

Stenographic Transcript
Before the

COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON
EMERGING U.S. DEFENSE CHALLENGES AND
WORLDWIDE THREATS

Tuesday, December 6, 2016

Washington, D.C.

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U.S. Senate

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Committee on Armed Services

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Washington, D.C.

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10 The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in
11 Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. John McCain,
12 chairman of the committee, presiding.

13

Committee Members Present: Senators McCain

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[presiding], Inhofe, Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Rounds, Ernst,

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Tillis, Sullivan, Lee, Graham, Cruz, Reed, McCaskill,

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Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono,

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Kaine, King, and Heinrich.

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1 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN, U.S. SENATOR
2 FROM ARIZONA

3 Chairman McCain: Good morning. The Senate Armed
4 Services Committee meets this morning to receive testimony
5 on emerging U.S. defense challenges and worldwide threats.

6 We're fortunate to have with us three distinguished
7 witnesses: General Jack Keane, Chairman of the Institute
8 for the Study of War and former Vice Chief of Staff of the
9 Army; Mr. Shawn Brimley, the Executive Vice President and
10 Director of Studies at The Center for a New American
11 Security; and Dr. Robert Kagan, Senior Fellow at The
12 Brookings Institute, Project on International Order and
13 Strategy.

14 Our next President will take office as the United
15 States confronts the most diverse and complex array of
16 global security challenges since the end of the second World
17 War. Great-power competition, once thought a casualty of
18 the end of history, has returned as Russia and China have
19 each challenged the rules-based order that is the foundation
20 of our security and prosperity. Rogue states like North
21 Korea and Iran are undermining regional stability while
22 developing advanced military capabilities that threaten the
23 United States and our allies. Radical Islamist terrorism
24 continues to pose a challenging threat to our security at
25 home and our interests abroad. And the chaos that has

1 spread across the Middle East and on which our terrorist
2 enemies thrive has torn apart nations, destroyed families,
3 killed hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children,
4 and sent millions more running for their lives.

5 But, today -- today -- President Obama will deliver a
6 speech in Florida touting his counterterrorism successes.
7 I'm not making that up. Yet, even a glimpse at the chaos
8 enveloping the Middle East and spreading throughout the
9 world reveals the delusion and sophistry of this President
10 and his failed policies. In short, when our next President
11 is inaugurated, just 6 weeks from now, he will look out on a
12 world on fire and have several consequential strategic
13 choices to make: how to address Russian or Chinese
14 aggression; how to confront threats from North Korea;
15 whether to alter our relationship with Iran; how to improve
16 and quicken our campaign against ISIL; how to counter the
17 instability radiating from Syria; how to ensure victory in
18 the war in Afghanistan -- and I could go on -- not to
19 mention the overwhelming challenge of cybersecurity. Our
20 next President will not have the benefit of time and
21 cautious deliberation to set a new strategic course for the
22 Nation. That work begins with a series of decisions that
23 will present themselves immediately on day one. That's why
24 it's so important to get these things right from the outset.

25 As we ponder these strategic questions, we must also

1 consider our military posture around the world. We must
2 decide the appropriate military presence in Europe and
3 reverse reductions made by the Obama administration under
4 the assumption that Russia was a partner. We also need a
5 fresh look at further steps to enhance U.S. presence in the
6 Asia-Pacific region. We need to uphold our commitments to
7 allies and partners, including by finally providing lethal
8 assistance to Ukraine and standing by the opposition in
9 Syria. We need to push back against the spread of Iranian
10 malign influence in the Middle East. This starts in Iraq,
11 where the eventual liberation of Mosul will intensify the
12 sectarian struggle for power and identity. We need to
13 finally give our troops in Afghanistan what they need to
14 succeed: permanent and flexible authorities to engage the
15 enemy and troop levels based on security conditions on the
16 ground.

17 Here at home, we need to return to a strategy-based
18 defense budget. Our next President would need more than
19 \$100 billion over and above the Budget Control Act caps just
20 to execute our current defense strategy, which is
21 insufficient, since it predates Russian invasion of Ukraine
22 and ISIL's rampage across Syria and Iraq. This will require
23 our next President to negotiate a broad bipartisan agreement
24 on the budget that brings an end to the dangerous and
25 misguided Budget Control Act. Such an agreement has eluded

1 President Obama and the Congress, not because of
2 disagreements on defense policy, but because we've lacked
3 the political will to prioritize defense.

4 Since the election, many have discussed domestic
5 priorities, including reviewing Obamacare, increasing
6 information spending, and implementing tax cuts. But, these
7 can be no -- there can be no greater priority than
8 preserving and increasing America's position of strength and
9 military advantage in the face of increasing global dangers,
10 that rebuilding our military must be a political priority,
11 not just a talking point. We must not only provide stable
12 and increased defense budgets, but the next President's
13 administration must also implement reforms to the Nation's
14 defense. This will include changes to the defense
15 enterprise passed by the Congress over the last 2 years.

16 I'm proud of the work we've done on modernization -- on
17 modernizing military retirement, improving military
18 healthcare, reforming defense acquisition, trimming Pentagon
19 bureaucracy, and more. But, the ultimate success of these
20 reforms will depend on years of faithful implementation and
21 dedicated follow through by the Department of Defense.

22 The President-Elect's selection of General James Mattis
23 to serve as Secretary is an encouraging sign in this regard,
24 but there are dozens of senior civilian and military
25 nominations still to come, and it will be the job of this

1 committee and the full Senate to provide advice and consent
2 on these nominations. We will be watching closely to see
3 what choices the next President makes.

4 I encourage the next President to be bold. We need
5 innovators for the future, not imitators of the past. We
6 need thinkers open to new ideas, not functionaries wedded to
7 old ways. We need people who understand the bureaucracy but
8 will not be captured by it. Put simply, to ensure the
9 success of defense reform, we need reformers throughout the
10 leadership of the Department of Defense.

11 Finally, our next President needs to repair the
12 relationship between the executive and legislative branches.
13 The constitutional mandate to provide for the common defense
14 is one the President and the Congress share together. This
15 is not a defect, but the design of our founders. To deter
16 adversaries and defeat our enemies, fix our defense budget,
17 and implement critical reforms on -- to our defense
18 enterprise, the executive and legislative branches must work
19 together as coequals. We need our next President, our next
20 Secretary of Defense, and those elected to the next Congress
21 to uphold this essential constitutional principle. The
22 American people and the men and women who serve in our Armed
23 Forces deserve and expect nothing less.

24 Senator Reed.

25

1 STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED, U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE
2 ISLAND

3 Senator Reed: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
4 Thank you for holding this very important hearing.

5 I also want to thank the witnesses for their
6 participation, not only their participation, but their
7 service in so many different capacities to the Nation over
8 many, many years. Thank you all very much.

9 The most immediate threat to the safety of Americans at
10 home and abroad still remains the Islamic State in Iraq and
11 the Levant, or ISIL, and the remnants of al Qaeda. And I
12 recently returned from the region, where I met with our
13 military commanders, diplomats, and senior political
14 leaders. Militarily, ISIL is on the path to defeat in Iraq.
15 The Iraqi Security Force, enabled by U.S. and coalition
16 train, advise, and assist efforts, coupled with airstrikes,
17 intelligence, and other support, are in the process of
18 displacing ISIL from Mosul and are expected, in the coming
19 months, to significantly disrupt the ability of ISIL to hold
20 any key terrain within Iraq. Nevertheless, ISIL will likely
21 continue to act as the subversive force in Iraq for the
22 foreseeable future; and also, as the Chairman indicated,
23 with the final capture of Mosul, that will start a political
24 process in which the sectarian groups will vie for power,
25 and that could be a decisive and critical theater arena of

1 action in Iraq.

2 In Syria, isolation operations around Raqqa have
3 commenced, but the task of supporting forces on the ground
4 who will ultimately enter, clear, and hold Raqqa is months
5 away. Unlike Iraq, we have no partner in Syria for
6 humanitarian, stabilization, and reconstruction efforts.
7 Even after Raqqa is retaken, the security situation will
8 remain extremely difficult as the remnants of ISIL seek
9 refuge in the largely ungoverned areas of eastern Syria
10 along the Euphrates River as the broader Syrian civil war is
11 likely to rage on.

12 I also recently visited Afghanistan, where political
13 tensions between President Ghani and Chief Executive Officer
14 Abdullah appear to be receding as the 2016 traditional
15 fighting season comes to a close. Our commander in
16 Afghanistan, General Nicholson, recently described the
17 conflict between the Afghan government and the Taliban as,
18 in his words, "an equilibrium in favor of the government
19 because they are controlling the majority of the
20 population."

21 Decisions earlier this year by the President to
22 maintain approximately 8400 U.S. troops in Afghanistan into
23 2017 and to provide robust support to the Afghan national
24 defense and security forces has laid the foundation for a
25 sustainable U.S. and international security presence in

1 Afghanistan. The decision also sent an important message to
2 Afghans, the Taliban, and others in the region, including
3 Pakistan, regarding the commitment of the United States to
4 continue progress in Afghanistan. Assuming the continued
5 support of the Afghan government and the support of its
6 people, I hope the next administration will follow a
7 conditions-based approach to U.S. presence in Afghanistan
8 that provides flexibility on the number of military
9 personnel deployed in support of our longer-term strategy
10 there.

11 Over the past few months, the implementation of the
12 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the JCPOA, has largely
13 proceeded as planned. And while the JCPOA is having its
14 intended impact in the nuclear arena, Iran's behavior with
15 respect to its proxy forces across the region has not
16 improved, and, as I discussed during my recent visit with
17 the commander of our naval forces in the Middle East, Iran's
18 unsafe and unprofessional actions in the maritime arena
19 continue. How the new administration chooses to proceed
20 with respect to Iran will be an important decision. It is
21 critical that we need cede space or territory to Iranian
22 influence, but it's similarly critical that we not take
23 actions that escalate tensions unnecessarily and can be
24 blamed on the United States. For example, as many experts
25 have pointed out, the likely result of the U.S. unilaterally

1 withdrawing from the JCPOA would be a resumption of the
2 Iranian nuclear program without the ability to reimpose
3 effective sanctions, which rely on enforcement by our
4 partners around the world.

5 In Europe, we continue to be a witness to a number of
6 destabilizing factors, including adversarial actions by
7 Russia, acts of terrorism, and sustained refugee and migrant
8 flows. Such instability is acutely on display in Ukraine,
9 where Russian-based separatists commit daily cease-fire
10 violations with seemingly endless resupply from Russia, and
11 disinformation campaigns continue to undermine public
12 confidence in Ukrainian government institutions. This
13 confluence of destabilizing factors makes the multinational
14 effort underway to strengthen Ukraine's capability to defend
15 itself and to decrease corruption, increase accountability,
16 and reform institutional structures all the more important.

17 In the Pacific, China has alarmed its neighbors in the
18 South China Sea by militarizing land features in a body of
19 water that is critical for trade and regional peace, and
20 refusing to acknowledge the international norms and laws
21 that govern those waters.

22 In Korea -- North Korea -- Kim Jung-un continues to
23 destabilize the Korean Peninsula with nuclear ballistic
24 missile developments, and sanctions are not working as
25 effectively as they should to bring the North Koreans to the

1 negotiating table. Regimes as authoritarian and insulated
2 as North Korea's are brittle and prone to collapse. How we
3 would deal with such a collapse and the security and
4 humanitarian problems that would ensue is an ongoing debate
5 and challenge to U.S. Forces Korea and the PACOM Commander.

6 Finally, defense budgets should be based on a long-term
7 military strategy, which requires the Department to focus at
8 least 5 years into the future. Last year, Congress passed
9 the 2015 Bipartisan Budget Act, or BBA, which established
10 the discretionary funding levels for defense spending for
11 fiscal years 2016 and 2017. While the BBA provided the
12 Department with budget stability in the near term, there is
13 no budget agreement for fiscal year 2018 and beyond.
14 Therefore, without another bipartisan agreement that
15 provides relief from sequestration, the military services
16 will be forced to adhere to the sequestration-level budget
17 caps and could undermine the investments made to rebuild
18 readiness and modernize platforms and equipment.

19 And again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for this important
20 hearing.

21 Chairman McCain: I thank you.

22 And I thank the witnesses.

23 General Keane, given your advanced age, we will begin
24 with you.

25

1 STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN M. KEANE, USA (RET.),
2 CHAIRMAN, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR, AND FORMER VICE
3 CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY

4 General Keane: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Love that
5 introduction.

6 [Laughter.]

7 General Keane: Good morning, everyone. Listen, I'm
8 delighted to be here with Dr. Kagan and -- my good friend.
9 And let me just say something about Dr. Kagan, here, and his
10 family. His father, himself, his wife, his brother, and his
11 sister-in-law all --

12 Chairman McCain: All have exceeded --

13 General Keane: -- make a great contribution --

14 Chairman McCain: -- exceeded his --

15 General Keane: -- to this country, believe me.

16 And Mr. Brimley, as well, thank you to be here.

17 Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished
18 members of the committee, thank you for inviting me once
19 again.

20 Listen, I so appreciate what this committee has done
21 through the years in taking care of our men and women in the
22 Armed Forces. And just let me say straight out, my
23 congratulations to the committee and to your leadership,
24 Senators McCain and Reed, for your seminal achievement with
25 the FY17 NDAA. We've not had such a critical

1 transformational piece of defense legislation in 30 years,
2 not since Goldwater-Nichols in 1986. You've stopped the
3 drawdown of our ground forces, particularly the Army, who's
4 borne the brunt of 15 years of war. They're still doing
5 heavy lifting around the world. You know, it was the Army
6 who was asked to reduce its force structure to pay for the
7 needs of the other Departments. Makes no sense whatsoever.

8 I applaud your bold reforms on defense acquisition,
9 military healthcare, security cooperation, and the reduction
10 of flag officer and SES billets -- I know you will
11 eventually get around to compensation, which is in dire
12 need-- and, of course, the much needed increase of funding
13 to depleted readiness accounts.

14 Let me summarize what you have in front of you with my
15 written statement, which has an unusual amount of verbosity
16 in it, but, given the subject matter was so important, I
17 decided to write a little bit more than I usually do. But,
18 let's start with the defense challenges.

19 You know as well as I do, there's a lot more that we
20 have to -- done here. You have made an incredible first
21 start with the FY17 NDA, but we have major capability gaps,
22 and we've got serious funding issues. The BSA has to end.
23 We can't do anything if that continues. We can't get out
24 our hole, and it's going to put us in a worse hole.

25 It's -- you know, it's not sufficient, you know, to be

1 the best military in the world. Certainly, we take pride in
2 that, as we rightfully should. And we've -- we spend more
3 money than many other nations do if you add them all up, by
4 comparison, in defense. But, what is really needed is, we
5 have to be so superior in our capability that our
6 adversaries are not willing to challenge us. And the reason
7 is because we're a credible deterrent. We had that for many
8 years in the Cold War. We were, indeed, a credible
9 deterrent. And I believe that deterrence, with other
10 issues, helped to force the collapse of the Soviet Union.

11 So, since that time, we've had two and a half decades
12 since the end of the Cold War, and -- which has been
13 reasonably successful, in terms of foreign policy and
14 national security. I don't dispute that. With some
15 exceptions. But, we have been continuously decrementing the
16 United States military during that whole period of time.
17 And our adversaries are closing the technology gap. They
18 are catching up.

19 We are ill-prepared, as we sit here today, to meet all
20 the threats that we're facing. And I don't make that
21 statement lightly. You've had a Chief of Service come in
22 here -- Milley, straight talker -- tell you, in no uncertain
23 words, that he's at high military risk to win a conventional
24 war. Now, that didn't get a headline in any newspaper, it
25 didn't even cause a stir with the administration. We

1 haven't had a service chief make a statement like that in 40
2 years. Other service chiefs could make the same statement.
3 The Air Force, they've got a 1947 air force, in size.
4 They've got 60-percent-plus combat aircraft than what we
5 used to have when we began the decline. Sixty-plus percent.
6 The Navy -- you know, you're aware of it -- they've got 270
7 hulls, and they're going to 308. And the 270, as part of
8 that, they're going to retire more ships than they can
9 replace during the timeframe to get to the 308. And they've
10 gone through a 50-percent-plus reduction during this two-
11 and-a-half-decade decline. If you look at it in spending
12 dollars, constant dollars, we're spending about the same
13 amount of money that we did three decades ago, but we're
14 considerably smaller. We've got so -- less to show for it.
15 So, we've got to fix the shortfall. The reality is, we need
16 more combat brigades. The reality is, we need more ships.
17 The reality is, we need more aircraft. It's indisputable.

18 The technology gap, it's closing, and closed.
19 Precision-guided munitions, space-based technology, stealth,
20 offensive and defense missiles, long-range artillery,
21 they're all there. That capability exists in our
22 adversaries.

23 Russia and China, they have a brilliant strategy.
24 They're not stupid. They've got an asymmetric strategy to
25 minimize the great-power advantage that we have in our air

1 and maritime capability. So, what have they done? They've
2 made long-range anti-ship missiles, and they've made long-
3 range anti-aircraft missiles. And those things matter.
4 They've deployed them in eastern China. And that's a major
5 challenge for us. And they've deployed them in western
6 Russia, and it's also a major challenge for us.

7 Russia's got a new tank. It's a T-14 Armata. The crew
8 is no longer in a turret. The first time that's ever
9 happened. It's in the main body. They're in a special
10 protected capsule. It has advanced reactive armor, second
11 generation, on it that we believe -- we don't know for sure--
12 - but our main tank Sabot round, long penetrator, it'll stop
13 it. And it also has active protective system on it, their
14 second generation. The United States has not fielded a
15 single Active Protective System on a tank yet, or any other
16 combat vehicle. But, your committee has mandated they do
17 it. And you put some money in there for them to do it.

18 Now, listen, if you don't know what Active Protective
19 System is, let me take you through it for a second. You put
20 sensors on a vehicle that track an incoming round to the
21 vehicle, and, as the vehicle -- as the round is about to hit
22 the vehicle, you actually have a kill system on the vehicle
23 that kills the round before it hits. Brilliant technology.
24 Where do we get all of that from? Private sector. It has
25 to do with microchip technology and incredible software

1 programs. Out there on the private sector, smart guys,
2 small business guys got it. DARPA had a program, over 10
3 years ago, to look at this. Technology's proven, and the
4 United States military ground forces still haven't put it on
5 anything. What's wrong with that? It has nothing to do
6 with money. It doesn't have anything to do with the White
7 House. It doesn't have anything to do with Congress.
8 Doesn't, I mean, have anything to do with OSD. You know
9 what it is? It's the damn bureaucracy inside the Army.
10 They push back on new technology, because they want to
11 design it themselves because you give them money to do it.
12 These are the laboratories and the tech bases. It's the
13 acquisition bureaucracy that stalls this.

14 When I was Vice Chief of Staff for the Army, I had no
15 idea about all of that, and it took me a year or two to
16 figure out what I was really dealing with, bureaucrats and
17 technocrats that were stalling the advance of a great army.
18 That's out there. And you've got to bore into that with
19 this committee. The military and Defense Department needs
20 help to break down that bureaucracy.

21 Listen, some -- all the service chiefs know what they
22 want to do with their service, but allow me a little bit of
23 allowance here, as an observer, to throw out a couple of
24 tidbits. You know, for my Army, the Army that you're
25 looking at is a 1980s Army. That's the equipment it's got.

1 It hasn't had a new major end item since the 1980s. The
2 Stryker vehicle was bought off-the-shelf. And that's a
3 legacy system out there. And the problem is, they're
4 200,000 shorter -- smaller than what the 1980 Army was.
5 200,000 smaller. If you have Active Protective System like
6 I just said, and you can kill anything that comes at a tank,
7 should we design a tank that looks different than what it
8 is? Does it really have to be 70 tons? I don't think so.

9 So, the Army's got to do some thinking about where it's
10 going. And I -- also, I believe it has to rethink its
11 organization, how it fights, and go after the technology
12 that is available, and press the R&D community to get you
13 the new technology that you can conceptually even think
14 through yourself.

15 The Navy -- lookit -- what the Chinese have is serious,
16 in terms of long-range anti-shipping. Long-range anti-
17 shipping missiles are here to stay. Nineteen-ship surface
18 carrier battle groups, does that still make sense in the
19 face of that threat? They can put -- they can swarm those
20 missiles. They can bring them en masse against that carrier
21 battle group that will really test our air defense systems.
22 Doesn't it make sense to look at undersea warfare and take a
23 look at all the functions that are taking place on the
24 surface, and whatever functions on the surface we can do
25 undersea, put it there. Why? You've got protection and

1 you've got stealth. Seems to make sense. Some of this is
2 cultural, to be sure, inside services. You know, these
3 things are not easy. And there are good people there. But,
4 you can push it a little bit. And Goldwater-Nichols changed
5 the United States military. FY- -- NDA-17 is going to do
6 some of that, as well.

7 The Air Force -- lookit, we know -- we know it
8 intuitively. It's obvious. It's right in front of us.
9 Unmanned flight is here. It's here. And we've got to get
10 serious about it. If you put, in a remote station, a pilot
11 and a multifunctional crew versus a single pilot or a dual
12 pilot in the air, that is an enhanced airpower capability.
13 That's here. We can do that. And we've got to think about
14 doing it.

15 I also think -- and comes through our flag officers, it
16 got at something that Senator McCain was saying -- we've got
17 to look for our flag officers who are not risk-averse, who
18 themselves are not bureaucrats, and who have -- they're
19 willing to take risk and are innovative. And the reason why
20 they got that rank on their shoulder has nothing to do with
21 cars, airplanes, and all them other stuff that goes with it.
22 It all has to do about taking the rocks out of the rucksack
23 of our soldiers and moving that system forward. And we've
24 got to get the best that we can to do that kind of work.

25 Let me just say that modernizing a military is

1 challenging. And we can do it, even though we're facing all
2 these threats, as Senator McCain and Senator Reed took out.
3 General Marshall, Admiral King, General LeMay, Admiral
4 Rickover, General Abrams, they all met those challenges, and
5 they transformed our land, air, and sea forces. They are
6 the ones that are responsible for winning on the battlefield
7 from Normandy to the Philippines and from Kuwait to Iraq.

8 Let me just say something about the DOD business side
9 of the house. Certainly, we are the best fighting force in
10 the world. We're first-rate at that. But, we're absolutely
11 third-rate at running the businesslike functions of DOD,
12 because we're not good at it. We don't know enough to be
13 good at it. We're managing huge real estate portfolios,
14 we're managing huge lodging capabilities. We're one of the
15 great -- biggest motel owners in the United States. We're
16 managing the largest healthcare enterprise in the world.
17 The amount of maintenance that we're doing, from a pistol to
18 an aircraft carrier, is staggering. Those are all business
19 functions. Business functions. They're all non-core
20 functions. And we're also managing new product design and
21 new product development, using business terms. And we don't
22 do well at this. And there's a ton of money involved in it.
23 We've got to get after that money, and we've got to do
24 better at it. And I think we should bring in, as the
25 number-two guy in the Department of Defense, a CEO from a

1 Fortune 500 company in the last 5 years that's done a major
2 turnaround of a large organization. We need businesspeople
3 to help us do this. We need a CFO, not a comptroller, in
4 DOD. That CFO has the background that's necessary to look
5 at business practices in the DOD, where cost is a -- cost-
6 based analysis and performance, internal control, auditing,
7 rigorous financial reviews, cost efficiency, and dealing
8 with waste. Those are the kind of things we need.
9 Desperately need them, because the money is there. We want
10 to -- you want to do so much more. Some of that money is
11 sitting right there in the budget.

12 You know as well as I do that these global security
13 challenges we're -- facing us are enormous. And Senator
14 McCain laid them all out. I won't go through them all.
15 I'll just touch on a couple of things.

16 One is American leadership. That is where we have to
17 start. American leadership is crucial and indispensable in
18 this world to global security and stability. And the world
19 economy absolutely depends on that global stability and
20 security. We need to reassure our allies that we're going
21 to stand behind them. They don't trust us. They don't
22 believe we're the reliable ally we used to be. If you
23 travel the world, you're getting the same thing that I'm
24 getting. This is real. And they -- as a result of it,
25 they're making decisions based on that fear. And some of

1 those decisions are not very good.

2 Radical Islam. We know it's a multigenerational
3 problem of the 21st century. We know we have to name it, we
4 have to define it, and we have to explain it to the American
5 people. My God, if they're going to deal with this for the
6 21st century, we're going to have people killing them on
7 some kind of episodic basis, they certainly need to
8 understand a little bit about it, you would think, that we
9 can explain what this is, what this ideology is, what are
10 the signs, symbols, dress, and behavior and speech of those
11 who radicalize themselves to it, so their eyes and ears can
12 identify it and report it to somebody. Just makes sense,
13 but we're not doing it.

14 The other thing is, we need to develop a comprehensive
15 strategy, but we can't do that until we form a global
16 alliance to push back against what is a global threat. And
17 we haven't done it.

18 ISIS. ISIS is the most successful terrorist
19 organization that's ever been put together. We're making
20 progress against them in Iraq, to be sure. We do not have
21 an effective strategy to defeat them in Syria, because we
22 don't have an effective ground force. And we have no
23 strategy to deal with the spread of ISIS to 35 other
24 countries. I'm not suggesting for a minute that we're
25 involved in all of that, but I think we can tangibly help

1 the people who are. This administration's going to have to
2 deal with, How do we defeat ISIS? Not just how we succeed
3 in Iraq. And I think they're going to ask for a
4 comprehensive campaign plan to do it. I don't think there
5 has been one, to be frank about it.

6 In Iraq, we will retake Mosul. How long will depend on
7 how much ISIS wants to defeat -- to resist. They didn't
8 resist in Fallujah and Ramadi that much. But, after we take
9 Mosul, if we have sectarian strife in Mosul, where we do not
10 have unity of governance and unity of security, then that is
11 going to contaminate the political unity in the country as a
12 whole which is so desperately needed. And that is a major
13 issue for us.

14 The major geopolitical issue for the United States in
15 Iraq is political unity with that government and diminishing
16 Iran's strategic influence on Iraq. That is what we should
17 be working on. And, frankly, we have not. We have not
18 worked on that anywhere near as hard as we could be. We
19 can't get the Secretary of State to make regular visits
20 there to work on that very project. But, the Iranians are
21 there all the time. That is a major issue for us. This
22 administration's going to have decide, as the previous one
23 did, Are we going to leave troops in Iraq? Yes? No? How
24 much? What are they going to do? How long? Those are
25 decisions in front of them. I would hope that we would

1 avoid the disastrous pullout we did in 2011, which had
2 incredible consequences, as we all know. The Syrian civil
3 war, a major human catastrophe, to be sure, and as
4 intractable a problem, I think, as any of us have had to
5 deal with.

6 The reality is, we squandered the opportunities to
7 change the momentum against the regime. I won't list them
8 all. And you're aware of it. But, right in front of us, I
9 still believe we could put safe zones in there to safeguard
10 some of those humans up near the Jordanian and Turkish
11 border. And that, de facto, would be a no-fly zone. I
12 think it would also aid the Syrian moderates, and likely
13 attract some others to that movement. Many of the people
14 that were helping the Syrian moderates, the Islamists, moved
15 way when we did not execute the 2013 chemical redline.

16 Chairman McCain: General, we're going to have to --

17 General Keane: Okay, I'll wrap it up.

18 Afghanistan. Let me just say, the war is not winnable
19 under the current policy. We cannot win. And that's the
20 reality of it. We've got sanctuaries in Pakistan. No
21 insurgency's ever been defeated with sanctuaries outside the
22 conflict area. Pakistani Afghan National Security Forces do
23 not have the enablers they need to be able to overcome the
24 Taliban, who have resurged. There's ways we can deal with
25 that, to be sure. I'll take it on in questions-and-answers.

1 With Russia and China, I'll just tell you that my view
2 is strength and resolve in dealing with both of them. And
3 they would recognize that. But, I truly believe that
4 Russia's aggression needs to be stopped. Credible
5 deterrence is the way to do it. And the resolve in that
6 deterrence. Russia certainly wants to be an equal partner
7 with the United States to be on the world stage. Grant them
8 that. But, we should make no concessions to them until they
9 change their behavior.

10 And I'll just stop right there, Mr. Chairman, and I'll
11 take your questions later.

12 Thank you.

13 [The prepared statement of General Keane follows:]

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1 Chairman McCain: Mr. Brimley.
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1 STATEMENT OF SHAWN BRIMLEY, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT
2 AND DIRECTOR OF STUDIES, THE CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN
3 SECURITY

4 Mr. Brimley: Thank you, Chairman McCain, Senator Reed,
5 members of the committee. I'm honored to testify before you
6 again, and have the distinct feeling of being out of place
7 again as I sit next to titans like Robert Kagan and General
8 Keane, two men I greatly admire.

9 President-Elect Donald Trump will take office next
10 January and shoulder the formidable burden of a complex
11 national security inheritance, which I'll summarize briefly
12 right now.

13 The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as you know, remain
14 incredibly complex. Although President Obama deserves
15 credit, in my mind, for undertaking the significant surge of
16 combat forces into Afghanistan 2009, the difficulty in
17 supporting Afghan Security Forces was complicated by the
18 public timelines for withdrawal. In Iraq, I believe the
19 reduction of forces between 2009-2012 was far too steep,
20 making it difficult for the U.S. to retain adequate leverage
21 over the sectarianism of the government in Baghdad, which,
22 in turn, enabled the rise of the Islamic State and the rapid
23 advances in both Iraq and Syria. While I largely agree with
24 the parameters of the operational approach in countering
25 ISIL on the ground in Iraq and Syria -- for instance,

1 airpower, Special Operations forces, and combat advisors, of
2 which I think we could do more -- the ultimate question of
3 how to deal with Bashar al-Assad remains unanswered, and
4 Russia's involvement and support of the barbarism we're
5 seeing every day in places like Aleppo is horrifying. And
6 we ought to do more to stop it.

7 I am concerned, but not particularly surprised, by the
8 behavior of Russia and China. Vladimir Putin is no friend
9 of the United States, and he clearly sees the long arc of
10 history bending against the maintenance of an extensive
11 Russian sphere of influence that acts as a break on
12 democracy, civil society, and full economic integration --
13 or integration with a wider Europe, and a global liberal
14 economic order. The unlawful incursion of Russia into
15 Ukraine should not be legitimized by the United States, and
16 ongoing steps to shore up our deterrence posture in the
17 region ought to be sustained and increased, and increased
18 soon.

19 China's behavior, in my mind, is perhaps the most
20 consequential, in terms of its lasting impact on the global
21 order. China's aggressive behavior towards its neighbors,
22 and, in particular, its rapid land reclamation efforts in
23 the South China Sea, are destabilizing. The eventual
24 placement -- and I think it will happen -- of military
25 platforms on these so-called "islands," things like antiship

1 cruise missiles, advanced air defense systems, and the like,
2 would further upset the military balance of power in the
3 region, which I think would dramatically risk escalation and
4 miscalculation and conflict. DOD has a significant role to
5 play in enhancing our military posture in the region, and I
6 hope the Trump administration will quickly do so. The
7 predictable provocation from North Korea, I should add, will
8 come soon, as well. And so, I believe urgency is important
9 in this regard.

10 From the perspective of the Secretary of Defense tasked
11 to oversee the development, sustainment, and employment of
12 U.S. military forces, it is clear that our vaunted military
13 technological edge that has allowed our men and women in
14 uniform to deploy rapidly around the world and engage our
15 adversaries with unrivaled speed, precision, and staying
16 power, has begun to erode. And we've seen this over the
17 last few years, for sure. I worry that our edge is eroding
18 to the point where the task of maintaining conventional
19 deterrence in key theaters around the world is becoming
20 difficult -- more difficult, more expensive, and more risky
21 to our men and women in uniform. Moreover, the era of tight
22 defense budgets and the disaster of sequestration, as you
23 know, has made it very difficult for the Pentagon to keep
24 investing in game-changing defense technologies and to
25 properly enable a culture of experimentation and exercising

1 that can advance new concepts of operation and displace old
2 and outdated ways of keeping our forces on the cutting edge.
3 I sincerely hope that sequester caps can be eliminated and
4 the Pentagon's defense budget can both increase and the
5 uncertainty which has imperiled rational strategic and
6 budgetary planning can finally be alleviated.

7 Finally, like General Keane, I would like to commend
8 this committee and its staff for the work done in assembling
9 an impressive conference report for the NDAA. Beyond the
10 budget levels, the NDAA advances a comprehensive and
11 important defense reform agenda that includes reforms in
12 OSD, the number of general and flag officers, DOD's
13 acquisition and healthcare systems, and adds important
14 rationality to our security assistance architecture, which
15 is so vital for our defense strategy. These and other
16 reforms must be implemented, and others initiated in the
17 years to come, not only because they will save significant
18 amounts of taxpayer money that will allow for investment in
19 other important areas in the defense program, but they will
20 make the Department more agile and more effective in
21 supporting and advancing America's security interests around
22 the world.

23 Thank you again for inviting me.

24 [The prepared statement of Mr. Brimley follows:]

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1 Chairman McCain: Dr. Kagan.
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1 STATEMENT OF ROBERT KAGAN, SENIOR FELLOW, PROJECT ON
2 INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND STRATEGY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

3 Dr. Kagan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you, all the
4 committee members, for holding this hearing, for inviting
5 me. It's an honor to be here. It's an honor to be on this
6 panel. I just want to say that every one of the family
7 members that General Keane mentioned is deeply in love with
8 General Keane. So, it's a mutual admiration society.

9 I want to talk about a subject that we don't like to
10 talk about in polite company, and it's called "world order."
11 You know, we naturally focus on threats to the homeland and
12 our borders, and we talk about terrorism, as we must, as
13 something that's obviously of utmost importance, has to be a
14 top priority to protect the homeland. But, as we look
15 across the whole panoply of threats that we face in the
16 world, I've -- I worry that it's too easy to lose sight of
17 what, to my mind, represent the greatest threats that we
18 face over the medium- and long term, and possibly even
19 sooner than we may think, and that is the threat posed by
20 the two great powers in the international system, the two
21 great revisionist powers international system: Russia and
22 China. Because what they threaten is something that is, in
23 a way, more profound, which is this world order that the
24 United States created after the end of World War II, a
25 global security order, a global economic order, and a global

1 political order. This is not something the United States
2 did as a favor to the rest of the world. It's not something
3 we did out of an act of generosity, although, by historical
4 terms, it was a rather remarkable act of generosity. It was
5 done based on what Americans learned in the first half of
6 the 20th century, which was that, if there was not a power,
7 whether it was Britain or, as it turned out it had to be,
8 the United States, willing and able to maintain this kind of
9 decent world order, you did not have some smooth ride into
10 something else. What you had was catastrophe. What you had
11 was the rise of aggressive powers, the rise of hostile
12 powers that were hostile to liberal values. We saw -- we
13 all know what happened with two world wars in the first half
14 of the 20th century. And what those who were present at the
15 creation, so to speak, after World War II wanted to create
16 was an international system that would not permit those
17 kinds of horrors to be repeated. And because the
18 understanding was that, while Americans believed very
19 deeply, in the 1920s and '30s, that they could be immune
20 from whatever horrors happened out there in the world, that
21 it didn't matter to them who ran Europe or who ran Asia or
22 who did what to whom, as long as were safe, they discovered
23 that that was not true and that, ultimately, the collapse of
24 world order would come back and strike the United States in
25 fundamental ways.

1 And so, Americans have decided to take on an unusual
2 and burdensome role of maintaining world order because the
3 United States was the only power in the world that could do
4 it. And the critical element of maintaining that world
5 order was to maintain peace and stability in the two big
6 cockpits of conflict that had destroyed the world and had
7 produced repeated conflicts from the late 19th century
8 onward. And that was Europe and Asia. The United States
9 accomplished something that no other power had able to
10 accomplish before. It essentially put a cork in two areas
11 that had been known for the constant warfare, put an end to
12 an endless cycle of war between France and Germany, between
13 Japan and China. And that was the stable world order that
14 was created after World War II that America gradually
15 thrived in, that produced the greatest era of great-power
16 peace that has been known in history, the greatest period of
17 prosperity, the greatest period of the spread of democracy.
18 I think it's very easy to take that for granted, to focus on
19 some nearer-term threats that we may face, which are, as I
20 say, understandable, but lose sight of how precious that
21 world order is and the degree to which it may be threatened.

22 And my concern right now is that that world order is
23 more at risk than we may want to realize. And it is at risk
24 because of two trend -- intersecting trend lines that I
25 think are things to be worried about. They are the trend

1 line of increasingly activist revisionist great powers,
2 Russia and China, together with the other trend line, which
3 is a United States which is increasingly lacking both the
4 will and the capacity to continue playing the role that it's
5 played since the end of World War II. And as those two
6 lines intersect, we begin to enter a period of increasing
7 danger, because, as the willingness and capacity of the
8 United States to maintain the order meets the increasing
9 desire of those revisionist powers to change the order, the
10 risk of conflict grows proportionately. If you think about
11 a historical analogy, I don't know whether it's 1920, 1925,
12 or 1931, but we are somewhere on that continuum, in my view.

13 And so, I think, with everything else that we have to
14 do -- and this puts enormous strain on our defense budget
15 resources, because we cannot ignore what's going on in the
16 Middle East, we cannot ignore Iran, we cannot ignore North
17 Korea, we cannot ignore ISIS, but we especially cannot take
18 our eye off what I believe is ultimately the main game,
19 which is managing these two revisionist powers and
20 understanding what they seek. We cannot be under any
21 illusions about Russia and China. We will find areas of
22 cooperation with them. They both partake and benefit from
23 and, in some case, sort of feed off of, the liberal world
24 order the United States has created. But, let us never
25 imagine that they are content with this order, that they do

1 not seek, fundamentally, eventually to upend this order,
2 especially on the security side, to create a situation which
3 they think ought to be the natural situation, which was --
4 which is they being hegemonic in their own region. China
5 has a historical memory of being hegemonic, dominant in its
6 region. Russia has a historical memory, which Putin has
7 expressed on numerous occasions, of restoring its empire,
8 which stretched right into the heart of central Europe. As
9 far as they are concerned, the order that the United States
10 has created is unfair, disadvantageous to them, temporary,
11 and ought to be overturned. And I can only say that, in the
12 process of overturning that, the history teaches, that
13 overturning does not occur peacefully. And so, it should be
14 our task both to prevent them from overturning it and to
15 prevent them in a way that does not produce another
16 catastrophic war. And that is the great challenge we face.

17 Now, are we up to this challenge? Unfortunately, that
18 is, I think, very much in question. I do believe that the
19 policies of the outgoing administration have indicated a
20 general desire for a degree of retrenchment in the world, a
21 sense that the United States was too involved, too engaged.
22 It focused, to some extent, on the Middle East, but, I
23 think, overall, the message that was sent, whether
24 intentionally or unintentionally, although, in some cases, I
25 think it was intentional, was that the United States is not

1 really going to be in this business of world-order upholding
2 as it used to be, and that we would really like others to
3 step up and play that role while we pull back and tend to
4 some of our business. Entirely understandable, entirely
5 dangerous, because it has, as the other panelists have said,
6 led both our allies to question whether the United States is
7 really there for them, and it has emboldened those who seek
8 revisions in the international system to take increasing
9 steps to do so.

10 It's unfortunate, that, after these 8 years which -- in
11 which this signal has been sent, that, during his political
12 campaign, the President-Elect's comments during the
13 campaign, as well as those of his surrogates, have only
14 reinforced the impression that the United States is out of
15 the world-order business. Comments about whether the United
16 States really should support NATO allies. Comments about
17 Estonia being in the suburbs of St. Petersburg. Complaints
18 about the need to defend Japan, and is that an equitable
19 thing? The fact that both candidates came out against the
20 Trans-Pacific Partnership, which is really, in my eyes, a
21 strategic deal more than a trade deal designed to pull the
22 United States and its Asian partners together. All the
23 elements of this campaign have only sent even greater
24 shockwaves throughout the world about what the United States
25 stands for.

1 So, in a certain sense, yes, the next administration
2 has a big hole to dig out of. It is -- also has to dig out
3 of a hole, to some extent, of its own making. And so, we
4 need to see, in the early stages -- in the very early
5 stages, I would say, a clear repudiation of all that
6 rhetoric, some clear signs that this new administration
7 understands the importance, not only of reassuring allies,
8 but a willingness to bolster our commitment to those allies.
9 Because, after all, the challenge from the revisionist
10 powers is increasing; therefore, it's not enough to say
11 we're committed to the defense of allies. We have to show
12 that our capacities are increasing along with those of the
13 increasing threat, which, of course, gets to the defense
14 budget, which I don't have to talk to this committee about
15 the need to do that.

16 Let me just end -- I know I'm going on too long -- let
17 me just end on one point, and it has to do with Russia.
18 Both China and Russia are revisionist powers. They have
19 different tools in their kit. China has been the more
20 cautious, so far, although I don't presume caution
21 indefinitely, focusing more on their economic clout. Russia
22 has, by far, been the most aggressive, willingness to use
23 military force. It's invaded two countries, projected force
24 into a third, but also has a whole panoply of geostrategic
25 weapons that it has used, from energy resources to cyber.

1 And now, especially in the past few years, to political
2 information warfare, direct meddling in the political
3 processes of the Western democracies. We've seen it in
4 central and eastern Europe. We've seen it in Western
5 Europe. We saw it in the Italian referendum. We're going
6 to see it in the French elections. We're going to see it in
7 Germany. This is a full-bore strategic tool being used by
8 Russia for two basic purposes: one, to affect the outcome
9 of these elections; but, I would say, more importantly, to
10 discredit the democratic process entirely. Because, after
11 all, Russia and China are both autocracies. They feel
12 threatened by democracies. One of their objectives -- and
13 this is an objective that Putin is particularly pursuing --
14 is to discredit democracy, in general. And this is his
15 major tool.

16 Unfortunately, as we've seen in this last campaign, the
17 United States has now become the target of this Russian
18 strategy. And what I'm about to say, I'm going to say
19 because I have all you Senators in front of me. This'll
20 probably be the last time I'll be invited to have all these
21 Senators in front of me. But, this is not a partisan
22 question. This is a strategic question. If Russia, every 4
23 years, is allowed to come in and weigh in in our elections
24 in the way that it did right now -- this -- in this
25 election, we are going to be at a serious strategic

1 disadvantage, going forward.

2 Now, I understand that we live in a partisan world. I
3 used to be a Republican. I -- the only administration I
4 ever served in was Republican. And I understand the
5 reluctance of Republicans to raise questions about this last
6 election. But, this has got to go beyond partisanship,
7 because this tool is not going away, this Russian effort is
8 not going away.

9 So, I would just -- I would hope that Congress takes
10 this threat seriously enough to hold serious investigations
11 on what happened, how it happened, and, most importantly,
12 how are we going to prevent it happening in the future.
13 Because this is a major strategic tool that the Russians are
14 going to continue using here and throughout the democratic
15 world.

16 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

17 [The prepared statement of Dr. Kagan follows:]

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1 Chairman McCain: Thank you, Doctor.

2 And that leads to my first question for the panel.

3 This morning, we had a briefing with the Commandant of the
4 Marine Corps, and I asked him what was, he felt, the highest
5 priority that the Marine Corps has to combat as -- not to
6 combat, but as far as challenges to our Nation's security.
7 And his first answer was cyber. But, he put it in the realm
8 of the ability of our adversaries to cripple our ability to
9 wage war. And so, I understand very well the side of it --
10 the aspect of it you just described, but I'd also, maybe,
11 like to ask the witnesses to elaborate on the absolute
12 military threat that -- and national security threat that
13 cybersecurity, or our lack of cybersecurity, capabilities to
14 combat and pose to the future of the military and our
15 national security.

16 General Keane.

17 General Keane: Sure, certainly. Well, cyber
18 represents another major battlefield capability and function
19 that is going to be part of us in any future conflict,
20 particularly dealing with any country that has advanced
21 technology. And that's the reality of it. We are
22 attempting to harden our cyberdefenses, you know, for our
23 systems so that we can adequately protect them. We are
24 totally reliant on space-based --

25 Chairman McCain: I don't mean to interrupt, but isn't

1 it true we don't have a policy --

2 General Keane: That's true.

3 Chairman McCain: -- as to how to combat --

4 General Keane: We --

5 Chairman McCain: -- cyberthreats?

6 General Keane: That's correct. And the reality is
7 that we are completely dependent on space-based technology,
8 which also, obviously, can be interfered with, with cyber.

9 Now, the one -- we have a decided advantage, and we
10 don't want to minimize this. The United States cyberattack
11 capability is second to none. And I'm assuming some members
12 of the committee have had compartmentalized briefings on
13 what that capability is, but it would make your eyes water.
14 So, I mean, it's quite extraordinary, our offensive
15 capability. And every other nation that's dealing with us
16 knows that, as well. So, there is a built-in mechanism
17 there, much as we had with nuclear weapons. But, the
18 reality -- in terms of mutually assured destruction -- but,
19 the reality is, in a tactical and operational setting, which
20 John McCain -- Senator McCain is getting at here, yes, we've
21 got a ways to go. There's -- we've got deficiencies there,
22 but we have enormous offensive capability, as well.

23 Chairman McCain: Mr. Brimley.

24 Mr. Brimley: Thank you, Senator. Just maybe a quick
25 anecdote, to your point about the lack of a policy. I was a

1 policy advisor in OSD in 2009, in the first years of the
2 Obama administration, and passed down through the chain of
3 command from Secretary Gates, at the time, was a question,
4 What constitutes an act of war in cyberspace? And I was
5 part of a small team that put together a memo that
6 apparently was very unsatisfactory, because one of the first
7 questions that Secretary Panetta asked, upon assuming
8 office, was, What constitutes an act of war in cyberspace?
9 And I think, in my mind, that just reflects the notion that
10 there's lots of memos being written, lots of folks inside
11 the bureaucracies thinking about and pondering these
12 questions, but we have yet to sort of establish the basic
13 rules of war. Rules of war as it pertains to cyberspace.
14 What constitutes a conflict?

15 Chairman McCain: Including what constitute an attack?

16 Mr. Brimley: Absolutely.

17 Chairman McCain: Do you take action to prevent it if
18 you know it's coming? And what do you do to respond to an
19 attack? Is that what you were discussing?

20 Mr. Brimley: Absolutely. Another quick anecdote.
21 Early in '09, and maybe it was 2010, we tried to come up
22 with a DOD cyberstrategy. And eventually we did and it got
23 released. But, as part of those discussions, there was this
24 questions of speed. So, for instance, I believe, at the
25 time, inside the Pentagon, there was this debate about

1 preauthorizing offensive use of cyber. And the argument
2 was, things happen in cyberspace so quickly, there's not
3 going to be an opportunity for humans -- i.e., the President
4 or the interagency -- to be involved in deliberating,
5 discussions about whether to take out a cyberserver farm,
6 say, in Singapore that happened to be harboring --
7 hypothetically harboring a third state's cyberoperations.
8 And so, there's this complex question of, How do we
9 authorize use of force and think about the use of force in
10 cyber, when you're not going to have the ability, in a -- on
11 a case-by-case basis, to have, you know, long, deliberative
12 discussions about policy. You're going to have to think
13 about preauthorizing steps in advance, up to and including
14 going beyond our own networks and attacking the networks of
15 others. So, that could create second- and third-order
16 effects.

17 It's a long way of saying, it remains incredibly
18 complex, it remains incredibly unclear, at least from a
19 public perspective, what our policies are. And I would
20 think there's a role for the committee in this regard in,
21 sort of, legislating DOD, for instance, to finally come up
22 and answer that basic question, What constitutes an act of
23 war in cyberspace?

24 Chairman McCain: Thank you.

25 Dr. Kagan, did you want to add anything to the --

1 Dr. Kagan: It's well out of my range, but I would just
2 say that, as with all weapons, unless you can demonstrate a
3 retaliatory capacity, you're never going to deter the use of
4 it. And that goes for cyber and the use -- in a war setting
5 and also in a political setting. So, unless there was
6 retaliatory action for Russian actions, they have no
7 incentive to stop doing it.

8 Chairman McCain: Senator Reed.

9 Senator Reed: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

10 Also, let me thank the witnesses for their comments on
11 NDAA. But, let me state the obvious, also. The -- this
12 reform initiative was a result of the constant and gentle
13 urgings of the Chairman. And so, I think --

14 Chairman McCain: It could not have happened unless it
15 was totally partnership.

16 Senator Reed: But, that nudging constantly was
17 noticed.

18 [Laughter.]

19 Senator Reed: Dr. Kagan, you made a -- I think a very
20 insightful -- no surprise -- analysis of two lines that
21 could intersect disastrously, the -- a revanchist Russia and
22 China and a disengaging United States. And this tracks, I
23 think, to a basic, fundamental issue we've all talked about.
24 We have to get a military -- not just the military, but our
25 national security enterprise -- the Department of State,

1 Homeland Security -- to a much higher level that requires
2 more resources. We can find some of those resources within
3 a context of savings -- General Keane pointed out, and --
4 that there's money there. But, I think, even exhausting all
5 the feasible savings, we still have a critical issue before
6 us. And it's -- goes to the points that you raised, in some
7 respects, just -- as a Nation, are we ready to take on the
8 challenge and pay for it? And so, General Keane, how do we
9 pay for the extra margin? If we can get out of
10 sequestration, how do we pay for the extra margin we'll need
11 to do all the things we have to do -- enhance our security,
12 in space, undersea, et cetera? And I'll ask everyone else
13 to comment. And that probably exhausts my time.

14 General Keane: Well, you know, some of that gets back
15 to what Dr. Kagan was talking about, is a lack of will. I
16 actually am absolutely convinced this is -- this is
17 fundamentally American presidential leadership, because, you
18 know, security of the American people shouldn't have a
19 pricetag. And that means we have to educate the American
20 people about what is really going on. We have to make
21 honest assessments about this threat and what it portends
22 for the future of America if we do not engage it. And,
23 frankly, we have not been doing that. I hope and trust that
24 this new administration will face up to that. But, I think
25 that's where it starts. It starts with American leadership,

1 and it starts with the education of the American people so
2 that they really do understand that there is danger here,
3 that it is threatening our livelihood as we know it. And we
4 have to make sure that they understand that and they're
5 informed. And they obviously influence this body, the House
6 of Representatives and the Senate, if they are educated, if
7 they are informed. Because that's where the decision is
8 going to be made about resources, largely. And I would
9 trust that the new American President would make the
10 commitment to invest in the defense budget, which it
11 desperately needs.

12 And all that said, this is not just a windfall for the
13 Department of Defense, because, at the end of the day,
14 they're going to support a national security strategy,
15 foreign policy would emanate from that, and a defense
16 strategy would emanate from that national security strategy.
17 But, it's also up to them to make the hard choices about
18 priorities. There's never enough money to go around. And
19 they've got to really make some tough choices here, to be
20 sure. But, we have such gaps and such holes that some of
21 those choices are not too hard to understand what needs to
22 be done. So, yes, I understand what you're saying, Senator,
23 and I'm sympathetic to it, but I'm absolutely convinced the
24 Nation doesn't understand. They really don't understand.
25 And we've got to start with them.

1 Senator Reed: Mr. Brimley, then Dr. Kagan.

2 Mr. Brimley: Thank you for your question, Senator.

3 I would just say, without disagreeing at all -- I would
4 never disagree with General Keane -- but, I would say, to
5 the committee at large, it's not just a question of money.
6 I mean, hypothetically, if sequester caps were lifted in the
7 next few months, and for FY18, if there's a radical increase
8 in defense spending, what do you think would happen? I
9 mean, you know, absent anything else, the Pentagon will
10 simply just keep doing what it's doing, and will just do
11 more of it. They'll buy more short-range tactical fighters,
12 they'll buy more vulnerable surface ships that are
13 particularly vulnerable to antiship cruise missiles, et
14 cetera.

15 Senator Reed: I think --

16 Mr. Brimley: The military services, left to their own
17 devices, I think, will basically just keep doing what
18 they're doing. Moreover, absent the reforms -- and, you
19 know, again, appreciate the reforms the committee pushed
20 during this last NDAA -- but, if we don't make progress on
21 personnel reform, if we don't bend the cost curve on
22 military healthcare, if we don't bend the cost curve on
23 personnel, no amount of money is going to fix these
24 problems. When I was in government, I spent a lot of time
25 thinking about posture -- overseas military posture. And we

1 found ways, at least in the Asia-Pacific, to start what we
2 dreamed of as a significant rebalance. I think there's a
3 lot more to do, but things like getting marines in Darwin,
4 opening the door, at the time, to the Philippines, getting
5 the Littoral Combat Ship forward-deployed to Singapore,
6 starting to negotiate with Japan to maybe forward-station
7 more aircraft carriers. I think there -- you know, frankly,
8 a mistake that the administration did was taking the BCTs
9 out of Europe. We ought to put those back in.

10 I think there are ways where we could do a lot more
11 without necessarily having to add dramatic amounts of more
12 dollars to the defense budget. We need to be more engaged
13 in the world. We need to forward-station our troops and
14 capabilities around the world. The pushback you get in the
15 Pentagon when you talk about overseas posture is this notion
16 that if I'm going to put something, say, in Europe or put
17 something permanently in Asia, that gives the --
18 potentially, the services and DOD writ large -- it starts to
19 lock them down. It somewhat decreases your global
20 flexibility. So, there's this argument inside the Pentagon
21 that, if we bring the troops home, and we bring capabilities
22 home, that gives us more flexibility to rapidly deploy
23 anywhere in the world where we may be needed. But, that
24 comes at the cost of being forward and present in key
25 theaters. We ought to be making bets on Europe, as Dr.

1 Kagan said. We ought to be making bets on Asia and forward-
2 station capabilities, and be very creative, and hold the
3 military services to account. There's a lot we can do to be
4 more engaged in the world without necessarily having to
5 increase the defense budget.

6 Senator Reed: Dr. Kagan, again, you raised this issue
7 of the will of the American people. And to be blunt, that
8 will is most -- or sometimes most directly expressed in,
9 What are you willing to pay for, and how are you willing to
10 pay for it? Can you comment?

11 Dr. Kagan: Yeah, I mean, I -- I'm not an expert on
12 Pentagon budget and what can be saved and what can't be
13 saved. I'm very dubious that, unless you actually increase
14 the top-line, that you're going to get what you need,
15 because I just think, you know, you can only squeeze so far
16 and be as brilliant as you can be. Brilliant is never going
17 to be your answer. So, I think the answer is, there's going
18 to have to be more spending. And, you know, I'm not a
19 budget expert, writ large, either, but I would say we have
20 to do whatever we need to do. We have to -- if we need to
21 raise taxes and we need to have some package that does that,
22 if we need to find other ways of, you know, dealing with
23 problems like entitlement spending to do it, we have to do
24 it. I mean, I lived through the Reagan years. There were
25 increases in defense budget which were offset by political

1 bargains of one kind or another that required increase in
2 domestic spending, which led to increased defense budgets.
3 We survived the -- I mean, in overall deficits -- we
4 survived the deficits and won the Cold War. So, I would say
5 we are going to have to, as a Nation, take this seriously
6 enough to pay for it.

7 Senator Reed: Thank you.

8 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

9 Chairman McCain: Senator Inhofe.

10 Senator Inhofe: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

11 The -- let's start off -- there are some differences
12 between the NDAA -- and I appreciate the comments that
13 you've all made about the -- this NDAA; we're going to get
14 it through, and it's going to improve things -- but
15 differences between the administration and the NDAA. I
16 happened to be in the Ukraine when they had their elections.
17 And it's the first time, as all of you know, in 96 years,
18 there's not one Communist on the Parliament at -- in the
19 Ukraine. And immediately afterwards, Putin came in and
20 started killing people. And we were wanting -- a lot of
21 people were wanting to get defensive weapons over to the
22 Ukraine. They're in this bill. But, the administration was
23 saying that the -- they refused to provide defensive legal
24 assistance to the Ukrainians, for fear of provoking Putin.
25 First question I'd ask you, Do you think Putin really

1 needs provocation? Or isn't he going to do it anyway?

2 Mr. Brimley: He doesn't need provocation. I think --
3 you know, I absolutely support being as -- you know, as --
4 as forward-leaning as possible in helping our Ukrainian
5 friends, you know, counter --

6 Senator Inhofe: Well --

7 Mr. Brimley: -- counter the aggression.

8 Senator Inhofe: Yeah. In my -- the reason I asked the
9 question, my feeling was, at the time, that he was doing
10 this because he -- the outcome of the -- of Parliament. He
11 didn't like that. And he's getting bolder and bolder, as
12 you have said.

13 Yes, General Keane.

14 General Keane: Well, I -- there's a larger issue here.
15 I mean, I think there's been a thought on part of the
16 administration that any act like that, even assisting
17 someone so that they can fight aggression, could possibly
18 create an escalating situation. And I think we get
19 paralyzed by the fear of adverse consequences.

20 And there's clearly a pattern here. You know, after --
21 not only did we not provide largely defensive lethal aid to
22 the Ukrainians, but, after the -- Libya and Qaddafi was
23 taken down, you could argue, Well, should we have done that,
24 or not? But, we did it. And the only thing the new elected
25 Islamic moderate government asked for us was to help them

1 create a defensive force to stop the radicals. And we said
2 no. And, as a result of that, we lost our Ambassador, the
3 Consulate, and eventually the Embassy. And the radicals are
4 running around the entire country, the Syrian moderates.
5 You've probably met some of them. They were so desperate,
6 they talked to me. And they wanted -- "Lookit, we don't
7 want your troops, we don't even want your airplanes. Just
8 give us some weapons to be able to fight this guy, Assad,
9 because he's got a modern -- he's got modern equipment. He
10 doesn't have very good soldiers. They lack will. But,
11 they've got tanks and artillery and airplanes, and that
12 makes a difference on the battlefield. Let us fight them.
13 Give us some antitank weapons, some antiaircraft weapons."
14 And we said no. Look at the problem we have. I mean, that
15 lack of support and engagement is mystifying to me. And to
16 fear that because it may escalate into something else? And
17 we get paralyzed by the fear that it may be something else
18 that -- it's --

19 Senator Inhofe: Yeah.

20 General Keane: Some of it's shameful.

21 Senator Inhofe: I appreciate that.

22 Let me just, real quickly, on -- my time is running out
23 here -- I was at the meeting also this morning with General
24 Neller. And I commented, and he agreed, that the problem --
25 one of the problems that we're having is that we don't -- we

1 have the wrong priority on defending America. I think you
2 just said it a minute ago, that defense of the American
3 people shouldn't have a pricetag. Well, we had a policy
4 from the administration that, when we're getting into
5 sequestration, that we're not going to put additional
6 funding into the military unless an equal amount's going to
7 be given to the nondefense portion of the budget. What does
8 that tell you? It tells you that there's not a priority in
9 defending America. And do you in -- feel the same way? Do
10 you feel that the next administration should have that
11 priority changed?

12 General Keane: Well, yeah, absolutely. Given the
13 threats that we're facing, and given the leaders of our
14 military who are coming before this committee and telling us
15 what major challenges and security deficiencies that they
16 have, that we can't meet the threats that are out there.
17 And I'm -- and I -- what I tried to explain to you is that,
18 yes, we have to make investments; yes, we have to grow the
19 capability of this force; but, also, we have to look inside
20 this Department as to how it does its business, and hold it
21 accountable for that.

22 But, yeah, absolutely, these -- this situation that's
23 in the world today is going to get worse if we don't stand
24 up to it. And I think we've learned a couple of lessons
25 from history. Our adversaries look at us in terms of real

1 capability. And they see that gap closing, just as we see
2 it. And so, rebuilding the military and putting that
3 capability on the table is real. And in and of itself, it
4 becomes a deterrent. That is the wonderful aspect of this.
5 And we learned that through the Cold War. But, the other
6 thing that has to be present, even though you have the
7 capabilities there, and they know those capabilities are
8 real, and they don't want to deal with those capabilities,
9 if we don't have the intent to use that capability, it is
10 not a credible deterrent. And they have to clearly
11 understand where those lines are. Russia's aggression has
12 to stop. China wants to dominate and control the Pacific,
13 and they resent the United States having done it for 70
14 years. They are forward-deploying forces to do that. That
15 kind of aggression that's taking place that will lead to
16 confrontation, they have to know that we're not going to
17 stand for that. And they have to understand that. So, the
18 intent, as well as the credible military capability, is what
19 is a credible deterrence. And you have to have both.

20 Senator Inhofe: Mr. Chairman, I've got to say, this
21 is-- I think, may be the best panel that we've had in recent
22 years.

23 I appreciate your honesty, all of you.

24 Thank you.

25 Chairman McCain: Thank you.

1 Senator Blumenthal.

2 Senator Blumenthal: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

3 I joined Chairman McCain at the Marine Corps Caucus
4 Breakfast this morning, where the Commandant of the Marine
5 Corps, in some sense surprisingly to me, identified cyber as
6 the major threat and, in fact, I think, clearly indicated
7 that we need a more robust and clear policy and strategy
8 regarding cyber. And one of the aspects of cyber that is
9 perhaps most troubling is that, first of all, it spreads
10 across many different spheres. Chairman McCain identified
11 the potential for crippling our warfighting ability by
12 literally disabling our ships or planes that are dependent
13 on cyber communication, but also the attacks on civilian
14 targets -- our utilities, our financial system, and our
15 election.

16 So, I take it, Mr. Kagan, you would agree that we need
17 a more clear and strong policy regarding cyber.

18 Dr. Kagan: Yes. As I say, I'm not a cyber expert, so
19 I couldn't tell you what that policy actually would be,
20 other than, as I say, I think, you know, we need to -- first
21 of all, we, as a Nation, need to be clear about what has
22 happened. And I think -- I mean, I'm only talking about the
23 political side here. I mean, there's still a lot of
24 uncertainty about what exactly has happened. And I think
25 it's very important that the American public know what

1 happened, who did it, and how. And so that then we can
2 begin to fashion a response to it, which I think must
3 include retaliatory action as a deterrent.

4 Senator Blumenthal: And that investigation of its most
5 recent effort to interfere in our elections is one that
6 really should be done soon, it should have bipartisan
7 support, and it should be sufficiently resourced so that it
8 can be effective. Would you agree?

9 Dr. Kagan: Yes. And, again, because it's as -- it
10 should be understood as a strategic -- it's a strategic
11 issue, because Russia deploys this political weapon as part
12 of its overall strategy. So, the United States needs to
13 respond as if this were a strategic issue, and forget about
14 who won and didn't win the election. This really is a
15 fundamental strategic question.

16 Senator Blumenthal: And without going into any of the
17 details that may be, preferably, discussed in a classified
18 setting, no doubt there has been work done -- investigative
19 work done into the Russian actions that were designed to
20 destabilize or interfere with our electoral process. But,
21 separately, you would recommend that the Congress undertake
22 such a study.

23 Dr. Kagan: Yes. And partly, again, for the reasons
24 that Congress is uniquely suited to then explaining things
25 to the American people in a way that the administration is

1 not likely to do. I mean, it's just not enough to come up
2 with a secret report on what happened. I think the American
3 people need to understand.

4 And, by the way, I also think this needs to put in --
5 be put in a global context, because this activity has been
6 conducted in elections throughout Europe and in a -- as I
7 say, is about to be conducted in elections that are coming
8 up in Europe.

9 Senator Blumenthal: You mentioned, Mr. Kagan -- and
10 I'd be interested in the opinions of other individuals on
11 this observations -- that the two trends that are troubling
12 are not only the changes in policy on the part of the
13 revisionist powers, but also the growing doubts about our
14 Nation's commitment to our alliances, including recent
15 statements by the President-Elect that we ought to, in
16 effect, withdraw from our commitments to NATO, that our
17 commitments to Japan also perhaps are not worth fulfilling.
18 And I wonder whether you would expand on the effects of
19 those kinds of statements on the world order.

20 Dr. Kagan: Well, as I say -- and I want to be, you
21 know, clear about this -- I think that, unfortunately, the
22 policies of the outgoing administration had already shaken
23 confidence in -- from the very beginning. I mean, I think
24 the way the initial Russian reset was carried out, which
25 wound up canceling military cooperation programs with

1 Poland, and the Czech Republic send a very early signal
2 about whether the United States was going to be a reliable
3 ally. I think premature withdrawal from Iraq, the whole
4 redline episode with Syria -- I mean, there's a background
5 here. And so, when I look at what happened during the
6 campaign, I see it as part of a continuum.

7 But, yes, the statements made by the President-Elect
8 and his proxies during the campaign have definitely raised
9 alarm bells around the world about what the United States
10 role is going to be, and have suggested that it is going to
11 be a different role than the world has been accustomed to.

12 Now, you know, we can -- are told that the -- people
13 don't mean anything they say in election campaigns. And
14 maybe that'll turn out to be true. But, that's why I think
15 that a very high priority, and a first priority of the
16 administration, must be to go out and reassure, publicly and
17 privately, the allies that we are fully committed to all of
18 our defense commitments. And, as I say, more than that, to
19 say that we are going to keep up with the rising challenges
20 that those countries face by taking the necessary steps, in
21 terms of our own capacities to do that.

22 Senator Blumenthal: Thank you very much.

23 My time is expired. But, at some point during the
24 hearing, I'd be interested in what the two other witnesses
25 have to say about both those areas.

1 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

2 Chairman McCain: Senator Blumenthal, in order for
3 continuity, we could have those comments now.

4 General Keane: Well, let me just add, as much as there
5 are issues in the cyber area with the United States
6 military, it also is the most protected function that we
7 have. You know as well as I do that our critical
8 infrastructure is exposed. By that I mean our banking and
9 financial system, our utility infrastructure, our
10 transportation system. They're all relatively exposed. The
11 Congress here tried to work public-private partnerships in
12 some legislation a few years ago. I think Senator Lieberman
13 led that effort with others, and we couldn't get it done,
14 mainly because the private sector did not want to make the
15 commitment that it would take, largely in terms of dollars,
16 to provide that kind of security.

17 There's a presidential commission reporting out this
18 week that's got a number of recommendations, so I think we
19 need to take a hard look at what they're looking at. And
20 this mostly deals with -- because they're not -- they don't
21 have access to the -- what the militaries do, in a
22 classified sense -- this largely has to do with the private
23 sector. But, it will take public-private partnership to
24 provide that kind of security. And let's face it, I mean,
25 cyberattacks on the United States have been absolutely

1 exploding, you know, in terms of stealing technology,
2 intellectual property, and obviously also in just stealing
3 critical information. And largely, we have not been
4 responding. And I don't know how you stop something like
5 that if they're not paying a price for it. And largely,
6 they're not paying a price for it, Senator. And that
7 clearly has to be a part of our strategy.

8 So, yes, we -- but, we have to find ways to defend that
9 critical infrastructure, and hopefully the presidential
10 commission will give us some ideas on what the Congress
11 needs to do to help do that. And there are some things on
12 the military side that we need to shore up.

13 Mr. Brimley: I would just say, sir, quickly, on the
14 allies-and-partners question. I agree with Dr. Kagan. I'm
15 somewhat worried about the comments I saw from the
16 President-Elect and his team. But, I'm inclined to give
17 them the benefit of the doubt, certainly during the
18 transition. I would think that, upon taking office -- to
19 execute any of the at least rhetorical policies I've heard,
20 vis-a-vis China or Iran, or even the comments on Taiwan, all
21 of those things require robust alliances and partnerships.
22 And moreover, the selection, I would think, of General
23 Mattis, who spent years fostering strong alliances and
24 partnerships in places like Central Command, for instance,
25 I'm hopeful that the next team will be -- at the Cabinet

1 level, will have folks that are deeply versed in the value
2 to us of having a strong strategy buttressed by strong
3 alliances and partnerships.

4 Chairman McCain: Senator Rounds.

5 Senator Rounds: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

6 I appreciate the direction that this committee meeting
7 is focused on. In particular, I'm curious as to whether or
8 not perhaps the committee has gone far enough with the NDAA
9 proposal this year. We've directed, for the first time
10 ever, that the President of the United States must now
11 define when an act in cyberspace would require a military
12 response. It started out with a discussion that we had as
13 to whether or not we should define a cyber act of war. It's
14 been refined a little bit in the discussion. And I think
15 it's a very appropriate item to have.

16 Would it be fair to say that -- have we gone far
17 enough, or do we have to go farther, in terms of what we're
18 expecting from the administration?

19 Mr. Brimley: I'm happy to go first with that, sir.

20 It's hard to know from the outside. I think a lot of
21 the most useful strategic guidance in this domain would be
22 highly classified. But, just from my own basic experience
23 in this, wrestling with this act-of-war question, I think
24 that's something that can and should be debated openly and
25 publicly. I think we ought to do more. Like I said, the

1 second- and third-order consequences of getting involved in
2 offensive operations, for instance, are problematic.

3 Just to the earlier point on cyber, writ large, I do
4 worry a little bit about the military services and sort of
5 running to the ball on cyber. You know, I want the Marine
6 Corps focused on closing with and destroying the enemy, you
7 know, from amphibious operations and the like. I want the
8 Army focused on, you know, major combat operations. I want
9 the Air Force focused on what it does best. I -- sometimes
10 I worry that, sort of, the lack of -- the necessity to have
11 each military services investing in cyber, along with the
12 broader architecture of Cyber Command and the NSA, it -- I'm
13 not sure the incentives are properly there. And each
14 military service chief feels compelled to focus on cyber,
15 because they have to. I -- sometimes I worry that that
16 focus sometimes can protract from what the military
17 services, in my mind, their core missions ought to be.
18 Thinking about seapower, thinking about airpower.
19 Obviously, cyber is a component of this. You know, but
20 sometimes I worry that they are -- that the demands for each
21 military service detract from their core mission. And I
22 think cyber ought to be, you know, a stronger voice,
23 perhaps, from Cyber Command and maybe even OSD is
24 appropriate.

25 Senator Rounds: Dr. Kagan?

1 Dr. Kagan: Senator, forgive me, I've already exceeded
2 my knowledge of cyber in this hearing.

3 Senator Rounds: General Keane.

4 General Keane: Well, I think the committee focus with
5 the military portion of cyber deals with Cyber Command,
6 itself. And they have responsibility for the function, both
7 from a defense perspective and from an offense perspective.
8 And I don't believe that this is an area that's going to
9 require major investment strategy that compares anything to
10 the lack of combat brigades, the lack of proper type of
11 combat aircraft, or the lack of proper types of submarines
12 and ships. And I would leave it to the commander there to
13 understand exactly what he needs to properly defend the
14 military. And also, I know he's got the offensive tools.
15 It's the defensive tools that are the issue.

16 Senator Rounds: Interesting to me. And I -- my time
17 is -- I've got a short amount of time left, but I'm just
18 curious. Throughout this discussion, we've talked cyber,
19 we've talked some readiness issues, we've talked some
20 challenges with regard to our naval forces, air forces,
21 army. But, we really have not said much at all about space.
22 And yet, everything everybody's got is dependent upon our
23 ability to protect our own assets within space. How
24 vulnerable are we? And should we be placing additional
25 emphasis on the protection of our own assets from kinetic

1 attack in space?

2 General Keane: Well, the short answer is yes. As our
3 adversaries have acquired all the technology that we have,
4 you -- we know for a fact it's part of their asymmetric
5 strategy to deny us as much of our space-based technology as
6 possible. And they practice it routinely. You know as well
7 as I do, the Chinese have been shooting satellites down for
8 years, getting ready for that asymmetric strategy against
9 us. So, most definitely, there's -- we're not going to go
10 back, in terms of that technology and our dependence. And
11 protecting it is an investment strategy, to be sure, but it
12 is not on the scale of what is needed for our offensive
13 capability, which is lacking.

14 Senator Rounds: Thank you.

15 My time is expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

16 Chairman McCain: Senator King.

17 Senator King: I also want to associate myself with the
18 comments of Senator Inhofe, and thank the Chairman and the
19 Ranking Member for arranging this hearing. This is -- this
20 has been a very insightful and important.

21 To follow up on this -- just a quick question on the
22 cyber issue. I wonder your opinions of splitting the cyber
23 from Cyber Command and NSA. It strikes me that those are
24 two different, very important, very engaging functions, and
25 I wonder if the time has come to acknowledge the importance

1 of each and make those two different individuals.

2 General Keane, your thoughts?

3 General Keane: Yeah, I wouldn't split it. I mean --

4 Senator King: You would not.

5 General Keane: No, no, absolutely not. Because the
6 main tool that you're actually going to use is NSA. That
7 is-- that's where most of our capability truly is. And if
8 Keith Alexander was sitting here -- he's a good friend of
9 mine, and I've talked to him at length about this -- he
10 would argue against splitting it.

11 Senator King: I --

12 General Keane: You're going to wind up --

13 Senator King: I've had that discussion with him --

14 General Keane: -- creating more bureaucracy than we
15 actually need if we do that.

16 Senator King: Mr. Brimley? Mr. Kagan?

17 Mr. Brimley: I've been back and forth on this
18 particular question, myself, over the years. You know, I
19 think one of the major problems we have with cyber, as it
20 pertains to the government and also the military, is, you
21 know, we're competing for talent. We're competing for
22 talent with the private sector, we're competing for talent
23 from the international community, as well. And which leads
24 me to believe that, you know, splitting, you know, one
25 rather -- you know, one bureaucratic entity into two

1 bureaucratic entities, you know, I think that could -- you
2 know, and setting those bureaucratic entities in some sort
3 of competition with one another for talent, whether it's
4 civilian talent or military talent -- it's probably not the
5 real issue. I would be more interested in, you know, making
6 sure that, from a military perspective, we have the ability
7 to direct-commission folks from, say, Silicon Valley who
8 want to serve as reservists or who can serve on Active Duty
9 for 1 or 2 years; you know, flexible hiring authorities for
10 the civilian side; you know, flexible spending incentive
11 programs to be able to compensate our best and brightest.
12 Maybe not, obviously, from a private-sector level, but
13 making it more attractive for folks to serve, both on the
14 civilian side and military side, I think that's where we
15 ought to focus much of our energy. And the wiring diagrams,
16 I think, are less important in that regard.

17 Senator King: Thank you. Thank you.

18 General Keane, I was struck by your testimony about the
19 bureaucracy in the Army which stalled the development of new
20 weapon systems and the deployment. That's a structural
21 issue and a cultural issue. It's hard -- these aren't bad
22 people saying, "We don't want to do good things." How do we
23 deal with the cultural structural issue? Because we're
24 seeing this across the -- all the services, and in
25 procurement, generally, of new technology. It takes too

1 long, and it's too expensive.

2 General Keane: Yeah, the -- it's a great question.
3 And the only way you get at that is with absolutely strong
4 leadership that is not going to tolerate that. And you've
5 got to bore down on it. First, you've got to get educated,
6 yourself, because -- most people, like I do -- I came to the
7 Pentagon, because I ran effective organizations at different
8 levels. But, I didn't know anything about the business side
9 of the Army. The first time I got exposed to it was when I
10 was a four-star general. And I was handicapped, initially,
11 because I didn't know what was going on. It took me, what,
12 a year, year and a half, to understand this issue.

13 So, having people there who are strong leaders, want to
14 get these results, holding the system accountable for it,
15 really driving innovation and technology, who you put in
16 there as Secretary of the Army, the civilian Under Secretary
17 of the Army -- a lot of times -- just be frank with you --
18 we put people in there, you know, who enjoy the ceremonial
19 aspect of it, they enjoy being Secretary of the Army, but
20 they don't drive change in the culture because they're --
21 it's a reward for something they've done.

22 Senator King: So, selection of leaders is a crucial
23 element, looking for innovative and willingness to move.
24 Let me --

25 General Keane: You've got to force the R&D effort, and

1 you've got to talk to civilian -- you've got to talk to the
2 defense industry on a regular basis, because the defense
3 industry is spending their time thinking about your
4 function. They're all -- they're also spending research
5 dollars on it. You have to have regular communication with
6 them, let them know where you're trying to go, bring them
7 into it to help contribute to it, drive your own people to
8 work with them, as well. We can accelerate this process
9 rather dramatically.

10 Senator King: And I would suggest that we have to.

11 Let me quickly move on to one other question. There's
12 an extraordinary story in this morning's Washington Post
13 about a report done by McKinsey and by the Business Board a
14 the Defense Department, \$125 billion of savings identified
15 over 5 years. That would be enough to fund the nuclear
16 modernization program. Do we need to take seriously --
17 because we're talking about increasing the defense budget,
18 but how about talking about using the dollars we have more
19 effectively?

20 Mr. Brimley, your thoughts?

21 Mr. Brimley: Quickly, sir. Absolutely. I mean, that
22 report -- I think it was the Defense Business Board Report -
23 - I mean, I remember reading that a few years ago when it
24 came out. I'm glad to see it's finally being reported on,
25 you know, at significant levels now.

1 Senator King: Well, it's pretty disappointing that --

2 Mr. Brimley: Absolutely.

3 Senator King: -- it took digging to get it out.

4 Mr. Brimley: Absolutely. I -- and I would just say,
5 as part of your hearings, your posture hearings in 2017, as
6 part of the budget debates, I mean, you ought to hold the
7 next Pentagon team to account in not only advocating for
8 more defense dollars, but making sure those defense dollars
9 are better spent. And that's going to take advancing the
10 reform agenda that this committee has laid out in the NDAA.

11 Senator King: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

12 Chairman McCain: Senator Ernst.

13 Senator Ernst: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

14 Thank you, gentlemen.

15 This has been a great discussion this morning. And I
16 hope that, Mr. Chairman, we can continue and not just
17 discuss it, but actually see some actions behind the words.
18 So, I'm really encouraged about what we're touching upon
19 today.

20 But, I would like to get your thoughts on ISIS in
21 Southeast Asia, because I do think it's something that we
22 haven't spent a lot of time focusing on. We're not talking
23 about it nearly enough. And Islamic extremist groups in
24 Southeast Asia, like the Abu Sayyaf group, they are all
25 coming together under the flag of ISIS. And it's a bit

1 concerning.

2 Earlier this year, both General Dunford and Secretary
3 Carter agreed on my assessment of ISIS in the region, and
4 they shared those concerns, as well. But, since that time,
5 ISIS-linked groups have carried out a number of attacks.
6 Just last week, we saw an attack against the Philippine
7 President's security detail, and we saw a bombing near the
8 U.S. Embassy. So, continuing escalation of violence in that
9 area by those extremist groups.

10 And, Mr. Brimley, I'd like to start with you, because
11 you did mention the rebalance towards the Pacific, and --
12 you've mentioned that rebalance. And I think, when that
13 first started, the focus was very much on China and maybe
14 North Korea, some of those aspects, but now we have ISIS
15 engaging heavily in the Philippines. You spoke about the
16 Marines in Darwin and other activities. Can you talk a
17 little bit what you think our administration, the incoming
18 administration, should do to really address this rising
19 threat of ISIS in Southeast Asia?

20 Mr. Brimley: Sure. Thank you, Senator.

21 I would just say, we saw this before, you know, in
22 2001-2002, you know, terrorist groups in the region that
23 have their own, sort of, particular interests as it pertains
24 to the countries in which they operate. I mean, I think
25 there's a lot of branding going on. And we saw, in -- after

1 9/11, a lot of terrorist groups around the world, but
2 somehow they're affiliated with al Qaeda, and that gave them
3 some, sort of, I guess, marketing prowess. And it's -- it
4 doesn't surprise me that we're seeing that again with ISIS.
5 But, I would just say, from a DOD perspective, one of the
6 ways -- you know, I think our posture in the region ought be
7 focused on maintaining the regional order. And we need to
8 be able to prepare to go toe-to-toe with countries and
9 threats. I'm worried about China. I'm worried about North
10 Korea and the like. But, one of the tangible second-order
11 benefits that we get from forward-deploying our troops and
12 capabilities overseas is, we have that daily connectivity,
13 and we have that daily deterrent prowess in places around
14 the region.

15 One of the debates that you see and hear inside the
16 Pentagon, or one of the debates that we had in the -- inside
17 the Pentagon as it pertains to, say, the Marines in Darwin,
18 for instance, is, you know, you start to break apart these
19 larger entities, like a marine air/ground task force, for
20 instance, and you start to put -- you know, put a company
21 here in southern Philippines, and put a -- you know, a task
22 force of some kind in Australia, and there's a tradeoff
23 between doing that, which gives you that kind of daily
24 interaction with local communities, the ability to do
25 counterterrorism operations, for instance, but there is some

1 risk that it becomes more difficult to quickly bring those
2 capabilities back together for a larger threat, responding
3 to a larger threat. And that's the balance that DOD,
4 particularly OSD, has to grapple with every day.

5 And I would just encourage the committee, as you think
6 about the -- what -- the Defense Strategy Review, what used
7 to be the QDR, that the next administration will do next
8 year, that you -- you're very aggressive with them in
9 articulating, you know, what you want to see out of the
10 strategy, classified briefings for all these factors, and
11 making sure that all these different constituent elements
12 are part of that strategy and it's not -- it's not just a
13 public-relations document, which is what QDRs, I think,
14 unfortunately, have tended to evolve into, which is part of
15 the reason the committee took its action it did to make the
16 QDR a Defense Strategy Review with a classified component.

17 Senator Ernst: Very good, thank you.

18 And, General Keane, could you talk a little bit more
19 about, militarily, what we could be doing in that region,
20 and the uses of forces?

21 General Keane: Yeah, absolutely.

22 And ISIS has expanded into 35 countries. And we don't
23 really have a strategy to deal with any of that. We're
24 focused on the territory that they took, certainly, in Iraq
25 and Syria. And I'm not saying that's not appropriate. That

1 should be a priority. But, commensurate with that priority,
2 we should be addressing these other areas, as well. And a
3 lot of the identification with ISIS is aspirational, but
4 they also have affiliates in these countries. This is one
5 of them. And what they -- with an affiliate, they actually
6 sign a document together to abide by certain ISIS principles
7 and rules. And in some cases, they direct; some cases, they
8 provide aid; but in most cases, there's no direction. And
9 that's largely the case here.

10 But, I believe what the United States can do, with its
11 allies, is that -- you know, we've been at war with
12 organizations like this now for 15 years, and our reservoir
13 of knowledge and capability here is pretty significant. And
14 it far exceeds anybody else in the world. But, we have
15 allies that are participating with us. There's much we can
16 do with them, in sharing intelligence and helping them with
17 training and also helping them with technology -- not
18 expensive technology, but things that can truly make a
19 difference, you know, with those troops. And I don't think
20 we necessarily have to be directly involving in fighting
21 these forces ourselves, but aiding and supporting these
22 forces, and having a strategy to do that, and lining up some
23 priorities for ourselves -- because we have limited amount
24 of resources -- but, make some choices, you know, based on
25 what that threat is and what it may be -- its implications

1 for the region could help guide us to what those priorities
2 should be.

3 Senator Ernst: I appreciate your input.

4 Thank you, Mr. Chair.

5 Chairman McCain: Senator Shaheen.

6 Senator Shaheen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank
7 you, both to the Chair and Ranking Member, and also to all
8 of our panelists, for giving us a lot to think about this
9 morning.

10 Dr. Kagan, I want to begin with you and with your
11 comments about Russia's interference in our elections,
12 because this is something that I have found very troubling.
13 And, in fact, before Congress went out, before the October
14 recess, called on hearings to better look at what was going
15 on. And we know that we've had Secretary Johnson and other
16 Homeland Security officials say that there is evidence of
17 Russian hacking into our electoral system that goes to the
18 highest levels of the Russian government. And that was
19 done, not to influence the outcome of the election,
20 necessarily, but to sow confusion about whether our
21 electoral process was working. And yet, to date, there has
22 not been one hearing on this issue in this Congress. And
23 what I was told when I asked about a hearing -- and I have,
24 again, called on the Foreign Relations Committee, on which I
25 sit, to do a hearing, and I know that they're considering

1 it-- but I was told that there was concern that this might
2 be viewed as a partisan issue.

3 So, I am very heartened by your point that this is not
4 a partisan issue. In fact, the first person I heard raise
5 it in Congress was Senator McCain, the Chairman of this
6 committee, who talked about the efforts to hack into the
7 Arizona and Illinois voter files.

8 So, I couldn't agree more, this is a hearing that we
9 ought to undertake because it's important to our American
10 democracy, it's important to European democracy, when we
11 look at what Russia's doing in eastern Europe, as you point
12 out, in Germany, in France, the potential for them to
13 continue to sow mischief.

14 What kinds of -- you also talked about taking
15 retaliatory action against Russia for what they're doing --
16 what kinds of efforts would you suggest we look at, in terms
17 of trying to retaliate or respond to what Russia is doing in
18 the United States?

19 Dr. Kagan: Well, there are -- I'm sure there are
20 people better equipped to answer that question than I am,
21 but I would, you know, publish the Swiss bank accounts of
22 all the oligarchs around -- I mean, just these -- there are
23 all kinds of things that you could do that would cause --

24 Senator Shaheen: Yeah, keep --

25 Dr. Kagan: Well, I mean --

1 Senator Shaheen: -- saying a few more of those,
2 because I think those are helpful.

3 Dr. Kagan: You know, you could talk about all the ways
4 in which -- you know, you could reveal stuff about the way
5 Putin has manipulated his own elections. I mean, there's
6 all kinds of stuff out there, which, if you were of a mind
7 to do it, you could do that would be embarrassing, of one
8 kind or another. I mean, these people have money stashed
9 all over the world. They have dachas, they have villas, et
10 cetera. They -- this is a kind of a Mafia organization,
11 where, you know, part of the game is everybody holding
12 together. There's ways to create divisions and
13 difficulties. I mean, it -- I'm sure, as I say, there are
14 people who could -- if you put them to the task -- and I'm -
15 - for all I know, they have been put to the task -- you
16 could come up with a whole list of things.

17 And, by the way, I wouldn't make an announcement of it.
18 They'll -- they would understand what had happened. But,
19 until we do something like that, it's just open season for
20 them to do this. And so, I think we've already -- we need
21 to treat this like any other weapon system that's being
22 deployed, because they are treating it like a weapon system.

23 Senator Shaheen: Thank you.

24 Well, Mr. Chairman and Senator Reed, I hope that this
25 committee will also consider hearings on this topic.

1 Let me follow up on Senator King's issue that he raised
2 with respect to the Pentagon study that was reported in the
3 Washington Post, because -- I haven't read the study. I
4 don't know whether the concerns that are raised by some of
5 the Pentagon officials in this news story are accurate, or
6 not, but the very fact that it was buried -- or the attempt
7 was to bury it by Pentagon officials, I think, is a very bad
8 message to be sending, especially in an organization that
9 can't even get ready for an audit until 2017. I don't know
10 how long we've been asking for an audit. It's been since I
11 got on this committee, in 2011, so that's at least 6 years.
12 And I suspect it's been longer than that. So, there are
13 clearly, as all of you pointed out, bureaucratic changes
14 that need to be made in the Department.

15 And one of the things, General Keane, that you pointed
16 out is that there is a predilection to try and kill some of
17 the innovative programs so that the Pentagon can actually do
18 those themselves. We had this experience with the Small
19 Business Innovation Research Program as we're going into
20 this NDAA, because the initial effort was to try and
21 increase the amount of money that DOD is making available to
22 small businesses to do innovation. And I think we've heard
23 from a number of panelists previously that this is one of
24 the best research programs that still exists within -- for
25 small businesses to produce innovation that's used by the

1 Department of Defense.

2 So, is this the kind of initiative that you're talking
3 about that there may be, for whatever reason, efforts to try
4 and keep it from putting more money into that small-business
5 effort to produce innovation?

6 General Keane: I certainly encourage that. The -- you
7 know, the Active Protective System that I was talking about
8 and that, when DARPA, you know, made a call to the people to
9 come forward, and they knew that this would be an advanced
10 technology that could actually change warfare, the
11 contractor that the United States Army has gone to is a
12 small-business contractor. So, here's this small-business
13 contractor, conceptualized this capability themselves, and
14 it will revolutionize combat warfare as we go forward. They
15 also have technology, interesting enough, and they brought
16 military leaders out to see it. They can stop a bullet. In
17 other words, a 50-caliber bullet, they can kill the bullet.
18 And it's all because of -- everything -- all of this is
19 available on the private sector.

20 Senator Shaheen: Right.

21 General Keane: Microchip technology, as I mentioned,
22 and unbelievable software applied to that technology. Well,
23 that's revolutionary technology, what I just mentioned to
24 you. It changes warfare. And so, that is something we
25 should be investing in. We should put money behind this. I

1 have no affiliation with this organization, let's get that
2 straight, so -- but, yes, this is -- absolutely right, this
3 is America. We're the most innovative, creative people on
4 the planet. And it's out there, and we have to unleash it
5 and bring it in. It doesn't have to necessarily be a giant
6 organization that does it. There are Americans out there
7 doing this stuff. And they're creative. And, lookit, they
8 changed a -- the whole dot-com aspect of our lives out there
9 in California by the innovation and creativity that these
10 engineers have. We've got to tap into it.

11 Senator Shaheen: Well, my time is up. Thank you,
12 General Keane.

13 I would point out that the reauthorization of the SBIR
14 program is in this NDAA for 5 years, which I think is very
15 positive, and I applaud the Chairman and Ranking Member for
16 that. Unfortunately, the increase in spending on that
17 program did not make it into the bill.

18 Thank you all.

19 Chairman McCain: Senator Lee.

20 Senator Lee: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

21 And thanks, to each of you, for being here. Thanks for
22 all you do to keep Americans informed and to keep Americans
23 aware of what we're discussing today; that is, the emerging
24 threats to our security.

25 There are a number of threats we face around the world,

1 and it's important to keep those threats in mind as we
2 approach this exciting new period in our history, in which
3 we've got a new administration coming. And one of the many
4 threats that we face in any era, in any administration,
5 relates to the threat posed by the excessive accumulation of
6 power in the hands of a few. We see that happen around the
7 world, and sometimes we see it within our own government.
8 It's one of the reasons why our system is set up the way it
9 is. The Constitution of the United States is designed
10 specifically to protect us against that kind of threat here
11 at home, and it does so by wisely dividing that authority
12 between Congress and the presidency.

13 The framers believed that forcing the two political
14 branches of government -- that is, the two political
15 branches that are not the judiciary -- to collaborative, to
16 interact with each other; where necessary, to serve as a
17 check and as a balance on each other -- and that this would
18 provide us the best means toward achieving a stable,
19 successful, and, hopefully, relatively popular foreign
20 policy; that is, one that, in one way or another, reflects
21 the will of the people, or at least is likely to be geared
22 toward their interests.

23 But, for several decades, Congress, quite regrettably,
24 in my opinion, has deliberately abdicated many of its
25 constitutional responsibilities. And it's just sort of

1 handed it over to the executive branch, being willing to
2 take a backseat role -- a backseat role, at best, in
3 determining America's role around the world on how we're
4 going to combat threats that face us. The result ends up
5 being a foreign policy that is made primarily within the
6 executive branch bureaucracy and Washington insider circles,
7 informed, as they tend to be, by the interests and the
8 aspirations of the so-called international community. And
9 as -- this is a circle that increasingly becomes untethered
10 from any clear lines of accountability connecting policy,
11 policymakers, and the American people.

12 For instance, the U.S. military is currently operating
13 in the Middle East under a very broad -- I believe,
14 irresponsibly broad interpretation of a 15-year-old
15 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, using it as
16 justification to engage in a pretty broad range of actions,
17 from intervening in two separate civil wars to propping up a
18 failing Afghan government. Meanwhile, the executive branch
19 seems increasingly inclined to choose and identify and
20 engage threats through covert actions. And that further
21 helps the executive branch to avoid the scrutiny that would
22 be available if stronger congressional oversight existed.
23 And they avoid that kind of scrutiny and public
24 accountability.

25 Now, this may be convenient for Members of Congress who

1 want nothing more than to just have someone else to blame
2 for decisions that turn out to be unpopular or unsuccessful,
3 but it's an affront to the Constitution. And it's more than
4 that. It's more than just an affront to a 229-year-old
5 document. It's an affront to the system of representative
6 government that we have dedicated ourselves to as Americans.
7 And I think it's an insult to the American people, who are
8 losing patience with a foreign policy that they feel
9 increasingly and very justifiably disconnected from.
10 Notwithstanding the fact that they're still asked, from time
11 to time, to send their sons and daughters into harm's way to
12 defend.

13 So, as we discuss these emerging threats to our
14 national security, I'd encourage this committee and all of
15 my colleagues to prioritize the threat that will inevitably
16 come to us if we continue to preserve the status quo and to
17 exclude the American people and their elected
18 representatives -- in many cases, ourselves -- from the
19 process.

20 So, I have a question for our panelists. One of the
21 focuses of this committee has been on the readiness crisis
22 within the military brought about by the conflicts we're
23 facing in the Middle East and by a reduction in the amount
24 of money that the Pentagon has access to. Easy answer to
25 this is often, "Well, let's just increase spending." That's

1 not to say that that's not necessary, now or in other
2 circumstances, in particular, but setting aside that, that
3 is one approach that people often come up with. But,
4 another option that I think has to be considered, and
5 perhaps ought be considered first, is to reexamine the tasks
6 and the priorities that we're giving to our military leaders
7 and to ask whether these purposes that we're seeking
8 readiness for are truly in the interests of the American
9 people, those we're representing, those who are paying the
10 bill for this, and those who are asked to send their sons
11 and daughters --

12 Chairman McCain: The Senator's time has expired.

13 Senator Lee: -- into harm's way. So --

14 Chairman McCain: The Senator's time has expired.

15 Senator Kaine.

16 Senator Lee: Could I just ask a one-sentence question,
17 Mr. Chairman, to --

18 Chairman McCain: Yes, but I would appreciate courtesy
19 to the other members that if -- make one long opening
20 statement, it does not leave time for questions.

21 Senator is recognized for a question.

22 Senator Lee: Do you believe that the Congress, the
23 White House, and the executive branch agencies have done an
24 adequate job in reaching consensus on what the American
25 people's interests are and on calibrating the military and

1 diplomatic means to appropriate ends?

2 Dr. Kagan: Do we answer?

3 I don't accept this dichotomy that you've posited
4 between what the Congress and the President do and what the
5 American people want. I mean, when I think of some of the -
6 - first of all, historically, the executive has always had
7 tremendous influence on foreign policy, much -- whatever the
8 Constitution may say, although the Constitution did give the
9 executive tremendous power to make foreign policy, if you go
10 back to Jefferson, the willingness to deploy force without
11 congressional approval; you can go all the way through 200
12 years of history. I'm not sure it's substantially
13 different. But, in any case, that's been the general
14 prejudice. The founders wanted energy in the executive, and
15 particularly in the conduct of foreign policy. That was the
16 lesson of the Revolutionary War. That's why they created a
17 Constitution which particularly gave power to the executive.

18 But, also, I just don't believe that the American
19 people are constantly having things foisted on them that
20 they didn't approve of. So, one of the most controversial
21 things that's happened, obviously, in recent decade, that
22 people talk about all the time, is the Iraq War, which was
23 voted on, debated at length, and Congress, 72-to-28 I think
24 was the vote, something like that, the American people --
25 public opinion was in favor of it, just as the American

1 people was in favor of World War I, the Spanish-American
2 War. Later, these wars turn out to be bad or badly handled,
3 the American people decide that it was a terrible idea, and
4 then people start saying, "Well, who did this?" And the
5 American people want to find somebody to blame for doing
6 these things. They don't want to take responsibility for
7 their own decisions.

8 I don't believe we have a fundamentally undemocratic
9 way of making foreign policy decisions. I think it's
10 complicated. I think mistakes are made. Foreign policy is
11 all about failure. People don't want to acknowledge that
12 failure is the norm in foreign policy, and then they want to
13 blame people for failure. But, I think the American people
14 are participants in this process.

15 Senator Kaine: Thank you.

16 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

17 General Keane: The only thing I would add is, I do
18 think Congress should be more involved with the use of force
19 when we're deploying force overseas. And I think Congress
20 has walked away from that responsibility recently. You have
21 a colleague here who's been banging on this for some time:
22 Senator Kaine. And I would hope that this new
23 administration would welcome congressional involvement when
24 the Nation is going to commit its forces.

25 Mr. Brimley: Sir, very quickly, I would just say, you

1 know, the Defense Strategy Review that the Pentagon is
2 mandated to provide this committee and Congress and the
3 American people, that's a great forum to engage in these
4 questions. What -- readiness for what? Force structure for
5 what? Modernization priorities. These are all things that
6 can be debated openly. These are things which the Pentagon
7 is congressionally required to submit. And, you know, I
8 think that's a great forum for these discussions.

9 Chairman McCain: Senator Kaine.

10 Senator Kaine: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

11 And thanks, to the witnesses.

12 An observation and two questions.

13 Observation. I was chairman of the Democratic National
14 Committee from 2009 through early 2011, and we had a file
15 cabinet in the office, with a plaque over it, and it was a
16 file cabinet that was invaded in 1972 at the Watergate
17 complex when materials were taken out of the DNC. The
18 materials that were taken were modest, and it made no
19 outcome on what was one of the biggest landslide elections
20 in the history of the United States. And yet, it led to one
21 of -- a very searching congressional inquiry, not because of
22 the outcome of the election, but it led to a searching
23 inquiry because of a desire to uphold the integrity of our
24 electoral processes.

25 I associate myself with comments of Dr. Kagan and some

1 of the witnesses here. There have been requests of the
2 Foreign Relations Committee, Armed Services Committee.
3 There was a letter to the President from Democrats on the
4 Intel Committee, dated November 29, asking that the
5 President declassify information with regard to the
6 engagement of Russia in activity concerning the American
7 presidential election. I think it's absolutely critical
8 that the American public know what happened, that Congress
9 know what happened, and that we then figure out what we can
10 do to avoid such instances, by Russia or anybody else, in
11 the future. But, my fear is, if we don't do what we did,
12 back in the '70s, in such an instance -- and that wasn't a
13 foreign government undertaking to influence an American
14 election -- but, if we don't, as Congress, stand up to
15 protect the integrity of the system, that we're going to
16 regret it in a lot of ways in the future. And that's
17 observation.

18 Question. I thought it was interesting, Dr. Kagan, you
19 talked about two trends: the historical rejuvenation
20 project ambitions of certain nations and a retreating
21 American willingness to be engaged. A third trend that I'm
22 kind of interested in -- I certainly see the first two -- a
23 third one is the increase of the power of nonstate
24 organizations that don't follow any of the rules, Geneva
25 Conventions, et cetera, and whether that -- it be ISIL or al

1 Qaeda or al-Nusra or ah-Shabaab, or whether it be, you know,
2 global organizations that can offshore everything or the
3 Sinaloa Cartel, there's a lot of nonstate organizations that
4 use violence to achieve their end or use a nonstate capacity
5 to avoid accountability. And I think that is a trend that
6 is also a pretty important trend that is hard for us to
7 completely get our minds around, because so many of our
8 doctrines are doctrines that we have developed thinking
9 about state versus state. So, I'm just curious, in my first
10 question, if you would just say something briefly about that
11 trend, the rise of a nonstate willing to use violence or
12 other nefarious ends, and how we should factor that into our
13 strategic thinking.

14 Dr. Kagan: Well, obviously, it's a problem, and --
15 although I always find it ironic that these nonstate actors,
16 all they really want to do is become a state. I mean,
17 that's ISIS's great goal, is to be a state. So, you know,
18 when I hear about how the state is becoming less important,
19 that's all that these nonstate actors want to be. But, it's
20 obviously something that we are engaged in, must be engaged
21 in dealing with.

22 What I would just say is, it's not going to be the rise
23 of nonstate actors that upends the world order. It is going
24 to be a constant problem, a constant threat, and, in some
25 paradoxical way, a greater threat to the homeland in

1 particular instances. But, it is only the great powers, the
2 great revisionist powers that are capable of undoing this
3 world order that the United States created after World War
4 II. And so, while we have to do everything, I just don't
5 want us to lose sight of what I consider to be the main
6 game, because we can fight a kind of low-level battle
7 against nonstate actors for a long time. And we will be.
8 But, once the order has blown up -- well, we've seen what
9 happens when the order blows up. And that's what -- we've
10 got to make sure that we are preventing that from happening.

11 Senator Kaine: Let me ask one other question. Dr.
12 Kagan, again, you said something interesting about how China
13 wants to be a hegemon in Asia and the Pacific. Russia wants
14 to be a hegemon in Europe. And they resist and resent the
15 fact that the U.S. has played this role, post World War II,
16 in engagement in international institutions and our own
17 unilateral activity around the globe. You know, as they
18 think about the future, when they think about a future where
19 they would be hegemons in their regions and the U.S. would
20 be a hegemon in the Americas. Because I -- one of the
21 things I'm questioning is, by trying to do a little bit
22 everywhere, we're actually not doing very much in the
23 Americas; and the activity of China, for example, in the
24 Americas is very significant. So, I'm not sure we're
25 committing the resources to do the global mission, nor are

1 we committing the resources even to play the kind of
2 leadership role that I think we could play in the Americas.
3 But, I'm curious as to any of your thoughts on that.

4 Thank you.

5 Mr. Brimley: Well, sir, I would just say quickly,
6 again, I don't think it's simply a matter of dollars and
7 money. I think there are things we can do in Asia, there
8 are things we can do in Europe that won't break the bank. I
9 remember when we put together what became this Asia
10 rebalance, and we came up with a briefing for then-Secretary
11 Gates, you know, and there were three maps that we gave him.
12 One map was the status quo of our posture in the region.
13 One map was a -- sort of a 20-year -- what things could like
14 in 20 years, and it was pretty, you know, ambitious, in
15 terms of what the posture would look like. And the third
16 slide was what we called, sort of -- at least I called "baby
17 steps." Here are things that we can do inside the FYDP that
18 are not going to break the bank, that are politically
19 doable, that aren't going to be, you know, politically
20 controversial, in the sense of taking things away from, say,
21 our bases here at home. And that's when we came up Darwin
22 and Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore, and some other
23 things in the Philippines at the time. And the vision was
24 that we could do these sorts of small episodic baby steps
25 year after year, administration after administration. If we

1 had that political will, over the course of 20 years, it
2 would amount to something truly strategic. And that's still
3 my hope. And I -- and so, I don't think it requires huge
4 amounts of new defense dollars to reinvest in our posture in
5 places like the Asia-Pacific in ways that would detract from
6 doing more in, say, North and South America.

7 General Keane: I'd just add one thing on your nonstate
8 actors. You know, in -- they certainly know that they
9 cannot defeat the United States military or militaries that
10 exist in Europe. But, that's not their objective. I mean,
11 their objective is to break our will, to force us back into
12 ourselves so that they can have their way, you know, with
13 the caliphate that they want to establish. And they think
14 by routinely killing us, it would force us to disengage and
15 withdraw. And that's, in my judgment, not going to happen.
16 They dramatically underestimate the character and will and
17 strength of the American people. Bin Laden did the same
18 thing. He thought he was going to break our will by doing
19 9/11, and quite the opposite occurred as a result of it.

20 But, there is something that we have to be very careful
21 of. We don't want to be very dismissive of this kind of
22 warfare, because we've known for years the al Qaeda's
23 pursuit of WMD. And, make no mistake about it, obviously if
24 one of these organizations got their hands on it, they would
25 certainly use it, as brutal and fanatic as they are about

1 killing people. And also, one of the things that troubles
2 us -- the Director of the National Security Agency would --
3 could speak better on it than I -- but, we've been
4 concerned, for a number of years, that radical Islamic
5 organization will likely buy a offensive capability from the
6 Russians, who are -- half of what they devote to cyber is
7 criminal. And buy that capability, and do some real damage
8 to the United States in a way that 9/11 could never have
9 done. So, the -- you -- we cannot underestimate the intent
10 of the nonstate actors while we attempt to control what
11 they're doing.

12 Chairman McCain: Senator Graham.

13 Senator Graham: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
14 for holding an important hearing on a very difficult topic,
15 and to all the committee members for showing up. We're
16 talking about important things to an empty room. Just look.
17 Just look.

18 So, Iran with a nuke. Number one -- I'm going to ask,
19 like 45 questions in 5 minutes. Give brief answers if you
20 can. If you can't, don't say a word.

21 [Laughter.]

22 Senator Graham: Do you believe that the Iranians, in
23 the past, have been trying to develop a nuclear weapon, not
24 a nuclear powerplant for peaceful purposes?

25 Mr. Brimley: Yes.

1 General Keane: Nuclear weapon, yes.

2 Dr. Kagan: Yes.

3 Senator Graham: All right, three for three.

4 Do you believe that there's -- that's their long-term
5 goal, in spite of what they say, is to have a nuclear
6 weapon?

7 General Keane: Yes.

8 Senator Graham: Do you believe that would be one of
9 the most destabilizing things in the world?

10 Mr. Brimley: Yes.

11 Senator Graham: Do you believe the Arabs will get one
12 of their own?

13 Mr. Brimley: Yes.

14 Senator Graham: Do you believe the Iranians might
15 actually use the weapon if they got one? The Ayatollah?

16 General Keane: Well, I think the -- before I answer
17 that, I think there's just as great a chance that the Arabs
18 would use their weapon --

19 Senator Graham: Okay. Well, so --

20 General Keane: -- as a first strike --

21 Senator Graham: -- we don't know -- well, let's --

22 Bob, you should your hand. Do you -- if you're Israel, what
23 bet would you make?

24 Dr. Kagan: I would bet my 100-plus nuclear weapons
25 would be a deterrent to their use of nuclear weapons.

1 Senator Graham: Okay. But, what if he wants to die
2 and doesn't mind taking you with him? What does he want?
3 Does he want to destroy Israel, or is he just getting --
4 when the Ayatollah says he wants to wipe Israel out, is that
5 all talk?

6 Dr. Kagan: I don't know if it's all talk, and I don't
7 blame people for being nervous. We lived under -- the
8 United States, we all lived under the shadow of possible
9 nuclear war for 50 years.

10 Senator Graham: Yeah, but, you know, on their worst
11 day, the Russians didn't have a religious doctrine that
12 wanted to destroy everybody. Do you believe he's a
13 religious Nazi at his heart? Or you don't know? Answer
14 maybe you don't know.

15 Dr. Kagan: Well, look, I believe that they -- he
16 clearly is that -- believes in a fanatical religion, but --

17 Senator Graham: Well, here's what I believe.

18 Dr. Kagan: -- I'm not -- okay, go ahead.

19 Senator Graham: Okay. I believe that you ought to
20 take him seriously, based on their behavior. Number one --

21 General Keane: I think we should take him seriously.
22 How -- whether they're religious fanatics or not, I don't
23 think is that relevant. Clearly, their geopolitical goals
24 to dominate the Middle East strategically, to destroy the
25 state of Israel, and to drive the United States out of the

1 Middle East, they have talked about it every single year --

2 Senator Graham: Well, do you think that's their goal?

3 General Keane: Yes, that --

4 Senator Graham: Okay.

5 General Keane: Of course it's their goal.

6 Senator Graham: So --

7 General Keane: And not only is it their goal, but
8 they're succeeding at it.

9 Senator Graham: Do you think we should deny them that
10 goal?

11 Dr. Kagan: Yes.

12 Senator Graham: Good.

13 North Korea. Why are they trying to build an ICBM?
14 Are they trying to send a North Korean in space? What are
15 they trying to do?

16 Mr. Brimley: They're trying to threaten us and our
17 allies --

18 Dr. Kagan: To put a nuclear weapon on it to --

19 Senator Graham: Do you believe it should be the policy
20 of the United States Congress and the next President to deny
21 them that capability?

22 Mr. Brimley: I believe so.

23 Senator Graham: Would you support an Authorization to
24 Use Military Force that would stop the ability of the North
25 Koreans to develop a missile that could reach the United

1 States? Do you think Congress would be wise to do that?

2 Mr. Brimley: I think Congress should debate it. I
3 remember distinctly the op-ed that Secretary William Perry
4 and Ashton Carter --

5 Senator Graham: Well, I'm going to introduce one.
6 Would you vote for it if you were here?

7 Dr. Kagan: Only if Congress was willing to do what was
8 necessary to follow up --

9 Senator Graham: Well, do you think Congress should be
10 willing to authorize any President, regardless of party, to
11 stop North Korea from developing a missile that can hit the
12 homeland?

13 Dr. Kagan: Only if Congress is willing to follow up
14 with what might be required, depending on North Korea's
15 response.

16 Senator Graham: Well, what might be required is to
17 stop their nuclear program through military force. That's
18 why you would authorize it.

19 Dr. Kagan: No, but I'm saying that if -- I'm -- the
20 answer is yes, but then you also have to be willing, if
21 North Korea launched --

22 Senator Graham: Would you advise me --

23 Dr. Kagan: -- North Korea, that you'd have to be
24 willing to --

25 Chairman McCain: You have to let the witness --

1 Senator Graham: Yeah, but he's not giving an answer.

2 Dr. Kagan: Well, I thought I was giving an answer.

3 Senator Graham: So, here's the question. Do you
4 support Congress -- everybody's talking about Congress
5 sitting on the sidelines. I think a North Korean missile
6 program is designed to threaten the homeland. I don't think
7 they're going to send somebody in space. So, if I'm
8 willing, along with some other colleagues, to give the
9 President the authority, he doesn't have to use it, but
10 we're all onboard for using military force to stop this
11 program from maturing. Does that make sense to you, given
12 the threats we face?

13 General Keane: I don't believe that North Korea is
14 going to build an ICBM, weaponize it, and shoot it at the
15 United States.

16 Senator Graham: Okay. Then you wouldn't need the
17 Authorization to Use Military Force.

18 General Keane: Right. And the reason for that is --

19 Senator Graham: That's fine.

20 General Keane: The reason for -- Senator, the reason
21 they have nuclear weapons is -- one reason. To preserve the
22 regime. They know, when you have nuclear weapons, we're not
23 going to conduct an invasion of North Korea. South Korea is
24 not going to do it, we're not going to do it.

25 Senator Graham: Why are they trying to build ICBM?

1 General Keane: They want to weaponize it.

2 Senator Graham: And do what with it?

3 General Keane: I don't --

4 Dr. Kagan: Preserve their regime.

5 Senator Graham: Okay. All right. So, you would be
6 okay with letting them build a missile?

7 Dr. Kagan: No. But --

8 Senator Graham: Would you, General Keane?

9 General Keane: They're already building a missile.

10 Senator Graham: Well, would you be willing to stop
11 them?

12 General Keane: I would stop them from using it, yes.

13 Senator Graham: Okay.

14 General Keane: I'm not going to stop them from
15 building it.

16 Senator Graham: Assad. Final question. Do all of you
17 agree that leaving Assad in power is a serious mistake?

18 Dr. Kagan: Yes.

19 General Keane: Yes, absolutely.

20 Senator Graham: Finally, do you believe 4 percent of
21 GDP should be the goal that Congress seeks because it's been
22 the historical average of what we spend on defense since
23 World War II.

24 General Keane: Pretty close.

25 Senator Graham: Thanks.

1 Chairman McCain: Senator Sullivan.

2 Senator Sullivan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

3 And I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony
4 today and their years of service and helping the Members of
5 Congress understand some of these very difficult issues.

6 Dr. Kagan, your "Of Paradise and Power" was one of the
7 most insightful books I've ever read. So -- I'm not sure
8 that's saying much, but -- from me -- but, it was a great
9 book. So, thanks.

10 I want to follow up on Senator Graham's questions.
11 Also, Mr. Brimley, I actually really appreciated your point
12 about cyber, how it, you know, can become the bright shiny
13 object that every service is pursuing, and forgetting their
14 comparative advantages. I think that's a really important
15 point. A number of us had breakfast with the Commandant
16 this morning, and that -- the Marine Corps -- and that came
17 up.

18 But, with regard to -- I want to go back to North
19 Korea. And the issue of -- you know, one of the concerns
20 that we clearly have is that, within the next 2 to 3 to 4 or
21 5 years -- and, you know, nobody's sure when, but it's
22 certainly going to happen -- is that they're going to have
23 an intercontinental ballistic missile that's likely going to
24 be able to range continental United States. They're already
25 probably close to ranging my State of Alaska and Hawaii.

1 But -- and the concern I have, along the lines of what
2 Senator Graham was saying, is that the American people are
3 going to wake up, whenever that happens, and all of a sudden
4 it's going to be in the news and it's going to be wild
5 reports and, you know, "The President has to do something."
6 If we know that's coming -- and it is coming -- my view is -
7 - and I'm wondering what your view is -- that we should be
8 doing a lot more on missile defense, because if -- let's say
9 he's able to get -- you know, let's say he -- he is an
10 irrational actors, and let's say he has the ability to
11 launch one or two, and we have a very robust missile
12 defense. We'll be able to confidently shoot that down,
13 retaliate massively, which should be really strong
14 deterrence.

15 So, can you just comment on that, but, more broadly,
16 just on North Korea, all three of you? I'm really stuck by
17 the -- or struck by -- you know, obviously, President
18 Obama's strategic patience was a nice phrase, but didn't do
19 anything. And this is going to be a really, really big
20 issue, maybe for this administration. You're already seeing
21 the concerns we have here. But, if we know that, in 1 to 5
22 years, this guy, who's not very stable, is going to be able
23 to range our country with an intercontinental ballistic
24 nuclear missile, shouldn't we be doing something right now,
25 missile defense or otherwise?

1 General Keane: Well, we are doing missile defense, to
2 a certain degree, as you well know.

3 Senator Sullivan: Yeah, but it's not nearly as strong
4 as it --

5 General Keane: And some of it is in your State. I
6 think what the new administration has to do is take a look
7 at that threat that we're discussing, and also, you know, a
8 rogue actor, not trying to destroy the United States, but
9 firing a couple of missiles at the United States for some
10 motivating reason. Is it appropriate that we have a
11 capability to defend against that? A number of years ago,
12 we identified Iran as a potential actor that could do
13 something like that, and also North Korea. And we began to
14 put in place a missile defense strategy to deal with that.
15 Now, we've pulled it out of Europe as a part of the
16 ridiculous reset we did with the Russians, a major
17 concession we made to them. I think this should be on the
18 table with the new administration when they're looking at a
19 national security strategy in dealing with both of those
20 actors along this line, because I'm convinced the Iranians
21 are going to get a nuclear weapon. And also, what North
22 Korea has, to this day. And I would -- I agree with, I
23 think, what you were feeding back to me, is that that
24 missile defense infrastructure that we have is not adequate.

25 Senator Sullivan: No.

1 General Keane: So, let's take a look at what it would
2 take to make it adequate, see what the investment strategy
3 is, and see if that is a priority that we want to make. I
4 would admit it is.

5 Senator Sullivan: And wouldn't that buy time for the
6 President, whoever that -- if it's President Trump -- you
7 know, when this becomes the big news in 2 years, "Oh, my
8 goodness, he can range Chicago with a nuke." If we have a
9 strong missile defense, the President's going to have some
10 additional options that he might not have if we don't have
11 anything or if we have a weak one, like we do now.

12 Mr. Brimley: Senator, I agree. I worry deeply about
13 the nature of the regime and if we see the mating of a
14 nuclear capability with, say, a KN08 or one of the variants.
15 I think that's deeply concerning. And I think it's not just
16 missile defense. It's comprehensive ISR architecture. And,
17 frankly, it's both of those things forward-deployed in
18 places like South Korea and Japan and other places. And
19 this gets back to the alliances-and-partnerships question.
20 I mean, the -- missile defense and forward-deployed missile
21 defense and all the concepts and operations and
22 communications that requires with allies and partners ought
23 to be a focus of the next defense strategy, for sure.

24 Senator Sullivan: Dr. Kagan?

25 Dr. Kagan: Well, this is a way -- my answer answers a

1 lot of the things that have been raised, including this
2 issue, including space, including cyber, which is that we
3 have been living in a series of delusions for years that
4 somehow all these countries are not going to develop every
5 capability they can possibly develop. And we have been
6 holding off or slowing down or not moving sufficiently
7 quickly to develop the capabilities to stay ahead of their
8 capability. So, we slowed down, I think, dumbed down our
9 missile defense --

10 Senator Sullivan: Yeah.

11 Dr. Kagan: -- efforts, because we decided it was
12 somehow a violation of one thing or another. And that was
13 just foolish. And I don't know -- you guys that -- know
14 better than I do -- whether he can build an ICBM faster than
15 we can build the missile defense capability necessary to
16 deal with it. But, yes, and we ought to be -- and, by the
17 way, that will be useful in dealing with China, too. I
18 mean, I've always felt that one of the major ways to get the
19 Chinese to put pressure on North Korea is for us to build up
20 capabilities that have direct implications for Chinese
21 strategic interests. So, a missile defense capability that
22 we build up in response to Korea will also affect China's
23 nuclear force. And that gives them more incentive than any
24 of these other efforts we've been making to try to push.
25 So, I would say full speed ahead. But, what I don't know,

1 as a technical matter, is, What does full speed ahead mean
2 when we have been artificially capping what we even are
3 trying to do?

4 Senator Sullivan: Well, it means more than we're doing
5 now.

6 Dr. Kagan: Yeah.

7 Senator Sullivan: Thank you.

8 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

9 Chairman McCain: Senator Cruz.

10 Senator Cruz: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

11 Good morning. Welcome. Thank you for testifying here
12 today.

13 As all of you know, our Nation faces mounting
14 challenges. And state actors have become increasingly
15 belligerent in recent years. Radical Islamic terrorism has
16 metastasized in the Middle East and spread globally. And we
17 have failed to fund and build a military that is designed to
18 meet the entirety of our strategic commitments. And I look
19 forward to working with the incoming administration to
20 ensure that the security of our country and the welfare of
21 every serviceman and -woman is among the very highest
22 priorities.

23 General Keane, as the next administration begins the
24 process of designing our national security strategy, what
25 advice would you give them with respect to the

1 prioritization of our resources and efforts?

2 General Keane: Well, first of all, the national
3 security strategy should be job one and -- in putting that
4 together. And also, it -- just as a -- it'll drive foreign
5 policy, and it'll drive the defense strategy. And I think
6 the Congress should also be informed about it as they're
7 going through this process, because you have much to
8 contribute, particularly this committee and Foreign
9 Relations.

10 But, clearly, from a priority standpoint dealing with
11 national security strategy, we start with the Nation's
12 interests, and we also start with the threats. And we start
13 with the threats that are the most significant to us. And
14 we've spent a lot of time talking about this already. And
15 those threats are coming at us from the revisionist powers:
16 Russia, China, and Iran. And that's -- certainly are our
17 top priorities. We've got radical Islam, which has morphed
18 into a global jihad. And ISIS, most successful terrorist
19 organization in history, affiliating now with 35 country --
20 even though it's still losing its caliphate. The Taliban,
21 frankly, have more territory in Afghanistan under their
22 control than at any time since 2001. And that war, under
23 current policy, is not winnable. We have to deal with that
24 issue. And particularly frustrating after 15 years of
25 involvement. This is the United States of America. Fifteen

1 years of involvement, and we're still involved in a war that
2 we can't win. And I'm not suggesting we pull out of it.

3 Those are major issues that we have to deal with.
4 Another one is cyber. And we've spent a lot of time talking
5 about cyber here today. But, our critical infrastructure is
6 exposed. Our military needs to be hardened. And this
7 capability is growing, and our adversaries are exploding in
8 the use of it.

9 So, those are strategies that'll eventually lead to a
10 defense strategy, which this committee has to deal with.
11 And I would hope, when the Department comes over here to
12 discuss their defense strategy, that there really is some
13 discussion about it. Because, listen -- look what's
14 happened to us. Do you remember, a number of years ago,
15 that we had a defense strategy that was built around the
16 anchor of defeating two regional conflicts? Remember that
17 thought? We moved from defeating two regional conflicts to
18 something less, that I can't even define. I don't know what
19 it is. To tell you how sadly this is, we are fighting two -
20 - we fought two insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan -- low-
21 tech insurgencies, no air force, no navy involved -- and we
22 could not fight those two low-tech insurgencies
23 simultaneously, Senator. We could not do it. We fought
24 them sequentially. And that's one of the reasons why we've
25 got this problem in Afghanistan, because the ground forces

1 were not large enough to fight two low-tech insurgencies
2 simultaneously. But, we used to have a strategy that we
3 were resourcing at one time to fight two major conflict
4 simultaneously. We have to have a discussion about what it
5 is we really are trying to do, and then resource it. And
6 that has -- and that's what we haven't been doing, and
7 that's the point you are making.

8 Senator Cruz: Thank you, General.

9 Let me shift --

10 Chairman McCain: That's --

11 Senator Cruz: -- to a different issue, which is the
12 potential for Iranian and North Korean nuclear
13 proliferation. And this is a question for Dr. Kagan. What
14 concrete policy steps would you recommend to prevent
15 cooperative nuclear proliferation between Iran and North
16 Korea, and to promote enforcement of sanctions by China?

17 Dr. Kagan: I'm trying to get Chinese leverage against
18 North Korea. I believe -- and I was saying this to the
19 Senator before -- the best incentive to get Chinese to put
20 more pressure on North Korea is to up our own strategic
21 capabilities in East Asia, and making it clear that, for as
22 long as North Korea continues to have -- pose a growing
23 threat, that means an increase in the American military
24 presence along all different levels. So, particularly -- we
25 were just talking about missile defense. Any missile

1 defense increase that we do in response to a North Korean
2 potential ICBM with a nuclear weapon on it also impacts the
3 Chinese nuclear force. And that is an incentive for the
4 Chinese to put more pressure than they're currently putting
5 on North Korea right now.

6 And so, I think that, in terms of -- I don't --
7 diplomacy and sanctions, we can tighten sanctions, but, at
8 this point, we need to put sufficient pressure on China, but
9 it has to be pressure that's meaningful to them, and that's
10 of a strategic nature if we're going to get any progress on
11 dealing with North Korea.

12 But, second -- other than that, we should be building
13 up our missile defense capabilities much more in
14 technologically advanced way and in -- much faster to deal
15 with that potential threat.

16 As far as Iran is concerned, I don't believe we are
17 ultimately going to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear
18 weapon. They are determined to get it. We can slow them
19 down. But, whether we are ultimately going to prevent that,
20 I think, it's highly unlikely. And so, we either have to
21 be-- your -- the options are then obvious, we're either
22 going to have to contain them when they have a nuclear
23 weapon or we're going to have to prevent them from getting
24 it, by force. And that is the -- those are the -- in my
25 view, those are the only real alternatives that we face.

1 Senator Cruz: Thank you.

2 Chairman McCain: Any additional comment on that?

3 General Keane: I have one. I will disagree with the
4 Doctor, here. I think we -- this administration, despite
5 the nuclear deal that has been made -- I'm not suggesting
6 that we tube the nuclear deal. I do believe we have to hold
7 them accountable and have a tough inspection protocol, turn
8 all of our intelligence agencies on it, and the rest of it.
9 We know they're going to cheat. They have, before. It was
10 an informant that gave us the Fordow secret site. But, I
11 believe we need a policy, an unequivocal policy that says we
12 are not going to let Iran have a nuclear weapon, and we
13 would use the means necessary to stop it, if necessary.
14 Iran with a nuclear weapon, I think, should be unacceptable
15 to us, as a matter of national security policy.

16 Chairman McCain: Mr. Brimley?

17 Mr. Brimley: I disagree with General Keane's comments.

18 Chairman McCain: You want to elaborate on that?

19 [Laughter.]

20 Mr. Brimley: Well, I just think -- similar to North
21 Korea, I mean, I worry about -- particularly with North
22 Korea and the nature of the regime itself, I think -- you
23 know, at the end of the day, I think -- as objectionable as
24 the Iranian regime may be, I think that they have proven to
25 be rational actors. They have a strategy that makes sense

1 from their perspective, that -- and we are countering it
2 through various means. And we can debate whether we need to
3 do more.

4 I worry more about North Korea. And that's why -- I
5 mentioned the op-ed, I think before you got in, Senator, but
6 that the Secretary of Defense Perry wrote with Dr. Carter --
7 Dr. Ash Carter, who's now the Secretary of Defense, about 10
8 years ago, that argued in favor of preemptively taking out
9 any long-range ballistic missile from North Korea that was
10 mated with a nuclear capability. I think that debate ought
11 to be had again, because that's the one scenario that I
12 worry about probably more than most.

13 Dr. Kagan: Could I --

14 Chairman McCain: It was -- go ahead, Dr. Kagan.

15 Dr. Kagan: I just want to make sure I've slid myself
16 in exactly where I want to be, here, because I don't like
17 General Keane disagreeing with me. But, I'm not saying we
18 should not be willing to use force to deal with Iran. I'm
19 saying let's not kid ourselves that there is a middle option
20 between containment and ultimately using force, because of
21 their determination.

22 But, the only thing that I would say, in both Iran and
23 North Korea's case, is, let's also not assume that there is
24 an easy, quick option, where we do a surgical strike and
25 then it's all over and we can all go home. They have

1 options, too, after that strike, and we -- we can't walk
2 into that unless we are willing, ourselves, to take next
3 steps that may be necessary. That's the only -- it's not
4 what -- if Senator Graham had been here, that's what I
5 wanted to say to Senator Graham.

6 Chairman McCain: I'll relay that to him.

7 [Laughter.]

8 Chairman McCain: And only a President of the United
9 States can make decisions along the lines of what we are
10 discussing, with or without, in some cases, the approval of
11 Congress.

12 I want to thank the witnesses. It's been extremely
13 helpful, as every member who attended had commented. I
14 thank you for your knowledge. I thank you for your service
15 to the country. And we'll be calling on you again.

16 Thank you.

17 This hearing is adjourned.

18 [Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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