

Stenographic Transcript  
Before the

COMMITTEE ON  
ARMED SERVICES

## **UNITED STATES SENATE**

TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON POLICY AND STRATEGY IN THE ASIA-  
PACIFIC

Tuesday, April 25, 2017

Washington, D.C.

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2 PACIFIC

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U.S. Senate

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Committee on Armed Services

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Washington, D.C.

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10 The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in  
11 Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John  
12 McCain, chairman of the committee, presiding.

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Committee Members Present: Senators McCain

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[presiding], Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Tillis,

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Sullivan, Perdue, Cruz, Graham, Sasse, Strange, Reed,

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Nelson, McCaskill, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,

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Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, and Peters.

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1           OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN MCCAIN, U.S. SENATOR  
2 FROM ARIZONA

3           Chairman McCain: Good morning. The Senate Armed  
4 Services Committee meets this morning to receive testimony  
5 on U.S. policy and strategy in the Asia-Pacific region.

6           I am pleased to welcome today our panel of expert  
7 witnesses, all with deep knowledge and experience in the  
8 region: Victor Cha, who is the senior adviser and Korea  
9 Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies;  
10 Aaron Friedberg, who is professor of politics and  
11 international affairs at Princeton University; Kelly  
12 Magsamen, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of  
13 Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs; and Ashley  
14 Tellis, senior fellow and Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs  
15 at the Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, an old  
16 friend of the committee.

17           America's interests in the Asia-Pacific region are deep  
18 and enduring. That is why, for the past 70 years, we have  
19 worked with our allies and partners to uphold a rules-based  
20 order based on principles of free peoples and free markets,  
21 open seas and open skies, the rule of law, and the peaceful  
22 resolution of disputes.

23           These ideas have produced unprecedented peace and  
24 prosperity in the Asia-Pacific. But now, the challenges to  
25 this rules-based order are mounting, as they threaten not

1 just the nations of the Asia-Pacific region, but the United  
2 States as well.

3 The most immediate challenge is the situation on the  
4 Korean Peninsula. Kim Jong Un's regime has thrown its full  
5 weight behind its quest for nuclear weapons and the means to  
6 deliver them. And unfortunately, the regime is making real  
7 progress. A North Korean missile with a nuclear payload  
8 capable of striking an American city is no longer a distant  
9 hypothetical, but an imminent danger -- one that poses a  
10 real and rising risk of conflict.

11 I look forward hearing from our witnesses today about  
12 U.S. policy options on the Korean Peninsula. For years, the  
13 United States has looked to China, North Korea's long-term  
14 patron and sole strategic ally, to bring the regime to the  
15 negotiating table and achieve progress toward a  
16 denuclearized Korean Peninsula. We have done so for the  
17 simple reason that China is the only country with the  
18 influence to curb the North Korea's destabilizing behavior.  
19 But China has repeatedly refused to exercise that influence.

20 Instead, China has chosen to bully South Korea for  
21 exercising its sovereign right to defend itself from the  
22 escalating North Korean threat.

23 In response to the alliance decision to deploy the  
24 THAAD missile defense system to the Korean Peninsula, China  
25 has waged a campaign of economic retaliation against South

1 Korea, which has inflicted real damage.

2 The twisted reality is that China is doing all of this  
3 to stop the deployment of a defensive system, which is only  
4 necessary because of China has aided and abetted North Korea  
5 for decades.

6 I welcome the Trump administration's outreach to China  
7 on the issue of North Korea. But as these discussions  
8 continue, the United States should be clear that while we  
9 earnestly seek China's cooperation on North Korea, we do not  
10 seek such cooperation at the expense of our vital interests.  
11 We must not and will not bargain over our alliances with  
12 Japan and South Korea, nor over fundamental principles such  
13 as freedom of the seas.

14 As its behavior towards South Korea indicates over the  
15 last several years, China has acted less and less like a  
16 responsible stakeholder of the rules-based order in the  
17 region and more like a bully. Its rapid military  
18 modernization, provocations in the East China Sea, and  
19 continued militarization activities in the South China Sea  
20 signal an increasingly assertive pattern of behavior.

21 Despite U.S. efforts to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific,  
22 U.S. policy has failed to adapt to the scale and velocity of  
23 China's challenge to the rules-based order. That failure  
24 has called into question the credibility of America's  
25 security commitments in the region.

1           The new administration has an important opportunity to  
2 chart a different and better course. For example, I believe  
3 there is strong merit for an Asia-Pacific Stability  
4 Initiative, which is similar to the European deterrence  
5 initiative pursued over the last few years.

6           This initiative would enhance Pacific Command's  
7 credible combat power through targeted funding to realign  
8 U.S. military force posture in the region, improve  
9 operationally relevant infrastructure, fund additional  
10 exercises, pre-position equipment and munitions, and build  
11 capacity with our allies and partners. These are important  
12 steps that should be taken as part of a new, comprehensive  
13 strategy in the Asia-Pacific that incorporates all elements  
14 of national power.

15           I hope our witnesses will describe their ideas about  
16 what an APSI should fund and how they would articulate an  
17 interagency strategy for the Asia-Pacific.

18           I thank all of the witnesses for being here today, and  
19 I look forward to your testimony.

20           Senator Reed?

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1           STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED, U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE  
2 ISLAND

3           Senator Reed: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling  
4 this very important hearing. And thank you to all the  
5 witnesses for agreeing to testify this morning.

6           This hearing could not come at a more critical time as  
7 the North Korea regime has engaged in an aggressive schedule  
8 of tests for its nuclear and missile programs.

9           I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on whether  
10 they believe China can and will exert sufficient pressure on  
11 the regime to denuclearize the peninsula. If not, what are  
12 the alternatives? Is a military strike something we should  
13 consider, given the uncertainty regarding the possible scope  
14 and nature of retaliation from the regime?

15           I would also like to hear whether there are feasible  
16 military options on the table and how we should coordinate  
17 those options with our allies in the region. We have also  
18 heard concern from our allies and partners in the region  
19 that the administration has not yet articulated a  
20 comprehensive Asia-Pacific strategy.

21           For example, what is administration's maritime strategy  
22 to deal with excessive unlawful maritime claims? How will  
23 it balance our military presence with economic engagement to  
24 counter the narrative that China is the economic partner of  
25 choice? And most important, how will it balance cooperation

1 and competition with China, especially given the importance  
2 of China's cooperation on issues ranging from North Korea to  
3 terrorism?

4 Mr. Chairman, again, thank you for holding this  
5 important hearing. I look forward to hearing the testimony  
6 of the witnesses on all of these issues and more. Thank  
7 you.

8 Chairman McCain: Before I call on the witnesses, we  
9 have a housekeeping item. I would like to -- what is that?

10 All right, we just lost one, so we will wait.

11 Dr. Cha, welcome.

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1           STATEMENT OF VICTOR D. CHA, PH.D., SENIOR ADVISER AND  
2 KOREA CHAIR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

3           Dr. Cha: Thank you, Chairman McCain, Ranking Member  
4 Reed, and distinguished members of the committee.

5           There used to be a time when North Korea and their  
6 actions were considered isolated acts by a lonely dictator  
7 who was harmless and just looking for some attention with  
8 really bad hair. I do not think people think that way  
9 anymore.

10          Between 1994 and 2008, North Korea did 16 ballistic  
11 missile tests and one nuclear test. Since January of 2009,  
12 they have done 71 missile tests, including four nuclear  
13 tests. The leader in North Korea has made no effort to have  
14 dialogue with any other country in the region, not just the  
15 United States, but that includes China, South Korea, Russia-  
16 - absolutely no interest in talking.

17          All of this translates to one of the most challenging  
18 strategic environments for the United States and its allies,  
19 and a very dark strategic cloud that is starting to dominate  
20 the skyline with regard to East Asia.

21          Having said that, I think there is a silver lining to  
22 every dark cloud. In this case, I think there are four that  
23 could help to inform an Asia-Pacific Security Initiative, as  
24 the chairman mentioned.

25          First, the North Korean threat provides opportunity for

1 a closer coordination of policy between the next government  
2 in South Korea, which will be elected May 9th, and  
3 Washington. A new South Korean Government cannot afford  
4 ideological indulgences in a renewed engagement or sunshine  
5 policy.

6 It would be unwise, for example, for a new South Korea  
7 President on May 10th, presumably in the aftermath of more  
8 North Korean provocations and possibly a sixth nuclear test,  
9 to declare that he or she is reopening the Kaesong  
10 Industrial complex. This would only serve to further  
11 marginalize South Korea's strategic position, as the new  
12 government would lose step with the United States, Japan,  
13 and even China.

14 The U.S. is not averse to inter-Korean engagement.  
15 However, for it to be effective, such engagement must be  
16 used strategically and coordinated with an overall U.S.-ROK  
17 strategy for negotiations and denuclearization.

18 The second silver lining has to do with trilateral  
19 coordination. The United States should welcome an early  
20 meeting with the U.S. President and South Korea and Japan,  
21 presumably before President Trump's scheduled trip to the  
22 region in the fall. The goal of alliance coordination  
23 should be a collective security statement among the three  
24 allies, the United States, Japan, Korea, that an attack on  
25 one constitutes an attack against all.

1           The third silver lining relates to China. Beijing is  
2 unlikely to let off on the economic pressure on South Korea  
3 over the THAAD defense system for I think at least another  
4 one or two financial quarters. This will hurt South Korean  
5 businesses and tourism even more, but it should also spark  
6 serious strategic thinking in the United States and South  
7 Korea about reducing the ROK's economic dependence on China.

8           Given the energy revolution in the United States and  
9 the removal of export restrictions, the two allies should  
10 think seriously about new bilateral energy partnerships that  
11 could reduce South Korean energy dependence on China in the  
12 Middle East.

13           Washington and Seoul's policy-planning offices can work  
14 together to map out a South Korean strategy for engaging  
15 India as well as ASEAN countries. These new engagements  
16 should not be a temporary measure but should be a serious  
17 effort at creating new markets for U.S. allies, products,  
18 production chains, and investment.

19           The Chinese have proven with their coercion over the  
20 THAAD issue that South Korea's future welfare cannot be left  
21 in Chinese hands.

22           Finally, the United States should encourage the new  
23 government in South Korea to take a stronger stand in  
24 supporting public goods off the Korean Peninsula in  
25 neighboring waters. In particular, as part of a new

1 engagement strategy with ASEAN, the U.S., with the support  
2 of South Korea, could show stronger will to discourage  
3 further militarization of the South China Sea. This would  
4 win partners among ASEAN countries and be a distinctly  
5 positive platform for the United States and its allies in  
6 the region.

7 Thank you very much.

8 [The prepared statement of Dr. Cha follows:]

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1 Chairman McCain: Thank you.

2 Dr. Friedberg, before we go to you, we do have a quorum  
3 now present.

4 I ask the committee consider a list of 5,550 pending  
5 military nominations.

6 All these nominations have been before the committee  
7 the required length of time.

8 Is there a motion in favor of reporting these 5,550  
9 military nominations to the Senate?

10 Senator Reed: So moved.

11 Chairman McCain: Is there a second?

12 All in favor, say aye.

13 The motion carries.

14 Dr. Friedberg, welcome.

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1           STATEMENT OF AARON L. FRIEDBERG, PH.D., PROFESSOR OF  
2 POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

3           Dr. Friedberg: Senator McCain, Senator Reed, thank you  
4 very much, members of the committee. I appreciate very much  
5 the opportunity to express my views on these important  
6 subjects.

7           In the time available, I would like to try to make  
8 three main points.

9           First, as Senator McCain I think has already indicated,  
10 I do not think the United States currently has a coherent,  
11 integrated national strategy for the Asia-Pacific region,  
12 and, in particular, it lacks a strategy for dealing with an  
13 increasingly powerful and assertive China. What we have  
14 instead are the remnants of a strategy first put in place  
15 over 2 decades ago, some aspirational goals and a set of  
16 policies and programs intended to achieve them that are now  
17 in varying states of disrepair, and which are, in any event,  
18 largely disconnected from one another.

19           Second, China does have such a strategy, not only for  
20 the Asia-Pacific but for the continental domain along its  
21 land frontiers. The goal of Beijing's strategy, as has  
22 become increasingly clear in the last few years, is to  
23 create a regional Eurasian order that is very different from  
24 the one we have been trying to build since the end of the  
25 Cold War.

1           Third, just because Beijing has a strategy does not  
2 mean it will succeed. China has many weaknesses and  
3 liabilities. We and our allies have many strengths. But I  
4 do think we have reached the point where it is essential  
5 that we reexamine our goals, review our strategy, and adjust  
6 our policies accordingly.

7           The start of a new administration would naturally be  
8 the time to attempt such a review. It simply becomes more  
9 difficult as time goes on and more issues accumulate.

10          Let me try to expand on each of those points.

11          When the Cold War ended, the United States set out to  
12 expand the geographic scope of the Western liberal economic  
13 and institutional order by integrating the pieces of the  
14 former Soviet Union and the former Soviet empire, and by  
15 accelerating the integration of China, a process that had  
16 begun a few years before. As regards to China, the United  
17 States pursued a two-pronged strategy, on the one hand  
18 seeking to engage China across all domains, economic in  
19 particular, but diplomatic and others, and at the same time,  
20 working with our allies and partners in maintaining our own  
21 forces in the region to preserve a balance of power that was  
22 favorable to our interests and to the security of our  
23 allies.

24          The goals of that policy were to preserve stability, to  
25 deter the possibility of aggression while waiting for

1 engagement to work its magic. The U.S. hoped, in effect, to  
2 tame and ultimately to transform China, to encourage its  
3 leaders to see their interests as lying in the preservation  
4 of that order and to set in motion processes that would  
5 lead, eventually, to the economic and political  
6 liberalization of that country.

7 As in European, so also in Asia, our ultimate aim was  
8 to build a region whole and free, an open, liberal region in  
9 an open and liberal world.

10 Since the turn of the century, it has become  
11 increasingly apparent that this approach has not worked, at  
12 least not yet. Engagement has not achieved its intended  
13 results. China is obviously far stronger, far richer, but  
14 it is more repressive domestically than at any time since  
15 the cultural revolution. It continues to rely heavily on  
16 mercantilist economic policies and impose costs on other  
17 countries, including ours. And its external behavior has  
18 become increasingly assertive, even aggressive, most  
19 notably, but not entirely, in the maritime domain.

20 Meanwhile, engagement not working, balancing has become  
21 more difficult for us and for our allies because of the  
22 growth of China's military capabilities.

23 So, second, what accounts for this recent shift in  
24 Chinese behavior? The short answer to that question is that  
25 Beijing's increased assertiveness is driven by a mix of



1 optimism and even arrogance, on the one hand, and also deep  
2 insecurity.

3 For roughly the first 15 years or so after the end of  
4 the Cold War, China's rulers followed the wisdom of Deng  
5 Xiaoping, who advised in 1991 that China should hide its  
6 capabilities and bide its time, avoid confrontation, build  
7 up all the elements of its national power, and advance  
8 cautiously toward, eventually, achieving a position  
9 reestablishing China as a preponderant power in the region.

10 Things began to change in 2008 with the onset of the  
11 financial crisis, and these changes have accelerated and  
12 become institutionalized since 2013 with the accession of Xi  
13 Jinping to top positions in the party and the state.

14 Basically, the financial crisis caused Chinese  
15 strategists to conclude that the United States was declining  
16 more rapidly than had been expected and that China was,  
17 therefore, able to rise more quickly than had been hoped.  
18 It was time, then, for China to step up to become clearer in  
19 defining its core interests and more assertive in pursuing  
20 them.

21 At the same time, however, the crisis also deepened the  
22 Chinese leadership's underlying concerns about their  
23 prospects for sustaining economic growth and preserving  
24 social stability.

25 So China is behaving more assertively both because its

1 leaders want to seize the opportunities presented to them by  
2 what they see as a more favorable external situation and  
3 because they feel the need to bolster their legitimacy and  
4 to rally domestic support by courting controlled  
5 confrontations with others whom they can present as hostile  
6 foreign forces, including Japan and the United States.

7         The Chinese actions are not limited to pursuing its  
8 claims and trying to extend its zone of effective control in  
9 the maritime domain. Along its land frontiers, Beijing has  
10 also unveiled a hugely ambitious set of infrastructure  
11 development plans, the so-called One Belt, One Road  
12 initiative, which aims to transform the economic and  
13 strategic geography of much of Eurasia.

14         China's leaders have begun to articulate their vision  
15 for a new Eurasian order, a system of infrastructure  
16 networks, regional free trade areas, new rules written in  
17 Beijing, and mechanisms for political consultation, all with  
18 China at the center and the United States pushed to the  
19 periphery, if not out of the region altogether. In this  
20 vision, U.S. alliances would either be dissolved or drained  
21 of their significance, maritime democracies would be divided  
22 from one another and relatively weak, and China, meanwhile,  
23 would be surrounded on the continent by friendly and  
24 subservient authoritarian regimes.

25         So if in the 20th century, the United States tried to

1 make the world safe for democracy, in the 21st, China is  
2 trying to make the world safe for authoritarianism, or at  
3 least it is trying to make Asia safe for continued Communist  
4 Party rule of China.

5         And they are using and trying to coordinate all the  
6 instruments of policy to achieve these ends -- military  
7 domain, building up of conventional and so-called anti-  
8 access/area denial capabilities. And they are modernizing  
9 their nuclear forces in order to deter possible U.S.  
10 intervention and to raise questions about the continued  
11 viability of our security guarantees, and also developing  
12 other instruments -- lawfare, little blue men maritime  
13 militia, island construction -- to advance toward their  
14 goals, create facts without provoking confrontation.

15         Economically, they have been using the growing  
16 gravitational pull of their economy to draw others toward  
17 them. And also, they have been increasingly open in using  
18 economic threats and punishments to try to shape the  
19 behavior of others in the region, including U.S. allies, as  
20 Dr. Cha mentioned, Korea and also the Philippines.

21         And China has been engaging in what Chinese strategists  
22 refer to as political warfare, attempts to shape the  
23 perceptions of both leaders and elites and publics by  
24 conveying the message that China's growing wealth and power  
25 present an opportunity rather than a threat to its

1 neighbors, while raising questions about the continued  
2 reliability and leadership capacity of the United States.

3 I think it is important to note also that China is  
4 waging political warfare against us, holding out the  
5 prospect of cooperation on trade and on North Korea, which I  
6 think is now going to be again a part of that process, even  
7 as they work to undermine and weaken our position in the  
8 long run.

9 Finally, and very briefly, how should the United States  
10 respond? As I stated at the outset, I think the time has  
11 come for a fundamental reexamination of our strategy toward  
12 China and toward the Asia-Pacific and, indeed, the entire  
13 Eurasian domain more broadly. A serious effort along these  
14 lines would look at all the various instruments of power,  
15 the various aspects of our policy, which I think now are  
16 largely fragmented and dealt with separately, and consider  
17 the ways in which they might be better integrated. It would  
18 also weigh the possible costs and benefits and risks of  
19 alternative strategies.

20 A useful model here would be the so-called Solarium  
21 Project, a review of possible approaches for dealing with  
22 the Soviet Union that was undertaken in 1953 during the  
23 early months of the Eisenhower administration. To my  
24 knowledge, in the last 25 years, there has been no such  
25 exercise regarding our policies towards Asia and towards

1 China. So we are effectively running on the fumes of a  
2 strategy that was put into place a quarter century ago.

3 Obviously, Congress cannot do such an assessment  
4 itself, but it might wish to concern mandating such a review  
5 as it did in requiring a general statement of National  
6 Security Strategy in 1986 and the Quadrennial Defense Review  
7 in 1997.

8 I am afraid my clock is not working, so I am sure that  
9 I have already gone over time. I cannot claim to have  
10 conducted such an exercise myself, but I would like to close  
11 with just a few thoughts about some of the issues that it  
12 might address and perhaps some of the conclusions toward it  
13 which might lead.

14 The first and most basic is, what is it that we are  
15 trying to achieve? If an Asia whole and free is out of  
16 reach, at least for now, and if a region reshaped according  
17 to Beijing's vision would be threatening to our interests  
18 and to our values, as I think it would be, how should we  
19 define our strategic goals?

20 Part of the answer here I think is likely to be that we  
21 will need to rededicate ourselves to defending those parts  
22 of the Asian regional system that remain open and liberal,  
23 including our allies, the rules with which they abide, and  
24 the commons that connect them.

25 It is sometimes said that in order to accommodate

1 China's rising power and avoid conflict, we will need to  
2 compromise. That is certainly true. But there are some  
3 issues where it will not be possible to split the  
4 difference. We need to be clear about what those are.

5 In the economic domain, if we do not want others to be  
6 drawn increasingly into a Chinese co-prosperity sphere, we  
7 need to provide them with the greatest possible opportunity  
8 to remain engaged in mutually beneficial trade and  
9 investment with us and with one another.

10 Whatever its economic merits, TPP had significant  
11 strategic benefits in this regard. And it is not clear, at  
12 this point, what, if anything, will take its place.

13 In regard to military strategy, for good reason, a  
14 great deal of energy has been devoted recently to figuring  
15 out how to respond to these Chinese initiatives in the so-  
16 called gray zone. As important as this problem is, it seems  
17 to me that it is subordinate to the larger question of how  
18 we and our allies can counter China's evolving anti-  
19 access/area denial strategy.

20 We are in kind of an odd position now of having raised  
21 this issue in a very visible way back in 2011, with the  
22 creation of the Air Sea Battle Office, and then seeming to  
23 back away from it. While there is obviously a limit to what  
24 we can and should say in public, we are at a point I think  
25 where we need to be able to explain to our allies, our

1 possible adversaries, and ourselves how would we fight and  
2 win a war in Asia, should that ever become necessary.

3       Finally, there is this delicate issue of political  
4 warfare. As Senator Reed mentioned, what is our counter to  
5 the narrative that the Chinese are pushing across much of  
6 Asia in which we are portrayed as internally divided, as  
7 unable to solve our domestic problems, as inward-turning,  
8 unreliable, and potentially dangerous, while China presents  
9 itself as the wave of the future -- economically dynamic,  
10 efficient, unthreatening, nonjudgmental, loaded with cash,  
11 and eager to do business.

12       In this regard, it seems to me that it would be a  
13 serious mistake, strategic as well as moral, to drop the  
14 subjects of human rights and universal values from our  
15 discussions with and about China. Our commitment to these  
16 values and our demonstrated willingness to defend them are  
17 still among our greatest assets. And being seen to abandon  
18 them in the face of China's growing wealth and power will  
19 embolden Beijing and other authoritarian regimes, and  
20 discourage our allies and demoralize those people in China  
21 and around the world who often at great personal risk  
22 continue to advocate for freedom.

23       Thank you very much.

24       [The prepared statement of Dr. Friedberg follows:]

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1 Chairman McCain: Ms. Magsamen?  
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1           STATEMENT OF KELLY E. MAGSAMEN, FORMER PRINCIPAL  
2 DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC  
3 SECURITY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4           Ms. Magsamen: Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed,  
5 other distinguished committee members, thank you for  
6 convening this important and very timely hearing today.

7           I want to commend the committee for its steadfast  
8 bipartisan leadership on all matters of peace and security  
9 in the Asia-Pacific, that is extremely important, as well as  
10 your steadfast commitment to our men and women in uniform  
11 and the civilians who serve alongside them. So thank you.

12           Also, thank you to my fellow panelists here whose  
13 counsel I drew upon quite a bit while I was in government.  
14 I think you are going to hear a lot of similarity in our  
15 testimony today. Let me try to quickly summarize my  
16 testimony that I have submitted for the record.

17           Bottom line, up front, while some may prefer to discard  
18 the rhetoric of the rebalance, we need to follow through on  
19 its strategic intent, because if we do not, American primacy  
20 in the most consequential region in the world is at risk. I  
21 will go one step further by saying mere continuity of  
22 American effort is not going to be enough to stem the tide.

23           We need to encourage the new administration to present  
24 an affirmative vision and strategy for the region, as the  
25 other panelists have discussed, and to avoid ad hoc

1 approaches. This needs to start with a clear-eyed view of  
2 our interests and the necessity of preserving our position  
3 through any means necessary to advance our interests.

4       So with that theme in mind, I would like to highlight  
5 what I see as the top three challenges and opportunities  
6 facing the United States in the Asia-Pacific. Of course,  
7 the first most urgent challenge is North Korea and its  
8 relentless pursuit of its ballistic missile program and  
9 nuclear program, a challenge that has vexed multiple  
10 administrations, including the Obama administration most  
11 recently.

12       The bottom line here is that we need a new playbook.  
13 First, we need to increase the pressure on North Korea as a  
14 necessary predicate to any other option. China is central  
15 to that, but we cannot rely only on Chinese pressure. We  
16 also need to be realistic. Kim Jong Un is not going to  
17 unilaterally disarm because of international pressure.  
18 Pressure alone is not going to solve the problem.

19       Second, military options should remain on the table,  
20 but they are extremely high-risk and should be a last  
21 resort. We should not kid ourselves here. A conflict on  
22 the peninsula would be unlike anything we have seen in  
23 decades. North Korea is not a Syria. It is not an Iraq.  
24 The consequences could be extremely high.

25       So where does that leave us? After and only after a

1 sustained period of significant pressure and deep  
2 coordination with our allies, we need to ready a diplomatic  
3 play.

4 For diplomacy to succeed, however, its goal has to be  
5 achievable. So this will not be popular, but  
6 denuclearization is unlikely at this point, at least in the  
7 near term and at least under this regime.

8 So we need to have some realism and develop some  
9 diplomatic creativity. We, in close coordination with our  
10 allies, should develop a diplomatic road map with outcomes  
11 short of denuclearization that would still effectively limit  
12 the threat in a meaningful and verifiable way.

13 Finally, we really need to turn up our defense game.  
14 We need to accelerate improvements in regional missile  
15 defense of our allies as well as our homeland so that we are  
16 better prepared in the event diplomacy fails or even if it  
17 succeeds.

18 This brings me to the second challenge, and this is the  
19 most consequential challenge, as others have discussed --  
20 China. To be clear, China's strategic intent is to chip  
21 away at decades of American security and economic primacy in  
22 Asia. Some are going to get squeamish over the idea of  
23 U.S.-China great power competition. But to ignore the fact  
24 that China is already in competition with us would be  
25 tantamount to strategic malpractice.

1           So I agree with Aaron on his comments earlier about the  
2           need for a big look at our China strategy.

3           I do not mean to suggest that we should enter a new  
4           cold war with China, nor can we cast aside areas of  
5           cooperation that benefit our interests. But we need to be  
6           clear-eyed about our long-term interests in preserving the  
7           American position, and that should be our north star.

8           To do so, the United States needs to invest in our  
9           comparative strengths and, by extension, our credibility.  
10          We need to get our own house in order to address the pure  
11          scale, as the chairman mentioned, of this challenge --  
12          necessary budget investments, human capital investments,  
13          which is something that is not talked about enough, and  
14          overall strategy.

15          And we need to move to the next phase of increasing  
16          U.S. presence, posture, and capabilities in the region.  
17          That next phase is going to be a lot harder.

18          In this regard, I would like to thank you, Chairman  
19          McCain, for your idea and proposal on the Asia-Pacific  
20          Stability Initiative, which I hope the Trump administration  
21          will support. It will not only improve our ability to fight  
22          and win wars, it will improve our ability to keep the peace.

23          This brings me to the third challenge, an enduring and  
24          persistence one, which is terrorism in the region. I think  
25          in the emergence of ISIL, the terrorist threat in South and

1 Southeast Asia is evolving, and bottom line here is we need  
2 to get ahead of it. We have time to get ahead of it, so we  
3 need to take more preventive action on terrorism in South  
4 and Southeast Asia.

5 Let me talk briefly about opportunities, which tend to  
6 get lost in all of the noise.

7 First, I would say the biggest strategic opportunity is  
8 India. And here, the United States and India increasingly  
9 share a common strategic outlook on the Asia-Pacific,  
10 especially a mutual concern over Chinese military  
11 modernization and adventurism.

12 But the question here is, can we reach a new level of  
13 cooperation to place limits on Chinese ambition? I believe  
14 it is possible but only if the United States and India  
15 together persist in overcoming the suspicions of the past  
16 and build stronger habits of actual cooperation. And this  
17 is going to require the U.S. and Indian systems, which are  
18 not naturally compatible, to demonstrate mutual flexibility  
19 as well as ambition.

20 The second opportunity, which is a near-term and high-  
21 reward opportunity, is Southeast Asia. As the chairman  
22 knows, the demand signal in Southeast Asia for U.S. defense  
23 engagement is on the rise. And we need to meet it.

24 While we can do more through defense engagement, we  
25 also need to do more on diplomatic, economic, commercial,

1 private sector engagement in Southeast Asia. Whether it is  
2 in Vietnam or Burma or Sri Lanka, there are countless  
3 opportunities for the United States to build strategic depth  
4 in Southeast Asia.

5 ASEAN also needs to be central to our strategy, and I  
6 would recommend Secretary Mattis continue efforts of his  
7 last two predecessors to host the ASEAN Defense Ministers in  
8 the United States at the earliest opportunity.

9 Finally, this committee's leadership on Southeast Asia  
10 has been essential. Whether it was by your engagement every  
11 year at the Shangri-La Dialogue, which is an important  
12 expression of American bipartisan commitment to the Asia-  
13 Pacific, or whether it is following through with action as  
14 in the case of the Southeast Asian Maritime Security  
15 Initiative, a much-needed, timely American effort to fill a  
16 critical capacity gap.

17 Finally, the big one, the long-term strategy, the real  
18 opportunity for the United States. To retain our primacy,  
19 the United States needs to weave together its disparate  
20 security and economic efforts into a broader strategy. We  
21 need to fashion a networked security architecture with  
22 allies and partners to help all of us do more over greater  
23 distances with greater economy of effort, undergirded by a  
24 shared set of principles in support of a rules-based order.

25 We need to present a vision for an equivalent economic

1 architecture that promotes sustainable and inclusive  
2 economic growth and opportunity for all countries, including  
3 the United States.

4 In the absence of meaningful American economic  
5 statecraft in the region, China is filling the void. That  
6 has dangerous implications for our relationships, setting up  
7 false choices for our allies between their security and  
8 their prosperity. Besides these strategic implications, the  
9 lack of a serious U.S. economic initiative in Asia will  
10 leave average Americans at a long-term economic  
11 disadvantage.

12 So in sum, the challenges of opportunities for the  
13 United States are significant. But without urgent American  
14 leadership and the requisite whole-of-government investment,  
15 the United States will not be able to rise to them, and  
16 decades of relative peace and prosperity that American  
17 leadership has enabled are at risk.

18 Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

19 [The prepared statement of Ms. Magsamen follows:]

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1 Chairman McCain: Dr. Tellis?  
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1           STATEMENT OF ASHLEY J. TELLIS, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW,  
2           CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

3           Dr. Tellis: Thank you, Senator McCain. Good morning.  
4           Thank you, Ranking Member Reed, and members of the  
5           committee, for inviting me to testify this morning on the  
6           challenges facing the United States in the Indo-Pacific.

7           I have submitted a longer statement. I would be  
8           grateful if that is entered into the record.

9           Chairman McCain: Without objection.

10          Dr. Tellis: In my opening remarks this morning, I want  
11          to highlight five themes drawn from my written statement.

12          First, the challenges posed by North Korea and China  
13          obviously remain the most dangerous problems facing the  
14          United States in the Indo-Pacific. The challenges emanating  
15          from North Korea and obviously real, dangerous, and in the  
16          near term. The challenges emanating from China are long-  
17          term, enduring, and aimed fundamentally at decoupling the  
18          United States from its Asian partners.

19          In my remarks this morning, I want to focus primarily  
20          on China, and I want to thank my colleagues, Victor Cha and  
21          Kelly Magsamen, for spending time on speaking about the  
22          issues relating to North Korea.

23          The first point I want to make in this connection is  
24          that as we think about China as a strategic competitor, it  
25          is important not to think of China as merely a regional

1 power, but increasingly as a global challenger to the United  
2 States.

3 China is already a great power in Pacific Asia. It is  
4 increasingly active militarily in the Indian Ocean. It is  
5 seeking facilities in the Mediterranean and along the  
6 African coasts. And within a couple of decades, the size of  
7 Chinese naval capabilities will begin to rival those of our  
8 own. And it is likely that China will begin to maintain a  
9 presence both in the Atlantic and in the Arctic Oceans as  
10 well.

11 So we have to think of China in a new way, not just  
12 simply as an Asian power but as a global power.

13 The second point I want to make is that it becomes  
14 increasingly important for the United States as it deals  
15 with the emerging Chinese challenge to reaffirm its own  
16 commitment to maintaining its traditional preeminence both  
17 globally and in the Indo-Pacific.

18 The U.S. commitment to this preeminence is now  
19 uncertain in Asia. The Asian states are uncertain about  
20 whether Washington can be counted on to balance against  
21 China's quest for regional hegemony, and whether Washington  
22 can be lured away from the attractions of condominium with  
23 China, a condominium which might threaten the security of  
24 our friends.

25 The President, therefore, should use the opportunity

1 offered by his appearance at the East Asia summit to clearly  
2 affirm America's commitment to maintaining its global  
3 primacy. But words alone are not enough. I think it would  
4 be very helpful for the administration to support your  
5 initiative, Senator McCain, with respect to the Asia-Pacific  
6 Stability Initiative, in fact, urging funding at levels that  
7 approximate those offered for the European Reassurance  
8 Initiative.

9 Third, the resources that I believe should be allocated  
10 to the Indo-Pacific should focus increasingly on restoring  
11 the effectiveness of U.S. power projection, because that  
12 capability has been undermined considerably by China's  
13 recent investments in anti-access and area denial.

14 In the near term, this will require shifting additional  
15 combat power to the theater, remedying shortfalls in  
16 critical munitions, expanding logistics capabilities,  
17 increasing joint exercises in training, and improving force  
18 resiliency by enabling a more dispersed deployment posture.

19 But the longer term is just as crucial, and the demands  
20 of the longer term cannot be avoided indefinitely. Here I  
21 believe bipartisan support will be necessary for developing  
22 and rapidly integrating various revolutionary technologies  
23 into the joint force, technologies that will emphasize  
24 stealth, long-range, and unmanned capabilities as well as  
25 doubling down on our advantages in undersea warfare.

1 Fourth, building better capabilities alone will not  
2 suffice for effective power projection if the United States  
3 lacks the will to protect the international regime that  
4 serves our strategic interests. An important element of  
5 that regime, protecting the freedom of navigation, is now at  
6 serious risk because of China's activities in the South  
7 China Sea.

8 It is time for Washington to push back on these efforts  
9 by undertaking regular freedom of navigation operations in  
10 much the same way as we do sensitive recognizance operations  
11 in the Indo-Pacific today. These operations should be  
12 regular, unpublicized, undertaken at the discretion at  
13 PACOM, and should not be constrained by the promise of  
14 Chinese good behavior on other issues.

15 Fifth and finally, we will not be able to tame Chinese  
16 power in the Indo-Pacific without strengthening our friends  
17 and alliance partners, a point made quite clearly by Kelly  
18 in her remarks before me. There are diverse initiatives  
19 that are required for success on this account. I will just  
20 flag a few.

21 The United States should first begin to seriously think  
22 about working with its partners to replicate China's own  
23 anti-access and area denial capabilities, in effect,  
24 replicating many A2/AD bubbles throughout the Indo-Pacific,  
25 to constrain China's freedom of maneuver around the

1 littorals.

2           The United States cannot afford to put off the aid and  
3 enhanced training to Taiwan for very much longer, just as we  
4 ought to urge Taipei to move expeditiously with respect to  
5 increasing its own military spending and reforming its own  
6 concepts of military operations. As a matter of national  
7 policy, we should affirm our strong support for trilateral  
8 cooperation between Japan, India, and Australia, whether or  
9 not the United States is party to these activities.

10           As Kelly emphasized, we should not give up on the  
11 nations of Southeast Asia either. They are currently at the  
12 receiving end of Chinese assertiveness, and, therefore, our  
13 theater engagement plan is something that we need to  
14 reinvest in because it gives us the opportunity to provide  
15 critical reassurance to the smaller Southeast Asian states  
16 in ways that will limit the potential for Chinese  
17 intimidation.

18           Finally, we need to reinvigorate the balancing of China  
19 by doubling down on our strategic partnership with India.  
20 This is no longer simply a political necessity. It is an  
21 urgent operational necessity as well. As Chinese military  
22 activities in the Indian Ocean begin to gather steam. The  
23 partnership with India becomes even more important because  
24 of the limits it can impose on China's freedom faction in  
25 the Indian Ocean and thereby limiting the burdens on U.S.

1 forward defense in other parts of the Indo-Pacific.

2 In short, managing the rise of Chinese military power  
3 will be the most difficult challenge that the United States  
4 faces in the Indo-Pacific over the longer term. Managing  
5 that challenge will be demanding, but we have no choice but  
6 to be resolute in doing so, because our security, our  
7 international standing, and the wellbeing of our allies is  
8 at stake.

9 Thank you very much for inviting me this morning, and I  
10 look forward to answering your questions.

11 [The prepared statement of Dr. Tellis follows:]

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1 Chairman McCain: Thank you very much, Dr. Tellis.

2 Would the witnesses agree that the abandonment of TPP  
3 was one of the biggest mistakes we have made?

4 Dr. Cha?

5 Dr. Cha: Yes, I saw TPP as not just being a trade  
6 agreement but having broader strategic implications. It is  
7 one of the three legs that United States stands on in Asia,  
8 in addition to our military presence and our values. So it  
9 is quite unfortunate, yes.

10 Chairman McCain: Dr. Friedberg?

11 Dr. Friedberg: I agree. In addition to the harmful  
12 effects of not going forward with the agreement, the signal  
13 that it sent I think was deeply damaging. So the fact that  
14 we placed such emphasis on it, talked about it, tried to  
15 persuade others to do it, encouraged others, including I  
16 think in particular our friends and allies in Japan to go  
17 out on limbs themselves to try to persuade their  
18 legislatures to accept this agreement, and then pulled the  
19 rug out, it really was a perfect storm, it seems to me, and  
20 very damaging. And it is going to take a while, I think, to  
21 work our way back from that setback.

22 Ms. Magsamen: Yes, because a Sinocentric economic  
23 order in Asia is not in our interests, so, yes, I agree it  
24 was a disaster.

25 It is also, actually, having practical effects on our

1 security. It is making it harder for us to engage with  
2 countries about access agreements, because the Chinese are  
3 in there essentially lining pockets and promising lots of  
4 investments in infrastructure, et cetera. So it is making  
5 our job on the defense side a lot harder.

6 Dr. Tellis: I agree completely with my fellow  
7 panelists. Withdrawal from TPP was both unfortunate and  
8 dangerous. I would flag three reasons for this.

9 First, the business of Asia is business. If we cannot  
10 engage in matters that are really important the to Asian  
11 states, enhancing their own prosperity, our inability to  
12 enhance their security will also be diminished. That is  
13 point number one.

14 Point number two, we really cannot cede to the Chinese  
15 the ability to create new rules for trade in Asia. TPP  
16 offered us the opportunity to create gold standard rules,  
17 and we have now divested ourselves of that opportunity.

18 Three, between TPP and TPEP, there was every promise  
19 that we could add close to 1 percent to U.S. GDP growth  
20 through trade. Even if you believe in America first, you do  
21 need to find ways of enhancing our global growth, and trade  
22 offers a great opportunity.

23 Chairman McCain: Right now, we have increasing  
24 tensions, as we all know, between us and North Korea, with  
25 the most unstable ruler that they have had. And the testing



1 of nuclear weapons, I think as Dr. Cha pointed out, and  
2 missile capability, has dramatically escalated.

3 Yet, at the same time, we have North Korean artillery  
4 in place, at a degree where at least they could launch one  
5 attack that would strike Seoul, a city of 25 million people,  
6 as I recall. And obviously, the key to some of this is  
7 China. And China had taken some very small steps as far as  
8 coal is concerned, but they have never taken any real steps  
9 to restrain North Korean activity.

10 So it seems to me that we are probably in one of the  
11 most challenging situations since the Cuban Missile Crisis,  
12 in some respects, certainly not exact parallels, but maybe  
13 it rhymes a bit.

14 Dr. Cha?

15 Dr. Cha: I think that is a very accurate assessment of  
16 the situation. There is nothing that I see that suggests  
17 that North Korea is going to slow down the pace of its  
18 testing. In fact, I think it is going to increase, given  
19 the elections in South Korea.

20 And China still subsidizes, even if they cut coal, they  
21 still subsidize 85 percent of North Korea's external trade.  
22 So China is definitely part of the solution in trying to  
23 stop North Korea, but it is also part of the problem, as you  
24 suggest, in that they are not willing to really put the sort  
25 of pressure that will impose economic costs on North Korea

1 for going down this path.

2 Dr. Friedberg: China has been playing a game with us  
3 for at least 15 years on this issue. When we get especially  
4 concerned about what the North Koreans are doing, and we go  
5 to the Chinese and we ask them for their help, what they  
6 have done in the past is to apply limited increments of  
7 pressure. They did it in 2003 to get the North Koreans to  
8 agree to sit down in what became the Six Party talks. But  
9 at the same time, almost simultaneously, as Victor suggests,  
10 they are enabling the North Korean regime to continue by  
11 allowing continued economic exchange across their border.

12 The Chinese have also allowed -- or the Chinese  
13 authorities have at least looked aside as Chinese-based  
14 companies have exported to North Korea components that were  
15 essential to the development of their ballistic missiles and  
16 probably other parts of their special weapons programs.

17 I am not at all optimistic that the Chinese are going  
18 to play a different game with us now than they did in the  
19 past.

20 One thing I would add, though, aside from military  
21 pressure, which for reasons that you suggest, Senator  
22 McCain, are I think of questionable plausibility, there are  
23 ways in which we could increase economic pressure on the  
24 North Korea regime, particularly by imposing further  
25 economic sanctions and especially financial sanctions. We

1 did that in the Bush administration. I think it was  
2 actually something that caused a good deal of pain. We  
3 backed away from it for various reasons. I think it was a  
4 mistake to have done that.

5 One of the reasons, in my understanding, that we have  
6 not been willing to push on this harder is that it probably  
7 would involve sanctioning entities that are based in China.  
8 And I think we have been reluctant to do that because of our  
9 concerns about upsetting the relationship with China.

10 I think if we are going to be serious about this, we  
11 probably are going to have to go down that road.

12 Chairman McCain: The military option being extremely  
13 challenging.

14 Dr. Friedberg: Yes. I was in government in 2003-2005.  
15 At that time, my understanding was it really was not --  
16 there was no way of dealing with the conventional counter-  
17 deterrent that the North Koreans had. I do not have any  
18 reason to think that it has better. Moreover, the nuclear  
19 targets themselves have become more numerous.

20 North Koreans are starting to develop mobile ballistic  
21 missiles. The problem of preempting or attacking in a  
22 preventive way and destroying North Korean nuclear  
23 capability is only getting worse, I would think. And  
24 nothing really has been done to deal with the conventional  
25 threat to South Korea.

1 Chairman McCain: Ms. Magsamen?

2 Ms. Magsamen: I agree on the China front. I think  
3 there are going to be limits to what they are going to be  
4 willing to do. Their biggest fear, of course, is  
5 destabilizing the peninsula.

6 Now is the time to try to make China understand that  
7 the status quo is worse for them than all other scenarios.  
8 And to do that, I think we need to hold their interests at  
9 risk. And what I mean by that is somewhat of what Dr.  
10 Friedberg said, which is we really need to think hard about  
11 secondary sanctions on Chinese banks.

12 I actually think we should to go out and do it now. I  
13 do not think we should actually wait. I do not think that  
14 holding it in abeyance is actually going to induce Chinese  
15 cooperation. So now is the time to demonstrate to China  
16 that we are serious in that regard.

17 Chairman McCain: By the way, I agree with the  
18 witnesses about the importance of the U.S.-India  
19 relationship, which is something that I think has enormous  
20 potential as well.

21 Dr. Tellis?

22 Dr. Tellis: I concur with what has been said before on  
23 the challenges with North Korea. I think China has to make  
24 a strategic decision. If the current status quo serves its  
25 interests, and it seems to, because it immunizes China from

1 the threat of chaos, it provides a buffer between the U.S.  
2 military presence and the Chinese border, so if this status  
3 quo continues to advance Chinese interests, there is a small  
4 likelihood that they will be more helpful to us with respect  
5 to managing North Korea.

6 So the issue for decision in China is whether the Trump  
7 administration's increased pressure might change the game  
8 sufficiently that the threat of war becomes real enough for  
9 China to move. And to that degree, I think creating this  
10 head of steam, which the administration seems to be making  
11 an effort toward, would actually be helpful, because it  
12 might motivate the Chinese to cross lines they have not  
13 crossed before.

14 Senator Reed: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

15 Thank you for your excellent testimony.

16 Dr. Cha, just a quick point. You suggest that, at the  
17 conclusion of the election, whoever emerges victorious will  
18 take a harder line on the North Koreans. They will not open  
19 up the facility across the border, et cetera. Is that  
20 matched by the rhetoric? Some impressions we are getting  
21 are that it is a race to who is the most sensitive to the  
22 issues, not the most bellicose.

23 Dr. Cha: Thank you for the question.

24 I think certainly the political spectrum has shifted in  
25 Korea during this 7-month impeachment crisis further to the

1 left, or left of center, if you will. The leading  
2 candidates all seem to espouse views that call for more  
3 engagement with North Korea.

4 But I think that often what is said in campaigns is  
5 very different from when the individual takes office on the  
6 first day.

7 Senator Reed: You have noticed?

8 Dr. Cha: And I think in the case of South Korea, they  
9 will find that they will be in a position where their  
10 primary ally, the United States, is not of similar mind,  
11 neither is the partner across the sea, Japan. Arguably,  
12 China is not in that position as well.

13 And so while I do not think engagement is necessarily  
14 completely wrong with North Korea, but now is not the time.  
15 When I was in government, we were dealing with a progressive  
16 government in South Korea. We fully respected the fact that  
17 they were interested in engaging North Korea, but there was  
18 a right time for it, and a wrong time for it, not just by  
19 U.S. policy preference but by what would be deemed effective  
20 engagement. And I think the previous government understood  
21 that, I would imagine that the next government in South  
22 Korea would as well.

23 Senator Reed: Let me ask you all a question, beginning  
24 with Dr. Tellis. There is deep skepticism that the Chinese  
25 will apply economic pressure of a significant degree to

1    compel changes in behavior.  A variation on that is that,  
2    even if they did, do you believe that the North Korean  
3    regime would abandon their missile programs and their  
4    nuclear programs?

5           Dr. Tellis:  I do not believe that to be the case.  I  
6    believe the North Korean regime will continue to persist  
7    with its nuclear program because it sees that as  
8    indispensable to its own survival.  And I also do not  
9    believe that China will exert the kind of pressure required  
10   to force the North Korean regime to make those kinds of  
11   fundamental changes.

12           Senator Reed:  So that leaves us at what point in the  
13   future?

14           Dr. Tellis:  We essentially have to prepare for a North  
15   Korean capability that will ultimately reach the United  
16   States.  And if it comes to that point, we have only one of  
17   two choices.  We continue to hope in the reliability of  
18   deterrence, which is dangerous because of the  
19   unpredictability of this regime, or we will be forced into  
20   military actions, which will be extremely costly and  
21   painful.

22           Senator Reed:  Ms. Magsamen?

23           Ms. Magsamen:  No, I do not think Kim Jong Un is going  
24   to voluntarily give up his nuclear weapons, even with  
25   significant Chinese pressure.  I also agree that the Chinese

1 are not going to go as far as we need them to go to make  
2 that strategic choice.

3 Where that leaves us is essentially what I said  
4 earlier, which is, after increasing the pressure, running  
5 the China play, we do need to think carefully about whether  
6 or not we should proceed with a diplomatic effort to limit  
7 the program as best we can, because I think we are going to  
8 face a very stark choice at some point in the future,  
9 probably in the next 5 years, about an ICBM reaching the  
10 United States.

11 That is going to present some pretty stark choices, so  
12 I think our challenge now is to find a way to avoid having  
13 to make that choice at the end.

14 Senator Reed: Dr. Friedberg, please?

15 Dr. Friedberg: I do not think, first, that the Chinese  
16 will apply all the pressure that they could conceivably  
17 apply. In part, for that reason, I do not think that it is  
18 likely that the North Korean regime would agree to give up  
19 their programs. It seems to me that some years ago, it  
20 might have been possible to put the leadership in a position  
21 where we could make them an offer where they could not  
22 refuse, where they really felt that their own personal  
23 survival was at stake. I think we are past that point.

24 So I agree with both my colleagues on two points. One,  
25 the question now it seems to me is, are there things we can



1 do, working with China, perhaps, to try to slow down the  
2 progress of the North Korean program? So if they do not  
3 test as often as they have tested, presumably that will make  
4 it more difficult for them, eventually, to field reliable  
5 capability, testing both weapons and missiles.

6 It is not inconceivable, I think, that the Chinese  
7 might join with us in applying sufficient pressure to try to  
8 slow that down. I think that is the best we can hope for.

9 Then the question is, how do we prepare to defend  
10 against this? There is, in the long run, I hesitate to use  
11 this term because it has fallen into disfavor for good and  
12 bad reasons, but the ultimate solution to this problem is  
13 regime change.

14 Unless and until there is a change in the character in  
15 the North Korean regime, and certainly the identity of the  
16 current leadership, there is absolutely no prospect that I  
17 can see that this problem will get better. I do not think  
18 there is any active way in which we can promote that, but we  
19 ought to think about what conditions might lead, eventually,  
20 to that kind of change.

21 Senator Reed: Dr. Cha, finally.

22 Dr. Cha: I agree with my colleagues. I do not think  
23 Chinese pressure will necessarily stop North Korea's  
24 program. But I think what Chinese pressure can do is force  
25 the North Koreans back to the negotiating table.

1           The theory of the case of that that is, I think in  
2   2003, when China temporarily cut off oil, the North Koreans  
3   agreed to the Six Party talks. And then again in 2007, when  
4   the Treasury Department undertook actions that led to a  
5   seizure of North Korean assets in a bank in China, that  
6   clearly put a lot of pressure on the regime, and they came  
7   back to implement an agreement. So I think there is  
8   precedent there.

9           I entirely agree with my colleagues that I am not sure  
10   how much China is willing to put that kind of pressure on  
11   North Korea, but one could argue that the situation is a  
12   little bit different now because the Chinese are desperate  
13   for some sort of diplomacy to take place. They really do  
14   not understand what President Trump might do, and they feel  
15   they have no control over North Korea, so they may be more  
16   receptive than they were in the past.

17           Senator Reed: Thank you.

18           Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

19           Chairman McCain: Senator Inhofe?

20           Senator Inhofe: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

21           First of all, these hearings are very significant. We  
22   get people like you, and there is no more qualified panel we  
23   could have to advise us and to reflect on it. But also,  
24   these are public meetings, and I see the other value is  
25   informing the public of things that we assume up here they

1 already know about. I would like to concentrate on just  
2 North Korea, because I have always had this bias that this  
3 is really where the serious problem is.

4 We are talking about two things here. We are talking  
5 about their development and the technology over a period of  
6 time, developing a bomb, a weapon, and then secondly, a  
7 delivery system. Just real quickly, let me run over that.

8 In the delivery system, North Korea, it goes all the  
9 way back to the 1970s. In the 1970s, they had the Scud B,  
10 and everybody remembers that. They forgot that for a couple  
11 decades.

12 Along came 1990, their first No-dong missile. The test  
13 fire range 1,300 kilometers. Then a few years later, in  
14 2006, the Taepodong-2 long-range missile had the capability  
15 of traveling 1,500 miles. Then firing of the Taepodong  
16 missile, which they said was satellite-launched.

17 December 2012, North Korea launches a rocket that puts  
18 their first satellite into space. We have watched their  
19 progress all the way through to 2016, when North Korea  
20 launches a solid fuel ballistic missile from a submarine.

21 Then lastly, Kim Jong Un declares that North Korea is  
22 in its final stage in preparation to test an  
23 intercontinental ballistic missile.

24 You see what they have done in that period of time. I  
25 have to almost conclude that the guy really means it when he

1 comes out with a statement.

2 But then going back to the bomb, in 2006, we had one,  
3 an explosion, that was 1 kiloton. In 2009, that was up to 2  
4 kilotons. In 2013, it went to a third nuclear test. It was  
5 an atomic bomb with an estimated explosion of 6.27 kilotons.

6 And then, finally, September 9, 2016, is the fifth and  
7 latest nuclear test. It registered 5.3 in magnitude, with  
8 an explosive yield estimated between 10 and 30 kilotons,  
9 which is about the same as it was in Hiroshima, in Nagasaki,  
10 and 10 times stronger than what North Korea was able to do  
11 10 years before.

12 So you have gone, over that period of time -- when we  
13 talk to the military, and we will have them in on Thursday,  
14 I understand, I know that they will say that the two big  
15 problems that distinguish the threat that comes from North  
16 Korea from other threats is that, first of all, you are  
17 talking about a mentally deranged guy who is making the  
18 decisions, and, secondly, this country has been more  
19 consistent in both developing its weapon and the delivery  
20 system. And you come to the conclusion that, as I have come  
21 to, that I believe that there is an argument that it can  
22 pose the greatest threat to the United States.

23 And I would like to get a response, if you would, Dr.  
24 Cha, to, first of all, are we accurate in terms of that  
25 technological development over that period of time? And

1 does that relate to the threat?

2 Dr. Cha: Thank you, Senator.

3 I think what you just described is entirely accurate in  
4 terms of a systematic plan by the North Koreans over the  
5 past decades to develop a capability that seeks to threaten  
6 the U.S. homeland. I think there is no doubt about it, that  
7 that is what they are after.

8 As I mentioned earlier, they have done 71 of these  
9 tests since 2009, which is a step increase from what we have  
10 seen in the past. They have done seven tests since the  
11 election of our current President. They have over 700 Scud  
12 missiles, 200 to 300 No-dong missiles. And the pace of  
13 their development and history of their development shows  
14 that they want to be able not to just field one missile that  
15 can potentially range the United States, but a whole slew of  
16 them.

17 So this is a very proximate threat. You are absolutely  
18 right, Senator.

19 Senator Inhofe: Any other comments on that?

20 Is it completely unreasonable that, as a result of  
21 this, we can consider North Korea as the greatest threat  
22 facing the United States?

23 Dr. Friedberg?

24 Dr. Friedberg: I think it certainly is the most  
25 imminent. I do not know that it is the greatest in terms of

1 its magnitude in the long run, as Dr. Tellis said. I think  
2 China presents a greater challenge. But, certainly, it is  
3 the most imminent.

4 One thing to add, just to make the picture even worse,  
5 it is conceivable that the North Korean leadership may  
6 believe not only as they acquire these capabilities that  
7 they are going to be able to extort more economic goods from  
8 the world, and not only that they are going to deter action  
9 against them, but that they might believe at some point they  
10 really had an option for reuniting the peninsula. They  
11 might believe that Japan would be deterred by the threat of  
12 attack on bases on its soil from allowing the United States  
13 to use it as their rear area to support operations on the  
14 peninsula. They might believe that the United States would  
15 be deterred from coming to the --

16 Senator Inhofe: My time has expired, but the military  
17 also says that it is the unpredictability that we have  
18 there. Everything else is pretty predictable. We all look  
19 back wistfully at the days, some do, anyway, I do, at the  
20 Cold War when things were predictable. We knew what they  
21 had. They knew what we had. Mutually assured destruction  
22 meant something. It does not mean anything anymore.

23 Unpredictability is what the military is going to tell  
24 us on Thursday is the major problem that they have with  
25 North Korea.

1 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

2 Chairman McCain: Senator Nelson?

3 Senator Nelson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

4 So given all of that discussion, and given that the  
5 neighboring problem, China, continues to be very aggressive,  
6 so you are advising us as policymakers, as people who pass  
7 appropriations bills, what to do, so what to do to deter  
8 North Korea and further Chinese aggressiveness?

9 Ms. Magsamen: So this gets back to a point earlier.  
10 We really need to double down on our regional ballistic  
11 missiles defense. THAAD on the peninsula was an important  
12 step, but there is more to be done. I think, for example,  
13 we can consider putting THAAD in Japan. I think there are  
14 additional deterrents, things we can also do with the  
15 Japanese and the Koreans together, whether it is more  
16 operational cooperation in the air and on the sea. We  
17 should consider a whole range of options, even including  
18 potentially strengthening our extended deterrence  
19 commitments to the Koreans by potentially rotating dual-  
20 capable aircraft to the peninsula, which would be a big  
21 move.

22 So there are additional things I think we can do on the  
23 deterrence side and the posture side that would be  
24 particularly relevant and applicable to the threat.

25 Senator Nelson: But you do not think that that would

1 deter the North Korean leader, do you, from continuing this  
2 development of nuclear weapons, missiles, and then marrying  
3 a nuclear weapon to a long-range ICBM?

4 Ms. Magsamen: No, Senator, I do not, but I do think it  
5 would help reassure our allies and also put us in a better  
6 position in the event diplomacy fails.

7 Senator Nelson: And do any of you have any reason to  
8 think that diplomacy would succeed with this North Korean  
9 leader?

10 Dr. Tellis: Even if it does not, we cannot do anything  
11 else without exhausting the alternatives offered by  
12 diplomacy, because dealing with North Korea, at the end of  
13 the day, will require a coalition effort, and we have to  
14 satisfy the expectations of our coalition partners that we  
15 have made every effort in the interim to deal with the  
16 challenge. So we have to think of it in terms of a  
17 multistep game.

18 As Dr. Cha highlighted, the immediate objective should  
19 be to get the North Korean regime back to the negotiation  
20 table. The ultimate objective must be to hope that there  
21 will be evolutionary change in the regime. But between  
22 those two bookends, we have to think seriously about what is  
23 required for deterrence, what is required for defense, and  
24 what is required for denial.

25 Senator Nelson: Anybody else?



1           Dr. Cha:  Senator, the only thing I would add to the  
2 list that Kelly enumerated is that I think those sorts of  
3 posture moves and strengthening of deterrence in defense,  
4 they are good for our allies.  They certainly increase the  
5 cost for China of allowing the situation to continue as it  
6 is and might make them more receptive to putting pressure on  
7 the regime.

8           In the end, the problem we have is that North Korea  
9 feels no pain for the direction they are going.  Their  
10 people are feeling pain, but they do not care about their  
11 people.  So the immediate tactical effort is to try to get  
12 the regime to feel the pain, and that requires China to stop  
13 subsidizing 85 percent of North Korea's external trade as  
14 well as some of their leadership funding.

15           So that is the proximate tactical goal to try to at  
16 least get some leverage on the issue, because, right now, we  
17 have none.

18           Senator Nelson:  Describe the aftermath if we saw that  
19 he was readying an ICBM that could reach the U.S., Alaska,  
20 Hawaii, and we decided to preemptively take out the assets  
21 that we knew where they were, which is more difficult  
22 because they are now moveable.  Describe the aftermath of  
23 what would happen.  And what would be their retaliation?

24           Dr. Friedberg:  Well, we do not know for sure, but I  
25 think the assumption for several decades has been that they

1 would begin with a massive artillery barrage against Seoul,  
2 which is within range across the demilitarized zone. The  
3 North Koreans have for years exercised and tested special  
4 operations forces, chemical and biological weapons.

5 The fear would be that they would unleash all of this.  
6 I do not know that they would, necessarily, because the next  
7 step would be the annihilation of the North Korean regime.  
8 But the fear is that that is their capability and they  
9 might.

10 Just a note on that, I am not a psychiatrist, so I  
11 would not want to judge the current leader's sanity or lack  
12 of sanity, but it does seem to me that North Korean leaders  
13 have been rational in their behavior. It sometimes appears  
14 odd, and it is very threatening, but is purposeful, and it  
15 has been consistent.

16 And I think for that reason, it is important also to  
17 remain focused on what it is that would probably deter them,  
18 which is the threat of personal annihilation. So the threat  
19 of we and our South Korean allies would, if we needed to,  
20 and could destroy the regime and destroy the leadership. I  
21 think that is a message that they understand.

22 Ms. Magsamen: Just to add to the question on the  
23 aftermath, we have 28,500 U.S. troops on the peninsula.  
24 That is just the troops. That is not their families. So  
25 there are thousands, hundreds of thousands of dependents, in

1 addition to the Koreans. Japan is within range, so I think  
2 Japan would take a hit, potentially.

3 There would be significant economic impact, frankly, to  
4 war on the peninsula, which I do not think anyone is talking  
5 about.

6 And the regional actors, like the Chinese, would move  
7 in. They would not sit on the sidelines and watch the  
8 United States try to rearrange the peninsula in their favor.  
9 They would certainly try to intervene at some point. That  
10 could also have catastrophic consequences.

11 So in terms of the aftermath of a U.S. strike, there  
12 are particularly high costs.

13 Dr. Tellis: If I may just add to that, obviously, the  
14 most confident thing we can say is that we do not know how  
15 the regime would respond. But I think it would depend on  
16 whether they saw the strike as a discrete effort made at  
17 resolving a specific problem or whether that is a leading  
18 edge of a larger effort at replacing the regime itself.

19 If it was seen as a discrete effort aimed at resolving  
20 a specific program, one can hope that their response would  
21 be more restrained. But if it is seen as the leading edge  
22 of an effort to replace the regime, then I think all hell  
23 breaks loose.

24 At this point, whichever the choices are, I agree with  
25 Ms. Magsamen completely, the Chinese cannot afford to sit on

1 the sidelines, because it undermines their core interests of  
2 preventing the rise of chaos on their frontiers and keeping  
3 the United States and its military forces as far away as  
4 possible from their borders.

5 Those two variables change dramatically if the United  
6 States engages in military action in the peninsula.

7 Dr. Cha: Senator, just to add to this very quickly,  
8 all I will say is that I think it is absolutely true that  
9 the North Korean dictator's number one goal is survival. If  
10 the United States were to carry out a strike, the North  
11 Koreans may feel like the only way to survive is to respond,  
12 retaliate, as my colleagues have suggested, what would  
13 follow from that.

14 The other way to think about it is that if they do not  
15 respond, that could also threaten the survival of the  
16 leadership and the regime.

17 And I am still looking for the intelligence analysts  
18 who can tell me which of these things the North Korean  
19 leader will do, because I have not been able to find one  
20 yet.

21 Chairman McCain: Senator Wicker?

22 Senator Wicker: But Senator Nelson described a  
23 situation in which our government is almost certain that a  
24 strike is imminent. And in that case, and I will start with  
25 Dr. Tellis, if our response was a discrete strike to prevent

1 that, might it not be worth it?

2 Dr. Tellis: First, I do not know the basis for the  
3 judgment that there is a danger that is imminent. But if we  
4 assume the premise of your question, it may be worth it if  
5 we can be assured two things. One, that the North Korean  
6 response will be limited and that the effects of our strikes  
7 will be permanent. That is, we will be able to cap the  
8 North Korean capability at some level and not go beyond.  
9 And, two, that the Chinese will actually intervene in ways  
10 to force the North Koreans to reach some sort of a  
11 diplomatic understanding.

12 And I am not confident that either of those two  
13 conditions would actually be obtained.

14 Senator Wicker: Rather than have all of you respond to  
15 that, I will take that answer.

16 Dr. Friedberg, you say the United States does not have  
17 a coherent integrated national strategy for the Asia-  
18 Pacific. Instead, all we have are the remnants of a 2-  
19 decades-old strategy. Yet, the Defense Department's 2012  
20 strategic guidance says we will, out of necessity, rebalance  
21 toward the Asia-Pacific region, and the QDR 2 years earlier  
22 said essentially the same thing.

23 Was rebalance to Asia-Pacific words only?

24 Dr. Friedberg: Well, with deference to my colleague  
25 who worked hard on making it happen, I do not think it was

1 words only, but the ratio of words to deeds I think was not  
2 what it should have been. We talked a lot. We did some  
3 things. We did not do nearly enough for a variety of  
4 reasons.

5 I think the previous administration was preoccupied, it  
6 became preoccupied with other problems in the Middle East,  
7 with Russia, continuing constraints on defense spending.

8 Senator Wicker: Some issues arose outside Asia-  
9 Pacific.

10 Dr. Friedberg: Yes.

11 Senator Wicker: To our surprise.

12 Dr. Friedberg: Yes. And this continuing budget  
13 constraint.

14 So I think, for a variety of reasons, not enough was  
15 done.

16 I agree that the general concept, the idea that we need  
17 to focus more of our resources on the Asia-Pacific, was the  
18 right one. Many of the things that the previous  
19 administration started I think were worthy. But for various  
20 reasons, they did not or were not able to follow through  
21 adequately.

22 Senator Wicker: Let me shift, then, back to North  
23 Korea. There has been mention of regime change. I would  
24 like any of you to comment about the scenario in which that  
25 might happen.

1           Also, Dr. Tellis mentioned evolutionary change within  
2 the regime. I suppose you could say at the end of the Cold  
3 War, there was certainly an evolutionary change in Moscow,  
4 which gave us hope for a little while.

5           But what do we know about the decision-making process  
6 within the regime in North Korea? And who has a good  
7 understanding, if not the United States, about the decision-  
8 making team surrounding Kim Jong Un?

9           And I will start with you, Dr. Friedberg.

10          Dr. Friedberg: I do not think our knowledge is very  
11 good. I think the assumption of most people is that the  
12 decision-making is concentrated very heavily in the hands of  
13 the current leader and maybe a small circle around of people  
14 around him.

15          As far as this evolutionary versus revolutionary, in  
16 the latter part of the Kim Jong Il regime, and I think at  
17 the very beginning of the Kim Jong Un regime, there were  
18 people who hoped that there might be a greater willingness  
19 to open up. The Chinese I think had some hopes that they  
20 might be able to persuade the North Korean leadership to  
21 follow a path more similar to their own, retaining tight  
22 political control, but opening up economically.

23          I think the Chinese may also have had some hopes that  
24 there were people around the new leader who they could  
25 influence. Many of those people have been executed by Kim

1 Jong Un, I think precisely because he feared that they were  
2 Chinese agents of influence.

3 So the prospects for evolutionary change seem grim, in  
4 part for the reason that Dr. Cha mentioned. I think this  
5 has been a mistaken assumption at times that people in the  
6 outside world have made, that if we offered the right kind  
7 of inducements to the regime, in particular if we offered  
8 economic inducements, the opportunity to join the world, to  
9 improve the livelihood of North Korean citizens, and so on,  
10 we could somehow influence their policies.

11 The problem is the leadership does not care about those  
12 things and does not value those things and sees openings as  
13 threatening.

14 So I do not see much prospect for evolutionary change  
15 of this particular leader.

16 Senator Wicker: Any other panelists have observations  
17 about the decision-making team?

18 Dr. Cha: I think right now it is almost wholly in the  
19 hands of this one individual. I think there were others in  
20 the past who were around him, but, as Aaron said, they have  
21 been systematically executed.

22 The level of purging inside the system is  
23 unprecedented, not just at the highest levels but also at  
24 the military army chief of staff, deputy chief of staff  
25 level. There has been unprecedented fluidity there as well.



1           So all of this suggests that there is significant churn  
2 inside the system and that the leadership is facing certain  
3 challenges, and he is dealing with them in one way, which is  
4 just to purge everybody.

5           The Chinese would have had the best insight into what  
6 is going on inside of North Korea, but I think that after  
7 the leader executed his uncle, the Chinese have lost really  
8 all windows into North Korea.

9           And I think it is a mistake. I mean, we often hear in  
10 the press about how the Chinese are upset with the North  
11 Koreans; that is why there are no high-level meetings. We  
12 actually did a study on this, looking at all Chinese-North  
13 Korean exchanges going back to Kim Il Sung and Mao. The  
14 difference today is that there are no exchanges, but it is  
15 because the North Koreans do not want to talk to the  
16 Chinese. They are not interested in talking to the Chinese,  
17 to the United States, or to anybody else. And that is what  
18 is so worrying about the current situation.

19           Chairman McCain: Senator Shaheen?

20           Senator Shaheen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

21           And thank you all very much for being here.

22           You have all pointed out that China does not want to  
23 see instability on the Korean Peninsula, that it is not in  
24 their interest.

25           And, Dr. Cha, you pointed out that China is not willing

1 to take action -- I think maybe everybody has made that  
2 point -- against North Korea. Do you then agree with Dr.  
3 Tellis that the more uncertain they are about the potential  
4 for President Trump and the United States to engage in war  
5 on the peninsula, the more likely they would be to weigh in  
6 and to try to help address the North Korean situation?

7 Dr. Cha: Yes, Senator. I mean, an argument could be  
8 made, I think, that in terms of what is a decades-old U.S.  
9 entreaties for China to do more, that there may be  
10 marginally more leverage today than there has been in the  
11 past, largely because I think the Chinese feel the situation  
12 is getting out of control, and I think they feel like they  
13 do not have any ability to manage either side, the United  
14 States or North Korea. And I think Xi Jinping wants a good  
15 relationship with the U.S. President, and this U.S.  
16 President does seem to signal at least some unpredictability  
17 when it comes to North Korea.

18 So in that sense, I think we might have marginally more  
19 leverage than in the past. But again, it is all tactical.  
20 It is not a strategy yet, where we are right now.

21 Senator Shaheen: I think I would probably feel better  
22 if I thought what we were doing right now was part of a  
23 strategy toward North Korea and Asia.

24 In that context, what does a mess-up like we had with  
25 the Carl Vinson carrier strike group do in terms of the

1 signals that we might be trying to be send to China and to  
2 our allies and to everybody in Asia about what our  
3 intentions are?

4 Ms. Magsamen?

5 Ms. Magsamen: I will say that was a pretty big screw-  
6 up. I also think it really undermined our credibility among  
7 our allies, the fact that you are seeing South Korean  
8 commentators and politicians commenting about that, about  
9 how it shows the United States is not reliable.

10 I think it is an unfortunate incident. I do not know  
11 how it happened and how it occurred. I would be curious to  
12 hear what Admiral Harris has to say about that on Thursday.  
13 But it had a serious effect.

14 And it was kind of, you know, in Texas, we have a  
15 saying, all hat, no cattle. So you do not want to show up  
16 with all hat and no cattle.

17 Senator Shaheen: Everybody I assume agrees with that?

18 Along those lines of how we can better send signals  
19 about what our intents are, what does it say to both our  
20 allies and our adversaries in Asia that right now we are not  
21 able to get a budget agreement here domestically, that we  
22 have divisions in Congress about how we are going to fund  
23 defense in the next year? What kind of messages does that  
24 send to those people for whom we want to project strength?

25 Dr. Friedberg, I think you mentioned that, when you

1 were talking about what our allies are looking at in the  
2 United States versus China.

3 Dr. Friedberg: Yes. Well, it does not help. On the  
4 other hand, it is not entirely new, so people have been  
5 watching us and the unfolding of our political process for a  
6 while.

7 I think there is an undercurrent of concern, which has  
8 been present for some time, about our reliability and our  
9 staying power and our capacity to mobilize the necessary  
10 resources to do the things that we have been talking about  
11 doing.

12 I do think that those concerns have grown since our  
13 election or during the course of our election campaign and  
14 since the election, because, at least in terms of rhetoric,  
15 the current administration, or candidate Trump before he  
16 became President, raised questions about all of the  
17 essential aspects of our global posture, our alliances, our  
18 commitment to free trade, our commitment to universal values  
19 and so on.

20 Now it may be in the long run that the policies that he  
21 follows will not deviate as much as the rhetoric seems to  
22 suggest. But all of that I think has added to the sense of  
23 anxiety about where the United States is going that many in  
24 the region feel.

25 And on the other hand, there is this growing concern

1 about China.

2 Senator Shaheen: Along the lines of escalated  
3 rhetoric, to what extent does that escalation of rhetoric  
4 against North Korea then produce a response in North Korea  
5 that not only heightens the situation but provides attention  
6 that Kim Jong Un may be interested in having from the world?

7 Dr. Friedberg: I think there is a window. There is  
8 only so much unpredictability that you can pull off. There  
9 is some leverage that may come from appearing to be willing  
10 to do things that perhaps seemed unlikely before.

11 That is I think one of the reasons why, in 2003, the  
12 Chinese did step in. It was right at the time of the run-up  
13 to the war in Iraq. We were still hurting from 9/11. There  
14 was a perception that the United States might do all kinds  
15 of things to reduce the threat.

16 And, similarly, now, because of the rhetoric and  
17 behavior of the new administration, I think there is a  
18 moment at which there is a lot of uncertainty. The Chinese  
19 are not sure. The North Koreans are not.

20 I suspect that has a half-life. It is going to  
21 diminish over time. I think that is what the Chinese are  
22 playing for, waiting to see. I am not sure that they really  
23 believe, at the end of the day, that for all of the tough  
24 talk, we are actually going to do something as risky as  
25 launch an attack on the North Koreans in the near term.

1           Whether the North Koreans believe that or not is  
2 another question.

3           Senator Shaheen: Thank you.

4           Chairman McCain: Senator Sullivan?

5           Senator Sullivan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

6           And I appreciate the panel's wise counsel on a lot of  
7 these very important issues. Let me talk about the issue I  
8 know a number of you brought up, about the importance of our  
9 allies in the region and globally, but particularly in this  
10 region.

11           Would you all agree that one of the most important  
12 strategic advantages that we have as a Nation is that we are  
13 an ally-rich country and that our adversaries or potential  
14 adversaries, whether it is China or Russia or North Korea or  
15 Iran, are ally-poor? Would you all agree with that?

16           Ms. Magsamen: Yes, absolutely. On the strategic  
17 balance sheet of assets and liabilities, our alliances are  
18 certainly on the asset column.

19           Senator Sullivan: And that the countries that do not  
20 have all the allies are consistently trying to undermine our  
21 alliances, whether it is China or Russia? Would you agree  
22 with that?

23           Let me ask a kind of broad-based question. A number of  
24 us try to get out to the region a lot. We go to the  
25 Shangri-La Dialogue on a regular basis. There is always

1 this discussion about how China has this great long-term  
2 strategic vision, and they have the ability to see around  
3 the corners of history, and we do not that capability.

4 But when you are in the region, it certainly seems that  
5 their aggressive actions in the South China Sea are actually  
6 driving countries away from them toward us. And this is not  
7 just our traditional allies, but it is countries like  
8 Vietnam, countries like India.

9 So I think initially, I certainly and I think some of  
10 our colleagues here had some concerns about whether the  
11 Trump administration fully understood this strategic  
12 advantage when you watched the campaign. But now that they  
13 are in office, whether it is General Mattis' first trip as  
14 SECDEF to the region or the Vice President's trip that he is  
15 finishing up here to the Asia-Pacific, it certainly seems  
16 like they are focused on it.

17 But are we doing enough? What more can we be doing to  
18 bolster this very, very important strategic advantage we  
19 have with regard to our deep network of allies, deepening  
20 it, expanding it, and making sure the Chinese do not try to  
21 fracture it? What more can we be doing?

22 I will open that up to anybody.

23 Dr. Tellis: I think we need to be doing at least two  
24 things to start.

25 First, we need to publicly commit to protecting the

1 regime that we have built in Asia over the last 60 years,  
2 that this regime is not open for negotiations, that the  
3 United States will not walk away.

4 Senator Sullivan: So we need to put out red lines.  
5 The Chinese put out red lines on Taiwan, on Tibet. But yet,  
6 we do not seem to put out our own strategic red lines in the  
7 region. So you are saying, with regard to our alliances, we  
8 should make that a strategic red line.

9 Dr. Tellis: Absolutely. The second thing we need to  
10 do is we need to think of our alliances in exactly the way  
11 you described, as assets, not liabilities.

12 The third thing that I would emphasize is that the U.S.  
13 needs to avoid appearing wobbly. To the degree that we  
14 create uncertainties about our commitments to the region, it  
15 only opens the door for the Chinese to do exactly what you  
16 described.

17 Senator Sullivan: Any other thoughts on allies, real  
18 quick before I turn to my next subject?

19 Ms. Magsamen: Certainly, consistency is key. Clarity  
20 of message from the United States is key. Bipartisanship on  
21 Asia policy is important.

22 Senator Sullivan: I think you have it, for the most  
23 part.

24 Ms. Magsamen: I think it is actually pretty good,  
25 initiatives like the maritime security initiative that this



1 committee initiated the last couple of years, those kinds of  
2 physical demonstrations of American commitment and interest  
3 in the region.

4 But also, really, the United States needs to present an  
5 actual vision and a strategy. And I think at the heart of  
6 that, our goal needs to be that we want to ensure that the  
7 region is able to make choices on the economic side and on  
8 the security side independent of coercion. That, for a lot  
9 of countries in the region, is the key.

10 Senator Sullivan: Dr. Cha, I will let you address this  
11 first.

12 But speaking of coercion and allies, the issue of  
13 China's actions in the South China Sea have been a concern  
14 of many of us on this committee. Secretary Carter put  
15 forward a good policy. We will fly, sail, operate anywhere  
16 international law allows. The problem was the execution, in  
17 my view, was weak. It was inconsistent. It undermined  
18 credibility.

19 This committee seemingly had to push, push, and push.  
20 When they actually did do their first FONOP, they seemed  
21 embarrassed about it. The Secretary of Defense was right  
22 here. He would not even admit it to the chairman.

23 So what do we need to do with regard to FONOPs? My  
24 view is they should be regular, so they are not newsworthy,  
25 and they should be done, as possible, in coordination with

1 our allies. And they not be done in terms of the way the  
2 Obama administration did them with regard to innocent  
3 passage. We are nothing asking for innocent passage. We do  
4 not recognize these built-up land masses.

5 So what should we be doing to make sure we do not fall  
6 in the trap -- good policy, bad execution, undermine our  
7 credibility, in my view. With the new administration, what  
8 should we be doing on our policy with regard to FONOPs?

9 Dr. Cha, we will start with you, sir.

10 Dr. Cha: Well, I think, Senator, you provided the  
11 solution right there, which is that we need to approach  
12 these things as standard, as nonpolitical, as not big  
13 statements of policy. We should just do them quietly and --

14 Senator Sullivan: We have been doing them for 70  
15 years, right?

16 Dr. Cha: -- on a consistent basis. Absolutely.

17 And if I could say, on your other question, I think I  
18 just finished writing a book on the history of the U.S.  
19 alliances in Asia. They are very unique, historical assets,  
20 as Dr. Friedberg said.

21 The only thing I would add to everything my colleagues  
22 mentioned is that we need to network better our alliances.  
23 These are largely bilateral hub and spokes, and we need to  
24 build a tire around that hub and spokes, whether it is in  
25 terms of missile defense or collective security statements.

1 Things of that nature would be great value added for our  
2 alliances.

3 Senator Sullivan: Great. Anyone else on the FONOPs?

4 I look forward to reading your book, by the way.

5 Dr. Cha: I will send you a copy.

6 Ms. Magsamen: So just quickly, on the FONOPs, I  
7 completely agree. They need to be more regular. If we make  
8 them more regular, then they become a little less piqued  
9 every time we do them. But they cannot be the measure of  
10 our strategy in the South China Sea.

11 Freedom of navigation and overflight are important to  
12 preserve, but it cannot be the entire strategy that we have.  
13 So we need to think about the long game. That goes back to  
14 the maritime security capacity-building initiatives that we  
15 have.

16 It also means we need a real regional diplomatic  
17 strategy on the South China Sea, so that the Arbitral  
18 Tribunal ruling actually has effect. That is where we  
19 actually missed a huge opportunity last year was with the  
20 ruling and not really pursuing a real diplomatic effort at  
21 the regional level. We kind backed off from it, tried to  
22 calm the waters, which was important at the time. But we  
23 never really followed through with an actual diplomatic  
24 game.

25 Dr. Tellis: I think we need to do three other things.

1           The first is, we need to conduct FONOP operations at  
2           the discretion of the PACOM commander. I do not think they  
3           should be centrally controlled from Washington. That gets  
4           you to where you want, which is regular, unpublicized, so on  
5           and so forth.

6           The second is we need to stay away from innocent  
7           passage, because the moment you talk about innocent passage,  
8           you are actually reaffirming a particular Chinese view of  
9           its rights under UNCLOS, which we have never accepted and  
10          which the Western world, in terms of the freedom of the  
11          seas, has never accepted. So we need to stay away from that  
12          like the plague.

13          And the third is, as part of the strategy, we need to  
14          provide tangible reassurance to our partners, which means  
15          actually building up their capacity to stand up to coercion,  
16          which might mean enhanced training, which might mean  
17          providing them with weapons required, and ultimately backing  
18          it up with a constant U.S. naval presence in the area. Now,  
19          it does not have to be every day, but it has to be regular  
20          enough that the regional states begin to feel comfortable  
21          that the U.S. is at least always around the corner.

22          Senator Sullivan: Great. Thank you.

23          Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

24          Senator Reed: [Presiding.] On behalf of Chairman  
25          McCain, Senator Hirono.

1           Senator Hirono: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

2           I would like to focus on our chairman's focus on this  
3 part of the world. He has proposed a budget, an  
4 appropriation amount. So this has to do with APSI. So \$7.5  
5 billion of new military funding for U.S. forces.

6           Perhaps this is a question for Ms. Magsamen and  
7 possibly one for Dr. Cha.

8           So U.S. forces and their allies in the Asia-Pacific,  
9 and these funds could be used, as the chairman noted in his  
10 opening, to boost operational military construction,  
11 increase munition procurement, enhance capacity-building  
12 with allies and partners, and expand military exercises and  
13 other training activities to help combat the movement toward  
14 basically Chinese influence throughout the Asia-Pacific  
15 region.

16           So, Ms. Magsamen, how can this fund, this money and  
17 this initiative, impact the U.S. role in the region? How  
18 can we incorporate this initiative into a larger, more  
19 holistic Asia strategy that includes maintaining regional  
20 stability and improving diplomatic ties?

21           Ms. Magsamen: Certainly. I am supportive of the  
22 initiative in part because we need to stem the bleeding. We  
23 are woefully behind in terms of what we need to be doing in  
24 the Pacific in terms of our presence and our capabilities,  
25 our ability to fill critical munition gaps, prepare runways

1 that are going to be necessary in the event of a conflict.  
2 I mean, it is stuff like that. This initiative I actually  
3 think is hugely valuable and fills a very important  
4 budgetary gap for the Pacific. So I would be supportive of  
5 it.

6 But I think it goes back to the larger point of the  
7 United States needs to be seen strategically as investing in  
8 this part of the world. There is signaling value. Beyond  
9 just the regular value, the actual value of the initiative,  
10 there is signaling value to the initiative as well, in terms  
11 of our commitment to peace and security in the region, and  
12 our willingness to make the actual investments to make that  
13 possible.

14 I think the region would perceive it very well. I  
15 think our allies, if we were able to use that kind of  
16 funding to do more work, to network the allies and partners,  
17 as Victor was suggesting, in this principled security  
18 network, is what we called it in the Obama administration.  
19 But the reality is we need more funding. We need more  
20 presence and capability.

21 Dr. Cha: Senator?

22 Senator Hirono: Dr. Cha, you are a Korea expert. How  
23 important is it to utilize a whole-of-government approach to  
24 maintaining stability in the region, recognizing full well  
25 that we do not have very much information about what goes on

1 in Kim Jong Un's mind, and it is hard enough, it is  
2 challenging enough regarding our complicated relationship  
3 with China.

4 So in terms of stability in this part of the world,  
5 would you also support this initiative, by the way, APSI,  
6 and how we can do a more whole-of-government approach?

7 Dr. Cha: I think those two questions are completely  
8 connected to each other in the sense that our effectiveness  
9 in being able to get China to do more, or to signal to North  
10 Korea the credibility of our deterrence, or any of our  
11 policies, greatly depends on whether the region sees us as  
12 committing to it and having staying power.

13 As Aaron mentioned in his testimony, there is a grand  
14 game taking place in Asia today where the Chinese are trying  
15 to erode U.S. credibility, reliability, and resiliency in  
16 the region, and replacing it with the fact that they are  
17 there, they are big, and they have a lot of money in their  
18 pocket.

19 Senator Hirono: They really do engage in a whole-of-  
20 government approach in this area.

21 Dr. Cha: Yes. So there could not be a single, more  
22 important signal of U.S. staying power in the region than  
23 something like APSI that is investing in the things that  
24 constitute the U.S. security presence in Asia.

25 I think that will then redound positively in terms of

1 the credibility of our North Korean policy, the credibility  
2 of what we say to China.

3 Senator Hirono: Would all of you agree that maybe our  
4 staying power is really continuing to show up? So I think  
5 it was important for Secretary Mattis to visit Japan and  
6 South Korea as his first official secretarial duties. But  
7 the continual emphasis and showing up part of the message  
8 that we have a commitment to this part of the world is an  
9 important aspect, as well as the practical parts about  
10 funding and resources? Would you agree, all of you?

11 Ms. Magsamen, you mentioned the Carl Vinson issue, that  
12 that was a big screw-up. So how is the United States viewed  
13 right now in this part of the world? You can respond as  
14 well as the other panelists, very briefly.

15 Ms. Magsamen: Well, I would not say the Vinson issue  
16 should be determinative of how we are viewed in the region.  
17 But our credibility is our currency. So the minute you  
18 undertake actions that undermine credibility, that has a  
19 profound effect in the region in terms of how we are  
20 perceived.

21 The Vinson was just one incident. I am sure there are  
22 very good reasons for why it happened. But the reality is  
23 it created a perception of lack of credibility.

24 Senator Hirono: So if we have a range -- I hope you do  
25 not mind, Mr. Chairman -- a range that we are viewed



1 credibly of 1-5, 5 being we are viewed credibly, where would  
2 you put the U.S. for how that part of the world views us,  
3 including the Philippines, South Korea, Japan, Australia?  
4 Where would we fall in terms of our credibility, 1-5, 5  
5 being the highest credibility?

6 Ms. Magsamen: I think that is a question for them.

7 Senator Hirono: Well, give me a number.

8 Ms. Magsamen: I think the United States has been a  
9 credible power in the Pacific. The question now is, can we  
10 continue to be one?

11 Senator Hirono: Anyone want to weigh in very briefly?  
12 Just give me a number.

13 Dr. Cha: I would say that we were probably below 3.  
14 But then we have seen a series of trips by the  
15 administration with Secretaries Mattis and Tillerson, the  
16 Vice President. I think that helped to send a very positive  
17 signal to the region, taking us over that threshold.

18 Senator Hirono: All right. Thank you.

19 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

20 Chairman McCain: [Presiding.] Senator Cruz?

21 Senator Cruz: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

22 Thank you to each of the witnesses for being here. I  
23 think the importance of the Asia-Pacific region has been  
24 well-highlighted by this testimony and also by the well-  
25 justified public focus on the threat of North Korea.

1 I want to start by focusing on North Korea specifically  
2 and ask the panel to assess the following hypothetical,  
3 which is, if tensions were to escalate to the point of a  
4 targeted military strike against North Korea's nuclear  
5 facilities, how would the witnesses assess the probabilities  
6 of four potential outcomes: one, a retaliatory strike with  
7 North Korean nuclear weapons; two, a retaliatory strike with  
8 North Korean conventional weapons; three, the attack  
9 precipitating a collapse of the North Korean regime; and,  
10 four, the attack precipitating direct Chinese military  
11 intervention?

12 I would ask it to any of the witnesses on the panel.

13 Dr. Friedberg: I think it would depend I guess in part  
14 on exactly the character of the strike. We had talked a  
15 little bit about that earlier, whether the regime would  
16 perceive it as something that was intended to be surgical or  
17 as the forerunner for an attempt to overthrow it.  
18 Obviously, the more the regime worries that the United  
19 States and South Koreans are coming to get them, the more  
20 likely it is that they will let loose and --

21 Senator Cruz: Let's assume the strike was targeted at  
22 taking out nuclear facilities.

23 Dr. Friedberg: I do not think the prospect in the near  
24 term of collapse would be very great because there would not  
25 be anything directly that had been done to weaken the

1 regime. I would think the likelihood of conventional  
2 response would be very high. I would put the likelihood of  
3 a nuclear response somewhat lower, because then all bets  
4 would be off.

5 As far as Chinese intervention, I would think that that  
6 would be unlikely unless and until the Chinese leadership  
7 believed that the regime was about to collapse and North  
8 Korea was about to fragment, and South Korea and the United  
9 States were moving forces toward their border. I do not  
10 think they would do it unless those conditions had been met.

11 Dr. Cha: Senator, I used to think that the response  
12 would be conventional, that they have 10,000 artillery  
13 pieces, that they would use those.

14 But these days, looking at the character of North  
15 Korean missile testing, my guess is that the response would  
16 actually be on Japan to try to split the U.S.-Korea alliance  
17 from the U.S.-Japan alliance, because at least the character  
18 of their testing recently has been focused on demonstrating  
19 an ability to target with ballistic missiles all U.S. bases  
20 in Japan, flying missiles within 200 kilometers of the  
21 Japanese shoreline.

22 So that is what I think they would do. I am not clear  
23 if the attack itself, as you describe it, would be able to  
24 eliminate all of their nuclear facilities, because I do not  
25 think we know where they all are.

1 Ms. Magsamen: I would agree with Victor. I think they  
2 would definitely go after Japan.

3 I disagree a little bit about Aaron on the Chinese  
4 intervention point. I actually do think the Chinese could  
5 potentially try to intervene just to preserve stability on  
6 their flank. What that looks like and how that  
7 materializes, I do not know. But I do not think that the  
8 Chinese would sit back, even if it was a targeted strike.

9 Now the thing that would change that might be whether  
10 or not, in advance, we could get the Chinese to hold back.  
11 But I still have extreme doubts that they would do that.

12 Dr. Tellis: I suspect the likelihood of a nuclear  
13 retaliatory response is relatively low, because we would  
14 still have the capacity to have escalation dominance in that  
15 scenario.

16 I think a conventional retaliation is inevitable. It  
17 would be aimed both at South Korea and Japan in order to  
18 communicate the credibility of the North Korean leadership  
19 and its determination to protect its survival as well as to  
20 split the alliance.

21 The key question about China really hinges on whether  
22 the Chinese see the targeted attack as really being the  
23 first phase of air-ground action to follow. If they  
24 perceive air-ground action to follow, then it is almost  
25 certain that they would intervene to try and prevent this

1 from escalating further.

2 Senator Cruz: In your assessment, short of military  
3 action, how much positive impact could China have in reining  
4 in North Korean hostilities? And what would it take for  
5 China to exercise its influence and end power?

6 Dr. Cha: Well, I think we are talking about China  
7 going someplace it has never been before. Unfortunately, I  
8 think the only way that is going to happen is if they think  
9 that the United States is going to go someplace it has never  
10 been before.

11 I think, based on my experience as a negotiator on this  
12 issue in previous administrations, I feel that the only time  
13 China ever responds is not in response to anything North  
14 Korea does because they just assume that is a constant. It  
15 is the variation in U.S. behavior is what they take notice  
16 of, and what I think the current administration is trying to  
17 leverage right now.

18 Senator Cruz: So what U.S. behavior do you see as  
19 maximizing China's beneficial influence on North Korea?

20 Dr. Cha: I think the United States right now is trying  
21 to signal a combination of muscularity, unpredictability,  
22 and decisiveness all at the same time, largely because they  
23 feel like the past administration was 8 years of  
24 predictability and indecisiveness. And that is a hard thing  
25 to manage. I think it is hard to manage all those things,

1 because they are conflicting signals. But they seem to be  
2 trying to walk that line right now.

3 Dr. Friedberg: If you ask what would be the outer  
4 limit of what China could do, assuming that it was willing  
5 to do almost anything, it could bring the North Korean  
6 economy to its knees. It is pretty close to that already.  
7 It could cut off the flows of funds that go across the  
8 border into North Korea partly from the so-called illicit  
9 activities North Koreans engage in. It could interdict  
10 components that flow into North Korea through China that  
11 support the special weapons programs. It could do a lot.

12 Now the question is what might induce them to do that.  
13 It seems there are a number of possibilities. One is the  
14 prospect that the United States was, as Victor suggests,  
15 going to do something really drastic that could have  
16 catastrophic consequences. They would have to believe that.  
17 I do not think at this point they do.

18 Another possibility would be somehow to persuade them  
19 that the entire relationship with the United States was on  
20 the line, including, in particular, the economic  
21 relationship, and we were willing to do things that imposed  
22 costs and pain on China that would be so great that it would  
23 be a danger to the Chinese regime, and, therefore, they  
24 might do something that we would want them to do to pressure  
25 North Korea.

1 I do not think we are willing to do that, but it is  
2 theoretically possible.

3 Senator Cruz: Thank you very much.

4 Chairman McCain: Senator Peters?

5 Senator Peters: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

6 Thank you to our panelists for a very interesting  
7 discussion here.

8 Actually, I want to pick up on the comment about the  
9 economic relations between these two countries. It seems to  
10 me, between us and China, that this is a new paradigm when  
11 it comes to international relations, in that we are dealing  
12 with a country that we actually have very close economic  
13 relations with, and it is not a situation where you can  
14 impose sanctions on China and not have some of that blow  
15 back on the United States. We are not talking about unequal  
16 partners here in the equation.

17 When you think about the conflict with the Soviet Union  
18 back in those days, we had a closed economy, not really tied  
19 to the U.S. That was a completely different dynamic.

20 I think some of the thinking, and I heard about a  
21 change in strategy from each of the panelists, that in the  
22 past, we thought about engaging in trade and engagement,  
23 that would actually liberalize the Chinese culture or the  
24 society. That has not been the case. That theory did not  
25 play out.

1           Also the theory is, if you are more engaged in trade  
2 and more engaged in engagement, you are less likely to have  
3 an armed conflict. Is that theory not going to play out in  
4 China as well?

5           Maybe if the panelists could talk a little bit about  
6 how we have this mutual dependence between China and the  
7 United States, and how that limits some of the tools that we  
8 have in order to engage with the Chinese with some of these  
9 behaviors that are becoming quite troublesome to our  
10 national security?

11          Dr. Friedberg: I think you are right that it is a new  
12 paradigm but it is not unique historically. In fact, what  
13 is usual was the situation that prevailed during the Cold  
14 War where we engaged with strategic competition with the  
15 Soviet Union but traded very little with them.

16          Historically, it has been more typical for countries to  
17 have both economic relations and strategic interactions, and  
18 it has not always prevented war. Before the First World  
19 War, Britain and Germany were one another's leading or close  
20 to leading trading and investment partners. But in the end,  
21 geopolitics overwhelmed economics.

22          The other thing I would say is that the economic  
23 relationship between the United States and China is not  
24 entirely equal. In certain respects, it appears that China  
25 has been getting the better side of that deal. The Chinese



1 have also been exploiting the relationship to promote not  
2 only the growth of their economy but the development of  
3 their military capabilities.

4 The last thing I would say is that I think, in the long  
5 run, the Chinese hope to diminish their dependence on  
6 economic interaction with the United States so as to  
7 increase their strategic independence. They cannot entirely  
8 eliminate it, but I think they believe they passed through a  
9 period when, in fact, they were so dependent on American  
10 capital and American markets that they were constrained  
11 strategically. They would like to move away from that in  
12 the long run.

13 Ms. Magsamen: I would just add a couple points.

14 I think it would be a mistake to set the bilateral  
15 relationship with China above our interests. We cannot make  
16 the preservation of that relationship our objective. So  
17 that is the first point, which I think it has created  
18 complications for American policy on China for quite some  
19 time now.

20 The second thing I would say is that we should avoid  
21 issue linkage in the relationship. I think that is very  
22 dangerous. For example, getting the Chinese to put pressure  
23 on North Korea, therefore, we back off on the South China  
24 Sea or pick another issue like Taiwan. That would be a  
25 tremendous mistake, because the region is watching that and

1 they are looking for signs the Americans are going to  
2 sacrifice their interests.

3 So in the context of the broader relationship, I think  
4 your point is right. It is a big relationship that has a  
5 lot elements of competition and cooperation. But we have to  
6 be clear-eyed about what our actual interests are in the  
7 context of that.

8 Dr. Tellis: Let me just add one other point to that.

9 Security competition is complicated in the context of  
10 economic interdependence. There is no getting away from  
11 that. The fact is the balance of risks that North Korea  
12 poses to the United States and China are different. The  
13 risks to the United States as a result of North Korean  
14 behavior are far greater.

15 Where the balance of interests are concerned, they are  
16 parallel. China has an interest in avoiding an explosion on  
17 the peninsula. The United States has a comparable interest.

18 So because the balance of risks are greater for us, I  
19 think it really behooves China to do whatever they can to  
20 push the North Koreans at least in the near term to the  
21 negotiating table, and then give diplomacy a chance to  
22 figure out what can be put in place to at least buy some  
23 time until we can get our hands around more permanent sorts  
24 of solutions.

25 Dr. Cha: Senator, the only thing I would add to these

1 very good comments is that you mentioned in your question  
2 the role that potentially greater economic independence  
3 could have in mollifying state policies in the region. I  
4 think while many of us teach those theories in the  
5 classroom, what has been very clear in Asia is that China's  
6 growing economic interaction in the region has not had a  
7 mollifying impact on their foreign policy. It has actually  
8 made them leverage economic tools to their benefit in very  
9 draconian ways. Whether it is economic sanctions against  
10 South Korea over THAAD or it is tropical fruits from the  
11 Philippines or it is rare earth minerals to Japan, there is  
12 a very clear pattern of how China uses economic leverage,  
13 uses economic interdependence in ways that one would not  
14 consider very productive for overall peace and security in  
15 the region.

16 Senator Peters: Thank you very much.

17 Chairman McCain: Senator Graham?

18 Senator Graham: Dr. Cha, if nothing changes, is it  
19 just a matter of time until North Korea has an ICBM that can  
20 hit America with a nuclear weapon on top?

21 Dr. Cha: Yes, sir, I think that is true. It is just a  
22 matter of time, if nothing changes.

23 Senator Graham: Why do they want to achieve that goal?

24 Dr. Cha: I think there are a couple of reasons. One  
25 is a desire for their own domestic narrative. This current

1 leader has none of the mythology of his father or  
2 grandfather, so he needs some big thing that he can point to  
3 because he does not have the economy or anything else to  
4 point to.

5 The other is that it is part of a military strategy to  
6 be able to deter the United States from flowing forces and  
7 aiding allies in the region.

8 Senator Graham: Do all of you agree with that  
9 assessment?

10 Let the record reflect a positive response.

11 So in many ways, the Korean War is not over for North  
12 Korea in their own minds? Is that fair to say?

13 Dr. Cha: I think that is right, sir.

14 Senator Graham: I mean, they literally believe that we  
15 are going to come in on any given day and take their country  
16 away from them? Is that fair to say?

17 Dr. Cha: I certainly think that is the justification  
18 to their own audience of what they are pursuing, yes.

19 Senator Graham: How would you say the regime treats  
20 its own people on a scale of 1-10, 10 being very bad?

21 Dr. Cha: One hundred. I think it is about the worst  
22 human rights violator in the world today.

23 Senator Graham: So here is the dilemma for the United  
24 States. We have the worst human rights violator in the  
25 world about to acquire a missile to hit the American

1 homeland. Do you trust North Korea not to use it one day?

2 Dr. Cha: I think there is always hope that deterrence  
3 works, as it had worked during the Cold War. But that  
4 assumes rationality on the part of all actors, and we cannot  
5 assume that in North Korea's case.

6 Senator Graham: In terms of threats to the United  
7 States coming from Asia, what would be greater than North  
8 Korea with a missile and a nuclear weapon that could hit the  
9 homeland?

10 Dr. Cha: I cannot think of a more proximate threat to  
11 our security, at this point.

12 Senator Graham: Do you believe that if the North  
13 Koreans believe that military force is not an option to stop  
14 their missile program, they will most certainly move  
15 forward?

16 Dr. Cha: I will be happy to give my colleagues a  
17 chance to answer, but I think that --

18 Senator Graham: Dr. Tellis, is that true?

19 Dr. Tellis: I believe that is true, sir.

20 Senator Graham: Everybody believe that?

21 I believe that is true too, because if I were them, why  
22 would you? Because if you get there, you have an insurance  
23 policy, I guess, for regime survivability.

24 All of you agree that China has the most leverage of  
25 anybody in the world regarding North Korea. Is that a fair

1 statement?

2 Is it fair to say they have not fully utilized that  
3 leverage up to this point?

4 Do you believe that if China believed we would use  
5 military force to stop their missile program from maturing,  
6 they may use more leverage?

7 Affirmative answer.

8 What do you believe North Korea's view of the Trump  
9 administration and China's view of the Trump administration  
10 is regarding the use of force? Is it too early to tell?  
11 What are your initial impressions?

12 Dr. Friedberg: I think it is too early to tell.

13 From the point of view of China, this is part of a  
14 larger set of questions that they pose for themselves about  
15 which direction the new administration is going to go. They  
16 have, I think, two views of it.

17 One is it is a reckless administration that is bound to  
18 get into conflict, and even conflict with themselves. On  
19 the other hand, there are those, and I think this is now a  
20 prevalent view, who believe that the President of the United  
21 States is a dealmaker, he is interested in business, and it  
22 is possible to get along with him. But they have to get  
23 there, and they are concerned and uncertain.

24 Dr. Cha: I would also add that I think, I hope, that  
25 the Chinese also understand that the structure of the

1 situation is very different now. North Korea, as you said,  
2 Senator, is now approaching a capability that compels the  
3 United States to make choices it has never had to make  
4 before, and that whether it is President Trump or anybody  
5 else who is President, they would all be forced into a  
6 situation today when they are making choices they never had  
7 to make before because there is a homeland security threat.

8 My hope is that the Chinese understand that the  
9 structure of the situation is very different regardless of  
10 who is President.

11 Senator Graham: Do you believe that North Korea's  
12 missile technology, if not changed, will mature by the time  
13 of 2020? They will have a missile, if nothing changes?

14 Affirmative response.

15 All right, so we are all going to the White House  
16 tomorrow night to be briefed. No good choices when it comes  
17 to North Korea. Do you all agree with that? Would you  
18 agree that if there was a war between North Korea and the  
19 United States, we would win? Do you think North Korea  
20 understands that?

21 Dr. Tellis: We would win ultimately, but it would be  
22 extremely costly in the near term.

23 Senator Graham: More costly to them than us?

24 Dr. Tellis: Not where regime survival is concerned,  
25 obviously. More costly for them where regime survival is

1 concerned, yes.

2 Senator Graham: So I will end with this thought. No  
3 good choices left, but if there is a war today, it is over  
4 there. In the future if there is a war and they get a  
5 missile, it comes here.

6 Thank you for your time.

7 Dr. Tellis: May I add one other thought, Senator?

8 Senator Graham: Absolutely.

9 Dr. Tellis: We ought not to forget the prospects of  
10 further North Korean outward proliferation beyond just  
11 issues of --

12 Senator Graham: I did not even get there because that  
13 bothers me as much as the missile, because they could give  
14 it to somebody to use it in a different way.

15 So on that cheery note, we will end.

16 Chairman McCain: Senator Blumenthal?

17 Senator Blumenthal: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

18 I would like to thank all of you for being here today  
19 and for your very helpful and informative testimony.

20 Right now, we have a nuclear submarine at South Korea.

21 Dr. Friedberg, how persuasive to the North Koreans are  
22 that kind of gesture or show of force, for lack of a better  
23 term, along with the Carl Vinson being in the area? Do they  
24 matter? Are they simply more provocative because it  
25 provides a larger platform and more visible show on their



1 part?

2 Dr. Friedberg: I think the North Koreans have shown a  
3 great deal of sensitivity to our military activity in  
4 conjunction with the South Koreans around the peninsula.  
5 They get very upset with military exercises and so on.

6 So they are paying close attention, and they notice  
7 what we do. The question is, how do they interpret that,  
8 and does it cause them to change their behavior? I think in  
9 the short term, probably these gestures have caused them to  
10 pull back a little bit. Maybe they would have gone ahead  
11 with the test a week ago if not for all the talk of U.S.  
12 forces flowing into the region.

13 But in the long run, I am not so sure that they  
14 actually believe that we are going to use those  
15 capabilities.

16 Ms. Magsamen: I think they do have an effect on the  
17 North Koreans, certainly. This morning, you saw that they  
18 had a big artillery exercise, live artillery exercise. So  
19 they are reactive to some of what we do.

20 I do think, though, that the accumulation of it over  
21 time can have kind of a numbing effect, frankly, on the  
22 dynamics.

23 So they do react. It does get their attention. But  
24 they have also gotten a little bit used to some of these  
25 moves.

1           Senator Blumenthal: Dr. Friedberg, you made the point  
2           that the Chinese have played us, I think, to paraphrase what  
3           you said before, to quote you, for at least the last 15  
4           years. Is there any prospect of these military exercises  
5           changing China's view?

6           Dr. Friedberg: I think if the Chinese became  
7           persuaded, convinced that we actually were on the verge of  
8           initiating military action against North Korea, then they  
9           might behave differently. They might apply greater economic  
10          pressure, for example, to North Korea.

11          But I do not think they are convinced of that. They  
12          are uncertain.

13          Ms. Magsamen: I also think that if it is perceived  
14          that we are making a big bluff, that has really serious  
15          credibility impacts for our strategy.

16          Senator Blumenthal: Sending our fleet to exercises  
17          with Australia rather than to the area where we said they  
18          were going might undermine our credibility, correct?

19          Ms. Magsamen: It was not a shining moment, Senator.

20          Dr. Friedberg: Could I say, there is another aspect to  
21          this? And Dr. Cha would be an expert on this.

22          But that is how our actions are perceived in South  
23          Korea and the extent to which people there become fearful  
24          that, in fact, we might do things that would cause a war  
25          that would produce great suffering in South Korea.

1           We have to be very careful that we are communicating  
2           our intentions, and the people in the South Korea, the  
3           leadership but also the public, perceive that accurately.  
4           Otherwise, we are going to do damage to our long-term  
5           relationship with one of our most important allies.

6           Senator Blumenthal: Dr. Cha?

7           Dr. Cha: Yes, I agree with that. I think for many in  
8           South Korea, it is sort of a dual-edged sword. On the one  
9           hand, they would like to see a stronger U.S. posture with  
10          regard to the North Korean threat, but then they do not want  
11          too strong a posture, because then it looks like you are  
12          preparing for something else and not just deterrence.

13          I would agree with what Kelly said as well. I think,  
14          whether it is a submarine or the Vinson strike group, these  
15          things either as part of or related to the two sets of  
16          exercises, the major exercises the United States does with  
17          the ROK in the region, are good. They show must  
18          muscularity. But they do sort of have a numbing effect, and  
19          then you are compelled to think of other things that would  
20          sort of negate that or create more of a sense that there is  
21          more than just posturing here.

22          One of the things that I have heard talked about is  
23          flowing more forces to the peninsula. But as I said, that  
24          could be a dual-edged sword. It could be seen as  
25          strengthening deterrence. It could also be seen as

1 preparing for something else.

2 So there are a lot of very difficult angles to the  
3 problem that I think the current administration must deal  
4 with.

5 Senator Blumenthal: Behind all of it, there is the  
6 danger of miscalculation, which is perhaps most frightening,  
7 because it means that any kind of military conflict would  
8 not be on the terms that wanted, not consistent with the  
9 plan that we may prepare. It is precipitous and unexpected,  
10 and, therefore, even more dangerous than military conflict  
11 would be otherwise.

12 Dr. Cha: I entirely agree with that.

13 Senator Blumenthal: Thank you.

14 Senator Reed: [Presiding.] On behalf of Chairman  
15 McCain, Senator Warren, please.

16 Senator Warren: Thank you.

17 And thank you all for being here and for this detailed  
18 and very helpful hearing. I just want to probe a couple  
19 other points in a little more detail, if I can.

20 Dr. Tellis, the U.S.-India relationship has evolved  
21 over the past decade from one of distance to a close  
22 strategic partnership. In just the past few years alone,  
23 the Department of Defense has named India a major defense  
24 partner and established the Defense Technology Trade  
25 Initiative.

1           But India famously values its nonalignment in foreign  
2 policy, and it has a longstanding relationship with Russia.  
3 Even today, Russia is India's primary arms supplier.  
4 Whereas the United States emphasizes restrictions on the use  
5 of force, Russian arms come with very few strings attached.

6           Dr. Tellis, some have recently suggested that India is  
7 playing the United States and Russia against each other for  
8 its own benefit. Do you think that is true? Do you believe  
9 that this is something the United States should be concerned  
10 about?

11           Dr. Tellis: I think India will always have a  
12 relationship with Russia independent of the United States  
13 for a very simple reason, that the Russians have been far  
14 more willing to provide India with strategic capabilities  
15 and strategic technologies of the kind that we would not,  
16 either for reasons of policy or law.

17           But our objective with India has been more subtle than  
18 I think has been expressed often in the public commentary.  
19 The U.S. has approached India with a view to building its  
20 own capabilities, rather than seeking to forge an alliance.  
21 The reason we have done that is because we believe a strong  
22 India aids in the preservation of a balance of power in Asia  
23 that serves our interests.

24           So our calculation has been that, if India can stand on  
25 its own feet and if India can help balance China

1 independently, then that is a good thing for us irrespective  
2 of what they do with us bilaterally. I think that policy is  
3 a sensible and we ought to pursue it.

4 Let me say one other thing about Russia. The Indians  
5 have come around to the recognition that Russia today no  
6 longer has the kind of cutting-edge capabilities that it did  
7 during the days of the Soviet Union, and, too, that the  
8 Russians are not particularly reliable with respect to  
9 providing advanced conventional technologies of the kind  
10 that the U.S. has.

11 So while they want to keep the relationship with Russia  
12 in good repair, because they have a substantial military  
13 capital stock from Russia, they want to diversify. And the  
14 United States is number one in the diversification plan.

15 Senator Warren: That is very helpful. I very much  
16 appreciate your perspective on this.

17 India is the largest democracy in the world and an  
18 important partner for us in the region. I think it is  
19 incredibly important to continue to grow the relationship in  
20 the years to come. Thank you.

21 I have one other question, if I can, and that is, Ms.  
22 Magsamen, earlier, you mentioned the missile defense when we  
23 were talking about Korea.

24 THAAD is clearly a critical part of our layered missile  
25 defenses. But what are the additional military measures

1 specifically that we should be taking with our allies in  
2 South Korea and Japan in order to deal with the North Korean  
3 threat?

4 Ms. Magsamen: Actually, I think the most important  
5 thing we can do is encourage trilateral cooperation,  
6 especially in the maritime space and the regional missile  
7 defense space.

8 We have been doing some of that over the last year. We  
9 have made a lot of progress. Of course, South Korea and  
10 Japan still have historic concerns with each other that have  
11 inhibited a lot of progress. I think that is changing,  
12 though.

13 I think the more the United States can get South Korea  
14 and Japan operating together, getting our systems talking to  
15 each other, it is only going to improve our ability to  
16 defend ourselves. So I think that is the most important  
17 thing that we can be doing right now.

18 You saw the Carl Vinson is doing exercises with the  
19 Japanese. They are getting ready to hand off to the Koreans  
20 I think today. There is sequencing there that is important.  
21 But we need to move past just a sequenced set of  
22 cooperation, and we need to actually be doing more together  
23 on the water, in particular.

24 Senator Warren: That is very helpful.

25 I have a few seconds left. Would anyone like to add to

1 that? Dr. Friedberg? Dr. Cha?

2 Dr. Cha: The only thing I would add is I think we need  
3 another THAAD battery on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea  
4 can angle their missiles in a certain way they can avoid one  
5 battery, so I think we need more than one.

6 Senator Warren: I see lots of nodding heads. I take  
7 it that is a consensus position. All right, that is very  
8 helpful.

9 I think we need to signal to our allies that our  
10 commitment is firm, that it is unshakeable, and that we are  
11 going to pursue appropriate ways to demonstrate that.

12 Thank you.

13 Senator Reed: On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator  
14 Kaine?

15 Senator Kaine: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

16 I want to follow up on Senator Warren's questions about  
17 the U.S.-India relationship. Two of you mentioned in your  
18 opening testimony the importance of the relationship.  
19 Senator McCain echoed that.

20 One of you only talked about the Indo-Pacific, not the  
21 Asia-Pacific. Dr. Tellis, I thought that was interesting.  
22 The title of the hearing is about the Asia-Pacific, but you  
23 used the phrase Indo-Pacific. About 2 years ago, virtually  
24 all of our DOD witnesses switched over to using Indo-Pacific  
25 largely in their testimony.



1           The Indian military does more joint exercises with the  
2 United States than they do with any other Nation. That is  
3 an important trend. That is a recent trend. I view  
4 probably Prime Minister Modi being a BJP -- the Congress  
5 Party has had that traditional nonalliance. This is a  
6 little bit of an evolution for them.

7           Talk about what we should be doing to deepen that  
8 relationship, not only militarily, but it seems that a  
9 similarity between China and Russia is they both would like  
10 the U.S. less involved in the region, and they both seem to  
11 have an interest in undermining the brand of democracies  
12 generally and suggesting that authoritarian nations are just  
13 as good.

14           We are the oldest democracy in the world. India is the  
15 largest democracy in the world. Both of our nations have  
16 some motive to demonstrate the strength of democracies.

17           There does not seem to be an institution in the world  
18 now that is effectively promoting the strength of the  
19 democratic model. I am curious to have you talk about what  
20 the U.S. and India might do together, either security issues  
21 in the region or more generally, to promote the democratic  
22 model against this assault from authoritarian nations to  
23 suggest it is losing its vigor.

24           Thanks.

25           Ms. Magsamen: I would say, practically speaking, with

1 the Indians, we could be doing a lot more in Southeast Asia  
2 together, and South Asia, in particular on building capacity  
3 of our partners.

4 The Indians have taken a recent interest in getting  
5 more engaged in the Asia-Pacific as part of Modi's Act East.

6 But I actually think there is more coordination that  
7 the United States and India can do at the strategic level in  
8 terms of finding ways to build capacity of the Southeast  
9 Asian partners and South Asia as a way to check Chinese  
10 ambitions a little bit.

11 Also more cooperation in the Indian Ocean region for  
12 sure, historically, that has been India's space. But I  
13 think there is more the United States and India could do  
14 together in that area as well.

15 We have a very successful exercise called Malabar that  
16 we do with India, that we invite the Japanese to. I think,  
17 going back to the point I made earlier about networking our  
18 security relationships, we should really try to press the  
19 Indians to also include allies like Australia into that  
20 exercise. The more that we and India can work together to  
21 expand this hub-and-spoke approach to the region, I think  
22 the better.

23 In terms of your question on democracy, the United  
24 States and India share a strategic view on the importance of  
25 a rules-based order. It is what drives our cooperation at

1 the strategic level. I think the more that the United  
2 States and India are seen partnering together in initiatives  
3 in the region, the more it kind of has a bank shot on the  
4 democratic aspects. There are more ways that we can speak  
5 together with a common voice about the importance of the  
6 rules-based order together.

7 Dr. Tellis: Senator, let me start by giving you a  
8 sense of what I think the fears and the uncertainties in  
9 Delhi are right now.

10 They are concerned that the U.S. will not make the  
11 investments required to protect its preeminence in Asia.  
12 And if that concern grows roots, then their willingness to  
13 bet on the U.S. relationship diminishes.

14 They are also concerned that the U.S., for tactical  
15 reasons, might reach a condominium with the Chinese. And if  
16 that happens, then India will find itself in a sense losing  
17 out.

18 So the immediate challenge that we have with India is  
19 to reassure it that the U.S. will continue to remain the  
20 security guarantor of the Asian space, writ large. And by  
21 that, I include both the Indian Ocean and the Asia-Pacific.

22 The second point I would make is that they see the  
23 strategic challenges immediately as arising from China, so  
24 whatever we can do to help them cope with those emerging  
25 strategic challenges are the things that advance our common

1 interests.

2 And I endorse everything that Kelly said in this  
3 regard. So the Indian Ocean area becomes an immediate point  
4 of focus. Southeast Asia becomes an immediate point of  
5 focus.

6 And I would also say Central Asia and the Persian Gulf,  
7 because India has interests in Afghanistan, in particular.  
8 It has interests in the gulf. There are millions of Indians  
9 who work in the gulf. It is an important source of foreign  
10 exchange, so on and so forth.

11 So those are three areas where we continue to do work  
12 in terms of broader defense cooperation.

13 Senator Warren already eluded to the defense technology  
14 initiative that was started by Secretary Carter. I think we  
15 ought to pursue that, because it really meets an important  
16 need. And I hope the new administration doubles down on  
17 support.

18 The final point I would make with respect to democracy  
19 promotion, the Indians are actually very eager to work with  
20 the United States on democracy promotion, but not at the  
21 high end, at the low end. They are more interested in  
22 working with us in building institutions as opposed to  
23 changing regimes. They know they cannot affect our choices  
24 with respect to how we deal with regimes.

25 But getting the mechanics of democracy right, so

1 helping countries conduct elections, having training  
2 programs for civil servants, helping them put together the  
3 institutional capacities to man democracy, that is where  
4 India has in the past been quite willing to work with us.  
5 And during the Bush administration they worked with us on  
6 the Global Democracy Initiative.

7 It would be really unfortunate if we lost our appetite  
8 for democracy promotion at this point when you have a Prime  
9 Minister in India who is actually quite eager to work with  
10 us on democracy promotion collaboratively around the world.

11 Senator Reed: On behalf of the chairman, Senator King,  
12 please.

13 Senator King: Thank you very much.

14 There are eight other countries in the world other than  
15 North Korea that have nuclear weapons, and many of them have  
16 had them for many years. They have never been used,  
17 principally because of the principle of deterrence.

18 So the question, based upon your testimony today, which  
19 is that a continued pursuit of nuclear weapons by North  
20 Korea is virtually inevitable, it will be very difficult to  
21 derail with anything short of devastating military  
22 confrontation, which we can discuss in a moment, will  
23 deterrence work with North Korea just as it has worked with  
24 the rest of the world to keep us away from nuclear  
25 confrontation?

1 Dr. Cha?

2 Dr. Cha: So I think the hopeful answer is that it  
3 will. North Korea has been deterred from invading the  
4 Korean Peninsula again with armored divisions, so the U.S.-  
5 ROK alliance in terms of conventional deterrence has worked,  
6 so one hopes to assign some rationality to North Korean  
7 calculations because of that outcome.

8 But there are two things that are different. One is  
9 that we are talking about nuclear weapons now. And, two, we  
10 are talking about a different leader.

11 Even if we assume that deterrence holds, nuclear  
12 deterrence holds, we still have two other problems. One is,  
13 as Senator Graham and Ashley mentioned, outward  
14 proliferation. North Korea is a serial proliferator. Every  
15 weapons system they have ever developed, they have sold.

16 Senator King: And the real nightmare is nonstate  
17 actors obtaining nuclear weapons for whom deterrence would  
18 not work.

19 Dr. Cha: That is absolutely right. That is absolutely  
20 correct.

21 And then the second concern is that, because if  
22 deterrence holds at the nuclear rung of the ladder, there is  
23 also the possibility that North Korea will feel the United  
24 States has deterred. Therefore, it can actually coerce more  
25 at the conventional level, something that is known as the

1 stability-instability paradox.

2           So I think there is a lot of concern that North Korea,  
3 even if it is deterred, will actually feel that it has more  
4 license to take actions at the conventional level to coerce  
5 others.

6           Senator King: You all have testified about the  
7 consequences of some kind of preemptive strike, in terms of-  
8 - and I think it is important to realize that Seoul is about  
9 as far from the DMZ as we are from Baltimore. We are not  
10 talking about nuclear strike. We are talking about  
11 artillery.

12           But let me ask the question another way. And perhaps  
13 this is best addressed to the intelligence community, but  
14 you may have views.

15           Could we take out their nuclear capacity with a  
16 preemptive strike? Or would there simply be enough left?  
17 You cannot bomb knowledge. There would be enough left to  
18 reconstitute it, and they would be even more determined at  
19 that point?

20           Ms. Magsamen?

21           Ms. Magsamen: I mean, the short answer is, I do not  
22 know. But I do think that the question of permanence is  
23 important, and what the objective of the strike would be, if  
24 it was to take out the program.

25           There is, as you mentioned, the knowledge issue.

1           Senator King: During our debate on the JCPOA, the  
2 intelligence community informed us that an all-out strike on  
3 the nuclear capacity of Iran would delay their program 2  
4 years. That was a very important part of the debate,  
5 because that really makes that alternative less appealing,  
6 particularly when you layer on the response and the danger  
7 of confrontation with China.

8           Any other of you have views on the feasibility of how  
9 far a military strike could go in terms of eliminating the  
10 capacity?

11           Dr. Tellis, do you?

12           Dr. Tellis: I do not believe we have the capacity to  
13 eliminate the program in its entirety, which essentially  
14 means that there will be both the residual assets and the  
15 capacity for reconstitution.

16           Senator King: And certainly the will, based upon  
17 having been struck.

18           Dr. Tellis: Correct.

19           Senator King: To change the subject slightly, one of  
20 the things that really concerns me about the situation that  
21 we are in now, which is one of the most dangerous I can  
22 remember in my adult life, is accidental escalation,  
23 misperception. We move the carrier group. We believe that  
24 is a message. They believe it is preparation for an  
25 invasion, and you get a response.



1           You are all nodding. The record will not show nods.

2           Dr. Friedberg, your thoughts?

3           Dr. Friedberg: Yes, I think that is an additional  
4 danger. Even if you assume a certain level of rationality  
5 on the part of the North Korean leadership, they are not  
6 insane, there is a real problem of misperception and  
7 miscalculation. The view that, as nearly as we can tell,  
8 the current North Korean leadership has of the rest of the  
9 world, of the United States, is extremely distorted. I  
10 think they do believe that we are out to get them, and there  
11 are possibilities for interaction between things that we do  
12 and things that they do that could have unintended  
13 consequences.

14           Senator King: Do we have any direct communication with  
15 North Korea?

16           Dr. Cha: The channel that the U.S. Government usually  
17 uses is through the Permanent Mission to the U.N. in New  
18 York. But it is largely a messaging channel.

19           Senator King: It strikes me that that would be an  
20 important issue when you are in a situation where you do not  
21 want misunderstandings. That is when wars start, is  
22 misunderstanding, misperception of each side's moves.

23           Dr. Cha: I agree. And to add to what Aaron said, it  
24 could also be miscalculation that comes from someplace  
25 completely different.

1           In other words, we have data that suggests North Korea  
2 likes to target both U.S. and South Korean elections with  
3 provocations, and we have an election in South Korea May  
4 9th. So it is entirely plausible the North Koreans could  
5 carry out something that is non-ballistic missile, non-  
6 nuclear directed at South Korea that can also spin out of  
7 control. So miscalculation can come from a variety of  
8 different places.

9           Senator King: I appreciate your testimony. Needless  
10 to say, we focused a great deal on North Korea. We did not  
11 really talk as much about China.

12           Graham Allison has a new book, *Destined for War*. I  
13 think we all need to study the Thucydides Trap with regard  
14 to China. We could have an entire hearing on that.

15           Thank you very much for your testimony.

16           Senator Reed: Thank you.

17           Let me thank the panel for very compelling testimony.  
18 Thank you very, very much.

19           And on behalf of Chairman McCain, declare that the  
20 hearing is adjourned.

21           Thank you.

22           [The information referred to follows:]

23           [Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

24

25