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Before the

COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON UNITED STATES INDO-
PACIFIC COMMAND IN REVIEW OF THE DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022 AND THE
FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

Tuesday, March 9, 2021

Washington, D.C.

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HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON UNITED STATES INDO-PACIFIC
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FISCAL YEAR 2022 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

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U.S. Senate
Committee on Armed Services
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in
Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jack Reed,
chairman of the committee, presiding.

Committee Members Present: Senators Reed [presiding],
Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King,
Peters, Manchin, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Wicker, Fischer,
Cotton, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Blackburn,
Hawley, and Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED, U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE ISLAND

Chairman Reed: Let me call the hearing to order.

This morning the committee will receive testimony from Admiral Davidson, the Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command. Admiral, I understand this is likely to be your last appearance before the committee prior to your retirement, and I want to thank you and your family for your decades of service to the country. We also ask that you extend our thanks and gratitude to the men and women under your command who each day sacrifice and serve the nation. Thank you very much, sir, for your distinguished service.

Due to the coronavirus pandemic, you have not appeared before the committee since February 2019. There have been many regional developments since that time, and we look forward to your updates.

At his confirmation hearing, Secretary Austin accurately described China as the "pacing threat" for the Department of Defense. Under President Xi Jinping, China has moved away from greater integration with the liberal world order and instead created a style of authoritarian capitalism that it now seeks to export throughout the region and the world. Additionally, China seeks to co-opt into national institutions or create parallel organizations to supports its strategic interests.
The challenges posed by China require a truly whole-of-government approach, but the Department of Defense and INDOPACOM, in particular, play a key role in seeking to deter increasingly aggressive behavior by the Chinese military.

China seeks to use its superior military power to suppress smaller countries' sovereignty claims in key regions. Nowhere is this more evident than in the South China Sea, which is why international freedom of navigation operations, including regular passage by U.S. warships through strategic waterways, are essential for maintaining internationally recognized transit routes and pushing back against China's excessive claims.

Recognizing the challenges posed by China, on February 10th, President Biden announced the establishment of a China task force to examine the Department's strategy, operational concepts, technology and force structure, posture, intelligence, U.S. alliances and partnerships, and other matters relating to China. Admiral Davidson, I look forward to hearing your thoughts on this task force and the wide range of issues it is considering.

Deterrence is key to avoiding an unnecessary and costly armed conflict with China. Unfortunately, as has been widely recognized by national security leaders and scholars alike, the foundations of U.S. deterrence in the Indo-
Pacific have steadily eroded over time. That is why this committee led the way in the creation of the Pacific Defense Initiative, or PDI, in last year's National Defense Authorization Act. We created the PDI to better focus DOD resources on key military capabilities necessary to deter China, reassure U.S. allies and partners, and send a strong signal to the Chinese Community Party that we are committed to defending U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific. Maintaining momentum behind the PDI will be a key focus of this committee as we begin work on this year's NDAA. Admiral Davidson, we look forward to hearing your assessment of the PDI, how it is being implemented, and what additional requirements you have identified for the upcoming fiscal year and beyond.

At the same time, we must guard against treating the Chinese People's Liberation Army and China as ten feet tall. As an emerging power, China faces a number of challenges that it must contend with, both domestically and internationally. Deterring aggressive military action should certainly be our objective, but we must also seek to exploit China's weaknesses in other areas, including by exposing its suppression of human rights at home and lack of alliances and partners abroad. The world is rightly alarmed by Chinese human rights abuses and threats to democratic movement.
Earlier this year, the State Department appropriately labeled the wide-scale use of Uyghur and other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities by Chinese security forces as a genocide. Additionally, Chinese anti-democratic crackdown in Hong Kong signals an increasing willingness by the Chinese Communist Party to impose its will through force. These actions, coupled with continued rhetoric and aggressive military exercise directed at Taiwan, should give us pause.

While I expect to hear separately from the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea in a few weeks, it is important to note the near-term threat posed by North Korea to the region, and potentially the United States. Many observers believe Kim Jong Un may seek to test the Biden administration with provocative actions in the coming weeks or months. The challenge posed by North Korea can only be addressed through a unified strategy with our allies, and particularly with South Korea and Japan.

We must also seek to coordinate, to the extent possible, with China, if possible, and that is something we should investigate. Admiral Davidson, I look forward to hearing your assessment of the security situation in the Korean Peninsula and your assessment of what more can be done to effect a change in North Korea's course.

Perhaps most importantly, our network of regional
allies and partners is critical to confronting the challenges posed by China and North Korea. The Biden administration is rightly focused on re-invigorating our alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand. These alliances certainly are not without challenges but remain indispensable to our efforts to ensure a stable and open Indo-Pacific region. At the same time, we must continue growing sustainable partnerships with India, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, and others. These allies and partners are our comparative advantage in the region and will be critical to protecting and advancing our collective interests in the coming years.

I would also like to take a moment to stress my concern about the recent military coup and ongoing violent security crackdown in Myanmar. President Biden has made clear that respect for human rights will be a centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy, and I strong support efforts to achieve a return to democratic governance, peace, and rule of law in Myanmar as soon as possible.

Finally, the ongoing coronavirus pandemic and climate change will continue to shape INDOPACOM's operations in the region and engagement with partners and allies for the foreseeable future. We are interested in hearing more about how each of these challenges is impacting INDOPACOM activities in the region today and how you are working to
prepare the command to better prepare and address them in the future.

Again, Admiral Davidson, thank you for your service, and we look forward to your testimony.

Senator Wicker, please.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER WICKER, U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI

Senator Wicker: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Davidson, Senator Inhofe has duties in Oklahoma this morning and wanted me to enter a statement on his behalf. He also wants me to thank you for your decades of service and leadership that you have provided for the Department of Defense, and also to observe that this may be your last appearance before the committee. From my standpoint, I hate to see you go, and I think these will be big shoes to fill.

And this is Senator Inhofe's statement:

The Senate Armed Services Committee's top priority over the last three years has been to ensure the effective implementation of the National Defense Strategy. To implement the NDS, Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks said China is the pacing threat for the Department of Defense, and General Milley said the Pacific is the number one regional priority for the United States military. Competition with China is our top focus and has overwhelming bipartisan support.

As Commander of INDOPACOM, you are on the front lines of military competition with China. Your job is to ensure that there never comes a day when the Chinese Communist Party leadership concludes it can achieve its goals through the use of military force.
However, even with the progress our military has made over the past four years to rebuild readiness, the reality is that the conventional military balance of power in the Indo-Pacific is getting worse, not better. General McMaster told us last week that since the Cold War, China has undertaken the largest peacetime military buildup in history.

At the same time, America grew more complacent. For example, under Obama, from 2010 to 2015, while Chinese military spending grew by 83 percent, we decreased our military spending by 25 percent. As China invested in military capabilities, many Americans naively assumed that China's entry into the WTO and the global integration of its economy would somehow make the Chinese Communist Party more friendly and open to the West.

The result now is America's military advantage and the credibility of our deterrent is eroding. That is why the 2021 NDAA was the toughest bill on China ever, with several national security committees involved, and that is specifically why this committee put the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, or PDI, into last year's NDAA, to stop aggression from the Chinese Communist Party.

In Europe we have made a lot of progress on posture through the European Defense Initiative, or EDI, by investing over $20 billion in the last five years. We need
to apply a similar level of focus, effort, and resources to our posture in the Pacific through PDI. We know we need advanced capabilities like hypersonics and AI, but that is not enough. It is clear we need the right posture to ensure our forces can be in the right place, at the right time, with the right stuff. This is what PDI was designed to accomplish.

In reading your assessment of what we need PDI to do, some other focus areas include integrated air and missile defense; hardened and dispersed bases, expanded training ranges, improved joint exercise, and increased security cooperation with the allies and partners. Admiral Davidson, we hope you will expand on this today and give us details of exactly what you need and where we must invest.

It is a dangerous time in the world but especially in the Indo-Pacific. For example, at last week's hearing, General McMaster told us that "Taiwan may represent the most dangerous flashpoint for war." That is a quote. Admiral Davidson, we must win this competition for the security of our nation as well as our partners and allies.

I look forward to hearing from you about strengthening deterrents and regaining the advantage in the Indo-Pacific. So thank you very much for your attendance and your leadership and your great service to the United States of America, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Wicker.

Admiral Davidson, you are recognized for your testimony.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL PHILIP S. DAVIDSON, USN,
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND

Admiral Davidson: Chairman Reed, Senator Wicker, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Indo-Pacific region today.

Today I am joined by Indo-Pacific Command's senior enlisted advisor, Command Sergeant Major Shane Shorter, a Special Forces warrior with decades of experience in the Indo-Pacific Theater, operating and training alongside our most critical allies and partners.

I can report that Indo-Pacific Command is laser-focused on the Secretary of Defense's immediate five priorities, beginning with the initiatives centered on the health and well-being of our people. Indeed, investing in our most critical and resilient resource, our people, is a national security imperative.

For the past 12 months, we have worked to support the protection and sustainment of our Joint Force readiness while mitigating the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, our team has worked extensively with local, state, and national leadership to help defeat the disease and minimize the impact on our ability to perform our missions. We also remain deeply focused on cultivating a safe environment for our DOD professionals to learn, to
thrive, to execute their mission, and to fulfill their oath to the Constitution.

In doing so, we must also work to eliminate sexual assault, sexual harassment, racism, and extremism, which have no place within our ranks. Such abhorrent behaviors are inconsistent with our values and the principles we are sworn to defend. Our greatest military strength is our people. Therefore, operating in an environment free of discrimination, free of hate or harassment, while accomplishing our mission is paramount to our success.

Indeed, it is paramount to ensuring we can accomplish our mission to meet the greatest challenges of the 21st century.

The Indo-Pacific is the most consequential region for America's future and remains the United States' priority theater. The region itself contains four of the five priority security challenges identified by the Department of Defense -- China, Russia, North Korea, as well as violent extremist organizations. The Indo-Pacific region also experiences frequent natural and man-made disasters -- the negative impacts of climate change, rapid population growth, drugs and human trafficking, and, of course, disease and pandemics.

That said, the region accounts for 60 percent of the world's current gross domestic product, and it contributes more than two-thirds to the present global economic growth.
And in ten years, the region will host two-thirds of the world's population and two-thirds of the global economy.

Our nation's vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific serves as an important reminder to all nations that the United States remains committed to free, fair, and reciprocal trade, shared access to global markets, good governance, and human rights and civil liberties.

Now, if you would, let me focus my remarks on the greatest long-term strategic threat to security in the 21st century, China. In stark contrast to our free and open vision, the Communist Party of China promotes a closed and authoritarian system through internal oppression and external aggression. China's pernicious approach to the region includes a whole-of-party effort to coerce, corrupt, and collapse governments, businesses, organizations, and the people of the Indo-Pacific.

As China continues to increase the size of the People's Liberation Army and advance their own joint capabilities, the military balance in the Indo-Pacific is becoming more unfavorable for the United States and our allies. And with this imbalance, we are accumulating risk that may embolden China to unilaterally change the status quo before our forces may be able to deliver an effective response.

The greatest danger the United States and our allies face in the region is the erosion of conventional
deterrents, vis-à-vis the People's Republic of China. Absent a convincing deterrent, China will be emboldened to continue to take action to supplant the established rules-based international order and the values represented in our vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Our deterrence posture in the Indo-Pacific must demonstrate the capability, the capacity, and the will to convince Beijing, unequivocally, the costs of achieving their objections by the use of military force are simply too high. Indeed, we must be doing everything possible to deter conflict. Our number one job is to keep the peace, but we absolutely must be prepared to fight and win should competition turn to conflict.

I want to thank this committee for your deep commitment to defending U.S. values and interests in the Indo-Pacific through your efforts to establish the ground-breaking Pacific Deterrence Initiative, or PDI. PDI provides the foundation for establishing a forward-deployed, defense in-depth posture that defends the U.S. homeland and our interests abroad, deters aggression, assures our allies and partners, and provides the flexible response options should deterrence fail.

So on behalf of the men and women of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, I thank you for your time today, for your continued support, and for your desire to improve the
prosperity and security of the Indo-Pacific, indeed, the most critical region on the planet. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Davidson follows:]
Chairman Reed: Thank you, Admiral. Before we begin questions let me remind everyone how we will proceed with remote participants. Since it is impossible to know exactly when our colleagues who will be joining via the computer arrive, we will not be following our standard early bird timing rule. Instead, we handle the order of questions by seniority, alternating sides, until we have gone through everyone. Once we reach the end, if there is anyone we missed we will start back at the top of the list and continue until everyone has had their turn.

We will do the standard five-minute rounds. I ask my colleagues on the computers, and at their desk, to please keep an eye on the clock, which you should see on your screens.

Finally, to allow for everyone to be heard, whether in the room or on the computer, I ask all colleagues to please mute your microphone when not speaking.

Admiral, again, thank you for your service and thank you for your testimony. And as you indicated, one of the principal initiatives of this committee over the last several years was the PDI. And I would ask you, in your view, how is the Department, and in particular the services, responded to the establishment of PDI?

Admiral Davidson: Thank you, Senator, for the question. I am quite encouraged, as you know, the budget
for FY 2022 alone is under review by the new administration, and I was quite encouraged by the Deputy Secretary of Defense's memo of two weeks ago, where she articulated that the PDI was absolutely a priority that would be addressed during the budget review.

I think the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, funded in FY 2021 for about $2.2 billion, was a good first start. I recognize that the committee has put a cap of $5.5 billion on the fund going forward. I understand from the draft budgets that there is certainly recognition of the funds that need to go into PDI. I have been encouraged by much of the draft material I have seen, but there is a long way to go before the budget is finalized, and we will continue to engage with the Department to see it through.

Chairman Reed: And let me shift focus. How have our allies and partners responded to PDI?

Admiral Davidson: I think quite positively. Our allies and partners in the region are looking for the surety that the United States is a reliable partner in the region and is here to stay. And the investments that we make specifically towards the PDI will be recognized, and I think are being recognized, at least as we have talked about them, in their own advances and their own defense budgets, where you see Japan, Korea, and Australia, for example, all increasing their defense budgets.
Chairman Reed: Well, thank you, Admiral. In your independent assessment, you suggested a $4.7 billion Federal funding level. Would that be sufficient for all your needs?

Admiral Davidson: As we have articulated for FY 2022, sir, if that was to be fully resourced it would assess our needs to put in place the deterrent posture that I am advocating for.

Chairman Reed: Thank you very much. One of the big challenges, not just in the Pacific but across the military services is joint capabilities, particularly secure and uninterrupted communication. I do not think it takes a lot of expertise to understand that the first wave of assault will probably be cyberattacks on communications and other sensitive instruments. We have problems getting our services jointly connected, and you can allude to them, but our greatest comparative advantage in the Pacific is our allies. And so not only do we have to solve the problem of joint communications with our forces, we have to extend that to our allies. If we do, that investment, I think, would probably be the most fundamental one we could make, because a fully integrated force that can fight together is probably the greatest deterrent in the Pacific.

Can you comment on that, sir?

Admiral Davidson: Thank you, Senator. Indeed, I agree. One of the things that we have advocated for in the
PDI and our 1251 assessment that we submitted last week is the need for a mission partner environment, which is information technology that is available to us today, that extended to our allies and partners in the region would give us confidence in the cybersecurity of all those systems and the resiliency against attack, and it would greatly enhance our ability to plan, our ability to collaborate in operations and planning, certainly in peace time but then in crisis and conflict as well.

Chairman Reed: Is that your number one priority?

Admiral Davidson: After the defense of Guam, MPE, and then advancement for our ranges, absolutely, sir. Those are the three big requirements I have for this fiscal year.

Chairman Reed: Just a final question and a quick response. Most of our relationships, going back several decades, have been bilateral in the Pacific, and we have to move to a multilateral approach. Is there any progress in that direction?

Admiral Davidson: I am quite encouraged by the potential power of an organization like the Quad might bring. In my view, India, Japan, Australia, and the United States, that is a diamond of democracies that could bring so much more, not only to the region but to the globe, not in terms of security alone but in terms of how we might approach the global economy, critical technologies like
telecommunications and 5G, collaboration on the international order. This must to be done diplomatically and economically, and I have great hope that our ministerial-level meetings with the Quad, as it is known and returned, will build into something much bigger for the sake of the globe.

Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Admiral. Senator Wicker, please.

Senator Wicker: Thank you very much, and at this, Mr. Chairman, I want to enter into the record three unclassified documents which amount to Appendix 1 of the 1251 report.

Chairman Reed: Without objection.

[The information referred to follows:]

[COMMITTEE INSERT]
Senator Wicker: And basically, Admiral, we talked about this earlier, it shows, in an unclassified way, the balance between the communist Chinese and the United States in 1999, currently, and projected for 2025, four short years from now. With regard to the projected 2025, it shows that at that point China will have three aircraft carriers to our one in the region. Is that correct?

Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir.

Senator Wicker: And with regard to amphibious assault ships, it is project in 2025 that they will have six to our two.

Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir.

Senator Wicker: And then with regard to modern multi-warfare combatant ships, 54 to our 6. Is that correct?

Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir.

Senator Wicker: And what is the significance of that last figure, Admiral?

Admiral Davidson: Really, the three charts work together, Senator, one to show the change in capability and capacity that the Chinese have undertaken during the course of the 21st century, and the relative static nature of our own forward-positioned forces. As I described, our effort to do a deterrence, to sustain a deterrence posture in the region is so important on our ability to respond in time. And without question, you know, as an old novel in the '70s
used to say, the importance of U.S. presence forward is incredibly important. Perfect speed is being there. And it is to show that if we do not make changes in our posture forward, it will demonstrate that the Chinese have much greater capacity than we have.

Senator Wicker: Now let's look at it on a little brighter side. If you take everything projected that our allies in the area will have, and also you consider what we have in Alaska, which is not west of the International Date Line but it is still fairly close, can you tell us what that does, say, to the amphibious assault ships, which is projected to be six Chinese and two for us?

Admiral Davidson: Certainly that gap closes with us and the Japanese, with our ambition, but the important factor here is time. It takes almost 3 weeks to respond from the West Coast of the United States and 17 days to respond from Alaska, to get all the way to the first island chain and to conduct operations within the second island chain.

Senator Wicker: Now --

Admiral Davidson: So -- go ahead, sir.

Senator Wicker: No, go ahead.

Admiral Davidson: But clearly, Japan brings amphibious capability. They have combatant capability, fighter aircraft, maritime patrol aircraft. To me, the Japanese are
the number one ally in the region and they are critically
important to the security of the region as well.

Senator Wicker: Can you supply us then with another
map, taking those considerations that I mentioned into
account?

Admiral Davidson: Absolutely.

Senator Wicker: You will do that for the record?

Now the Chinese are projecting a 6.8 percent defense
budget increase for the next fiscal year. Is that correct?

Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir.

Senator Wicker: And we are not prepared to match that,
are we?

Admiral Davidson: Not from what I have heard so far,
sir.

Senator Wicker: And so we are going to have to spend
our money smarter.

Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir.

Senator Wicker: I am afraid to get what you say you
need in the PDI, we are going to have to take money from
somewhere else in the defense budget, at this point. Is
that correct? Is that your assessment?

Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir. The way the PDI is
constructed, it will have to come out of the base budget,
yes.

Senator Wicker: And with regard to the PDI, I think
you are telling us there are three things that are yet unfunded in the budget plan. Is that correct?

Admiral Davidson: Again, sir, the budget is not final, it is undergoing a review, but I am certainly advocating for Aegis Ashore in Guam, the mission partner environment as well as the PMTC -- the Pacific Missile -- excuse me, the Pacific Range improvements that I seek for our structure in Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, and so forth.

Senator Wicker: In a nutshell, how do you feel about our ability, right now, to defend Taiwan?

Admiral Davidson: Well, sir, as I articulated in my opening comments, I think our conventional deterrent is actually eroding in the region, and it is because of the vast advances, on the charts that you were just looking at, that the Chinese have undertaken in both terms of capacity over the last 20 years, and then in the next few years, the improvements they will make in their capabilities as well. We need to work more forthrightly.

We have described, in that 1251 assessment that you referenced, which is reflective of our regaining advantage brief, that improvements in capability, our joint lethality out there, enhancements in our design and posture, where we are, our ability to operate from more dispersed places, a strengthened, allied and partnered network, and improvements in our exercises, experimentation, and innovation will make
vast improvements for really less than 1 percent of the defense budget, going forward, and help regain the advantage for us, put that conventional deterrent in the field, and prevent Chinese designs on its neighbors.

Senator Wicker: Thank you so much.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Wicker. Now, via Webex, Senator Shaheen is recognized.

Senator Shaheen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Hopefully you can hear me at this point.

Chairman Reed: We can hear you, Senator.

Senator Shaheen: Great. Admiral Davidson, thank you for your testimony this morning and for your amazing service to the country.

I would like to change the topic a little bit and talk about information and the challenges that information warfare presents. In Europe, disinformation, cyber hacking has been so important in Russia's ability to make inroads that NATO has developed a center to respond to that.

Can you talk about what you are seeing in the Indo-Pacific region with respect to cyber warfare and disinformation, from both Russia and China, and how INDOPACOM is responding to that?

Admiral Davidson: Thank you very much for that question, Senator. Without question, China has a vast disinformation machine. They use both regular media and
social media, and have nearly 1 million people in their propaganda machine, to undermine U.S. interests, to capture the narrative to their own benefit, and to, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, you know, corrupt the environment in a way that creates doubt amongst our allies and partners in the reliability of the United States.

Russia, in the region, acts much more like a spoiler. As opposed to putting forth their own vision, they look to deny the visions of others, and are very active as well, especially in the diplomatic space but in social media. We see the same kind of effects that, you know, the rest of the globe has seen from the Russian machine.

In terms of our INDOPACOM capability and return, you know, we are highly dependent on what is a military function, the MISO operations. We are engaged deeply with the State Department on the kind of messaging that would reinforce what the United States does in the region, and as opposed to providing disinformation, would highlight the ills that others have in the region. I think that is supportive of the kind of normalized information needs that any nation has. Back to you.

Senator Shaheen: So as you are talking about the effort that is underway, do we need to do more? Should there be more collaboration with the State Department? You and Senator Reed discussed the Quad as being one of the
multilateral potential institutions that could respond to particularly the Chinese threat. Is this something that the Quad should take up in a major way, as we look at the threats? Because as you describe it, our threats are not just from conventional weapons. They are also from that cyber warfare and disinformation space.

Admiral Davidson: To your point, Senator, you know, disinformation is part of the new geostrategic fabric that is making the competition so difficult. So a return of capability, to the State Department primarily, but certainly to the interagency, and what it is able to message across the globe I think is critically important. It has immense power, just as a historical example, back during the Cold War. And I am not trying to imply that this is — and I do not want you to infer that this is a Cold War advocacy again. But truth, as it moves around the globe, is critically important in everything we do and should be part of this competition that is being articulated from the White House. Back to you.

Senator Shaheen: Well, thank you very much. I am out of time. But thank you also to INDOPACOM for your support for the Women, Peace, and Security Act. I hope we will hear more about next steps in that area.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Let me
recognize Senator Fischer via Webex.

Senator Fischer: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Admiral, for your dedicated service to this country and your constant vigilance in defending our security and keeping us safe.

Last year, the Strategic Forces Subcommittee authorized an additional $77 million to begin fielding a persistent air and missile defense on Guam. Unfortunately, this funding was removed in conference and replace with language requiring the Department to study the issue. Can you walk us through the need for this system?

Admiral Davidson: Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question. I am a key advocate for persistent, fixed, 360-degree air and missile defense that would be capable of meeting cruise missile threats, ballistic missile threats, certainly anything to be a cruise missile launched from a bomber, from the land, from the sea, and from the air in the region. The structure that is out there right now, the THAAD radar, is not capable of meeting the current trajectory of threats from China, as I have articulated, nor the size of those raids. And a persistent capability, given what we are observing in the theater, advancements in Chinese capability, are critically important. And it must be delivered in a 360-degree fashion to protect from the kind of activities we are seeing China conduct, which is
circumnavigations of Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana, et cetera.

Most importantly, we all have to understand, Guam is a U.S. territory. We have 170,000 U.S. citizens living on Guam. Their defense is homeland defense. We have 21,000 U.S. service men and women and DOD employees as well, plus their families. It is a deep-water strategic port, major fuel stores, munitions stores, command and control. It is a major power projection airfield for us in the region. And it has been evidenced, by me, and displayed by the Chinese, in a propaganda video of their own bomber forces attacking Andersen Air Force Base on Guam.

Guam is a target today. It needs to be defended and it needs to be prepared for the threats that will come in the future, because it is clear to me that Guam is not just a place that we believe that we could fight from, as we have for many decades. We are going to have to fight for it in order to be able to do that.

Senator Fischer: And [inaudible] already developed systems that can meet this need. Is that right? We are not talking about any kind of new development program here, are we?

Admiral Davidson: In partnership with the Missile Defense Agency we believe that the Aegis Ashore system, as is being put to sea right now, and has been constructed
previously in Romania and Poland, delivers the kind of capabilities that would meet the threat that is extant here, by mid-decade, and will help us pace the threat into the future. Yes, ma'am.

Senator Fischer: We always talk about missile defenses as having a deterrence by denial effect. Do you see that applying here, and would this make the conflict less likely by undermining the adversary's confidence that they could achieve their goals?

Admiral Davidson: Absolutely. We have to demonstrate that any ambition that China might have, and any threat it might put forth towards Guam would come at cost, and that would be really by the collection of not only this defensive capability, which I think is so critical because it prevents a cheap shot, but also the rest of the capabilities that I have described in the 1251 assessment, which includes some offensive capabilities, to let China know that the costs of what they seek to do are too high and to give them doubt in their success.

Senator Fischer: Admiral Davidson, in 2018 you testified, quote, that "PACOM only has about a quarter of the ISR it needs in the AOR," unquote. Does that remain the case today? I can say that in visiting with all of our combatant commanders there is never enough ISR to meet the needs in your area. Is that true? And can you compare what
we have to the investments that China is making in their ISR?

Admiral Davidson: We have a continued need for ISR to monitor the day-to-day activities in the region, certainly, but also to understand Chinese designs in the region, what they are doing in the training sphere, and things like that. My ISR posture has improved slightly since 2018. There has been some action taken in just the last few months to restore some of that ISR capability. But if Indo-Pacific Command is indeed the priority theater, we need to continue to look at our total intelligence apparatus -- signals intelligence, communications intelligence, our imagery that comes from space, for airborne assets and all that we gather there -- to make sure that we have the warning that is required to get our forces to respond, alert our allies and partners, and prevent any kind of Chinese external attack in the region.

Senator Fischer: Thank you, Admiral. Thank you for your service. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Fischer. Let me recognize Senator Gillibrand via Webex.

Senator Gillibrand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, the Department of Defense has recently outlined China's military strategy known as Military-Civil Fusion, aka Civil-Military Integration, to develop the PLA into a world-class...
military by 2049. The 2019 DoD report on China stated that, quote, "China uses a variety of methods to acquire foreign military and dual-use technologies, including targeted foreign direct investments, cyber theft, in expectation of private Chinese nationals' access to these technologies, as well as harnessing its intelligence service, computer intrusions, and other illicit approaches."

Because these efforts by China will certainly affect business and people across the region, what would you recommend we work with, with our allies, to counter this strategy while maintaining the principles of a free and open Indo-Pacific?

Admiral Davidson: Thank you for your question, Senator. To your point, the Chinese military-civil fusion approach, which is underpinned by Chinese law that says any state or commercial business enterprise with concerns in China must provide any information that the state seeks for its benefit. That has made for particularly, you know, complex global engagement and global economic scenario, I think, for not only the United States, but as you said, our allies and partners.

It has been very important that, you know, laws like FIRRMA, the CFIUS process that has been established in the United States, is meant to help deny that fusion within China. I know that many of our allies and partners in the
region have begun to pass laws in that direction and are
deleting them as well.

Senator Gillibrand: Well, related, in last year's NDAA we included language requiring the DOD to look into better cooperation with our allies in the Pacific. Specifically, we recognized our cooperation is to, quote, "enhance through more proactive planning and cooperation with allies and partners that capitalize on each country's comparative strengths." The study requires determining what comparative advantages our allies have and what barriers exist to fully realize them.

So what barriers did you face in working with our allies, and what could Congress to do facilitate these relationships?

Admiral Davidson: Well, one, there has to be not just an explanation from the security side but on the economic side as well, you know, complete clarity in what China's military-civil fusion threat does to partnered multinational companies and things like that, that might have a presence or subsidiaries in China. So I think there needs to be, you know, clear dialogue about that.

Transparency and the kind of laws we have passed and the rationale for them, like CFIUS and FIRRMA, and we need to drive understanding with our allies and partners that this threat is real and that if we do not see change from
our allies and partners that we may have to determine whether many of our technologies can be shared with them, to prevent their just outright conveyance to China alone.

Senator Gillibrand: Thank you. I also want to continue on this line of question from Senator Shaheen. As new technologies have been developed rapidly, and nontraditional threats such as COVID and climate change begin to bear greater relevance, it has been crucial that we are able to work in a proactive manner to coordinate and respond to their allies. What lessons would you say the COVID-19 pandemic has taught INDO PACOM about coordinating with allies in the face of emerging nontraditional and transnational threats? Further, do we balance our approach, or how do we balance our approach to these particular threats in contrast to the traditional ones that we face in the Indo-Pacific?

Admiral Davidson: Thank you, Senator. I absolutely agree the is opportunity for deepened relationships with our allies and partners on transnational issues. And this is whole-of-government opportunity for us, because, you know, there are economic components of the government, law enforcement, health and human services, et cetera, when combined with some of the capabilities we can bring to deliver, add capacity in diagnosing and delivering vaccines, for example, collaborating with our allies and partners in
the region for those nations in need is hugely powerful.
And I think there should be deepened relationships across
the whole U.S. Government with their counterparts in these
other countries.

I am finding, just, you know, in the transnational
threat alone, that some nations have legal means and
relationships with countries that would be incredibly
effective to help undermine things like Chinese corruption
on the Belt and Road Initiative, for example. So deepening
partnerships there with our allies and partners across our
whole-of-government I think is a key part of the competition
that we are all talking about.

Senator Gillibrand: Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Senator
Cotton, please.

Senator Cotton: Admiral Davidson, thank you for your
appearance again here today. Thanks for your service to our
nation. I want to talk a little bit about the balance of
power in the Western Pacific when it comes to missiles. For
decades, the United States belonged to something called the
INF Treaty, which prohibited us and Russia, the only two
parties, from building ground-based, intermediate-range
missiles, roughly speaking like 300 to 3,000 miles of range.

China was never a party to this. That is why they have
stockpiled thousands of these missiles that, as you have testified, can threaten not only our allies in places like Taiwan and Japan and South Korea, but also our own troops and citizens in places like Guam and other islands in the Western Pacific.

We finally left the INF Treaty a couple of years back, in part because Russia was cheating on it for years, in part because of this imbalance of power. How important is it that the United States continues to build up our missile forces so that we can hold China, you know, in deterrence and at risk in the Western Pacific?

Admiral Davidson: I think it is very important, Senator. I think a wider base of long-range precision fires, which are enabled by all our terrestrial forces, not just sea and air but by land forces as well, is critically important to stabilizing what is becoming a more unstable environment in the Western Pacific.

I have been encouraged by the enthusiasm by the Army and the Marine Corps to embrace some of the capabilities that Navy and Air Force have already developed. I think that is a low-cost way to quick capability that can be fielded potentially in the region and I think we ought to stay after it.

I say to people all the time, missile defense is the hardest thing we do, and if I am the manager of a baseball
team, you know, I could have the best defenses in the world, but if I cannot score some runs I cannot win the game. We have got to have offensive capabilities that threaten -- you know, that cause a potential adversary to think twice about any malign activities that they might take in the region, militarily, and that is where offensive fires come into play.

Senator Cotton: And to drive this home again, the importance of ground-based precision fires. The Navy and the Air Force have great capabilities, but you can only put so many missiles on a ship or on an aircraft. Ground-based fires allow you to build up a stockpile, the same way China has done on its mainland, where they have thousands of missiles aimed at Taiwan or Japan or Guam, and that is one reason why it is so important to continue to build up those ground-based fires. Is that correct?

Admiral Davidson: Yes, Senator. The U.S. fights as a joint force, and long-range precision fires delivered to the ground force I think are critically important to enhance the maneuver and positional advantage of U.S. forces in the theater.

Senator Cotton: Let's turn from missiles to payloads. Do you agree with Admiral Richard at Strategic Command that China could triple or even quadruple its nuclear weapon stockpile in the years ahead?
Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir, I do.

Senator Cotton: And presumably, if they are going to build all those nuclear warheads they are also going to build the delivery systems for those warheads as well. Correct?

Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir. They have quadrupled their nuclear capability since the turn of the century and they will at least double it during the course of this decade, and I have seen the same estimates that Admiral Richard is talking about.

Senator Cotton: Whereas the United States, because we just gave a no-strings-attached extension to the New START Treaty, is limited to 800 deployed nuclear weapons. So China, unconstrained by this treaty, if they triple or quadruple their stockpile, could possibly have nuclear overmatch against the United States before the end of this decade. Is that correct?

Admiral Davidson: If they were to quadruple their stockpile, yes, sir.

Senator Cotton: And when you combine the strategic forces of both Russia and China, then they certainly would have overmatch against the United States when it comes to our nuclear arsenal.

Admiral Davidson: Yes, Senator.

Senator Cotton: It is very expensive and hard work to
win an arms race, but it is much better to win an arms race
than to lose a war.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator
Blumenthal, please.

Senator Blumenthal: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think
that the thrust of this hearing and your testimony is to
emphasize the ongoing and increasing threat and danger of
Chinese military buildup and potential aggression. And we
have been talking, I guess, mainly about the conventional
threats and nuclear threats, but recently the Chinese
launched a cyberattack on this country. What should the
American public know about that attack involving Microsoft,
recently disclosed?

Admiral Davidson: I am sorry. I will have to take
that one for the record, sir. I have not had direct
conversations with Microsoft about that.

Senator Blumenthal: Would you agree that China
represents a threat in the cyber domain?

Admiral Davidson: Oh, absolutely.

Senator Blumenthal: And would you agree also that what
you just said about nuclear capacity applies to cyber as
well, namely that defense is not enough. You need offense
and you need to draw lines so that adversaries will know
what they cannot do, lines they cannot cross, and offense is
necessary to deter them from crossing those lines.
Admiral Davidson: I absolutely agree, Senator. China is advancing its cyber capability in leaps and bounds. I do not think I could articulate it in a quantified manner like the discussion we just had with Senator Cotton. But they are vastly improving that cyber capabilities, and we are witnessing some of that malign activity amongst our own capabilities here in the country, as you implied.

Senator Blumenthal: And do you continue to believe, as you said in 2019, shifting to another domain, the undersea domain, that, quote, "Continuing to build submarines is critically important," end quote, and, quote, "It is our most significant advantage in all domains right now," end quote, referring to submarines.

Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir. Our advantage in the undersea, our submarine force, absolutely. But also what we can do in what we call anti-submarine warfare to deny other nations use, and that is the use of maritime patrol aircraft, that is the kind of sonars and sensors we put on our surface ships, we have to absolutely sustain that advantage going forward.

Senator Blumenthal: So you would strongly endorse, I hope, the continued construction of two Virginia-class submarines a year, and the continued development and construction of the Columbia class as well?

Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir. The Virginia class, what
is coming with the Virginia payload module, I think are critically important to continue U.S. deterrence in the theater, and there is no doubt that the strategic deterrent needs to be recapitalized, and the Columbia is the way to do that for our Ohio-class submarines.

Senator Blumenthal: Thank you. You know, I would like to turn to a nontraditional source of concern, first of all, the COVID pandemic. I understand that the ship, the USS Theodore Roosevelt has had several coronavirus cases recently, following the outbreak that occurred. Is that true? And to what extent is COVID a continuing danger in your command?

Admiral Davidson: Thanks for that, Senator. Yes, a few weeks ago the Theodore Roosevelt identified three positive cases out of their normal surveillance testing. Those three positive cases were sent ashore in Guam. There were some 40-odd close contacts that were in quarantine. They have continued to test negative in that time frame, and the ship remains at sea, and continues at sea. And in the meantime, we have tested the whole of the crew and there are no other positive cases.

Senator Blumenthal: So it is a relatively contained, isolated outbreak.

Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir. Yeah, the three positive cases are off the ship and ashore at this point.
Senator Blumenthal: Thank you. And in the closing short time I have left, do you regard climate change as a security threat in the command that is under your control?

Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir. It is something I hear about quite frequently from my peers, particularly in the Pacific Island chain, who can describe for you, during the course of their own lifetimes, you know, the changes that they observe and have observed in their island nations.

Much of what we do at Indo-Pacific Command helps enable their ability to combat some of the ill effects that are immediately manifested, whether it is severe storm. We have an organization called the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management that helps train not only our military folks, certifying my own military folks to do disaster management, but we make it available to non-governmental organizations as well as other governments, and we do it virtually, we do it in person, we bring them to Hawaii, all kinds of methods. It is very important for us.

Senator Blumenthal: I thank you for your testimony today and for your service to our nation. I am not going to be able to follow up now on the climate change question but I will submit more for the record. Thank you, sir.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator Sullivan, please.

Senator Sullivan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Admiral, for your service. You mentioned about deterrence eroding in the region, and in your testimony this morning in the classified session and then also in this focused on the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. That was a bipartisan initiative that came out of this committee, actually. So I think most of the members of this committee, Democrats and Republicans, are certainly supportive.

So is it your testimony today that you need full funding of that $4.6 billion as something that can help with regard to this eroding deterrence? Can you explain about that a little bit more?

Admiral Davidson: I would absolutely yes, sir. I think it fulfills what the law has asked for in the entablament of the PDI.

Senator Sullivan: And that was in last year's NDAA, so we all agreed to it.

Admiral Davidson: In last year's NDAA, and meets the strategic vision that I have in the theater to present a conventional deterrent that would give China pause from any malign military activity that they would undergo against any of our allies and partners in the region.

Senator Sullivan: Well, I really appreciate that. If there was one kind of takeaway from this hearing, you have the Indo-Pacific Commander, the entire Armed Services Committee, the NDAA, all pushing for this. I certainly hope
the Biden administration is focused on this hearing and recognizes that they should fully fund the PDI, which is what most of us wanted and what we all voted for last year when we passed the NDAA.

Let me next talk about the issue of the force posture in the region. You know, I just started my second term here as a Senator and I was asked, six years ago, by our former chairman of this committee, Senator McCain, to really focus on this issue of force posture, which I have been doing a lot. I just got home from Alaska, so that is actually being out in the region, as you know, when I am home in the great state of Alaska.

One of the things I have noticed is that our force posture seems to be somewhat, I would say, stale, when you look at where our forces are -- Okinawa, Korea, Guam -- because they have been there for so long, and we have this issue that you have talked about, first and second island chain, the vulnerabilities. What is the right mix as you look at dispersal of forces, wanting them to be there quickly, in the region, but also the vulnerabilities that you have, first, second island chain?

I will give you an example. Alaska will soon have over 100 fifth-generation fighters stationed there. If you have the right mix of tankers, those assets could be in, for example, the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait within hours,
with the right tankers. How do you think about dispersal of forces and the different vulnerabilities that we have when it comes to force posture?

Admiral Davidson: Thanks, Senator. I think about it much like I have described in the Regain the Advantage, that a more dispersed design and posture in the region is going to be required in order to achieve the positional advantages that we seek. And that is done through permanently based forward-deployed forces -- Japan, Korea, Guam, and elsewhere in the theater -- and the use of CONUS-based forces, Hawaii and Alaska forces, that will rotate through the theater.

That combination of rotating presence and permanent presence has to be robust enough in order buy us the time to deny any quick action going forward. And that is a mix of capabilities, and certainly the fifth-gen fighters, I would tell you, are the backbone of any of our planning for a crisis forward in the theater, and would be needed at dispersed locations within the first and second island chain.

But it also means maritime forces, it means ISR, you know, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance forces, things like that, that have to be made available as well.

Senator Sullivan: Let me ask, you know, when I talk to officials, and I would love your view on this, our intel community, the common theme I hear with regard to China's
actions under Xi Jinping's leadership is alarm. That is a phrase that is used a lot -- alarm. And they point to things, just within the last year, the COVID outbreak and the non-cooperation that China has had with the rest of the world; the border conflict with India, and cyberattacks that were probably launched by China against India, major cyberattacks; an economic embargo against one of our most important allies in the region, Australia; crushing dissent in Hong Kong; very aggressive military actions in the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea; Japan Xinjiang. Do you agree these are alarming maneuvers? This is within the last year.

Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir.

Senator Sullivan: And what does this kind of do to your timeline if you are extrapolating out with regard to any potential conflict or timeline in the Taiwan Strait, when you look at how aggressive Xi Jinping's leadership has been?

Admiral Davidson: I think our concerns are manifest here during this decade, not only on the development, the numbers of, you know, ships, aircraft, rockets, et cetera, that they have put in the field, but the way they are advancing those capabilities as well, in combination with everything that you just cited -- Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet, and the line of actual control, and the South China Sea and the East China Sea. I worry that they are
accelerating their ambitions to supplant the United States, and our leadership role in the rules-based international order, which they have long said that they want to do that by 2050, I am worried about them moving that target closer. Taiwan is clearly one of their ambitions before then, and I think the threat is manifest during this decade, in fact, in the next six years.

Senator Sullivan: Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Let me recognize Senator Hirono via Webex.

Senator Hirono: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Davidson, welcome. This is probably going to be the last time that you will be testifying before our committee, so I want to add my thanks to you for your service, and, of course, we will miss you in Hawaii.

Admiral Davidson, do you support HDR-H Hawaii as an important part of the region's layered missile defense system to protect Hawaii from long-range missiles fired from rogue states such as North Korea?

Admiral Davidson: Absolutely, Senator. It raises the confidence of any employment of a ground-based interceptor, and will help as any advancement in North Korean capabilities might put forth. It is critically important to the overall defense of the country.
Senator Hirono: Thank you. You focused on two areas in your recent PDI report that, in my opinion, are vital to our national security strategy in the Indo-Pacific area. One, strengthening our allies and partners, and two, funding joint coalition military exercises and updating and networking our tests and training ranges in this area of responsibility, including two major training areas in Hawaii, the Pacific Missile Range Facility, or PMRF, and the Pohakuloa Training Area, PTA.

I noticed that you significantly increased the requested amount from last year's PDI report to this year's report to strengthen our allies and partners over the next five years in the region, from over $300 million to about $2.8 billion. Can you discuss your rationale for this significant increase and what that additional funding is intended to do, or where will it go?

Admiral Davidson: Well, you highlighted the key aspects, ma'am. It is to enhance and make improvements in our joint exercise program, and that is principally because not only the United States but our key allies and partners -- Japan, Korea, Australia, as just three examples -- are buying important capabilities that match ours -- integrated air and missile defense, for example, fifth-generation fighters like the F-35. They are being actually delivered in the theater.
We have got to advance our exercise program in a way that allows us to exercise those capabilities deliberately. That is going to require not only changes in our joint exercise program, and I will come back to that in a minute, but also changes in our range structures, to make sure that we can put forth the threats in a live, virtual, constructive format, that will stress the force and stress a coalition force, if it were to come about.

But additionally, that joint exercise program needs to be improved to do precisely what Senator Sullivan was talking about, to help us put more robust forces quickly in the field, to test them under concepts like contested logistics, in which we might have our cyber connectivity restricted and things like that. We have really got to advance from what I view as kind of 20th century exercises into the 21st century capabilities and concerns we need to be worried about.

Senator Hirono: I assume that some of the money that you are requesting to enhance or exercise capabilities will, of course, go to PMRF and PTA in Hawaii.

News reports have indicated that around 15 percent of the persons involved in the recent riots at the Capitol had military experience, either currently or were on active duty, retired, or recently separated. Secretary Austin recently order a 60-day stand-down to address troubling
reports of extremism in the ranks, and the DOJ IG is currently investigating violent extremism within the armed forces after myself and several of my colleagues sent a letter asking for action.

As you finish over 35 years of service, Admiral Davidson, in your opinion, are there steps, other steps that the DOD should take to root out violent extremism in the ranks?

Admiral Davidson: Well, I think certainly, Senator, the stand-down was intended just to be the first step on this. There is absolutely no place for extremism in the United States military.

I can tell you, at my own headquarters, we have already conducted the stand-down. We came together not only to have the leadership discuss what our expectations are, which is, you know, well guided by DoD instruction alone, you know, beyond the oath, but also to bring in other experts. We even had the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force come in to talk to us about the kind of behaviors we might see, as leaders and as peers, and as subordinates and others, that might indicate extremist behaviors. We also recommitted to our oaths, and then we broke down to small groups.

We are going to have to continue to communicate on this with the force, to make sure that our expectations are well known. There is just absolutely no place for that in the
United States military.

Senator Hirono: I am considering legislation to create a standalone punitive article in the Uniform Code of Military Justice to address violent extremism in the ranks, and to send a message of deterrence that this kind of conduct will not be tolerated in the military. Do you think that this kind of legislation is warranted?

Admiral Davidson: I think it should be certainly part of the discussion to examine. You know, I would have to defer to the Department, ma'am, about the approaches that we would take going forward.

Senator Hirono: Yeah. I just want to note that there are certain entities such as the Oathkeepers who actively recruit from the military to join their extremist ranks.

I think I am out of time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Hirono. Let me recognize now Senator Tillis.

Senator Tillis: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Davidson, thank you for being here and for your years of service. Just a question, and I apologize. I have three hearings going on at the same time, so if someone has covered this it probably still bears repeating.

Talking specifically about protection of U.S. troops and bases in Indo-Pacific and our low-density, high-demand rotational capabilities are what we are relying on today.
So if China were to initiate a kinetic operation somewhere in the Indo-Pacific, do you believe the relatively short notice and the warning timelines would make it particularly either very difficult or virtually impossible to defend critical locations like Guam?

Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir. One of the reasons that we have made a point of advocating for sufficient ISR -- intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance -- that buys us that warning in order to respond, is critically important. And we have capacity needs there, and our war gaming has shown that if it is insufficient we cannot respond in time.

Senator Tillis: In the INDOPACOM report, Section 1251 of the FY 2021 NDAA, you all state, "The most important action the U.S. can take to increase joint forces' lethality is to introduce a 360-degree persistent and integrated air defense capability in Guam. Guam is our most crucial operating location in the Western Pacific and its defense remains the number one unfunded priority." I think you are requesting somewhere around $350 million for that purpose. Can you explain how China's missile arsenal threatens Taiwan and why Guam is so important to defend, and how a missile defense system permanently stationed in Guam would help towards that end?

Admiral Davidson: I think the most visible means that we have seen is China's own air force has put out a
propaganda video showing their H-6 bomber force attacking Andersen Air Force Base at Guam, and distributed that quite publicly. We are seeing Chinese naval deployments of surface task groups and submarines that make circumnavigations of Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, and, of course, you know, we see the vast asymmetry, the very large ballistic missile force that China has.

As one component of our deterrence strategy, but again, my number one priority, because it has been unfunded and I think critical to our needs, is a defensive system that would defend against all those threats. And in our work with the Missile Defense Agency, only one system can do that, meet the threats as they will be evident in mid-century, and help us leap to the future as well, and that is an Aegis Ashore-like system there on Guam.

You know, I am not Pollyanna-ish about this. It is not the sole solution. We had discussions about offense capabilities, earlier warning, the ability to disperse fighter aircraft -- all that is critical components as well. But I have been very encouraged by the individual services' transformation approaches, what their support is in the theater, but one of the key shortcomings is not having this defensive system, and we need it going forward.

Senator Tillis: Maybe in my time remaining you can
talk a little bit about the need for permanently stationed forces in the region. Do you think it is adequate now? I think the answer is no, but what does it look like if we were at some level of critical mass with actually personnel west of the International Date Line?

Admiral Davidson: Because so much dialogue would have to happen with allies and partners in the region, sir, although there is one modification in effect that would result in more troops, Marines, actually relocating from Japan to Guam and elsewhere, I am pretty satisfied with the permanent stationing of forces in the region right now.

If situation were to avail us, I think more capabilities in Southeast Asia and South Asia would be a priority. But in the meantime, what is achievable is to help with dispersal locations and with the accommodation of rotational forces within U.S. territories and the freely associated states in the region, principally, as well as our key allies in the region.

Senator Tillis: Thank you, Admiral.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Tillis. Senator Kaine, please.

Senator Kaine: Thank you, Mr. Chair, and Admiral Davidson, I want to echo Senator Hirono's comments. We will miss you. I have really enjoyed working with you, being on this committee, and in your various capacities.
You answered a number of great questions this morning in our classified briefing that my colleagues put on the table and so I am not going to repeat those.

In your military judgment, would it be in the United States' security interest if we were to ratify the U.N. Conference on Law of the Sea?

Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir. I am on record saying that that would be good for us. I think you would be hard-pressed to find a Navy admiral that said otherwise.

Senator Kaine: The convention would allow us to assert, for example, defensive claims in international tribunals to Chinese island-building or Russian activity in the Arctic, and it would also allow us to assert some offensive claims to, for example, mineral rights in the Arctic, that we cannot currently do. I would hope that the committee might revisit whether we should finally do this, to try to gain a better footing in the INDOPACOM and elsewhere.

Second, with respect to China and the competition with China, as much as they are worried about any innovation, weapons system that the U.S. is developing, wouldn't you say that in some way their greatest worry about the U.S. is the network of allies and alliances we have, in their region and elsewhere?

Admiral Davidson: Absolutely. I think the network of
alliances, the partnerships that we have, not only in the region but across the globe, are hugely powerful, and the potential of deepening relationships strategic to defense partnership with a country like India, or in a multilateral formation like the Quad -- India, United States, Japan, and Australia -- I think is a key strategic opportunity for the United States, and those three other countries. But it could be so much more than just a security apparatus, and I think we ought to be thinking about it in terms of all the capabilities that it might help the globe with.

Senator Kaine: It is interesting because I think China and Russia, though very different nations, both are very afraid of the U.S.'s network of alliances, and they have not yet been able to cobble together the kinds of alliances that are based upon mutual regard and mutual work. You know, China uses debt diplomacy to get folks in hock to them, but that is not the same thing as a significant alliance, and Russia uses, you know, availability of natural gas in sort of the same way. But the networks of alliances, they just are not anywhere near where we are.

So I hope as we are trying to maintain strategic match or overmatch in tactical weapons systems we never lose sight of the fact that strengthening alliances is ultimately about the best guarantee we have against aggression by China.

The last question I will ask you is this. Sometimes on
this committee, and in Congress generally, we get into a mindset where we think about the defense budget as very different than the non-defense budget, and on budgetary matters we assume that the sort of non-defense budget is not as critical in national security as the defense budget. I was struck by your testimony in the classified setting this morning -- this is not classified. Again and again you said it is not just defense. If we are going to be strong in the INDOPACOM, vis-à-vis China, it has got to be defense, and diplomacy, and humanitarian aid, and trade, and economic aid. These are items that are not included in the defense budget but I gather you think they are every bit as important to maintaining a robust American presence and leadership in the INDOPACOM, they are as important as the defense budget.

Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir. When I engage with any of the countries in the region, whether they are an ally or it is part of the partner network, their assessment of U.S. reliability is not based on the military presence alone. It is based on our interactions, diplomatically, in the information sphere, where we are economically, our foreign direct investment, our trade. All those elements is how the allies and partners want to engage with the United States and how they view our reliability.

Indeed, to do a competition like we are talking about
with China, it is going to take a whole-of-nation approach,
not just a whole-of-government approach, and all of those
elements come into play.

Senator Kaine: One program that I was not really aware
of, but I am sure other members of the committee were, the
Department of Interior has a program that provides financial
assistance to American Samoa, Guam, Virginia Islands,
Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, and the freely
associated states of the Federated States of Micronesia,
Republic of Marshall Islands, and Palau. The compact with
Palau will expire in 2024. These are non-defense budget
items within Interior, but they can have a significant
effect upon this question that you mentioned, our
reliability, which is really, really important.

So as if we did not have enough work to do on this
committee, we have to also pay attention to the non-defense
budgetary items that are strong evidence of America's desire
to be a leader in the region.

Again, thank you, Admiral Davidson. Thank you, Mr.
Chair.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Kaine. Let me
recognize Senator Cramer via Webex.

Senator Cramer: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you, Admiral, for your service and for being with us today.
This has been most interesting.
I am going to drill down maybe a little bit on some of the things related to the allies and their trust in us and how we build a stronger alliance of free people that are concerned about China. I do not think there is any question China is the topic of the day in lots of places, not just here. But I also know that a lot of these matters get out there on the fringe a little bit, sometimes things we may not think about.

So I want to ask you specifically, there was a recent Reuters story that said Iran has quietly moved record amounts of crude oil to its top client, of course, China, in recent months, at the same time that India, India's state refineries added Iranian oil to their annual import plans on the assumption that the United States is going to lift their sanctions.

Does INDOPACOM, do you guys track Iranian oil shipments within your area of responsibility, and if so, does that information get back to the Pentagon, the White House, decision-makers that are making lots of big decisions about things domestically and around the world that might have an impact on our relationships?

Admiral Davidson: Certainly, Senator. We track the Iranian trans-shipment of oil across the theater. You know, the interactions with China are indicative of China's willingness to ignore sanctions and international norms to
do that kind of thing.

Senator Cramer: But with regard to India, then, do you see a risk if we lift the sanctions on Iran, that they are able to now sell oil to an important ally, I mean, obviously very much in the region. I am just, again, thinking about all of the relationships and all of the factors that enter into the relationship. And I know I am asking you now to probably opine on a policy question as opposed to whether or not you are tracking it. But it seems to me that these decisions, things like lifting sanctions on Iran, could have ramifications that we maybe have not thought of yet. If you want to comment, you can. Otherwise, I can move on.

Admiral Davidson: No. Sir, it is an important policy issue for the United States. Iran is, no doubt, a net exporter of oil and it will have to be considered.

Senator Cramer: Thank you. I want to follow up on a line of questioning that Senator Fischer asked as well, about ISR and the importance of it, and I will probably just skip some of the easy stuff that she was asking about, easy for me, not necessarily for you.

I will just ask this. Adding on to her line of questioning, do you think that the sale of ISR platforms to allies in the region might help our ISR needs in the region? In other words, I know that there have been some restrictions, there are some sales pending, there is, I
know, a lot of desire by both allies and some of our American contractors. Could we help the ISR picture a little bit by opening up sales, maybe speeding them up a little bit to allies in the region?

Admiral Davidson: I would say it depends on some of the exact capabilities that we are talking about. But I will tell you, broadly, we share information with our allies in the region and many, many partners. They benefit from the information that we generate. I can tell you, in the East China Sea, in the South China Sea, we, the United States benefit from much of what our allies and partners do there as well.

So it would certainly add capacity to the picture, and as we deepen our information-sharing agreements, which is dependent on a lot of factors, we will share that information amongst us. It is going to make us better.

Senator Cramer: I do not know if you are hearing me but I stopped hearing you suddenly. I will ask one more question, in case you are listening and can hear it, and it is a pretty basic one. Do you consider China a developing country or a developed country? And that is a question I just started exploring. And what is the difference, whether we consider it developing or developed?

Admiral Davidson: Sir, I imagine economists, you know, have a standard for that description. I mean, certainly
they have lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty just since the turn of the century, but I would say that they still have hundreds of millions to go. But I would have to defer to an economist to give you the exact characterization.

Senator Cramer: Yeah, and you are right. There are some standards that economists use relating to, you know, gross versus net and all these economic points. They are relevant -- do not get me wrong. But what I am more concerned about is how the rest of the world treats a developing nation versus a developed nation, and I guess I would submit to you whether they are considered developed or in transition, they are, as the chairman said in his opening comments, an emerging threat and a near-peer ally prepared for some pretty serious confrontations.

So anyway, all of that said, again, thank you for your service and thank you for being with us today, and I see my time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Cramer. Let me recognize Senator King.

Senator King: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, you spent a lot of time in this region in the last several years. You have thought a lot about China, as you have indicated today. Here is a kind of mind-reading question. Why are they militarizing? Why are they suddenly spending
so much money? Is it because of paranoia about being
attacked or is it because of preparing for aggression? Do
you see the difference?

Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir, absolutely. I appreciate
the question. That is exactly the issue at hand. I see
them developing systems, capabilities, and a posture that
would indicate that they are interested in aggression, and
what they have committed, in their nearest abroad -- Hong
Kong, line of actual control, Xinjiang, the kind of pressure
they are putting on Tibet and others in the region -- I
think it is dramatically misplaced. The West has greatly
assisted in the development of China, to the last
conversation that we have had, over the course of the last
35 years or so. I cannot, for the life of me, understand
some of the capabilities that they are putting in the field
unless it is an aggressive posture, and frankly, I think
they have told us that with their ambition to supplant the
rules-based international order and replace it with one with
Chinese characteristics, which they said they intend to do
by mid-century.

Senator King: I think that is a key question we have
to continue to examine -- what does China want?

Next question. What do you see, strategically,
militarily, technically, in terms of cooperation between
Russia and China? In the '50s and '60s, they were
considered a monolith. Then they split. Are they moving toward a greater degree of cooperation? Is that something we should be concerned about?

Admiral Davidson: In a tactical and operational space I have seen some collaboration there. China has participated in Russia's Pacific/Eastern Military District capstone exercise for three straight years. We have seen co-bomber flights as recently as last fall, where Chinese and Russian bombers joined on each other and flew through the Sea of Japan, East China Sea, and into the Philippine Sea. We are seeing some exchanges like that.

I think that there is less cooperation, although frequent discussion, at the strategic level. Through all of it, I view it with some alarm. While we could consider some of the tactical and operational cooperation nascent, they are building towards improvement. There is no doubt in my mind.

Senator King: Which it seems to me, if that continues is a matter of serious concern.

Admiral Davidson: I would agree, absolutely.

Senator King: Developing a higher level of cooperation.

Speaking of alliances, I spent some time in Asia a few years ago and met, bilaterally, with a whole range of countries in that region. I came away with the conclusion,
we have allies; China has customers. And one of my questions is, you have mentioned India several times. India has always been a neutral country, if you will. Are we developing a stronger alliance with them? You mentioned them as part of the Quad. Do they consider themselves a member of something of that nature?

Admiral Davidson: India has long had an approach called strategic autonomy, you know, a non-aligned approach with others. But I think certainly the activities along the line of actual control with China has opened their eyes to what cooperative effort with others might mean for their own defensive needs. We have provided some information to India in that crisis -- cold weather closing, clothing, some other equipment, some things like that -- and over the last several years we have been deepening our maritime cooperation.

I think you will see India, in the very near term, you know, remain committed to their non-aligned approach, but I think they will deepen their engagement with the Quad, and I think that is a key strategic opportunity for us, Australia, and Japan.

Senator King: That would be a geopolitical major development if India were closely aligned with those other countries.

One final short question. My concern is accidental
conflict. A destroyer is in the South China Sea. A Chinese pilot miscalculates and runs into the destroyer. There is escalation from there. What do we have in place in the way of mil-to-mil contact or other mechanisms for defusing accidental conflict? Some very serious worldwide conflicts have begun with accidents.

Admiral Davidson: Thanks, Senator, for that. You know, first, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and all of our service chiefs, as well as the Secretary of Defense, have routine communications with their counterparts in China. There is no doubt about it. But I would assure you that, you know, 99.xx percent of the encounters we have with the Chinese, at sea and in the air, are safe and professional. And that goes down all the way to the communications that transpire between our two nations when we are occupying the same tactical space. Those remain safe and professional.

The repeated narrative of miscalculation, you know, was really borne from China, because I hear it through diplomatic means. They are threatening other nations of a miscalculation in order to deter us from doing what is rightfully the international operations that we do in the East China Sea and South China Sea. We will continue to endeavor to keep our aviators and our mariners properly informed of the risks that were out there. But make no mistake about it, our expectation is that China conduct
themselves safe and professionally at sea, and should going forward.

Senator King: Thank you. Thank you, Admiral.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator King. Senator Scott, please.

Senator Scott: Thank you, Chairman Reed. Admiral, thank you for your service and the men and women you command for what they do every day to defend the freedom of this country.

My first question is about Taiwan. I think you agree that we have got to prevent Communist China from controlling Taiwan. It is a strategic necessity for the United States, and the loss would devastate our ability and the ability of Japan to counter China's aggression. You agree with that, right?

Admiral Davidson: As a commander out there in the Indo-Pacific, I have an obligation to support the Taiwan Relations Act, and in a geostrategic sense I think it is critically important to the United States' global status, yes.

Senator Scott: I introduce the Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act to end the U.S. strategic ambiguity about Taiwan. I think it is time for the U.S. to state clearly that we are not going to allow Communist China to invade and subdue Taiwan, and that both in Taiwan and the United States
we have got to invest the right resources -- weapons, training, and dialogue -- to ensure that General Secretary Xi understand that he is not going to gain anything.

So what are your thoughts on that?

Admiral Davidson: Sir, I wake up every day, you know, trying to assess the dynamic nature of the geostrategic environment, and, you know, frankly, we ought to be thinking about these things every day. I would submit that we have got more than 40 years of the strategic ambiguity has helped keep Taiwan in its current status. But, you know, these things should be reconsidered routinely. I would look forward to the conversation.

Senator Scott: Do you feel comfortable that both the United States and Taiwan are moving forward in a manner that they are going to be able to defend, with our support, if there was an invasion?

Admiral Davidson: I think it takes our continued support, Senator, and key to that is consistent and persistent arms sales to Taiwan in order for them to continue their capability going forward.

Senator Scott: How much effort or time do you put into Indonesia, and can they be a check on Communist China's aggression?

Admiral Davidson: I am sorry. Could you say the question again?
Senator Scott: On Indonesia, can they be much of a check on Communist China's aggression?

Admiral Davidson: I have cooperative efforts with Indonesia, in the maritime especially, and a deepening relationship. We do a number of exercises together. I would say Indonesia is very concerned about Chinese activities, particularly when they infringe in or around the waters of Indonesia going forward. And I think that Indonesia is an opportunity for the U.S. to deepen our relationship with. With China, it is just one of the things we need to be thinking about together.

Senator Scott: How well is the ability to communicate being done with our allies there, whether it is Taiwan or South Korea or Japan? I mean, like what Senator King was talking about, the chance that there would be an inadvertent mistake, and is there the ability to, even on our side, share information well enough to help prevent something?

Admiral Davidson: We proposed, in our 1241 assessment for the PDI, a multi-partner environment, which is IT technology that I think would raise the surety of the cybersecurity of what we transmit back and forth between our allies and partners in the region. It would enable us to, as well, not only protect information but deepen collaboration on key strategic and military issues like this as well, yes.
Senator Scott: How well is Huawei or other companies, Chinese companies, been able to infiltrate the communications systems in these countries that we rely on as allies? Or are we giving China the ability to be able to shut down communications pretty easily, which would impact our own ability for our military to discuss things with our allies?

Admiral Davidson: That is certainly something that we have to be on the lookout for. We have been deeply engaged over a couple, three years about the vulnerability that Huawei equipments would present in any kind of allied structure. And to be frank, given what I know of the threat I would want to withhold any information-sharing or equipments that would rely on that.

Senator Scott: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Scott. Let me now call on Senator Peters via Webex.

Senator Peters: Admiral, thank you for being with us today. Thank you for your continued service to our country, as well. I appreciate all of your efforts.

Admiral, Chinese hostility towards Taiwan and of aggression in the South China Sea and certainly the military growth that we are seeing from the Chinese requires a conventional deterrent. But unrestricted warfare also requires comprehensive deterrence, as you know. I think
Admiral Mullen described it as "two challenges and one fleet."

So to my question to you, Admiral, is, where do information warfare and low-intensity conflict fit into your priorities within your command? And I ask because the PDI does not appear to project growth for the JTFIP, and the question, is it simply a low-cost endeavor or does it reflect a more limited role in the overall strategy that you are pursuing?

Admiral Davidson: Well, it is not meant to be a limited role at all, Senator. I do think it is a low-cost effort. That said, much of what we have accomplished with Joint Task Force Indo-Pacific, looking backwards, in the years past, has been taken out of hide in order to properly man it and equip it. I am trying to round out the investments there so that the shortcomings I have taken in the rest of the portfolio, you know, that JTFIP does not come at that expense into the future. But I think it is actually key to our deterrent approach going forward.

Senator Peters: Thank you, Admiral. You know, a partner of government that shares our view on regional security landscape, that may not necessarily reflect the majority view of its own society, even when it is combined with security cooperation, so a constant tension for those governments. So my question is related to how INDOPACOM can
actually bridge this gap through civil-military initiatives. So my question for you, Admiral is, to what extent do you see initiatives such as Pacific Angel and the Embassy Civil-Military Support elements playing a role in your command strategy towards China, specifically?

Admiral Davidson: I think they are key efforts as well, Senator. We were talking earlier about a whole-of-nation approach to meet these challenges, and those two organizations you highlighted help knit together multi-agency efforts in that particular regard.

Senator Peters: So a U.S. Army Pacific element, Task Force Oceana, has a continuous presence on ten Pacific islands, using two-person augmentation teams that kind of shape the physical and the informational environments in those places. How do you believe we can better enable these units to make sure that our strategic message is having the impact that we would like it to have?

Admiral Davidson: Well, it is an element in my 1251 request for the PDI. We call it Operation Pacific Resolve writ large. But the proper resourcing of it is to do precisely what you have asked for, to deepen, first, our interagency relationships, and then, as well, to deepen our partnerships with other nations on matters of concern to those other nations, because that is really the basis of our relationships across the region. And the Army's
involvement, and indeed, all the service components have an approach out here that is very similar. Their execution of it is critical to our overall strategy in the region, and frankly, it is the day-to-day connectivity with counterparts on the ground, in the air, and in the maritime, and all those places.

Senator Peters: Well, thank you, Admiral. I appreciate those responses. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Senator Peters. Now let me recognize Senator Blackburn via Webex.

[No response.]

Chairman Reed: It appears that we have some communications issues, and I will recognize Senator Tuberville.

Senator Tuberville: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, thank you for your testimony today. I am glad to hear you call it Indo-Pacific. You know, I am sure China would prefer we not use that word because of a democracy and how big of an ally they are for us. I have heard several people, even in this building, call it something else.

But, you know, we heard for years the United States needs to turn its attention to the Indo-Pacific, and the U.S. has invested $20 billion since 2014 in the European Deterrence Initiative, but we have not done much in the Pacific.
Here are my questions. Explain very briefly, the Aegis Ashore system. Could you explain that, explain the Aegis Ashore system? Could you explain that?

Admiral Davidson: Thank you for the question, Senator. Aegis Ashore is a system that has, in fact, already been developed. We have built and are employing one actually already in Romania, and there is one building and imminently operational in Poland as well, and it is to help NATO with the defense of Europe. It is, essentially, a radar. The command and control, the information technology, communications connectivity, and the interceptors, missiles, that are capable of defeating ballistic missile, cruise missile threats in and around today.

You know, an Aegis Ashore system on Guam, a fixed site on Guam, would enable 360-degree defense of Guam from any military attacks from China, whether they come by sea, by air, or by ballistic missile, in the future. It is technology that is available today. We have built it ashore, we have built it at sea, and it is our number one priority for funding in Guam.

Senator Tuberville: I am sure Putin is real fired up about us putting one in Poland, but that is all right. That is one of your priorities. Is that still going to be your priority for Guam?

Admiral Davidson: We need to have a mix of operational
and defensive capability out there, and in my own analysis and my work with the Missile Defense Agency it is the key shortcoming for the defense of Guam at this point.


Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Senator Tuberville. I will now call upon Senator Manchin. Senator Manchin, please.

Senator Manchin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Admiral, for your service, and I am sure you are looking forward to your retirement. That has to be good for your family, but I know we will be seeing more of you in a different light, I am sure.

Sir, basically on Japan, has Japan changed its position on Aegis?

Admiral Davidson: Japan has reconsidered its pursuit of two Aegis Ashore sites. It has already committed funds to it. They are still working their way through rally a base of alternatives that I think include both a disaggregated posture between land and sea as well as sea and land options.

Senator Manchin: Was it mostly from just public opinion, public discourse with it, more so than military decisions?

Admiral Davidson: The reason to roll it back?
Senator Manchin: Uh-huh.

Admiral Davidson: The siting of the initial Ashore sites that they established I think ran into some local political concerns that had not been worked through before they made the decisions, so they are trying to work through those local politics.

Senator Manchin: And beyond the Aegis Ashore system in Guam, what further missile defense capabilities do we need in the Pacific, and where do you believe they should be located?

Admiral Davidson: You know, for fixed sites, I mean, that is the one I am advocating for. You know, one of the benefits it provides us is it frees up our sea-based assets, our destroyers, to move with the maneuver forces, protect the carriers, protect the amphibious forces, and to protect more widely dispersed land sites that we might be operating from, on behalf of the Air Force, the Army, the Marines, et cetera. That is why I am pursuing that, and that is the sole major structure at this point.

We do have existing capabilities, as do our allies and partners, when it comes to some shorter-range air defense threats.

Senator Manchin: Hypersonic weapons may be one of the biggest threats, based on Russian and Chinese development and the lack of defenses against these types of weapons.
Acknowledging that we are not in the classified portion of our hearing, which we were this morning, can you tell us, are U.S. capabilities in hypersonic weapons sufficient, based on the capability of Chinese defenses against our conventional assets? How are we able to defend ourselves against hypersonics?

Admiral Davidson: If you do not mind, Senator, I would like to take that one for the record and do it in a classified way, so that it is clear.

Senator Manchin: So I do not know whether this might be in the same category. How vulnerable are we to Russia and Chinese hypersonic weapons in the Pacific theater, and are you satisfied with the capabilities being developed to counter the threat? Do we consider that a threat in the Pacific theater, and are we developing anything that we can help protect in that area?

Admiral Davidson: Both China and Russia are developing hypersonic weapons. We are in the R&D stages of development as well, and much more work needs to be done to provide for the defenses, you know, an operational system that would provide for the defenses. And frankly, it is going to take a mixture of what we put on land and at sea as well as what we can put in space to actually defend against those going forward.

Senator Manchin: According to the World Economic
Forum, by 2030, your area of responsibility, or that you have had, your area of responsibility, will be home to many of the world's megacities, that will continue to present vast, complicated governance issues, and my fear is that these governments will look to an authoritarian China as a model, rather than the United States. So my question would be, from a military perspective, what are some meaningful steps that can be taken to help leaders in India, Indonesia, Japan, and the Philippines so that they do not start looking at authoritarianism as the way to go?

Admiral Davidson: I think we have to recognize we are in a competition here, Senator. China's Belt and Road Initiative actually has a component that is trying to enable smart cities globally, where all cyber connections would lead back to China, which we have to highlight the threat that that presents to others. And then we -- and again, a whole-of-government approach -- have to be willing to compete in that environment to help the infrastructure and advances in these other cities, even if it is only advice.

Senator Manchin: Where do we need to expand the programs to ensure allies are capable and that we have appropriate interoperability in the case of a conflict in the Indo-Pacific region?

Admiral Davidson: My key objective in this year's budget is to pursue this mission partner environment, to
help raise the information technology connections between our allies and partners in the region, build collaborative efforts in operations and planning, highlight concerns to these individual nations, and have the kind of resiliency in the networks that we need.

Senator Manchin: Has any thought been given to increasing those programs with India and our partners in the Indo-China peninsula, to provide a barrier and distraction to China's efforts in the South China Sea?

Admiral Davidson: Absolutely. That is at the core of our effort.

Senator Manchin: Thank you, Admiral.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Manchin. Now I would like to recognize Senator Blackburn via Webex.

Senator Blackburn: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Admiral, thank you for your time this morning. I know that we are talking a lot about the Indo-Pacific and China and the problems that we have there. And I am going to stay kind of with the same line of questioning that you have had with Senator Manchin.

Our nuclear triad, do you agree that we should be modernizing, that that would be a valid and convincing deterrent?

Admiral Davidson: Yes, absolutely, ma'am.

Senator Blackburn: And Taiwan, let's talk a little bit
about that. I know you mentioned that earlier, in one of your responses. What should we be doing to increase our bilateral military exercises with Taiwan, or multilateral exercises with others in the region or professional military development?

Admiral Davidson: You know, to your last point first, ma'am, I think there is opportunity to help in professional development when it comes to Taiwan. We think that they have some specific issues that could help provide for their defense, you know, better reserve corps, for example, better response. I can tell you, Sergeant Major Shorter, who is sitting behind me here, has had a longstanding professional development dialogue with his counterparts in Taiwan as well.

When it comes to exercises, we at U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, we do periodically provide -- actually, it is annually provide some exercise support to Taiwan's major exercise, Han Kuang, during the course of the year. We help provide some observers to help understand how Taiwan thinks about their defense, what their exercises exercise, you know, what that exercise contribution is to the advancement in their doctrine within Taiwan, and then to deepen our relationships as well.

Senator Blackburn: On the fusion centers, I had included some language in the 2021 NDAA to support an
increased funding for these regional fusion centers. I would like for you to talk just a little bit about what opportunities arise for China if we do not continue an aggressive support for these, and then if you want to highlight the changes that you think we should be making as we look at the Indo-Pacific region in helping to strengthen our allies using these fusion centers.

Admiral Davidson: Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question. Setting China aside, which really is not at the core of these fusion centers, what we envision in the region is three collaboration networks, one focused mostly on the Indian Ocean, one focused on counterterrorism and centered in Southeast Asia, and then one to be sited somewhere in the Pacific as well. But it is really to knit together -- as we have articulated earlier, we do not have a multilateral alliance network. We have a series of bilateral alliances and partnership. And some of the concerns of the nations that would be involved in these individual centers, you know, there is kind of a common concern that would enable dialogue and cooperation.

So, you know, just speaking of the CTIF in Singapore, the Counter-Terrorism Information Facility, they are concerned about ISIS in East Asia, ISIS in the Philippines, the potential of some ISIS foreign fighters returning to that area. And it is just an opportunity for military and
civilian entities in Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand,
Malaysia, Brunei, with U.S. and Australian support, to come
together and speak about it.

In the Pacific, as just one other example, it is really
to focus on illegal, unregulated, unreported fishing and
other trafficking threats in the region, like narco
trafficking and human trafficking and things like that, and
to provide a reliable network where multiple bilateral
partners can come together and speak in these area.

You know, because of the very bilateral nation-to-
nation nature of the region, finding areas of common cause I
think are critically important, and we are trying to fill
that need.

Senator Blackburn: Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Blackburn. And now
let me recognize Senator Duckworth via Webex.

Senator Duckworth: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral
Davidson, it is good to see you again. I am sorry I was not
able to come visit in 2020, but hopefully 2021 I will be
back in the Indo-Pacific region.

I do not have to tell you about the unique challenges,
the tyranny of distance in the Indo-Pacific's geography and
great power competitors and what they present to our supply
chain and logistics enterprises. I know we have to invest
in long-range fires and other critical capabilities, but I hope that you share my concern that we will not be able to build a combat-credible deterrent if we do not have the logistics capability and capacity to realistically support our complex military op plan.

Admiral Davidson, please elaborate on your request for funding for a Pacific movement and coordination center. What would this funding provide for you and why is it critical for achieving your objectives in the Indo-Pacific region?

Admiral Davidson: Thank you very much, Senator. We had hoped to see you out in the Indo-Pacific as well. You have laid the basis for this quite well. We have added a fifth pillar into the 2022 budget because we did not think that joint logistics and sustainment was getting the requisite focus as we talked about all these other issues.

So the movement center, in and of itself, is to enable our ability to work with the tyranny of distance, have more resiliency in all the multiple processes that go into logistics, from multiple sources. Some are governmental, some are commercial, et cetera. And then to start to deal in the contested environment, the kind of threats that we might see disrupting our logistics writ large.

So we have highlighted it in the 1251 report for this year and we will keep joint logistics on there as a pillar
that we need to focus on, going forward.

Senator Duckworth: Thank you. So let's go further into this. How can the military services and other DOD agencies play a role in developing the logistics systems capabilities and capacity required to support these op plan? You know, I am thinking of everybody can play a part in this. Can you speak a little bit to what the other agencies can do? What can we do right now to address these issues?

Admiral Davidson: Well --

Senator Duckworth: I speak to things like, you know, TRANSCOM, and we do not have enough tanker aircraft, we do not have enough hulls in the water, that sort of thing.

Admiral Davidson: Yeah, no, you have got it exactly right. I mean, there is deep need to recapitalize the military sea lift and anything that -- plus those assets, not anything, those assets that Maritime Administration provides. I think recapitalization there is necessary. We are closely partnered with TRANSCOM on the tanker network around the globe. I think writ large you will see the Air Force and TRANSCOM working together, trying to figure out where new capability like the KC-46 should be added, what is the best positioning for it in order to make its availability and sustainability sound while contributing to the overall transportation network as well. You know, that needs to be recapitalized -- excuse me, examined. The
posture needs to be examined as it goes forward as well.

There is a deep focus on the issue of contested logistics as well. It is one of the doctrinal concepts that the Joint Staff is trying to advance. We are deeply involved in that conversation and look forward to its output here during the course of this year.

Senator Duckworth: Could we carry out the op plans for the Indo-Pacific region without the fifth pillar that you are proposing?

Admiral Davidson: Oh, ma'am, all the combatant commands depend highly on logistics. In our theater, I do not have the benefit of internal lines of communication. We have got to be able to protect these external lines of communication, you know, deliver some actually to our allies and partners in the region as well, and then defend it all in order to maintain the posture that we have out there in the region.

Senator Duckworth: Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Senator Duckworth. Let me recognize Senator Hawley via Webex.

Senator Hawley: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, thank you for being here and congratulations on your many decades now of outstanding service. And on behalf of your fellow Missourians I just want to say thank you for
all that you have done for the country, and we are very
proud of you in the state of Missouri, so thank you for your
service.

Let me ask you a question that I posed to Deputy
Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks in her testimony a
couple of weeks ago. She testified that it is essential for
the United States to maintain the ability to defeat a
Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan in order to strengthen
deterrence against China. Do you agree with Deputy Hicks on
this point?

Admiral Davidson: Absolutely.

Senator Hawley: And do you agree with Deputy Hicks
that a strategy of denial is essential for deterring Chinese
aggression?

Admiral Davidson: Yes, and that is core to our
approach in the 1251 report.

Senator Hawley: Yes, it is. Let me just give you a
second to explain to the committee why it is important you
think to strengthen our forces west of the International
Date Line in order to effectively achieve deterrence by
denial.

Admiral Davidson: Thanks, Senator. You know, our
posture in the region must be demonstrative of the
capabilities that the United States could and would bring to
bear in a crisis -- its capacity, numbers, and the will of
the United States to prevent the fait accompli that you highlighted.

We fulfill that not only through -- and this goes back a little bit to what Senator Duckworth had to say -- not only through people focused so much on fires and platforms, but it is the whole of the apparatus that makes that sound. It is the logistics, it is the intelligence and warning, it is all that stuff that buys you the time in order to present options to the national security apparatus here, and the nation, should the day-to-day competition turn to crisis.

Importantly, what we are trying to do is every day that China gets out of bed and peels back the curtain and sees the United States and its allied and partner network out there in the Western Pacific, assuring its own access, that it thinks I do not want to mess with that capability and that capacity and what I know to be the will, and closes the curtains, and is not going to fight. You know, that is what we are trying to achieve.

Senator Hawley: Yeah, let me just ask you about the window of conflict with regard to China. Some are saying that we do not really need to worry about potential conflict with China until 2035, or even later. You said last week China could achieve military overmatch in the region as soon as 2026, and that if it does -- and I am quoting you now -- it could like choose to forcibly change the status quo in
the region.

Can you just elaborate on those comments?

Admiral Davidson: Yeah. We have indication that the risks are actually going up. I have to be a little delicate here, Senator, because of the classified nature of some of the material, but I think, demonstratively, what you are seeing China do in the region -- in Hong Kong, in the South China Sea, and the East China Sea, some of the malign military actions that have taken in and around Taiwan and elsewhere in the East China Sea and South China Sea, are indicative that China's pace is quickening, and we need to be postured to prevent that quickening from happening.

Senator Hawley: You also said that if China does succeed in changing the status quo that that change would likely be permanent. Tell us what you meant by that.

Admiral Davidson: Well, they have made it quite plain that they would wish to supplant U.S. leadership around the globe. I am seeing a whole-of-government effort in trying to fulfill that ambition, and they are trying to do that by mid-century. They are knocking down waypoints that they think stand in their way of achieving that. I would say the most waypoint that they have knocked down is the establishment of the -- or the revocation of the national security law in Hong Kong, and the obliteration of one country and two systems there. That, fundamentally, is, you
know, I think sending a chill across the region about what Chinese ambitions might be and who might fall ill of Chinese design.

Senator Hawley: I have got just a few seconds here. Let me ask you -- actually, give you the opportunity actually to comment about the Guam defense system. You have spoken about the need for this on a number of occasions. Just give us a sense of what will happen to our ability to deter Chinese aggression if we do not strengthen Guam's air and missile defense systems.

Admiral Davidson: It is the key piece that we are missing that signals to the region that the U.S. is a reliable and committed security partner, that we are there to defend not only U.S. territory but our interests abroad, and in combination with other capabilities. A more distributed posture, a higher level of lethality in our air and maritime and ground forces that might be rotating or present in the region puts forward that total deterrent posture that helps the deter-by-denial objective, that they cannot knock Guam out with an easy shot and keep us out of the fight to present that fait accompli that Deputy Secretary Hicks talked about.

Senator Hawley: Great. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Hawley. Now via
Webex I would like to recognize Senator Rosen.

Senator Rosen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Admiral, for being here, for your service, you and your team, all the work that you have done.

I would like to focus today a little bit on how using technology can potentiate our strategic planning and, of course, the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. So let's talk about regional data-sharing for a moment. America's longstanding advantage in the Indo-Pacific relies on our network of alliances with regional democracies. These partnerships are the cornerstone of promoting a free and open region. As part of the mission partner environment, U.S. INDOPACOM seeks to develop an integrated architecture to expand data-sharing amongst like-minded nations through the use of information fusion centers, joint centers where allies can share information using cloud-based technologies, integrated systems, and secure access control.

So, Admiral Davidson, can you outline your plans to establish an interoperable, digital network in the Indo-Pacific, and how does an integrated IT architecture strengthen our ability to share information and really fight together with our allies and partners?

Admiral Davidson: Thank you for the question, Senator, very much. We have described the MPE in our 1251 assessment, and we hope it will be resourced by the PDI
initiative. It is technology and capability that is actually evident, you know, now. It is not new development that we need to do.

But sharing with our allied and partner network around the region would do a few things, to your last point. One, raise the cyber resiliency of the information that we share and others share with us and with each other, and then, in turn, provide reliable connectivity for us to collaborate, to cooperate, to plan, to highlight threats in the region to the level of concern that the nations participating would have, all the way from illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing on to the higher threat concerns in the region with other partners. But it would give us the assurance that the information that is being shared could not be disrupted or could not be shared outside the confines of the network as well.

Senator Rosen: Thank you. I would like to move to, and we spoke about this a little bit earlier, but virtual military exercise, because we have to overcome the challenge of joint training across long distances in the Indo-Pacific. So U.S. INDOPACOM, I know that you are seeking initiative Pacific Multi-Domain Training and Experimentation Capability, or PMTEC. This initiative would include creating virtual coalition training complexes, linking together testing and training ranges in the United States,
like Nellis Air Force Base and Fallon Range Training Complex in my home state of Nevada, with allies like Japan and Australia.

So can you talk a little bit about how the virtual training environment can transform the way U.S. forces train with allies in the region, how it allows us to model and try different things out in a virtual setting with our allies and partners, and maybe even increase the frequency of these training missions.

Admiral Davidson: Yes, ma'am. Thank you very much. As our own joint force has brought in now what we call multi-domain capabilities, meaning space and cyber capability as well as what we see in the terrestrial environment, right -- air, land, and sea -- as well as adapt the capabilities, or modernize the capabilities in the terrestrial environment, fifth-generation fighters like the F-35 and the F-22, integrated air and missile defense like our Aegis ships, THAAD radars, and things like that. We need to be able to stress the joint force in a dynamic training range in a way that cannot occur in what was 20th century-developed ranges.

Each one of these ranges that we have talked about -- Alaska, what you have highlighted in Nevada at Fallon and Nellis, what we have in Hawaii, for example, at PTA and PMRF in Kauai, and what we hope for at the CJMT, the training
range out in Guam, and CNMI -- we want to deliver some connectivity, range to range, and the ability to inject, you know, computer-generated, virtual and constructive, as we call it, capabilities in there so that we can more widely stress the joint force, test it, train it, and, oh, by the way, if we wanted to keep anything secret that we did not want a satellite or an intelligence-gathering ship to observe, do it in an entirely virtual environment.

We need to extend PMTC as we have developed it to these ranges. We think it is transportable, we think it is sharable between these ranges, and we think it will bring a much higher level of fidelity of training to the very disparate forces we have over vast areas, from Alaska to California to Hawaii and westward, going forward.

Senator Rosen: Thank you. I appreciate that. I look forward to working with you on developing all the new skill sets that our military needs to perform these operations.

Thank you.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Rosen. Now let me recognize Senator Kelly.

Senator Kelly: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Admiral, for joining us today. I have got a couple of questions here about command and control and communications, and we rely heavily on satellites to do that.

In January of 2007, China conducted an anti-satellite
test against one of their own nonoperational weather
satellites with a kinetic kill vehicle, and it has been
reported that in the years since China has an operational
capability that can attack satellites in low-earth orbit and
that they are developing the capability that goes all the
way out to geosynchronous orbit.

So how does this affect the strategic balance of power
in the region, from your perspective?

Admiral Davidson: Thanks for that, Senator. Yes, both
China and Russia have demonstrated capability to disrupt
satellites, you know, testing capabilities on their own
assets in the past, as you have articulated. It clearly, I
think, demonstrates that space, which we have long
considered a domain in which would be unthreatened for the
United States, the potential is there, actually, for it to
be threatened.

We have to build resiliency into our space apparatus.
That happens with other space assets, it happens with
creating airborne and other terrestrial alternatives to
fulfill that, and it changes the calculus in space as well.
We have to recognize that, again -- and this goes back to
some earlier comments I made about deterrence theory. We
are not going to be able to play defense alone in this
particular regard. If we cannot demonstrate to others that
their capabilities in space might be at risk, then we run
the risk of a deterrence failure.

That said, the space layer is critically important to how we sense in the strategic nuclear deterrent, how we communicate across the joint force, and even how we sense and distribute information to the conventional forces as well. Its resiliency is incredibly important to us.

Senator Kelly: As you are gaming out scenarios with the PLA, do you consider this capability that they have obtained?

Admiral Davidson: Yes, absolutely.

Senator Kelly: Okay. And then do you have sufficient intelligence and surveillance capability to keep up with the changes that they are making with regards to their space systems now?

Admiral Davidson: I would have to allow General Raymond at the Space Force and General Dickinson to respond at SPACECOM as well. But writ large, over all the capabilities that we see China developing there is a need for more intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of their test and development, in particular, and then, you know, observing what they are doing in the training and exercise realm as well, writ large. I would be surprised if General Raymond and General Dickinson did not agree that that was necessary in space too.

Senator Kelly: All right. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Senator Kelly. Admiral Davidson, thank you again for your distinguished service in the Navy and the nation, to your family who endured as much as you, in many cases. And once again, please convey our appreciation and profound respect for the men and women under your command. Thank you, Admiral Davidson. This is the end of the hearing.

[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]