

Stenographic Transcript
Before the

COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY
ON THE UNITED STATES' STRATEGIC COMPETITION
WITH CHINA.

Tuesday, June 8, 2021

Washington, D.C.

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1 HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE UNITED STATES' STRATEGIC
2 COMPETITION WITH CHINA.

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5
6 U.S. Senate

7 Committee on Armed Services

8 Washington, D.C.
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10 The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in
11 Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jack Reed,
12 chairman of the committee, presiding.

13 Committee Members Present: Senators Reed [presiding],
14 Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Warren,
15 Peters, Manchin, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer,
16 Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Scott, Blackburn,
17 Hawley, and Tuberville.
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1 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED, U.S. SENATOR FROM
2 RHODE ISLAND

3 Chairman Reed: Let me call the hearing the order. The
4 committee meets today to receive testimony on the United
5 States' strategic competition with China. This morning we
6 will hear from four distinguished witnesses who are true
7 experts in their respective fields. I would like to welcome
8 each of you and thank you for joining us today.

9 Ms. Bonnie Glaser is the Director of the Asia Program
10 at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. She
11 brings decades of experience working at the intersection of
12 Indo-Pacific geopolitics and U.S. policy, including senior
13 roles at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
14 the Department of Defense, and the Department of State.

15 Dr. Sheena Chestnut Greitens is an Associate Professor
16 at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of
17 Texas at Austin, where her work focuses on East Asia,
18 American national security, and authoritarian politics. She
19 also serves as a fellow and adviser at many prominent think
20 tanks and academic institutions.

21 Dr. Evan Medeiros is the Penner Family Chair in Asia
22 Studies in the School of Foreign Service and the Cling
23 Family Distinguished Fellow in U.S.-China Studies at
24 Georgetown University. His expertise stems from his East
25 Asia policy experience on the National Security Council and

1 as a top advisor to President Obama. And Dr. Medeiros was
2 fortunate to grow up in Providence, Rhode Island, and I
3 commend you for that.

4 Finally, Mr. Matt Pottinger is a Distinguished Visiting
5 Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. He
6 served previously on the National Security Council and as
7 Deputy National Security Advisor from 2019 to 2021, where he
8 led the administration's work on the Indo-Pacific region, in
9 particular its new emphasis on China policy.

10 We are grateful to have such an accomplished and wide-
11 ranging panel of experts with us to discuss this important
12 issue.

13 The Department of Defense has appropriately identified
14 the Indo-Pacific as its "priority theater" and China as the
15 "pacing threat" for the United States military. In the next
16 10 years, the Indo-Pacific region is projected to generate
17 two-thirds of the global economy and be home to two-thirds
18 of the global population.

19 For the past several decades, China has studied the
20 United States' way of war and focused its efforts on
21 offsetting our advantages. This strategy has achieved
22 results, largely because China began without any significant
23 legacy systems to maintain and built from the ground up,
24 investing in disruptive technologies like AI, quantum
25 computing, hypersonics, and biotechnology, and stealing

1 enormous amounts of intellectual property from other
2 countries.

3 But despite its impressive military buildup, we must
4 not assume that China is "ten feet tall." In the coming
5 years, China faces a number of challenges both at home and
6 abroad, including a significantly aging population, a push
7 by Chinese minority groups for humane treatment by the
8 government, and growing distrust and hostility toward
9 China's predatory behavior around the world. I would
10 welcome the witnesses' views on this aspect of our
11 competition.

12 There is also broad consensus that our comparative
13 advantage over China is our network of partners and allies
14 in the region and globally. Strengthening that network
15 should be at the center of any strategy for the Indo-Pacific
16 region, but we must avoid making our approach "all about
17 China" or we will risk isolating ourselves and alienating
18 the very partners we will rely on. As the National Security
19 Council Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs, Kurt Campbell,
20 said recently, "The best China policy really is a good Asia
21 policy." Given economic, cultural, and geographic ties, we
22 cannot simply ask other nations to choose between us and
23 China. We have to present a more attractive alternative,
24 and this is the very essence of competition.

25 In that vein, the maturation of the Quadrilateral

1 Security Dialogue, or Quad, involving the United States,
2 Japan, India, and Australia, presents a strategic
3 opportunity to establish a durable framework in the Indo-
4 Pacific. We are already seeing this potential in the Quad's
5 work to improve COVID-19 vaccine distribution, and it is my
6 hope that the Quad will continue to develop into a platform
7 for engaging other regional partners. I would ask that the
8 witnesses share their perspectives on how we can best manage
9 this multinational and multilateral relationship.

10 In order to maintain and boost our military advantage,
11 the Armed Services Committee created the Pacific Deterrence
12 Initiative, or PDI, to better align DoD resources in support
13 of military-to-military partnerships to address the
14 challenges posed by China, and PDI will remain a priority of
15 this committee.

16 As we seek to more effectively compete with China
17 through PDI and other military and non-military initiatives,
18 we must also find new and better ways to responsibly manage
19 this strategic competition and help to prevent hostilities
20 between our two nations. Much has been written about the
21 history of conflict between established and rising powers.
22 History need not repeat itself, and armed conflict between
23 the United States and China is not inevitable. Intended or
24 not, such a conflict would be extremely costly to both sides
25 and disastrous for the world.

1 We have many serious questions before us, and I am
2 delighted we have such significant and wise witnesses to
3 help us sort through these issues.

4 Now let me now recognize the ranking member.

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1 STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR FROM
2 OKLAHOMA

3 Senator Inhofe: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and also
4 thank you for the great witnesses that we have, that we
5 collectively brought in at the right time. We have some
6 problems right now that we need to recognize, and we know
7 that China is a full spectrum threat. They are competing
8 with us in every area -- economics, technology, military,
9 diplomacy, information warfare. Our witnesses today will
10 give us a good idea of how China blends all of its tools of
11 national power to achieve its objectives. That is something
12 we need to do better here.

13 The 2018 National Defense Strategy, this document here,
14 oriented the United States military toward competition with
15 China. I think we have done a good job of pressing the
16 Pentagon to implement that strategy. The Biden
17 administration's Interim National Security Strategic
18 Guidance should focus the entire Federal Government, not
19 just the military, on long-term competition with China.

20 But it has failed to do that. This year's budget does
21 not resource our troops at the levels necessary to carry out
22 this 2018 NDS. President Biden wants to lead first with
23 diplomacy, but we know a strong military underwrites
24 effective diplomacy. We learned and others, including
25 Ronald Reagan.

1 We have got a budget that cuts defense when we need
2 real growth. You see the impact everywhere, underfunding of
3 ships, aircraft, munitions, and more, and that includes the
4 Pacific Deterrence Initiative, which the chairman
5 referenced. And there is just clearly a disconnect from our
6 language last year, from the language now.

7 We also just received the military unfunded priorities.
8 Let's be straight. These are not wish lists. These are
9 military commanders telling us the combat risks we are
10 taking by not adequately resourcing our strategy, and risk
11 means deaths.

12 We are not making hard choices. We are making bad
13 choices. We also have not yet reoriented most of the U.S.
14 Government to great power competition. Our executive
15 agencies do not coordinate very well. We consistently and
16 constantly ask the military to do things it should not do
17 when our Federal agencies have failed to take action. We do
18 not coordinate very well in Congress either. For the last
19 month or so, we have been working on so-called China Bill,
20 but key national security committees, including this one,
21 were not consulted at all in the hurried and chaotic
22 approach to this bill. So to counter China's comprehensive
23 strategy in this long-term competition we need well-thought-
24 out bipartisan and effective legislation instead of the
25 rushed language that we have now.

1 I know our witnesses. They are the right ones at the
2 right time. I appreciate the fact that they are here. They
3 are very much needed, and I look forward to their comments.

4 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

5 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Inhofe. And now let
6 me recognize Ms. Glaser for her testimony.

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1 STATEMENT OF BONNIE S. GLASER, DIRECTOR, ASIA PROGRAM,
2 GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES

3 Ms. Glaser: Thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
4 Inhofe, and distinguished members of the committee, thank
5 you for the opportunity to testify today at this important
6 hearing.

7 For some time to come, China will be the top strategic
8 competitor of the United States, and therefore the U.S. must
9 prepare for multidimensional competition with China. My
10 written testimony focuses on three issues: China's gray
11 zone tactics in support of its strategic objectives,
12 deterrence in the Taiwan Strait and U.S. policy toward
13 Taiwan, and the role of U.S.-China military ties in
14 deterring conflict and managing escalation.

15 China has developed an expansive toolkit to advance its
16 interests and goals. Increasingly prominent among these
17 tools are gray zone tactics, activities of non-traditional
18 statecraft that are designed to achieve strategic advantage
19 without resorting to or provoking use of force. These
20 tactics include economic coercion, cyber and information
21 operations, disinformation campaigns, military pressure, and
22 state-controlled paramilitary maritime forces.

23 China's confidence in its gray zone arsenal reduces its
24 reliance on military force to secure favorable outcome, but
25 it also complicates the ability of the U.S. to respond

1 effectively to deter Chinese bullying and to reassure allies
2 and partners. China is using U.S. avoidance of risk to its
3 advantage. It employs gray zone tactics because the costs
4 are minimal.

5 The U.S. should be more proactive rather than reactive
6 in its approach to China's gray zone challenges. In
7 particular, the U.S. and its allies must be willing to incur
8 some degree of escalation risk to effectively deter and
9 respond to gray zone coercion. We must also develop means
10 to impose greater costs on China for its malign behavior in
11 places like the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.

12 Taiwan remains the most dangerous potential flashpoint
13 between the United States and China. China's priority is to
14 deter Taiwan independence. Unification is a longer-term
15 goal that Beijing prefers to achieve without bloodshed. It
16 is employing a vast array of tools designed to undermine the
17 confidence of the people of Taiwan in their government, and
18 weaken their will to resist integration with China.

19 The U.S. can and should take measures to bolster
20 Taiwan's security and cross-Strait deterrence, and I propose
21 ways to do that in my written testimony. However,
22 abandoning the longstanding U.S. policy of ambiguity
23 regarding whether the United States would come to Taiwan's
24 defense could provoke rather than deter a Chinese invasion
25 of Taiwan.

1 Finally, the U.S.-China military relationship is an
2 important component of the bilateral relationship that
3 should be integrated into U.S. strategy. Mounting strategic
4 mistrust and systemic rivalry between the U.S. and China
5 have increased the need for regular dialogue to clarify
6 strategic intentions and avoid misunderstanding, as well as
7 for mechanisms to reduce risk, avoid accidents, and manage
8 crises.

9 Top U.S. and Chinese leaders should reaffirm the
10 importance of dialogue between the two militaries, as well
11 as the establishment and enforcement of bilateral mechanisms
12 aimed at crisis communication, risk reduction, and
13 confidence building. The bilateral MOUs, signed in 2014, on
14 rules of behavior for safety of air and maritime encounters
15 can be strengthened by making them binding, rather than
16 voluntary.

17 The Code of Unplanned Encounters at Sea should be
18 extended to non-naval vessels. Dialogues on strategic
19 stability, and deconflicting U.S. and Chinese forces in
20 potential Korean Peninsula contingencies should also be
21 pursued. Crisis communication links between the U.S. and
22 Chinese defense establishments should be expanded to theater
23 commands and used frequently. Nevertheless, it will be
24 difficult to overcome Beijing's reluctance to use hotlines
25 in a crisis, due to the nature of its political system.

1 I will end my oral remarks here, and look forward to
2 your questions. Thank you.

3 [The prepared statement of Ms. Glaser follows:]

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1 Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Ms. Glaser. Dr.
2 Greitens, please.

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1 STATEMENT OF DR. SHEENA CHESTNUT GREITENS, ASSOCIATE
2 PROFESSOR, LYNDON B. JOHNSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS,
3 UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN

4 Ms. Greitens: Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe,
5 and distinguished Senators, thank you for having me today to
6 discuss this defining challenge for American foreign policy
7 and national security. My written statement focuses on how
8 internal security priorities shape repression inside China
9 and China's behavior abroad.

10 In 2014, Xi Jinping introduced what he termed the
11 "Comprehensive National Security Concept." In 2015, he
12 launched China's first-ever national security strategy.
13 What China calls national security, however, is probably
14 better translated as state security. Chinese sources are
15 clear that national security work is actually centered on
16 internal security, and the central objective is preservation
17 of the Chinese Communist Party and China's socialist system
18 with Xi Jinping at the core.

19 This new strategy calls on the party state to
20 proactively address threats of both physical harm and
21 ideological contamination to guard against external threats,
22 destabilizing China internally, and to prevent and control
23 risks to internal stability and party control. Political
24 threats are often described as viruses, and leaders speak of
25 the need to immunize the Chinese body politic, implicitly

1 acknowledging that many of their interventions target
2 citizens who have, as yet, exhibited no symptoms.

3 This framework explains much of the PRC's recent, more
4 proactive, and more repressive behavior. It explains why,
5 since 2014, the CCP has reorganized both the military and
6 the internal security apparatus, purged senior leadership of
7 both organizations on the grounds that corruption erodes the
8 party's ruling foundation and has achieved national security
9 threat, passed a dozen new national security laws that have
10 both internal and extraterritorial reach, and dramatically
11 boosted spending on internal security and surveillance in an
12 effort to create what leaders call a "multidimensional
13 information-based prevention and control system for public
14 security."

15 Internationally, the PRC has sought to shape global
16 regulation of surveillance technology to be compatible with
17 China's own surveillance ecosystem, exported surveillance
18 platforms to at least 80 countries, and expanded its
19 international policing and law enforcement activities in an
20 effort to shape global security governance. And on its
21 periphery, China has engaged in conflict on the Indian
22 border, escalated military activity around Taiwan and
23 coercive pressure in the South China Sea, cracked down on
24 Hong Kong, and escalated repression in Xinjiang, resulting
25 in grossly disproportionate violations of human rights.

1 What does this framework mean for American competition
2 with China? Let me offer four main thoughts. First, the
3 CCP's central objective, as it directs the levers of
4 national power at home and abroad, is to solidify its own
5 ruling status. Some of the chief tools that it uses in
6 doing so are nonmilitary, and some are tools developed for
7 purposes of internal control but used beyond China's
8 borders. Thus, while military competition remains central,
9 the United States must also understand, predict, and address
10 the use of these other tools, which are often used and
11 prioritized by the CCP itself.

12 Second, the emphasis on regime security may somewhat
13 complicate the task of reassurance in U.S.-China relations.
14 The U.S. must address China's legitimate interests, but at
15 the same time cannot and should not be in the business of
16 assuring the CCP of its perpetual hold on political power.

17 Third, the United States must develop a robust
18 interagency strategy to address China's efforts to shape
19 global governance of both surveillance technology and law
20 enforcement, to ensure that the frameworks that operate
21 internationally protect democracy, basic human rights, and
22 fundamental freedoms.

23 Fourth, the interlinking of internal and external
24 security puts stress on Chinese diaspora populations
25 worldwide. This manifests in a wide range of challenges,

1 from talent programs and illicit technology transfer to
2 extraterritorial surveillance of ethnic minorities and
3 activists, to concerns about organizations like Chinese
4 Student and Scholar Associations on American campuses. It
5 is entirely possible to address these challenges in ways
6 that avoid racism and focus on the core problem, the party
7 state's extension of its internal structures and sometimes
8 its repressive practices abroad, but only if we correctly
9 diagnose these problems in the first place.

10 Thank you for your time. I look forward to your
11 questions.

12 [The prepared statement of Ms. Greitens follows:]

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1 Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Doctor. Now let
2 me recognize Dr. Medeiros.

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1 STATEMENT OF DR. EVAN S. MEDEIROS, PENNER FAMILY CHAIR
2 IN ASIA STUDIES IN THE SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE AND THE
3 CLING FAMILY DISTINGUISHED FELLOW IN U.S.-CHINA STUDIES,
4 GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

5 Mr. Medeiros: Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe,
6 distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
7 opportunity to join you today to discuss U.S.-China
8 strategic competition. Mr. Chairman, as a native of the
9 great state of Rhode Island, it is a particular pleasure to
10 share my views with your committee today.

11 It has become trite but accurate to point out that the
12 U.S.-China relationship is the most consequential one in
13 global politics today. But this claim is accurate not only
14 because U.S.-China ties have become contentious and
15 competitive, but because the competition is multifaceted,
16 dynamic, and may ultimately be a greater challenge than the
17 Soviet Union ever was.

18 To understand this, my testimony today will briefly
19 touch on three issues: the changing global and regional
20 context for U.S.-China competition, the nature of the U.S.-
21 China relationships and the meaning of strategic
22 competition, and third, recommendations for U.S. policy.

23 First, in terms of the global and regional context, the
24 current global context for major power competition differs
25 from previous eras in several important ways and in ways

1 that redound to the benefit of U.S. interests. Contemporary
2 global politics is not purely multipolar, which would allow
3 competition among major powers to be intensive, ultimately
4 constraining U.S. policy options and resources. Today's
5 global order is a mix of unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar
6 elements.

7 The current order is not a blank-slate world of 1945,
8 in which the system needs to be rebuilt from the ground up.
9 Rather, major power competition today is re-emerging in the
10 context of a diversity of widely accepted rules, norms, and
11 institutions.

12 And thirdly, unlike past eras, major power competition
13 is unfolding non-institutionalized the context of the
14 existence of multiple nuclear weapon states, complex
15 economic interdependence, and the relative prevalence of
16 democracy. This plays to numerous U.S. advantages.

17 In Asia, the regional context is also important. A
18 basic and enduring strategic reality for many policymakers
19 in Asia is this: no one in Asia wants China to dominate,
20 but at the same time no one in Asia wants to have to choose
21 between the United States and China, including those
22 countries who are most aligned with U.S. interests and
23 values.

24 The space in between these two views is the current
25 geopolitical reality for most Asian policymakers, and

1 American ones too. U.S. policy should be forged with this
2 reality in mind, because it will impact the extent to which
3 U.S. allies, partners, and friends in Asia will be willing
4 to adopt risky and costly strategies of competition in
5 coordination with the United States.

6 So what does this mean for the U.S.-China relationship
7 today? The current U.S.-China relationship has the
8 following core characteristics. First, U.S.-China
9 competition is intensifying and diversifying. The
10 longstanding differences on issues of security and economics
11 have become sharper in recent years. There are also new
12 sources of competition in the relationship coming online,
13 and in particular, in my testimony I focus on the challenges
14 of technology and differences in governance and values.

15 Number two, domestic politics in both countries are
16 playing a greater role in shaping the relationship. We may
17 be entering a period in which domestic politics will play a
18 central, if not a defining role in the trajectory of the
19 bilateral relationship.

20 Third, new U.S.-China dynamics are emerging as
21 strategic competition intensifies and diversifies. Both
22 Washington and Beijing are now pursuing more openly
23 competitive and sometimes confrontational policies in which
24 both sides are now taking risks as they probe the limits of
25 the other, motivated by ambition and frustration as well as

1 new capabilities.

2 Fourth, the risk of U.S.-China conflict is real.
3 Credible scenarios for accidents, miscalculation, and
4 deliberate actions exist and carry a heightened risk of
5 escalation to armed conflict.

6 And then lastly, the traditional U.S. toolkit to reduce
7 mistrust, manage disagreement, and bound competition, such
8 as strategic dialogue, reassurance, and cooperation, has
9 proven to be of limited value.

10 So what should the United States do about this? I
11 would argue, as I do in my testimony, that a strategic
12 competition expands and intensifies and as the risk of armed
13 conflict grows, the strategy challenge for American
14 policymakers is immediate and complicated. The solution is
15 not as simple as push back against China in all areas, using
16 every tool, and at the same time. Washington needs to adopt
17 a more tailored approach that seeks to alter Beijing's
18 perceptions, incentives, choices, and, ultimately, its
19 behavior, by both shaping the environment around China and
20 also dealing directly with Beijing. This will require a
21 dynamic mix of strategies, including security balancing,
22 binding China to new and existing institutions, and
23 promoting diplomatic dialogue and interaction.

24 The core challenge for U.S. strategy is to deter a
25 growing diversity of Chinese behaviors while remaining

1 connected to allies and partners and not increasing the risk
2 of armed conflict. In my testimony, I highlight three
3 specific areas of policy action. First, bolster deterrence.
4 The United States needs to get serious about strengthening
5 deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, both the general and
6 specific varieties of deterrence. The Pentagon's response
7 should focus on modernization, diversification, and
8 resilience of U.S. posture in the region. The U.S. military
9 needs to develop new concepts of operation for fighting in
10 highly contested environments.

11 Second recommendation, expanding operations with allies
12 and partners. There is much the United States can do to
13 expand the quality and quantity of military cooperation
14 among allies and partners. For example, the connection
15 should be more focused on specific military mission sets
16 such as area denial in the South China Sea. Such
17 connectivity should focus on better hub-and-spoke alignment
18 as well as more spoke-to-spoke alignment.

19 U.S. should coordinate with allies not just in Asia but
20 in Europe as well, to encourage them to think more
21 systematically about their security interests in the Indo-
22 Pacific. The upcoming NATO summit would be a good
23 opportunity to do so.

24 My final recommendation is to explore U.S.-China
25 interactions. In other words, beyond U.S. actions in Asia

1 and around China, the United States should consider a
2 variety of ways to conduct direct dialogue with China.
3 Building a credible and sustainable strategy toward Asia and
4 China requires a deliberate approach toward interaction with
5 Chinese officials. I support the Biden administration's
6 judicious approach to date toward dialogue with China, and
7 specifically their careful and deliberate sequencing of
8 actions in support of a whole-of-government approach toward
9 strategic competition with China.

10 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

11 [The prepared statement of Mr. Medeiros follows:]

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1 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Dr. Medeiros, and you
2 receive the right-on-time bonus, so I hope you appreciate
3 it.

4 Mr. Pottinger, please.

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1 STATEMENT OF MATT F. POTTINGER, FORMER ASSISTANT TO
2 THE PRESIDENT AND DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR;
3 DISTINGUISHED VISITING FELLOW, THE HOOVER INSTITUTION,
4 STANFORD UNIVERSITY

5 Mr. Pottinger: Chairman Reed, Senator Inhofe, it is a
6 privilege to appear before your committee today.

7 The free world was slow to realize it, but the
8 adversarial relationship between Washington and Beijing did
9 not begin with Xi Jinping's rise to power in 2012. It began
10 three decades ago, when the Chinese Communist Party revised
11 its grand strategy at the end of the Cold War. At the time,
12 Beijing had been shaken by three historic events: the 1989
13 pro-democracy protests in Tiananmen Square; the lopsided,
14 American-led victory over Saddam Hussein's forces in early
15 1991; and the collapse of the Soviet Union, later in 1991.

16 As Rush Doshi wrote in his recent book, *The Long Game*,
17 quote, "The United States quickly replaced the Soviet Union
18 as China's primary security concern, that in turn led to a
19 new grand strategy, and a 30-year struggle to displace
20 American power was born," close quote.

21 So China's grand strategy aimed first to dilute
22 American influence in Asia, and then to displace American
23 power from the region, and ultimately to dominate a global
24 order in ways that suit and promote Beijing's authoritarian
25 model.

1 While Xi Jinping didn't father this strategy, he has
2 accelerated it. Beijing's old guiding precept that it
3 should, quote, "hide its capabilities and bide its time" has
4 given way to new slogans that China, quote, "take center
5 stage" in the world and build "a community of common destiny
6 for mankind."

7 Beijing's economic strategy, which was
8 institutionalized in the party's latest 5-year plan, is to
9 dominate supply chains, to make the world more dependent on
10 Chinese high-tech exports, and more dependent on its huge
11 market for low-tech imports, and then to use the accumulated
12 leverage to try to extract political concessions from
13 countries around the world. Beijing has already
14 experimented with this approach by restricting trade with
15 Australia, Canada, South Korea, the Philippines, Mongolia,
16 and others, to try to force changes in those countries' laws
17 and in their internal politics and judicial processes.

18 So U.S. policy towards China, during the Trump and
19 Biden administrations, is best thought of as a
20 counterstrategy to Beijing's 30-year-old grand strategy.

21 There are few areas where we need to strengthen our
22 counterstrategy urgently. First is in the realm of what
23 Beijing calls "information warfare." Free countries must
24 work together to counter the CCP's malign narratives,
25 leverage our values, and also make common cause with the

1 Chinese people.

2 Second is in the realm of finance. Without
3 congressional action and oversight, the retirement savings
4 of U.S. citizens will continue to flow into Beijing's
5 military modernization and into Chinese entities that are
6 complicit in crimes against humanity, including genocide.

7 Third, we must ensure that the United States beats
8 Beijing in the race for high-tech supremacy, not only by
9 running faster but also by actively frustrating the
10 Communist Party's attempts at self-sufficiency in the all-
11 important area of semiconductors.

12 Thank you.

13 [The prepared statement of Mr. Pottinger follows:]

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1 Chairman Reed: Well, thank you very much to all the
2 witnesses for your excellent testimony. And beginning with
3 Ms. Glaser, we have all emphasized the formidable strength
4 that China is displaying, but I think we have to also look
5 at potential vulnerabilities and how we might exploit them.
6 So starting with Ms. Glaser, could you comment about the
7 vulnerabilities that China is looking at and how we can
8 exploit them? What is keeping Xi up at night?

9 Ms. Glaser: Well, thank you for that question,
10 Senator. I think there is a great deal that keeps Xi
11 Jinping up at night -- whether or not the party will
12 continue to have legitimacy. We saw, for example, in the
13 early days of the pandemic, quite a bit of criticism of the
14 Chinese Communist Party among average people. So that is an
15 immediate problem but it is a longstanding concern that Xi
16 Jinping has.

17 Secondly, I think the demographic issue is something
18 that keeps Xi Jinping up at night. The Chinese are now
19 trying to encourage women to have three children, but there
20 are many who do not want to have any, or at most want to
21 have one.

22 I think that the perhaps biggest vulnerability that
23 China has is that it really does not have allies, and this
24 is something that, of course, the United States can exploit,
25 because we can bring together a network of countries to work

1 with us, yes, to push back, but also to make our own
2 democracies and societies more resilient. It is not just
3 that the Chinese choose not to have alliances, but countries
4 around them really do not want to be China's best friend.
5 They just do not want to be China's enemy. So this is an
6 area that I think really plays to our advantage.

7 Finally, I will just say it is a question mark as to
8 whether or not we should try to sow instability in China.
9 My view is that that is dangerous, that that would likely
10 shore up support for the party and make them tougher. But I
11 do think that we should be getting information, where
12 possible, into China about facts, what is happening in the
13 real world, and in democracy, and in their own country.
14 Thank you.

15 Chairman Reed: Thank you. Dr. Greitens, your
16 comments, please.

17 Ms. Greitens: Thank you very much. I think one of the
18 advantages that the United States has is, as Ms. Glaser
19 mentioned, the network of allies and partners that the
20 United States has, not only in the Indo-Pacific but
21 globally. Many of those partnerships also share a strong
22 commitment to democratic values, and that is a second
23 strength that I would identify of the United States in the
24 competition that it is engaged in with the PRC.

25 In terms of the things that keep Xi Jinping up at

1 night, I think my statement made clear that I view him as
2 fundamentally motivated, as is most of the Chinese
3 leadership, by concern about maintaining the leadership
4 position and the ruling status of the Chinese Communist
5 Party, and so many of their activities, both internally and
6 externally, are directed at that end. In my view, the
7 United States needs to use that largely as a tool to
8 understand and predict Chinese strategy and understand where
9 it interferes with and compromises American values and
10 American national security, as well as the security and
11 interests of our partners and allies abroad. That is a very
12 complex interagency challenge, but in my view that should be
13 the framing orientation of the strategy that we form for
14 this competition. Thank you.

15 Chairman Reed: Thank you. Mr. Medeiros, please.

16 Mr. Medeiros: Chairman Reed, I think, first and
17 foremost, Xi Jinping is focused on how to sustain economic
18 momentum. So much of the basis of Chinese powers rests on
19 the large, growing, and modernizing Chinese economy, and yet
20 the Chinese economy still runs the risk of falling into the
21 middle-income trap. And Xi Jinping needs to continue the
22 rebalancing of the Chinese economy from exports and
23 investment, the old drivers, to consumption in services, the
24 new drivers, in order to avoid falling into the middle-
25 income trap.

1 And so the Chinese leadership, I think, faces a variety
2 of challenges in dealing with economic imbalances at the
3 heart of its economy, in particular such as its large and
4 growing debt. So if the Chinese economy, the momentum of
5 the Chinese economy were to stall, that would not only
6 create challenges at home but I think it would also raise
7 questions about China's global reach.

8 Second and final point is that I think a major
9 vulnerability for the Chinese leadership is their inability
10 to understand how the rest of the world sees them, and in
11 particular, how much of the world sees Chinese behavior as
12 non-transparent, coercive, and predatory, and their growing
13 use of those kinds of tactics have been a negative for them
14 in recent years. Thank you.

15 Chairman Reed: Thank you. Mr. Pottinger, and time is
16 limited, but your comments, please.

17 Mr. Pottinger: Sir, I think that one of the key
18 vulnerabilities of the Chinese Communist Party is that it
19 does not actually view the United States as its chief
20 adversary. It views its own people as the biggest threat to
21 its rule. That is why they spend more money on surveilling
22 and controlling their own population through their security
23 apparatus than they even spend on their military. They do
24 not stand for anything but their own power, and they know
25 that.

1 And I agree with my other colleagues here that the
2 economic model that they are pursuing is fundamentally
3 unsustainable. What appears to be an innovation economy is
4 actually innovation that has been largely siphoned from the
5 United States, from training here, from our smart capital,
6 from Silicon Valley, and I think that that will stall out.
7 That economic miracle will quickly stall out as Beijing
8 alienates more and more of its former partners around the
9 globe.

10 Chairman Reed: Thank you very much. Senator Inhofe,
11 please.

12 Senator Inhofe: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The PDI --
13 well, first of all, in my opening statement I mentioned it
14 did not really comport with our language in the Defense
15 Authorization Bill of 2021. Mr. Pottinger, General McMaster
16 tell us, of course, you were the top China expert during the
17 Trump administration. Now as I mentioned in my opening, the
18 budget request gets the Pacific Deterrence Initiative all
19 wrong. As I said, there was clearly a disconnect there, and
20 we will work with that with the Pentagon shortly here. PDI
21 is about having the right infrastructure and combat-credible
22 U.S. military force posture west of the International Date
23 Line to deter and compete with China. It is not about
24 buying ships and aircraft.

25 From your time, Mr. Pottinger, at the NSC in the

1 military arena, do Chinese leaders pay close attention to
2 the military infrastructure and forces we have stationed
3 forward in theater? Do our allies and partners pay a lot of
4 attention to the PDI, and what it funds?

5 Mr. Pottinger: Senator Inhofe, thank you. Absolutely,
6 the answer is a resounding yes on both those fronts. The
7 Chinese Communist Party, every time we expand our
8 infrastructure and give ourselves more places to operate out
9 of, it complicates, quite badly, their military strategy.
10 It complicates their plans for things like coercing Taiwan,
11 and they notice it. And our allies notice it just as much,
12 right? My experience was that a lot of our partners around
13 the region usually knew our defense budget better than we
14 did. They noticed every dollar that was committed or
15 withdrawn from FMF sales or from training and other
16 activities in the region.

17 So I couldn't agree more that the PDI is really about
18 building infrastructure, it is about improving our force
19 posture in theater, giving us that versatility and that
20 redundancy to be a formidable deterrent.

21 Senator Inhofe: That is good. Dr. Greitens, the
22 Chinese Communist Party has built a police state that would
23 make the Soviets blush, but they are doing it with new
24 technology, and they are exporting the technology that makes
25 monitoring and repression possible. How are they using that

1 technology to repress the Uyghurs and the people of Hong
2 Kong, and what should the United States do to fight back
3 against the global proliferation of this technology?

4 Ms. Greitens: Thank you, Senator. There is a lot in
5 that question. Let me try to answer concisely. We often
6 hear a lot about the fancy technology that collects data
7 from Chinese citizens, but the heart of the surveillance
8 project is actually the back-end database and platforms that
9 put all of this information from different collection points
10 together. That is what enables the CCP to look at your
11 behavior, know where your parents work, where your children
12 or child goes to school, your ID number, your passport and
13 travel history, your religion, to use facial recognition to
14 identify how many times you scanned into the mosque this
15 week, whether you have bought gas, or bought a knife
16 recently, just to take a few examples.

17 All of that can be put together in an algorithm, and we
18 have seen that when the use of this kind of surveillance
19 technology was applied in Urumqi or Xinjiang, for example,
20 visits to religious sites dropped off sharply, because if
21 you hit a certain quota in the algorithm you would be
22 flagged for detention and re-education, and that made
23 people, quite frankly, afraid to pray.

24 So that is the role that surveillance and these
25 surveillance algorithms play in the repressive project that

1 the CCP has constructed, especially in Xinjiang. And that
2 same national security framework, under last year's Hong
3 Kong national security law is now being applied and is in
4 the process of being constructed in Hong Kong as well.

5 I think that there are a couple of steps the United
6 States could and should take. First of all, the United
7 States really needs a robust interagency strategy to address
8 the proliferation of Chinese surveillance technology
9 worldwide. That includes a plan for engaging more actively
10 with international organizations that are involved in
11 technology standard setting. It includes a lot of the
12 efforts that some of my colleagues have mentioned today,
13 about making sure that the United States is competitive in
14 key technologies and that those technologies are protected
15 from illicit tech transfer to China.

16 And we also need to recognize that some of the
17 countries that are adopting Chinese surveillance technology
18 are doing it because they are trying to solve a governance
19 problem, like crime, and this technology does not actually
20 work very well for solving crime problems, in most cases.
21 But we need to address the underlying challenges that are
22 leading some of those countries to turn to China, and we
23 need to make sure that we have robust efforts to do that.

24 Finally, I will say that when repression increases
25 domestically, the only available sites of opposition and

1 pursuit of freedom often move abroad. And so the United
2 States could, and I believe should, take steps to support
3 people from Hong Kong, for example, who want to claim
4 refugee or asylum status in the United States, given the
5 increasing climate of political persecution there. Thank
6 you.

7 Senator Inhofe: Thank you, Dr. Greitens. You covered
8 it all. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

9 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Let me
10 recognize Senator Shaheen, please.

11 Senator Shaheen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
12 you to each of you for testifying this morning.

13 Dr. Medeiros, in your statement you pointed out that
14 many countries do not want to have to choose between the
15 United States and China. So how do we better position the
16 United States as the preferred partner?

17 Mr. Medeiros: Senator Shaheen, excellent question.
18 The simple answer is raise our game. Devote more time and
19 energy toward modernizing our military so our partners in
20 Asia know that we are a highly capable partner. A second
21 critical component is ensuring that the United States has a
22 viable economic strategy toward the Asia-Pacific. One of
23 China's greatest advantages is that its economy is large,
24 growing, and present in Asia. And so one of the principal
25 reasons allies and partners are torn is because American

1 provides security, China provides growth. The United States
2 needs to get in the game of growth, modernization, and
3 innovation, and I think the administration would do well to
4 articulate a more robust strategy of economic engagement in
5 Asia. Thank you.

6 Senator Shaheen: You also talked about the prospect
7 for expanding. I translated it as expanding training with
8 our allies in the region, and the importance of NATO looking
9 at China as being an issue that is critical to the NATO
10 countries. As NATO looks at preparing the 2030 new mission
11 document, how do we convince our other NATO partners that
12 they should also be worried about China?

13 Mr. Medeiros: Senator, the current Secretary General
14 of NATO has actually been quite consistently outspoken about
15 his concerns about China. I just heard him talk about China
16 on NPR this morning. So I think what the United States
17 should do is develop a systematic, diplomatic campaign to
18 reach out to the many members of NATO to talk them through
19 the changes in Chinese diplomatic strategy, economic
20 coercion, as others in today's hearing have talked about, as
21 well as military modernization, so they can come to
22 understand the nature of the challenge we face by China. I
23 think it is going to require careful, systematic diplomacy
24 in order for NATO countries, who normally associate their
25 interests with Europe and do not think about the Asia-

1 Pacific, to understand how connected their interests are in
2 the face of a rising China and the emergency of U.S.-China
3 strategic competition. Thank you.

4 Senator Shaheen: Thank you. Mr. Pottinger, you
5 expressed your concern about allowing our thrift savings
6 plan to be invested in China, which I certainly share. Are
7 there other aspects of our financial system that we ought to
8 be looking at in terms of China's ability to use our
9 financing system to their own benefit?

10 Mr. Pottinger: Thanks, Senator, and thanks for your
11 own support of that thrift savings plan issue, which was
12 extremely effective. I think that the new Executive order
13 that President Biden signed, which sort of refreshes a
14 couple of President Trump's Executive orders designed to
15 blacklist certain Chinese companies so that Americans can no
16 longer invest in companies that are involved in gross human
17 rights violations or in their military modernization, that
18 list, in my view, through very close congressional
19 oversight, needs to expand dramatically. Right now it is 59
20 companies. That is a good start. It probably needs to grow
21 by a couple orders of magnitude.

22 Another area to look at would be potentially looking at
23 almost a reverse CFIUS type of body. In other words,
24 screening American outbound investment headed towards China
25 to make sure that it comports with our national security

1 interests.

2 Senator Shaheen: Thank you. Ms. Glaser, the United
3 States Innovation and Competition Act also includes \$52
4 billion in emergency appropriations to support domestic
5 semiconductor development production. How important do you
6 think it is for us to make those investments, or do you
7 think it is important to make those investments in
8 semiconductor development so that we can compete in that
9 realm?

10 Ms. Glaser: Thank you for the question, Senator. I
11 think it is critically important for the United States to
12 invest in semiconductors, and we have seen, just in this
13 current period, because of disruptions that have taken place
14 and changes in demand for certain types of chips, that there
15 are now shortages around the world. This is a national
16 security issue and one in which the United States must be
17 competitive. So we have to work, of course, with allies and
18 partners and other suppliers. We have to figure out which
19 parts of the supply chain we want to have here in the United
20 States, and we have to ensure that we are working closely
21 with Taiwan, because as you know, TSMC is the leading
22 company, the producer of chips, and it is terrific that they
23 are going to be investing in Arizona. It will be a small
24 plant, but we have to develop our own capabilities here.
25 Thank you.

1 Senator Shaheen: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

2 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator
3 Wicker, please.

4 Senator Wicker: Let's let all the panelists respond to
5 Senator Shaheen's question about semiconductors and the
6 larger question about what we are trying to do on the floor
7 this last few weeks in this frontier and R&D. Start with
8 Mr. Pottinger and go to my left. Are we on the right track?
9 Are we spending too much money there? What advice do you
10 have for us these last few days in this frontier?

11 Mr. Pottinger: Senator, thank you. I think that we
12 are moving in the right direction. We do need to pay to
13 bring back some of that fab capacity that we have lost over
14 the decades, in large part because competitors, primarily
15 now China, are subsidizing heavily those sectors. But it is
16 not enough to run faster, by which I mean spending more on
17 our own fab capacity, which is a very laudable objective.
18 We also need to use our Commerce Department authorities much
19 more sharply to ensure that China does not subsidize its way
20 to dominating the semiconductor sector, including those
21 fabs.

22 Senator Wicker: Dr. Medeiros, can you take a few
23 seconds to answer that?

24 Mr. Medeiros: Sure. I agree with Mr. Pottinger. I
25 think U.S. strategy in this area on technology,

1 semiconductors in particular, needs to be a combination of
2 investing in American capabilities, in particular basic and
3 applied R&D that is going to be essential, but you also want
4 to slow down the competitor to some degree. But I would
5 also encourage you to apply this strategy not just to
6 semiconductors but also other areas of technology like 5G,
7 in which I think it is going to be important for the United
8 States to establish a lead in the future. Thank you.

9 Senator Wicker: Okay. I am out of time on that so I
10 have to move on. Mr. Pottinger, why is China prioritizing
11 naval expansion, and how does that fit into their long-term
12 strategic ambitions?

13 Mr. Pottinger: Right now, sir, the objective is to
14 take back Taiwan through either coercion or by making it
15 sort of a fait accompli, whereby the Chinese military makes
16 it more difficult over time for the United States to
17 actually intervene on Taiwan's behalf. That is the reason
18 why they have built a navy that now has more ships than the
19 United States Navy, by about 60 -- less tonnage, but more
20 ships than the United States.

21 If Taiwan falls, China will then be turning that navy
22 into a global navy that will challenge us in every part of
23 the world.

24 Senator Wicker: In terms of our shipbuilding budget,
25 what does that instruct us to do?

1 Mr. Pottinger: As Stalin said, "Quantity has a quality
2 all of its own." We do need more ships. We do have a
3 troubling window where ships that are going offline, ending
4 their terms of service, will leave a growing gap in the
5 Western Pacific. And so part of it is building existing
6 platforms and also working more on autonomous platforms
7 that, over time, will actually cost less but be highly
8 lethal and problematic for China's plans.

9 Senator Wicker: What is your advice to policymakers
10 about staying with strategic ambiguity with regard to Taiwan
11 or moving to a more strategic clarity position?

12 Mr. Pottinger: Sir, I think what China is going to be
13 looking at, more than the answer to that question, is, is
14 the United States actually investing where it needs to
15 invest, urgently, to create more capability? China is going
16 to be looking at our capability not only to respond but to
17 respond quickly to a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. And so it
18 to my mind those trajectories that we are currently on need
19 to be remedied through capability. That will go much
20 further in terms of deterring China than turning towards a
21 strategic.

22 Senator Wicker: When China sees the recent budget
23 request of the Biden administration, what does that tell
24 them?

25 Mr. Pottinger: I think that the PDI that we were just

1 discussing needs to be revamped urgently. I think that
2 growth in our defense budget is warranted, in light of the
3 nature of this threat, and China is going to notice.

4 Senator Wicker: Dr. Medeiros, you quote, approvingly,
5 some statements of Admiral Davidson, and yet just a third of
6 the requested funds recently coming from the administration
7 go to INDOPACOM's top priority, the Guam defense system. Is
8 that something you approve of -- and we are out of time but
9 can you comment quickly about that?

10 Mr. Medeiros: My analysis of Admiral Davidson's
11 statement was that it was a very, very robust laydown of the
12 kinds of acquisitions that the United States needs to make
13 in order to shore up conventional deterrence in the Asia-
14 Pacific. Senators, this is an urgent problem for the United
15 States. The U.S. needs to think differently and creatively
16 in the face of a fairly systematic, long-term effort by
17 China, to undermine U.S. power projection, and my
18 interpretation of Admiral Davidson's statement is that it
19 was a very robust conception, and I hope that that --

20 Senator Wicker: Can we do that on the cheap, sir? Can
21 we do that on the cheap?

22 Mr. Medeiros: I am not a budget expert. I do not know
23 if we can do it on the cheap. But my instinct is no.

24 Senator Wicker: Thank you.

25 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Wicker. Senator

1 Kaine, please.

2 Senator Kaine: Thank you, Mr. Chair and Ranking Member
3 Inhofe. Great testimony from our four witnesses today.

4 So one of my favorite articles is the George Kennan
5 piece, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" in Foreign Affairs in
6 1947, and here is a great quote. Kennan's basic point with
7 respect to the Soviet Union was U.S. strength, vis-à-vis the
8 Soviet Union, was first and foremost a question of our
9 internal strength. And he said, quote, "Exhibitions of
10 indecision, disunity, and internal disintegration within
11 this country have an exhilarating effect on the whole
12 communist movement. At each evidence of these tendencies a
13 thrill of hope and excitement goes through the communist
14 world."

15 I would argue that one of the most important things
16 that we need to, vis-à-vis China, is to be strong
17 internally. Things like the attack on the Capitol on
18 January 6th, and the dispute over the attack, and elected
19 leadership challenge, and the integrity of American
20 democratic elections are a much bigger obstacle for us than
21 any Chinese military investment.

22 I want to ask, Ms. Glaser, you a question. When you
23 were asked by Senator Shaheen, I believe, or maybe Senator
24 Reed, what keeps Chinese leadership up at night, one of the
25 things you mentioned is the U.S. network of alliances and

1 the fact that China, they may have relationships but not
2 alliances, that they are seen as too predatory, too
3 obviously focused on their own self-interest.

4 If that is the case, one of the areas I think we should
5 focus on is strengthening the alliances even more. And so I
6 view, for example, the upcoming Summit for Democracy that
7 President Biden has indicated he would hold, likely in 2022,
8 as a real opportunity for democracies all over the world to
9 band together, share best practices, be self-critical about
10 our own internal weaknesses, and link arms against
11 authoritarian nations. Would you agree that investment of
12 time in shoring up alliances and taking that to a new level
13 would be an effective strategy to counter China?

14 Ms. Glaser: Well, thank you, Senator Kaine. I could
15 not agree with you more. I think that the one thing that
16 China does really fear is the forging of a coalition of
17 countries. Whether or not we label it an anti-China
18 coalition is not really the point. It is how it is
19 perceived in China. A grouping of countries around the
20 world that are determined to support their democracies, that
21 are determined to defend their interests. And, of course,
22 there are cases in which there are countries that are not
23 democracies but we still want to be partners with them, and
24 I hope that we can find ways to expand those relationships,
25 and I think Vietnam, in particular, comes to mind.

1 The period, I think, during the Trump administration,
2 where some of our alliances were weakened -- and I do not
3 think that that was permanent, but I do think that there was
4 some questioning in our alliances -- that was a gift to
5 China, and the Chinese saw it that way. This is one change
6 in the Biden administration that the Chinese point out, time
7 and again, they are concerned about the Quad, that was
8 mentioned by Chairman Reed, they are concerned about the
9 upcoming NATO meetings in Europe that our President will
10 have, and they are concerned about the Summit for Democracy.
11 Thank you.

12 Senator Kaine: I think the Quad is a great example.
13 The first meeting of the Quad countries' actual political
14 leadership was around vaccine distribution. It was not
15 about military exercises, but it was about additional
16 vaccine production in India that could be used both in India
17 and throughout the Indo-Pacific. And I would encourage more
18 activity of that kind.

19 Dr. Greitens, you talked about the fact that China's
20 primary focus is the internal security, and you mentioned
21 the deplorable treatment of Uyghurs in China. I am the
22 Chair of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee over Western
23 Hemisphere and Global Democracy, and my subcommittee and the
24 East Asia Subcommittee of Foreign Relations, on Thursday, is
25 having a hearing focusing on persecution of the Uyghurs. I

1 tend to believe that anything we can do in this body to
2 shine a spotlight on the persecution of Uyghurs within
3 China, but also China's long arm into U.S. allies, like the
4 UAE and Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to get Uyghurs deported back
5 to China, I tend to think anything we can do to shine a
6 spotlight on that persecution is true to our values but also
7 helpful in the U.S.-China relationship. Would you agree
8 with that?

9 Ms. Greitens: Thank you, Senator, and thank you for
10 your leadership on that really important issue. I think it
11 is important that the United States understand what I would
12 describe as a somewhat below-the-radar effort to augment its
13 international law enforcement and police presence. That has
14 taken a number of different forms -- police liaisons,
15 extradition agreements, other forms of police cooperation,
16 training of foreign police officials at provincial or other
17 academies in China, and the export of surveillance
18 technology that is specifically used in policing and public
19 security, but then sometimes comes either with Chinese
20 involvement or expectations.

21 And so I think it is critically important that the
22 United States direct some attention and some resources
23 toward figuring out how to deal with the increasing
24 activity, globally, of Chinese police and public security
25 officials.

1 Senator Kaine: Great. Thank you very much. Thank
2 you, Mr. Chair.

3 Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Senator Kaine.
4 And now let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Fischer,
5 please.

6 Senator Fischer: Thank you, Senator Reed. Mr.
7 Pottinger, throughout the Cold War there were those who
8 argued that United States defense spending stimulated Soviet
9 spending on defense, and I recall that then Secretary of
10 Defense Harold Brown's rebuttal of that argument was his
11 famous line, "When we build, they build. When we cut, they
12 build."

13 Do you believe that the U.S. defense spending
14 stimulates China's investment in its military, and do you
15 believe reducing U.S. spending or force posture in the Indo-
16 Pacific would result in positive changes in Chinese behavior
17 or reduce their military spending?

18 Mr. Pottinger: Thank you, Senator. I think 30 years
19 ago you could argue, after China watched us mop up Saddam
20 Hussein's forces in the Gulf War, that we did stimulate some
21 Chinese spending. That was 30 years ago. China now spends
22 more than all of the countries of Asia combined. It is the
23 largest peacetime military buildup certainly in the modern
24 era, maybe one of the largest in history. So I do not think
25 that we are driving that. I think that it is incumbent upon

1 us to have a counterstrategy to actually more effectively,
2 to be able to deny China's ability, for example, to forcibly
3 subordinate Taiwan, including through some kind of fait
4 accompli attempt. So I agree with the sentiment that you
5 quoted.

6 Senator Fischer: Thank you. Ms. Glaser, do you have
7 anything to add?

8 Ms. Glaser: I would agree, Senator, with Matt
9 Pottinger on that issue. I think that the drivers of
10 China's military modernization are in large part in support
11 of what Xi Jinping has stated as his objective. In 2035,
12 2049, he has set out a series of goals, to make China
13 basically a professional military by 2035, and by 2049 to be
14 a top tier and peer competitor, or maybe even more capable
15 than the United States.

16 The focus, of course, is on the region, but I think
17 they also have global ambitions. So the way that China
18 shapes its own military and its posture is in response, in
19 part, to what the United States is doing and the access area
20 denial capabilities. But in terms of the size of that
21 budget and achieving China's ambitions, which Matt
22 rightfully said is to take Taiwan -- that is the top
23 priority -- I think that is driven by internal needs and
24 goals set in China, not in response to the United States.

25 Senator Fischer: Thank you. As the United States

1 policy on China shifts towards competition, there are those
2 who vocally argue that we should be focusing on cooperation
3 instead of competition. Mr. Pottinger, how do you view that
4 argument and what lessons do you think we can draw from
5 previous eras where cooperation was a significant component
6 of the U.S. policy towards China?

7 Mr. Pottinger: Yeah, Senator, I think that there is
8 enough material available now where we can actually read
9 what Chinese communist leaders have been saying to each
10 other and in their own language, when they thought we were
11 not hearing. And it is clear that they have identified us
12 as their core adversary for some 30 years. So if we are
13 going to cooperate, and in some areas we should, it should
14 better be because it is directly in our national interest to
15 do so and not because we think that we are somehow earning
16 favors or reassuring China. That can lead to sort of
17 fantastical thinking. We should not be emphasizing
18 cooperation with a country with China's record in damaging
19 U.S. interests over the past couple of decades.

20 Senator Fischer: Thank you. And Dr. Medeiros, we have
21 a few seconds left. I know you worked on cooperative
22 efforts with China during your time with the Obama
23 administration. What are some of the limitations we need to
24 be mindful of when it comes to cooperation, and what do you
25 think is a realistic expectation about the extent to which

1 cooperation will work with China?

2 Mr. Medeiros: Thank you, Senator. This is an
3 important point. I agree with others on the panel that
4 competition is more of a reality than a choice for the
5 United States, and U.S. policymakers need to focus on a
6 diversity of policies to compete with China.

7 One aspect of that is maintaining dialogue and
8 interaction and cooperating with China, where possible. And
9 I think in the Obama administration, for example, we
10 prominently, in 2014, negotiated a deal with the Chinese to
11 improve their behavior on climate change, to expand their
12 commitment to more rapidly reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
13 So that is an example of how cooperation can work to serve a
14 global public good.

15 The Chinese, though, do sometimes use dialogue about
16 cooperation to play for time and play for advantage, in an
17 effort to generate leverage with the United States. So I
18 think the United States policymakers simply need to be
19 careful and judicious that discussions with China about
20 cooperation are not used to play for time and advantage but
21 actually are used to generate practical, tangible actions
22 that advance U.S. interests. Thank you, Senator.

23 Senator Fischer: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

24 Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Senator Fischer.
25 Now let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Gillibrand.

1 Senator Gillibrand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this
2 excellent hearing, and I just want to thank our witnesses
3 for their expertise.

4 The cybersecurity threat that China poses to the U.S.
5 obviously has become increasingly relevant, as we have seen
6 cyber espionage attacks continuing, in March hackers gaining
7 access to the Microsoft Exchange servers, which affected
8 more than 100,000 private sector companies. Most recently,
9 Chinese hackers were able to access the MTA system in New
10 York. Although they did not do any significant damage at
11 the time, or pose risk to users, obviously we are very
12 concerned about the possibility that they could do so in the
13 future.

14 We have also had several open hearings in this
15 committee to discuss various vulnerabilities in the U.S.
16 system as well as blind spots, and I have great concern
17 about the vulnerability of our main infrastructure in the
18 United States. To combat such security threats in response
19 to the Colonial Pipeline hack, President Biden obviously is
20 taking this very seriously and signed an Executive order
21 about cybersecurity, and it includes basically telling
22 companies that they should report severe cyber incidents
23 within 3 days and strengthen Federal testing programs.

24 I want to talk a little bit about what is your
25 recommendation to this committee about how we should respond

1 more proactively to create a better cyber defense system for
2 our country? Because obviously we have very different
3 authorities for what the U.S. military can do, what our
4 intelligence services can do, and what the private sector
5 really just relies on themselves to do. And I am deeply
6 concerned because China uses the U.S. landscape as their
7 warzone. They are intentionally undermining our democracy,
8 our country, our infrastructure, and we need a stronger
9 defense in the United States with full understanding that we
10 have civil liberties, civil rights, and privacy concerns.

11 But I am very concerned every time I hear, in this
12 committee, that we have blind spots or vulnerabilities. So
13 I would like your expert advice on how we weigh these issues
14 of building and creating a proper cyber defense that is
15 consistent with our values. And each witness can answer.

16 Mr. Pottinger: Senator, Matt Pottinger here. Thanks
17 for your question on that. I think that a couple of ideas
18 would be for different types of cyberattacks on the United
19 States, for example, some of the most damaging attacks have
20 not been the more recent ones on some of our infrastructure,
21 these ransomware attacks, but the wholesale theft of
22 trillions of dollars' worth of our intellectual property.
23 The Obama administration, actually Dr. Medeiros' work, they
24 came up with a good Executive order, I think it was in 2015,
25 that gave the United States the authority to sanction

1 Chinese companies that have benefitted from stolen American
2 intellectual property. To date, no administration has ever
3 actually employed that option. I think we should have a
4 team that is constantly sanctioning Chinese companies that
5 have benefitted from our stolen intellectual property.

6 When it comes to threatening our infrastructure, we do
7 have asymmetrical ways of deterring that activity, and one
8 of the most natural ones would be to threaten China's great
9 firewall. In fact, we do not have to threaten Chinese, you
10 know, domestic infrastructure. Just by threatening to poke
11 holes in that firewall so that Chinese people can actually
12 hear the conversations that are taking place around the
13 world, like the one we are having in this room right now,
14 would pose such a dramatic threat to the Communist Party's
15 rule that I think we should wield that one with credibility.

16 Mr. Medeiros: Senator, I applaud your focus on Chinese
17 cyber operations. It is an issue I dealt with fairly
18 consistently during my time at the National Security
19 Council. While I am not an expert on cyber policy, I know
20 how the Chinese thing about deterrence, and U.S. policy
21 needs to move in the direction of shifting China's calculus
22 about the benefit associated with conducting cyber
23 operations, reducing the benefits, increasing the costs.

24 And so where that leads one is then the path of much
25 more investment in resilience, and I think there is more

1 space for public-private partnerships, the government
2 working with the private sector. But I also think that the
3 administration needs to think even further about both the
4 application of defensive and offensive cyber operations so
5 the Chinese fully appreciate the costs associated with their
6 cyber activities. Thank you, Senator.

7 Senator Gillibrand: My time has expired, so if the
8 other two witnesses have an answer, you could submit it to
9 the record please. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

10 Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Senator
11 Gillibrand. And now let me recognize, via Webex, Senator
12 Cotton, please.

13 Senator Cotton: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
14 Pottinger, you and I have discussed a strategic and targeted
15 decoupling of our economy from China. Any talk of
16 decoupling, of course, gives the vapors to a lot of
17 corporate America, and so many multinational companies, who
18 long ago took their 30 pieces of silver from the Chinese
19 Communist Party. But isn't China engaged in its own kind of
20 decoupling, both trying to reduce its dependence on sole or
21 limited-source imports of raw materials from other countries
22 while also increasing the free world's dependence on China
23 for manufactured and high-tech goods?

24 Mr. Pottinger: Senator Cotton, that is exactly what
25 China is doing, and, in fact, that strategy that you just

1 described is one that is written and institutionalized in
2 their latest 5-year plan. And I will give you an example of
3 it in action.

4 If you look at what China is doing to Australia right
5 now, Australia had the temerity to suggest to the World
6 Health Organization that the world try to find out the
7 origins of this virus that has now killed four million of
8 our fellow souls and wrought catastrophe on the world
9 economy. China, to punish Australia for suggesting that
10 there should be an investigation, decided to use its
11 leverage as a major market for Australian exports. About 30
12 percent of Australia's exports go to China. It decided to
13 start cutting off Australia's exports, exports of coal,
14 barley, beef, wine. And then they didn't just punish them
15 but laid out a series of political demands. In fact, there
16 was a list of 14 political demands that China made,
17 including that Australia needs to stop challenging Beijing's
18 outrageous claims over the South China Sea, that needs to
19 roll back its own laws that are designed to counter malign
20 influence and espionage, and that it needs to muzzle the
21 free press in Australia so it no longer criticizes the
22 Communist Party.

23 So this gives you a taste. Australia is a guinea pig
24 for this new strategy that you just described, and it is
25 being employed against other countries as well. It is one

1 that they plan to employ against the United States if and
2 when they achieve the point where they no longer believe
3 they need access to our capital and our technology, which is
4 primarily stolen but in some cases willfully handed over by
5 foolish business leaders who have the fantasy that it is
6 somehow going to get them access to the China market.

7 So that is my view on that, Senator. Thank you.

8 Senator Cotton: China is engaged in this kind of
9 strategic decoupling from the American economy and really
10 from the free world's economy. Since that is the case,
11 doesn't it make sense that we should go forward with our own
12 kind of targeted decoupling so we can do it on our own
13 terms?

14 Mr. Pottinger: Yes. Yes. And certainly in many of
15 the areas that you outlined in your own paper a couple of
16 months ago, the Beat China paper, all of the areas that
17 China has identified in its Made in China 2025 strategy, all
18 of the high-tech sectors that it wants to dominate in the
19 21st century are areas where we should be proactively and
20 selectively decoupling from.

21 Senator Cotton: Yeah. You mentioned Australia
22 commenting on the origins of the Wuhan coronavirus. What
23 are your thoughts on the origins of that coronavirus and
24 whether it is worthwhile to investigate all possible
25 origins, to include the possibility that it leaked from the

1 labs in Wuhan?

2 Mr. Pottinger: Well, I think that the preponderance of
3 circumstantial evidence -- and it is important to note that
4 it is still circumstantial evidence -- weighs in favor of
5 the hypothesis that this was an accidental leak from a
6 laboratory and not a natural zoonotic event. China does not
7 want us to actually find the answer to the question of what
8 exactly happened, and I think that a bipartisan commission
9 should be quickly established that has subpoena power. I
10 think that we need to halt gain-of-function research and
11 take the lead globally, really reinstating an Obama
12 administration ban on gain-of-function research, which was
13 designed to help predict the current pandemic but may have
14 actually seeded it.

15 And I think one other area would be to start building a
16 surveillance network. You know, the technology is there,
17 and with a little more effort could be quite powerful at
18 detecting pathogenic disease through a global surveillance
19 network.

20 Senator Cotton: Yeah, I agree with you that all the
21 evidence points towards the lab, and I mean all the
22 evidence. There is not a single piece of evidence that
23 points towards that stupid food market the Chinese Communist
24 Party used as a cover story. But I also agree with you that
25 China does not want us to discover it, so I am very

1 skeptical that we will ever get direct evidence of the
2 origin in the labs, but we can make reasonable inferences
3 based on what we know, and common sense, as you have, Mr.
4 Pottinger, that this virus originated in those labs and
5 China needs to face grave consequences for unleashing this
6 plague on the world. Thank you.

7 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Cotton. Let me
8 recognize Senator Blumenthal, please.

9 Senator Blumenthal: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
10 you for holding this hearing. Let me pursue the line of
11 questioning that Senator Cotton just raised. I think that
12 there has been a lot of commentary, including a lot of
13 conspiracy theories about the origins of COVID-19 and the
14 virus, but one point of consensus seems to be that the
15 Chinese regime has been patently uncooperative with efforts
16 to uncover the origins and report to the public in a way
17 that will help prevent such pandemics in the future. And
18 that lack of cooperation, perhaps verging on deliberate
19 coverup, has been frustrating to public health experts and
20 to all of us who care about preventing pandemics in the
21 future.

22 I am asking this panel -- we heard from Mr. Pottinger
23 -- what can be done to prompt and persuade the Communist
24 Party, which essentially runs China, that world health
25 depends on their being more forthcoming, more transparent,

1 and more cooperative in this effort to uncover the origins
2 of the pandemic so that we can fight and prevent pandemics
3 in the future?

4 Mr. Medeiros: Senator, why don't I begin. So I think,
5 first and foremost, it is important to keep in mind that the
6 origins of the virus may very well touch on the question of
7 regime legitimacy, and it is one of the reasons why the
8 government has been so incredibly untransparent and
9 uncooperative. So it is an uphill battle.

10 And so in that context, I think that the best
11 opportunity to influence the leadership on being transparent
12 and cooperative would be for -- the best opportunity would
13 be is if an international consensus were to emerge that the
14 Chinese needed to share more information. And to the extent
15 that this was reflected in the statements by international
16 organizations, of course beginning with the WHO, the
17 activities of other countries, and I support Mr. Pottinger's
18 recommendation that there be a bipartisan commission, 9/11-
19 like, to investigate the origins of it. And the more that
20 the Chinese recognize that they are simply out of step with
21 the international community, and that they are alienating
22 countries all over the world by being uncooperative, that
23 has the best chance, but even then, as I said, this is an
24 uphill battle.

25 Senator Blumenthal: It is an uphill battle but it is

1 one that we need to win.

2 Mr. Medeiros: Absolutely.

3 Senator Blumenthal: And it is like cyber, as you
4 commented, the Chinese calculus has to be driven toward more
5 transparency, the calculus involving the costs of failing to
6 be cooperative. And I think a bipartisan commission -- I
7 have support a 9/11-type commission from the very start of
8 the pandemic, and I continue to support it, as you have
9 suggested. But I think also making China pay a price for
10 its failure to be forthcoming has to be made part of their
11 calculus. Maybe others have comments as well.

12 Ms. Greitens: Senator, if I could add one thing. I
13 think that we have to grapple with the fact that information
14 problems are endemic to non-democratic systems. There is a
15 term that we use called "preference falsification," which
16 means that no one is forthcoming about their true beliefs
17 and the extent of their knowledge, because of the costs
18 sometimes of speaking truth in a political system that
19 operates the way that China's does.

20 And the conclusion that I draw from that, while I
21 applaud some of the efforts that have been recommended and
22 think that they are worth pursuing, I think that the
23 international community also fundamentally is going to have
24 to grapple with the need for a fallback mechanism because of
25 the reality going forward that the Chinese system is not

1 built for internal or external transparency and is not
2 showing any sign of changing that any time soon. So there
3 needs to be a workaround to protect global health.

4 Senator Blumenthal: That point is very well taken.
5 Authoritarian regimes are not known for their transparency,
6 obviously, so we cannot expect that the Chinese are going to
7 be making international concessions about the origin, but
8 they at least may allow access to people on the ground who
9 know what the facts are, to the facilities that might be
10 revealing. Maybe that hope seems naïve, but as part of the
11 calculus that Chinese officials are going to have to
12 confront, whether it is on cyber or on public health, we
13 ought to consider all the available options, including for
14 both Putin and the Chinese leaders, some disclosure of their
15 ill-gotten gains, their concealed, illicit profits that are
16 at the price of people who live in the very countries they
17 are dominating.

18 So my time has expired. I appreciate the expertise and
19 wisdom of this panel. And if anyone has additional thoughts
20 on this topic I would really welcome them. Thank you.

21 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Let me
22 recognize Senator Ernst, please.

23 Senator Ernst: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
24 thank our witnesses as well for putting together this
25 hearing to address our great power competition that we have

1 already engaged in with China. And over the past, as you
2 have heard from many of my colleagues as well, we have been
3 expressing the hope that the U.S. will continue to make room
4 and accommodate China's rise in the international order,
5 that, of course, as they do that that their authoritarianism
6 would smooth out and cooperation would increase. But
7 unfortunately, folks, that is not what we have seen happen.
8 The accommodation and the appeasement to China has failed,
9 and the Chinese Communist Party's disruptive efforts have
10 not softened, and our world is still being subjected to the
11 pressure and threats of a totalitarian regime.

12 Their approach to governing has changed very, very
13 little, and the leeway that we have granted them has to
14 change, and it has to change now. The United States, as a
15 whole, has become far too dependent upon Communist China.
16 So we have heard from others about their unlawful incursions
17 in the South China Sea. We have heard about their treatment
18 of the Uyghurs, even far reaching outside of China, and we
19 cannot ignore this any longer. And so, again, I am just
20 grateful that we are having this discussion today.

21 So, Mr. Pottinger, if you would please, we have talked
22 about our military and diplomatic operations. What
23 countermeasures can we take through the military and
24 diplomatic operations to create challenges for the Chinese
25 approach and disrupt their activities in and out of the gray

1 zone?

2 Mr. Pottinger: Thank you, Senator. In addition to
3 some of the ideas that Bonnie was talking about earlier, in
4 relation to gray zone, I agree that we need to do much more
5 with our partners in the region. We need to accept more
6 risk but also expand areas of cooperation, intelligence
7 sharing, for example, with key partners in the region,
8 Vietnam, with the Philippines and Indonesia in addition to,
9 you know, our bedrock partners like Japan and South Korea.
10 Increasing our FMF spending to help them build up some of
11 those standoff capabilities, you know, things like UAVs and
12 helicopters and anti-ship missiles, things of that nature
13 that can complicate China's gray zone calculus.

14 Senator Ernst: I appreciate that, and I think that is
15 something that we need to have a broader discussion on as
16 well, as we are looking at foreign military sales and
17 supports through those types of approaches. But I do think
18 that, as you said, information sharing, very important as
19 well. There are many things that we need to be engaging in
20 to counteract that gray zone activity that we have seen from
21 China.

22 So moving on, of course during COVID-19 and a number of
23 the recent cyberattacks as well, it is just really
24 demonstrating the precarious nature that has been caused by
25 our dependence on China and the global supply and

1 distribution chains. So what do you see as the most
2 critical elements to protecting our domestic critical supply
3 chains and ensuring we are able to meet our needs during
4 that national security crisis, or national security
5 requirements in the event of a crisis?

6 Mr. Pottinger: Senator, I think one good place to
7 start is first to recognize that the tariffs that we put in
8 place during the Trump administration on China have actually
9 helped to diversify supply chains, not only for us but for a
10 lot of our partners. I talked to someone this morning who
11 just returned from the region, visiting several countries,
12 and on his travels he learned that many countries in the
13 region are shifting a lot of their manufacturing out of
14 China because of political risk, because of, in part, the
15 tariffs that we put in place, and expanding that footprint
16 in ways that make the supply chain more resilient. So I
17 think recognizing the salutary effect of those tariffs is an
18 important place to start.

19 I think we should expand our trade with other partners
20 in the region through bilateral trade and investment
21 agreements, not multilateral ones, which the American public
22 rightly suspects do not serve their interest as well as was
23 promised, for example, when we brought China into the WTO.
24 But if we do more major bilateral trade agreements with many
25 of our partners out in the Indo-Pacific we have the ability

1 to enforce them better when they are bilateral, and to have
2 terms that make it worthwhile, since we are still their best
3 market.

4 Senator Ernst: Yeah, I appreciate that. And visiting
5 with SOUTHCOM just recently, and Admiral Faller there, of
6 course we do see China in our own neighborhood here in the
7 western hemisphere. So having those great alliances, those
8 great trading partners can be very beneficial for everyone
9 to push back upon a nefarious China. Thank you very much.
10 Thank you.

11 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Ernst. Now let me
12 recognize, via Webex, Senator Warren, please.

13 Senator Warren: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So today's
14 hearing is on the U.S.'s competition with China, and I just
15 want to spend some time this morning talking about the idea
16 of great power competition. This is a phrase that has been
17 throw around a lot over the last five years. You know,
18 someone must have thought that it was a clear articulation
19 of the state of the world. But I am concerned that it
20 obscures more than it reveals. Understanding the notion of
21 great power competition is important because military
22 leaders come before this committee using it as their
23 justification for even higher budgets.

24 So let me just start with the basics. Can anyone tell
25 me what this competition with China is over? For example,

1 is it over resources? Territory? Seat control? Military
2 supremacy? Economic dominance? Whose political economic
3 system is the best? Global leadership? Something else?
4 All of the above? Anybody?

5 Mr. Pottinger: Senator, I think it is all of the
6 above, at least in the case of China. Not so much Iran or
7 even Russia. But in the case of China it really is they are
8 thinking big. Remember, the meeting that the Chinese had in
9 their first face-to-face, high-level meeting with the Biden
10 Administration in Alaska, what the Chinese were making a
11 case for was Chinese leadership of the world, and in a very
12 explicitly antidemocratic model. In fact, they mocked
13 American democracy in that meeting. They mocked the idea of
14 universal values, which we have stood for, which we
15 sacrificed for, and built in order to help preserve
16 following World War II. China is trying to undermine all of
17 that, so I do think it is all of the above, ma'am.

18 Senator Warren: Well, okay. I hear you on all of the
19 above, but what I'm hearing you saying is we are competing
20 with them for advantage across a wide range of categories,
21 and that makes it pretty easy to see how this great power
22 competition can mean almost anything.

23 But let's make this simple and say we are trying to
24 maintain our status as the dominant power economically and
25 militarily. The problem with the idea of great power

1 competition is that I am not sure it is much different from
2 the way the policymakers and experts thought about our place
3 atop the international system in the 1980s and the 1990s.
4 You know, the notion of the U.S. as a dominant power in a
5 unipolar world, and that is what was used to justify the
6 Reagan defense buildup. So the way I see it, great power
7 competition looks like new packaging for an old concept.

8 So, Mr. Pottinger, let me ask you. You have described
9 the idea of great power competition as a series of
10 qualifying dashes that we must run and win in order to
11 qualify for the next dash, but no one knows when the race
12 will end. So is it fair to say that you view our
13 relationship with China as a sustained competition for the
14 upper hand over the coming decades rather than a contest
15 that would be decided, say, in the next few years?

16 Mr. Pottinger: Ma'am, I think that there are areas
17 where China has a window of opportunity to do grave damage
18 to our influence over international institutions, do damage
19 to our alliances, the things that keep us safe and
20 prosperous. And so when I talk about the idea that we have
21 to sprint, it is really on these areas where we have opened
22 up vulnerabilities that really should be strengths. For
23 example, our financial markets, our capital markets, which
24 are the deepest and most liquid in the world. Right now
25 those are benefitting the expansion of China's empire. This

1 is a dictatorship that is committing genocide and
2 implementing a high-tech totalitarianism. We should not be
3 doing that anymore, and I think that we need to sprint to
4 rectify some of those areas where we have been playing to
5 their advantage instead of our own. That will put us on a
6 path to be able to have a stable, long-term competition
7 where we do not have to live in quite as immediate fear --

8 Senator Warren: Okay. So I take it that was a long
9 answer to say yes, this is going to be long-term competition
10 here.

11 Mr. Pottinger: Yes, ma'am. I think it will be.

12 Senator Warren: I support investing in smart, cutting-
13 edge technology for our military because we cannot keep
14 building the world's best 20th century military for the 21st
15 century. But too often in Congress, and in this committee
16 in particular, the metric for whether we are making the U.S.
17 stronger and more competitive in the world gets reduced to
18 the number of bombers, the number of submarines, the number
19 of missiles we have, compared with China. And whenever
20 somebody points out the price tag, the Pentagon tells us it
21 is justified because of great power competition.

22 So Dr. Medeiros, would you say that if we have any hope
23 of competing over the next century, the United States needs
24 an economy that is moving at full steam ahead for everyone
25 and not just a tiny slice at the top?

1 Mr. Medeiros: Absolutely, Senator. I mean, the
2 fundamental basis of American strength is not just our
3 political system and our values, which obviously need some
4 work, but also the United States economy, and the Chinese
5 know that. They watch and track very carefully the health
6 of our economy and, in particular, our technology sector.

7 To answer your previous question, I agree with your
8 assessment. This will be a broad-spectrum, long-term
9 competition with China, and I think that that means that the
10 United States needs to invest more at home to ensure that we
11 run faster and simply do not focus on slowing the other guy
12 down. So the more we can invest in American jobs, in
13 American families -- I support the administration's
14 infrastructure initiatives -- the more we create the basis
15 for the United States to run faster in this broad-spectrum,
16 long-term competition. Thank you, Senator.

17 Senator Warren: Thank you, and I think it is important
18 to emphasize that investing in our economy means more than
19 boosting semiconductor production and throwing money at R&D.
20 It also means broad-based investments in the American
21 worker, like universal child care or cancelling student loan
22 debt, and providing a strong social safety net for everyone.
23 Competing with an authoritarian, corrupt, repressive regime,
24 we need to be the model of democracy, the model of
25 anticorruption, the model of freedom that the rest of the

1 world wants to follow.

2 You know, I am not interested in slogans that just
3 justify another billion dollars in weapons spending. I
4 think we need to focus on strengthening the U.S. through
5 investments in our democracy and in our whole economy.

6 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

7 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Warren. Senator
8 Scott, please.

9 Senator Scott: I thank each of you for being here. Do
10 any of you disagree with the belief that Communist China has
11 a goal to completely dominate our way of life, control, you
12 know, the worldwide economy and dictate the rules for how
13 the worldwide economy works and what type of governments
14 will be in power around the world? Does anybody disagree
15 with that?

16 Do you believe that if Communist China continues to
17 grow its economy and build up its military that American
18 families are going to have better opportunities to compete
19 and succeed, if we do not have the same opportunities that
20 we have had because of control by Communist China? Does
21 everybody agree with that?

22 Do you believe that if Communist China's economy
23 continues to grow at the rate it has been growing that they
24 are going to spend less on their military or more on their
25 military? Does anybody believe they are going to spend

1 less? No.

2 So do you believe that American consumers and American
3 businesses should be making decisions if they are part of
4 our economy and part of what we want our way of life to
5 grow, that we have got to stop, to the extent we can, of
6 doing business with them and support our allies and support
7 businesses in the United States?

8 Mr. Medeiros: Senator, can I ask you a question on
9 that? So you raised one of the fundamental questions at the
10 heart of the emerging era of strategic competition. What
11 costs is the United States, the American consumer, the
12 American business, willing to pay for a broad-based economic
13 decoupling? We have a \$650 billion trade relationship with
14 China. That is an economic reality. So, you know,
15 unwinding that would be a historically disruptive event for
16 the United States.

17 And so I agree with your previous assessments of the
18 nature of the challenges posed by China. The question is,
19 you know, at what cost do we pursue a 100 percent economic
20 decoupling?

21 Senator Scott: At what cost do we not have the same
22 opportunity we have had in the past? So I think if American
23 families knew that every time they buy a Chinese product,
24 and if an American businessperson knew every time they do
25 business with Communist China they reduce their chance for

1 their children and their grandchildren to live the dream
2 that we have all had the opportunity to live over the last
3 200-some years, then it is a small price to pay.

4 So do you, one, believe that we ought to, when you buy
5 products in America, you ought to know exactly where they
6 are produced, and many Americans would make the decision not
7 to buy a product in Communist China?

8 Mr. Pottinger: Senator, I strongly support the idea
9 that when people shop online they should be able to see, as
10 they are shopping, where goods are made, and they should be
11 able to make decisions about whether they want to buy goods
12 that are made in China. I strongly support that.

13 I think that it was historically disruptive for the
14 world to concentrate as much of the manufacturing base of
15 the planet into coastal China as we did over the past 30
16 years, and that it is inevitable that that needs to be
17 unwound. It will be to our benefit that it gets unwound.
18 That does not necessarily mean a wholesale decoupling.

19 I think that it is a straw man argument to say that,
20 you know, everything is going to stop. But certainly when
21 we are talking about some of those areas in the high-tech
22 sector, for example, where we out-innovate China, where
23 China is using technology to repress its citizens in deeply
24 disturbing ways, decoupling is more than called for. And I
25 think it is already underway. Some of the business

1 community here are outliers right now. That is why we have
2 government to tell them what the new rules are.

3 Senator Scott: As they build their economy, do you
4 think Taiwan is at less risk or more risk?

5 Mr. Medeiros: Greater. Greater risk.

6 Senator Scott: Anybody think they are at less risk?

7 Ms. Greitens: No, Senator, I do not. What I wanted to
8 do is just maybe add something to what Mr. Pottinger was
9 saying a moment ago, which is that I think that your remarks
10 highlight some of the coercive pressure that dependence on
11 the Chinese economy can create, and that has been brought to
12 bear not just on Australia, which was touched on earlier,
13 but American allies in Korea and the Philippines, just to
14 think about the last 5 to 8 years.

15 So one of the things I think we need to think about, in
16 terms of this selective or multistage decoupling process
17 that we have been discussing today, also has to do with, in
18 the meantime, how is it that we can coordinate effectively
19 with our allies and partners when they come under that kind
20 of targeted economic pressure. Because no matter what pace
21 or form decoupling takes -- and I would agree that China is
22 also pursuing its own form of decoupling to try to advantage
23 itself in that process -- that still means that in the next
24 few years we need a strategy to figure out how to make
25 ourselves and our allies less vulnerability to the economic

1 pressure that China is going to be able to bring to bear,
2 and has already brought to bear on our allies and partners
3 in the interim. And I think that is a really important
4 point and piece of the strategy that we have to grapple
5 with.

6 Ms. Glaser: if I could just quickly, Senator, add a
7 point on Taiwan. Just as we have a very large trading
8 relationship with China, obviously so does Taiwan. Over 40
9 percent of its exports go to China. An enormous amount of
10 investment that has been accumulated, and over 1 million
11 Taiwanese citizens live in China.

12 So I think that they should be diversifying. We should
13 be encouraging them to do that. There are areas where they
14 are vulnerable. Australia has shown what vulnerability
15 brings. The Chinese so far haven't begun to use the tools,
16 really, of economic coercion against Taiwan. That pineapple
17 ban was just small potatoes compared to what they could do.
18 But it is also, again, unrealistic. I think we cannot
19 completely decouple from China, so Taiwan probably cannot
20 either. But there is certainly more that they can do, and
21 we can help them do, to diversify and reduce their
22 vulnerabilities.

23 Senator Scott: Thank you.

24 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Scott. Let me
25 recognize Senator King via Webex.

1 Senator King: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Glaser, in
2 your opening statement you said something very important, I
3 think, and that was the importance of maintaining the
4 strategic ambiguity with Taiwan and that being more
5 explicit, being explicit about a Mutual Defense Treaty or
6 something like that could actually provoke the Chinese to
7 take concrete steps to annex Taiwan.

8 Could you expand on that? I think that is an important
9 point, because there is a lot of discussion in this
10 committee and in the Congress that seems to assume a kind of
11 Article V Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan, which we do not
12 have, and why is it important to maintain the ambiguity?

13 Ms. Glaser: Thank you for that question, Senator. I
14 believe that we all share an interest in supporting Taiwan
15 and providing for its defense. If we choose, in a crisis,
16 to go to Taiwan's aid, that is up to the President in
17 consultation with Congress.

18 But I think that if we were to take a position of being
19 clear that under all contingencies and circumstances we
20 would come to Taiwan's defense, that China would view this
21 as a resurrection of the Mutual Defense Treaty that the
22 United States had with Taiwan from 1954 to 1979. This was a
23 condition, breaking that of normalization with the PRC. And
24 I believe that we should not rule out the potential for
25 China to respond in ways that we don't want to see,

1 including launching an attack on Taiwan.

2 So we should help Taiwan to become more indigestible,
3 in terms of the way we support its military. We should
4 ensure, importantly, as Matt said earlier, our own ability
5 to intervene militarily on Taiwan's behalf, that we ensure
6 that is credible. We should be working with allies to
7 bolster their support for Taiwan. We should help Taiwan to
8 strengthen its economy, including through the negotiation of
9 a bilateral free trade agreement with Taiwan, and we should
10 do what we can to limit and reduce Taiwan's isolation from
11 the international community. All of those things will help
12 to strengthen deterrence. And simply making a declaratory
13 statement that we will come to Taiwan's defense if it is
14 attacked may, in fact, undermine Taiwan's security.

15 Senator King: Thank you. I think that is very
16 important, and you use a term I've never heard in foreign
17 policy -- indigestible. I like that concept.

18 Mr. Medeiros, why is it that the Chinese are reluctant
19 to establish a kind of hotline, red hone, mil-to-mil
20 connection, because it seems to me that one of the grave
21 dangers both countries face is an accidental conflict. I
22 just checked on Amazon. There are 11 copies left of the
23 Chinese language version of The Guns of August, and perhaps
24 we ought to send those to the Chinese Politburo, because
25 this business of not wanting to be on the other end of the

1 phone if there is an incident in the South China Sea makes
2 no sense to me, from the point of view of China, let alone
3 our country.

4 Mr. Medeiros: Thank you, Senator. Excellent question,
5 and I strongly support your information operation of sending
6 Chinese language versions of The Guns of August to the
7 Politburo Standing Committee. Maybe we can work on that
8 after this hearing.

9 But more specifically, actually, the channels of
10 communication, crisis communication exists. In 2008, a
11 defense telephone link was created between the Pentagon and
12 the Ministry of Defense in China. The issue is less the
13 nonexistence of channels. It is the fact that the Chinese
14 choose not to use them.

15 There is both a structural reason and an incentive-
16 based reason for that. Structurally, oftentimes when the
17 U.S., if the call is not prearranged, and it usually takes
18 48 to 72 hours to prearrange it, nobody on the other end, in
19 Beijing, wants to pick up the phone, because either it is
20 not plugged in or they are not sure what to say when the
21 phone call comes in.

22 But more broadly than sort of the structural political
23 reason is the incentive reason. I have heard Chinese
24 retired military officers simply say, "The more we engage in
25 crisis communications and confidence building measures with

1 the United States, the more the U.S. will be present and
2 push us in terms of conducting risky military operations
3 within East Asia."

4 And so, you know, I worry that it is going to take a
5 Cuban Missile Crisis-like situation for the Chinese
6 leadership to appreciate how important crisis communication
7 is, and encourage them to move away from such a stilted view
8 of how to use these channels. Because the interactions
9 between the Chinese military and U.S. military in East Asia
10 are growing in frequency and complexity, and if we don't
11 have the right measures in place, the risk of a crisis is
12 growing, and then because of the weak communication channels
13 our ability to manage that crisis is significantly
14 constrained. Thank you, Senator.

15 Senator King: Thank you. Frequency, complexity, and
16 danger, I would say.

17 Mr. Pottinger, my time is up. I would like to ask you
18 a question for the record, and that is, how is the Belt and
19 Road Initiative working out for the Chinese with regard to
20 their international customers? I think America has allies;
21 China has customers. My sense is that they are getting some
22 significant pushback from countries around the world who are
23 finding that dealing with the Belt and Road Initiative is
24 not all that positive.

25 So if could submit for the record some thoughts on how

1 they are doing, if you will, politically, with the Belt and
2 Road Initiative, I would appreciate it. Thank you.

3 Mr. Pottinger: I certainly well, Senator. Thank you.

4 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator King. Let me
5 recognize Senator Sullivan, please.

6 Senator Sullivan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want
7 to thank the witnesses for their excellent testimony. I
8 have been watching this hearing. Really important hearing.

9 I am just back from Taiwan and Korea, actually, and I
10 will tell you, there is nothing like being in a country, two
11 places if it weren't for the sacrifice of America's military
12 over decades you wouldn't have these free, prosperous,
13 thriving democracies. It makes you very proud as an
14 American citizen to see that.

15 Mr. Pottinger, I want to commend you on your Wall
16 Street Journal op-ed, "Beijing Targets American Business,"
17 from March 26, and, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit
18 this for the record.

19 Chairman Reed: Without objection.

20 [The information follows:]

21 Senator Sullivan: So one thing that I want to address
22 to you, Mr. Pottinger, many people, when you read the
23 Financial Times and others, there is this narrative of the
24 inevitable rise of China, with regard to power, economics,
25 the military, but you have, already in your testimony today,

1 talked about how this could, particularly on the econ side,
2 stall out, and you have emphasized smart capital,
3 intellectual property. Can you briefly just mention that in
4 a little bit more detail, and then I want to go into some of
5 these finance concerns.

6 Mr. Pottinger: Senator, of course. One of the things
7 that I was struck by over my time working on the NSC staff
8 was the degree to which China is frightened of losing access
9 to American know-how, as well as capital.

10 Senator Sullivan: Yeah.

11 Mr. Pottinger: And especially smart capital, like
12 Silicon Valley venture capital that provides both the know-
13 how and the money. And, in fact, if you look at China's
14 tech sector, virtually every single major player, at least
15 in the software space, was funded by Silicon Valley, and the
16 software engineers were trained in the United States.

17 So the idea that China is inexorably going to continue
18 to rise, that they have cracked the code, even though they
19 have enormous talent -- there is no denying the incredible
20 pools of talent and industriousness and entrepreneurship of
21 Chinese people -- the system does not reward that, and
22 decreasingly so. It is less and less rewarding to work in
23 those sectors because the party fears those entrepreneurs in
24 those sectors challenging party authority.

25 So I think that without the benefit of American know-

1 how and smart capital, you would see a stalling out of what
2 appears a miracle.

3 Senator Sullivan: Good. Let me dig into that, and
4 it's really troubling. The more you mentioned smart
5 capital, the more that I dig into this. Senior Democrats in
6 the Biden administration, senior Republicans from the Trump
7 administration, have all mentioned to me, with alarm, this
8 issue of American financiers -- private equity, big banks,
9 they mention Sequoia Capital all the time, BlackRock --
10 these are Americans who have gotten super rich in our
11 capitalistic society, but they knowingly are funding,
12 financing our competitor, the PLA, AI. They funded the rise
13 of China. This is a concern I am hearing about all the
14 time.

15 Can you talk about these firms, others, and what we
16 should do to stop it? China doesn't have this problem.
17 They don't have billionaire Chinese funding us. But we have
18 this problem. And I am going to start naming names. It is
19 unpatriotic. It is a real problem. I am hearing it from
20 Democrats and Republicans. Can you unpack that a little bit
21 more? How damaging are these American companies to American
22 interests?

23 Mr. Pottinger: Senator, I do think that that trend of
24 growing flows of capital -- and I think there is both dumb
25 money and smart money, but both of them are very useful.

1 Senator Sullivan: I wouldn't call money "smart" if it
2 -- maybe these guys are going to get rich, but I do not
3 think it is smart if it is funding our chief adversary
4 globally. Do you?

5 Mr. Pottinger: I think one of our most potent
6 advantages that we are now actually --

7 Senator Sullivan: How do we stop these American
8 financiers from funding the Communist Party of China?

9 Mr. Pottinger: I think that congressional oversight of
10 the Treasury Department, hard oversight, riding them hard to
11 expand, like I said, by orders of magnitude the blacklist of
12 companies that Americans are allowed to invest in in China
13 is one. I think we should be looking at a CFIUS-like body
14 for outbound investment, so that we screen outbound American
15 investment headed toward China to make sure that it is not
16 damaging our national interest and national security. Those
17 are a few ideas.

18 Senator Sullivan: Let me ask one final question. You
19 know, a lot of this hearing has talked about American
20 comparative advantages. I think that is always an important
21 area of focus. We have talked about allies, of freedom
22 certainly, the rule of law. But let me give one other
23 question for you -- energy. We are now the world's energy
24 superpower. We are energy independent. We produce more
25 natural gas, more oil, more renewables than any country on

1 the planet earth. We have been seeking that energy
2 independence, in a bipartisan way, for decades. We are now
3 there.

4 China, I believe, fears this tremendously. We now have
5 an administration that actually is looking to restrict the
6 production of American energy. Every time John Kerry goes
7 to another country and says, "We are going to restrict
8 production of American energy. You should restrict your
9 production of energy too" -- Korea, Taiwan -- it is crazy.
10 How big of a comparative advantage is American energy
11 independence relative to China, and do you think like I do
12 that this administration's policy of unilaterally disarming
13 this enormous comparative advantage is strategic insanity?

14 Mr. Pottinger: Well, the second half of the 20th
15 century, all of the wars that we got involved in, in the
16 Middle East, are in one way or another tied to America
17 trying to protect its energy supplies and energy security.
18 So the fact that we have actually achieved energy
19 independence is a godsend. It is something that gives us
20 far more options, it allows us to avoid getting entangled
21 into conflicts in parts of the world that we don't want to
22 be in conflict in. And to that extent, I think that
23 whatever approach we take in trying to greenify the economy
24 first has to take into account the fact that gas is a lot
25 cleaner than it is given credit for. But second, that we

1 don't want to end up in a position where we are suddenly
2 making China the new Saudi Arabia because we are depending
3 on their supply chains to provide us with, for example,
4 batteries for our cars.

5 So if we are going to go to all-electric vehicles, we
6 are going to have to have a pretty tough-minded policy of
7 tariffs as well as subsidies that are designed to actually
8 bring that entire supply chain back to the United States.
9 That is not an easy thing to do.

10 Senator Sullivan: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

11 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Let me
12 now recognize Senator Manchin, via Webex.

13 Senator Manchin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
14 appreciate it. And this first question will go to Ms.
15 Glaser. Ms. Glaser, this committee is providing guidance to
16 the Department of Defense on restructuring for a near-peer
17 threat in Russia and China. I worry that we will continue
18 to be stuck in our old mindsets. Historically, the United
19 States has had the ability to move freely about the globe,
20 uncontested, which likely would not be the case in the event
21 of a conflict with Russia or China.

22 So how do we shift the entire Department's mindset from
23 only having to fight when we get to fighting to get access
24 to traditional sea lanes, and air space we have taken for
25 granted in moving our troops? How are we able to get into

1 the fight if we can't get to the fight?

2 Ms. Glaser: Well, that is a very important question,
3 Senator, and this is one of the reasons why we have to
4 maintain our access to the region. We have to have the
5 right kind of platforms in order to be able to get us to the
6 fight. And we have to preserve our maneuverability within
7 the Indo-Pacific region, should we end up engaging an enemy
8 there. And that means dispersing our forces, being less
9 reliant on these static bases. We have to develop
10 operational concepts that will enable the United States to
11 operate from more mobile areas.

12 Senator Manchin: Are you at all concerned about this?
13 I understand the Marines have been worried about it, but are
14 there any other branches concerned about it?

15 Ms. Glaser: I think that several of the Services have
16 developed their own operational concepts. The Army has one,
17 for example. As you said, the Marines do. Different
18 Services are working on this problem. I don't think we yet
19 have an integrated approach.

20 But this is what, I hope, the global posture review
21 that the Biden administration is undertaking will address,
22 because this is critically important to the United States
23 going forward.

24 Senator Manchin: I would like to follow up with you on
25 this later in time, and all the different branches, to find

1 out exactly what their intents are.

2 Mr. Pottinger, China has committed billions of dollars
3 in loans and aid to Middle East countries, including Oman,
4 Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, and Pakistan. Pakistan alone has
5 plans for up to \$62 billion in projects, much of that
6 devoted to military development. What are the implications
7 of a China-allied Pakistan in our fight against violent
8 extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan?

9 Mr. Pottinger: Senator, thank you. I think that, you
10 know, Pakistan will probably prove to be a mixed bag for
11 China.

12 Senator Manchin: Always has been.

13 Mr. Pottinger: As it often has been for others as
14 well. But, you know, the main approach that China is taking
15 in the region, Pakistan is very much for China about trying
16 to counterbalance and create problems for India, and then as
17 you move further west into the Middle East, it --

18 Senator Manchin: That would be the follow-up of my
19 question is the Middle East. Their involvement and their
20 interests in the Middle East, what are your thoughts and
21 concerns about that?

22 Mr. Pottinger: Yeah. I think that it is a similar
23 paly to the ones that they are playing in Central Asia, in
24 Africa, and Latin America, but with the proviso that the
25 Middle East is a lot more complicated even than all of those

1 great continents. But it is very much about securing
2 supplies. It is about playing a cynical role between the
3 Iranians and the Sunni Arab states and Israel.

4 So I think that countries there do not actually want to
5 see China moving into a dominant role in the region, and I
6 hear that from those countries, usually privately, but
7 nonetheless quite consistently.

8 Senator Manchin: Well, the thing that bothers me more
9 is the \$62 billion they are receiving, and using it for
10 their military aid. That bothers me a lot more than the
11 infrastructure that is going into the countries.

12 Mr. Pottinger: Yes, sir. There is no doubt that there
13 are dual-use facilities. They are looking to build
14 airstrips as well as naval facilities that could be dual
15 use. By the way, they are looking to do that in the
16 Atlantic as well. China now has the aspiration to be an
17 Atlantic military power. And so it all the more reason why
18 we have to provide an alternative, through things like the
19 Blue Dot Network that is being continued and built upon by
20 the Biden administration, things to provide an alternative
21 to the corrupt debt trap type money, highly corrupting
22 money, that is being used to subvert the sovereignty of a
23 lot of these countries to build out China's military
24 footprint.

25 Senator Manchin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Manchin. Now let me
2 recognize Senator Blackburn, please.

3 Senator Blackburn: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
4 appreciate that. And thank you to our witnesses for being
5 here today.

6 Dr. Greitens, I want to come to you. General McMaster
7 wrote something that I really like. He pursues the three-
8 pronged approach when he is talking about the CCP --
9 corruption, coercion, concealment -- in how they pursue
10 military fusion. And I find that so interesting, because
11 that is one of the issues that really hits us in the face
12 when we look at how China approaches this. And I know you
13 have done a lot of study on this.

14 So what I would like for you to do is to lay out your
15 concerns and also your recommendations on how we should
16 proceed as we deal with each prong, knowing that we do not
17 practice civil-military fusion. You know where our Commerce
18 Department ends and you know where our defense industry
19 begins. So if you would just lay that out, and then talk
20 about how that affects our academic and research
21 institutions.

22 Ms. Greitens: Thank you, Senator. That is a really
23 important question, and I am happy to try to cover as much
24 of it as I can, and then I will follow up.

25 Senator Blackburn: And let me just say this. If you

1 want to give a highlight and then submit to me for the
2 record, I think that is something that as we look at the
3 NDAA, we need to think this through and have a more
4 thoughtful approach to this. You hear us talking about
5 semiconductors. You hear us talking about AVs and EVs and
6 AI. And there is an integration of every bit of that.

7 So hit the highlights and then, Mr. Pottinger, I have a
8 question I want to come to you on.

9 Ms. Greitens: Yes. Thank you. Let me bracket the
10 question of semiconductors, because we have had a little bit
11 of a chance to discuss that already, and I am happy to
12 follow up with you after the hearing to discuss that, and I
13 will focus principally on your question about higher
14 education for the moment.

15 I think American higher education is in the midst of a
16 reckoning and a recalibration of its relationships with the
17 People's Republic of China. I would look at four different
18 areas in thinking about the challenges that China's role
19 poses for American higher education.

20 First of all is research security. One of the things
21 that you all are considering is an enormous amount of
22 investment in American research, particularly in tech and
23 the sciences, and it is really important that that funding
24 not immediately get siphoned off --

25 Senator Blackburn: And as you are aware, we have a

1 trial going on in Knoxville, Tennessee this week with a UT
2 professor, and we also have an issue with a Russian spy that
3 somehow became connected to Oak Ridge. So very aware then.
4 Thank you for mentioning it.

5 Ms. Greitens: Yes, and thank you for your attention to
6 that issue.

7 I think one of the things that needs to happen is
8 tighter requirements, and I have publicly supported and
9 written about some of these in the past, of disclosure of
10 both funding coming from China or other foreign countries --
11 it not just a China problem but the size of the funding is a
12 lot bigger -- and talent program participation. I can tell
13 you, from having been at two American flagship public
14 universities that the disclosure process is not standard
15 across different institutions, and I would support some
16 standardization and some collaboration between the
17 Department of Education, the American universities, and
18 other parts of the Federal Government to ensure that
19 disclosures are more uniform and more complete.

20 Second, I think I would commend some excellent work by
21 Mary Gallagher, that I would be happy to provide to the
22 committee, where she looks at the role of Chinese Student
23 and Scholars Associations. This is less an issue with
24 espionage or tech transfer than it is in the social sciences
25 and for free speech and free inquiry on campus, which is a

1 fundamental value of American society and American higher
2 ed. Her suggestion is that given the nature of the funding
3 and the close coordination between the CSSAs, the shorthand,
4 and some of their relationships with Chinese government
5 entities like consulates in the United States, that it may
6 be appropriate for them to register as foreign agents, under
7 the Foreign Agents Registration Act. So that is a second
8 recommendation.

9 Third is that I think we need to grapple with the
10 increasing use of what I would call "lawfare," meaning
11 lawsuits and sanctions that punish researchers who publish
12 work that is critical of the Chinese Communist Party. And
13 we have seen that recently with researchers and people who
14 have been advocates for human rights, in Europe and in North
15 America as well. Much of this will be more of a university-
16 level conversation, but I think Congress has a role in
17 setting expectations for the support that will be provided
18 to people if the pressure from the Chinese Communist Party
19 gets brought to bear.

20 The last thing is that I think we have a pipeline
21 problem, in that during the Cold War we funded open-source
22 translation, and we funded the development of a cohort of
23 analysts and experts who really knew the Soviet Union and
24 were reporting in real time about a lot of developments.
25 That pipeline, from my perspective, as the one who trains

1 doctoral students and researchers, is too thin. And so I
2 think as we talk about Federal funding, and as we look at
3 investments, a relatively small investment in social
4 sciences and open-source translation services to build the
5 intellectual base that we need for our long-term competition
6 is going to be an important measure to consider. Thank you.

7 Senator Blackburn: Thank you. I appreciate that. And
8 Mr. Pottinger, I am going to come to you with a written
9 question pertaining to electric vehicles, and the supply
10 chain issues that we face there with electric vehicles. We
11 also see the same thing in pharmaceuticals. But, of course,
12 we have an administration trying to really incentivize \$200
13 billion into EVs. But what I have learned by talking to
14 some of our researchers is we do not have the necessary
15 support base for that, and I will send that in writing to
16 you.

17 Mr. Pottinger: I will gladly respond. Thank you,
18 Senator Blackburn.

19 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Blackburn. Senator
20 Kelly.

21 Senator Kelly: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Glaser,
22 good morning. You have rightly pointed out the challenges
23 in building a unified bloc of international partners to
24 stand up against China's economically coercive policies.
25 And yet we know we are strongest when we act together with

1 our partners and with our allies. As we continue to observe
2 some of our closest international partners being
3 economically targeted by China for deploying U.S. missile
4 defense systems or supporting pro-democracy protesters, or
5 even for simply opting not to allow Chinese state-owned
6 companies to build their 5G networks, it is clear we face a
7 shared concern here.

8 So Ms. Glaser, how can the United States better
9 leverage our alliances to affect a more unified response to
10 China's coercive behaviors?

11 Ms. Glaser: Thank you for that question, Senator. I
12 think that, as I said earlier, China engages in these
13 practices because they don't pay any costs, and we have seen
14 this beginning with Norway, and it has gone through the
15 Philippines, as you said, South Korea, Australia. It is a
16 very large number of countries. And some cases the United
17 States, I think, has stood back and admired the problem. We
18 haven't done enough to push back.

19 So we really do need to get like-minded countries
20 together, first just to establish a coalition, to signal to
21 China that we are willing to take joint steps. That, in
22 itself, may begin to deter some of Chinese behavior.

23 But then we have to -- again, we have to reduce our
24 vulnerabilities, which we talked about earlier, and the
25 vulnerabilities of our allies. We should encourage all

1 countries to ensure that they are not sending a particular
2 product to China, an enormous percentage of it, without
3 having potential plans to diversify in the event that China
4 imposes coercion on them. Countries have to be prepared,
5 and maybe we can have a group effort to actually work with
6 countries to buy some of their products if they are
7 boycotted. We are not going to be able to replace all of
8 the damages, in dollar-to-dollar terms, but again, we can
9 signal China that we can do something.

10 And then I think we can look for WTO consistent ways to
11 actually impose costs on China, maybe through tariffs, joint
12 actions taken by other countries, maybe to boycott China's
13 products in response.

14 So we have to have a menu of things, but it has to be
15 voluntary. If we tell countries, "If you join up for this,
16 these are all the things you must do," then we will probably
17 be standing alone or with very few partners. So I really do
18 think we have to work with countries and do what is
19 comfortable for them, and on a case-by-case basis, we should
20 start by building that coalition. Thank you.

21 Senator Kelly: Have you seen any effort by any
22 administration to build this coalition?

23 Ms. Glaser: I have not. I have not seen, in the case
24 of the economic coercive measures taken by China against
25 South Korea, when it deployed THAAD. The one case I would

1 say is with Japan and the export of rare earths, which the
2 Chinese tried to limit to Japan. We did join in a WTO case,
3 and the EU joined with us, and we won that case.

4 So we could do the same with Australia. As a third
5 party we are allowed to join WTO cases. So I think I would
6 cite that as one example, but there isn't always enough data
7 available to prove, to build that case for the WTO, because
8 the Chinese do this deniability.

9 Senator Kelly: Thank you, Ms. Glaser. Dr. Medeiros,
10 competition has increasingly come to define the U.S.-China
11 relationship, and indeed this week the Senate is considering
12 a bill that would enhance U.S. footing in strategic
13 competition with China. Dr. Medeiros, you have spoken about
14 China's increasing anxiety in the face of changing U.S.
15 policy. What risks does this anxiety pose to U.S. national
16 security interests and regional stability, and how should
17 that inform U.S. strategy?

18 Mr. Medeiros: Thank you, Senator Kelly, and thank you
19 for your longstanding commitment and work on the U.S.-China
20 relationship. Chinese anxiety because of U.S. actions is
21 not necessarily a bad thing. While the U.S. should seek to
22 avoid accidents and miscalculation, I think it is also
23 important to understand that American actions can signal to
24 China the risks and costs associated with much of their
25 behavior. And I very much agree with Ms. Glaser's written

1 and oral testimonies, where she talks about, in certain
2 areas, both related to gray zone operations and specifically
3 economic coercion, perhaps the Chinese haven't fully
4 internalized the cost associated with their actions.

5 So I think that the more that the United States invests
6 at home and signals to China that it is revitalizing itself,
7 it is resilient, and it will be a strong, long-term
8 competitor, but also the more China engages in both economic
9 and military coercion, the more that the United States will
10 work with other countries to constrain Chinese options. And
11 I think that will have an important effect on China's
12 calculus going forward. Thank you, Senator.

13 Senator Kelly: Well, thank you, and I couldn't agree
14 more. I mean, we have got to stand up and put those
15 roadblocks in place and coordinate with our allies, and also
16 make sure they understand that we are going to build this
17 capability at home. And so I think this legislation we are
18 going to be voting on this week is a good first step, but it
19 is not all that we need to do. Thank you.

20 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Kelly. Senator
21 Hawley.

22 Senator Hawley: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to
23 all the witnesses for being here. Let me start with you,
24 Mr. Pottinger. I noticed that Xi Jinping said the following
25 to the CCP Central Committee during a closed-door session

1 back in 2013. Here is the quote: "Most importantly, we
2 must concentrate our efforts on continually broadening our
3 comprehensive national power and laying the foundation for a
4 future where we will win the initiative and have the
5 dominant position." That is Xi.

6 Give us a sense of how seizing control of Taiwan plays
7 into this, and to Beijing's strategy, in your judgment, in
8 terms of Beijing winning the initiative, as Xi was talking
9 about, and assuming a dominant position in INDOPACOM and the
10 beyond.

11 Mr. Pottinger: Senator, yeah, that speech is a
12 remarkable one for that quote and many others. It was
13 actually kept secret by the Chinese government for more than
14 6 years, but it really did lay out, at the very beginning of
15 Xi Jinping's rise, what the goal was, and it was to
16 challenge and eventually defeat capitalism, in his words,
17 and expand the Chinese version of socialism, which is a dark
18 one.

19 When it comes to Taiwan, I mean, if we were to think of
20 the unthinkable and imagine what would happen if Taiwan were
21 coerced, and coercibly subordinated, it would not only snuff
22 out the first Chinese democracy in history, a very
23 successful one, it would also damage the democratic models
24 of other neighboring countries in the region. It would do
25 serious damage to U.S. credibility as an ally. It might

1 lead to nuclear weapons proliferation as countries scramble
2 for something that they hope would be more reliable than the
3 assurances of our extended deterrent. It would badly
4 disrupt the chip and semiconductor industry, those supplies.
5 If we think automakers are having trouble right now, you
6 know, you haven't seen anything yet. And the list goes on
7 and on.

8 So China views it as a means not only to solve
9 something of a domestic matter in their view, and for
10 something of the domestic credibility of the Chinese
11 Communist Party, but also as a way of shattering U.S.
12 influence, shattering U.S. alliances, and really shattering
13 the defense concept of Japan, for example, to say nothing of
14 Southeast Asia, and giving it a clear view all the way to
15 Hawaii.

16 That would also mean that all of the effort that they
17 put into arming for a Taiwan contingency could then be
18 devoted to expanding China's influence everywhere else
19 around the world.

20 Senator Hawley: For those reasons, do you agree with
21 the Department of Defense that the U.S. government, and the
22 DoD in particular, should prioritize defeating a fait
23 accompli in Taiwan as a pacing scenario, as they sometimes
24 say?

25 Mr. Pottinger: I do, and that is something that has

1 been in our 2018 Indo-Pacific strategy framework. It is in
2 the 2018 National Defense Strategy. It is not a question of
3 implementation, and the implementation isn't there yet, and
4 time is running short, because it is going to take some
5 years for the benefits of that implementation to start
6 showing up in the form of capability.

7 Senator Hawley: Give us a key, just a thumbnail
8 sketch, of what you think some of the key steps are when it
9 comes to implementation. You say it is not there yet. What
10 needs to happen?

11 Mr. Pottinger: Well, from what I understand, I haven't
12 read the budget submission, but from what I am reading in
13 the press, the Pacific Deterrence Initiative needs to be
14 resubmitted, in my view, in a way that is actually in tune
15 with what Congress clearly intended in a bipartisan fashion.

16 Senator Hawley: Yeah, I wanted to ask you about that.
17 The Department's FY 2022 budget, instead of the \$2.2
18 billion requested by PACOM for force design and posture and
19 PDI, DoD is proposing \$23 million. That seems strange.
20 What do you make of that?

21 Mr. Pottinger: Yeah. I mean, I hope that is something
22 that can be worked out, but the spirit and intent of this
23 initiative was really to expand the operating space for U.S.
24 forces, to make our allies more capable and interchangeable,
25 interoperable. It is not just about, you know, budgeting a

1 few more airplanes or an extra ship, which we should also be
2 doing, by the way. But it is really more about changing the
3 battle space in ways that complicate China's plans.

4 Senator Hawley: In the few remaining seconds that I
5 have, Dr. Greitens, I want to ask you a question. It seems
6 that China has become bolder, more and more aggressive,
7 across a variety of fronts. We have seen it with their
8 Uyghur genocide. We have seen it with their military
9 adventurism. We have seen it, unfortunately, in the
10 crackdown on Hong Kong, which I witnessed first-hand.

11 In your assessment, what has led to the CCP's bolder,
12 more aggressive posture in recent years?

13 Ms. Greitens: I think it has a lot to do with the
14 national security concept and strategy that was adopted by
15 Xi Jinping in 2014 and 2015, and one of the things that that
16 strategy does, it talks about that China is approaching the
17 center of the world stage, there is this unprecedented
18 period of strategic opportunity. So it is a recognition
19 that China's power and its capability of pushing the
20 envelope in all the areas you mentioned has really grown and
21 increased.

22 At the same time, there is also this interesting strand
23 of insecurity, even paranoia, that gets paired with that,
24 where the CCP talks about, and the closer we get, the more
25 resistance we are going to encounter, and therefore the more

1 vigilant we will have to be, the harder we will have to
2 push, and the earlier we will have to crack down on any
3 internal dissent or opposition abroad.

4 And so this concept, in the way that internal and
5 external security are interlinked, really pushes the entire
6 party state system, both internally and externally, toward
7 this extreme form of prevention down to really trying to
8 control and immunize politically incorrect thought, which we
9 know to be really dangerous and has had disastrous
10 consequences for the Chinese people, particularly people in
11 Xinjiang, and now in Hong Kong.

12 Senator Hawley: Very good. Thank you very much.
13 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

14 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Hawley. Let me
15 recognize Senator Peters, please.

16 Senator Peters: Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. This
17 question I am going to direct to all four of you. Maybe,
18 Ms. Glaser, we will start with you and then work down the
19 dais.

20 I want to start with kind of the big picture of what we
21 look at in this competition between China and the United
22 States. It has been described as this is really a challenge
23 between authoritarianism and liberal, small L, liberal
24 democracy, and that translates into the economic systems.
25 You have a state capitalism system with the Chinese, a

1 market capitalism here in the United States. And from my
2 background, I spent 20-plus years in the investment
3 business, taught strategic management at university, and as
4 we are thinking of companies in a competitive environment,
5 you always want to think about what is your comparative
6 advantage to your competitors, what is your comparative
7 disadvantage to your competitors, and sort of you can think
8 through your strategic approach to that challenge.

9 So my question to you is if you could just put one
10 thing, what do you think is China's competitive advantage
11 with their system versus the United States? What is their
12 comparative disadvantage? And if each of you could kind of
13 give me a sense of what you think is the top advantage and
14 disadvantage from a competitiveness perspective, across all
15 those things, from technology to the economy to military,
16 the way their governance structure is. You can frame it in
17 the way you would like, and we will start with Ms. Glaser.

18 Ms. Glaser: Well, thank you, Senator, for that
19 question, and I will be short so I can leave time for my
20 colleagues. I think that what is China's greatest strength
21 is its ability as a state to allocate resources in ways that
22 work to its advantage, and yet the other side of that coin
23 is that it is also its disadvantage, because that capital is
24 then allocated inefficiently. But there are times that this
25 really works in China's favor. If they throw money at the

1 problem of developing semiconductors, if we are not putting
2 in place the barriers to prevent them to catch up, then the
3 resources they throw at that enables them to do that.

4 But the fact that the rest of the world is waking up to
5 the challenges and threats that China poses is really the
6 greatest threat, because that will make it more difficult
7 for them to achieve their goals going forward. Thank you.

8 Senator Peters: Thank you.

9 Ms. Greitens: I would add to Ms. Glaser's comments the
10 mobilization capacity and the ruthlessness of the Chinese
11 party state, combined with sheer economic gravity are two
12 pretty formidable strengths in this competition. The United
13 States has unique values and a network of allies and
14 partners that make it globally appealing. I continue to
15 believe that that is a really important advantage for the
16 United States, although I will add that I think when we talk
17 about values and the importance of democracy we should treat
18 it as an aspiration rather than an exclusive club of
19 membership. That will make it much easier to work with some
20 of the partners who are still aspirational or only partly
21 democratic. And so I think striking that balance in our
22 allies and partners and our networks globally is going to
23 remain an important advantage for the United States.

24 Senator Peters: Great. Thank you.

25 Mr. Medeiros: Senator, I think the Chinese have two

1 advantages. As my colleagues said, number one, their
2 ability to mobilize and allocate resources, absent dealing
3 with domestic politics, is a real strength, and the fact
4 that they have turned that into the second-largest economy
5 in the world. Another major strength is that their economy
6 is large and very present in Asia, which has a sort of
7 gravitational pull on other economies in Asia, which is a
8 strategic challenge for the United States.

9 The challenges that they face are, number one, that
10 they have an inability to appreciate how other countries see
11 them, how other countries have a growing number of concerns
12 about coercive and predatory behavior. And if you are a
13 Chinese citizen, the use of coercion by the part state
14 system, the fact that the government could simply come in at
15 any time and disrupt your life, I think is a major headwind
16 toward their ability to become the kind of more open,
17 innovative economy they want, going forward in the future.
18 Thank you.

19 Senator Peters: Thank you.

20 Mr. Pottinger: Senator, I think China's biggest
21 advantage is its scale. They have incredible people and
22 talented people, but, of course, a lot of countries do as
23 well. It is simply the scale. And if China were a lot
24 smaller it would be creaking and probably would have
25 collapsed quite a long time ago. So that scale is a huge

1 advantage for them, and they are trying to leverage that to
2 their advantage.

3 The biggest disadvantage is that the ruling Communist
4 Party doesn't stand for anything except for its own power.
5 There is no other answer. They don't have anything they can
6 paper over to explain their reason for being in power other
7 than power itself.

8 The United States is the flip of that. It is our
9 values that are our biggest strength. It is the thing that
10 we fight for. It is also a sharp instrument that we have to
11 fight against tyranny. It is why we have alliances. It is
12 why people want to trade and visit and study and move and
13 immigrate to the United States.

14 Our disadvantage has been, and I think we are turning a
15 corner on this, but it has been a lack of a sense of purpose
16 or a sense of unity on this problem, and I think that we are
17 achieving that. I think we have seen, and even heard today
18 in this room, the degree to which this is really a
19 bipartisan consensus now that is growing on this.

20 Senator Peters: Thank you. Each of you, thank you.
21 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

22 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Peters. Let me
23 recognize Senator Tuberville, please.

24 Senator Tuberville: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank
25 you for being here today. This has been pretty enlightening

1 for me, somebody who has been in education for the last 40
2 years.

3 Dr. Greitens, China's human rights violations against
4 the Uyghurs were social monitoring and privacy violations.
5 Do you think they used the same thing or are using the same
6 thing against Hong Kong, as we speak?

7 Ms. Greitens: Senator, the tools that were developed
8 and applied in Xinjiang actually began being tested and
9 experimented with about 10 years earlier on China's eastern
10 seaboard, in large urban areas. So in some ways it is
11 actually easier to apply them in a place like Hong Kong,
12 which is more similar to Shanghai or some of the big cities
13 where these techniques were originally rolled out, than it
14 was to adapt them to the geography and the sort of
15 demography and the areas that the CCP is trying to control
16 in Xinjiang.

17 What we've seen is that the sort of fusing of the
18 national security state into Hong Kong's political system
19 has been gradual, although I would say it has pretty rapidly
20 accelerated since the passage of the national security law
21 last summer. And yes, some of the same tools have been
22 applied. There are some things that we have seen used on
23 the mainland and throughout the rest of China that we have
24 signals or signs may be employed in Hong Kong, but it has
25 been a partial process and I don't think the CCP is finished

1 yet.

2 Senator Tuberville: Thank you. You know, I look at
3 education as the key to freedom for any country. As we
4 speak, we have got thousands of young men and women from
5 China here in our higher education system. Now, a lot of
6 them might be more apt to their economy or their lifestyle
7 than ours. But as we speak, we have got 55 Confucius
8 Institutes in this country, 55. How would you recommend we
9 approach the threats that the Confucius Institutes put
10 towards us here in this country?

11 Ms. Greitens: Thank you. I think that the Confucius
12 Institutes, and the 55 that remain, are an interesting
13 challenge, because one of the sort of principles that China
14 uses in its own governance is to take a goal or a central
15 principle and then adapt it to different circumstances on
16 the ground. That was one of the lessons of the Chinese
17 Revolution and it is sort of hard-wired to Chinese
18 governance. We see that with Confucius Institutes as well,
19 that right now, on different campuses in different places
20 they fit in university structures differently, they serve
21 different purposes, and therefore they also pose different
22 challenges.

23 So I think that the way that I see it is that
24 principally the challenge that is posed by an organization
25 like a Confucius Institute is that students come to American

1 classrooms from China, from around the world, to study in an
2 environment that is characterized by free and open
3 intellectual inquiry and pluralistic debate. And so any
4 arrangement that seeks to apply China's political security
5 standards or sort of policing of political rhetoric to
6 members of American educational communities, and to regulate
7 them through what I would describe as corporatist or sort of
8 monopolistic organizations and practices really does pose a
9 risk to what makes American higher education unique and what
10 makes it globally competitive.

11 And so what I think we need to think about is that in
12 many cases the Confucius Institutes are either sort of --
13 there are cases where they are filling a gap in language
14 training, and in that case, in my view, it is the role and
15 responsibility of the United States government to step in
16 and fill that gap, to ensure that the curriculum and the
17 teaching that we need to compete with China, which includes
18 that cadre of trained analysts that I talked about before,
19 that cohort of trained analysts I talked about before, isn't
20 being trained, necessarily, through funding from the Chinese
21 government. I think that's the responsibility of the United
22 States to invest in that project itself.

23 And so in the cases where the Confucius Institute is
24 there because it fills a gap that wasn't being funded or
25 addressed, then I think it is our responsibility to step in

1 and fix that.

2 Otherwise, I think it is really important that American
3 higher education retain control over hiring, personnel
4 review, the tenure process, publication, and that foreign
5 governments not have the ability to influence any of those
6 processes. So any arrangement where a Confucius Institute
7 has involvement in any of those I think is actually
8 inappropriate for American higher education.

9 Senator Tuberville: Thank you. Thank you. One more
10 question. Mr. Pottinger, I hear all about the
11 semiconductors, the lack of, and the things that we don't
12 need to be doing business with China, and all that. We have
13 got rare earth minerals here in this country, and we don't
14 mine them. I don't understand that. And we are going to
15 end up like we did with this pandemic. We are not going to
16 have anything to use in terms of masks and equipment. But I
17 hear nobody talking about rare earth minerals in this
18 country. What are your thoughts on that?

19 Mr. Pottinger: Yes, sir. It is sort of a misnomer to
20 call them rare earths, because they are all over the place.
21 We have got a lot of deposits in the United States as well,
22 and as you mentioned, those have been largely shuttered
23 because they weren't economical in a competition with a
24 country like China that doesn't have environmental
25 standards, for one thing, and that also put an enormous

1 amount of subsidy into building not just the mines but, more
2 importantly, the downstream components of the rare earths
3 chain. So it is those factories that turn those minerals
4 into things like neodymium magnets that are used in all
5 kinds of things, that you can imagine.

6 So if we were to be competitive and to build sort of a
7 new supply chain, we have to realize that you can't just go
8 after one component of that supply chain. You actually have
9 to incentivize the building of those facilities that are not
10 only going to mine but actually create those products that
11 can then go straight into automobiles and missiles and
12 helicopters, and all the rest.

13 Senator Tuberville: Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
14 Chairman.

15 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Senator
16 Rosen, please.

17 Senator Rosen: There we go. Sorry. Thank you,
18 Chairman Reed, and thank you to all the witnesses for being
19 here today for your thoughtful testimony and your work in
20 these areas.

21 I would like to talk a little bit and touch on
22 international standards for emerging technologies, because
23 they serve as a foundation for the development of, and use
24 of emerging technologies, as we have been speaking about,
25 our global competitiveness. It depends on our participation

1 and in our leadership for setting standards for the next
2 generation of technologies. That is why last year I helped
3 introduce the bipartisan Promoting United States Wireless
4 Leadership Act of 2020, to ensure that the U.S. has a seat
5 at the table in the wireless standards-setting process.

6 But we know China has an explicit plan to become a
7 standards-issuing country by targeting emerging technologies
8 where global rules have yet to be fully defined. In fact,
9 China has a goal of achieving leadership in emerging
10 technologies by 2030. That is only 9 years from now. So I
11 want to repeat -- 9 years from now. It is going to go by
12 this fast, right? So for the U.S. to remain a leader in
13 this space and maintain our national security edge, our
14 response must include working with the private sector,
15 investing in research and development in these technologies,
16 and coordinating with all the relevant agencies and engaging
17 international standards-setting bodies.

18 So, Ms. Glaser, if China is set on achieving leadership
19 in about 9 years, can you describe the importance and the
20 impact of U.S. participation in international standards-
21 setting bodies right now for the development and use of
22 emerging technologies, and what do you think we need to do
23 to coordinate with the private sector? We don't have any
24 time to waste?

25 Ms. Glaser: Well, thank you, Senator. I agree with

1 you and I hear this from companies as well that are in
2 associations that want to be leaders in standards setting,
3 and they say that the Chinese come into meetings and they
4 flood the agenda with very large numbers of papers, each
5 putting forward their own standards. So we need to bolster
6 the capabilities of our companies to compete in standards-
7 setting organizations.

8 We also need to work together with our allies and
9 partners. This is an important space for us to be working
10 particularly with European companies who are very concerned
11 about China's lead in standards setting and settings
12 standards that will favor China's interest rather than their
13 interests in combination with the United States. So I think
14 we are knocking on an open door with our allies when we
15 raise these kinds of issues, working with the Europeans. So
16 I would very much support that. Thank you.

17 Senator Rosen: Well, I want to build on that, because
18 we must maintain our technological edge. And, you know, our
19 leadership in emerging technologies is increasingly
20 challenged, primarily by China. They are making advances in
21 critical areas like AI, robotics, cyber, hypersonics, while
22 at the same time rapidly procuring commercial technologies
23 that can be adopted, we know, for military purposes, so
24 global competition, declining R&D, limited incentives. Our
25 procurement processes are the few impediments that we have

1 to turn greater private industry and military partnership in
2 the U.S.

3 So again, Ms. Glaser, how can we capitalize on
4 collaboration between the military and commercial industries
5 to maintain our technological edge going forward?

6 Ms. Glaser: Well, in that area, Senator, I think that
7 we do need to be working more closely between our private
8 and public sectors. We have to be coordinating what our
9 defense establishment is doing with the private sector. I
10 think that is going on, to some extent. The answer, of
11 course, is not to have a military-civil fusion strategy like
12 China has, but we do need to be more integrated and ensure
13 that we are leaders in these key areas that China has set
14 out, for example, in Made in China 2025, which is only one
15 of their industrial strategies, because they have many.

16 But there is nothing that Xi Jinping is more determined
17 to do than to be the leader of these 21st century strategic
18 technologies. So it is imperative and should be a very high
19 priority of the United States.

20 Senator Rosen: And although we don't want a military-
21 civil fusion policy like the Chinese, what do you think we
22 can do to best nurture and empower our public-private
23 partnerships to continue to grow our investments and
24 strengthen technology?

25 Ms. Glaser: Well, let me pass on to maybe some of my

1 colleagues who might have specific ideas on that, but I'd be
2 happy to provide you something in writing.

3 Senator Rosen: Okay.

4 Mr. Medeiros: So, Senator, thank you for your
5 leadership on this issue. The issue of technology standards
6 is often seen as a technical one. I actually see it as a
7 strategy one, and I have two modest recommendations.

8 Number one, I encourage you to interact with the new
9 Secretary of Commerce, who, as you know, controls NIST, and
10 I believe that there will be a new leader of NIST appointed
11 soon. Secretary Raimondo has identified American technology
12 leaders and standards leadership as one of her priorities,
13 and I think that having the Commerce Department more
14 involved in incentivizing public-private partnership and
15 then having the Congress seed some of these efforts with
16 some initial funding to facilitate public-private
17 partnerships in this area, both of these initiatives will be
18 important. Thank you.

19 Senator Rosen: Thank you. I see my time has expired.
20 I believe we have a vote, so we can take -- I know you all
21 have some suggestions. We can take that for the record,
22 please. Thank you.

23 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Rosen. And let me
24 thank the panel for an excellent presentation. Both your
25 testimony and your responses to questions have been

1 insightful, thoughtful, and very, very helpful to the
2 committee.

3 With that let me adjourn the hearing. Thank you.

4 [Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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