HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON

EMERGING U.S. DEFENSE CHALLENGES AND WORLDWIDE THREATS

Tuesday, December 6, 2016

U.S. Senate
Committee on Armed Services
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. John McCain, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Committee Members Present: Senators McCain [presiding], Inhofe, Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Lee, Graham, Cruz, Reed, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, and Heinrich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN, U.S. SENATOR
FROM ARIZONA

Chairman McCain: Good morning. The Senate Armed Services Committee meets this morning to receive testimony on emerging U.S. defense challenges and worldwide threats. We're fortunate to have with us three distinguished witnesses: General Jack Keane, Chairman of the Institute for the Study of War and former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; Mr. Shawn Brimley, the Executive Vice President and Director of Studies at The Center for a New American Security; and Dr. Robert Kagan, Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institute, Project on International Order and Strategy.

Our next President will take office as the United States confronts the most diverse and complex array of global security challenges since the end of the second World War. Great-power competition, once thought a casualty of the end of history, has returned as Russia and China have each challenged the rules-based order that is the foundation of our security and prosperity. Rogue states like North Korea and Iran are undermining regional stability while developing advanced military capabilities that threaten the United States and our allies. Radical Islamist terrorism continues to pose a challenging threat to our security at home and our interests abroad. And the chaos that has
spread across the Middle East and on which our terrorist
enemies thrive has torn apart nations, destroyed families,
killed hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children,
and sent millions more running for their lives.

But, today -- today -- President Obama will deliver a
speech in Florida touting his counterterrorism successes.
I'm not making that up. Yet, even a glimpse at the chaos
enveloping the Middle East and spreading throughout the
world reveals the delusion and sophistry of this President
and his failed policies. In short, when our next President
is inaugurated, just 6 weeks from now, he will look out on a
world on fire and have several consequential strategic
choices to make: how to address Russian or Chinese
aggression; how to confront threats from North Korea;
whether to alter our relationship with Iran; how to improve
and quicken our campaign against ISIL; how to counter the
instability radiating from Syria; how to ensure victory in
the war in Afghanistan -- and I could go on -- not to
mention the overwhelming challenge of cybersecurity. Our
next President will not have the benefit of time and
cautious deliberation to set a new strategic course for the
Nation. That work begins with a series of decisions that
will present themselves immediately on day one. That's why
it's so important to get these things right from the outset.

As we ponder these strategic questions, we must also
consider our military posture around the world. We must
decide the appropriate military presence in Europe and
reverse reductions made by the Obama administration under
the assumption that Russia was a partner. We also need a
fresh look at further steps to enhance U.S. presence in the
Asia-Pacific region. We need to uphold our commitments to
allies and partners, including by finally providing lethal
assistance to Ukraine and standing by the opposition in
Syria. We need to push back against the spread of Iranian
malign influence in the Middle East. This starts in Iraq,
where the eventual liberation of Mosul will intensify the
sectarian struggle for power and identity. We need to
finally give our troops in Afghanistan what they need to
succeed: permanent and flexible authorities to engage the
enemy and troop levels based on security conditions on the
ground.

Here at home, we need to return to a strategy-based
defense budget. Our next President would need more than
$100 billion over and above the Budget Control Act caps just
to execute our current defense strategy, which is
insufficient, since it predates Russian invasion of Ukraine
and ISIL's rampage across Syria and Iraq. This will require
our next President to negotiate a broad bipartisan agreement
on the budget that brings an end to the dangerous and
misguided Budget Control Act. Such an agreement has eluded
President Obama and the Congress, not because of disagreements on defense policy, but because we've lacked the political will to prioritize defense. Since the election, many have discussed domestic priorities, including reviewing Obamacare, increasing information spending, and implementing tax cuts. But, these can be no -- there can be no greater priority than preserving and increasing America's position of strength and military advantage in the face of increasing global dangers, that rebuilding our military must be a political priority, not just a talking point. We must not only provide stable and increased defense budgets, but the next President's administration must also implement reforms to the Nation's defense. This will include changes to the defense enterprise passed by the Congress over the last 2 years. I'm proud of the work we've done on modernization -- on modernizing military retirement, improving military healthcare, reforming defense acquisition, trimming Pentagon bureaucracy, and more. But, the ultimate success of these reforms will depend on years of faithful implementation and dedicated follow through by the Department of Defense. The President-Elect's selection of General James Mattis to serve as Secretary is an encouraging sign in this regard, but there are dozens of senior civilian and military nominations still to come, and it will be the job of this
committee and the full Senate to provide advice and consent on these nominations. We will be watching closely to see what choices the next President makes.

I encourage the next President to be bold. We need innovators for the future, not imitators of the past. We need thinkers open to new ideas, not functionaries wedded to old ways. We need people who understand the bureaucracy but will not be captured by it. Put simply, to ensure the success of defense reform, we need reformers throughout the leadership of the Department of Defense.

Finally, our next President needs to repair the relationship between the executive and legislative branches. The constitutional mandate to provide for the common defense is one the President and the Congress share together. This is not a defect, but the design of our founders. To deter adversaries and defeat our enemies, fix our defense budget, and implement critical reforms on -- to our defense enterprise, the executive and legislative branches must work together as coequals. We need our next President, our next Secretary of Defense, and those elected to the next Congress to uphold this essential constitutional principle. The American people and the men and women who serve in our Armed Forces deserve and expect nothing less.

Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED, U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE ISLAND

Senator Reed: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this very important hearing.

I also want to thank the witnesses for their participation, not only their participation, but their service in so many different capacities to the Nation over many, many years. Thank you all very much.

The most immediate threat to the safety of Americans at home and abroad still remains the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL, and the remnants of al Qaeda. And I recently returned from the region, where I met with our military commanders, diplomats, and senior political leaders. Militarily, ISIL is on the path to defeat in Iraq. The Iraqi Security Force, enabled by U.S. and coalition train, advise, and assist efforts, coupled with airstrikes, intelligence, and other support, are in the process of displacing ISIL from Mosul and are expected, in the coming months, to significantly disrupt the ability of ISIL to hold any key terrain within Iraq. Nevertheless, ISIL will likely continue to act as the subversive force in Iraq for the foreseeable future; and also, as the Chairman indicated, with the final capture of Mosul, that will start a political process in which the sectarian groups will vie for power, and that could be a decisive and critical theater arena of
action in Iraq.

In Syria, isolation operations around Raqqa have commenced, but the task of supporting forces on the ground who will ultimately enter, clear, and hold Raqqa is months away. Unlike Iraq, we have no partner in Syria for humanitarian, stabilization, and reconstruction efforts. Even after Raqqa is retaken, the security situation will remain extremely difficult as the remnants of ISIL seek refuge in the largely ungoverned areas of eastern Syria along the Euphrates River as the broader Syrian civil war is likely to rage on.

I also recently visited Afghanistan, where political tensions between President Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah appear to be receding as the 2016 traditional fighting season comes to a close. Our commander in Afghanistan, General Nicholson, recently described the conflict between the Afghan government and the Taliban as, in his words, "an equilibrium in favor of the government because they are controlling the majority of the population."

Decisions earlier this year by the President to maintain approximately 8400 U.S. troops in Afghanistan into 2017 and to provide robust support to the Afghan national defense and security forces has laid the foundation for a sustainable U.S. and international security presence in
Afghanistan. The decision also sent an important message to Afghans, the Taliban, and others in the region, including Pakistan, regarding the commitment of the United States to continue progress in Afghanistan. Assuming the continued support of the Afghan government and the support of its people, I hope the next administration will follow a conditions-based approach to U.S. presence in Afghanistan that provides flexibility on the number of military personnel deployed in support of our longer-term strategy there.

Over the past few months, the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the JCPOA, has largely proceeded as planned. And while the JCPOA is having its intended impact in the nuclear arena, Iran's behavior with respect to its proxy forces across the region has not improved, and, as I discussed during my recent visit with the commander of our naval forces in the Middle East, Iran's unsafe and unprofessional actions in the maritime arena continue. How the new administration chooses to proceed with respect to Iran will be an important decision. It is critical that we need cede space or territory to Iranian influence, but it's similarly critical that we not take actions that escalate tensions unnecessarily and can be blamed on the United States. For example, as many experts have pointed out, the likely result of the U.S. unilaterally
withdrawing from the JCPOA would be a resumption of the Iranian nuclear program without the ability to reimpose effective sanctions, which rely on enforcement by our partners around the world.

In Europe, we continue to be a witness to a number of destabilizing factors, including adversarial actions by Russia, acts of terrorism, and sustained refugee and migrant flows. Such instability is acutely on display in Ukraine, where Russian-based separatists commit daily cease-fire violations with seemingly endless resupply from Russia, and disinformation campaigns continue to undermine public confidence in Ukrainian government institutions. This confluence of destabilizing factors makes the multinational effort underway to strengthen Ukraine's capability to defend itself and to decrease corruption, increase accountability, and reform institutional structures all the more important.

In the Pacific, China has alarmed its neighbors in the South China Sea by militarizing land features in a body of water that is critical for trade and regional peace, and refusing to acknowledge the international norms and laws that govern those waters.

In Korea -- North Korea -- Kim Jung-un continues to destabilize the Korean Peninsula with nuclear ballistic missile developments, and sanctions are not working as effectively as they should to bring the North Koreans to the
negotiating table. Regimes as authoritarian and insulated as North Korea's are brittle and prone to collapse. How we would deal with such a collapse and the security and humanitarian problems that would ensue is an ongoing debate and challenge to U.S. Forces Korea and the PACOM Commander.

Finally, defense budgets should be based on a long-term military strategy, which requires the Department to focus at least 5 years into the future. Last year, Congress passed the 2015 Bipartisan Budget Act, or BBA, which established the discretionary funding levels for defense spending for fiscal years 2016 and 2017. While the BBA provided the Department with budget stability in the near term, there is no budget agreement for fiscal year 2018 and beyond. Therefore, without another bipartisan agreement that provides relief from sequestration, the military services will be forced to adhere to the sequestration-level budget caps and could undermine the investments made to rebuild readiness and modernize platforms and equipment.

And again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for this important hearing.

Chairman McCain: I thank you.

And I thank the witnesses.

General Keane, given your advanced age, we will begin with you.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN M. KEANE, USA (RET.),
CHAIRMAN, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR, AND FORMER VICE
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY

General Keane: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Love that
introduction.

[Laughter.]

General Keane: Good morning, everyone. Listen, I'm
delighted to be here with Dr. Kagan and -- my good friend.
And let me just say something about Dr. Kagan, here, and his
family. His father, himself, his wife, his brother, and his
sister-in-law all --

Chairman McCain: All have exceeded --

General Keane: -- make a great contribution --

Chairman McCain: -- exceeded his --

General Keane: -- to this country, believe me.

And Mr. Brimley, as well, thank you to be here.

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished
members of the committee, thank you for inviting me once
again.

Listen, I so appreciate what this committee has done
through the years in taking care of our men and women in the
Armed Forces. And just let me say straight out, my
congratulations to the committee and to your leadership,
Senators McCain and Reed, for your seminal achievement with
the FY17 NDAA. We've not had such a critical
transformational piece of defense legislation in 30 years, not since Goldwater-Nichols in 1986. You've stopped the drawdown of our ground forces, particularly the Army, who's borne the brunt of 15 years of war. They're still doing heavy lifting around the world. You know, it was the Army who was asked to reduce its force structure to pay for the needs of the other Departments. Makes no sense whatsoever.

I applaud your bold reforms on defense acquisition, military healthcare, security cooperation, and the reduction of flag officer and SES billets -- I know you will eventually get around to compensation, which is in dire need -- and, of course, the much needed increase of funding to depleted readiness accounts.

Let me summarize what you have in front of you with my written statement, which has an unusual amount of verbosity in it, but, given the subject matter was so important, I decided to write a little bit more than I usually do. But, let's start with the defense challenges.

You know as well as I do, there's a lot more that we have to -- done here. You have made an incredible first start with the FY17 NDA, but we have major capability gaps, and we've got serious funding issues. The BSA has to end. We can't do anything if that continues. We can't get out our hole, and it's going to put us in a worse hole.

It's -- you know, it's not sufficient, you know, to be
the best military in the world. Certainly, we take pride in that, as we rightfully should. And we've -- we spend more money than many other nations do if you add them all up, by comparison, in defense. But, what is really needed is, we have to be so superior in our capability that our adversaries are not willing to challenge us. And the reason is because we're a credible deterrent. We had that for many years in the Cold War. We were, indeed, a credible deterrent. And I believe that deterrence, with other issues, helped to force the collapse of the Soviet Union.

So, since that time, we've had two and a half decades since the end of the Cold War, and -- which has been reasonably successful, in terms of foreign policy and national security. I don't dispute that. With some exceptions. But, we have been continuously decrementing the United States military during that whole period of time. And our adversaries are closing the technology gap. They are catching up.

We are ill-prepared, as we sit here today, to meet all the threats that we're facing. And I don't make that statement lightly. You've had a Chief of Service come in here -- Milley, straight talker -- tell you, in no uncertain words, that he's at high military risk to win a conventional war. Now, that didn't get a headline in any newspaper, it didn't even cause a stir with the administration. We
haven't had a service chief make a statement like that in 40 years. Other service chiefs could make the same statement. The Air Force, they've got a 1947 air force, in size. They've got 60-percent-plus combat aircraft than what we used to have when we began the decline. Sixty-plus percent. The Navy -- you know, you're aware of it -- they've got 270 hulls, and they're going to 308. And the 270, as part of that, they're going to retire more ships than they can replace during the timeframe to get to the 308. And they've gone through a 50-percent-plus reduction during this two-and-a-half-decade decline. If you look at it in spending dollars, constant dollars, we're spending about the same amount of money that we did three decades ago, but we're considerably smaller. We've got so -- less to show for it. So, we've got to fix the shortfall. The reality is, we need more combat brigades. The reality is, we need more ships. The reality is, we need more aircraft. It's indisputable.

The technology gap, it's closing, and closed. Precision-guided munitions, space-based technology, stealth, offensive and defense missiles, long-range artillery, they're all there. That capability exists in our adversaries.

Russia and China, they have a brilliant strategy. They're not stupid. They've got an asymmetric strategy to minimize the great-power advantage that we have in our air
and maritime capability. So, what have they done? They've made long-range anti-ship missiles, and they've made long-range anti-aircraft missiles. And those things matter. They've deployed them in eastern China. And that's a major challenge for us. And they've deployed them in western Russia, and it's also a major challenge for us.

Russia's got a new tank. It's a T-14 Armata. The crew is no longer in a turret. The first time that's ever happened. It's in the main body. They're in a special protected capsule. It has advanced reactive armor, second generation, on it that we believe -- we don't know for sure -- but our main tank Sabot round, long penetrator, it'll stop it. And it also has active protective system on it, their second generation. The United States has not fielded a single Active Protective System on a tank yet, or any other combat vehicle. But, your committee has mandated they do it. And you put some money in there for them to do it.

Now, listen, if you don't know what Active Protective System is, let me take you through it for a second. You put sensors on a vehicle that track an incoming round to the vehicle, and, as the vehicle -- as the round is about to hit the vehicle, you actually have a kill system on the vehicle that kills the round before it hits. Brilliant technology. Where do we get all of that from? Private sector. It has to do with microchip technology and incredible software.
programs. Out there on the private sector, smart guys, small business guys got it. DARPA had a program, over 10 years ago, to look at this. Technology's proven, and the United States military ground forces still haven't put it on anything. What's wrong with that? It has nothing to do with money. It doesn't have anything to do with the White House. It doesn't have anything to do with Congress. Doesn't, I mean, have anything to do with OSD. You know what it is? It's the damn bureaucracy inside the Army. They push back on new technology, because they want to design it themselves because you give them money to do it. These are the laboratories and the tech bases. It's the acquisition bureaucracy that stalls this.

When I was Vice Chief of Staff for the Army, I had no idea about all of that, and it took me a year or two to figure out what I was really dealing with, bureaucrats and technocrats that were stalling the advance of a great army. That's out there. And you've got to bore into that with this committee. The military and Defense Department needs help to break down that bureaucracy.

Listen, some -- all the service chiefs know what they want to do with their service, but allow me a little bit of allowance here, as an observer, to throw out a couple of tidbits. You know, for my Army, the Army that you're looking at is a 1980s Army. That's the equipment it's got.
It hasn't had a new major end item since the 1980s. The Stryker vehicle was bought off-the-shelf. And that's a legacy system out there. And the problem is, they're 200,000 shorter -- smaller than what the 1980 Army was. 200,000 smaller. If you have Active Protective System like I just said, and you can kill anything that comes at a tank, should we design a tank that looks different than what it is? Does it really have to be 70 tons? I don't think so. So, the Army's got to do some thinking about where it's going. And I -- also, I believe it has to rethink its organization, how it fights, and go after the technology that is available, and press the R&D community to get you the new technology that you can conceptually even think through yourself.

The Navy -- lookit -- what the Chinese have is serious, in terms of long-range anti-shipping. Long-range anti-shipping missiles are here to stay. Nineteen-ship surface carrier battle groups, does that still make sense in the face of that threat? They can put -- they can swarm those missiles. They can bring them en masse against that carrier battle group that will really test our air defense systems. Doesn't it make sense to look at undersea warfare and take a look at all the functions that are taking place on the surface, and whatever functions on the surface we can do undersea, put it there. Why? You've got protection and
you've got stealth. Seems to make sense. Some of this is
cultural, to be sure, inside services. You know, these
things are not easy. And there are good people there. But,
you can push it a little bit. And Goldwater-Nichols changed
the United States military. FY- -- NDA-17 is going to do
some of that, as well.

The Air Force -- lookit, we know -- we know it
intuitively. It's obvious. It's right in front of us.
Unmanned flight is here. It's here. And we've got to get
serious about it. If you put, in a remote station, a pilot
and a multifunctional crew versus a single pilot or a dual
pilot in the air, that is an enhanced airpower capability.
That's here. We can do that. And we've got to think about
doing it.

I also think -- and comes through our flag officers, it
got at something that Senator McCain was saying -- we've got
to look for our flag officers who are not risk-averse, who
themselves are not bureaucrats, and who have -- they're
willing to take risk and are innovative. And the reason why
they got that rank on their shoulder has nothing to do with
cars, airplanes, and all them other stuff that goes with it.
It all has to do about taking the rocks out of the rucksack
of our soldiers and moving that system forward. And we've
got to get the best that we can to do that kind of work.

Let me just say that modernizing a military is
challenging. And we can do it, even though we're facing all
these threats, as Senator McCain and Senator Reed took out.
General Marshall, Admiral King, General LeMay, Admiral
Rickover, General Abrams, they all met those challenges, and
they transformed our land, air, and sea forces. They are
the ones that are responsible for winning on the battlefield
from Normandy to the Philippines and from Kuwait to Iraq.

Let me just say something about the DOD business side
of the house. Certainly, we are the best fighting force in
the world. We're first-rate at that. But, we're absolutely
third-rate at running the businesslike functions of DOD,
because we're not good at it. We don't know enough to be
good at it. We're managing huge real estate portfolios,
we're managing huge lodging capabilities. We're one of the
great -- biggest motel owners in the United States. We're
managing the largest healthcare enterprise in the world.
The amount of maintenance that we're doing, from a pistol to
an aircraft carrier, is staggering. Those are all business
functions. Business functions. They're all non-core
functions. And we're also managing new product design and
new product development, using business terms. And we don't
do well at this. And there's a ton of money involved in it.
We've got to get after that money, and we've got to do
better at it. And I think we should bring in, as the
number-two guy in the Department of Defense, a CEO from a
Fortune 500 company in the last 5 years that's done a major
turnaround of a large organization. We need businesspeople
to help us do this. We need a CFO, not a comptroller, in
DOD. That CFO has the background that's necessary to look
at business practices in the DOD, where cost is a -- cost-
based analysis and performance, internal control, auditing,
rigorous financial reviews, cost efficiency, and dealing
with waste. Those are the kind of things we need.
Desperately need them, because the money is there. We want
to -- you want to do so much more. Some of that money is
sitting right there in the budget.

You know as well as I do that these global security
challenges we're -- facing us are enormous. And Senator
McCain laid them all out. I won't go through them all.
I'll just touch on a couple of things.

One is American leadership. That is where we have to
start. American leadership is crucial and indispensable in
this world to global security and stability. And the world
economy absolutely depends on that global stability and
security. We need to reassure our allies that we're going
to stand behind them. They don't trust us. They don't
believe we're the reliable ally we used to be. If you
travel the world, you're getting the same thing that I'm
getting. This is real. And they -- as a result of it,
they're making decisions based on that fear. And some of
those decisions are not very good.

Radical Islam. We know it's a multigenerational problem of the 21st century. We know we have to name it, we have to define it, and we have to explain it to the American people. My God, if they're going to deal with this for the 21st century, we're going to have people killing them on some kind of episodic basis, they certainly need to understand a little bit about it, you would think, that we can explain what this is, what this ideology is, what are the signs, symbols, dress, and behavior and speech of those who radicalize themselves to it, so their eyes and ears can identify it and report it to somebody. Just makes sense, but we're not doing it.

The other thing is, we need to develop a comprehensive strategy, but we can't do that until we form a global alliance to push back against what is a global threat. And we haven't done it.

ISIS. ISIS is the most successful terrorist organization that's ever been put together. We're making progress against them in Iraq, to be sure. We do not have an effective strategy to defeat them in Syria, because we don't have an effective ground force. And we have no strategy to deal with the spread of ISIS to 35 other countries. I'm not suggesting for a minute that we're involved in all of that, but I think we can tangibly help
the people who are. This administration's going to have to
deal with, How do we defeat ISIS? Not just how we succeed
in Iraq. And I think they're going to ask for a
comprehensive campaign plan to do it. I don't think there
has been one, to be frank about it.

In Iraq, we will retake Mosul. How long will depend on
how much ISIS wants to defeat -- to resist. They didn't
resist in Fallujah and Ramadi that much. But, after we take
Mosul, if we have sectarian strife in Mosul, where we do not
have unity of governance and unity of security, then that is
going to contaminate the political unity in the country as a
whole which is so desperately needed. And that is a major
issue for us.

The major geopolitical issue for the United States in
Iraq is political unity with that government and diminishing
Iran's strategic influence on Iraq. That is what we should
be working on. And, frankly, we have not. We have not
worked on that anywhere near as hard as we could be. We
can't get the Secretary of State to make regular visits
there to work on that very project. But, the Iranians are
there all the time. That is a major issue for us. This
administration's going to have decide, as the previous one
did, Are we going to leave troops in Iraq? Yes? No? How
much? What are they going to do? How long? Those are
decisions in front of them. I would hope that we would
avoid the disastrous pullout we did in 2011, which had
iccredible consequences, as we all know. The Syrian civil
war, a major human catastrophe, to be sure, and as
intractable a problem, I think, as any of us have had to
deal with.

The reality is, we squandered the opportunities to
change the momentum against the regime. I won't list them
all. And you're aware of it. But, right in front of us, I
still believe we could put safe zones in there to safeguard
some of those humans up near the Jordanian and Turkish
border. And that, de facto, would be a no-fly zone. I
think it would also aid the Syrian moderates, and likely
attract some others to that movement. Many of the people
that were helping the Syrian moderates, the Islamists, moved
way when we did not execute the 2013 chemical redline.

Chairman McCain: General, we're going to have to --

General Keane: Okay, I'll wrap it up.

Afghanistan. Let me just say, the war is not winnable
under the current policy. We cannot win. And that's the
reality of it. We've got sanctuaries in Pakistan. No
insurgency's ever been defeated with sanctuaries outside the
conflict area. Pakistani Afghan National Security Forces do
not have the enablers they need to be able to overcome the
Taliban, who have resurged. There's ways we can deal with
that, to be sure. I'll take it on in questions-and-answers.
With Russia and China, I'll just tell you that my view is strength and resolve in dealing with both of them. And they would recognize that. But, I truly believe that Russia's aggression needs to be stopped. Credible deterrence is the way to do it. And the resolve in that deterrence. Russia certainly wants to be an equal partner with the United States to be on the world stage. Grant them that. But, we should make no concessions to them until they change their behavior.

And I'll just stop right there, Mr. Chairman, and I'll take your questions later.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Keane follows:]
Chairman McCain: Mr. Brimley.
STATEMENT OF SHAWN BRIMLEY, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT
AND DIRECTOR OF STUDIES, THE CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN
SECURITY

Mr. Brimley: Thank you, Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, members of the committee. I'm honored to testify before you again, and have the distinct feeling of being out of place again as I sit next to titans like Robert Kagan and General Keane, two men I greatly admire.

President-Elect Donald Trump will take office next January and shoulder the formidable burden of a complex national security inheritance, which I'll summarize briefly right now.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as you know, remain incredibly complex. Although President Obama deserves credit, in my mind, for undertaking the significant surge of combat forces into Afghanistan 2009, the difficulty in supporting Afghan Security Forces was complicated by the public timelines for withdrawal. In Iraq, I believe the reduction of forces between 2009-2012 was far too steep, making it difficult for the U.S. to retain adequate leverage over the sectarianism of the government in Baghdad, which, in turn, enabled the rise of the Islamic State and the rapid advances in both Iraq and Syria. While I largely agree with the parameters of the operational approach in countering ISIL on the ground in Iraq and Syria -- for instance,
airpower, Special Operations forces, and combat advisors, of which I think we could do more -- the ultimate question of how to deal with Bashar al-Assad remains unanswered, and Russia's involvement and support of the barbarism we're seeing every day in places like Aleppo is horrifying. And we ought to do more to stop it.

I am concerned, but not particularly surprised, by the behavior of Russia and China. Vladimir Putin is no friend of the United States, and he clearly sees the long arc of history bending against the maintenance of an extensive Russian sphere of influence that acts as a break on democracy, civil society, and full economic integration -- or integration with a wider Europe, and a global liberal economic order. The unlawful incursion of Russia into Ukraine should not be legitimized by the United States, and ongoing steps to shore up our deterrence posture in the region ought to be sustained and increased, and increased soon.

China's behavior, in my mind, is perhaps the most consequential, in terms of its lasting impact on the global order. China's aggressive behavior towards its neighbors, and, in particular, its rapid land reclamation efforts in the South China Sea, are destabilizing. The eventual placement -- and I think it will happen -- of military platforms on these so-called "islands," things like antiship
cruise missiles, advanced air defense systems, and the like, would further upset the military balance of power in the region, which I think would dramatically risk escalation and miscalculation and conflict. DOD has a significant role to play in enhancing our military posture in the region, and I hope the Trump administration will quickly do so. The predictable provocation from North Korea, I should add, will come soon, as well. And so, I believe urgency is important in this regard.

From the perspective of the Secretary of Defense tasked to oversee the development, sustainment, and employment of U.S. military forces, it is clear that our vaunted military technological edge that has allowed our men and women in uniform to deploy rapidly around the world and engage our adversaries with unrivaled speed, precision, and staying power, has begun to erode. And we've seen this over the last few years, for sure. I worry that our edge is eroding to the point where the task of maintaining conventional deterrence in key theaters around the world is becoming difficult -- more difficult, more expensive, and more risky to our men and women in uniform. Moreover, the era of tight defense budgets and the disaster of sequestration, as you know, has made it very difficult for the Pentagon to keep investing in game-changing defense technologies and to properly enable a culture of experimentation and exercising
that can advance new concepts of operation and displace old and outdated ways of keeping our forces on the cutting edge. I sincerely hope that sequester caps can be eliminated and the Pentagon's defense budget can both increase and the uncertainty which has imperiled rational strategic and budgetary planning can finally be alleviated.

Finally, like General Keane, I would like to commend this committee and its staff for the work done in assembling an impressive conference report for the NDAA. Beyond the budget levels, the NDAA advances a comprehensive and important defense reform agenda that includes reforms in OSD, the number of general and flag officers, DOD's acquisition and healthcare systems, and adds important rationality to our security assistance architecture, which is so vital for our defense strategy. These and other reforms must be implemented, and others initiated in the years to come, not only because they will save significant amounts of taxpayer money that will allow for investment in other important areas in the defense program, but they will make the Department more agile and more effective in supporting and advancing America's security interests around the world.

Thank you again for inviting me.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brimley follows:]
Chairman McCain: Dr. Kagan.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT KAGAN, SENIOR FELLOW, PROJECT ON INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND STRATEGY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

Dr. Kagan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you, all the committee members, for holding this hearing, for inviting me. It's an honor to be here. It's an honor to be on this panel. I just want to say that every one of the family members that General Keane mentioned is deeply in love with General Keane. So, it's a mutual admiration society.

I want to talk about a subject that we don't like to talk about in polite company, and it's called "world order." You know, we naturally focus on threats to the homeland and our borders, and we talk about terrorism, as we must, as something that's obviously of utmost importance, has to be a top priority to protect the homeland. But, as we look across the whole panoply of threats that we face in the world, I've -- I worry that it's too easy to lose sight of what, to my mind, represent the greatest threats that we face over the medium- and long term, and possibly even sooner than we may think, and that is the threat posed by the two great powers in the international system, the two great revisionist powers international system: Russia and China. Because what they threaten is something that is, in a way, more profound, which is this world order that the United States created after the end of World War II, a global security order, a global economic order, and a global
political order. This is not something the United States
did as a favor to the rest of the world. It's not something
we did out of an act of generosity, although, by historical
terms, it was a rather remarkable act of generosity. It was
done based on what Americans learned in the first half of
the 20th century, which was that, if there was not a power,
whether it was Britain or, as it turned out it had to be,
the United States, willing and able to maintain this kind of
decent world order, you did not have some smooth ride into
something else. What you had was catastrophe. What you had
was the rise of aggressive powers, the rise of hostile
powers that were hostile to liberal values. We saw -- we
all know what happened with two world wars in the first half
of the 20th century. And what those who were present at the
creation, so to speak, after World War II wanted to create
was an international system that would not permit those
kinds of horrors to be repeated. And because the
understanding was that, while Americans believed very
deeply, in the 1920s and '30s, that they could be immune
from whatever horrors happened out there in the world, that
it didn't matter to them who ran Europe or who ran Asia or
who did what to whom, as long as were safe, they discovered
that that was not true and that, ultimately, the collapse of
world order would come back and strike the United States in
fundamental ways.
And so, Americans have decided to take on an unusual and burdensome role of maintaining world order because the United States was the only power in the world that could do it. And the critical element of maintaining that world order was to maintain peace and stability in the two big cockpits of conflict that had destroyed the world and had produced repeated conflicts from the late 19th century onward. And that was Europe and Asia. The United States accomplished something that no other power had able to accomplish before. It essentially put a cork in two areas that had been known for the constant warfare, put an end to an endless cycle of war between France and Germany, between Japan and China. And that was the stable world order that was created after World War II that America gradually thrived in, that produced the greatest era of great-power peace that has been known in history, the greatest period of prosperity, the greatest period of the spread of democracy. I think it's very easy to take that for granted, to focus on some nearer-term threats that we may face, which are, as I say, understandable, but lose sight of how precious that world order is and the degree to which it may be threatened.

And my concern right now is that that world order is more at risk than we may want to realize. And it is at risk because of two trend -- intersecting trend lines that I think are things to be worried about. They are the trend
line of increasingly activist revisionist great powers, Russia and China, together with the other trend line, which is a United States which is increasingly lacking both the will and the capacity to continue playing the role that it's played since the end of World War II. And as those two lines intersect, we begin to enter a period of increasing danger, because, as the willingness and capacity of the United States to maintain the order meets the increasing desire of those revisionist powers to change the order, the risk of conflict grows proportionately. If you think about a historical analogy, I don't know whether it's 1920, 1925, or 1931, but we are somewhere on that continuum, in my view.

And so, I think, with everything else that we have to do -- and this puts enormous strain on our defense budget resources, because we cannot ignore what's going on in the Middle East, we cannot ignore Iran, we cannot ignore North Korea, we cannot ignore ISIS, but we especially cannot take our eye off what I believe is ultimately the main game, which is managing these two revisionist powers and understanding what they seek. We cannot be under any illusions about Russia and China. We will find areas of cooperation with them. They both partake and benefit from and, in some case, sort of feed off of, the liberal world order the United States has created. But, let us never imagine that they are content with this order, that they do
not seek, fundamentally, eventually to upend this order, especially on the security side, to create a situation which they think ought to be the natural situation, which was -- which is they being hegemonic in their own region. China has a historical memory of being hegemonic, dominant in its region. Russia has a historical memory, which Putin has expressed on numerous occasions, of restoring its empire, which stretched right into the heart of central Europe. As far as they are concerned, the order that the United States has created is unfair, disadvantageous to them, temporary, and ought to be overturned. And I can only say that, in the process of overturning that, the history teaches, that overturning does not occur peacefully. And so, it should be our task both to prevent them from overturning it and to prevent them in a way that does not produce another catastrophic war. And that is the great challenge we face.

Now, are we up to this challenge? Unfortunately, that is, I think, very much in question. I do believe that the policies of the outgoing administration have indicated a general desire for a degree of retrenchment in the world, a sense that the United States was too involved, too engaged. It focused, to some extent, on the Middle East, but, I think, overall, the message that was sent, whether intentionally or unintentionally, although, in some cases, I think it was intentional, was that the United States is not
really going to be in this business of world-order upholding
as it used to be, and that we would really like others to
step up and play that role while we pull back and tend to
some of our business. Entirely understandable, entirely
dangerous, because it has, as the other panelists have said,
led both our allies to question whether the United States is
really there for them, and it has emboldened those who seek
revisions in the international system to take increasing
steps to do so.

It's unfortunate, that, after these 8 years which -- in
which this signal has been sent, that, during his political
campaign, the President-Elect's comments during the
campaign, as well as those of his surrogates, have only
reinforced the impression that the United States is out of
the world-order business. Comments about whether the United
States really should support NATO allies. Comments about
Estonia being in the suburbs of St. Petersburg. Complaints
about the need to defend Japan, and is that an equitable
thing? The fact that both candidates came out against the
Trans-Pacific Partnership, which is really, in my eyes, a
strategic deal more than a trade deal designed to pull the
United States and its Asian partners together. All the
elements of this campaign have only sent even greater
shockwaves throughout the world about what the United States
stands for.
So, in a certain sense, yes, the next administration has a big hole to dig out of. It is -- also has to dig out of a hole, to some extent, of its own making. And so, we need to see, in the early stages -- in the very early stages, I would say, a clear repudiation of all that rhetoric, some clear signs that this new administration understands the importance, not only of reassuring allies, but a willingness to bolster our commitment to those allies. Because, after all, the challenge from the revisionist powers is increasing; therefore, it's not enough to say we're committed to the defense of allies. We have to show that our capacities are increasing along with those of the increasing threat, which, of course, gets to the defense budget, which I don't have to talk to this committee about the need to do that.

Let me just end -- I know I'm going on too long -- let me just end on one point, and it has to do with Russia. Both China and Russia are revisionist powers. They have different tools in their kit. China has been the more cautious, so far, although I don't presume caution indefinitely, focusing more on their economic clout. Russia has, by far, been the most aggressive, willingness to use military force. It's invaded two countries, projected force into a third, but also has a whole panoply of geostrategic weapons that it has used, from energy resources to cyber.
And now, especially in the past few years, to political information warfare, direct meddling in the political processes of the Western democracies. We've seen it in central and eastern Europe. We've seen it in Western Europe. We saw it in the Italian referendum. We're going to see it in the French elections. We're going to see it in Germany. This is a full-bore strategic tool being used by Russia for two basic purposes: one, to affect the outcome of these elections; but, I would say, more importantly, to discredit the democratic process entirely. Because, after all, Russia and China are both autocracies. They feel threatened by democracies. One of their objectives -- and this is an objective that Putin is particularly pursuing -- is to discredit democracy, in general. And this is his major tool.

Unfortunately, as we've seen in this last campaign, the United States has now become the target of this Russian strategy. And what I'm about to say, I'm going to say because I have all you Senators in front of me. This'll probably be the last time I'll be invited to have all these Senators in front of me. But, this is not a partisan question. This is a strategic question. If Russia, every 4 years, is allowed to come in and weigh in in our elections in the way that it did right now -- this -- in this election, we are going to be at a serious strategic
disadvantage, going forward.

Now, I understand that we live in a partisan world. I used to be a Republican. I -- the only administration I ever served in was Republican. And I understand the reluctance of Republicans to raise questions about this last election. But, this has got to go beyond partisanship, because this tool is not going away, this Russian effort is not going away.

So, I would just -- I would hope that Congress takes this threat seriously enough to hold serious investigations on what happened, how it happened, and, most importantly, how are we going to prevent it happening in the future. Because this is a major strategic tool that the Russians are going to continue using here and throughout the democratic world.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kagan follows:]
Chairman McCain: Thank you, Doctor.

And that leads to my first question for the panel. This morning, we had a briefing with the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and I asked him what was, he felt, the highest priority that the Marine Corps has to combat as -- not to combat, but as far as challenges to our Nation's security.

And his first answer was cyber. But, he put it in the realm of the ability of our adversaries to cripple our ability to wage war. And so, I understand very well the side of it -- the aspect of it you just described, but I'd also, maybe, like to ask the witnesses to elaborate on the absolute military threat that -- and national security threat that cybersecurity, or our lack of cybersecurity, capabilities to combat and pose to the future of the military and our national security.

General Keane.

General Keane: Sure, certainly. Well, cyber represents another major battlefield capability and function that is going to be part of us in any future conflict, particularly dealing with any country that has advanced technology. And that's the reality of it. We are attempting to harden our cyberdefenses, you know, for our systems so that we can adequately protect them. We are totally reliant on space-based --

Chairman McCain: I don't mean to interrupt, but isn't
it true we don't have a policy --

   General Keane: That's true.

   Chairman McCain: -- as to how to combat --

   General Keane: We --

   Chairman McCain: -- cyberthreats?

   General Keane: That's correct. And the reality is

   that we are completely dependent on space-based technology,

   which also, obviously, can be interfered with, with cyber.

   Now, the one -- we have a decided advantage, and we

   don't want to minimize this. The United States cyberattack

   capability is second to none. And I'm assuming some members

   of the committee have had compartmentalized briefings on

   what that capability is, but it would make your eyes water.

   So, I mean, it's quite extraordinary, our offensive

   capability. And every other nation that's dealing with us

   knows that, as well. So, there is a built-in mechanism

   there, much as we had with nuclear weapons. But, the

   reality -- in terms of mutually assured destruction -- but,

   the reality is, in a tactical and operational setting, which

   John McCain -- Senator McCain is getting at here, yes, we've

   got a ways to go. There's -- we've got deficiencies there,

   but owe have enormous offensive capability, as well.

   Chairman McCain: Mr. Brimley.

   Mr. Brimley: Thank you, Senator. Just maybe a quick

   anecdote, to your point about the lack of a policy. I was a
policy advisor in OSD in 2009, in the first years of the
Obama administration, and passed down through the chain of
command from Secretary Gates, at the time, was a question,
What constitutes an act of war in cyberspace? And I was
part of a small team that put together a memo that
apparently was very unsatisfactory, because one of the first
questions that Secretary Panetta asked, upon assuming
office, was, What constitutes an act of war in cyberspace?
And I think, in my mind, that just reflects the notion that
there's lots of memos being written, lots of folks inside
the bureaucracies thinking about and pondering these
questions, but we have yet to sort of establish the basic
rules of war. Rules of war as it pertains to cyberspace.

What constitutes a conflict?

Chairman McCain: Including what constitute an attack?

Mr. Brimley: Absolutely.

Chairman McCain: Do you take action to prevent it if
you know it's coming? And what do you do to respond to an
attack? Is that what you were discussing?

Mr. Brimley: Absolutely. Another quick anecdote.

Early in '09, and maybe it was 2010, we tried to come up
with a DOD cyberstrategy. And eventually we did and it got
released. But, as part of those discussions, there was this
questions of speed. So, for instance, I believe, at the
time, inside the Pentagon, there was this debate about
preauthorizing offensive use of cyber. And the argument was, things happen in cyberspace so quickly, there's not going to be an opportunity for humans -- i.e., the President or the interagency -- to be involved in deliberating, discussions about whether to take out a cyberserver farm, say, in Singapore that happened to be harboring -- hypothetically harboring a third state's cyberoperations. And so, there's this complex question of, How do we authorize use of force and think about the use of force in cyber, when you're not going to have the ability, in a -- on a case-by-case basis, to have, you know, long, deliberative discussions about policy. You're going to have to think about preauthorizing steps in advance, up to and including going beyond our own networks and attacking the networks of others. So, that could create second- and third-order effects.

It's a long way of saying, it remains incredibly complex, it remains incredibly unclear, at least from a public perspective, what our policies are. And I would think there's a role for the committee in this regard in, sort of, legislating DOD, for instance, to finally come up and answer that basic question, What constitutes an act of war in cyberspace?

Chairman McCain: Thank you.

Dr. Kagan, did you want to add anything to the --
Dr. Kagan: It's well out of my range, but I would just say that, as with all weapons, unless you can demonstrate a retaliatory capacity, you're never going to deter the use of it. And that goes for cyber and the use -- in a war setting and also in a political setting. So, unless there was retaliatory action for Russian actions, they have no incentive to stop doing it.

Chairman McCain: Senator Reed.

Senator Reed: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Also, let me thank the witnesses for their comments on NDAA. But, let me state the obvious, also. The -- this reform initiative was a result of the constant and gentle urgings of the Chairman. And so, I think --

Chairman McCain: It could not have happened unless it was totally partnership.

Senator Reed: But, that nudging constantly was noticed.

[Laughter.] Senator Reed: Dr. Kagan, you made a -- I think a very insightful -- no surprise -- analysis of two lines that could intersect disastrously, the -- a revanchist Russia and China and a disengaging United States. And this tracks, I think, to a basic, fundamental issue we've all talked about. We have to get a military -- not just the military, but our national security enterprise -- the Department of State,
Homeland Security -- to a much higher level that requires more resources. We can find some of those resources within a context of savings -- General Keane pointed out, and -- that there's money there. But, I think, even exhausting all the feasible savings, we still have a critical issue before us. And it's -- goes to the points that you raised, in some respects, just -- as a Nation, are we ready to take on the challenge and pay for it? And so, General Keane, how do we pay for the extra margin? If we can get out of sequestration, how do we pay for the extra margin we'll need to do all the things we have to do -- enhance our security, in space, undersea, et cetera? And I'll ask everyone else to comment. And that probably exhausts my time.

General Keane: Well, you know, some of that gets back to what Dr. Kagan was talking about, is a lack of will. I actually am absolutely convinced this is -- this is fundamentally American presidential leadership, because, you know, security of the American people shouldn't have a pricetag. And that means we have to educate the American people about what is really going on. We have to make honest assessments about this threat and what it portends for the future of America if we do not engage it. And, frankly, we have not been doing that. I hope and trust that this new administration will face up to that. But, I think that's where it starts. It starts with American leadership,
and it starts with the education of the American people so that they really do understand that there is danger here, that it is threatening our livelihood as we know it. And we have to make sure that they understand that and they're informed. And they obviously influence this body, the House of Representatives and the Senate, if they are educated, if they are informed. Because that's where the decision is going to be made about resources, largely. And I would trust that the new American President would make the commitment to invest in the defense budget, which it desperately needs.

And all that said, this is not just a windfall for the Department of Defense, because, at the end of the day, they're going to support a national security strategy, foreign policy would emanate from that, and a defense strategy would emanate from that national security strategy. But, it's also up to them to make the hard choices about priorities. There's never enough money to go around. And they've got to really make some tough choices here, to be sure. But, we have such gaps and such holes that some of those choices are not too hard to understand what needs to be done. So, yes, I understand what you're saying, Senator, and I'm sympathetic to it, but I'm absolutely convinced the Nation doesn't understand. They really don't understand. And we've got to start with them.
Senator Reed: Mr. Brimley, then Dr. Kagan.

Mr. Brimley: Thank you for your question, Senator.

I would just say, without disagreeing at all -- I would never disagree with General Keane -- but, I would say, to the committee at large, it's not just a question of money. I mean, hypothetically, if sequester caps were lifted in the next few months, and for FY18, if there's a radical increase in defense spending, what do you think would happen? I mean, you know, absent anything else, the Pentagon will simply just keep doing what it's doing, and will just do more of it. They'll buy more short-range tactical fighters, they'll buy more vulnerable surface ships that are particularly vulnerable to antiship cruise missiles, et cetera.

Senator Reed: I think --

Mr. Brimley: The military services, left to their own devices, I think, will basically just keep doing what they're doing. Moreover, absent the reforms -- and, you know, again, appreciate the reforms the committee pushed during this last NDAA -- but, if we don't make progress on personnel reform, if we don't bend the cost curve on military healthcare, if we don't bend the cost curve on personnel, no amount of money is going to fix these problems. When I was in government, I spent a lot of time thinking about posture -- overseas military posture. And we
found ways, at least in the Asia-Pacific, to start what we
dreamed of as a significant rebalance. I think there's a
lot more to do, but things like getting marines in Darwin,
opening the door, at the time, to the Philippines, getting
the Littoral Combat Ship forward-deployed to Singapore,
starting to negotiate with Japan to maybe forward-station
more aircraft carriers. I think there -- you know, frankly,
a mistake that the administration did was taking the BCTs
our of Europe. We ought to put those back in.

I think there are ways where we could do a lot more
without necessarily having to add dramatic amounts of more
dollars to the defense budget. We need to be more engaged
in the world. We need to forward-station our troops and
capabilities around the world. The pushback you get in the
Pentagon when you talk about overseas posture is this notion
that if I'm going to put something, say, in Europe or put
something permanently in Asia, that gives the --
potentially, the services and DOD writ large -- it starts to
lock them down. It somewhat decreases your global
flexibility. So, there's this argument inside the Pentagon
that, if we bring the troops home, and we bring capabilities
home, that gives us more flexibility to rapidly deploy
anywhere in the world where we may be needed. But, that
comes at the cost of being forward and present in key
theaters. We ought to be making bets on Europe, as Dr.
Kagan said. We ought to be making bets on Asia and forward-
station capabilities, and be very creative, and hold the
military services to account. There's a lot we can do to be
more engaged in the world without necessarily having to
increase the defense budget.

Senator Reed: Dr. Kagan, again, you raised this issue
of the will of the American people. And to be blunt, that
will is most -- or sometimes most directly expressed in,
What are you willing to pay for, and how are you willing to
pay for it? Can you comment?

Dr. Kagan: Yeah, I mean, I -- I'm not an expert on
Pentagon budget and what can be saved and what can't be
saved. I'm very dubious that, unless you actually increase
the top-line, that you're going to get what you need,
because I just think, you know, you can only squeeze so far
and be as brilliant as you can be. Brilliant is never going
to be your answer. So, I think the answer is, there's going
to have to be more spending. And, you know, I'm not a
budget expert, writ large, either, but I would say we have
to do whatever we need to do. We have to -- if we need to
raise taxes and we need to have some package that does that,
if we need to find other ways of, you know, dealing with
problems like entitlement spending to do it, we have to do
it. I mean, I lived through the Reagan years. There were
increases in defense budget which were offset by political
bargains of one kind or another that required increase in domestic spending, which led to increased defense budgets. We survived the -- I mean, in overall deficits -- we survived the deficits and won the Cold War. So, I would say we are going to have to, as a Nation, take this seriously enough to pay for it.

Senator Reed: Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman McCain: Senator Inhofe.

Senator Inhofe: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The -- let's start off -- there are some differences between the NDAA -- and I appreciate the comments that you've all made about the -- this NDAA; we're going to get it through, and it's going to improve things -- but differences between the administration and the NDAA. I happened to be in the Ukraine when they had their elections. And it's the first time, as all of you know, in 96 years, there's not one Communist on the Parliament at -- in the Ukraine. And immediately afterwards, Putin came in and started killing people. And we were wanting -- a lot of people were wanting to get defensive weapons over to the Ukraine. They're in this bill. But, the administration was saying that the -- they refused to provide defensive legal assistance to the Ukrainians, for fear of provoking Putin. First question I'd ask you, Do you think Putin really
needs provocation? Or isn't he going to do it anyway?

Mr. Brimley: He doesn't need provocation. I think --
you know, I absolutely support being as -- you know, as --
as forward-leaning as possible in helping our Ukrainian
friends, you know, counter --

Senator Inhofe: Well --

Mr. Brimley: -- counter the aggression.

Senator Inhofe: Yeah. In my -- the reason I asked the
question, my feeling was, at the time, that he was doing
this because he -- the outcome of the -- of Parliament. He
didn't like that. And he's getting bolder and bolder, as
you have said.

Yes, General Keane.

General Keane: Well, I -- there's a larger issue here.

I mean, I think there's been a thought on part of the
administration that any act like that, even assisting
someone so that they can fight aggression, could possibly
create an escalating situation. And I think we get
paralyzed by the fear of adverse consequences.

And there's clearly a pattern here. You know, after --
not only did we not provide largely defensive lethal aid to
the Ukrainians, but, after the -- Libya and Qaddafi was
taken down, you could argue, Well, should we have done that,
or not? But, we did it. And the only thing the new elected
Islamic moderate government asked for us was to help them
create a defensive force to stop the radicals. And we said no. And, as a result of that, we lost our Ambassador, the Consulate, and eventually the Embassy. And the radicals are running around the entire country, the Syrian moderates. You've probably met some of them. They were so desperate, they talked to me. And they wanted -- "Lookit, we don't want your troops, we don't even want your airplanes. Just give us some weapons to be able to fight this guy, Assad, because he's got a modern -- he's got modern equipment. He doesn't have very good soldiers. They lack will. But, they've got tanks and artillery and airplanes, and that makes a difference on the battlefield. Let us fight them. Give us some antitank weapons, some antiaircraft weapons."

And we said no. Look at the problem we have. I mean, that lack of support and engagement is mystifying to me. And to fear that because it may escalate into something else? And we get paralyzed by the fear that it may be something else that -- it's --

Senator Inhofe: Yeah.

General Keane: Some of it's shameful.

Senator Inhofe: I appreciate that.

Let me just, real quickly, on -- my time is running out here -- I was at the meeting also this morning with General Neller. And I commented, and he agreed, that the problem -- one of the problems that we're having is that we don't -- we
have the wrong priority on defending America. I think you just said it a minute ago, that defense of the American people shouldn't have a pricetag. Well, we had a policy from the administration that, when we're getting into sequestration, that we're not going to put additional funding into the military unless an equal amount's going to be given to the nondefense portion of the budget. What does that tell you? It tells you that there's not a priority in defending America. And do you in -- feel the same way? Do you feel that the next administration should have that priority changed?

General Keane: Well, yeah, absolutely. Given the threats that we're facing, and given the leaders of our military who are coming before this committee and telling us what major challenges and security deficiencies that they have, that we can't meet the threats that are out there. And I'm -- and I -- what I tried to explain to you is that, yes, we have to make investments; yes, we have to grow the capability of this force; but, also, we have to look inside this Department as to how it does its business, and hold it accountable for that.

But, yeah, absolutely, these -- this situation that's in the world today is going to get worse if we don't stand up to it. And I think we've learned a couple of lessons from history. Our adversaries look at us in terms of real
capability. And they see that gap closing, just as we see it. And so, rebuilding the military and putting that capability on the table is real. And in and of itself, it becomes a deterrent. That is the wonderful aspect of this. And we learned that through the Cold War. But, the other thing that has to be present, even though you have the capabilities there, and they know those capabilities are real, and they don't want to deal with those capabilities, if we don't have the intent to use that capability, it is not a credible deterrent. And they have to clearly understand where those lines are. Russia's aggression has to stop. China wants to dominate and control the Pacific, and they resent the United States having done it for 70 years. They are forward-deploying forces to do that. That kind of aggression that's taking place that will lead to confrontation, they have to know that we're not going to stand for that. And they have to understand that. So, the intent, as well as the credible military capability, is what is a credible deterrence. And you have to have both.

Senator Inhofe: Mr. Chairman, I've got to say, this is-- I think, may be the best panel that we've had in recent years.

I appreciate your honesty, all of you.

Thank you.

Chairman McCain: Thank you.
Senator Blumenthal.

Senator Blumenthal: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I joined Chairman McCain at the Marine Corps Caucus Breakfast this morning, where the Commandant of the Marine Corps, in some sense surprisingly to me, identified cyber as the major threat and, in fact, I think, clearly indicated that we need a more robust and clear policy and strategy regarding cyber. And one of the aspects of cyber that is perhaps most troubling is that, first of all, it spreads across many different spheres. Chairman McCain identified the potential for crippling our warfighting ability by literally disabling our ships or planes that are dependent on cyber communication, but also the attacks on civilian targets -- our utilities, our financial system, and our election.

So, I take it, Mr. Kagan, you would agree that we need a more clear and strong policy regarding cyber.

Dr. Kagan: Yes. As I say, I'm not a cyber expert, so I couldn't tell you what that policy actually would be, other than, as I say, I think, you know, we need to -- first of all, we, as a Nation, need to be clear about what has happened. And I think -- I mean, I'm only talking about the political side here. I mean, there's still a lot of uncertainty about what exactly has happened. And I think it's very important that the American public know what
happened, who did it, and how. And so that then we can
begin to fashion a response to it, which I think must
include retaliatory action as a deterrent.

Senator Blumenthal: And that investigation of its most recent effort to interfere in our elections is one that really should be done soon, it should have bipartisan support, and it should be sufficiently resourced so that it can be effective. Would you agree?

Dr. Kagan: Yes. And, again, because it's as -- it should be understood as a strategic -- it's a strategic issue, because Russia deploys this political weapon as part of its overall strategy. So, the United States needs to respond as if this were a strategic issue, and forget about who won and didn't win the election. This really is a fundamental strategic question.

Senator Blumenthal: And without going into any of the details that may be, preferably, discussed in a classified setting, no doubt there has been work done -- investigative work done into the Russian actions that were designed to destabilize or interfere with our electoral process. But, separately, you would recommend that the Congress undertake such a study.

Dr. Kagan: Yes. And partly, again, for the reasons that Congress is uniquely suited to then explaining things to the American people in a way that the administration is
not likely to do. I mean, it's just not enough to come up with a secret report on what happened. I think the American people need to understand.

And, by the way, I also think this needs to put in -- be put in a global context, because this activity has been conducted in elections throughout Europe and in a -- as I say, is about to be conducted in elections that are coming up in Europe.

Senator Blumenthal: You mentioned, Mr. Kagan -- and I'd be interested in the opinions of other individuals on this observations -- that the two trends that are troubling are not only the changes in policy on the part of the revisionist powers, but also the growing doubts about our Nation's commitment to our alliances, including recent statements by the President-Elect that we ought to, in effect, withdraw from our commitments to NATO, that our commitments to Japan also perhaps are not worth fulfilling. And I wonder whether you would expand on the effects of those kinds of statements on the world order.

Dr. Kagan: Well, as I say -- and I want to be, you know, clear about this -- I think that, unfortunately, the policies of the outgoing administration had already shaken confidence in -- from the very beginning. I mean, I think the way the initial Russian reset was carried out, which wound up canceling military cooperation programs with
Poland, and the Czech Republic send a very early signal about whether the United States was going to be a reliable ally. I think premature withdrawal from Iraq, the whole redline episode with Syria -- I mean, there's a background here. And so, when I look at what happened during the campaign, I see it as part of a continuum.

But, yes, the statements made by the President-Elect and his proxies during the campaign have definitely raised alarm bells around the world about what the United States role is going to be, and have suggested that it is going to be a different role than the world has been accustomed to.

Now, you know, we can -- are told that the -- people don't mean anything they say in election campaigns. And maybe that'll turn out to be true. But, that's why I think that a very high priority, and a first priority of the administration, must be to go out and reassure, publicly and privately, the allies that we are fully committed to all of our defense commitments. And, as I say, more than that, to say that we are going to keep up with the rising challenges that those countries face by taking the necessary steps, in terms of our own capacities to do that.

Senator Blumenthal: Thank you very much.

My time is expired. But, at some point during the hearing, I'd be interested in what the two other witnesses have to say about both those areas.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman McCain: Senator Blumenthal, in order for continuity, we could have those comments now.

General Keane: Well, let me just add, as much as there are issues in the cyber area with the United States military, it also is the most protected function that we have. You know as well as I do that our critical infrastructure is exposed. By that I mean our banking and financial system, our utility infrastructure, our transportation system. They're all relatively exposed. The Congress here tried to work public-private partnerships in some legislation a few years ago. I think Senator Lieberman led that effort with others, and we couldn't get it done, mainly because the private sector did not want to make the commitment that it would take, largely in terms of dollars, to provide that kind of security.

There's a presidential commission reporting out this week that's got a number of recommendations, so I think we need to take a hard look at what they're looking at. And this mostly deals with -- because they're not -- they don't have access to the -- what the militaries do, in a classified sense -- this largely has to do with the private sector. But, it will take public-private partnership to provide that kind of security. And let's face it, I mean, cyberattacks on the United States have been absolutely
exploding, you know, in terms of stealing technology, intellectual property, and obviously also in just stealing critical information. And largely, we have not been responding. And I don't know how you stop something like that if they're not paying a price for it. And largely, they're not paying a price for it, Senator. And that clearly has to be a part of our strategy.

So, yes, we -- but, we have to find ways to defend that critical infrastructure, and hopefully the presidential commission will give us some ideas on what the Congress needs to do to help do that. And there are some things on the military side that we need to shore up.

Mr. Brimley: I would just say, sir, quickly, on the allies-and-partners question. I agree with Dr. Kagan. I'm somewhat worried about the comments I saw from the President-Elect and his team. But, I'm inclined to give them the benefit of the doubt, certainly during the transition. I would think that, upon taking office -- to execute any of the at least rhetorical policies I've heard, vis-a-vis China or Iran, or even the comments on Taiwan, all of those things require robust alliances and partnerships. And moreover, the selection, I would think, of General Mattis, who spent years fostering strong alliances and partnerships in places like Central Command, for instance, I'm hopeful that the next team will be -- at the Cabinet
level, will have folks that are deeply versed in the value
to us of having a strong strategy buttressed by strong
alliances and partnerships.
Chairman McCain: Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the direction that this committee meeting
is focused on. In particular, I'm curious as to whether or
not perhaps the committee has gone far enough with the NDAA
proposal this year. We've directed, for the first time
ever, that the President of the United States must now
define when an act in cyberspace would require a military
response. It started out with a discussion that we had as
to whether or not we should define a cyber act of war. It's
been refined a little bit in the discussion. And I think
it's a very appropriate item to have.
Would it be fair to say that -- have we gone far
enough, or do we have to go farther, in terms of what we're
expecting from the administration?
Mr. Brimley: I'm happy to go first with that, sir.
It's hard to know from the outside. I think a lot of
the most useful strategic guidance in this domain would be
highly classified. But, just from my own basic experience
in this, wrestling with this act-of-war question, I think
that's something that can and should be debated openly and
publicly. I think we ought to do more. Like I said, the
second- and third-order consequences of getting involved in offensive operations, for instance, are problematic. Just to the earlier point on cyber, writ large, I do worry a little bit about the military services and sort of running to the ball on cyber. You know, I want the Marine Corps focused on closing with and destroying the enemy, you know, from amphibious operations and the like. I want the Army focused on, you know, major combat operations. I want the Air Force focused on what it does best. I -- sometimes I worry that, sort of, the lack of -- the necessity to have each military services investing in cyber, along with the broader architecture of Cyber Command and the NSA, it -- I'm not sure the incentives are properly there. And each military service chief feels compelled to focus on cyber, because they have to. I -- sometimes I worry that that focus sometimes can protract from what the military services, in my mind, their core missions ought to be. Thinking about seapower, thinking about airpower. Obviously, cyber is a component of this. You know, but sometimes I worry that they are -- that the demands for each military service detract from their core mission. And I think cyber ought to be, you know, a stronger voice, perhaps, from Cyber Command and maybe even OSD is appropriate.

Senator Rounds: Dr. Kagan?
Dr. Kagan: Senator, forgive me, I've already exceeded my knowledge of cyber in this hearing.

Senator Rounds: General Keane.

General Keane: Well, I think the committee focus with the military portion of cyber deals with Cyber Command, itself. And they have responsibility for the function, both from a defense perspective and from an offense perspective. And I don't believe that this is an area that's going to require major investment strategy that compares anything to the lack of combat brigades, the lack of proper type of combat aircraft, or the lack of proper types of submarines and ships. And I would leave it to the commander there to understand exactly what he needs to properly defend the military. And also, I know he's got the offensive tools. It's the defensive tools that are the issue.

Senator Rounds: Interesting to me. And I -- my time is -- I've got a short amount of time left, but I'm just curious. Throughout this discussion, we've talked cyber, we've talked some readiness issues, we've talked some challenges with regard to our naval forces, air forces, army. But, we really have not said much at all about space. And yet, everything everybody's got is dependent upon our ability to protect our own assets within space. How vulnerable are we? And should we be placing additional emphasis on the protection of our own assets from kinetic
attack in space?

General Keane: Well, the short answer is yes. As our adversaries have acquired all the technology that we have, you -- we know for a fact it's part of their asymmetric strategy to deny us as much of our space-baked technology as possible. And they practice it routinely. You know as well as I do, the Chinese have been shooting satellites down for years, getting ready for that asymmetric strategy against us. So, most definitely, there's -- we're not going to go back, in terms of that technology and our dependence. And protecting it is an investment strategy, to be sure, but it is not on the scale of what is needed for our offensive capability, which is lacking.

Senator Rounds: Thank you.

My time is expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman McCain: Senator King.

Senator King: I also want to associate myself with the comments of Senator Inhofe, and thank the Chairman and the Ranking Member for arranging this hearing. This is -- this has been a very insightful and important.

To follow up on this -- just a quick question on the cyber issue. I wonder your opinions of splitting the cyber from Cyber Command and NSA. It strikes me that those are two different, very important, very engaging functions, and I wonder if the time has come to acknowledge the importance
of each and make those two different individuals.

General Keane, your thoughts?

General Keane: Yeah, I wouldn't split it. I mean --

Senator King: You would not.

General Keane: No, no, absolutely not. Because the main tool that you're actually going to use is NSA. That is-- that's where most of our capability truly is. And if Keith Alexander was sitting here -- he's a good friend of mine, and I've talked to him at length about this -- he would argue against splitting it.

Senator King: I --

General Keane: You're going to wind up --

Senator King: I've had that discussion with him --

General Keane: -- creating more bureaucracy than we actually need if we do that.

Senator King: Mr. Brimley? Mr. Kagan?

Mr. Brimley: I've been back and forth on this particular question, myself, over the years. You know, I think one of the major problems we have with cyber, as it pertains to the government and also the military, is, you know, we're competing for talent with the private sector, we're competing for talent from the international community, as well. And which leads me to believe that, you know, splitting, you know, one rather -- you know, one bureaucratic entity into two
bureaucratic entities, you know, I think that could -- you
know, and setting those bureaucratic entities in some sort
of competition with one another for talent, whether it's
civilian talent or military talent -- it's probably not the
real issue. I would be more interested in, you know, making
sure that, from a military perspective, we have the ability
to direct-commission folks from, say, Silicon Valley who
want to serve as reservists or who can serve on Active Duty
for 1 or 2 years; you know, flexible hiring authorities for
the civilian side; you know, flexible spending incentive
programs to be able to compensate our best and brightest.
Maybe not, obviously, from a private-sector level, but
making it more attractive for folks to serve, both on the
civilian side and military side, I think that's where we
ought to focus much of our energy. And the wiring diagrams,
I think, are less important in that regard.

Senator King: Thank you. Thank you.

General Keane, I was struck by your testimony about the
bureaucracy in the Army which stalled the development of new
weapon systems and the deployment. That's a structural
issue and a cultural issue. It's hard -- these aren't bad
people saying, "We don't want to do good things." How do we
deal with the cultural structural issue? Because we're
seeing this across the -- all the services, and in
procurement, generally, of new technology. It takes too
long, and it's too expensive.

General Keane: Yeah, the -- it's a great question.
And the only way you get at that is with absolutely strong
leadership that is not going to tolerate that. And you've
got to bore down on it. First, you've got to get educated,
yourself, because -- most people, like I do -- I came to the
Pentagon, because I ran effective organizations at different
levels. But, I didn't know anything about the business side
of the Army. The first time I got exposed to it was when I
was a four-star general. And I was handicapped, initially,
because I didn't know what was going on. It took me, what,
a year, year and a half, to understand this issue.

So, having people there who are strong leaders, want to
get these results, holding the system accountable for it,
really driving innovation and technology, who you put in
there as Secretary of the Army, the civilian Under Secretary
of the Army -- a lot of times -- just be frank with you --
we put people in there, you know, who enjoy the ceremonial
aspect of it, they enjoy being Secretary of the Army, but
they don't drive change in the culture because they're --
it's a reward for something they've done.

Senator King: So, selection of leaders is a crucial
element, looking for innovative and willingness to move.
Let me --

General Keane: You've got to force the R&D effort, and
you've got to talk to civilian -- you've got to talk to the
defense industry on a regular basis, because the defense
industry is spending their time thinking about your
function. They're all -- they're also spending research
dollars on it. You have to have regular communication with
them, let them know where you're trying to go, bring them
into it to help contribute to it, drive your own people to
work with them, as well. We can accelerate this process
rather dramatically.

Senator King: And I would suggest that we have to.

Let me quickly move on to one other question. There's
an extraordinary story in this morning's Washington Post
about a report done by McKinsey and by the Business Board a
the Defense Department, $125 billion of savings identified
over 5 years. That would be enough to fund the nuclear
modernization program. Do we need to take seriously --
because we're talking about increasing the defense budget,
but how about talking about using the dollars we have more
effectively?

Mr. Brimley, your thoughts?

Mr. Brimley: Quickly, sir. Absolutely. I mean, that
report -- I think it was the Defense Business Board Report -
- I mean, I remember reading that a few years ago when it
came out. I'm glad to see it's finally being reported on,
you know, at significant levels now.
Senator King: Well, it's pretty disappointing that --
Mr. Brimley: Absolutely.
Senator King: -- it took digging to get it out.
Mr. Brimley: Absolutely. I -- and I would just say, as part of your hearings, your posture hearings in 2017, as part of the budget debates, I mean, you ought to hold the next Pentagon team to account in not only advocating for more defense dollars, but making sure those defense dollars are better spent. And that's going to take advancing the reform agenda that this committee has laid out in the NDAA.
Senator King: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain: Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, gentlemen.
This has been a great discussion this morning. And I hope that, Mr. Chairman, we can continue and not just discuss it, but actually see some actions behind the words. So, I'm really encouraged about what we're touching upon today.
But, I would like to get your thoughts on ISIS in Southeast Asia, because I do think it's something that we haven't spent a lot of time focusing on. We're not talking about it nearly enough. And Islamic extremist groups in Southeast Asia, like the Abu Sayyaf group, they are all coming together under the flag of ISIS. And it's a bit
concerning.

Earlier this year, both General Dunford and Secretary Carter agreed on my assessment of ISIS in the region, and they shared those concerns, as well. But, since that time, ISIS-linked groups have carried out a number of attacks. Just last week, we saw an attack against the Philippine President's security detail, and we saw a bombing near the U.S. Embassy. So, continuing escalation of violence in that area by those extremist groups.

And, Mr. Brimley, I'd like to start with you, because you did mention the rebalance towards the Pacific, and -- you've mentioned that rebalance. And I think, when that first started, the focus was very much on China and maybe North Korea, some of those aspects, but now we have ISIS engaging heavily in the Philippines. You spoke about the Marines in Darwin and other activities. Can you talk a little bit what you think our administration, the incoming administration, should do to really address this rising threat of ISIS in Southeast Asia?

Mr. Brimley: Sure. Thank you, Senator.

I would just say, we saw this before, you know, in 2001-2002, you know, terrorist groups in the region that have their own, sort of, particular interests as it pertains to the countries in which they operate. I mean, I think there's a lot of branding going on. And we saw, in -- after
9/11, a lot of terrorist groups around the world, but somehow they're affiliated with al Qaeda, and that gave them some, sort of, I guess, marketing prowess. And it's -- it doesn't surprise me that we're seeing that again with ISIS. But, I would just say, from a DOD perspective, one of the ways -- you know, I think our posture in the region ought be focused on maintaining the regional order. And we need to be able to prepare to go toe-to-toe with countries and threats. I'm worried about China. I'm worried about North Korea and the like. But, one of the tangible second-order benefits that we get from forward-deploying our troops and capabilities overseas is, we have that daily connectivity, and we have that daily deterrent prowess in places around the region.

One of the debates that you see and hear inside the Pentagon, or one of the debates that we had in the -- inside the Pentagon as it pertains to, say, the Marines in Darwin, for instance, is, you know, you start to break apart these larger entities, like a marine air/ground task force, for instance, and you start to put -- you know, put a company here in southern Philippines, and put a -- you know, a task force of some kind in Australia, and there's a tradeoff between doing that, which gives you that kind of daily interaction with local communities, the ability to do counterterrorism operations, for instance, but there is some
risk that it becomes more difficult to quickly bring those
capabilities back together for a larger threat, responding
to a larger threat. And that's the balance that DOD,
particularly OSD, has to grapple with every day.

And I would just encourage the committee, as you think
about the -- what -- the Defense Strategy Review, what used
to be the QDR, that the next administration will do next
year, that you -- you're very aggressive with them in
articulating, you know, what you want to see out of the
strategy, classified briefings for all these factors, and
making sure that all these different constituent elements
are part of that strategy and it's not -- it's not just a
public-relations document, which is what QDRs, I think,
unfortunately, have tended to evolve into, which is part of
the reason the committee took its action it did to make the
QDR a Defense Strategy Review with a classified component.

Senator Ernst: Very good, thank you.

And, General Keane, could you talk a little bit more
about, militarily, what we could be doing in that region,
and the uses of forces?

General Keane: Yeah, absolutely.

And ISIS has expanded into 35 countries. And we don't
really have a strategy to deal with any of that. We're
focused on the territory that they took, certainly, in Iraq
and Syria. And I'm not saying that's not appropriate. That
should be a priority. But, commensurate with that priority, we should be addressing these other areas, as well. And a lot of the identification with ISIS is aspirational, but they also have affiliates in these countries. This is one of them. And what they -- with an affiliate, they actually sign a document together to abide by certain ISIS principles and rules. And in some cases, they direct; some cases, they provide aid; but in most cases, there's no direction. And that's largely the case here.

But, I believe what the United States can do, with its allies, is that -- you know, we've been at war with organizations like this now for 15 years, and our reservoir of knowledge and capability here is pretty significant. And it far exceeds anybody else in the world. But, we have allies that are participating with us. There's much we can do with them, in sharing intelligence and helping them with training and also helping them with technology -- not expensive technology, but things that can truly make a difference, you know, with those troops. And I don't think we necessarily have to be directly involving in fighting these forces ourselves, but aiding and supporting these forces, and having a strategy to do that, and lining up some priorities for ourselves -- because we have limited amount of resources -- but, make some choices, you know, based on what that threat is and what it may be -- its implications
for the region could help guide us to what those priorities should be.

Senator Ernst: I appreciate your input.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chairman McCain: Senator Shaheen.

Senator Shaheen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, both to the Chair and Ranking Member, and also to all of our panelists, for giving us a lot to think about this morning.

Dr. Kagan, I want to begin with you and with your comments about Russia's interference in our elections, because this is something that I have found very troubling. And, in fact, before Congress went out, before the October recess, called on hearings to better look at what was going on. And we know that we've had Secretary Johnson and other Homeland Security officials say that there is evidence of Russian hacking into our electoral system that goes to the highest levels of the Russian government. And that was done, not to influence the outcome of the election, necessarily, but to sow confusion about whether our electoral process was working. And yet, to date, there has not been one hearing on this issue in this Congress. And what I was told when I asked about a hearing -- and I have, again, called on the Foreign Relations Committee, on which I sit, to do a hearing, and I know that they're considering
it-- but I was told that there was concern that this might
be viewed as a partisan issue.

So, I am very heartened by your point that this is not
a partisan issue. In fact, the first person I heard raise
it in Congress was Senator McCain, the Chairman of this
committee, who talked about the efforts to hack into the
Arizona and Illinois voter files.

So, I couldn't agree more, this is a hearing that we
ought to undertake because it's important to our American
democracy, it's important to European democracy, when we
look at what Russia's doing in eastern Europe, as you point
out, in Germany, in France, the potential for them to
continue to sow mischief.

What kinds of -- you also talked about taking
retaliatory action against Russia for what they're doing --
what kinds of efforts would you suggest we look at, in terms
of trying to retaliate or respond to what Russia is doing in
the United States?

Dr. Kagan: Well, there are -- I'm sure there are
people better equipped to answer that question than I am,
but I would, you know, publish the Swiss bank accounts of
all the oligarchs around -- I mean, just these -- there are
all kinds of things that you could do that would cause --

Senator Shaheen: Yeah, keep --

Dr. Kagan: Well, I mean --
Senator Shaheen: -- saying a few more of those, because I think those are helpful.

Dr. Kagan: You know, you could talk about all the ways in which -- you know, you could reveal stuff about the way Putin has manipulated his own elections. I mean, there's all kinds of stuff out there, which, if you were of a mind to do it, you could do that would be embarrassing, of one kind or another. I mean, these people have money stashed all over the world. They have dachas, they have villas, et cetera. They -- this is a kind of a Mafia organization, where, you know, part of the game is everybody holding together. There's ways to create divisions and difficulties. I mean, it -- I'm sure, as I say, there are people who could -- if you put them to the task -- and I'm -- for all I know, they have been put to the task -- you could come up with a whole list of things.

And, by the way, I wouldn't make an announcement of it. They'll -- they would understand what had happened. But, until we do something like that, it's just open season for them to do this. And so, I think we've already -- we need to treat this like any other weapon system that's being deployed, because they are treating it like a weapon system.

Senator Shaheen: Thank you.

Well, Mr. Chairman and Senator Reed, I hope that this committee will also consider hearings on this topic.
Let me follow up on Senator King's issue that he raised with respect to the Pentagon study that was reported in the Washington Post, because -- I haven't read the study. I don't know whether the concerns that are raised by some of the Pentagon officials in this news story are accurate, or not, but the very fact that it was buried -- or the attempt was to bury it by Pentagon officials, I think, is a very bad message to be sending, especially in an organization that can't even get ready for an audit until 2017. I don't know how long we've been asking for an audit. It's been since I got on this committee, in 2011, so that's at least 6 years. And I suspect it's been longer than that. So, there are clearly, as all of you pointed out, bureaucratic changes that need to be made in the Department.

And one of the things, General Keane, that you pointed out is that there is a predilection to try and kill some of the innovative programs so that the Pentagon can actually do those themselves. We had this experience with the Small Business Innovation Research Program as we're going into this NDAA, because the initial effort was to try and increase the amount of money that DOD is making available to small businesses to do innovation. And I think we've heard from a number of panelists previously that this is one of the best research programs that still exists within -- for small businesses to produce innovation that's used by the
Department of Defense.

So, is this the kind of initiative that you're talking about that there may be, for whatever reason, efforts to try and keep it from putting more money into that small-business effort to produce innovation?

General Keane: I certainly encourage that. The -- you know, the Active Protective System that I was talking about and that, when DARPA, you know, made a call to the people to come forward, and they knew that this would be an advanced technology that could actually change warfare, the contractor that the United States Army has gone to is a small-business contractor. So, here's this small-business contractor, conceptualized this capability themselves, and it will revolutionize combat warfare as we go forward. They also have technology, interesting enough, and they brought military leaders out to see it. They can stop a bullet. In other words, a 50-caliber bullet, they can kill the bullet. And it's all because of -- everything -- all of this is available on the private sector.

Senator Shaheen: Right.

General Keane: Microchip technology, as I mentioned, and unbelievable software applied to that technology. Well, that's revolutionary technology, what I just mentioned to you. It changes warfare. And so, that is something we should be investing in. We should put money behind this. I
have no affiliation with this organization, let's get that straight, so -- but, yes, this is -- absolutely right, this is America. We're the most innovative, creative people on the planet. And it's out there, and we have to unleash it and bring it in. It doesn't have to necessarily be a giant organization that does it. There are Americans out there doing this stuff. And they're creative. And, lookit, they changed a -- the whole dot-com aspect of our lives out there in California by the innovation and creativity that these engineers have. We've got to tap into it.

Senator Shaheen: Well, my time is up. Thank you,

General Keane.

I would point out that the reauthorization of the SBIR program is in this NDAA for 5 years, which I think is very positive, and I applaud the Chairman and Ranking Member for that. Unfortunately, the increase in spending on that program did not make it into the bill.

Thank you all.

Chairman McCain: Senator Lee.

Senator Lee: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thanks, to each of you, for being here. Thanks for all you do to keep Americans informed and to keep Americans aware of what we're discussing today; that is, the emerging threats to our security.

There are a number of threats we face around the world,
and it's important to keep those threats in mind as we approach this exciting new period in our history, in which we've got a new administration coming. And one of the many threats that we face in any era, in any administration, relates to the threat posed by the excessive accumulation of power in the hands of a few. We see that happen around the world, and sometimes we see it within our own government. It's one of the reasons why our system is set up the way it is. The Constitution of the United States is designed specifically to protect us against that kind of threat here at home, and it does so by wisely dividing that authority between Congress and the presidency.

The framers believed that forcing the two political branches of government -- that is, the two political branches that are not the judiciary -- to collaborative, to interact with each other; where necessary, to serve as a check and as a balance on each other -- and that this would provide us the best means toward achieving a stable, successful, and, hopefully, relatively popular foreign policy; that is, one that, in one way or another, reflects the will of the people, or at least is likely to be geared toward their interests.

But, for several decades, Congress, quite regrettably, in my opinion, has deliberately abdicated many of its constitutional responsibilities. And it's just sort of
handed it over to the executive branch, being willing to
take a backseat role -- a backseat role, at best, in
determining America's role around the world on how we're
going to combat threats that face us. The result ends up
being a foreign policy that is made primarily within the
executive branch bureaucracy and Washington insider circles,
informed, as they tend to be, by the interests and the
aspirations of the so-called international community. And
as -- this is a circle that increasingly becomes untethered
from any clear lines of accountability connecting policy,
policymakers, and the American people.

For instance, the U.S. military is currently operating
in the Middle East under a very broad -- I believe,
irresponsibly broad interpretation of a 15-year-old
Authorization for the Use of Military Force, using it as
justification to engage in a pretty broad range of actions,
from intervening in two separate civil wars to propping up a
failing Afghan government. Meanwhile, the executive branch
seems increasingly inclined to choose and identify and
engage threats through covert actions. And that further
helps the executive branch to avoid the scrutiny that would
be available if stronger congressional oversight existed.
And they avoid that kind of scrutiny and public
accountability.

Now, this may be convenient for Members of Congress who
want nothing more than to just have someone else to blame
for decisions that turn out to be unpopular or unsuccessful,
but it's an affront to the Constitution. And it's more than
that. It's more than just an affront to a 229-year-old
document. It's an affront to the system of representative
government that we have dedicated ourselves to as Americans.
And I think it's an insult to the American people, who are
losing patience with a foreign policy that they feel
increasingly and very justifiably disconnected from.
Notwithstanding the fact that they're still asked, from time
to time, to send their sons and daughters into harm's way to
defend.

So, as we discuss these emerging threats to our
national security, I'd encourage this committee and all of
my colleagues to prioritize the threat that will inevitably
come to us if we continue to preserve the status quo and to
exclude the American people and their elected
representatives -- in many cases, ourselves -- from the
process.

So, I have a question for our panelists. One of the
focuses of this committee has been on the readiness crisis
within the military brought about by the conflicts we're
facing in the Middle East and by a reduction in the amount
of money that the Pentagon has access to. Easy answer to
this is often, "Well, let's just increase spending." That's
not to say that that's not necessary, now or in other circumstances, in particular, but setting aside that, that is one approach that people often come up with. But, another option that I think has to be considered, and perhaps ought be considered first, is to reexamine the tasks and the priorities that we're giving to our military leaders and to ask whether these purposes that we're seeking readiness for are truly in the interests of the American people, those we're representing, those who are paying the bill for this, and those who are asked to send their sons and daughters --

Chairman McCain: The Senator's time has expired.

Senator Lee: -- into harm's way. So --

Chairman McCain: The Senator's time has expired.

Senator Kaine.

Senator Lee: Could I just ask a one-sentence question, Mr. Chairman, to --

Chairman McCain: Yes, but I would appreciate courtesy to the other members that if -- make one long opening statement, it does not leave time for questions.

Senator is recognized for a question.

Senator Lee: Do you believe that the Congress, the White House, and the executive branch agencies have done an adequate job in reaching consensus on what the American people's interests are and on calibrating the military and
diplomatic means to appropriate ends?

Dr. Kagan: Do we answer?

I don't accept this dichotomy that you've posited between what the Congress and the President do and what the American people want. I mean, when I think of some of the -- first of all, historically, the executive has always had tremendous influence on foreign policy, much -- whatever the Constitution may say, although the Constitution did give the executive tremendous power to make foreign policy, if you go back to Jefferson, the willingness to deploy force without congressional approval; you can go all the way through 200 years of history. I'm not sure it's substantially different. But, in any case, that's been the general prejudice. The founders wanted energy in the executive, and particularly in the conduct of foreign policy. That was the lesson of the Revolutionary War. That's why they created a Constitution which particularly gave power to the executive.

But, also, I just don't believe that the American people are constantly having things foisted on them that they didn't approve of. So, one of the most controversial things that's happened, obviously, in recent decade, that people talk about all the time, is the Iraq War, which was voted on, debated at length, and Congress, 72-to-28 I think was the vote, something like that, the American people -- public opinion was in favor of it, just as the American
people was in favor of World War I, the Spanish-American War. Later, these wars turn out to be bad or badly handled, the American people decide that it was a terrible idea, and then people start saying, "Well, who did this?" And the American people want to find somebody to blame for doing these things. They don't want to take responsibility for their own decisions.

I don't believe we have a fundamentally undemocratic way of making foreign policy decisions. I think it's complicated. I think mistakes are made. Foreign policy is all about failure. People don't want to acknowledge that failure is the norm in foreign policy, and then they want to blame people for failure. But, I think the American people are participants in this process.

Senator Kaine: Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Keane: The only thing I would add is, I do think Congress should be more involved with the use of force when we're deploying force overseas. And I think Congress has walked away from that responsibility recently. You have a colleague here who's been banging on this for some time: Senator Kaine. And I would hope that this new administration would welcome congressional involvement when the Nation is going to commit its forces.

Mr. Brimley: Sir, very quickly, I would just say, you
know, the Defense Strategy Review that the Pentagon is mandated to provide this committee and Congress and the American people, that's a great forum to engage in these questions. What -- readiness for what? Force structure for what? Modernization priorities. These are all things that can be debated openly. These are things which the Pentagon is congressionally required to submit. And, you know, I think that's a great forum for these discussions.

Chairman McCain: Senator Kaine.

Senator Kaine: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

And thanks, to the witnesses.

An observation and two questions.

Observation. I was chairman of the Democratic National Committee from 2009 through early 2011, and we had a file cabinet in the office, with a plaque over it, and it was a file cabinet that was invaded in 1972 at the Watergate complex when materials were taken out of the DNC. The materials that were taken were modest, and it made no outcome on what was one of the biggest landslide elections in the history of the United States. And yet, it led to one of -- a very searching congressional inquiry, not because of the outcome of the election, but it led to a searching inquiry because of a desire to uphold the integrity of our electoral processes.

I associate myself with comments of Dr. Kagan and some
of the witnesses here. There have been requests of the Foreign Relations Committee, Armed Services Committee. There was a letter to the President from Democrats on the Intel Committee, dated November 29, asking that the President declassify information with regard to the engagement of Russia in activity concerning the American presidential election. I think it's absolutely critical that the American public know what happened, that Congress know what happened, and that we then figure out what we can do to avoid such instances, by Russia or anybody else, in the future. But, my fear is, if we don't do what we did, back in the '70s, in such an instance -- and that wasn't a foreign government undertaking to influence an American election -- but, if we don't, as Congress, stand up to protect the integrity of the system, that we're going to regret it in a lot of ways in the future. And that's observation.

Question. I thought it was interesting, Dr. Kagan, you talked about two trends: the historical rejuvenation project ambitions of certain nations and a retreating American willingness to be engaged. A third trend that I'm kind of interested in -- I certainly see the first two -- a third one is the increase of the power of nonstate organizations that don't follow any of the rules, Geneva Conventions, et cetera, and whether that -- it be ISIL or al
al-Qaeda or al-Nusra or ah-Shabaab, or whether it be, you know, global organizations that can offshore everything or the Sinaloa Cartel, there's a lot of nonstate organizations that use violence to achieve their end or use a nonstate capacity to avoid accountability. And I think that is a trend that is also a pretty important trend that is hard for us to completely get our minds around, because so many of our doctrines are doctrines that we have developed thinking about state versus state. So, I'm just curious, in my first question, if you would just say something briefly about that trend, the rise of a nonstate willing to use violence or other nefarious ends, and how we should factor that into our strategic thinking.

Dr. Kagan: Well, obviously, it's a problem, and -- although I always find it ironic that these nonstate actors, all they really want to do is become a state. I mean, that's ISIS's great goal, is to be a state. So, you know, when I hear about how the state is becoming less important, that's all that these nonstate actors want to be. But, it's obviously something that we are engaged in, must be engaged in dealing with.

What I would just say is, it's not going to be the rise of nonstate actors that upends the world order. It is going to be a constant problem, a constant threat, and, in some paradoxical way, a greater threat to the homeland in
particular instances. But, it is only the great powers, the
great revisionist powers that are capable of undoing this
world order that the United States created after World War
II. And so, while we have to do everything, I just don't
want us to lose sight of what I consider to be the main
game, because we can fight a kind of low-level battle
against nonstate actors for a long time. And we will be.
But, once the order has blown up -- well, we've seen what
happens when the order blows up. And that's what -- we've
got to make sure that we are preventing that from happening.

Senator Kaine: Let me ask one other question. Dr.
Kagan, again, you said something interesting about how China
wants to be a hegemon in Asia and the Pacific. Russia wants
to be a hegemon in Europe. And they resist and resent the
fact that the U.S. has played this role, post World War II,
in engagement in international institutions and our own
unilateral activity around the globe. You know, as they
think about the future, when they think about a future where
they would be hegemons in their regions and the U.S. would
be a hegemon in the Americas. Because I -- one of the
things I'm questioning is, by trying to do a little bit
ev everywhere, we're actually not doing very much in the
Americas; and the activity of China, for example, in the
Americas is very significant. So, I'm not sure we're
committing the resources to do the global mission, nor are
we committing the resources even to play the kind of leadership role that I think we could play in the Americas. But, I'm curious as to any of your thoughts on that. Thank you.

Mr. Brimley: Well, sir, I would just say quickly, again, I don't think it's simply a matter of dollars and money. I think there are things we can do in Asia, there are things we can do in Europe that won't break the bank. I remember when we put together what became this Asia rebalance, and we came up with a briefing for then-Secretary Gates, you know, and there were three maps that we gave him. One map was the status quo of our posture in the region. One map was a -- sort of a 20-year -- what things could like in 20 years, and it was pretty, you know, ambitious, in terms of what the posture would look like. And the third slide was what we called, sort of -- at least I called "baby steps." Here are things that we can do inside the FYDP that are not going to break the bank, that are politically doable, that aren't going to be, you know, politically controversial, in the sense of taking things away from, say, our bases here at home. And that's when we came up Darwin and Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore, and some other things in the Philippines at the time. And the vision was that we could do these sorts of small episodic baby steps year after year, administration after administration. If we
had that political will, over the course of 20 years, it would amount to something truly strategic. And that's still my hope. And I -- and so, I don't think it requires huge amounts of new defense dollars to reinvest in our posture in places like the Asia-Pacific in ways that would detract from doing more in, say, North and South America.

General Keane: I'd just add one thing on your nonstate actors. You know, in -- they certainly know that they cannot defeat the United States military or militaries that exist in Europe. But, that's not their objective. I mean, their objective is to break our will, to force us back into ourselves so that they can have their way, you know, with the caliphate that they want to establish. And they think by routinely killing us, it would force us to disengage and withdraw. And that's, in my judgment, not going to happen. They dramatically underestimate the character and will and strength of the American people. Bin Laden did the same thing. He thought he was going to break our will by doing 9/11, and quite the opposite occurred as a result of it.

But, there is something that we have to be very careful of. We don't want to be very dismissive of this kind of warfare, because we've known for years the al Qaeda's pursuit of WMD. And, make no mistake about it, obviously if one of these organizations got their hands on it, they would certainly use it, as brutal and fanatic as they are about
killing people. And also, one of the things that troubles us -- the Director of the National Security Agency would --
could speak better on it than I -- but, we've been
concerned, for a number of years, that radical Islamic
organization will likely buy a offensive capability from the
Russians, who are -- half of what they devote to cyber is
criminal. And buy that capability, and do some real damage
to the United States in a way that 9/11 could never have
done. So, the -- you -- we cannot underestimate the intent
of the nonstate actors while we attempt to control what
they're doing.

Chairman McCain: Senator Graham.

Senator Graham: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
for holding an important hearing on a very difficult topic,
and to all the committee members for showing up. We're
talking about important things to an empty room. Just look.
Just look.

So, Iran with a nuke. Number one -- I'm going to ask,
like 45 questions in 5 minutes. Give brief answers if you
can. If you can't, don't say a word.

[Laughter.]

Senator Graham: Do you believe that the Iranians, in
the past, have been trying to develop a nuclear weapon, not
a nuclear powerplant for peaceful purposes?

Mr. Brimley: Yes.
General Keane: Nuclear weapon, yes.

Dr. Kagan: Yes.

Senator Graham: All right, three for three.

Do you believe that there's -- that's their long-term goal, in spite of what they say, is to have a nuclear weapon?

General Keane: Yes.

Senator Graham: Do you believe that would be one of the most destabilizing things in the world?

Mr. Brimley: Yes.

Senator Graham: Do you believe the Arabs will get one of their own?

Mr. Brimley: Yes.

Senator Graham: Do you believe the Iranians might actually use the weapon if they got one? The Ayatollah?

General Keane: Well, I think the -- before I answer that, I think there's just as great a chance that the Arabs would use their weapon --

Senator Graham: Okay. Well, so --

General Keane: -- as a first strike --

Senator Graham: -- we don't know -- well, let's -- Bob, you should your hand. Do you -- if you're Israel, what bet would you make?

Dr. Kagan: I would bet my 100-plus nuclear weapons would be a deterrent to their use of nuclear weapons.
Senator Graham: Okay. But, what if he wants to die and doesn't mind taking you with him? What does he want? Does he want to destroy Israel, or is he just getting -- when the Ayatollah says he wants to wipe Israel out, is that all talk?

Dr. Kagan: I don't know if it's all talk, and I don't blame people for being nervous. We lived under -- the United States, we all lived under the shadow of possible nuclear war for 50 years.

Senator Graham: Yeah, but, you know, on their worst day, the Russians didn't have a religious doctrine that wanted to destroy everybody. Do you believe he's a religious Nazi at his heart? Or you don't know? Answer maybe you don't know.

Dr. Kagan: Well, look, I believe that they -- he clearly is that -- believes in a fanatical religion, but --

Senator Graham: Well, here's what I believe.

Dr. Kagan: -- I'm not -- okay, go ahead.

Senator Graham: Okay. I believe that you ought to take him seriously, based on their behavior. Number one --

General Keane: I think we should take him seriously. How -- whether they're religious fanatics or not, I don't think is that relevant. Clearly, their geopolitical goals to dominate the Middle East strategically, to destroy the state of Israel, and to drive the United States out of the
Middle East, they have talked about it every single year --

Senator Graham: Well, do you think that's their goal?

General Keane: Yes, that --

Senator Graham: Okay.

General Keane: Of course it's their goal.

Senator Graham: So --

General Keane: And not only is it their goal, but they're succeeding at it.

Senator Graham: Do you think we should deny them that goal?

Dr. Kagan: Yes.

Senator Graham: Good.

Dr. Kagan: To put a nuclear weapon on it to --

Senator Graham: Do you believe it should be the policy of the United States Congress and the next President to deny them that capability?

Mr. Brimley: I believe so.

Senator Graham: Would you support an Authorization to Use Military Force that would stop the ability of the North Koreans to develop a missile that could reach the United
States? Do you think Congress would be wise to do that?

Mr. Brimley: I think Congress should debate it. I remember distinctly the op-ed that Secretary William Perry and Ashton Carter --

Senator Graham: Well, I'm going to introduce one. Would you vote for it if you were here?

Dr. Kagan: Only if Congress was willing to do what was necessary to follow up --

Senator Graham: Well, do you think Congress should be willing to authorize any President, regardless of party, to stop North Korea from developing a missile that can hit the homeland?

Dr. Kagan: Only if Congress is willing to follow up with what might be required, depending on North Korea's response.

Senator Graham: Well, what might be required is to stop their nuclear program through military force. That's why you would authorize it.

Dr. Kagan: No, but I'm saying that if -- I'm -- the answer is yes, but then you also have to be willing, if North Korea launched --

Senator Graham: Would you advise me --

Dr. Kagan: -- North Korea, that you'd have to be willing to --

Chairman McCain: You have to let the witness --
Senator Graham: Yeah, but he's not giving an answer.

Dr. Kagan: Well, I thought I was giving an answer.

Senator Graham: So, here's the question. Do you support Congress -- everybody's talking about Congress sitting on the sidelines. I think a North Korean missile program is designed to threaten the homeland. I don't think they're going to send somebody in space. So, if I'm willing, along with some other colleagues, to give the President the authority, he doesn't have to use it, but we're all onboard for using military force to stop this program from maturing. Does that make sense to you, given the threats we face?

General Keane: I don't believe that North Korea is going to build an ICBM, weaponize it, and shoot it at the United States.

Senator Graham: Okay. Then you wouldn't need the Authorization to Use Military Force.

General Keane: Right. And the reason for that is -- Senator Graham: That's fine.

General Keane: The reason for -- Senator, the reason they have nuclear weapons is -- one reason. To preserve the regime. They know, when you have nuclear weapons, we're not going to conduct an invasion of North Korea. South Korea is not going to do it, we're not going to do it.

Senator Graham: Why are they trying to build ICBM?
General Keane: They want to weaponize it.

Senator Graham: And do what with it?

General Keane: I don't --

Dr. Kagan: Preserve their regime.

Senator Graham: Okay. All right. So, you would be okay with letting them build a missile?

Dr. Kagan: No. But --

Senator Graham: Would you, General Keane?

General Keane: They're already building a missile.

Senator Graham: Well, would you be willing to stop them?

General Keane: I would stop them from using it, yes.

Senator Graham: Okay.

General Keane: I'm not going to stop them from building it.

Senator Graham: Assad. Final question. Do all of you agree that leaving Assad in power is a serious mistake?

Dr. Kagan: Yes.

General Keane: Yes, absolutely.

Senator Graham: Finally, do you believe 4 percent of GDP should be the goal that Congress seeks because it's been the historical average of what we spend on defense since World War II.

General Keane: Pretty close.

Senator Graham: Thanks.
Chairman McCain: Senator Sullivan.

Senator Sullivan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony today and their years of service and helping the Members of Congress understand some of these very difficult issues.

Dr. Kagan, your "Of Paradise and Power" was one of the most insightful books I've ever read. So -- I'm not sure that's saying much, but -- from me -- but, it was a great book. So, thanks.

I want to follow up on Senator Graham's questions. Also, Mr. Brimley, I actually really appreciated your point about cyber, how it, you know, can become the bright shiny object that every service is pursuing, and forgetting their comparative advantages. I think that's a really important point. A number of us had breakfast with the Commandant this morning, and that -- the Marine Corps -- and that came up.

But, with regard to -- I want to go back to North Korea. And the issue of -- you know, one of the concerns that we clearly have is that, within the next 2 to 3 to 4 or 5 years -- and, you know, nobody's sure when, but it's certainly going to happen -- is that they're going to have an intercontinental ballistic missile that's likely going to be able to range continental United States. They're already probably close to ranging my State of Alaska and Hawaii.
But -- and the concern I have, along the lines of what Senator Graham was saying, is that the American people are going to wake up, whenever that happens, and all of a sudden it's going to be in the news and it's going to be wild reports and, you know, "The President has to do something." If we know that's coming -- and it is coming -- my view is -- and I'm wondering what your view is -- that we should be doing a lot more on missile defense, because if -- let's say he's able to get -- you know, let's say he -- he is an irrational actors, and let's say he has the ability to launch one or two, and we have a very robust missile defense. We'll be able to confidently shoot that down, retaliate massively, which should be really strong deterrence.

So, can you just comment on that, but, more broadly, just on North Korea, all three of you? I'm really stuck by the -- or struck by -- you know, obviously, President Obama's strategic patience was a nice phrase, but didn't do anything. And this is going to be a really, really big issue, maybe for this administration. You're already seeing the concerns we have here. But, if we know that, in 1 to 5 years, this guy, who's not very stable, is going to be able to range our country with an intercontinental ballistic nuclear missile, shouldn't we be doing something right now, missile defense or otherwise?
General Keane: Well, we are doing missile defense, to a certain degree, as you well know.

Senator Sullivan: Yeah, but it's not nearly as strong as it --

General Keane: And some of it is in your State. I think what the new administration has to do is take a look at that threat that we're discussing, and also, you know, a rogue actor, not trying to destroy the United States, but firing a couple of missiles at the United States for some motivating reason. Is it appropriate that we have a capability to defend against that? A number of years ago, we identified Iran as a potential actor that could do something like that, and also North Korea. And we began to put in place a missile defense strategy to deal with that. Now, we've pulled it out of Europe as a part of the ridiculous reset we did with the Russians, a major concession we made to them. I think this should be on the table with the new administration when they're looking at a national security strategy in dealing with both of those actors along this line, because I'm convinced the Iranians are going to get a nuclear weapon. And also, what North Korea has, to this day. And I would -- I agree with, I think, what you were feeding back to me, is that that missile defense infrastructure that we have is not adequate.

Senator Sullivan: No.
General Keane: So, let's take a look at what it would take to make it adequate, see what the investment strategy is, and see if that is a priority that we want to make. I would admit it is.

Senator Sullivan: And wouldn't that buy time for the President, whoever that -- if it's President Trump -- you know, when this becomes the big news in 2 years, "Oh, my goodness, he can range Chicago with a nuke." If we have a strong missile defense, the President's going to have some additional options that he might not have if we don't have anything or if we have a weak one, like we do now.

Mr. Brimley: Senator, I agree. I worry deeply about the nature of the regime and if we see the mating of a nuclear capability with, say, a KN08 or one of the variants. I think that's deeply concerning. And I think it's not just missile defense. It's comprehensive ISR architecture. And, frankly, it's both of those things forward-deployed in places like South Korea and Japan and other places. And this gets back to the alliances-and-partnerships question. I mean, the -- missile defense and forward-deployed missile defense and all the concepts and operations and communications that requires with allies and partners ought to be a focus of the next defense strategy, for sure.

Senator Sullivan: Dr. Kagan?

Dr. Kagan: Well, this is a way -- my answer answers a
lot of the things that have been raised, including this issue, including space, including cyber, which is that we have been living in a series of delusions for years that somehow all these countries are not going to develop every capability they can possibly develop. And we have been holding off or slowing down or not moving sufficiently quickly to develop the capabilities to stay ahead of their capability. So, we slowed down, I think, dumbed down our missile defense --

Senator Sullivan: Yeah.

Dr. Kagan: -- efforts, because we decided it was somehow a violation of one thing or another. And that was just foolish. And I don't know -- you guys that -- know better than I do -- whether he can build an ICBM faster than we can build the missile defense capability necessary to deal with it. But, yes, and we ought to be -- and, by the way, that will be useful in dealing with China, too. I mean, I've always felt that one of the major ways to get the Chinese to put pressure on North Korea is for us to build up capabilities that have direct implications for Chinese strategic interests. So, a missile defense capability that we build up in response to Korea will also affect China's nuclear force. And that gives them more incentive than any of these other efforts we've been making to try to push. So, I would say full speed ahead. But, what I don't know,
as a technical matter, is, What does full speed ahead mean
when we have been artificially capping what we even are
trying to do?

Senator Sullivan: Well, it means more than we're doing
now.

Dr. Kagan: Yeah.

Senator Sullivan: Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman McCain: Senator Cruz.

Senator Cruz: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning. Welcome. Thank you for testifying here
today.

As all of you know, our Nation faces mounting
challenges. And state actors have become increasingly
belligerent in recent years. Radical Islamic terrorism has
metastasized in the Middle East and spread globally. And we
have failed to fund and build a military that is designed to
meet the entirety of our strategic commitments. And I look
forward to working with the incoming administration to
ensure that the security of our country and the welfare of
every serviceman and -woman is among the very highest
priorities.

General Keane, as the next administration begins the
process of designing our national security strategy, what
advice would you give them with respect to the
prioritization of our resources and efforts?

General Keane: Well, first of all, the national security strategy should be job one and -- in putting that together. And also, it -- just as a -- it'll drive foreign policy, and it'll drive the defense strategy. And I think the Congress should also be informed about it as they're going through this process, because you have much to contribute, particularly this committee and Foreign Relations.

But, clearly, from a priority standpoint dealing with national security strategy, we start with the Nation's interests, and we also start with the threats. And we start with the threats that are the most significant to us. And we've spent a lot of time talking about this already. And those threats are coming at us from the revisionist powers: Russia, China, and Iran. And that's -- certainly are our top priorities. We've got radical Islam, which has morphed into a global jihad. And ISIS, most successful terrorist organization in history, affiliating now with 35 country -- even though it's still losing its caliphate. The Taliban, frankly, have more territory in Afghanistan under their control than at any time since 2001. And that war, under current policy, is not winnable. We have to deal with that issue. And particularly frustrating after 15 years of involvement. This is the United States of America. Fifteen
years of involvement, and we're still involved in a war that we can't win. And I'm not suggesting we pull out of it.

Those are major issues that we have to deal with.

Another one is cyber. And we've spent a lot of time talking about cyber here today. But, our critical infrastructure is exposed. Our military needs to be hardened. And this capability is growing, and our adversaries are exploding in the use of it.

So, those are strategies that'll eventually lead to a defense strategy, which this committee has to deal with. And I would hope, when the Department comes over here to discuss their defense strategy, that there really is some discussion about it. Because, listen -- look what's happened to us. Do you remember, a number of years ago, that we had a defense strategy that was built around the anchor of defeating two regional conflicts? Remember that thought? We moved from defeating two regional conflicts to something less, that I can't even define. I don't know what it is. To tell you how sadly this is, we are fighting two -- we fought two insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan -- low-tech insurgencies, no air force, no navy involved -- and we could not fight those two low-tech insurgencies simultaneously, Senator. We could not do it. We fought them sequentially. And that's one of the reasons why we've got this problem in Afghanistan, because the ground forces
were not large enough to fight two low-tech insurgencies simultaneously. But, we used to have a strategy that we were resourcing at one time to fight two major conflict simultaneously. We have to have a discussion about what it is we really are trying to do, and then resource it. And that has -- and that's what we haven't been doing, and that's the point you are making.

Senator Cruz: Thank you, General.

Let me shift --

Chairman McCain: That's --

Senator Cruz: -- to a different issue, which is the potential for Iranian and North Korean nuclear proliferation. And this is a question for Dr. Kagan. What concrete policy steps would you recommend to prevent cooperative nuclear proliferation between Iran and North Korea, and to promote enforcement of sanctions by China?

Dr. Kagan: I'm trying to get Chinese leverage against North Korea. I believe -- and I was saying this to the Senator before -- the best incentive to get Chinese to put more pressure on North Korea is to up our own strategic capabilities in East Asia, and making it clear that, for as long as North Korea continues to have -- pose a growing threat, that means an increase in the American military presence along all different levels. So, particularly -- we were just talking about missile defense. Any missile
defense increase that we do in response to a North Korean potential ICBM with a nuclear weapon on it also impacts the Chinese nuclear force. And that is an incentive for the Chinese to put more pressure than they're currently putting on North Korea right now.

And so, I think that, in terms of -- I don't -- diplomacy and sanctions, we can tighten sanctions, but, at this point, we need to put sufficient pressure on China, but it has to be pressure that's meaningful to them, and that's of a strategic nature if we're going to get any progress on dealing with North Korea.

But, second -- other than that, we should be building up our missile defense capabilities much more in technologically advanced way and in -- much faster to deal with that potential threat.

As far as Iran is concerned, I don't believe we are ultimately going to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. They are determined to get it. We can slow them down. But, whether we are ultimately going to prevent that, I think, it's highly unlikely. And so, we either have to be-- your -- the options are then obvious, we're either going to have to contain them when they have a nuclear weapon or we're going to have to prevent them from getting it, by force. And that is the -- those are the -- in my view, those are the only real alternatives that we face.
Senator Cruz: Thank you.

Chairman McCain: Any additional comment on that?

General Keane: I have one. I will disagree with the Doctor, here. I think we -- this administration, despite the nuclear deal that has been made -- I'm not suggesting that we tube the nuclear deal. I do believe we have to hold them accountable and have a tough inspection protocol, turn all of our intelligence agencies on it, and the rest of it. We know they're going to cheat. They have, before. It was an informant that gave us the Fordow secret site. But, I believe we need a policy, an unequivocal policy that says we are not going to let Iran have a nuclear weapon, and we would use the means necessary to stop it, if necessary. Iran with a nuclear weapon, I think, should be unacceptable to us, as a matter of national security policy.

Chairman McCain: Mr. Brimley?

Mr. Brimley: I disagree with General Keane's comments.

Chairman McCain: You want to elaborate on that?

[Laughter.]

Mr. Brimley: Well, I just think -- similar to North Korea, I mean, I worry about -- particularly with North Korea and the nature of the regime itself, I think -- you know, at the end of the day, I think -- as objectionable as the Iranian regime may be, I think that they have proven to be rational actors. They have a strategy that makes sense
from their perspective, that -- and we are countering it through various means. And we can debate whether we need to do more.

I worry more about North Korea. And that's why -- I mentioned the op-ed, I think before you got in, Senator, but that the Secretary of Defense Perry wrote with Dr. Carter -- Dr. Ash Carter, who's now the Secretary of Defense, about 10 years ago, that argued in favor of preemptively taking out any long-range ballistic missile from North Korea that was mated with a nuclear capability. I think that debate ought to be had again, because that's the one scenario that I worry about probably more than most.

Dr. Kagan: Could I --

Chairman McCain: It was -- go ahead, Dr. Kagan.

Dr. Kagan: I just want to make sure I've slid myself in exactly where I want to be, here, because I don't like General Keane disagreeing with me. But, I'm not saying we should not be willing to use force to deal with Iran. I'm saying let's not kid ourselves that there is a middle option between containment and ultimately using force, because of their determination.

But, the only thing that I would say, in both Iran and North Korea's case, is, let's also not assume that there is an easy, quick option, where we do a surgical strike and then it's all over and we can all go home. They have
options, too, after that strike, and we -- we can't walk
into that unless we are willing, ourselves, to take next
steps that may be necessary. That's the only -- it's not
what -- if Senator Graham had been here, that's what I
wanted to say to Senator Graham.

Chairman McCain: I'll relay that to him.

[Laughter.]

Chairman McCain: And only a President of the United
States can make decisions along the lines of what we are
discussing, with or without, in some cases, the approval of
Congress.

I want to thank the witnesses. It's been extremely
helpful, as every member who attended had commented. I
thank you for your knowledge. I thank you for your service
to the country. And we'll be calling on you again.

Thank you.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]