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Before the

COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON UNITED STATES INDO-
PACIFIC COMMAND IN REVIEW OF THE DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022 AND THE
FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

Tuesday, March 9, 2021

Washington, D.C.

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1 HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON UNITED STATES INDO-PACIFIC
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7 U.S. Senate

8 Committee on Armed Services

9 Washington, D.C.
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11 The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in
12 Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jack Reed,
13 chairman of the committee, presiding.

14 Committee Members Present: Senators Reed [presiding],
15 Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King,
16 Peters, Manchin, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Wicker, Fischer,
17 Cotton, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Blackburn,
18 Hawley, and Tuberville.
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1 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED, U.S. SENATOR FROM
2 RHODE ISLAND

3 Chairman Reed: Let me call the hearing to order.

4 This morning the committee will receive testimony from
5 Admiral Davidson, the Commander of the United States Indo-
6 Pacific Command. Admiral, I understand this is likely to be
7 your last appearance before the committee prior to your
8 retirement, and I want to thank you and your family for your
9 decades of service to the country. We also ask that you
10 extend our thanks and gratitude to the men and women under
11 your command who each day sacrifice and serve the nation.
12 Thank you very much, sir, for your distinguished service.

13 Due to the coronavirus pandemic, you have not appeared
14 before the committee since February 2019. There have been
15 many regional developments since that time, and we look
16 forward to your updates.

17 At his confirmation hearing, Secretary Austin
18 accurately described China as the "pacing threat" for the
19 Department of Defense. Under President Xi Jinping, China
20 has moved away from greater integration with the liberal
21 world order and instead created a style of authoritarian
22 capitalism that it now seeks to export throughout the region
23 and the world. Additionally, China seeks to co-opt into
24 national institutions or create parallel organizations to
25 supports its strategic interests.

1 The challenges posed by China require a truly whole-of-
2 government approach, but the Department of Defense and
3 INDOPACOM, in particular, play a key role in seeking to
4 deter increasingly aggressive behavior by the Chinese
5 military.

6 China seeks to use its superior military power to
7 suppress smaller countries' sovereignty claims in key
8 regions. Nowhere is this more evident than in the South
9 China Sea, which is why international freedom of navigation
10 operations, including regular passage by U.S. warships
11 through strategic waterways, are essential for maintaining
12 internationally recognized transit routes and pushing back
13 against China's excessive claims.

14 Recognizing the challenges posed by China, on February
15 10th, President Biden announced the establishment of a China
16 task force to examine the Department's strategy, operational
17 concepts, technology and force structure, posture,
18 intelligence, U.S. alliances and partnerships, and other
19 matters relating to China. Admiral Davidson, I look forward
20 to hearing your thoughts on this task force and the wide
21 range of issues it is considering.

22 Deterrence is key to avoiding an unnecessary and costly
23 armed conflict with China. Unfortunately, as has been
24 widely recognized by national security leaders and scholars
25 alike, the foundations of U.S. deterrence in the Indo-

1 Pacific have steadily eroded over time. That is why this
2 committee led the way in the creation of the Pacific Defense
3 Initiative, or PDI, in last year's National Defense
4 Authorization Act. We created the PDI to better focus DOD
5 resources on key military capabilities necessary to deter
6 China, reassure U.S. allies and partners, and send a strong
7 signal to the Chinese Communist Party that we are committed
8 to defending U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific.

9 Maintaining momentum behind the PDI will be a key focus of
10 this committee as we begin work on this year's NDAA.

11 Admiral Davidson, we look forward to hearing your assessment
12 of the PDI, how it is being implemented, and what additional
13 requirements you have identified for the upcoming fiscal
14 year and beyond.

15 At the same time, we must guard against treating the
16 Chinese People's Liberation Army and China as ten feet tall.
17 As an emerging power, China faces a number of challenges
18 that it must contend with, both domestically and
19 internationally. Deterring aggressive military action
20 should certainly be our objective, but we must also seek to
21 exploit China's weaknesses in other areas, including by
22 exposing its suppression of human rights at home and lack of
23 alliances and partners abroad. The world is rightly alarmed
24 by Chinese human rights abuses and threats to democratic
25 movement.

1 Earlier this year, the State Department appropriately
2 labeled the wide-scale use of Uyghur and other predominantly
3 Muslim ethnic minorities by Chinese security forces as a
4 genocide. Additionally, Chinese anti-democratic crackdown
5 in Hong Kong signals an increasing willingness by the
6 Chinese Communist Party to impose its will through force.
7 These actions, coupled with continued rhetoric and
8 aggressive military exercise directed at Taiwan, should give
9 us pause.

10 While I expect to hear separately from the Commander of
11 U.S. Forces Korea in a few weeks, it is important to note
12 the near-term threat posed by North Korea to the region, and
13 potentially the United States. Many observers believe Kim
14 Jong Un may seek to test the Biden administration with
15 provocative actions in the coming weeks or months. The
16 challenge posed by North Korea can only be addressed through
17 a unified strategy with our allies, and particularly with
18 South Korea and Japan.

19 We must also seek to coordinate, to the extent
20 possible, with China, if possible, and that is something we
21 should investigate. Admiral Davidson, I look forward to
22 hearing your assessment of the security situation in the
23 Korean Peninsula and your assessment of what more can be
24 done to effect a change in North Korea's course.

25 Perhaps most importantly, our network of regional

1 allies and partners is critical to confronting the
2 challenges posed by China and North Korea. The Biden
3 administration is rightly focused on re-invigorating our
4 alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the
5 Philippines, and Thailand. These alliances certainly are
6 not without challenges but remain indispensable to our
7 efforts to ensure a stable and open Indo-Pacific region. At
8 the same time, we must continue growing sustainable
9 partnerships with India, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, and
10 others. These allies and partners are our comparative
11 advantage in the region and will be critical to protecting
12 and advancing our collective interests in the coming years.

13 I would also like to take a moment to stress my concern
14 about the recent military coup and ongoing violent security
15 crackdown in Myanmar. President Biden has made clear that
16 respect for human rights will be a centerpiece of U.S.
17 foreign policy, and I strongly support efforts to achieve a
18 return to democratic governance, peace, and rule of law in
19 Myanmar as soon as possible.

20 Finally, the ongoing coronavirus pandemic and climate
21 change will continue to shape INDOPACOM's operations in the
22 region and engagement with partners and allies for the
23 foreseeable future. We are interested in hearing more about
24 how each of these challenges is impacting INDOPACOM
25 activities in the region today and how you are working to

1 prepare the command to better prepare and address them in
2 the future.

3 Again, Admiral Davidson, thank you for your service,
4 and we look forward to your testimony.

5 Senator Wicker, please.

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1 STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER WICKER, U.S. SENATOR FROM
2 MISSISSIPPI

3 Senator Wicker: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral
4 Davidson, Senator Inhofe has duties in Oklahoma this morning
5 and wanted me to enter a statement on his behalf. He also
6 wants me to thank you for your decades of service and
7 leadership that you have provided for the Department of
8 Defense, and also to observe that this may be your last
9 appearance before the committee. From my standpoint, I hate
10 to see you go, and I think these will be big shoes to fill.

11 And this is Senator Inhofe's statement:

12 The Senate Armed Services Committee's top priority over
13 the last three years has been to ensure the effective
14 implementation of the National Defense Strategy. To
15 implement the NDS, Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary
16 Hicks said China is the pacing threat for the Department of
17 Defense, and General Milley said the Pacific is the number
18 one regional priority for the United States military.
19 Competition with China is our top focus and has overwhelming
20 bipartisan support.

21 As Commander of INDOPACOM, you are on the front lines
22 of military competition with China. Your job is to ensure
23 that there never comes a day when the Chinese Communist
24 Party leadership concludes it can achieve its goals through
25 the use of military force.

1 However, even with the progress our military has made
2 over the past four years to rebuild readiness, the reality
3 is that the conventional military balance of power in the
4 Indo-Pacific is getting worse, not better. General McMaster
5 told us last week that since the Cold War, China has
6 undertaken the largest peacetime military buildup in
7 history.

8 At the same time, America grew more complacent. For
9 example, under Obama, from 2010 to 2015, while Chinese
10 military spending grew by 83 percent, we decreased our
11 military spending by 25 percent. As China invested in
12 military capabilities, many Americans naively assumed that
13 China's entry into the WTO and the global integration of its
14 economy would somehow make the Chinese Communist Party more
15 friendly and open to the West.

16 The result now is America's military advantage and the
17 credibility of our deterrent is eroding. That is why the
18 2021 NDAA was the toughest bill on China ever, with several
19 national security committees involved, and that is
20 specifically why this committee put the Pacific Deterrence
21 Initiative, or PDI, into last year's NDAA, to stop
22 aggression from the Chinese Communist Party.

23 In Europe we have made a lot of progress on posture
24 through the European Defense Initiative, or EDI, by
25 investing over \$20 billion in the last five years. We need

1 to apply a similar level of focus, effort, and resources to
2 our posture in the Pacific through PDI. We know we need
3 advanced capabilities like hypersonics and AI, but that is
4 not enough. It is clear we need the right posture to ensure
5 our forces can be in the right place, at the right time,
6 with the right stuff. This is what PDI was designed to
7 accomplish.

8 In reading your assessment of what we need PDI to do,
9 some other focus areas include integrated air and missile
10 defense; hardened and dispersed bases, expanded training
11 ranges, improved joint exercise, and increased security
12 cooperation with the allies and partners. Admiral Davidson,
13 we hope you will expand on this today and give us details of
14 exactly what you need and where we must invest.

15 It is a dangerous time in the world but especially in
16 the Indo-Pacific. For example, at last week's hearing,
17 General McMaster told us that "Taiwan may represent the most
18 dangerous flashpoint for war." That is a quote. Admiral
19 Davidson, we must win this competition for the security of
20 our nation as well as our partners and allies.

21 I look forward to hearing from you about strengthening
22 deterrents and regaining the advantage in the Indo-Pacific.
23 So thank you very much for your attendance and your
24 leadership and your great service to the United States of
25 America, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Wicker.

2 Admiral Davidson, you are recognized for your
3 testimony.

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1 STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL PHILIP S. DAVIDSON, USN,
2 COMMANDER, UNITED STATES INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND

3 Admiral Davidson: Chairman Reed, Senator Wicker,
4 distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
5 opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Indo-Pacific
6 region today.

7 Today I am joined by Indo-Pacific Command's senior
8 enlisted advisor, Command Sergeant Major Shane Shorter, a
9 Special Forces warrior with decades of experience in the
10 Indo-Pacific Theater, operating and training alongside our
11 most critical allies and partners.

12 I can report that Indo-Pacific Command is laser-focused
13 on the Secretary of Defense's immediate five priorities,
14 beginning with the initiatives centered on the health and
15 well-being of our people. Indeed, investing in our most
16 critical and resilient resource, our people, is a national
17 security imperative.

18 For the past 12 months, we have worked to support the
19 protection and sustainment of our Joint Force readiness
20 while mitigating the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.
21 Additionally, our team has worked extensively with local,
22 state, and national leadership to help defeat the disease
23 and minimize the impact on our ability to perform our
24 missions. We also remain deeply focused on cultivating a
25 safe environment for our DOD professionals to learn, to

1 thrive, to execute their mission, and to fulfill their oath
2 the Constitution.

3 In doing so, we must also work to eliminate sexual
4 assault, sexual harassment, racism, and extremism, which
5 have no place within our ranks. Such abhorrent behaviors
6 are inconsistent with our values and the principles we are
7 sworn to defend. Our greatest military strength is our
8 people. Therefore, operating in an environment free of
9 discrimination, free of hate or harassment, while
10 accomplishing our mission is paramount to our success.
11 Indeed, it is paramount to ensuring we can accomplish our
12 mission to meet the greatest challenges of the 21st century.

13 The Indo-Pacific is the most consequential region for
14 America's future and remains the United States' priority
15 theater. The region itself contains four of the five
16 priority security challenges identified by the Department of
17 Defense -- China, Russia, North Korea, as well as violent
18 extremist organizations. The Indo-Pacific region also
19 experiences frequent natural and man-made disasters -- the
20 negative impacts of climate change, rapid population growth,
21 drugs and human trafficking, and, of course, disease and
22 pandemics.

23 That said, the region accounts for 60 percent of the
24 world's current gross domestic product, and it contributes
25 more than two-thirds to the present global economic growth.

1 And in ten years, the region will host two-thirds of the
2 world's population and two-thirds of the global economy.

3 Our nation's vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific
4 serves as an important reminder to all nations that the
5 United States remains committed to free, fair, and
6 reciprocal trade, shared access to global markets, good
7 governance, and human rights and civil liberties.

8 Now, if you would, let me focus my remarks on the
9 greatest long-term strategic threat to security in the 21st
10 century, China. In stark contrast to our free and open
11 vision, the Communist Party of China promotes a closed and
12 an authoritarian system through internal oppression and
13 external aggression. China's pernicious approach to the
14 region includes a whole-of-party effort to coerce, corrupt,
15 and collapse governments, businesses, organizations, and the
16 people of the Indo-Pacific.

17 As China continues to increase the size of the People's
18 Liberation Army and advance their own joint capabilities,
19 the military balance in the Indo-Pacific is becoming more
20 unfavorable for the United States and our allies. And with
21 this imbalance, we are accumulating risk that may embolden
22 China to unilaterally change the status quo before our
23 forces may be able to deliver an effective response.

24 The greatest danger the United States and our allies
25 face in the region is the erosion of conventional

1 deterrents, vis-à-vis the People's Republic of China.
2 Absent a convincing deterrent, China will be emboldened to
3 continue to take action to supplant the established rules-
4 based international order and the values represented in our
5 vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific.

6 Our deterrence posture in the Indo-Pacific must
7 demonstrate the capability, the capacity, and the will to
8 convince Beijing, unequivocally, the costs of achieving
9 their objections by the use of military force are simply too
10 high. Indeed, we must be doing everything possible to deter
11 conflict. Our number one job is to keep the peace, but we
12 absolutely must be prepared to fight and win should
13 competition turn to conflict.

14 I want to thank this committee for your deep commitment
15 to defending U.S. values and interests in the Indo-Pacific
16 through your efforts to establish the ground-breaking
17 Pacific Deterrence Initiative, or PDI. PDI provides the
18 foundation for establishing a forward-deployed, defense in-
19 depth posture that defends the U.S. homeland and our
20 interests abroad, deters aggression, assures our allies and
21 partners, and provides the flexible response options should
22 deterrence fail.

23 So on behalf of the men and women of the United States
24 Indo-Pacific Command, I thank you for your time today, for
25 your continued support, and for your desire to improve the

1 prosperity and security of the Indo-Pacific, indeed, the
2 most critical region on the planet. Thank you.

3 [The prepared statement of Admiral Davidson follows:]

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1 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Admiral. Before we begin
2 questions let me remind everyone how we will proceed with
3 remote participants. Since it is impossible to know exactly
4 when our colleagues who will be joining via the computer
5 arrive, we will not be following our standard early bird
6 timing rule. Instead, we handle the order of questions by
7 seniority, alternating sides, until we have gone through
8 everyone. Once we reach the end, if there is anyone we
9 missed we will start back at the top of the list and
10 continue until everyone has had their turn.

11 We will do the standard five-minute rounds. I ask my
12 colleagues on the computers, and at their desk, to please
13 keep an eye on the clock, which you should see on your
14 screens.

15 Finally, to allow for everyone to be heard, whether in
16 the room or on the computer, I ask all colleagues to please
17 mute your microphone when not speaking.

18 Admiral, again, thank you for your service and thank
19 you for your testimony. And as you indicated, one of the
20 principal initiatives of this committee over the last
21 several years was the PDI. And I would ask you, in your
22 view, how is the Department, and in particular the services,
23 responded to the establishment of PDI?

24 Admiral Davidson: Thank you, Senator, for the
25 question. I am quite encouraged, as you know, the budget

1 for FY 2022 alone is under review by the new administration,
2 and I was quite encouraged by the Deputy Secretary of
3 Defense's memo of two weeks ago, where she articulated that
4 the PDI was absolutely a priority that would be addressed
5 during the budget review.

6 I think the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, funded in FY
7 2021 for about \$2.2 billion, was a good first start. I
8 recognize that the committee has put a cap of \$5.5 billion
9 on the fund going forward. I understand from the draft
10 budgets that there is certainly recognition of the funds
11 that need to go into PDI. I have been encouraged by much of
12 the draft material I have seen, but there is a long way to
13 go before the budget is finalized, and we will continue to
14 engage with the Department to see it through.

15 Chairman Reed: And let me shift focus. How have our
16 allies and partners responded to PDI?

17 Admiral Davidson: I think quite positively. Our
18 allies and partners in the region are looking for the surety
19 that the United States is a reliable partner in the region
20 and is here to stay. And the investments that we make
21 specifically towards the PDI will be recognized, and I think
22 are being recognized, at least as we have talked about them,
23 in their own advances and their own defense budgets, where
24 you see Japan, Korea, and Australia, for example, all
25 increasing their defense budgets.

1 Chairman Reed: Well, thank you, Admiral. In your
2 independent assessment, you suggested a \$4.7 billion Federal
3 funding level. Would that be sufficient for all your needs?

4 Admiral Davidson: As we have articulated for FY 2022,
5 sir, if that was to be fully resourced it would assess our
6 needs to put in place the deterrent posture that I am
7 advocating for.

8 Chairman Reed: Thank you very much. One of the big
9 challenges, not just in the Pacific but across the military
10 services is joint capabilities, particularly secure and
11 uninterrupted communication. I do not think it takes a lot
12 of expertise to understand that the first wave of assault
13 will probably be cyberattacks on communications and other
14 sensitive instruments. We have problems getting our
15 services jointly connected, and you can allude to them, but
16 our greatest comparative advantage in the Pacific is our
17 allies. And so not only do we have to solve the problem of
18 joint communications with our forces, we have to extend that
19 to our allies. If we do, that investment, I think, would
20 probably be the most fundamental one we could make, because
21 a fully integrated force that can fight together is probably
22 the greatest deterrent in the Pacific.

23 Can you comment on that, sir?

24 Admiral Davidson: Thank you, Senator. Indeed, I
25 agree. One of the things that we have advocated for in the

1 PDI and our 1251 assessment that we submitted last week is
2 the need for a mission partner environment, which is
3 information technology that is available to us today, that
4 extended to our allies and partners in the region would give
5 us confidence in the cybersecurity of all those systems and
6 the resiliency against attack, and it would greatly enhance
7 our ability to plan, our ability to collaborate in
8 operations and planning, certainly in peace time but then in
9 crisis and conflict as well.

10 Chairman Reed: Is that your number one priority?

11 Admiral Davidson: After the defense of Guam, MPE, and
12 then advancement for our ranges, absolutely, sir. Those are
13 the three big requirements I have for this fiscal year.

14 Chairman Reed: Just a final question and a quick
15 response. Most of our relationships, going back several
16 decades, have been bilateral in the Pacific, and we have to
17 move to a multilateral approach. Is there any progress in
18 that direction?

19 Admiral Davidson: I am quite encouraged by the
20 potential power of an organization like the Quad might
21 bring. In my view, India, Japan, Australia, and the United
22 States, that is a diamond of democracies that could bring so
23 much more, not only to the region but to the globe, not in
24 terms of security alone but in terms of how we might
25 approach the global economy, critical technologies like

1 telecommunications and 5G, collaboration on the
2 international order. This must to be done diplomatically
3 and economically, and I have great hope that our
4 ministerial-level meetings with the Quad, as it is known and
5 returned, will build into something much bigger for the sake
6 of the globe.

7 Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Admiral. Senator
8 Wicker, please.

9 Senator Wicker: Thank you very much, and at this, Mr.
10 Chairman, I want to enter into the record three unclassified
11 documents which amount to Appendix 1 of the 1251 report.

12 Chairman Reed: Without objection.

13 [The information referred to follows:]

14 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

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1 Senator Wicker: And basically, Admiral, we talked
2 about this earlier, it shows, in an unclassified way, the
3 balance between the communist Chinese and the United States
4 in 1999, currently, and projected for 2025, four short years
5 from now. With regard to the projected 2025, it shows that
6 at that point China will have three aircraft carriers to our
7 one in the region. Is that correct?

8 Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir.

9 Senator Wicker: And with regard to amphibious assault
10 ships, it is project in 2025 that they will have six to our
11 two.

12 Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir.

13 Senator Wicker: And then with regard to modern multi-
14 warfare combatant ships, 54 to our 6. Is that correct?

15 Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir.

16 Senator Wicker: And what is the significance of that
17 last figure, Admiral?

18 Admiral Davidson: Really, the three charts work
19 together, Senator, one to show the change in capability and
20 capacity that the Chinese have undertaken during the course
21 of the 21st century, and the relative static nature of our
22 own forward-positioned forces. As I described, our effort
23 to do a deterrence, to sustain a deterrence posture in the
24 region is so important on our ability to respond in time.
25 And without question, you know, as an old novel in the '70s

1 used to say, the importance of U.S. presence forward is
2 incredibly important. Perfect speed is being there. And it
3 is to show that if we do not make changes in our posture
4 forward, it will demonstrate that the Chinese have much
5 greater capacity than we have.

6 Senator Wicker: Now let's look at it on a little
7 brighter side. If you take everything projected that our
8 allies in the area will have, and also you consider what we
9 have in Alaska, which is not west of the International Date
10 Line but it is still fairly close, can you tell us what that
11 does, say, to the amphibious assault ships, which is
12 projected to be six Chinese and two for us?

13 Admiral Davidson: Certainly that gap closes with us
14 and the Japanese, with our ambition, but the important
15 factor here is time. It takes almost 3 weeks to respond
16 from the West Coast of the United States and 17 days to
17 respond from Alaska, to get all the way to the first island
18 chain and to conduct operations within the second island
19 chain.

20 Senator Wicker: Now --

21 Admiral Davidson: So -- go ahead, sir.

22 Senator Wicker: No, go ahead.

23 Admiral Davidson: But clearly, Japan brings amphibious
24 capability. They have combatant capability, fighter
25 aircraft, maritime patrol aircraft. To me, the Japanese are

1 the number one ally in the region and they are critically
2 important to the security of the region as well.

3 Senator Wicker: Can you supply us then with another
4 map, taking those considerations that I mentioned into
5 account?

6 Admiral Davidson: Absolutely.

7 Senator Wicker: You will do that for the record?

8 Now the Chinese are projecting a 6.8 percent defense
9 budget increase for the next fiscal year. Is that correct?

10 Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir.

11 Senator Wicker: And we are not prepared to match that,
12 are we?

13 Admiral Davidson: Not from what I have heard so far,
14 sir.

15 Senator Wicker: And so we are going to have to spend
16 our money smarter.

17 Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir.

18 Senator Wicker: I am afraid to get what you say you
19 need in the PDI, we are going to have to take money from
20 somewhere else in the defense budget, at this point. Is
21 that correct? Is that your assessment?

22 Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir. The way the PDI is
23 constructed, it will have to come out of the base budget,
24 yes.

25 Senator Wicker: And with regard to the PDI, I think

1 you are telling us there are three things that are yet
2 unfunded in the budget plan. Is that correct?

3 Admiral Davidson: Again, sir, the budget is not final,
4 it is undergoing a review, but I am certainly advocating for
5 Aegis Ashore in Guam, the mission partner environment as
6 well as the PMTC -- the Pacific Missile -- excuse me, the
7 Pacific Range improvements that I seek for our structure in
8 Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, and so forth.

9 Senator Wicker: In a nutshell, how do you feel about
10 our ability, right now, to defend Taiwan?

11 Admiral Davidson: Well, sir, as I articulated in my
12 opening comments, I think our conventional deterrent is
13 actually eroding in the region, and it is because of the
14 vast advances, on the charts that you were just looking at,
15 that the Chinese have undertaken in both terms of capacity
16 over the last 20 years, and then in the next few years, the
17 improvements they will make in their capabilities as well.
18 We need to work more forthrightly.

19 We have described, in that 1251 assessment that you
20 referenced, which is reflective of our regaining advantage
21 brief, that improvements in capability, our joint lethality
22 out there, enhancements in our design and posture, where we
23 are, our ability to operate from more dispersed places, a
24 strengthened, allied and partnered network, and improvements
25 in our exercises, experimentation, and innovation will make

1 vast improvements for really less than 1 percent of the
2 defense budget, going forward, and help regain the advantage
3 for us, put that conventional deterrent in the field, and
4 prevent Chinese designs on its neighbors.

5 Senator Wicker: Thank you so much.

6 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Wicker. Now, via
7 Webex, Senator Shaheen is recognized.

8 Senator Shaheen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Hopefully
9 you can hear me at this point.

10 Chairman Reed: We can hear you, Senator.

11 Senator Shaheen: Great. Admiral Davidson, thank you
12 for your testimony this morning and for your amazing service
13 to the country.

14 I would like to change the topic a little bit and talk
15 about information and the challenges that information
16 warfare presents. In Europe, disinformation, cyber hacking
17 has been so important in Russia's ability to make inroads
18 that NATO has developed a center to respond to that.

19 Can you talk about what you are seeing in the Indo-
20 Pacific region with respect to cyber warfare and
21 disinformation, from both Russia and China, and how
22 INDOPACOM is responding to that?

23 Admiral Davidson: Thank you very much for that
24 question, Senator. Without question, China has a vast
25 disinformation machine. They use both regular media and

1 social media, and have nearly 1 million people in their
2 propaganda machine, to undermine U.S. interests, to capture
3 the narrative to their own benefit, and to, as I mentioned
4 in my opening remarks, you know, corrupt the environment in
5 a way that creates doubt amongst our allies and partners in
6 the reliability of the United States.

7 Russia, in the region, acts much more like a spoiler.
8 As opposed to putting forth their own vision, they look to
9 deny the visions of others, and are very active as well,
10 especially in the diplomatic space but in social media. We
11 see the same kind of effects that, you know, the rest of the
12 globe has seen from the Russian machine.

13 In terms of our INDOPACOM capability and return, you
14 know, we are highly dependent on what is a military
15 function, the MISO operations. We are engaged deeply with
16 the State Department on the kind of messaging that would
17 reinforce what the United States does in the region, and as
18 opposed to providing disinformation, would highlight the
19 ills that others have in the region. I think that is
20 supportive of the kind of normalized information needs that
21 any nation has. Back to you.

22 Senator Shaheen: So as you are talking about the
23 effort that is underway, do we need to do more? Should
24 there be more collaboration with the State Department? You
25 and Senator Reed discussed the Quad as being one of the

1 multilateral potential institutions that could respond to
2 particularly the Chinese threat. Is this something that the
3 Quad should take up in a major way, as we look at the
4 threats? Because as you describe it, our threats are not
5 just from conventional weapons. They are also from that
6 cyber warfare and disinformation space.

7 Admiral Davidson: To your point, Senator, you know,
8 disinformation is part of the new geostrategic fabric that
9 is making the competition so difficult. So a return of
10 capability, to the State Department primarily, but certainly
11 to the interagency, and what it is able to message across
12 the globe I think is critically important. It has immense
13 power, just as a historical example, back during the Cold
14 War. And I am not trying to imply that this is -- and I do
15 not want you to infer that this is a Cold War advocacy
16 again. But truth, as it moves around the globe, is
17 critically important in everything we do and should be part
18 of this competition that is being articulated from the White
19 House. Back to you.

20 Senator Shaheen: Well, thank you very much. I am out
21 of time. But thank you also to INDOPACOM for your support
22 for the Women, Peace, and Security Act. I hope we will hear
23 more about next steps in that area.

24 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

25 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Let me

1 recognize Senator Fischer via Webex.

2 Senator Fischer: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
3 you, Admiral, for your dedicated service to this country and
4 your constant vigilance in defending our security and
5 keeping us safe.

6 Last year, the Strategic Forces Subcommittee authorized
7 an additional \$77 million to begin fielding a persistent air
8 and missile defense on Guam. Unfortunately, this funding
9 was removed in conference and replace with language
10 requiring the Department to study the issue. Can you walk
11 us through the need for this system?

12 Admiral Davidson: Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the
13 question. I am a key advocate for persistent, fixed, 360-
14 degree air and missile defense that would be capable of
15 meeting cruise missile threats, ballistic missile threats,
16 certainly anything to be a cruise missile launched from a
17 bomber, from the land, from the sea, and from the air in the
18 region. The structure that is out there right now, the
19 THAAD radar, is not capable of meeting the current
20 trajectory of threats from China, as I have articulated, nor
21 the size of those raids. And a persistent capability, given
22 what we are observing in the theater, advancements in
23 Chinese capability, are critically important. And it must
24 be delivered in a 360-degree fashion to protect from the
25 kind of activities we are seeing China conduct, which is

1 circumnavigations of Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern
2 Mariana, et cetera.

3 Most importantly, we all have to understand, Guam is a
4 U.S. territory. We have 170,000 U.S. citizens living on
5 Guam. Their defense is homeland defense. We have 21,000
6 U.S. service men and women and DOD employees as well, plus
7 their families. It is a deep-water strategic port, major
8 fuel stores, munitions stores, command and control. It is a
9 major power projection airfield for us in the region. And
10 it has been evidenced, by me, and displayed by the Chinese,
11 in a propaganda video of their own bomber forces attacking
12 Andersen Air Force Base on Guam.

13 Guam is a target today. It needs to be defended and it
14 needs to be prepared for the threats that will come in the
15 future, because it is clear to me that Guam is not just a
16 place that we believe that we could fight from, as we have
17 for many decades. We are going to have to fight for it in
18 order to be able to do that.

19 Senator Fischer: And [inaudible] already developed
20 systems that can meet this need. Is that right? We are not
21 talking about any kind of new development program here, are
22 we?

23 Admiral Davidson: In partnership with the Missile
24 Defense Agency we believe that the Aegis Ashore system, as
25 is being put to sea right now, and has been constructed

1 previously in Romania and Poland, delivers the kind of
2 capabilities that would meet the threat that is extant here,
3 by mid-decade, and will help us pace the threat into the
4 future. Yes, ma'am.

5 Senator Fischer: We always talk about missile defenses
6 as having a deterrence by denial effect. Do you see that
7 applying here, and would this make the conflict less likely
8 by undermining the adversary's confidence that they could
9 achieve their goals?

10 Admiral Davidson: Absolutely. We have to demonstrate
11 that any ambition that China might have, and any threat it
12 might put forth towards Guam would come at cost, and that
13 would be really by the collection of not only this defensive
14 capability, which I think is so critical because it prevents
15 a cheap shot, but also the rest of the capabilities that I
16 have described in the 1251 assessment, which includes some
17 offensive capabilities, to let China know that the costs of
18 what they seek to do are too high and to give them doubt in
19 their success.

20 Senator Fischer: Admiral Davidson, in 2018 you
21 testified, quote, that "PACOM only has about a quarter of
22 the ISR it needs in the AOR," unquote. Does that remain the
23 case today? I can say that in visiting with all of our
24 combatant commanders there is never enough ISR to meet the
25 needs in your area. Is that true? And can you compare what

1 we have to the investments that China is making in their
2 ISR?

3 Admiral Davidson: We have a continued need for ISR to
4 monitor the day-to-day activities in the region, certainly,
5 but also to understand Chinese designs in the region, what
6 they are doing in the training sphere, and things like that.
7 My ISR posture has improved slightly since 2018. There has
8 been some action taken in just the last few months to
9 restore some of that ISR capability. But if Indo-Pacific
10 Command is indeed the priority theater, we need to continue
11 to look at our total intelligence apparatus -- signals
12 intelligence, communications intelligence, our imagery that
13 comes from space, for airborne assets and all that we gather
14 there -- to make sure that we have the warning that is
15 required to get our forces to respond, alert our allies and
16 partners, and prevent any kind of Chinese external attack in
17 the region.

18 Senator Fischer: Thank you, Admiral. Thank you for
19 your service. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

20 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Fischer. Let me
21 recognize Senator Gillibrand via Webex.

22 Senator Gillibrand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral,
23 the Department of Defense has recently outlined China's
24 military strategy known as Military-Civil Fusion, aka Civil-
25 Military Integration, to develop the PLA into a world-class

1 military by 2049. The 2019 DoD report on China stated that,
2 quote, "China uses a variety of methods to acquire foreign
3 military and dual-use technologies, including targeted
4 foreign direct investments, cyber theft, in expectation of
5 private Chinese nationals' access to these technologies, as
6 well as harnessing its intelligence service, computer
7 intrusions, and other illicit approaches."

8 Because these efforts by China will certainly affect
9 business and people across the region, what would you
10 recommend we work with, with our allies, to counter this
11 strategy while maintaining the principles of a free and open
12 Indo-Pacific?

13 Admiral Davidson: Thank you for your question,
14 Senator. To your point, the Chinese military-civil fusion
15 approach, which is underpinned by Chinese law that says any
16 state or commercial business enterprise with concerns in
17 China must provide any information that the state seeks for
18 its benefit. That has made for particularly, you know,
19 complex global engagement and global economic scenario, I
20 think, for not only the United States, but as you said, our
21 allies and partners.

22 It has been very important that, you know, laws like
23 FIRREA, the CFIUS process that has been established in the
24 United States, is meant to help deny that fusion within
25 China. I know that many of our allies and partners in the

1 region have begun to pass laws in that direction and are
2 debating them as well.

3 Senator Gillibrand: Well, related, in last year's NDAA
4 we included language requiring the DOD to look into better
5 cooperation with our allies in the Pacific. Specifically,
6 we recognized our cooperation is to, quote, "enhance through
7 more proactive planning and cooperation with allies and
8 partners that capitalize on each country's comparative
9 strengths." The study requires determining what comparative
10 advantages our allies have and what barriers exist to fully
11 realize them.

12 So what barriers did you face in working with our
13 allies, and what could Congress to do facilitate these
14 relationships?

15 Admiral Davidson: Well, one, there has to be not just
16 an explanation from the security side but on the economic
17 side as well, you know, complete clarity in what China's
18 military-civil fusion threat does to partnered multinational
19 companies and things like that, that might have a presence
20 or subsidiaries in China. So I think there needs to be, you
21 know, clear dialogue about that.

22 Transparency and the kind of laws we have passed and
23 the rationale for them, like CFIUS and FIRRMA, and we need
24 to drive understanding with our allies and partners that
25 this threat is real and that if we do not see change from

1 our allies and partners that we may have to determine
2 whether many of our technologies can be shared with them, to
3 prevent their just outright conveyance to China alone.

4 Senator Gillibrand: Thank you. I also want to
5 continue on this line of question from Senator Shaheen. As
6 new technologies have been developed rapidly, and
7 nontraditional threats such as COVID and climate change
8 begin to bear greater relevance, it has been crucial that we
9 are able to work in a proactive manner to coordinate and
10 respond to their allies. What lessons would you say the
11 COVID-19 pandemic has taught INDOPACOM about coordinating
12 with allies in the face of emerging nontraditional and
13 transnational threats? Further, do we balance our approach,
14 or how do we balance our approach to these particular
15 threats in contrast to the traditional ones that we face in
16 the Indo-Pacific?

17 Admiral Davidson: Thank you, Senator. I absolutely
18 agree there is opportunity for deepened relationships with our
19 allies and partners on transnational issues. And this is
20 whole-of-government opportunity for us, because, you know,
21 there are economic components of the government, law
22 enforcement, health and human services, et cetera, when
23 combined with some of the capabilities we can bring to
24 deliver, add capacity in diagnosing and delivering vaccines,
25 for example, collaborating with our allies and partners in

1 the region for those nations in need is hugely powerful.
2 And I think there should be deepened relationships across
3 the whole U.S. Government with their counterparts in these
4 other countries.

5 I am finding, just, you know, in the transnational
6 threat alone, that some nations have legal means and
7 relationships with countries that would be incredibly
8 effective to help undermine things like Chinese corruption
9 on the Belt and Road Initiative, for example. So deepening
10 partnerships there with our allies and partners across our
11 whole-of-government I think is a key part of the competition
12 that we are all talking about.

13 Senator Gillibrand: Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr.
14 Chairman.

15 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Senator
16 Cotton, please.

17 Senator Cotton: Admiral Davidson, thank you for your
18 appearance again here today. Thanks for your service to our
19 nation. I want to talk a little bit about the balance of
20 power in the Western Pacific when it comes to missiles. For
21 decades, the United States belonged to something called the
22 INF Treaty, which prohibited us and Russia, the only two
23 parties, from building ground-based, intermediate-range
24 missiles, roughly speaking like 300 to 3,000 miles of range.
25 China was never a party to this. That is why they have

1 stockpiled thousands of these missiles that, as you have
2 testified, can threaten not only our allies in places like
3 Taiwan and Japan and South Korea, but also our own troops
4 and citizens in places like Guam and other islands in the
5 Western Pacific.

6 We finally left the INF Treaty a couple of years back,
7 in part because Russia was cheating on it for years, in part
8 because of this imbalance of power. How important is it
9 that the United States continues to build up our missile
10 forces so that we can hold China, you know, in deterrence
11 and at risk in the Western Pacific?

12 Admiral Davidson: I think it is very important,
13 Senator. I think a wider base of long-range precision
14 fires, which are enabled by all our terrestrial forces, not
15 just sea and air but by land forces as well, is critically
16 important to stabilizing what is becoming a more unstable
17 environment in the Western Pacific.

18 I have been encouraged by the enthusiasm by the Army
19 and the Marine Corps to embrace some of the capabilities
20 that Navy and Air Force have already developed. I think
21 that is a low-cost way to quick capability that can be
22 fielded potentially in the region and I think we ought to
23 stay after it.

24 I say to people all the time, missile defense is the
25 hardest thing we do, and if I am the manager of a baseball

1 team, you know, I could have the best defenses in the world,
2 but if I cannot score some runs I cannot win the game. We
3 have got to have offensive capabilities that threaten -- you
4 know, that cause a potential adversary to think twice about
5 any malign activities that they might take in the region,
6 militarily, and that is where offensive fires come into
7 play.

8 Senator Cotton: And to drive this home again, the
9 importance of ground-based precision fires. The Navy and
10 the Air Force have great capabilities, but you can only put
11 so many missiles on a ship or on an aircraft. Ground-based
12 fires allow you to build up a stockpile, the same way China
13 has done on its mainland, where they have thousands of
14 missiles aimed at Taiwan or Japan or Guam, and that is one
15 reason why it is so important to continue to build up those
16 ground-based fires. Is that correct?

17 Admiral Davidson: Yes, Senator. The U.S. fights as a
18 joint force, and long-range precision fires delivered to the
19 ground force I think are critically important to enhance the
20 maneuver and positional advantage of U.S. forces in the
21 theater.

22 Senator Cotton: Let's turn from missiles to payloads.
23 Do you agree with Admiral Richard at Strategic Command that
24 China could triple or even quadruple its nuclear weapon
25 stockpile in the years ahead?

1 Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir, I do.

2 Senator Cotton: And presumably, if they are going to
3 build all those nuclear warheads they are also going to
4 build the delivery systems for those warheads as well.
5 Correct?

6 Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir. They have quadrupled
7 their nuclear capability since the turn of the century and
8 they will at least double it during the course of this
9 decade, and I have seen the same estimates that Admiral
10 Richard is talking about.

11 Senator Cotton: Whereas the United States, because we
12 just gave a no-strings-attached extension to the New START
13 Treaty, is limited to 800 deployed nuclear weapons. So
14 China, unconstrained by this treaty, if they triple or
15 quadruple their stockpile, could possibly have nuclear
16 overmatch against the United States before the end of this
17 decade. Is that correct?

18 Admiral Davidson: If they were to quadruple their
19 stockpile, yes, sir.

20 Senator Cotton: And when you combine the strategic
21 forces of both Russia and China, then they certainly would
22 have overmatch against the United States when it comes to
23 our nuclear arsenal.

24 Admiral Davidson: Yes, Senator.

25 Senator Cotton: It is very expensive and hard work to

1 win an arms race, but it is much better to win an arms race
2 than to lose a war.

3 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator
4 Blumenthal, please.

5 Senator Blumenthal: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think
6 that the thrust of this hearing and your testimony is to
7 emphasize the ongoing and increasing threat and danger of
8 Chinese military buildup and potential aggression. And we
9 have been talking, I guess, mainly about the conventional
10 threats and nuclear threats, but recently the Chinese
11 launched a cyberattack on this country. What should the
12 American public know about that attack involving Microsoft,
13 recently disclosed?

14 Admiral Davidson: I am sorry. I will have to take
15 that one for the record, sir. I have not had direct
16 conversations with Microsoft about that.

17 Senator Blumenthal: Would you agree that China
18 represents a threat in the cyber domain?

19 Admiral Davidson: Oh, absolutely.

20 Senator Blumenthal: And would you agree also that what
21 you just said about nuclear capacity applies to cyber as
22 well, namely that defense is not enough. You need offense
23 and you need to draw lines so that adversaries will know
24 what they cannot do, lines they cannot cross, and offense is
25 necessary to deter them from crossing those lines.

1 Admiral Davidson: I absolutely agree, Senator. China
2 is advancing its cyber capability in leaps and bounds. I do
3 not think I could articulate it in a quantified manner like
4 the discussion we just had with Senator Cotton. But they
5 are vastly improving that cyber capabilities, and we are
6 witnessing some of that malign activity amongst our own
7 capabilities here in the country, as you implied.

8 Senator Blumenthal: And do you continue to believe, as
9 you said in 2019, shifting to another domain, the undersea
10 domain, that, quote, "Continuing to build submarines is
11 critically important," end quote, and, quote, "It is our
12 most significant advantage in all domains right now," end
13 quote, referring to submarines.

14 Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir. Our advantage in the
15 undersea, our submarine force, absolutely. But also what we
16 can do in what we call anti-submarine warfare to deny other
17 nations use, and that is the use of maritime patrol
18 aircraft, that is the kind of sonars and sensors we put on
19 our surface ships, we have to absolutely sustain that
20 advantage going forward.

21 Senator Blumenthal: So you would strongly endorse, I
22 hope, the continued construction of two Virginia-class
23 submarines a year, and the continued development and
24 construction of the Columbia class as well?

25 Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir. The Virginia class, what

1 is coming with the Virginia payload module, I think are
2 critically important to continue U.S. deterrence in the
3 theater, and there is no doubt that the strategic deterrent
4 needs to be recapitalized, and the Columbia is the way to do
5 that for our Ohio-class submarines.

6 Senator Blumenthal: Thank you. You know, I would like
7 to turn to a nontraditional source of concern, first of all,
8 the COVID pandemic. I understand that the ship, the USS
9 Theodore Roosevelt has had several coronavirus cases
10 recently, following the outbreak that occurred. Is that
11 true? And to what extent is COVID a continuing danger in
12 your command?

13 Admiral Davidson: Thanks for that, Senator. Yes, a
14 few weeks ago the Theodore Roosevelt identified three
15 positive cases out of their normal surveillance testing.
16 Those three positive cases were sent ashore in Guam. There
17 were some 40-odd close contacts that were in quarantine.
18 They have continued to test negative in that time frame, and
19 the ship remains at sea, and continues at sea. And in the
20 meantime, we have tested the whole of the crew and there are
21 no other positive cases.

22 Senator Blumenthal: So it is a relatively contained,
23 isolated outbreak.

24 Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir. Yeah, the three positive
25 cases are off the ship and ashore at this point.

1 Senator Blumenthal: Thank you. And in the closing
2 short time I have left, do you regard climate change as a
3 security threat in the command that is under your control?

4 Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir. It is something I hear
5 about quite frequently from my peers, particularly in the
6 Pacific Island chain, who can describe for you, during the
7 course of their own lifetimes, you know, the changes that
8 they observe and have observed in their island nations.

9 Much of what we do at Indo-Pacific Command helps enable
10 their ability to combat some of the ill effects that are
11 immediately manifested, whether it is severe storm. We have
12 an organization called the Center for Excellence in Disaster
13 Management that helps train not only our military folks,
14 certifying my own military folks to do disaster management,
15 but we make it available to non-governmental organizations
16 as well as other governments, and we do it virtually, we do
17 it in person, we bring them to Hawaii, all kinds of methods.
18 It is very important for us.

19 Senator Blumenthal: I thank you for your testimony
20 today and for your service to our nation. I am not going to
21 be able to follow up now on the climate change question but
22 I will submit more for the record. Thank you, sir.

23 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator
24 Sullivan, please.

25 Senator Sullivan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,

1 Admiral, for your service. You mentioned about deterrence
2 eroding in the region, and in your testimony this morning in
3 the classified session and then also in this focused on the
4 Pacific Deterrence Initiative. That was a bipartisan
5 initiative that came out of this committee, actually. So I
6 think most of the members of this committee, Democrats and
7 Republicans, are certainly supportive.

8 So is it your testimony today that you need full
9 funding of that \$4.6 billion as something that can help with
10 regard to this eroding deterrence? Can you explain about
11 that a little bit more?

12 Admiral Davidson: I would absolutely yes, sir. I
13 think it fulfills what the law has asked for in the
14 entablement of the PDI.

15 Senator Sullivan: And that was in last year's NDAA, so
16 we all agreed to it.

17 Admiral Davidson: In last year's NDAA, and meets the
18 strategic vision that I have in the theater to present a
19 conventional deterrent that would give China pause from any
20 malign military activity that they would undergo against any
21 of our allies and partners in the region.

22 Senator Sullivan: Well, I really appreciate that. If
23 there was one kind of takeaway from this hearing, you have
24 the Indo-Pacific Commander, the entire Armed Services
25 Committee, the NDAA, all pushing for this. I certainly hope

1 the Biden administration is focused on this hearing and
2 recognizes that they should fully fund the PDI, which is
3 what most of us wanted and what we all voted for last year
4 when we passed the NDAA.

5 Let me next talk about the issue of the force posture
6 in the region. You know, I just started my second term here
7 as a Senator and I was asked, six years ago, by our former
8 chairman of this committee, Senator McCain, to really focus
9 on this issue of force posture, which I have been doing a
10 lot. I just got home from Alaska, so that is actually being
11 out in the region, as you know, when I am home in the great
12 state of Alaska.

13 One of the things I have noticed is that our force
14 posture seems to be somewhat, I would say, stale, when you
15 look at where our forces are -- Okinawa, Korea, Guam --
16 because they have been there for so long, and we have this
17 issue that you have talked about, first and second island
18 chain, the vulnerabilities. What is the right mix as you
19 look at dispersal of forces, wanting them to be there
20 quickly, in the region, but also the vulnerabilities that
21 you have, first, second island chain?

22 I will give you an example. Alaska will soon have over
23 100 fifth-generation fighters stationed there. If you have
24 the right mix of tankers, those assets could be in, for
25 example, the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait within hours,

1 with the right tankers. How do you think about dispersal of
2 forces and the different vulnerabilities that we have when
3 it comes to force posture?

4 Admiral Davidson: Thanks, Senator. I think about it
5 much like I have described in the Regain the Advantage, that
6 a more dispersed design and posture in the region is going
7 to be required in order to achieve the positional advantages
8 that we seek. And that is done through permanently based
9 forward-deployed forces -- Japan, Korea, Guam, and elsewhere
10 in the theater -- and the use of CONUS-based forces, Hawaii
11 and Alaska forces, that will rotate through the theater.

12 That combination of rotating presence and permanent
13 presence has to be robust enough in order buy us the time to
14 deny any quick action going forward. And that is a mix of
15 capabilities, and certainly the fifth-gen fighters, I would
16 tell you, are the backbone of any of our planning for a
17 crisis forward in the theater, and would be needed at
18 dispersed locations within the first and second island
19 chain.

20 But it also means maritime forces, it means ISR, you
21 know, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance forces,
22 things like that, that have to be made available as well.

23 Senator Sullivan: Let me ask, you know, when I talk to
24 officials, and I would love your view on this, our intel
25 community, the common theme I hear with regard to China's

1 actions under Xi Jinping's leadership is alarm. That is a
2 phrase that is used a lot -- alarm. And they point to
3 things, just within the last year, the COVID outbreak and
4 the non-cooperation that China has had with the rest of the
5 world; the border conflict with India, and cyberattacks that
6 were probably launched by China against India, major
7 cyberattacks; an economic embargo against one of our most
8 important allies in the region, Australia; crushing dissent
9 in Hong Kong; very aggressive military actions in the Taiwan
10 Strait, South China Sea; Japan Xinjiang. Do you agree these
11 are alarming maneuvers? This is within the last year.

12 Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir.

13 Senator Sullivan: And what does this kind of do to
14 your timeline if you are extrapolating out with regard to
15 any potential conflict or timeline in the Taiwan Strait,
16 when you look at how aggressive Xi Jinping's leadership has
17 been?

18 Admiral Davidson: I think our concerns are manifest
19 here during this decade, not only on the development, the
20 numbers of, you know, ships, aircraft, rockets, et cetera,
21 that they have put in the field, but the way they are
22 advancing those capabilities as well, in combination with
23 everything that you just cited -- Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and
24 Tibet, and the line of actual control, and the South China
25 Sea and the East China Sea. I worry that they are

1 accelerating their ambitions to supplant the United States,
2 and our leadership role in the rules-based international
3 order, which they have long said that they want to do that
4 by 2050, I am worried about them moving that target closer.
5 Taiwan is clearly one of their ambitions before then, and I
6 think the threat is manifest during this decade, in fact, in
7 the next six years.

8 Senator Sullivan: Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr.
9 Chairman.

10 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Let me
11 recognize Senator Hirono via Webex.

12 Senator Hirono: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral
13 Davidson, welcome. This is probably going to be the last
14 time that you will be testifying before our committee, so I
15 want to add my thanks to you for your service, and, of
16 course, we will miss you in Hawaii.

17 Admiral Davidson, do you support HDR-H Hawaii as an
18 important part of the region's layered missile defense
19 system to protect Hawaii from long-range missiles fired from
20 rogue states such as North Korea?

21 Admiral Davidson: Absolutely, Senator. It raises the
22 confidence of any employment of a ground-based interceptor,
23 and will help as any advancement in North Korean
24 capabilities might put forth. It is critically important to
25 the overall defense of the country.

1 Senator Hirono: Thank you. You focused on two areas
2 in your recent PDI report that, in my opinion, are vital to
3 our national security strategy in the Indo-Pacific area.
4 One, strengthening our allies and partners, and two, funding
5 joint coalition military exercises and updating and
6 networking our tests and training ranges in this area of
7 responsibility, including two major training areas in
8 Hawaii, the Pacific Missile Range Facility, or PMRF, and the
9 Pohakuloa Training Area, PTA.

10 I noticed that you significantly increased the
11 requested amount from last year's PDI report to this year's
12 report to strengthen our allies and partners over the next
13 five years in the region, from over \$300 million to about
14 \$2.8 billion. Can you discuss your rationale for this
15 significant increase and what that additional funding is
16 intended to do, or where will it go?

17 Admiral Davidson: Well, you highlighted the key
18 aspects, ma'am. It is to enhance and make improvements in
19 our joint exercise program, and that is principally because
20 not only the United States but our key allies and partners
21 -- Japan, Korea, Australia, as just three examples -- are
22 buying important capabilities that match ours -- integrated
23 air and missile defense, for example, fifth-generation
24 fighters like the F-35. They are being actually delivered
25 in the theater.

1 We have got to advance our exercise program in a way
2 that allows us to exercise those capabilities deliberately.
3 That is going to require not only changes in our joint
4 exercise program, and I will come back to that in a minute,
5 but also changes in our range structures, to make sure that
6 we can put forth the threats in a live, virtual,
7 constructive format, that will stress the force and stress a
8 coalition force, if it were to come about.

9 But additionally, that joint exercise program needs to
10 be improved to do precisely what Senator Sullivan was
11 talking about, to help us put more robust forces quickly in
12 the field, to test them under concepts like contested
13 logistics, in which we might have our cyber connectivity
14 restricted and things like that. We have really got to
15 advance from what I view as kind of 20th century exercises
16 into the 21st century capabilities and concerns we need to
17 be worried about.

18 Senator Hirono: I assume that some of the money that
19 you are requesting to enhance or exercise capabilities will,
20 of course, go to PMRF and PTA in Hawaii.

21 News reports have indicated that around 15 percent of
22 the persons involved in the recent riots at the Capitol had
23 military experience, either currently or were on active
24 duty, retired, or recently separated. Secretary Austin
25 recently order a 60-day stand-down to address troubling

1 reports of extremism in the ranks, and the DOJ IG is
2 currently investigating violent extremism within the armed
3 forces after myself and several of my colleagues sent a
4 letter asking for action.

5 As you finish over 35 years of service, Admiral
6 Davidson, in your opinion, are there steps, other steps that
7 the DOD should take to root out violent extremism in the
8 ranks?

9 Admiral Davidson: Well, I think certainly, Senator,
10 the stand-down was intended just to be the first step on
11 this. There is absolutely no place for extremism in the
12 United States military.

13 I can tell you, at my own headquarters, we have already
14 conducted the stand-down. We came together not only to have
15 the leadership discuss what our expectations are, which is,
16 you know, well guided by DoD instruction alone, you know,
17 beyond the oath, but also to bring in other experts. We
18 even had the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force come in to
19 talk to us about the kind of behaviors we might see, as
20 leaders and as peers, and as subordinates and others, that
21 might indicate extremist behaviors. We also recommitted to
22 our oaths, and then we broke down to small groups.

23 We are going to have to continue to communicate on this
24 with the force, to make sure that our expectations are well
25 known. There is just absolutely no place for that in the

1 United States military.

2 Senator Hirono: I am considering legislation to create
3 a standalone punitive article in the Uniform Code of
4 Military Justice to address violent extremism in the ranks,
5 and to send a message of deterrence that this kind of
6 conduct will not be tolerated in the military. Do you think
7 that this kind of legislation is warranted?

8 Admiral Davidson: I think it should be certainly part
9 of the discussion to examine. You know, I would have to
10 defer to the Department, ma'am, about the approaches that we
11 would take going forward.

12 Senator Hirono: Yeah. I just want to note that there
13 are certain entities such as the Oathkeepers who actively
14 recruit from the military to join their extremist ranks.

15 I think I am out of time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

16 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Hirono. Let me
17 recognize now Senator Tillis.

18 Senator Tillis: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral
19 Davidson, thank you for being here and for your years of
20 service. Just a question, and I apologize. I have three
21 hearings going on at the same time, so if someone has
22 covered this it probably still bears repeating.

23 Talking specifically about protection of U.S. troops
24 and bases in Indo-Pacific and our low-density, high-demand
25 rotational capabilities are what we are relying on today.

1 So if China were to initiate a kinetic operation somewhere
2 in the Indo-Pacific, do you believe the relatively short
3 notice and the warning timelines would make it particularly
4 either very difficult or virtually impossible to defend
5 critical locations like Guam?

6 Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir. One of the reasons that
7 we have made a point of advocating for sufficient ISR --
8 intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance -- that buys us
9 that warning in order to respond, is critically important.
10 And we have capacity needs there, and our war gaming has
11 shown that if it is insufficient we cannot respond in time.

12 Senator Tillis: In the INDOPACOM report, Section 1251
13 of the FY 2021 NDAA, you all state, "The most important
14 action the U.S. can take to increase joint forces' lethality
15 is to introduce a 360-degree persistent and integrated air
16 defense capability in Guam. Guam is our most crucial
17 operating location in the Western Pacific and its defense
18 remains the number one unfunded priority." I think you are
19 requesting somewhere around \$350 million for that purpose.

20 Can you explain how China's missile arsenal threatens
21 Taiwan and why Guam is so important to defend, and how a
22 missile defense system permanently stationed in Guam would
23 help towards that end?

24 Admiral Davidson: I think the most visible means that
25 we have seen is China's own air force has put out a

1 propaganda video showing their H-6 bomber force attacking
2 Andersen Air Force Base at Guam, and distributed that quite
3 publicly. We are seeing Chinese naval deployments of
4 surface task groups and submarines that make
5 circumnavigations of Guam and the Commonwealth of the
6 Northern Marianas, and, of course, you know, we see the vast
7 asymmetry, the very large ballistic missile force that China
8 has.

9 As one component of our deterrence strategy, but again,
10 my number one priority, because it has been unfunded and I
11 think critical to our needs, is a defensive system that
12 would defend against all those threats. And in our work
13 with the Missile Defense Agency, only one system can do
14 that, meet the threats as they will be evident in mid-
15 century, and help us leap to the future as well, and that is
16 an Aegis Ashore-like system there on Guam.

17 You know, I am not Pollyanna-ish about this. It is not
18 the sole solution. We had discussions about offense
19 capabilities, earlier warning, the ability to disperse
20 fighter aircraft -- all that is critical components as well.
21 But I have been very encouraged by the individual services'
22 transformation approaches, what their support is in the
23 theater, but one of the key shortcomings is not having this
24 defensive system, and we need it going forward.

25 Senator Tillis: Maybe in my time remaining you can

1 talk a little bit about the need for permanently stationed
2 forces in the region. Do you think it is adequate now? I
3 think the answer is no, but what does it look like if we
4 were at some level of critical mass with actually personnel
5 west of the International Date Line?

6 Admiral Davidson: Because so much dialogue would have
7 to happen with allies and partners in the region, sir,
8 although there is one modification in effect that would
9 result in more troops, Marines, actually relocating from
10 Japan to Guam and elsewhere, I am pretty satisfied with the
11 permanent stationing of forces in the region right now.

12 If situation were to avail us, I think more
13 capabilities in Southeast Asia and South Asia would be a
14 priority. But in the meantime, what is achievable is to
15 help with dispersal locations and with the accommodation of
16 rotational forces within U.S. territories and the freely
17 associated states in the region, principally, as well as our
18 key allies in the region.

19 Senator Tillis: Thank you, Admiral.

20 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Tillis. Senator
21 Kaine, please.

22 Senator Kaine: Thank you, Mr. Chair, and Admiral
23 Davidson, I want to echo Senator Hirono's comments. We will
24 miss you. I have really enjoyed working with you, being on
25 this committee, and in your various capacities.

1 You answered a number of great questions this morning
2 in our classified briefing that my colleagues put on the
3 table and so I am not going to repeat those.

4 In your military judgment, would it be in the United
5 States' security interest if we were to ratify the U.N.
6 Conference on Law of the Sea?

7 Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir. I am on record saying
8 that that would be good for us. I think you would be hard-
9 pressed to find a Navy admiral that said otherwise.

10 Senator Kaine: The convention would allow us to
11 assert, for example, defensive claims in international
12 tribunals to Chinese island-building or Russian activity in
13 the Arctic, and it would also allow us to assert some
14 offensive claims to, for example, mineral rights in the
15 Arctic, that we cannot currently do. I would hope that the
16 committee might revisit whether we should finally do this,
17 to try to gain a better footing in the INDOPACOM and
18 elsewhere.

19 Second, with respect to China and the competition with
20 China, as much as they are worried about any innovation,
21 weapons system that the U.S. is developing, wouldn't you say
22 that in some way their greatest worry about the U.S. is the
23 network of allies and alliances we have, in their region and
24 elsewhere?

25 Admiral Davidson: Absolutely. I think the network of

1 alliances, the partnerships that we have, not only in the
2 region but across the globe, are hugely powerful, and the
3 potential of deepening relationships strategic to defense
4 partnership with a country like India, or in a multilateral
5 formation like the Quad -- India, United States, Japan, and
6 Australia -- I think is a key strategic opportunity for the
7 United States, and those three other countries. But it
8 could be so much more than just a security apparatus, and I
9 think we ought to be thinking about it in terms of all the
10 capabilities that it might help the globe with.

11 Senator Kaine: It is interesting because I think China
12 and Russia, though very different nations, both are very
13 afraid of the U.S.'s network of alliances, and they have not
14 yet been able to cobble together the kinds of alliances that
15 are based upon mutual regard and mutual work. You know,
16 China uses debt diplomacy to get folks in hock to them, but
17 that is not the same thing as a significant alliance, and
18 Russia uses, you know, availability of natural gas in sort
19 of the same way. But the networks of alliances, they just
20 are not anywhere near where we are.

21 So I hope as we are trying to maintain strategic match
22 or overmatch in tactical weapons systems we never lose sight
23 of the fact that strengthening alliances is ultimately about
24 the best guarantee we have against aggression by China.

25 The last question I will ask you is this. Sometimes on

1 this committee, and in Congress generally, we get into a
2 mindset where we think about the defense budget as very
3 different than the non-defense budget, and on budgetary
4 matters we assume that the sort of non-defense budget is not
5 as critical in national security as the defense budget. I
6 was struck by your testimony in the classified setting this
7 morning -- this is not classified. Again and again you said
8 it is not just defense. If we are going to be strong in the
9 INDOPACOM, vis-à-vis China, it has got to be defense, and
10 diplomacy, and humanitarian aid, and trade, and economic
11 aid. These are items that are not included in the defense
12 budget but I gather you think they are every bit as
13 important to maintaining a robust American presence and
14 leadership in the INDOPACOM, they are as important as the
15 defense budget.

16 Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir. When I engage with any of
17 the countries in the region, whether they are an ally or it
18 is part of the partner network, their assessment of U.S.
19 reliability is not based on the military presence alone. It
20 is based on our interactions, diplomatically, in the
21 information sphere, where we are economically, our foreign
22 direct investment, our trade. All those elements is how the
23 allies and partners want to engage with the United States
24 and how they view our reliability.

25 Indeed, to do a competition like we are talking about

1 with China, it is going to take a whole-of-nation approach,
2 not just a whole-of-government approach, and all of those
3 elements come into play.

4 Senator Kaine: One program that I was not really aware
5 of, but I am sure other members of the committee were, the
6 Department of Interior has a program that provides financial
7 assistance to American Samoa, Guam, Virginia Islands,
8 Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, and the freely
9 associated states of the Federated States of Micronesia,
10 Republic of Marshall Islands, and Palau. The compact with
11 Palau will expire in 2024. These are non-defense budget
12 items within Interior, but they can have a significant
13 effect upon this question that you mentioned, our
14 reliability, which is really, really important.

15 So as if we did not have enough work to do on this
16 committee, we have to also pay attention to the non-defense
17 budgetary items that are strong evidence of America's desire
18 to be a leader in the region.

19 Again, thank you, Admiral Davidson. Thank you, Mr.
20 Chair.

21 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Kaine. Let me
22 recognize Senator Cramer via Webex.

23 Senator Cramer: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
24 you, Admiral, for your service and for being with us today.
25 This has been most interesting.

1 I am going to drill down maybe a little bit on some of
2 the things related to the allies and their trust in us and
3 how we build a stronger alliance of free people that are
4 concerned about China. I do not think there is any question
5 China is the topic of the day in lots of places, not just
6 here. But I also know that a lot of these matters get out
7 there on the fringe a little bit, sometimes things we may
8 not think about.

9 So I want to ask you specifically, there was a recent
10 Reuters story that said Iran has quietly moved record
11 amounts of crude oil to its top client, of course, China, in
12 recent months, at the same time that India, India's state
13 refineries added Iranian oil to their annual import plans on
14 the assumption that the United States is going to lift their
15 sanctions.

16 Does INDOPACOM, do you guys track Iranian oil shipments
17 within your area of responsibility, and if so, does that
18 information get back to the Pentagon, the White House,
19 decision-makers that are making lots of big decisions about
20 things domestically and around the world that might have an
21 impact on our relationships?

22 Admiral Davidson: Certainly, Senator. We track the
23 Iranian trans-shipment of oil across the theater. You know,
24 the interactions with China are indicative of China's
25 willingness to ignore sanctions and international norms to

1 do that kind of thing.

2 Senator Cramer: But with regard to India, then, do you
3 see a risk if we lift the sanctions on Iran, that they are
4 able to now sell oil to an important ally, I mean, obviously
5 very much in the region. I am just, again, thinking about
6 all of the relationships and all of the factors that enter
7 into the relationship. And I know I am asking you now to
8 probably opine on a policy question as opposed to whether or
9 not you are tracking it. But it seems to me that these
10 decisions, things like lifting sanctions on Iran, could have
11 ramifications that we maybe have not thought of yet. If you
12 want to comment, you can. Otherwise, I can move on.

13 Admiral Davidson: No. Sir, it is an important policy
14 issue for the United States. Iran is, no doubt, a net
15 exporter of oil and it will have to be considered.

16 Senator Cramer: Thank you. I want to follow up on a
17 line of questioning that Senator Fischer asked as well,
18 about ISR and the importance of it, and I will probably just
19 skip some of the easy stuff that she was asking about, easy
20 for me, not necessarily for you.

21 I will just ask this. Adding on to her line of
22 questioning, do you think that the sale of ISR platforms to
23 allies in the region might help our ISR needs in the region?
24 In other words, I know that there have been some
25 restrictions, there are some sales pending, there is, I

1 know, a lot of desire by both allies and some of our
2 American contractors. Could we help the ISR picture a
3 little bit by opening up sales, maybe speeding them up a
4 little bit to allies in the region?

5 Admiral Davidson: I would say it depends on some of
6 the exact capabilities that we are talking about. But I
7 will tell you, broadly, we share information with our allies
8 in the region and many, many partners. They benefit from
9 the information that we generate. I can tell you, in the
10 East China Sea, in the South China Sea, we, the United
11 States benefit from much of what our allies and partners do
12 there as well.

13 So it would certainly add capacity to the picture, and
14 as we deepen our information-sharing agreements, which is
15 dependent on a lot of factors, we will share that
16 information amongst us. It is going to make us better.

17 Senator Cramer: I do not know if you are hearing me
18 but I stopped hearing you suddenly. I will ask one more
19 question, in case you are listening and can hear it, and it
20 is a pretty basic one. Do you consider China a developing
21 country or a developed country? And that is a question I
22 just started exploring. And what is the difference, whether
23 we consider it developing or developed?

24 Admiral Davidson: Sir, I imagine economists, you know,
25 have a standard for that description. I mean, certainly

1 they have lifted hundreds of millions of people out of
2 poverty just since the turn of the century, but I would say
3 that they still have hundreds of millions to go. But I
4 would have to defer to an economist to give you the exact
5 characterization.

6 Senator Cramer: Yeah, and you are right. There are
7 some standards that economists use relating to, you know,
8 gross versus net and all these economic points. They are
9 relevant -- do not get me wrong. But what I am more
10 concerned about is how the rest of the world treats a
11 developing nation versus a developed nation, and I guess I
12 would submit to you whether they are considered developed or
13 in transition, they are, as the chairman said in his opening
14 comments, an emerging threat and a near-peer ally prepared
15 for some pretty serious confrontations.

16 So anyway, all of that said, again, thank you for your
17 service and thank you for being with us today, and I see my
18 time is up, Mr. Chairman.

19 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Cramer. Let me
20 recognize Senator King.

21 Senator King: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, you
22 spent a lot of time in this region in the last several
23 years. You have thought a lot about China, as you have
24 indicated today. Here is a kind of mind-reading question.
25 Why are they militarizing? Why are they suddenly spending

1 so much money? Is it because of paranoia about being
2 attacked or is it because of preparing for aggression? Do
3 you see the difference?

4 Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir, absolutely. I appreciate
5 the question. That is exactly the issue at hand. I see
6 them developing systems, capabilities, and a posture that
7 would indicate that they are interested in aggression, and
8 what they have committed, in their nearest abroad -- Hong
9 Kong, line of actual control, Xinjiang, the kind of pressure
10 they are putting on Tibet and others in the region -- I
11 think it is dramatically misplaced. The West has greatly
12 assisted in the development of China, to the last
13 conversation that we have had, over the course of the last
14 35 years or so. I cannot, for the life of me, understand
15 some of the capabilities that they are putting in the field
16 unless it is an aggressive posture, and frankly, I think
17 they have told us that with their ambition to supplant the
18 rules-based international order and replace it with one with
19 Chinese characteristics, which they said they intend to do
20 by mid-century.

21 Senator King: I think that is a key question we have
22 to continue to examine -- what does China want?

23 Next question. What do you see, strategically,
24 militarily, technically, in terms of cooperation between
25 Russia and China? In the '50s and '60s, they were

1 considered a monolith. Then they split. Are they moving
2 toward a greater degree of cooperation? Is that something
3 we should be concerned about?

4 Admiral Davidson: In a tactical and operational space
5 I have seen some collaboration there. China has
6 participated in Russia's Pacific/Eastern Military District
7 capstone exercise for three straight years. We have seen
8 co-bomber flights as recently as last fall, where Chinese
9 and Russian bombers joined on each other and flew through
10 the Sea of Japan, East China Sea, and into the Philippine
11 Sea. We are seeing some exchanges like that.

12 I think that there is less cooperation, although
13 frequent discussion, at the strategic level. Through all of
14 it, I view it with some alarm. While we could consider some
15 of the tactical and operational cooperation nascent, they
16 are building towards improvement. There is no doubt in my
17 mind.

18 Senator King: Which it seems to me, if that continues
19 is a matter of serious concern.

20 Admiral Davidson: I would agree, absolutely.

21 Senator King: Developing a higher level of
22 cooperation.

23 Speaking of alliances, I spent some time in Asia a few
24 years ago and met, bilaterally, with a whole range of
25 countries in that region. I came away with the conclusion,

1 we have allies; China has customers. And one of my
2 questions is, you have mentioned India several times. India
3 has always been a neutral country, if you will. Are we
4 developing a stronger alliance with them? You mentioned
5 them as part of the Quad. Do they consider themselves a
6 member of something of that nature?

7 Admiral Davidson: India has long had an approach
8 called strategic autonomy, you know, a non-aligned approach
9 with others. But I think certainly the activities along the
10 line of actual control with China has opened their eyes to
11 what cooperative effort with others might mean for their own
12 defensive needs. We have provided some information to India
13 in that crisis -- cold weather closing, clothing, some other
14 equipment, some things like that -- and over the last
15 several years we have been deepening our maritime
16 cooperation.

17 I think you will see India, in the very near term, you
18 know, remain committed to their non-aligned approach, but I
19 think they will deepen their engagement with the Quad, and I
20 think that is a key strategic opportunity for us, Australia,
21 and Japan.

22 Senator King: That would be a geopolitical major
23 development if India were closely aligned with those other
24 countries.

25 One final short question. My concern is accidental

1 conflict. A destroyer is in the South China Sea. A Chinese
2 pilot miscalculates and runs into the destroyer. There is
3 escalation from there. What do we have in place in the way
4 of mil-to-mil contact or other mechanisms for defusing
5 accidental conflict? Some very serious worldwide conflicts
6 have begun with accidents.

7 Admiral Davidson: Thanks, Senator, for that. You
8 know, first, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and all of our
9 service chiefs, as well as the Secretary of Defense, have
10 routine communications with their counterparts in China.
11 There is no doubt about it. But I would assure you that,
12 you know, 99.xx percent of the encounters we have with the
13 Chinese, at sea and in the air, are safe and professional.
14 And that goes down all the way to the communications that
15 transpire between our two nations when we are occupying the
16 same tactical space. Those remain safe and professional.

17 The repeated narrative of miscalculation, you know, was
18 really borne from China, because I hear it through
19 diplomatic means. They are threatening other nations of a
20 miscalculation in order to deter us from doing what is
21 rightfully the international operations that we do in the
22 East China Sea and South China Sea. We will continue to
23 endeavor to keep our aviators and our mariners properly
24 informed of the risks that were out there. But make no
25 mistake about it, our expectation is that China conduct

1 themselves safe and professionally at sea, and should going
2 forward.

3 Senator King: Thank you. Thank you, Admiral.

4 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator King. Senator
5 Scott, please.

6 Senator Scott: Thank you, Chairman Reed. Admiral,
7 thank you for your service and the men and women you command
8 for what they do every day to defend the freedom of this
9 country.

10 My first question is about Taiwan. I think you agree
11 that we have got to prevent Communist China from controlling
12 Taiwan. It is a strategic necessity for the United States,
13 and the loss would devastate our ability and the ability of
14 Japan to counter China's aggression. You agree with that,
15 right?

16 Admiral Davidson: As a commander out there in the
17 Indo-Pacific, I have an obligation to support the Taiwan
18 Relations Act, and in a geostrategic sense I think it is
19 critically important to the United States' global status,
20 yes.

21 Senator Scott: I introduce the Taiwan Invasion
22 Prevention Act to end the U.S. strategic ambiguity about
23 Taiwan. I think it is time for the U.S. to state clearly
24 that we are not going to allow Communist China to invade and
25 subdue Taiwan, and that both in Taiwan and the United States

1 we have got to invest the right resources -- weapons,
2 training, and dialogue -- to ensure that General Secretary
3 Xi understand that he is not going to gain anything.

4 So what are your thoughts on that?

5 Admiral Davidson: Sir, I wake up every day, you know,
6 trying to assess the dynamic nature of the geostrategic
7 environment, and, you know, frankly, we ought to be thinking
8 about these things every day. I would submit that we have
9 got more than 40 years of the strategic ambiguity has helped
10 keep Taiwan in its current status. But, you know, these
11 things should be reconsidered routinely. I would look
12 forward to the conversation.

13 Senator Scott: Do you feel comfortable that both the
14 United States and Taiwan are moving forward in a manner that
15 they are going to be able to defend, with our support, if
16 there was an invasion?

17 Admiral Davidson: I think it takes our continued
18 support, Senator, and key to that is consistent and
19 persistent arms sales to Taiwan in order for them to
20 continue their capability going forward.

21 Senator Scott: How much effort or time do you put into
22 Indonesia, and can they be a check on Communist China's
23 aggression?

24 Admiral Davidson: I am sorry. Could you say the
25 question again?

1 Senator Scott: On Indonesia, can they be much of a
2 check on Communist China's aggression?

3 Admiral Davidson: I have cooperative efforts with
4 Indonesia, in the maritime especially, and a deepening
5 relationship. We do a number of exercises together. I
6 would say Indonesia is very concerned about Chinese
7 activities, particularly when they infringe in or around the
8 waters of Indonesia going forward. And I think that
9 Indonesia is an opportunity for the U.S. to deepen our
10 relationship with. With China, it is just one of the things
11 we need to be thinking about together.

12 Senator Scott: How well is the ability to communicate
13 being done with our allies there, whether it is Taiwan or
14 South Korea or Japan? I mean, like what Senator King was
15 talking about, the chance that there would be an inadvertent
16 mistake, and is there the ability to, even on our side,
17 share information well enough to help prevent something?

18 Admiral Davidson: We proposed, in our 1241 assessment
19 for the PDI, a multi-partner environment, which is IT
20 technology that I think would raise the surety of the
21 cybersecurity of what we transmit back and forth between our
22 allies and partners in the region. It would enable us to,
23 as well, not only protect information but deepen
24 collaboration on key strategic and military issues like this
25 as well, yes.

1 Senator Scott: How well is Huawei or other companies,
2 Chinese companies, been able to infiltrate the
3 communications systems in these countries that we rely on as
4 allies? Or are we giving China the ability to be able to
5 shut down communications pretty easily, which would impact
6 our own ability for our military to discuss things with our
7 allies?

8 Admiral Davidson: That is certainly something that we
9 have to be on the lookout for. We have been deeply engaged
10 over a couple, three years about the vulnerability that
11 Huawei equipments would present in any kind of allied
12 structure. And to be frank, given what I know of the threat
13 I would want to withhold any information-sharing or
14 equipments that would rely on that.

15 Senator Scott: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

16 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Scott. Let me now
17 call on Senator Peters via Webex.

18 Senator Peters: Admiral, thank you for being with us
19 today. Thank you for your continued service to our country,
20 as well. I appreciate all of your efforts.

21 Admiral, Chinese hostility towards Taiwan and of
22 aggression in the South China Sea and certainly the military
23 growth that we are seeing from the Chinese requires a
24 conventional deterrent. But unrestricted warfare also
25 requires comprehensive deterrence, as you know. I think

1 Admiral Mullen described it as "two challenges and one
2 fleet."

3 So to my question to you, Admiral, is, where do
4 information warfare and low-intensity conflict fit into your
5 priorities within your command? And I ask because the PDI
6 does not appear to project growth for the JTFIP, and the
7 question, is it simply a low-cost endeavor or does it
8 reflect a more limited role in the overall strategy that you
9 are pursuing?

10 Admiral Davidson: Well, it is not meant to be a
11 limited role at all, Senator. I do think it is a low-cost
12 effort. That said, much of what we have accomplished with
13 Joint Task Force Indo-Pacific, looking backwards, in the
14 years past, has been taken out of hide in order to properly
15 man it and equip it. I am trying to round out the
16 investments there so that the shortcomings I have taken in
17 the rest of the portfolio, you know, that JTFIP does not
18 come at that expense into the future. But I think it is
19 actually key to our deterrent approach going forward.

20 Senator Peters: Thank you, Admiral. You know, a
21 partner of government that shares our view on regional
22 security landscape, that may not necessarily reflect the
23 majority view of its own society, even when it is combined
24 with security cooperation, so a constant tension for those
25 governments. So my question is related to how INDOPACOM can

1 actually bridge this gap through civil-military initiatives.
2 So my question for you, Admiral is, to what extent do you
3 see initiatives such as Pacific Angel and the Embassy Civil-
4 Military Support elements playing a role in your command
5 strategy towards China, specifically?

6 Admiral Davidson: I think they are key efforts as
7 well, Senator. We were talking earlier about a whole-of-
8 nation approach to meet these challenges, and those two
9 organizations you highlighted help knit together multi-
10 agency efforts in that particular regard.

11 Senator Peters: So a U.S. Army Pacific element, Task
12 Force Oceana, has a continuous presence on ten Pacific
13 islands, using two-person augmentation teams that kind of
14 shape the physical and the informational environments in
15 those places. How do you believe we can better enable these
16 units to make sure that our strategic message is having the
17 impact that we would like it to have?

18 Admiral Davidson: Well, it is an element in my 1251
19 request for the PDI. We call it Operation Pacific Resolve
20 writ large. But the proper resourcing of it is to do
21 precisely what you have asked for, to deepen, first, our
22 interagency relationships, and then, as well, to deepen our
23 partnerships with other nations on matters of concern to
24 those other nations, because that is really the basis of our
25 relationships across the region. And the Army's

1 involvement, and indeed, all the service components have an
2 approach out here that is very similar. Their execution of
3 it is critical to our overall strategy in the region, and
4 frankly, it is the day-to-day connectivity with counterparts
5 on the ground, in the air, and in the maritime, and all
6 those places.

7 Senator Peters: Well, thank you, Admiral. I
8 appreciate those responses. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

9 Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Senator Peters.
10 Now let me recognize Senator Blackburn via Webex.

11 [No response.]

12 Chairman Reed: It appears that we have some
13 communications issues, and I will recognize Senator
14 Tuberville.

15 Senator Tuberville: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral,
16 thank you for your testimony today. I am glad to hear you
17 call it Indo-Pacific. You know, I am sure China would
18 prefer we not use that word because of a democracy and how
19 big of an ally they are for us. I have heard several
20 people, even in this building, call it something else.

21 But, you know, we heard for years the United States
22 needs to turn its attention to the Indo-Pacific, and the
23 U.S. has invested \$20 billion since 2014 in the European
24 Deterrence Initiative, but we have not done much in the
25 Pacific.

1 Here are my questions. Explain very briefly, the Aegis
2 Ashore system. Could you explain that, explain the Aegis
3 Ashore system? Could you explain that?

4 Admiral Davidson: Thank you for the question, Senator.
5 Aegis Ashore is a system that has, in fact, already been
6 developed. We have built and are employing one actually
7 already in Romania, and there is one building and imminently
8 operational in Poland as well, and it is to help NATO with
9 the defense of Europe. It is, essentially, a radar. The
10 command and control, the information technology,
11 communications connectivity, and the interceptors, missiles,
12 that are capable of defeating ballistic missile, cruise
13 missile threats in and around today.

14 You know, an Aegis Ashore system on Guam, a fixed site
15 on Guam, would enable 360-degree defense of Guam from any
16 military attacks from China, whether they come by sea, by
17 air, or by ballistic missile, in the future. It is
18 technology that is available today. We have built it
19 ashore, we have built it at sea, and it is our number one
20 priority for funding in Guam.

21 Senator Tuberville: I am sure Putin is real fired up
22 about us putting one in Poland, but that is all right. That
23 is one of your priorities. Is that still going to be your
24 priority for Guam?

25 Admiral Davidson: We need to have a mix of operational

1 and defensive capability out there, and in my own analysis
2 and my work with the Missile Defense Agency it is the key
3 shortcoming for the defense of Guam at this point.

4 Senator Tuberville: Yeah. Thank you, Admiral. I
5 yield.

6 Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Senator
7 Tuberville. I will now call upon Senator Manchin. Senator
8 Manchin, please.

9 Senator Manchin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
10 you, Admiral, for your service, and I am sure you are
11 looking forward to your retirement. That has to be good for
12 your family, but I know we will be seeing more of you in a
13 different light, I am sure.

14 Sir, basically on Japan, has Japan changed its position
15 on Aegis?

16 Admiral Davidson: Japan has reconsidered its pursuit
17 of two Aegis Ashore sites. It has already committed funds
18 to it. They are still working their way through rally a
19 base of alternatives that I think include both a
20 disaggregated posture between land and sea as well as sea
21 and land options.

22 Senator Manchin: Was it mostly from just public
23 opinion, public discourse with it, more so than military
24 decisions?

25 Admiral Davidson: The reason to roll it back?

1 Senator Manchin: Uh-huh.

2 Admiral Davidson: The siting of the initial Ashore
3 sites that they established I think ran into some local
4 political concerns that had not been worked through before
5 they made the decisions, so they are trying to work through
6 those local politics.

7 Senator Manchin: And beyond the Aegis Ashore system in
8 Guam, what further missile defense capabilities do we need
9 in the Pacific, and where do you believe they should be
10 located?

11 Admiral Davidson: You know, for fixed sites, I mean,
12 that is the one I am advocating for. You know, one of the
13 benefits it provides us is it frees up our sea-based assets,
14 our destroyers, to move with the maneuver forces, protect
15 the carriers, protect the amphibious forces, and to protect
16 more widely dispersed land sites that we might be operating
17 from, on behalf of the Air Force, the Army, the Marines, et
18 cetera. That is why I am pursuing that, and that is the
19 sole major structure at this point.

20 We do have existing capabilities, as do our allies and
21 partners, when it comes to some shorter-range air defense
22 threats.

23 Senator Manchin: Hypersonic weapons may be one of the
24 biggest threats, based on Russian and Chinese development
25 and the lack of defenses against these types of weapons.

1 Acknowledging that we are not in the classified portion of
2 our hearing, which we were this morning, can you tell us,
3 are U.S. capabilities in hypersonic weapons sufficient,
4 based on the capability of Chinese defenses against our
5 conventional assets? How are we able to defend ourselves
6 against hypersonics?

7 Admiral Davidson: If you do not mind, Senator, I would
8 like to take that one for the record and do it in a
9 classified way, so that it is clear.

10 Senator Manchin: So I do not know whether this might
11 be in the same category. How vulnerable are we to Russia
12 and Chinese hypersonic weapons in the Pacific theater, and
13 are you satisfied with the capabilities being developed to
14 counter the threat? Do we consider that a threat in the
15 Pacific theater, and are we developing anything that we can
16 help protect in that area?

17 Admiral Davidson: Both China and Russia are developing
18 hypersonic weapons. We are in the R&D stages of development
19 as well, and much more work needs to be done to provide for
20 the defenses, you know, an operational system that would
21 provide for the defenses. And frankly, it is going to take
22 a mixture of what we put on land and at sea as well as what
23 we can put in space to actually defend against those going
24 forward.

25 Senator Manchin: According to the World Economic

1 Forum, by 2030, your area of responsibility, or that you
2 have had, your area of responsibility, will be home to many
3 of the world's megacities, that will continue to present
4 vast, complicated governance issues, and my fear is that
5 these governments will look to an authoritarian China as a
6 model, rather than the United States. So my question would
7 be, from a military perspective, what are some meaningful
8 steps that can be taken to help leaders in India, Indonesia,
9 Japan, and the Philippines so that they do not start looking
10 at authoritarianism as the way to go?

11 Admiral Davidson: I think we have to recognize we are
12 in a competition here, Senator. China's Belt and Road
13 Initiative actually has a component that is trying to enable
14 smart cities globally, where all cyber connections would
15 lead back to China, which we have to highlight the threat
16 that that presents to others. And then we -- and again, a
17 whole-of-government approach -- have to be willing to
18 compete in that environment to help the infrastructure and
19 advances in these other cities, even if it is only advice.

20 Senator Manchin: Where do we need to expand the
21 programs to ensure allies are capable and that we have
22 appropriate interoperability in the case of a conflict in
23 the Indo-Pacific region?

24 Admiral Davidson: My key objective in this year's
25 budget is to pursue this mission partner environment, to

1 help raise the information technology connections between
2 our allies and partners in the region, build collaborative
3 efforts in operations and planning, highlight concerns to
4 these individual nations, and have the kind of resiliency in
5 the networks that we need.

6 Senator Manchin: Has any thought been given to
7 increasing those programs with India and our partners in the
8 Indo-China peninsula, to provide a barrier and distraction
9 to China's efforts in the South China Sea?

10 Admiral Davidson: Absolutely. That is at the core of
11 our effort.

12 Senator Manchin: Thank you, Admiral.

13 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Manchin. Now I
14 would like to recognize Senator Blackburn via Webex.

15 Senator Blackburn: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
16 Admiral, thank you for your time this morning. I know that
17 we are talking a lot about the Indo-Pacific and China and
18 the problems that we have there. And I am going to stay
19 kind of with the same line of questioning that you have had
20 with Senator Manchin.

21 Our nuclear triad, do you agree that we should be
22 modernizing, that that would be a valid and convincing
23 deterrent?

24 Admiral Davidson: Yes, absolutely, ma'am.

25 Senator Blackburn: And Taiwan, let's talk a little bit

1 about that. I know you mentioned that earlier, in one of
2 your responses. What should we be doing to increase our
3 bilateral military exercises with Taiwan, or multilateral
4 exercises with others in the region or professional military
5 development?

6 Admiral Davidson: You know, to your last point first,
7 ma'am, I think there is opportunity to help in professional
8 development when it comes to Taiwan. We think that they
9 have some specific issues that could help provide for their
10 defense, you know, better reserve corps, for example, better
11 response. I can tell you, Sergeant Major Shorter, who is
12 sitting behind me here, has had a longstanding professional
13 development dialogue with his counterparts in Taiwan as
14 well.

15 When it comes to exercises, we at U.S. Indo-Pacific
16 Command, we do periodically provide -- actually, it is
17 annually provide some exercise support to Taiwan's major
18 exercise, Han Kuang, during the course of the year. We help
19 provide some observers to help understand how Taiwan thinks
20 about their defense, what their exercises exercise, you
21 know, what that exercise contribution is to the advancement
22 in their doctrine within Taiwan, and then to deepen our
23 relationships as well.

24 Senator Blackburn: On the fusion centers, I had
25 included some language in the 2021 NDAA to support an

1 increased funding for these regional fusion centers. I
2 would like for you to talk just a little bit about what
3 opportunities arise for China if we do not continue an
4 aggressive support for these, and then if you want to
5 highlight the changes that you think we should be making as
6 we look at the Indo-Pacific region in helping to strengthen
7 our allies using these fusion centers.

8 Admiral Davidson: Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the
9 question. Setting China aside, which really is not at the
10 core of these fusion centers, what we envision in the region
11 is three collaboration networks, one focused mostly on the
12 Indian Ocean, one focused on counterterrorism and centered
13 in Southeast Asia, and then one to be sited somewhere in the
14 Pacific as well. But it is really to knit together -- as we
15 have articulated earlier, we do not have a multilateral
16 alliance network. We have a series of bilateral alliances
17 and partnership. And some of the concerns of the nations
18 that would be involved in these individual centers, you
19 know, there is kind of a common concern that would enable
20 dialogue and cooperation.

21 So, you know, just speaking of the CTIF in Singapore,
22 the Counter-Terrorism Information Facility, they are
23 concerned about ISIS in East Asia, ISIS in the Philippines,
24 the potential of some ISIS foreign fighters returning to
25 that area. And it is just an opportunity for military and

1 civilian entities in Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand,
2 Malaysia, Brunei, with U.S. and Australian support, to come
3 together and speak about it.

4 In the Pacific, as just one other example, it is really
5 to focus on illegal, unregulated, unreported fishing and
6 other trafficking threats in the region, like narco
7 trafficking and human trafficking and things like that, and
8 to provide a reliable network where multiple bilateral
9 partners can come together and speak in these area.

10 You know, because of the very bilateral nation-to-
11 nation nature of the region, finding areas of common cause I
12 think are critically important, and we are trying to fill
13 that need.

14 Senator Blackburn: Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr.
15 Chairman.

16 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Blackburn. And now
17 let me recognize Senator Duckworth via Webex.

18 Senator Duckworth: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral
19 Davidson, it is good to see you again. I am sorry I was not
20 able to come visit in 2020, but hopefully 2021 I will be
21 back in the Indo-Pacific region.

22 I do not have to tell you about the unique challenges,
23 the tyranny of distance in the Indo-Pacific's geography and
24 great power competitors and what they present to our supply
25 chain and logistics enterprises. I know we have to invest

1 in long-range fires and other critical capabilities, but I
2 hope that you share my concern that we will not be able to
3 build a combat-credible deterrent if we do not have the
4 logistics capability and capacity to realistically support
5 our complex military op plan.

6 Admiral Davidson, please elaborate on your request for
7 funding for a Pacific movement and coordination center.
8 What would this funding provide for you and why is it
9 critical for achieving your objectives in the Indo-Pacific
10 region?

11 Admiral Davidson: Thank you very much, Senator. We
12 had hoped to see you out in the Indo-Pacific as well.

13 You have laid the basis for this quite well. We have
14 added a fifth pillar into the 2022 budget because we did not
15 think that joint logistics and sustainment was getting the
16 requisite focus as we talked about all these other issues.

17 So the movement center, in and of itself, is to enable
18 our ability to work with the tyranny of distance, have more
19 resiliency in all the multiple processes that go into
20 logistics, from multiple sources. Some are governmental,
21 some are commercial, et cetera. And then to start to deal
22 in the contested environment, the kind of threats that we
23 might see disrupting our logistics writ large.

24 So we have highlighted it in the 1251 report for this
25 year and we will keep joint logistics on there as a pillar

1 that we need to focus on, going forward.

2 Senator Duckworth: Thank you. So let's go further
3 into this. How can the military services and other DOD
4 agencies play a role in developing the logistics systems
5 capabilities and capacity required to support these op plan?
6 You know, I am thinking of everybody can play a part in
7 this. Can you speak a little bit to what the other agencies
8 can do? What can we do right now to address these issues?

9 Admiral Davidson: Well --

10 Senator Duckworth: I speak to things like, you know,
11 TRANSCOM, and we do not have enough tanker aircraft, we do
12 not have enough hulls in the water, that sort of thing.

13 Admiral Davidson: Yeah, no, you have got it exactly
14 right. I mean, there is deep need to recapitalize the
15 military sea lift and anything that -- plus those assets,
16 not anything, those assets that Maritime Administration
17 provides. I think recapitalization there is necessary. We
18 are closely partnered with TRANSCOM on the tanker network
19 around the globe. I think writ large you will see the Air
20 Force and TRANSCOM working together, trying to figure out
21 where new capability like the KC-46 should be added, what is
22 the best positioning for it in order to make its
23 availability and sustainability sound while contributing to
24 the overall transportation network as well. You know, that
25 needs to be recapitalized -- excuse me, examined. The

1 posture needs to be examined as it goes forward as well.

2 There is a deep focus on the issue of contested
3 logistics as well. It is one of the doctrinal concepts that
4 the Joint Staff is trying to advance. We are deeply
5 involved in that conversation and look forward to its output
6 here during the course of this year.

7 Senator Duckworth: Could we carry out the op plans for
8 the Indo-Pacific region without the fifth pillar that you
9 are proposing?

10 Admiral Davidson: Oh, ma'am, all the combatant
11 commands depend highly on logistics. In our theater, I do
12 not have the benefit of internal lines of communication. We
13 have got to be able to protect these external lines of
14 communication, you know, deliver some actually to our allies
15 and partners in the region as well, and then defend it all
16 in order to maintain the posture that we have out there in
17 the region.

18 Senator Duckworth: Thank you. I yield back, Mr.
19 Chairman.

20 Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Senator Duckworth.
21 Let me recognize Senator Hawley via Webex.

22 Senator Hawley: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
23 Admiral, thank you for being here and congratulations on
24 your many decades now of outstanding service. And on behalf
25 of your fellow Missourians I just want to say thank you for

1 all that you have done for the country, and we are very
2 proud of you in the state of Missouri, so thank you for your
3 service.

4 Let me ask you a question that I posed to Deputy
5 Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks in her testimony a
6 couple of weeks ago. She testified that it is essential for
7 the United States to maintain the ability to defeat a
8 Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan in order to strengthen
9 deterrence against China. Do you agree with Deputy Hicks on
10 this point?

11 Admiral Davidson: Absolutely.

12 Senator Hawley: And do you agree with Deputy Hicks
13 that a strategy of denial is essential for deterring Chinese
14 aggression?

15 Admiral Davidson: Yes, and that is core to our
16 approach in the 1251 report.

17 Senator Hawley: Yes, it is. Let me just give you a
18 second to explain to the committee why it is important you
19 think to strengthen our forces west of the International
20 Date Line in order to effectively achieve deterrence by
21 denial.

22 Admiral Davidson: Thanks, Senator. You know, our
23 posture in the region must be demonstrative of the
24 capabilities that the United States could and would bring to
25 bear in a crisis -- its capacity, numbers, and the will of

1 the United States to prevent the fait accompli that you
2 highlighted.

3 We fulfill that not only through -- and this goes back
4 a little bit to what Senator Duckworth had to say -- not
5 only through people focused so much on fires and platforms,
6 but it is the whole of the apparatus that makes that sound.
7 It is the logistics, it is the intelligence and warning, it
8 is all that stuff that buys you the time in order to present
9 options to the national security apparatus here, and the
10 nation, should the day-to-day competition turn to crisis.

11 Importantly, what we are trying to do is every day that
12 China gets out of bed and peels back the curtain and sees
13 the United States and its allied and partner network out
14 there in the Western Pacific, assuring its own access, that
15 it thinks I do not want to mess with that capability and
16 that capacity and what I know to be the will, and closes the
17 curtains, and is not going to fight. You know, that is what
18 we are trying to achieve.

19 Senator Hawley: Yeah, let me just ask you about the
20 window of conflict with regard to China. Some are saying
21 that we do not really need to worry about potential conflict
22 with China until 2035, or even later. You said last week
23 China could achieve military overmatch in the region as soon
24 as 2026, and that if it does -- and I am quoting you now --
25 it could like choose to forcibly change the status quo in

1 the region.

2 Can you just elaborate on those comments?

3 Admiral Davidson: Yeah. We have indication that the
4 risks are actually going up. I have to be a little delicate
5 here, Senator, because of the classified nature of some of
6 the material, but I think, demonstratively, what you are
7 seeing China do in the region -- in Hong Kong, in the South
8 China Sea, and the East China Sea, some of the malign
9 military actions that have taken in and around Taiwan and
10 elsewhere in the East China Sea and South China Sea, are
11 indicative that China's pace is quickening, and we need to
12 be postured to prevent that quickening from happening.

13 Senator Hawley: You also said that if China does
14 succeed in changing the status quo that that change would
15 likely be permanent. Tell us what you meant by that.

16 Admiral Davidson: Well, they have made it quite plain
17 that they would wish to supplant U.S. leadership around the
18 globe. I am seeing a whole-of-government effort in trying
19 to fulfill that ambition, and they are trying to do that by
20 mid-century. They are knocking down waypoints that they
21 think stand in their way of achieving that. I would say the
22 most waypoint that they have knocked down is the
23 establishment of the -- or the revocation of the national
24 security law in Hong Kong, and the obliteration of one
25 country and two systems there. That, fundamentally, is, you

1 know, I think sending a chill across the region about what
2 Chinese ambitions might be and who might fall ill of Chinese
3 design.

4 Senator Hawley: I have got just a few seconds here.
5 Let me ask you -- actually, give you the opportunity
6 actually to comment about the Guam defense system. You have
7 spoken about the need for this on a number of occasions.
8 Just give us a sense of what will happen to our ability to
9 deter Chinese aggression if we do not strengthen Guam's air
10 and missile defense systems.

11 Admiral Davidson: It is the key piece that we are
12 missing that signals to the region that the U.S. is a
13 reliable and committed security partner, that we are there
14 to defend not only U.S. territory but our interests abroad,
15 and in combination with other capabilities. A more
16 distributed posture, a higher level of lethality in our air
17 and maritime and ground forces that might be rotating or
18 present in the region puts forward that total deterrent
19 posture that helps the deter-by-denial objective, that they
20 cannot knock Guam out with an easy shot and keep us out of
21 the fight to present that fait accompli that Deputy
22 Secretary Hicks talked about.

23 Senator Hawley: Great. Thank you, Admiral. Thank
24 you, Mr. Chairman.

25 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Hawley. Now via

1 Webex I would like to recognize Senator Rosen.

2 Senator Rosen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
3 Admiral, for being here, for your service, you and your
4 team, all the work that you have done.

5 I would like to focus today a little bit on how using
6 technology can potentiate our strategic planning and, of
7 course, the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. So let's talk
8 about regional data-sharing for a moment. America's
9 longstanding advantage in the Indo-Pacific relies on our
10 network of alliances with regional democracies. These
11 partnerships are the cornerstone of promoting a free and
12 open region. As part of the mission partner environment,
13 U.S. INDOPACOM seeks to develop an integrated architecture
14 to expand data-sharing amongst like-minded nations through
15 the use of information fusion centers, joint centers where
16 allies can share information using cloud-based technologies,
17 integrated systems, and secure access control.

18 So, Admiral Davidson, can you outline your plans to
19 establish an interoperable, digital network in the Indo-
20 Pacific, and how does an integrated IT architecture
21 strengthen our ability to share information and really fight
22 together with our allies and partners?

23 Admiral Davidson: Thank you for the question, Senator,
24 very much. We have described the MPE in our 1251
25 assessment, and we hope it will be resourced by the PDI

1 initiative. It is technology and capability that is
2 actually evident, you know, now. It is not new development
3 that we need to do.

4 But sharing with our allied and partner network around
5 the region would do a few things, to your last point. One,
6 raise the cyber resiliency of the information that we share
7 and others share with us and with each other, and then, in
8 turn, provide reliable connectivity for us to collaborate,
9 to cooperate, to plan, to highlight threats in the region to
10 the level of concern that the nations participating would
11 have, all the way from illegal, unregulated, and unreported
12 fishing on to the higher threat concerns in the region with
13 other partners. But it would give us the assurance that the
14 information that is being shared could not be disrupted or
15 could not be shared outside the confines of the network as
16 well.

17 Senator Rosen: Thank you. I would like to move to,
18 and we spoke about this a little bit earlier, but virtual
19 military exercise, because we have to overcome the challenge
20 of joint training across long distances in the Indo-Pacific.
21 So U.S. INDOPACOM, I know that you are seeking initiative
22 Pacific Multi-Domain Training and Experimentation
23 Capability, or PMTEC. This initiative would include
24 creating virtual coalition training complexes, linking
25 together testing and training ranges in the United States,

1 like Nellis Air Force Base and Fallon Range Training Complex
2 in my home state of Nevada, with allies like Japan and
3 Australia.

4 So can you talk a little bit about how the virtual
5 training environment can transform the way U.S. forces train
6 with allies in the region, how it allows us to model and try
7 different things out in a virtual setting with our allies
8 and partners, and maybe even increase the frequency of these
9 training missions.

10 Admiral Davidson: Yes, ma'am. Thank you very much.
11 As our own joint force has brought in now what we call
12 multi-domain capabilities, meaning space and cyber
13 capability as well as what we see in the terrestrial
14 environment, right -- air, land, and sea -- as well as adapt
15 the capabilities, or modernize the capabilities in the
16 terrestrial environment, fifth-generation fighters like the
17 F-35 and the F-22, integrated air and missile defense like
18 our Aegis ships, THAAD radars, and things like that. We
19 need to be able to stress the joint force in a dynamic
20 training range in a way that cannot occur in what was 20th
21 century-developed ranges.

22 Each one of these ranges that we have talked about --
23 Alaska, what you have highlighted in Nevada at Fallon and
24 Nellis, what we have in Hawaii, for example, at PTA and PMRF
25 in Kauai, and what we hope for at the CJMT, the training

1 range out in Guam, and CNMI -- we want to deliver some
2 connectivity, range to range, and the ability to inject, you
3 know, computer-generated, virtual and constructive, as we
4 call it, capabilities in there so that we can more widely
5 stress the joint force, test it, train it, and, oh, by the
6 way, if we wanted to keep anything secret that we did not
7 want a satellite or an intelligence-gathering ship to
8 observe, do it in an entirely virtual environment.

9 We need to extend PMTC as we have developed it to these
10 ranges. We think it is transportable, we think it is
11 sharable between these ranges, and we think it will bring a
12 much higher level of fidelity of training to the very
13 disparate forces we have over vast areas, from Alaska to
14 California to Hawaii and westward, going forward.

15 Senator Rosen: Thank you. I appreciate that. I look
16 forward to working with you on developing all the new skill
17 sets that our military needs to perform these operations.
18 Thank you.

19 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Rosen. Now let me
20 recognize Senator Kelly.

21 Senator Kelly: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
22 Admiral, for joining us today. I have got a couple of
23 questions here about command and control and communications,
24 and we rely heavily on satellites to do that.

25 In January of 2007, China conducted an anti-satellite

1 test against one of their own nonoperational weather
2 satellites with a kinetic kill vehicle, and it has been
3 reported that in the years since China has an operational
4 capability that can attack satellites in low-earth orbit and
5 that they are developing the capability that goes all the
6 way out to geosynchronous orbit.

7 So how does this affect the strategic balance of power
8 in the region, from your perspective?

9 Admiral Davidson: Thanks for that, Senator. Yes, both
10 China and Russia have demonstrated capability to disrupt
11 satellites, you know, testing capabilities on their own
12 assets in the past, as you have articulated. It clearly, I
13 think, demonstrates that space, which we have long
14 considered a domain in which would be unthreatened for the
15 United States, the potential is there, actually, for it to
16 be threatened.

17 We have to build resiliency into our space apparatus.
18 That happens with other space assets, it happens with
19 creating airborne and other terrestrial alternatives to
20 fulfill that, and it changes the calculus in space as well.
21 We have to recognize that, again -- and this goes back to
22 some earlier comments I made about deterrence theory. We
23 are not going to be able to play defense alone in this
24 particular regard. If we cannot demonstrate to others that
25 their capabilities in space might be at risk, then we run

1 the risk of a deterrence failure.

2 That said, the space layer is critically important to
3 how we sense in the strategic nuclear deterrent, how we
4 communicate across the joint force, and even how we sense
5 and distribute information to the conventional forces as
6 well. Its resiliency is incredibly important to us.

7 Senator Kelly: As you are gaming out scenarios with
8 the PLA, do you consider this capability that they have
9 obtained?

10 Admiral Davidson: Yes, absolutely.

11 Senator Kelly: Okay. And then do you have sufficient
12 intelligence and surveillance capability to keep up with the
13 changes that they are making with regards to their space
14 systems now?

15 Admiral Davidson: I would have to allow General
16 Raymond at the Space Force and General Dickinson to respond
17 at SPACECOM as well. But writ large, over all the
18 capabilities that we see China developing there is a need
19 for more intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of
20 their test and development, in particular, and then, you
21 know, observing what they are doing in the training and
22 exercise realm as well, writ large. I would be surprised if
23 General Raymond and General Dickinson did not agree that
24 that was necessary in space too.

25 Senator Kelly: All right. Thank you. I yield back.

1 Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Senator Kelly.
2 Admiral Davidson, thank you again for your distinguished
3 service in the Navy and the nation, to your family who
4 endured as much as you, in many cases. And once again,
5 please convey our appreciation and profound respect for the
6 men and women under your command. Thank you, Admiral
7 Davidson. This is the end of the hearing.

8 [Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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