discussion.

15 Senator Kelly: Do you expect them to do more anti-
16 satellite tests?

17 General Berrier: We have not seen evidence that they
18 plan, in the near future, of doing more, but I would expect
19 as they go through their development processes they will do
20 more tests.

21 Senator Kelly: All right. Thank you, General, and
22 thank you, Director Haines.

23 Chairman Reed: [Presiding.] Thank you, Senator Kelly.
24 Senator Rounds, please.

25 Senator Rounds: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin

1 by thanking both of you for your continued service to our
2 country.

3 Director Haines, in April, Secretary Blinken told
4 Congress that Iran's attempts to assassinate former
5 Secretary of State Mike Pompeo were real and ongoing, and
6 this month Israeli press reported that an agent for the
7 Iranian Revolutionary Guard's Quds Force was thwarted from
8 an assassination attempt on a U.S. general in Germany.

9 Why is Iran apparently so emboldened right now and how
10 can the Intelligence Community and national security
11 communities at large change this dangerous trend and deter
12 Iran from these malicious actions?

13 Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator. So I think we should
14 probably pick this up in closed session. What I think I can
15 say in open session is a fair amount of their motivation in
16 this area we assess to be in relation to Soleimani as part
17 of their sort of efforts for revenge, and it is a
18 particularly challenging area, I think, to deter them from
19 action in this space. But we can discuss more specifics, I
20 think, in closed session. Thank you, sir.

21 Senator Rounds: Very well. Director Haines once
22 again. The crisis at the United States southern border has
23 literally exploded under this Administration and continues
24 to deteriorate. Reuters reported that U.S. officials at the
25 Department of Homeland Security are preparing for as high as

1 9,000 arrests per day. As the economic and political
2 conditions in Latin America continue to spark waves of
3 migration that put pressure on our southern border, how
4 serious does the Intelligence Community see this as a threat
5 to our country, and also, how and to what degree is the
6 Intelligence Community shifting resources to address the
7 surge at our southern border?

8 Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator. We have stood up a
9 migrant crisis cell, which is essentially a cell that helps
10 to bring together intelligence from across the community to
11 support DHS's efforts, and it is really looking south of the
12 border at effectively migrant movements that may be coming
13 towards the southern border, so that we can help them to
14 prepare, in effect, for encounters on the border.

15 Senator Rounds: Are you in agreement with the
16 assessment that there could be as many as 9,000 arrests a
17 day? Is that an assessment that you would concur with?

18 Ms. Haines: Sir, I do not look at those particular
19 questions. That is within the Department of Homeland
20 Security.

21 Senator Rounds: I am just curious because when you are
22 doing your planning to determine what your needs are,
23 clearly in order for you to do the planning you have got to
24 have an assessment of what the expected flow would be. I am
25 just curious. It is not meant as a gotcha question.

1 Ms. Haines: No, no, no. Of course. So we do not
2 assess our needs along the border because we do not actually
3 have needs along the border. In other words, that is sort
4 of the DHS role is to figure out how can we plan for the
5 number of incidents or encounters that they will have on the
6 border. And for us, what we are trying to do is understand
7 what are the drivers, what are the ultimate flows that are
8 likely to occur, and we try to set up intelligence so that
9 we can actually provide some indication and warning of here
10 is where you are likely to see an increase in the flow,
11 either south or north or how it is and where it is coming
12 from, ultimately. Does that make sense?

13 Senator Rounds: It does. It just catches me a little
14 bit by surprise that in your planning that most certainly
15 you have to have a good communication with Homeland
16 Security. I am assuming there is a good communication there
17 --

18 Ms. Haines: Of course.

19 Senator Rounds: -- and that based upon what their
20 needs are is really what you are doing, is providing them
21 with additional resources. And you are also, at the same
22 time, gathering intel based on the possibility, the strong
23 possibility that individuals would try to come in through
24 the southern border. And based upon that I was just
25 curious, and I know that we are in a public discussion, but

1 nonetheless I think it is something that has been talked
2 about publicly, and the fact that we have got folks from all
3 over the world that are using that as an entryway into the
4 United States, and most certainly you are aware of that.

5 Ms. Haines: Absolutely. No, I am not trying to sort
6 of duck the question or anything. I think, you know, we see
7 a very high flow. There is no question. What happens is
8 the Department of Homeland Security, we have somebody who is
9 a liaison that sits within their sort of spaces that tells
10 here are the requirements, and they basically are looking
11 for indications and warning of, you know, we are likely to
12 see a flow along this part of the border, that sort of
13 thing, as opposed to us being able to help them determine,
14 okay, today you are going to see X number of people coming
15 through the southern border as a whole.

16 Senator Rounds: Thank you. Just one other quick
17 question. The Intelligence Community and Congress are
18 working to flesh out the Foreign Malign Influence Center's
19 mission, the budget and size, among other issues. But with
20 the 2022 midterms almost here we are probably behind the
21 curve a little bit.

22 What are the major roadblocks stopping the IC from
23 standing up this intelligence center?

24 Ms. Haines: We have just gotten appropriations,
25 basically, through the fiscal year 2022 budget, which has

1 been great, and we are currently building up the Foreign
2 Malign Influence Center. We already has the Election Threat
3 Executive so we have been doing work on what the threats
4 might be to our elections. That is now pulled into the
5 Foreign Malign Influence Center, and we effectively have the
6 budget for up to 12 people in the Foreign Malign Influence
7 Center under this context and we have asked for funding for
8 fiscal year 2023, essentially to be able to expand it by
9 about three people but also to allow us to access expertise
10 and knowledge that we think is critical, and really just to
11 help facilitate what the community is doing across the board
12 on these issues.

13 Senator Rounds: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
14 My time has expired.

15 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Rounds.

16 Senator Kaine, please.

17 Senator Kaine: Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thanks to our
18 witnesses. I want to ask about two items. The first is
19 undersea cables. Ninety-five percent of global
20 communication rely on a robust undersea cable network,
21 500,000 miles across the sea floor globally. Internet,
22 global banking transactions, the SWIFT system, diplomatic
23 cables, encrypted military communications are a few of the
24 myriad applications that rely on this network.

25 Two NATO commands, the Joint Support and Enabling

1 Command in Ulm, Germany, and Joint Force Command in Norfolk
2 are monitoring threats against undersea cables in the
3 Atlantic, but the vast majority of these cables are
4 controlled by private sector companies. In the U.S.,
5 France, Spain, Japan, China, these companies and contractors
6 who work with them, such as Google and Amazon, oversee the
7 planning, production, design, deployment, and maintenance of
8 the cables.

9 To what extent is the DoD and IC looking at integrating
10 and communicating with these private actors so that we can
11 monitor threats to the cables?

12 General Berrier: Senator, I am going to take that one
13 for action and do a little homework to get you a fulsome
14 answer.

15 Senator Kaine: And I would like, additionally, to know
16 whether China, Russia, or other malign actors have an
17 organic capability to map our networks, to cut into or tap
18 into them, to listen to military or other government
19 communications. So I would like a response back to that.

20 Here is my second question, unless, Director Haines,
21 you have something to offer on the undersea cable.

22 Ms. Haines: Thank you, sir. I actually would love to
23 do it in closed session if that is all right.

24 Senator Kaine: I will look forward to that.

25 Ms. Haines: Okay.

1 Senator Kaine: Now a question about intelligence
2 estimates of the strength of other militaries. I think
3 there were a number of estimates that the Afghan military
4 would perform much better than they did, and there were a
5 number of estimates that the Russian military was much
6 stronger than it has proven to be. So what are we doing to
7 assess why we overestimated the strength of both of those
8 militaries and recalibrating the way we assess military
9 strength of other nations?

10 General Berrier: Senator, I will start. We are taking
11 a holistic view of how we do analysis and evaluate foreign
12 militaries. You know, it start with the relationships that
13 we have with our foreign partners, understanding their
14 militaries, understanding their understanding of adversary
15 militaries, and working an all-source assessment to have
16 granularity inside the capabilities of these militaries.

17 Certainly the ANDSF was an issue. Certainly the
18 overestimation of Russian capability was an issue. But if
19 you back up, if you look at Russia's growth since the early
20 2000, their war in Chechnya, their war in Georgia, what they
21 did in Ukraine, their operations in Syria, and you
22 understand the reforms that they went through, we saw that
23 from the outside. What we did not see from the inside was
24 sort of this hollow force, lack of NCO corps, lack of
25 leadership training, lack of effective doctrines. So those

1 are the intangibles that we have got to be able to get our
2 arms around as an Intelligence Community to really
3 understand.

4 Senator Kaine: Thank you. I yield back.

5 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Kaine.

6 Senator Wicker, please.

7 Senator Wicker: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General
8 Berrier, let me quote from your prepared statement.

9 "Beijing appears willing to defer the use of military force
10 as long as it considers that unification with Taiwan can be
11 negotiated and that the cost of conflict outweigh the
12 benefits."

13 General Berrier, I believe the United States should
14 prepare Taiwan and send a clear message to Beijing that a
15 military invasion would be too costly. I also believe the
16 primary objective of the United States and its allies, with
17 regard to Taiwan, should not be so much to repel a Chinese
18 attack but to prevent it from ever occurring.

19 So, General, from your assessment of China's
20 capabilities and timeline as well as Taiwan's current
21 defensive posture, what needs to be done? What can the
22 United States be doing for or supplying to Taiwan in order
23 to prevent a Chinese attack from ever occurring?

24 General Berrier: Senator, thank you for that question.

25 First I would say that I believe the PRC would rather not

1 do it by force. I think they would rather do this
2 peacefully, over time. There are some things that we can do
3 with Taiwan. I think they are learning some very
4 interesting lessons from the Ukrainian conflict, like how
5 important leadership is, how important small-unit tactics
6 are, how important an NCO corps is, and really effective
7 training with the right weapon systems and what those
8 system, with the right people, would be able to do to thwart
9 that.

10 So I think we have to engage with our INDOPACOM
11 partners within the Department of Defense, the Taiwan
12 military and leadership, to help them understand what this
13 conflict has been about, what lessons they can learn, and
14 where they should be focusing their dollars on defense and
15 their training.

16 Senator Wicker: Is their NCO corps where it should be
17 at this point?

18 General Berrier: They have a largely conscript force.
19 I do not believe it is where it should be.

20 Senator Wicker: And so the volunteer part of their
21 armed forces, is that where it should be, the non-conscript?

22 General Berrier: They have a very short enlistment
23 period. I can provide you additional details in a written
24 response.

25 Senator Wicker: Okay. You also have written that the

1 PLA Navy is the largest navy in the world and has the
2 capability to conduct long-range precision strikes against
3 land targets from its submarine and surface combatants. You
4 later have written that Russia is fielding its new, quote,
5 "ultra-quiet" submarine, capable of threatening North
6 America from the Pacific Ocean.

7 General, do you assess that China and Russia will
8 continue to grow both of their naval fleets and invest in
9 new capabilities?

10 General Berrier: Yes, I do believe they will both
11 invest in new capabilities and grow their fleets.

12 Senator Wicker: And is the United States on pace to
13 build and commission as many ships as China is building?

14 General Berrier: I would refer that question to the
15 Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations.

16 Senator Wicker: But surely the Intelligence Community
17 has an assessment of that.

18 General Berrier: DIA has an assessment of Russian
19 naval capabilities and Chinese PLAN capabilities.

20 Senator Wicker: And DIA is familiar with what the
21 public plans of the Navy are at this point.

22 General Berrier: Probably, but I think the Navy will
23 make those investment decisions based on how they perceive
24 the threat as well, and we will certainly collaborate with
25 our partners in the Navy on any of that.

1 Senator Wicker: Let me switch to Afghanistan.
2 Director Haines, you submitted the 2022 Office of Director
3 of National Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment. On
4 Afghanistan, the report says that the Taliban takeover
5 threatens U.S. interests, that 500,000 Afghan refugees could
6 attempt to cross into surrounding countries, and that almost
7 certainly terrorist groups will establish and expand safe
8 havens from which to plot attacks.

9 So, Madam Director, given these assessments in your
10 office's Annual Threat Assessment, would you assess that the
11 chaotic U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan has left the
12 homeland more susceptible to terrorist attacks?

13 Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator. I agreed with what
14 General Barrier indicated earlier on about the threat,
15 essentially, that we are seeing from al Qaeda and from ISIS-
16 K, which is to say that we see ISIS-K as the more concerning
17 threat. At this point, we do not assess that they currently
18 have the capability to essentially affect external attacks
19 directed from Afghanistan to the United States at this
20 stage, but they could build that capability over time, and
21 they certainly have the intent to do so.

22 With al Qaeda, we are not seeing as much of a threat,
23 and that does not mean that it could not grow over time, and
24 that is obviously something that we are monitoring during
25 this period.

1 Senator Wicker: General Berrier, has the exit from
2 Afghanistan left our homeland more vulnerable?

3 General Berrier: Senator, I would not more vulnerable,
4 but this is certainly an issue that the Intelligence
5 Community has to keep on the warm plate, if you will, to
6 make sure that we can monitor those networks, what they are
7 doing, and where they are migrating to.

8 Senator Wicker: Thank you both.

9 Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Senator Wicker.

10 Senator King, please.

11 Senator King: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

12 Madam Director, I am concerned about the leaks last
13 week, the details of intelligence that is being shared with
14 the Ukrainians, both in terms of sources and methods,
15 alerting the Russians, what we know, perhaps how we know it,
16 and also feeding Vladimir Putin's paranoia about conflict
17 with the West. Are you actively pursuing the source of
18 those leaks from last week?

19 Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator. We obviously always
20 actively pursue any information that we have that indicates
21 that anybody may be disclosing classified information, you
22 know, without authorization.

23 Senator King: I hope you will pursue that because I
24 think sometimes leaks are embarrassing. We do not worry too
25 much about them. But I think in this case they were

1 harmful, and I hope that this will be an active
2 investigation.

3 A question to both of you. We all believe that the
4 Intelligence Community did a really excellent job of
5 predicting the invasion, alerting the world as to what was
6 going on, what the disposition of Russian troops were, the
7 involvement of Belarus, all of that. What we missed was the
8 will to fight of the Ukrainians and the leadership of
9 Zelenskyy. And we also missed that in Afghanistan. Within
10 12 months we missed the will to fight. We overestimated the
11 Afghans' will to fight, underestimated the Ukrainians will
12 to fight.

13 I realize will to fight is a lot harder to assess than
14 number of tanks or volume of ammunition or something, but I
15 hope that the Intelligence Community is doing some soul-
16 searching about how to better get a handle on that question,
17 because we had testimony, in this committee and in the
18 Intelligence Committee, that Kyiv was going to fall in 3 or
19 4 days and war would last 2 weeks, and that turned out to be
20 grossly wrong. Are you looking at this question of how to
21 assess will to fight and domestic leadership?

22 Ms. Haines: Yes, Senator. You heard from General
23 Berrier, obviously, a number of things that DIA is doing.
24 For the Intelligence Community writ large we have a process
25 at the National Intelligence Council taking a look at these

1 issues. I would say that it is a combination of will to
2 fight and capacity, in effect, and the two of them are
3 issues that are, as you indicated, quite challenging to
4 provide effective analysis on. And we are looking at
5 different methodologies for doing so.

6 Senator King: This is your lane, assessing military
7 capability, and a big part, as you testified earlier, the
8 reason the Ukrainian war is going the way it is is that the
9 Ukrainians are fighting for their land and the Russians do
10 not have the same will to fight.

11 I hope that this is something you are focused upon,
12 because again, I think we failed on this question in
13 Afghanistan. And in Afghanistan we had testimony over and
14 over that the government would last 6 months or a year
15 beyond the departure of U.S. troops. It lasted minus 2
16 weeks. Is this something that you are focused upon?

17 General Berrier: Senator, I am focused on it, and I
18 really appreciate this dialogue because I think there is an
19 important nuance that we have to discuss. One is the will
20 to fight and the other is the capacity to fight. In closed
21 briefings we talked about this capacity to fight, and given
22 the correlation of forces that the Russians had and what the
23 Ukrainians had, it was the thought of senior analysts that
24 it was not going to go very well, for a variety of factors.

25 But there was never an Intelligence Community

1 assessment that said the Ukrainians lacked the will to
2 fight. Those assessments talked about their capacity to
3 fight --

4 Senator King: Yeah, but there was not an assessment
5 that they did either. The assessment was Ukraine would be
6 overrun in a matter of weeks. That was grossly wrong.

7 General Berrier: Grossly wrong but not a question of
8 will to fight. It was capacity at that time, as the DNI
9 just said.

10 So we are taking a look at that, and we are --

11 Senator King: Are you saying Ukrainians' will to fight
12 has not been an important part of this struggle?

13 General Berrier: No, I am not saying that. I think it
14 has been everything.

15 Senator King: And that is what we did not know.
16 Correct?

17 General Berrier: Well, we assessed their capacity to
18 face the size of the Russian forces that were amassed on
19 their border was going to be very difficult for them.

20 Senator King: Well, I all I am saying is the
21 Intelligence Community needs to do a better job on this
22 issue.

23 General Berrier: I think the Intelligence Community
24 did a great job on this issue, Senator, and we will --

25 Senator King: General, how can you possibly say that

1 when we were told, explicitly, Kyiv would fall in 3 days and
2 Ukraine would fall in 2 weeks? You are telling me that was
3 accurate intelligence?

4 General Berrier: So we were really focused on the
5 Russian forces at the time, and so when we backed --

6 Senator King: And we were wrong about that too, were
7 we not? We overestimated the Russians.

8 General Berrier: Well, the Intelligence Community did
9 a great job in predicting and talking --

10 Senator King: And I acknowledged that at the beginning
11 of my question. I understand that. Yes, they did. What
12 they failed at was predicting what was going to happen after
13 Russia invaded.

14 General Berrier: So as I look at the totality of the
15 entire operation I think the enormity rests on the
16 predictions of what the Russians were going to do versus
17 whether or not the Ukrainians were going to be successful.

18 Senator King: Well, if you do not concede there was a
19 problem on this then we have got a problem.

20 General Berrier: Senator, I did not say that. We are
21 going to take a hard look at this, but I think in the
22 totality of the entire operation there were a lot more
23 successes than failures.

24 Senator King: I will not argue that point. I am just
25 trying to make a point that I think there was a major issue

1 that we missed that had a significant influence on how this
2 has unfolded, and had we had a better handle on the
3 prediction we could have done more to assist the Ukrainians
4 earlier.

5 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

6 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator King.

7 Senator Hawley, please.

8 Senator Hawley: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

9 Director Haines and General, is it your sense that
10 Beijing thinks that it has a window of opportunity to invade
11 Taiwan before Taiwan and the United States modernize and get
12 into better position to deter any such invasion? Let us
13 start with you, Director.

14 Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator. It is our view that
15 they are working hard to effectively put themselves into a
16 position in which their military is capable of taking Taiwan
17 over our intervention. We can talk in closed session about
18 timelines and so on for how quickly they think they may be
19 able to achieve that, but I think that is something that
20 they are trying to achieve, even as, what General Berrier
21 stated earlier is true, which is to say that they would
22 prefer not to have to use military force to take Taiwan.
23 They would prefer to use other means.

24 Senator Hawley: General, do you want to comment on
25 this?

1 General Berrier: Well, I know there are a lot of dates
2 out there, Senator -- 2027, 2030, 2049. Certainly it is on
3 their mind. We are not really sure what lessons Xi Jinping
4 is taking away from this conflict right now. We would hope
5 that they would be the right ones. But I think it is going
6 to take some time to sort out whether or not he believes
7 this is a window or that his timeline would extend.

8 Senator Hawley: Let me ask you about something that
9 Admiral Davidson said when he was Commander of PACOM. He
10 told the committee last March that he worried about a
11 Chinese invasion of Taiwan in the next 6 years. That is his
12 testimony. His successor, Admiral Aquilino, has similarly
13 said that he views the timeline to be shrinking.

14 Based on the indicators -- Director, let me start with
15 you on this -- based on the indicators available to the
16 Intelligence Community, do you agree that the threat to
17 Taiwan is acute between now and 2030?

18 Ms. Haines: Yes. I think it is fair to say that it is
19 critical or acute between now and 2030. I think that is
20 absolutely fair. What is hard to tell is how, for example,
21 whatever lessons China learns coming out of the Russia-
22 Ukraine crisis might affect that time, as well as, as you
23 indicated, whether or not our capabilities, Taiwan's
24 capabilities, other decisions that will have to be made
25 between now and then that will affect the timeline.

1 Senator Hawley: General, you said just a second ago
2 that you hoped China would learn some lessons from the
3 Ukraine conflict. What is it that you are hoping that they
4 take away?

5 General Berrier: Just how difficult a cross-strait
6 invasion might be and how dangerous and high risk that might
7 be. We saw --

8 Senator Hawley: Sorry. But do you not think that the
9 Chinese military is significantly more capable than the
10 Russians? As it turns out, just to pick up what Senator
11 King was pressing you on, we pretty dramatically
12 overestimated the strength of the Russian military. I would
13 be surprised, for one, if China's military strength proves
14 to so attenuated. I mean, do you not think that we are
15 dealing with a significantly more formidable adversary in
16 China?

17 General Berrier: I think China is a formidable
18 adversary.

19 Senator Hawley: So, I mean, back to lessons learned.
20 Unfortunately, I think one lesson they can draw from the
21 Ukraine conflict is that deterrence did not work in Ukraine.
22 I mean, Russia invaded Ukraine. I, for one, do not want to
23 be having this conversation about Taiwan in any period of
24 years, not next year, not in 5 years, not in 10 years.

25 So my sense of urgency on this is we better figure out

1 how deterrence is going to work in Taiwan, because if China
2 is successful in a fait accompli that is going to look a lot
3 different than a Russian scenario in Ukraine. Would you not
4 agree with that?

5 General Berrier: I do agree with that.

6 Senator Hawley: So just to that end, Director, let me
7 come back to you. One of the things that the Intelligence
8 Community was able to give us lead time on was a potential
9 Russian invasion of Ukraine. I mean, we are very clear on
10 that, that there was a strong likelihood of that, and you
11 had that month in advance, actually.

12 I am curious if you think that we would get similar
13 strategic warning about a potential Chinese invasion of
14 Taiwan?

15 Ms. Haines: I mean, it is too early to tell, honestly,
16 whether or not that would be the case, and obviously, you
17 know, in a kind of classic intelligence way we would sure as
18 hell not promise anything at this stage.

19 Senator Hawley: General, let me ask you about
20 something that has long been a concern of mine, and even
21 more so now, and that is what I think of as the simultaneity
22 problem, simultaneous conflicts in Western Europe, with
23 Russia and with China.

24 So do you worry that Beijing might see an opportunity
25 to invade Taiwan in the very near future, should the United

1 States get drawn into an actual conflict, a kinetic conflict
2 with Russia?

3 General Berrier: I think that is a remote possibility.

4 Senator Hawley: Which part is remote?

5 General Berrier: The part that China would see that as
6 a window to open to take advantage of that, based on the
7 fact that they probably are not ready to do that right now.

8 Senator Hawley: So you do not think they have the
9 capacity right now to invade Taiwan?

10 General Berrier: I did not say that.

11 Senator Hawley: Well, I am trying to drill down on
12 what you mean when you say that they would not do it.

13 General Berrier: I think they probably have --
14 actually, could we take this into the closed session?

15 Senator Hawley: Sure. Yeah, absolutely. And my time
16 has expired so I will take it up with you then.

17 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

18 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Hawley.

19 Senator Manchin, please.

20 Senator Manchin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

21 Sir, just real quick, back on Taiwan again. Do you
22 think Taiwan is prepared to defend itself? In your
23 evaluation of what Taiwan has been doing, the only thing I
24 keep seeing is they want more F-16s, and we think they are
25 going to be able to go to air war with China and defend

1 Taiwan? I do not think so.

2 General Berrier: I think Taiwan could do more, sir.

3 Senator Manchin: Are you all strategically giving them
4 different things that they can use, whether it be in the sea
5 or on land, to protect their island?

6 General Berrier: I think they are in close
7 consultation with our partners in INDOPACOM and within the
8 Department of Defense.

9 Senator Manchin: Mm-hmm. How about Ukraine? Can
10 Ukraine win now that we have, as Senator King so rightfully
11 pointed out and Senator Hawley followed up on, we misread
12 that one. Are we reading it now, they have the ability to
13 win if we continue to support, without us being pulled into
14 a land war with them? On their own, can they win?

15 General Berrier: I think that is a difficult
16 prediction to make. Right now I think where the agency is
17 at is a prolonged stalemate should no factor change on
18 either side. In other words, the Russians continue to do
19 what they are doing, and we continue to do what we are doing
20 for the Ukrainians. I see that as a stalemate, not a --

21 Senator Manchin: Director Haines, how do you evaluate
22 this? I am sure that you have been kept up to speed on this
23 and evaluating them. My other concern you might want to
24 answer is our ability to maintain and manufacture the
25 weapons that are needed to not only help Ukraine, not only

1 to backfill our allies, but also keep our own supply chains
2 up. Are we running critically low? Could it be that we
3 could put ourselves in a dangerous situation?

4 Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator. So I think a few
5 things. One is, just taking your last question first,
6 something we can do maybe a little bit in closed session is
7 talk about not just our military assistance to Ukraine but
8 also a number of other countries that have provided military
9 assistance to Ukraine.

10 Senator Manchin: -- ask the question, are you
11 concerned about the ability to have the supplies that are
12 needed for us, for our allies, and what Ukraine is going to
13 need to sustain and hopefully win this war?

14 Ms. Haines: So that is why I was talking about the
15 allies piece. No, I am not concerned because I think,
16 frankly, between all of us there is the capacity to provide
17 the kind of assistance that they are asking for.

18 Senator Manchin: Okay. And can you identify the hot
19 spots we are very much concerned about, other than China,
20 because we know China is the challenge we have. Other hot
21 spots that we are worried about that could rise up during
22 this very difficult time, and the geopolitical interests
23 that we have in the world. I mean, in Iran? North Korea?
24 Some of the one you are more watching and concerned about.

25 General Berrier: The agency is worried about North

1 Korea for sure, and their ballistic missile development
2 timeline, as well as potential nuclear testing. We are
3 always thinking about Iran and the actions that they have to
4 pull malign influence within the region against our
5 neighbors and certainly U.S. forces there. We are always
6 thinking through how to sustain partnerships to be able to
7 keep a beat on these threats.

8 Senator Manchin: Director Haines, are you concerned
9 about basically the tensions that we have with UAE and with
10 Saudis and also their more visual movements, intentional
11 movements towards China for support or basically the yuan
12 being used now as the currency that they are accepting for
13 payment of energy, things of this sort that could also put
14 us in a more precarious situation with UAE and Saudis?

15 Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator. I mean, obviously, as
16 you indicate, we are always looking at efforts that both
17 China and Russia make to try to make inroads with partners
18 of ours across the world, and UAE and Saudi Arabia are
19 examples of that in both respects.

20 Senator Manchin: Cybersecurity is my final one for you
21 all. Right now it seems like it is a convoluted area where
22 people would report, whether it is private companies in
23 America that are getting hacked and what is going on but
24 also who is in charge? Where do they go? What is the chain
25 right now within the Federal Government, in military

1 especially, on cyber, that you consider the premier spot
2 that we should be working with, or are we putting things
3 together? Are we still so fragmented throughout our
4 agencies?

5 Ms. Haines: I mean, my experience is it has gotten
6 better over the years. I would never say it is perfect. It
7 is one of those things that continues to be worked through.
8 But there is a very clear chain of command with respect to
9 taking action --

10 Senator Manchin: Who is taking the lead? Who takes
11 the lead?

12 Ms. Haines: When it comes to offensive cyber
13 operations to defend the country, obviously the Department
14 of Defense does so. When it comes to defending, you know,
15 helping to defend the infrastructure and critical -- right,
16 exactly, resilience -- it is the Department of Homeland
17 Security and the FBI, and everybody has a role to play, and
18 we obviously support, in the Intelligence Community, all of
19 them in the work that they are doing.

20 Senator Manchin: What about the National Cybersecurity
21 -- how about the center? How do you all evaluate the
22 National Cybersecurity Center?

23 Ms. Haines: You mean the National Cybersecurity
24 Director, the new position --

25 Senator Manchin: All the stakeholders are involved in

1 that. That is why I am saying it is convoluted. Who is
2 taking the lead? Who is the lead person? Who is the lead
3 agency?

4 Senator King: CISA.

5 Ms. Haines: Yeah, CISA is the main --

6 Senator Manchin: How do you evaluate that?

7 Ms. Haines: I think they are doing very well, yeah.

8 Senator Manchin: Okay. No further questions.

9 Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Senator Manchin.

10 Senator Sullivan, please.

11 Senator Sullivan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want
12 to thank the witnesses for their hard work during a
13 challenging time. I want to focus a lot on the issue of
14 energy, and I will relay a story I had with Senator McCain
15 and a Russian dissident who has now been arrested, Vladimir
16 Kura-Murza. He is in jail right now in Russia.

17 About 4 years ago, I asked him what was the number one
18 thing we could do to undermine the corrupt Russian regime,
19 to undermine Vladimir Putin, and he said, "The number one
20 thing? That is easy, Senator. Produce more American
21 energy." Produce more American energy.

22 So I want to talk a little bit about that. In your
23 assessment, is energy independence -- so a couple of years
24 ago we were the largest producer of natural gas in the
25 world, the largest producer of oil in the world, the largest

1 producer if renewables in the world -- is that good for
2 America's national security, General?

3 General Berrier: Senator, thanks for the question. As
4 we have watched this conflict unfold what we --

5 Senator Sullivan: I have a got a lot of questions. I
6 gave you a softball. Can you answer the question? Is that
7 good for America's national security to be energy
8 independent and the world's energy superpower?

9 General Berrier: Certainly energy independence is a
10 good thing.

11 Senator Sullivan: How about you, Director?

12 Ms. Haines: Yes.

13 Senator Sullivan: Okay. Thank you for the
14 straightforward answer.

15 Now, in this conflict with Ukraine, what does our
16 ability to produce energy, how do the Russians view that and
17 how do our allies view that? We all know Vladimir Putin
18 uses energy as a weapon. How are you assessing the ability
19 of the United States to fill the void that the Germans and
20 others have with regard to getting energy from Russia to now
21 get it from the United States? Is there a lot of interest
22 in that and is that a good thing for our national security?
23 General?

24 General Berrier: I certainly believe that our European
25 allies see this as a national security issue for sure, and

1 they are thinking through new ways of developing and getting
2 after their energy needs, for sure.

3 Senator Sullivan: How about getting some from the
4 United States?

5 General Berrier: If the United States had excess
6 capacity I am sure that would be something that they would
7 welcome.

8 Senator Sullivan: Do you see that, Director,
9 similarly?

10 Ms. Haines: Yes.

11 Senator Sullivan: Let me ask with regard to China.
12 Almost 70 percent of China's crude oil supply came in the
13 form of imports. What is your assessment of how China's
14 energy dependence could or would impact its military
15 operations during a potential cross-strait conflict? In
16 your assessment, when you read up on China's weaknesses, are
17 they concerned about their energy dependence with regard to
18 national gas and oil being a major, major importer?

19 General Berrier: If there is a way we could take this
20 into the closed session to discuss that, that would be
21 better, Senator.

22 Senator Sullivan: Okay.

23 General Berrier: I do believe they are concerned about
24 their dependence on energy.

25 Senator Sullivan: Director?

1 Ms. Haines: Yes, absolutely.

2 Senator Sullivan: Do you see that as a strategic
3 advantage we have in our great power competition with China
4 and Russia, the fact that we cannot only produce energy for
5 our own country -- and I am talking all of the above --
6 renewables, oil, gas. Do you see that as a strategic
7 advantage for our nation?

8 General Berrier: I see it as an advantage.

9 Ms. Haines: Yeah. I mean, I think, frankly, our
10 capacity to work with our allies on this issue has been a
11 strategic advantage, and our ability to work with them in
12 order to actually help to mitigate against Russia using
13 energy as a weapon has been a major issue.

14 Senator Sullivan: And China's dependence on energy,
15 should there be some kind of conflict between us and China?

16 Ms. Haines: Yes. The relationship with Russia will be
17 relevant under those circumstances, obviously.

18 Senator Sullivan: Let me ask one final question, and
19 it is not really a question on intel. You know, we are
20 getting ready to vote here on a \$40 billion package. My
21 team and I are looking through it. It is a lot. How do you
22 assess our NATO partners' commitment, finally, to hitting 2
23 percent of their GDP for their annual military budgets? I
24 mean, we have now 100,000 troops over in Europe. I fully
25 support what the President has been doing in that regard.

1 But if there was ever a time that countries had to kind of
2 wake up and say, you know what, for 40 years we promised it
3 at 2 percent. The wolf is at the door, or maybe the bear is
4 at the door, or the dragon is at the door, whatever metaphor
5 you want.

6 Are you seeing a shift? Because the Germans made a big
7 announcement. My understanding is Canada still will not
8 even hit 1 percent of GDP for their defense budget. Are you
9 seeing a shift in our NATO allies to say, you know what, it
10 is time for us to pull our own weight here. The Americans
11 are doing it, once again. And look, I support everything we
12 are doing, but, you know, \$40 billion, that is a lot of
13 money. My constituents have got a lot of needs too, and we
14 still have NATO allies, Canada one, who just freeload, and
15 it is getting a little tiring.

16 What is your assessment of our NATO partners'
17 commitment to finally hitting 2 percent now that it is very
18 clear that there is a brutal dictator on their doorstep?

19 Ms. Haines: I think we have seen, obviously, as you
20 indicated in the opening to your question, just a number of
21 countries now announce an increase in their defense budget,
22 and I think that is something that we are going to see them
23 follow through on, at least in part.

24 Senator Sullivan: General?

25 General Berrier: And I think this has had a

1 galvanizing effect on our NATO partners, and I think most of
2 them will come around.

3 Senator Sullivan: Thank you. And again, I did not
4 start by saying the intel you were providing us and
5 everybody else prior to the war was exceptional, and the
6 intel ops that you did were also really impressive. So I
7 appreciate that.

8 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Sullivan.

9 Senator Peters, please.

10 Senator Peters: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

11 Director Haines, the 2022 Annual Threat Assessment
12 states, quote, "China presents the broadest, most active and
13 persistent cyber espionage threat to the U.S. government and
14 private sector networks," end of quote. The assessment
15 specifically discusses the capacity for China to conduct
16 surveillance as well as disrupt critical infrastructure.

17 My question for you, ma'am, is does the ODNI believe
18 that China would use their cyber capacity to shape other
19 countries' decisions such as the Russians are known to do?
20 Do you believe that is in the cards as well?

21 Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator. Yes. I mean, I think
22 in the sense that, in particular, our assessment is that
23 China is pursuing significant cyber capabilities, in this
24 area in particular, to deter the United States from taking
25 action in the event of a conflict, for example, in their

1 region.

2 Senator Peters: Thank you. Media coverage during the
3 weeks leading up to Russia's invasion often used open-source
4 evidence to support the Administration's intelligence
5 estimates. Examples here range from images provided by
6 Maxar's commercial satellite network to Russian military
7 communications that were intercepted by tech-savvy
8 civilians.

9 My question for you, General Berrier, is how is the
10 proliferation of technology and information accessibility
11 for average citizens impacting the realm of professional
12 intelligence work within your agency?

13 General Berrier: From the perspective of this war
14 between Russia and Ukraine the plethora of open-source data
15 that is available to enrich our assessments has been
16 amazing. Just think of the third-party damage assessment
17 work that is happening right now using images because most
18 Ukrainian citizens have a cellphone. It has been really,
19 really rich. And then you combine it with the other open-
20 source data that is available, publicly available, and can
21 be purchased.

22 For us it has been enlightening and will probably shape
23 how we do intelligence operations and analysis going forward
24 in the future. We just have to be careful that we use the
25 right rules at the right time to make sure that we are

1 safeguarding information and that we are not violating any
2 laws or policies.

3 Senator Peters: That actually leads to the next
4 question, and you mentioned you are looking at how you
5 integrate that into how you collect information. Is there
6 anything that Congress should be doing to help you better
7 enable your abilities to harness the potential for open-
8 source information?

9 General Berrier: I think we are budgeted for it,
10 Senator, and we are looking forward to the work ahead as we
11 go forward on this issue.

12 Senator Peters: Good.

13 Director Haines, the Biden administration has done an
14 admirable job certainly of crafting a coalition of nations
15 to impose sanctions, enforce export controls against Russia
16 for their illegal invasion. This includes our trans-
17 Atlantic partners, many of them who are now giving up on
18 Russian hydrocarbons, something that I think we all would
19 have thought was absolutely unthinkable just a short while
20 ago, as well as our global partners, Japan and Taiwan,
21 actively engaged.

22 What has been noticeable, though, is to see that much
23 of the world is still not with us. They may not be with
24 Russia, and I am not saying they are with Russia, but they
25 are not subscribing to our call for a global coalition of

1 democracies to stand against Ukraine. This includes India,
2 Indonesia, Nigeria, South Africa, and particularly other
3 nations in the global south in which the U.S. certainly has
4 very friendly relations with but we have not yet been able
5 to get them to join the Ukrainian cause.

6 As the U.S. will need to certainly build an even more
7 robust coalition of nations in the future to counter
8 potential Chinese aggression, I believe it is imperative
9 that the U.S. understand how to win over these non-aligned
10 nations living certainly in a multi-polar world.

11 So my question to you, in your view what steps should
12 the U.S. take to build a broader coalition for potential
13 future conflicts, similar to what we are seeing right now?

14 Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator. From the Intelligence
15 Community perspective we have done a lot of thinking about
16 how we can help to facilitate, frankly, the policy community
17 in this area, to your point, and one of the things that we
18 did in the context of Ukraine that I think is possible for
19 us to do in other areas, and that we have discussed with the
20 policy community about, is basically working key allies and
21 partners who are influencers, in effect, within specific
22 regions, to try to get out to them as much intelligence as
23 we can, obviously being mindful of sources and methods. But
24 just to lay the groundwork so that then the policy community
25 can work with those countries to effectively provide for the

1 kind of coalition that you describe.

2 And I do think it is an absolutely fundamental piece.
3 I mean, the fact that the U.N. General Assembly managed to
4 garner 141 votes, I think it was, against Russia on the
5 Russia-Ukraine piece was pretty extraordinary. And I do
6 think that our capacity to share intelligence in advance of
7 that moment was critical to getting that kind of coalition
8 together, and I hope we can do that in the future.

9 Senator Peters: Great. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
10 Chairman.

11 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Peters.

12 Senator Rosen, please.

13 Senator Rosen: Thank you, Chairman Reed, and I really
14 appreciate the witnesses. I appreciate you both for being
15 here today and for your service.

16 Director Haines and General Berrier, given that the
17 Annual Threat Assessment was written before Russia's
18 invasion of Ukraine, has Russia's loss and expenditure of
19 military equipment, personnel, and resources in Ukraine,
20 coupled with their, frankly, poor performance, changed our
21 overall threat of Russia and their military capabilities,
22 and -- like I said, this was written before that -- how do
23 you assess we may need to adjust our planning going forward,
24 seeing as what we are learning?

25 General Berrier: I will start with that one, Senator.

1 I think, you know, as we have watched the Russians falter
2 here and the losses that they have sustained we believe that
3 they are going to be set back conventionally for a number of
4 years as they try to recoup these losses and replace all of
5 the equipment and soldiers that they have lost.

6 So I think we should back up our assessment really for
7 NATO and what that threat really looks like, also factoring
8 in their nuclear capabilities and what that means for NATO
9 going forward.

10 Ms. Haines: So I will just add to this. I think, you
11 know, as we talk to the analysts about this, and obviously
12 before each of the threat hearings we discussed this because
13 the threat hearings came after Russia's invasion of Ukraine,
14 and as you indicate the assessment was done beforehand, and
15 I think the overall threat level has not so much changed as
16 it is the question of how it is evolving, to General
17 Berrier's point.

18 I think our view is that the ground combat forces have
19 been degraded considerably. It is going to take them years
20 to basically manage, to the extent that they are able, to
21 rebuild that, in effect, and that may end up meaning that
22 they have greater reliance, in effect, on asymmetric tools
23 during this period. So they rely more on things like cyber,
24 nuclear, precision, et cetera, and that is obviously a shift
25 in the way in which they are exercising their efforts for

1 influence, and so on.

2 Senator Rosen: Well, and knowing that we also know, to
3 everyone else's point here too, that the world is watching.
4 So Director Haines, how do you assess the threat level to
5 Taiwan? Has it increased? Does China feel more emboldened
6 now that Russia has invaded Ukraine? And then I will give
7 the second part of that to you, General. Does China see
8 this as an opportunity, maybe this period, to invade Ukraine
9 as we might be distracted, the world might be distracted
10 with the Ukraine crisis?

11 Ms. Haines: Thank you, Senator. It is hard to tell,
12 honestly, at this stage. What we see is evaluating what is
13 happening in the Russia-Ukraine crisis. They are still
14 evaluating. The crisis obviously still continues. So what
15 lessons they learn during this period is not really
16 concluded yet, and so it is a little bit harder to tell
17 whether or not is an increased threat of accelerating their
18 efforts toward Taiwan or less so.

19 I would say that thus far the IC has not assessed that
20 the Russia-Ukraine crisis is likely to accelerate their
21 plan, vis-à-vis Taiwan, and the kinds of lessons that we
22 think are possible that are relevant, just to give you maybe
23 two, one is they were surprised by the degree to which the
24 United States and Europe came together to enact sanctions,
25 and that is something, obviously, they are going to be

1 looking at in the context of Taiwan.

2 And the second one, I think, is this point that really
3 General Berrier made earlier a little bit, which is to say
4 that one of the issues for them is the confidence they have
5 that they are able militarily to take action in Taiwan over
6 our intervention. That will play into their decision-making
7 over time, we think, and seeing what happened in Russia,
8 that might give them less confidence, in some respects, over
9 what it is that is likely to happen.

10 General Berrier: Senator, the only thing that I would
11 add is on a day-to-day basis with Chinese military activity
12 I am not seeing anything that would tell me that they are
13 thinking about trying to take advantage of this time that
14 they think that they might have.

15 Senator Rosen: Let me ask one additional follow-up on
16 that. What is your assessment of our ability to conduct
17 military operations in both theaters should something occur?

18 General Berrier: We have significant capabilities in
19 both theaters. It would depend on what the variables were
20 with each situation and what that meant. But that is why we
21 have four-star combatant commanders in USEUCOM and
22 INDOPACOM.

23 Senator Rosen: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

24 Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Senator Rosen, and
25 thank you, Madam Director and General. We have a vote

1 scheduled at 11:45. We will reconvene in SVC-217 for the
2 classified session at noon, 12 o'clock.

3 And at this time I will recess or adjourn the open
4 session. Thank you very much.

5 [Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25