STATEMENT OF
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REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND UNITED STATES COMBINED FORCES COMMAND;
AND UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA
IN SUPPORT OF U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND’S TESTIMONY
BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

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1. Introduction

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to report on the posture of our forces and operations in Korea. On behalf of the military members, government civilians, and family members of the United Nations Command (UNC), the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) and United States Combined Forces Command (CFC), and the United States Forces Korea (USFK), I thank the committee for your continued support.

I am honored to submit this statement on the first anniversary of my assumption of command in late April 2016. A year of fast-paced, high-stakes activity -- including the most active period in the years of Kim Jong Un’s rule in terms of missile launches, capability development, nuclear coercion, and attempts at intimidation -- led to a broad review of the situation and our approach to addressing it. From the review, three key conclusions emerged.

First, the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance, of which the military relationship is the centerpiece or heart, proved to be strong and resilient under incessant pressure.

Second, our deterrence efforts continue to serve as a bulwark for regional stability, successfully preserving the 64-year old Armistice that has prevented a resumption of combat. Yet, the same efforts have proven insufficient to deter the broadening threats (particularly intermediate and intercontinental ballistic missiles, and a weaponized nuclear capability) to our northeast Asian allies, South Korea and Japan, as well as the U.S. homeland and territories.
Third, our efforts to increase regional cooperation, to deepen the extent to which we operate in a combined fashion with the R.O.K. Armed Forces, and increased participation of United Nations Command Sending States in exercises and exchanges, are bearing fruit.

2. The Three Commands

USFK, CFC, and UNC offer distinct yet complementary platforms to support American interests and honor commitments in Korea and the Asia-Pacific. The cultivation of each of these three distinct Commands is critical, bringing not only clarity, but also better alignment of the resources to support the operations and capabilities of each Command with its respective mission and strategy. Understanding the distinctions among the commands is important.

USFK -- living proof of America’s commitment to South Korea -- is a unilateral subordinate unified command of U.S. Pacific Command with a command and staff structure that guides and directs U.S. military activities from all services on the Korean Peninsula and assists the U.S. Ambassador with representing U.S. interests to the Republic of Korea.

CFC -- the heart of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance -- is a bilateral warfighting command that provides the structure for U.S. and R.O.K. militaries to secure Korea’s future together under a common command, led by the senior U.S. general.

UNC-- the home for international commitments to the Korean Peninsula -- is a multinational unified command founded in 1950 to fight the Korean War under U.S. leadership and U.N. authority, now responsible for 64 years of armistice maintenance and much more. The command
remains useful as it is a standing mechanism to help like-minded nations contribute unique capabilities before, during, and after conflict.

Each of the three Commands is engaged in ongoing actions aimed toward improving the security and prosperity of South Korea and northeast Asia.

3. Current Situation

a. North Korea. Kim Jong Un is determined to sustain his regime and the Kim family dynasty, even at great expense to the North Korean state and people. North Korea’s top priority is the development of a credible nuclear deterrent to prevent any external intervention in North Korean affairs. The regime believes that it can dictate its own terms internationally if it can sufficiently check the military capabilities of the United States, South Korea, and other countries in the region while holding the homelands of each at risk through its nuclear arsenal and threats of employment. The cohesion among the five parties (China, Russia, U.S., R.O.K., and Japan) who could drive North Korea to the negotiating table remains a target for Kim Jong Un to disrupt – sowing friction and fissures among the five in order to buy time for capability development.

During the past year, North Korea conducted two nuclear tests and an unprecedented number of ballistic missile launches. These tests included the first test flight of an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) and successful testing of North Korea’s developmental Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM).

North Korea also garrisons much of its combat power – including its long-range artillery forces – in forward areas, maintaining the capability to do extensive damage to the Seoul
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metropolitan area, a modern “megacity” of over 25 million people. Furthermore, it continues to
invest in asymmetric capabilities such as special operations forces and cyber capabilities. The
North’s special operations forces are its best trained and equipped units and its cyber capabilities
are maturing, with cyberwarfare operators capable of conducting a variety of offensive
operations including computer network attack and network exploitation.

It is my view that the Alliance’s most effective response is for our alliance militaries to
remain deeply committed, well-integrated, highly capable, and ever-ready. The Alliance has
taken a series of steps -- B-52 and B-1 overflights of Osan Air Base and the Demilitarized Zone;
naval operations in the waters off Korea’s east coast; the deployment of carrier strike groups led
by the USS John C. Stennis and later the USS Carl Vinson to the vicinity of the Korean
Peninsula at different times in the last year; a combined R.O.K.-U.S. visit to view U.S. strategic
assets in Guam, including the ballistic missile submarine USS Pennsylvania; and the Alliance
deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. Together, these
actions send a persistent, deterrent message to the North while assuring our allies of our
committed presence and our extended deterrence beyond the forward presence.

Each North Korean provocation strengthens the will of the international community to stand
together against North Korea’s illicit activities, the expansion of its offensive military
capabilities, and its human rights abuses. UNC, CFC, and USFK have made important military
contributions to support the diplomatic, information, and economic-focused responses of the
R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance. These responses deter North Korean conventional attack and weapons of
mass destruction use and continue to assure the R.O.K. public and our international partners.

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b. Regional Considerations. We, along with the rest of the international community, are looking closely at how China approaches its relations with North Korea since the implementation of UNSCRs 2270 and 2321 and in light of the Alliance’s decision and actions to deploy THAAD. The USFK team assesses that China is frustrated with North Korean actions, but Beijing is hesitant to take measures that fundamentally threaten North Korea’s stability. Recent steps such as the cessation of Chinese coal imports from North Korea are positive. It is our hope that Beijing comes to realize that North Korean denuclearization is in the shared interests of China, the United States, South Korea, Japan and Russia.

China’s weakening support for Kim Jong Un’s regime creates an opening for stronger Russia-North Korea bilateral ties, but Russia’s extensive involvement in conflicts at home and across the Middle East has limited its capacity in the Asia-Pacific region. Russia enforced recent Security Council resolutions, directing its banking sector to cease transactions with North Korea. However, Russia also partnered with China in voicing opposition to the deployment of THAAD, their leaders recently agreeing to respond with “further countermeasures.”

Public support for greater cooperation between South Korea and Japan, two critical U.S. allies, continues to progress. The two governments made hard choices in 2016 that significantly strengthened both countries’ security. North Korean provocations have resulted in greater consultation, missile defense cooperation, and intelligence sharing between Seoul and Tokyo. In meeting with senior Japanese military leaders in October 2016 and in visiting Japan in November 2016 I found Japan’s national security leaders to be deeply committed in their role as host of our
United Nations Command Rear. In the event of conflict on the Peninsula, Japan’s support will be critical to the fight. We are grateful for their enduring support.

c. Republic of Korea. For 64 years the Alliance has played a key role in helping to maintain a stable environment for South Korea, enabling both nations to prosper as vibrant democracies, trading partners, and deeply committed Allies. The R.O.K. Government remains a trustworthy ally firmly committed to maintaining advanced capability to defend themselves, to committing fiscal resources to support R.O.K. forces and U.S. forces, and to modernizing their combat capabilities. In 2016, the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) provided $826M in support of USFK activities that would otherwise have been paid for by the U.S. Treasury. The SMA, only one component of overall R.O.K. financial support, provides contributions covering 41 percent of U.S. Non-Personnel Stationing Costs. The Agreement also provides much-needed flexibility to respond to the changing security environment and shift funds toward emerging requirements such as the THAAD site improvements.

Two significant projects, the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) and the Land Partnership Plan (LPP), comprise one of the Department of Defense’s largest relocation projects. YRP restations the majority of U.S. forces from the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area (GSMA) to new facilities primarily at U.S. Army Garrison (USAG) Humphreys, approximately 50 miles south of Seoul. LPP restations most U.S. forces from multiple posts, camps, and stations north of the GSMA to new facilities at USAG Humphreys.

Construction of new facilities under YRP is 100 percent R.O.K. funded, while those under the LPP are 100 percent U.S. resourced. Total project costs are approximately $10.8B, of which

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only 8 percent of that comes from U.S. appropriated funds. It is noteworthy that, in addition to funding 100 percent of YRP related construction, our R.O.K. allies are outfitting the new YRP facilities with furnishings through purchase and relocation, underwriting the relocation costs of U.S Forces and their families, and paying a portion of state-of-the-art Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) capabilities throughout the new facilities. LPP, although a U.S. responsibility, utilizes SMA contributions for most LPP-related construction.

South Korea is also investing significantly in its own military capabilities, increasing its defense budget by four percent in 2017, to $34.77 billion, or 2.6 percent of national GDP. Many of their acquisitions directly benefit the U.S. economy, as the R.O.K. spends approximately 90 percent of its weapons budget on U.S. systems, including the F-35, Apache E-model attack helicopters and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile defense systems. The R.O.K. defense ministry also decided this year to accelerate Korean Air and Missile Defense programs to enhance responses to the North Korean nuclear and missile threat.

The Republic of Korea is also making important progress outside the Alliance to achieve its own national security priorities, many of which also benefit the Alliance, U.S. interests, and global security imperatives. In November, the R.O.K. Government agreed with the Government of Japan to improve intelligence-sharing through a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). This milestone agreement will expand the information South Korea has available when responding to North Korean threats and will make significant contributions to both Korean and Japanese security.
In addition to the notable actions that the R.O.K. Government took toward improved national security, they also contribute significant forces worldwide. Their contributions to global security initiatives include 1,106 peacekeepers in six countries, financial support to reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq, counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the Philippines and West Africa.

I have great confidence in this blood-ally, with whom the United States has fought, side-by-side, in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.

4. Accomplishments of the Past Year

In 2016, the Command supported and implemented a wide array of national policy decisions, undertook combined exercises and deterrent operations, updated military plans to reflect changes in the security environment, and advanced transformation and relocation of U.S. military forces in Korea.

The Alliance decision to deploy THAAD will provide an additional layer to an integrated ballistic missile defense aimed to protect South Korea. The decision to temporarily station a Heavy Attack and Reconnaissance Squadron (AH-64E) at Suwon until airfield construction is complete at USAG Humphreys further demonstrates the Alliance commitment to finding innovative solutions to shared problems. Less publicized but equally important initiatives, like an increase in combined naval and special operations exercises, improve our interoperability. U.S. Naval Forces Korea recently completed a five-year transformation to become the only U.S. military headquarters in Korea located on a R.O.K. installation, collocated with the R.O.K. Fleet.
Likewise, the R.O.K.-U.S. Combined 2\textsuperscript{nd} Division under Eighth Army places U.S. and R.O.K. Soldiers together to reinforce our military bonds and interoperability at the tactical level.

In 2016, each of the three Commands made unique contributions to strengthen the Alliance. UNC operations demonstrated the essential coordinating role of the command. Actions to curtail illegal Chinese fishing in the Armistice-controlled Han River Estuary and the emplacement of artificial reefs helped prevent clashes between Chinese and Korean fisherman in an area where disputes could easily escalate. These missions under UNC authority provided a crucial element of international legitimacy, allowing the Alliance to achieve its objectives without escalating tensions. Also, during the 2016 Exercise ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN, UNC successfully tested the establishment of an integrated headquarters for United Nations Command Sending States. Canada sent its largest contingent in recent history, deploying a division headquarters of 104 personnel while Australia, Denmark, Columbia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom also contributed significantly.

USFK planning continues to move forward with the approval of a new bilateral effort and U.S. initiatives in support of the Alliance. CFC efforts concluded with approval of a new plan that accounts for regional interests in the event of conflict with North Korea. Contingency planning between the United States and South Korea continues to progress to increase responsiveness to a variety of potential North Korean provocations. USFK also drove refinements of the flow of U.S. forces and continues to refine plans to counter the changing challenges posed by North Korea and other actors in the region. The key to our success continues to be integration with our R.O.K. allies and other partners.
The CFC is working to support the commitment of the U.S., R.O.K., and Japanese governments to expand trilateral cooperation. This year, CFC participated in the first regularized series of consultations among the three governments in response to successive North Korean provocations and tested missile-defense cooperation through exercise PACIFIC DRAGON. In November, the Command also supported the first trilateral meeting of U.S., Korean, and Japanese Chiefs of Defense in Washington.

I would also like to acknowledge the contributions that each U.S. Service made to the Command in 2016. Specifically, the U.S. Army displayed exceptional innovation and flexibility in sourcing THAAD systems and personnel to South Korea on a timeline that allowed the Alliance to demonstrate the ability to quickly deploy advanced BMD capabilities. The Army also introduced a rotational Heavy Attack and Reconnaissance unit to the peninsula, continues its enduring Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) rotational deployments and is considering deploying additional enabling capabilities. This added commitment complements units based in Korea, improving overall readiness. U.S. Air Force employed regional assets in support of numerous flexible response options and large-scale exercises such as FOAL EAGLE, while Naval Forces worked to strengthen bilateral and trilateral coordination by conducting several key exercises and promoted goodwill during numerous port visits to Korea. U.S. Marines conducted a continuous series of exercises with their R.O.K. counterparts to build partner capacity and interoperability while enhancing their expeditionary capabilities through combined amphibious landing exercises and participation in a major offload associated with the Combined Joint Logistics Over the Shore Exercise (CJLOTS).
5. Key Congressional Support

The Command is deeply appreciative of Congressional support for the additional capabilities we have brought to bear this year, particularly your support of the THAAD deployment, which will add to our layered ballistic missile defenses. Additionally, Congressional Delegation visitors in 2016, interested in the welfare of our service members, government civilians, and our community’s families assisted the Command in focusing attention toward many of the challenges to timely and effective relocations to the expanded base at Camp Humphreys. I thank this committee and the U.S. Congress for supporting our efforts in Korea as a high priority.

6. Looking to the future

The UNC will continue to assert UN Command Authorities over areas covered by the Armistice Agreement and support efforts for increased self-accountability for Armistice compliance by South and North Korea. The UNC will also work closely with the Republic of Korea to support development of Visiting Forces Agreements for UN Sending States and endeavor to increase training and exercise opportunities for international partners in Korea and Japan.

CFC will continue to meet its readiness obligations, prepared to “fight tonight”, as it strives to transform the Alliance to meet the challenges of the future. CFC and our R.O.K. counterparts continue to make progress toward the conditions-based transition of wartime operational control (OPCON transition) from the United States to South Korea. In coming years, U.S. and R.O.K.
planners will negotiate a new strategic document that will more clearly define the Alliance relationships during this transformation period leading towards OPCON transition. Also, U.S. and R.O.K. planners will design a Future Command framework this year that builds upon our long traditions of combined operations, and one that balances the synergies of both nations to preserve our “Fight Tonight” capabilities. Progress on these efforts will be reported at the Military Committee Meeting and Security Consultative Meeting later this year.

USFK will sustain and enhance the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance by increasing interaction between standing R.O.K. and U.S. component commands to “set the theater” with key U.S. capabilities for a transition from Armistice to Crisis or War. USFK will also strive to sustain the forward-deployed U.S. force and establish a new normal associated with our changing posture. We will continue to ensure that our plans are nested with those of supporting commands and agencies, and continue to host strategic level events in Korea like our Korean Strategic Seminar and bi-annual exercises. We will simultaneously participate in integrated planning events to ensure readiness and to better inform senior leaders on critical subjects such as force flow, extended deterrence, posture, integrated campaign plans addressing trans-regional and multi-domain challenges, and joint readiness issues. By sustaining key relationships through ongoing dialogue, we will continue to ensure the Alliance is enabled with the full support of the capabilities that the greater enterprise can bring to bear in times of crisis. This persistent engagement plan amongst commands and agencies is essential to our ability to accomplish our mission.

The Command is also undergoing significant changes to its basing posture. USFK’s Relocation Program will consolidate U.S. forces into two enduring hubs – a Central Hub around
the cities of Osan and Pyeongtaek, and a Southern Hub around the city of Daegu. The program underwent a significant inflection point in 2015 when the emphasis of the project shifted from construction-centric activities to efforts aimed at moving closer to our desired schedule for movement and occupying new spaces. In 2016, continued efforts saw significant progress in bringing us closer to our relocation plan. Now slated for occupancy in 2017 are a new middle school at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys, several troop barracks, a televideo center, a new railhead, and dental and troop medical clinics. Significant numbers of personnel and their families will be relocating in 2017.

This summer, Eighth Army will relocate to its new headquarters, a modern nerve center for the largest U.S. Army element in Korea. By the end of 2017, the Garrison Humphreys census will nearly double, with growth from its current population of approximately 16,000 service members, families, civilian employees, and contractors, to almost 29,000 personnel. That growth will increase to more than 36,000 individuals by the end of December 2020 as most units complete their restationing.

2016 brought significant progress to the Relocation Program, yet some challenges remain. Construction issues, most of which result from contractor inefficiency and unsatisfactory quality, have caused delays in completing several of the facilities. Nevertheless, USFK continues to work closely with our R.O.K. counterparts to ensure the suitability of new facilities for our service members and their families.

Actions by the U.S. Army Installation Management Command, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the South Korean government reversed issues that were evident in construction
that would have hindered timely and efficient occupation of the hospital. The project has undergone substantial improvements since last year, with significantly improved quality of the hospital infrastructure, rework of known deficiencies and an improved schedule. Numerous mitigations are now in place to accommodate the growing census on the newly expanded base to meet healthcare requirements. The command has put in place initiatives such as increased USAG Humphreys transportation, extended troop medical clinic hours, bi-lingual healthcare support at TRICARE–approved local Humphreys Hospitals, stork nesting program for our pregnant members and dependents, and a nurse helpline for 24/7 healthcare support.

7. Capability Challenges

In the broadest terms, the greatest support comes in the form of recognizing the extraordinary characteristics of the R.O.K. – U.S. Alliance and ensuring that the U.S. commitment to the blood-alliance of the past 67 years remains strong and evident into the future. However, we continue to face capability challenges in the following areas:

   a. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). Increased ISR capability is critical to improve Indications and Warning (I&W), determining North Korea's intent, and reducing risk. Deep look ISR and moving target indicators would provide the ability to continuously track I&W targets over longer durations. As North Korea’s pattern of provocations continues, it is essential to have the fullest possible picture of activities above the Military Demarcation Line in all domains (land, air, maritime, cyber, and space, as well as the human domain).
b. Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I). These capabilities form the heart of interoperability. For example, seamless military-to-military data-sharing enables the Alliance to act under a Common Operating Picture or to employ an effective and coordinated missile defense. Policies, agreements, and technologies must lean toward enabling bi-national and multi-national cooperation.

c. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). We have made significant and important strides this year, with commitment to thicken the layers of air and missile defense through THAAD, PAC-3 missiles, missile upgrades, and Surface-Based-at-Sea interceptors. As North Korea constantly seeks to improve its missile forces, we must also continue to expand our defensive capabilities so that North Korea is diminished in its ability to hold the alliance at risk with threatening weapons.

d. Critical Munitions. The Command identified specific munitions that would be required in the early days of conflict on the Peninsula, and we are working closely with the Republic of Korea to ensure it procures the appropriate types and numbers of critical munitions.

With these capabilities, our Alliance will stay ahead of our adversary. R.O.K. and U.S. military leaders agree that these are the most critical tools to position the Alliance to deter North Korea, defend South Korea and maintain regional stability. We thank you for your consideration.

I would also like to acknowledge the importance of ongoing U.S. Service efforts aimed at filling capabilities gaps that will yield improvements to the readiness and interoperability of forces in Korea. The U.S. Army’s efforts to procure critical munitions, the U.S. Air Force emphasis on weapon system sustainment, the U.S. Navy focus on assured command and control,
and the U.S. Marine Corps push for improved aircraft modernization and maintenance are each examples of initiatives that will solve service challenges as well as mitigating some of our existing shortfalls. We are dependent upon the services to provide us with ready forces, and, similarly, we are impacted by any shortcomings in resourcing the services due to sequestration and unpredictable funding.

8. Conclusion

As Commander, I can report that, in 2016, as North Korea continued its development of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile capabilities, the Alliance and its international supporters responded decisively with an increase in commitment, cooperation, and capabilities. These practical steps improved the position of our Alliance military forces.

However, North Korea has not responded favorably to this concerted, nearly unanimous international response. As the North continues to develop offensive military capabilities in contravention of the will of the international community, the Alliance must also maintain its resolve to stay ahead and to decisively counter the rising threat to the U.S., R.O.K., and the Asia-Pacific. The most effective way to do this is to take military actions that complement and advance the diplomatic, informational, economic, intelligence, law enforcement, and financial efforts the R.O.K. and U.S. governments are undertaking.

As our three Commands take those actions, we are grateful for the continued support of Congress and the American people, as well as the partnership of our Korean allies and the UN Sending States. The leadership and support provided by senior U.S. and R.O.K. civilian and

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military leaders, including the USPACOM Commander, Admiral Harry Harris, with whom we
remain very closely coordinated, provides our forces on freedom’s frontier with the capability
and the will to fight and win. Thanks to the committee for your support and for the opportunity
to communicate the current posture.

I am honored and blessed to lead American Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines, our
government civilians, and their counterparts from the Republic of Korea.