

Stenographic Transcript
Before the

COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF
THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN REVIEW OF THE
DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2017 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE
PROGRAM

Thursday, February 11, 2016

Washington, D.C.

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8 U.S. Senate
9 Committee on Armed Services
10 Washington, D.C.

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12 The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:53 a.m. in
13 Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John
14 McCain, chairman of the committee, presiding.

15 Committee Members Present: Senators McCain
16 [presiding], Inhofe, Sessions, Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer,
17 Cotton, Ernst, Tillis, Lee, Reed, McCaskill, Manchin,
18 Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine,
19 King, and Heinrich.

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1 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN, U.S. SENATOR
2 FROM ARIZONA

3 Chairman McCain: The Senate Armed Services Committee
4 meets this morning to receive testimony on the findings and
5 recommendations of the National Commission on the Future of
6 the United States Army.

7 I am pleased to welcome General (Retired) Carter Ham,
8 General (Retired) James D. Thurman, the Honorable Thomas
9 Lamont and Sergeant Major of the Army (Retired) Raymond
10 Chandler.

11 Gentlemen, this committee is grateful to you for your
12 many years of distinguished service and your leadership
13 during the conduct of the National Commission's work. We
14 are thankful for the comprehensive and timely report.
15 Today, we hope to benefit from your recommendations.

16 The focus of this hearing is our Army and our soldiers.
17 Their mission is unequivocal. It is to fight and win our
18 Nation's wars. As Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley
19 said eloquently, the Army's "reason for being, our very
20 reason for being, at the very core of what it means to have
21 an Army is to win, and to win decisively, in ground combat
22 against the enemies of our country so that American citizens
23 can enjoy life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."

24 Through 15 years of war, our Army has been tested.
25 But, time and time again, our soldiers proved their

1 commitment, courage, and determination. It is our duty to
2 our utmost to provide them with the support they need and
3 deserve. That starts by recognizing that our Army is still
4 at war.

5 At this moment, 187,000 soldiers are deployed in 140
6 locations around the globe. They're fighting terrorists and
7 training our partners in Afghanistan and supporting the
8 fight against ISIL, all the while defending South Korea and
9 reassuring our allies in eastern Europe. Yet, as the
10 demands on our Army continue to increase, our support for
11 our soldiers has not kept pace. In short, our Army is
12 confronting growing threats and increasing operational
13 demands with shrinking and less-ready forces and aging
14 equipment. By the end of the next fiscal year, the Army
15 will be cut down to 450,000 Active Duty personnel soldiers,
16 down from a wartime peak of 570,000. These budget-driven
17 force reductions were decided before the rise of ISIL or
18 Russia's invasion of Ukraine. And, as the Commission notes,
19 a regular Army of 450,000 is the minimum sufficient force
20 necessary. We must be clear that, when we minimize our
21 Army, we maximize the risk to our soldiers. Those risks
22 will only grow worse if mindless sequestration cuts are
23 allowed to return and the Army shrinks to 420,000 soldiers.
24 On the present course, we're running the risk that, in a
25 crisis, we'll have too few soldiers who will enter a fight

1 without proper training or equipment.

2 Given current operational demands, readiness must be
3 the first priority of the Army. Yet, as our Army shrinks,
4 readiness suffers. Just over one-third of the Army's
5 Brigade Combat Teams are ready for deployment and decisive
6 operations. I repeat, only -- over one-third. And the Army
7 has no plan to return to full-spectrum readiness until 2021,
8 at the very earliest. As the Commission's report makes
9 clear, both the mission and the force are at risk.

10 Meanwhile, the Army is woefully behind on
11 modernization. The Army must modernize for the harsh
12 realities of 21st-century warfare. Our soldiers must be
13 trained and equipped for an increasingly diverse and complex
14 range of threats. They must be able to win against peers in
15 highly lethal combined-arms maneuver, near-peer in hybrid
16 warfare conditions, and determined unconventional
17 insurgents. Yet, our Army is essentially organized and
18 equipped as it was in the 1980s. The main difference is
19 that it's smaller. In fact, many key enabling forces, like
20 artillery, armored cavalry, engineers, air defense,
21 chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response,
22 and theater transport have been reduced to levels that
23 compromise the Army's ability to field campaign-quality
24 forces. Put simply, our ground force is not in balance.
25 We're not sized with the adequate capacity or with key

1 capabilities to give our soldiers what they need to win
2 decisively. Part of that is the legacy of the Army's
3 acquisition record, which former Army Secretary McHugh said,
4 quote, "too few" -- excuse me -- he said, "too often, a tale
5 of failure, too many underperforming or canceled programs,
6 too few successful fieldings of developmental designs, and
7 far too many taxpayer dollars wasted." And while we have
8 struggled, adversaries such as Russia have been investing
9 billions in modernizing their armies. The result is that
10 America's capability advantage in ground combat weapons is
11 not nearly as great as it once was.

12 Another challenge to the Army's balance has been its
13 failure to operate as a total force composed of the regular
14 Army, the Guard, and the Reserve. Yet, while the Army is
15 intended to operate as one force, the Commission identified
16 major gaps, including a lack of focus on multi-component
17 units, the absence of an integrated recruiting force, and
18 the inability to manage pay and personnel across the entire
19 Army with a single system. The Commission's recommendations
20 for developing a total Army as well as those related to the
21 critical issue of Army aviation are worthy of the
22 committee's consideration.

23 Our total Army needs a major change of direction. This
24 will not be easy, but it's been done before. Army leaders
25 like General Abrams transformed the Army before. They

1 restored the discipline and morale of the force in the
2 aftermath of the Vietnam War. They transitioned the Army to
3 an All-Volunteer Force while revolutionizing training
4 doctrine, and they built an Army that won the Cold War and
5 removed Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. We need this kind of
6 transformation again today, because, as the Commission has
7 made clear, our Army is in trouble. The increasing velocity
8 of instability, combined with continued reductions in
9 defense spending, will inevitably lead to depleted
10 readiness, chronic modernization problems, and deteriorating
11 morale. We can and must do better.

12 I'm grateful to the Commission for its important
13 contribution to helping us find a better way forward.

14 Senator Reed.

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1 STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED, U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE
2 ISLAND

3 Senator Reed: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
4 And thank you for holding this hearing. It's an -- very
5 important, as you pointed out.

6 And, after nearly 15 years of continuous operations,
7 it's critical we take a step back and assess the current
8 state of the regular Army, the Army National Guard, and the
9 Army Reserve. As such, our witnesses this morning each
10 bring a unique and valuable perspective on these issues. I
11 look forward to their testimony and exploring in greater
12 detail the recommendations that the National Commission on
13 the Future of the Army has put forth for consideration.

14 First, let me begin by thanking the commissioners as
15 well as your staff. You've done an extraordinary job. Your
16 hard work, your willingness to take on this challenge is
17 deeply appreciated. The comprehensive study that you have
18 produced is thorough and thoughtful. And, in particular, I
19 applaud your efforts to reach out to all stakeholders,
20 including senior leadership in the Department of Defense,
21 leadership within the regular Army, the Army National Guard,
22 the Army Reserve, numerous elected officials both in
23 Washington and in the States, and, most importantly,
24 soldiers currently serving in uniform. And I think you were
25 guided in those efforts very effectively by the Sergeant

1 Major.

2 So, thank you, Sergeant Major.

3 So, thank you for the process, and thank you for the
4 great effort.

5 As the final Commission report illustrates, the Army is
6 faced with a number of challenges and tough choices for the
7 foreseeable future. The threats facing our Nation are not
8 diminishing, and it underscores our need for a well-trained
9 and well-resourced, properly equipped military force that
10 can deploy at a moment's notice. The Army has made
11 increasing readiness levels a top priority; however, in a
12 constrained budget environment, augmenting funding for
13 readiness often comes at the expense of other Army
14 priorities, including investment in modernization and
15 recapitalization. Furthermore, the problem is compounded by
16 the fact the Army has had a poor track record with the
17 modernization efforts, resulting in programs that have been
18 truncated or canceled. I look forward to hearing from our
19 witnesses on their thoughts on how the Army can continue to
20 improve readiness, as well as your views on how the Army can
21 improve its acquisition process.

22 Another issue the Commission considered was the
23 Aviation Restructure Initiative, or the ARI, and the
24 transfer of all Apache helicopters in the Army National
25 Guard to regular Army. The Commission recommended allowing

1 the Active component to retain 20 battalions of Apaches,
2 each equipped with 24 aircraft, while providing the Army
3 National Guard with four battalions of Apaches, each
4 equipped with 18 aircraft. In light of the vigorous debate
5 the ARI proposal has generated in Congress and the
6 importance to the Army, I look forward to hearing our
7 witnesses particularly with respect to this issue.

8 Finally, the Army continues to draw down its end
9 strength, as the Chairman has pointed out. The final goal
10 is 450,000 in the Active Army, 335,000 in the Army National
11 Guard, and 195,000 in the Army Reserve. The Commission
12 noted this level of uniformed military personnel, again, as
13 the Chairman pointed out, provides the Army a minimally
14 sufficient capability and capacity across the range of near-
15 term challenges. In light of the evolving security
16 environment and unanticipated global challenges, I welcome
17 your comments on whether you believe the U.S. Army can
18 continue to meet its commitment with this Army -- this size
19 Army.

20 Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
21 commissioners.

22 Chairman McCain: I thank the witnesses. And I'd --
23 whatever order you would like to begin, I think would be
24 appropriate.

25 General Ham, is that --

1 JOINT STATEMENT OF GENERAL CARTER F. HAM, USA (RET.),
2 CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY;
3 HON. THOMAS R. LAMONT, VICE CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
4 THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY; GENERAL JAMES D. THURMAN, USA
5 (RET.), COMMISSIONER, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF
6 THE ARMY; AND SERGEANT MAJOR OF THE ARMY RAYMOND F. CHANDLER
7 III, USA (RET.), COMMISSIONER, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE
8 FUTURE OF THE ARMY

9 General Ham: Thanks, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Chairman
10 and Senator Reed, with your indulgence, I think, with the
11 agreement of my partners here, we'll just have one opening
12 statement, and then go to questions.

13 Chairman McCain: Thank you.

14 General Ham: So, sir, on behalf of all of the fellow
15 commissioners and the great staff that support us, thank you
16 all for inviting us to testify before the committee on a
17 report on the future of the Army. And I'd especially thank
18 you, Mr. Chairman, for having appointed General J.D. Thurman
19 to the Commission, and, Senator Reed, for having appointed
20 Sergeant Major of the Army Ray Chandler. It will be no
21 surprise to those on this committee that both General
22 Thurman and Sergeant Major of the Army Chandler offered
23 characteristically direct and forceful insights to the
24 Commission.

25 Chairman McCain: Not surprising.

1 General Ham: No, sir.

2 The committee and staff have already received the
3 Commission's report, so I won't spend a lot of time
4 addressing specific issues, but I would like to give you a
5 sense of how we approached the task that you gave to us in
6 the Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act.
7 The Commission made every effort to be inclusive,
8 accessible, and transparent. We visited 17 States,
9 interacted with over 320 different Army units of all three
10 components. We interacted with all 54 adjutants general and
11 33 Governors. About 80 Members of Congress engaged with the
12 Commission. We've met with all six geographic combatant
13 commanders, many of their Army's -- Army service component
14 commands, and many of our most important allies and foreign
15 partners. And that's certainly only a very partial list.
16 We tried to pay strict attention to the law that you passed
17 creating the Commission. Importantly, our recommendations
18 were required to be consistent with acceptable levels of
19 national risk and, importantly, anticipated future
20 resources. In other words, this was not an unbounded
21 effort.

22 The result is a set of 63 specific recommendations that
23 we believe are well researched based on realistic
24 assumptions and backed by solid data. We found that
25 America's Army is the best in the world, and those who have

1 chosen to serve make it so and deserve our full and
2 continued support and appreciation. Yet, as indicated, our
3 Army faces some significant challenges, many of them budget
4 driven.

5 From fiscal years 2010 to 2015, for example, overall
6 defense spending declined 7 percent, but Army funding
7 declined 14 percent. On the two main issues before the
8 Commission -- force size and mix and the Apache transfer --
9 the Commission found the following:

10 An Army of 980,000 is the minimally sufficient force to
11 meet current and anticipated missions at an acceptable level
12 of national risk. Within that 980,000, as indicated, the
13 Commission finds the regular Army of 450,000, the Army
14 National Guard of 335,000, and the Army Reserve of 195,000
15 present the right mix of forces; but, again, the absolute
16 minimum levels to meet America's national security
17 objectives. The numbers, though, do not tell the full
18 story. The Army of 980,000 must be resourced so that it is
19 trained, ready, postured, and modernized to meet the
20 Nation's demands.

21 It's important to remember the mandate that you gave
22 us. You told us to size the force in light of the two
23 previously mentioned considerations: risk and resources.
24 Adjust either, or both, particularly the level of
25 anticipated resourcing, and you would reasonably arrive at

1 very different conclusions. In our assessment, an Army of
2 980,000 is the absolute minimum -- a floor, not a ceiling.

3 On the Apache question, the Commission recommends the
4 Army maintain 24 fully manned Apache battalions, 20 in the
5 regular Army and four in the Army National Guard. The
6 Commission recommendation has advantages over the Aviation
7 Restructure Initiative in both wartime capacity and surge
8 capacity, and has the added benefit of reducing peacetime
9 deployment stress, and we believe it will better promote
10 integration of the regular Army in the Army National Guard.
11 But, it comes at added cost. To offset the added costs of
12 having four Apache battalions in the Guard, we make some
13 suggestions with regard to potential cost offsets, including
14 adding only two Black Hawk battalions to the National Guard
15 instead of the four that are currently planned, and suggest
16 considering slowing Black Hawk modernization.

17 The report also contains several prominent themes based
18 on the Commission's factfinding and analysis. We consider
19 sustaining the All-Volunteer Force, vital to the future of
20 the Nation. A return to a draft or other model of
21 compulsory military service will not yield the quality Army
22 the Nation requires. But, an All-Volunteer Force is
23 expensive to recruit and retain. But, we believe doing so
24 is the right choice.

25 The Commission believes it is critically important to

1 develop a true total-force culture. While the regular Army,
2 Army National Guard, and Army Reserve are distinct,
3 essential, and interdependent, they are meant to operate as
4 one force, with their efforts fully integrated. The
5 Commission found gaps in seams in the implementation of the
6 total-force policy, and our report highlights some of those
7 and offers some remedies.

8 The Commission recommends funding at least at the
9 fiscal year 2016 President's budget level, which would
10 provide, in our opinion, the Army the minimum resources
11 necessary to meet its requirement at acceptable risk. But,
12 given the evolving strategic environment and the potential
13 for growing instability, even this level of funding may
14 prove inadequate in the future.

15 Additionally, Army funding must be predictable.
16 Successive years of budget uncertainty and continuing
17 resolutions have had significant negative consequences for
18 the Army. In the Commission's view, even with budgets at
19 the President's budget '16 level, the Army would still have
20 some significant shortfalls in aviation, short-range air
21 defense, and other capabilities that we address in the
22 report.

23 Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, that's a brief rundown of
24 what we found. And we recognize that certainly not everyone
25 will agree with our recommendations. Indeed, many have

1 already voiced their disagreement. What I do hope, though
2 -- and I think I speak for the Commission -- is that our
3 report will contribute to the important debate that the
4 Congress and the administration -- I would argue, indeed,
5 the Nation -- must have to determine how America's Army
6 should be sized, trained, modernized, and postured.

7 And, with that, my fellow commissioners and I are
8 prepared to answer your questions.

9 [The prepared statement of General Ham follows:]

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1 Chairman McCain: Well, thank you very much. And thank
2 -- to the commissioners. And we're very appreciative. And
3 this comes at a excellent time for us as we begin the markup
4 for the 2017 defense authorization bill.

5 I guess I would like to start by saying: Obviously,
6 end strength is only part of the answer, but, if you want to
7 improve the missions and capabilities, end strength is a
8 place to begin. Would -- I think you would agree. And so,
9 we're now looking at a reduction for 2017 down to 420,000
10 Active component, as opposed to 450,000. What -- I guess my
11 first question is, How serious is that impact?

12 General Ham: Mr. Chairman, in the Commission's work
13 and in the analysis that we did, some of it in a classified
14 realm -- and I would certainly commend the classified annex
15 to the members of the committee and to your staffs -- it was
16 our assessment that the regular Army force of 420,000 would
17 be inadequate to meet the Nations' requirements at
18 acceptable levels of risk.

19 Chairman McCain: And you were looking at the 2016
20 level of funding as a level that you think is barely
21 acceptable, I guess is my interpretation. What if it's \$17
22 billion less?

23 General Ham: Sir, again, with any -- any change to
24 that -- and we all -- as you know, right now the Army is
25 looking at budgets below the President's budget for fiscal

1 year '16. We think that delta in funding just adds to the
2 level of risk, makes it more difficult for the Army to
3 sustain the levels of readiness that are required to meet
4 the Nation's objectives, and further delay any effort to
5 improve modernization.

6 Chairman McCain: And, as you pointed out in your
7 opening statement, as we lurch from one year to the next
8 with total unpredictability as to the level of funding, no
9 company or corporation could survive under that kind of
10 uncertainty from -- as they lurch from year to year. How
11 harmful is that, not only for planning, but -- help me out
12 on morale and retention and readiness, this OCO idea, which
13 none of us like, but seems to be the only way that we're
14 able to fund -- but the impact of the year-to-year
15 uncertainty of the ability they're going to be able to carry
16 out their missions.

17 General Ham: Mr. Chairman, let me start, and, if
18 you'll allow me, maybe turn to Sergeant Major of the Army
19 Chandler.

20 I think, in my view, the biggest impact of the budget
21 uncertainty manifests itself particularly in the area of
22 modernization, but we also -- in our site visits around the
23 Army, also heard numerous reports from soldiers,
24 noncommissioned officers, and officers of their training and
25 leader development plans that were disrupted because of the

1 uncertainty in the budget. For example, some leader
2 development courses that were canceled or postponed early in
3 the fiscal year because of funding challenges. And
4 particularly in the Reserve components, if a young
5 noncommissioned officer who is either employed or perhaps a
6 college student had made plans to attend a leader
7 development course, and then that was suddenly canceled
8 because of budget challenges, it may be a couple of years
9 before that Reserve-component noncommissioned officer may
10 find another opportunity to attend important leader
11 development.

12 Sergeant Major?

13 Mr. Chandler: Thanks, sir.

14 Mr. Chairman, you know, one of my great privileges is
15 to be able to talk with soldiers. It's what I did as the
16 Sergeant Major of the Army, it's what I was able to do in
17 great part as part -- a member of the Commission. And I
18 will tell you, I think that the risk to soldiers in the
19 long-term impact on areas like leader development and
20 retention are huge if we're not able to sustain a budget
21 over a period of time. And I'll give you a quick example.

22 We had the opportunity to go to the National Training
23 Center and speak with the 116th Brigade from a number of
24 States, primarily Idaho. And one of the commanders that we
25 had an opportunity to speak with, he was very concerned

1 about being able to retain his mid-grade noncommissioned
2 officers and officers. And the challenge was, if I'm -- got
3 to make a choice between going on an annual training event
4 or, as they did, 60 or 70 days of annual training in order
5 to prepare for a NTC rotation, if they weren't going to be
6 utilized after that and deployed someplace, then the issue
7 became, "Why am I doing this? I've deployed several times
8 over the past 14 or 15 years, and now being in a place where
9 I'm spending 2 or 3 years ramping up for a keystone event,
10 go to the National Training Center, and then not be deployed
11 to go do something. Why do I need to continue to do this?"

12 And I think you'll see that, if we're not able to
13 sustain adequate funding, leader development programs, and
14 the opportunity to go and train and deploy, this will have a
15 huge impact on the Army's ability to generate readiness and
16 fight and defend our Nation's wars.

17 Chairman McCain: General Thurman.

18 General Thurman: Mr. Chairman, one of the things that
19 I've observed with the lack of predictable funding has been
20 not being able to sustain Combat Training Center rotations.
21 The crown jewel of the Army to be able to conduct decisive
22 land combat is at our training centers. And there were
23 cases over the past few years where rotations were canceled.
24 That is not a good ideal, particularly when we've got
25 formations that have to be trained for land combat. I just

1 used my past experience in Korea. That situation is very
2 volatile over there, and it requires ground forces that are
3 properly trained for decisive land combat. And this has got
4 to be sustained.

5 And that was one of the things that I saw a I looked in
6 -- over the course of funding is -- if we don't have
7 predictable funding and cannot sustain readiness,
8 particularly on the high end, then we've got an Army that's
9 not properly trained.

10 And, you know, what I've learned over my experience, a
11 soldier must have confidence in themselves, they must have
12 confidence in their leadership, and they must have
13 confidence in their equipment. And that -- and if they
14 don't have that, and have the opportunity to train on that,
15 then we're headed for something that is not good for the
16 country.

17 Thank you.

18 Chairman McCain: Sir, did you want to answer?

19 Mr. Lamont: Just very quickly. I want to point out,
20 when we made reference to and benchmarked FYPB-16, that was
21 really informed by the QDR of 2014. And the strategic
22 environment, as we all know, has changed fairly dramatically
23 since then. So, we're quite concerned with those levels,
24 particularly as we go into '17.

25 Chairman McCain: Senator Reed.

1 Senator Reed: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

2 And once again, gentlemen, thank you and your
3 colleagues for your extraordinary service.

4 And let me go back to the issue of the Army
5 Restructuring Initiative, the helicopters. And I think,
6 General Ham, your comments and also the report suggested
7 that one of the reasons that you think it -- there should be
8 Apaches in the National Guard is to help integrate Army
9 aviation across the whole spectrum -- Active forces,
10 National Guard forces, Reserve forces. And I -- you might
11 comment on that. And also, in terms of the location of
12 these residual National Guard units, was there any
13 consideration to ensuring they are closely colocated with
14 Active forces so they have access to training ranges, to --
15 you know, to the things you need to do to stay proficient
16 and current? And would that be part of your
17 recommendations, or would you consider making further
18 recommendations?

19 General Ham and --

20 General Ham: Yeah, Senator Reed, thanks. If you'll
21 allow me to begin, then I'll turn to General Thurman --

22 Senator Reed: Yes, sir.

23 General Ham: -- who served on the Aviation
24 Subcommittee.

25 We looked at four criteria in evaluating a number of

1 alternatives for -- with regard to the Apache issue. We
2 looked, first and foremost, at wartime sufficiency. What
3 was the proper structure to meet the stated wartime demands?
4 That's articulated in the classified annex. We also looked
5 for what alternative offered the best surge capability for
6 unforeseen circumstances. Thirdly, we did look at, How do
7 we best support the total force policy or the integration of
8 the components? And lastly, importantly, looked at cost.
9 And, in all of those, we came to the conclusion that we have
10 stated. Cost, by the way, is one -- is the reason why we
11 recommend -- while the battalions in the National Guard --

12 Senator Reed: Right.

13 General Ham: -- be fully manned, they be equipped with
14 only 18, vice 24, aircraft, purely as a matter of cost. And
15 the National Guard Bureau and the Director of the Army
16 National Guard told us that they are quite familiar and
17 comfortable with cross-leveling units when there is a need
18 for operational employment.

19 Before I turn to General Thurman, Senator Reed, just --
20 we did not look specifically at where those battalions might
21 be located. But, certainly in the recommendation that
22 addresses multi-component units, which we think is
23 important, it does work best, in our opinion, when those
24 units are colocated -- regular Army, Army National Guard,
25 and Army Reserve.

1 General Thurman?

2 Senator Reed: General Thurman?

3 General Thurman: Sir, Senator Reed, just to add to
4 that. One of the things that I just would recommend is, we
5 went into extensive analysis on wartime capacity that's in
6 that classified annex that General Ham referred to. Bottom
7 line, there's -- if you put all of the AH-64 aircraft in the
8 regular Army, you have no strategic depth to reach back to.
9 And so, that was a big driver.

10 And here's the other fact, is -- our aviation units
11 today -- Combat Aviation Brigades, Apache units -- are
12 inside the 1:2 -- 1 year deployed to 2 years back home, the
13 BOG Dwell that's referred to. So, that really drove us to
14 come up with a alternative to the Aviation Restructure
15 Initiative. And, frankly, that initiative was budget-
16 driven, when you really get inside that and look at it.

17 The National Guard option, we looked at that, although
18 a little more expensive. We used several of the analysis
19 agencies to help us with this, with -- inside of the
20 Training and Doctrine Command. We settled that we -- as a
21 minimum, you need 20 battalions in the regular Army so you
22 can get them out the door. We learned a lot of lessons at
23 the start of this war, with aircraft and aviation. Twenty-
24 four is the right number in a Apache battalion to maintain
25 the amount of combat power that you must have when these

1 formations are deployed.

2 For the Army National Guard, we see some opportunities
3 also for them to work with combined-arms maneuver,
4 particularly with the units that are closely located,
5 whether it be Fort Bragg, Fort Hood, you name it. And
6 that's very important, because an aircraft not working with
7 maneuver formations, sir, you know that's not very
8 effective.

9 In terms of cost, what we didn't want to do as a
10 Commission is bring forth an option and not look in detail
11 at this cost, and look at how we would offset those costs.
12 Therefore, we looked, as an option, at the Black Hawk fleet.
13 Not to say the Black Hawk fleet is not an important
14 capability, because it is one of the capabilities that's
15 requested all the time, whether it be inside the regular
16 Army or for States and Governors for what they do in the
17 homeland. So, the National Guard option said they could get
18 by with only two battalions of Black Hawks, so we looked at
19 a 3-percent reduction -- modest reduction inside the Black
20 Hawk multiyear to be able to offset that. The onetime cost
21 to go from the AH-64 Delta aircraft to the Echo model, which
22 we would recommend, is about \$420 million. And we thought
23 we could offset that inside the aviation portfolio. The
24 annual operating costs are about 165 million. So,
25 therefore, we brought forth a option that is really paid for

1 out of that aviation portfolio, and that's what we tried to
2 do.

3 The other thing I think that's important inside of Army
4 aviation and what the current environment shows is, we are
5 rotating -- or are going to begin to rotate the Combat
6 Aviation Brigade out of Korea. Our professional judgment
7 was to leave that permanently stationed in Korea. One,
8 they've got to be ready to fight tonight. There's
9 environment issues over there. You're in a combined
10 environment over -- with the Republic of Korea. So, that is
11 very important, I think.

12 The last point I would bring up -- or two points -- is,
13 we also recommended retaining an 11th Combat Aviation
14 Brigade. Now, we don't have -- we would have to come,
15 obviously, to the Congress to get additional funding for
16 that. That's about \$1.9 billion, because you'd have to buy
17 additional aircraft to maintain 11 Combat Aviation Brigades.
18 But, the current environment says we need 11 Combat Aviation
19 Brigades in the regular Army.

20 And then the other thing that I could talk about would
21 be the increase in flying hours funding.

22 Senator Reed: Thank you.

23 Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

24 Gentlemen, thank you for your service.

25 Chairman McCain: Senator Sessions.

1 Senator Sessions: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

2 And -- well, General Thurman, on the aviation question,
3 it seems to me -- and you're recommending a stronger
4 commitment to that, it seems like to me -- what we learned
5 in Iraq and Afghanistan was just how critical that aviation
6 component is. Would you share your thoughts about the
7 lessons learned and the shortages we found when we were
8 trying to maintain operations in Afghanistan and Iraq?

9 General Thurman: Yes, sir, Senator.

10 As a division commander in Baghdad in 2006, the first
11 call I always heard was, "Troops in contact, requesting
12 attack helicopters." And the reason I bring that up,
13 because this entity is one of the capabilities that changes
14 dynamics on the battlefield. And I would say aviation is
15 going to continue to be a high-demand item in Afghanistan
16 and also what -- in Iraq or any other theater that we are
17 going to get involved in. And you see it when you review
18 the war plans, and you see it when you review the
19 requirements that are coming into the Joint Staff for Army
20 aviation.

21 Senator Sessions: Well, I think that's true. I was
22 talking to a young former helicopter pilot, and flew over a
23 group of Sunnis that we were supporting. And they were all
24 standing up and cheering. They were facing combat, and
25 they'd call for air -- aviation support, and, when it came,

1 he could see them cheer when they flew into the battle. So,
2 I think it's a big deal.

3 With regard -- I understand that the President's budget
4 zeros out the Lakota aircraft that's going to be used to
5 replace the old TH-67 trainers. Any of you aware of that
6 and have any comment on it? Do we -- we're well in the
7 process of replacing those. I think you -- it's odd and
8 concerning to me that it would just be stopped.

9 General Thurman: Senator, first thing in regard to the
10 Aviation Restructure Initiative, we did not look in detail
11 at the entire ARI proposal. We looked at -- the question
12 the law directed us to look at was primarily on AH-64s. I
13 have heard that the -- there has been an adjustment of
14 funding levels inside of Lakota aircraft. And I can confirm
15 what you've just said.

16 Senator Sessions: Well, we'll need to examine that, I
17 think, and make sure.

18 With regard to the Aviation Restructure Initiative,
19 it's -- there was a claim of 12 billion in savings. But,
20 you believe your plan -- that sort of strikes a compromise
21 -- maybe General Ham -- I -- whoever would like to answer
22 this -- your plan tries to offset any cost of this area.
23 And you think that you've minimized the cost by leaving,
24 what, four in the Guard?

25 General Ham: Yes, Senator. Certainly the

1 recommendation that the Commission made is more costly than
2 the Aviation Restructure Initiative. And again, as General
3 Thurman mentioned, Senator, we didn't look at the entirety
4 of ARI, we looked specifically at Apache. But, we felt it
5 was important for us, if we were going to recommend to you
6 something different than the Aviation Restructure
7 Initiative, that we at least offer some off -- some
8 alternative sources of funding offsets for you and for the
9 Army to consider.

10 Senator Sessions: Thank you.

11 One of the things that's concerning me about this is
12 that, as a -- in reality, General Ham, maybe Sergeant Major
13 Chandler, it's easier to fire, eliminate a Active-duty
14 military uniformed soldier than a civilian. And, as a
15 result, it seems to me we've drawn down dramatically our
16 uniformed personnel since the peak of the war. And a lot of
17 that was natural. I mean, we expected some of that to
18 happen. But, have we done enough to focus on reduction of
19 civilian personnel? It seems to me it would take fewer
20 civilians to support 450,000 Active Duty than it does to
21 support 570,000 Active Duty. Have you given any thought to
22 that?

23 General Ham: Senator, we didn't delve into that issue
24 particularly, but I would say -- and this is, in hindsight,
25 probably an area that perhaps we could have dealt with more

1 fully -- Army civilians are also part of the total force.
2 It's regular Army, Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and
3 the Army civilians that are so essential to sustaining
4 soldiers in all the components. Having said that, I think
5 certainly a comprehensive review is warranted. And I would
6 say the other component of that is certainly the contract
7 force that provides many services to the Army, as well. We
8 simply, because of time and scope, did not spend a lot of
9 effort in that area.

10 Mr. Lamont: I might add something to that, having been
11 the former Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower,
12 which had the civilian component within that organization.
13 We reached a peak also in civilians about the same time as
14 we reached in the uniformed side, with roughly 570-, the
15 number being anywhere from 275,000 civilian upwards almost
16 to 300,000. I'm advised -- and I can't say this as being
17 totally informed, but I'm advised we're roughly at 235,000
18 Army civilians now, or at least headed in that direction.
19 Perhaps some of the staff can confirm that.

20 But, we have to be a little bit careful as we refer to
21 the generating force. There's the operational force and the
22 generating force within the Army, and the generating force
23 takes up roughly one-third. Within that generating force is
24 over 60-percent civilian. So, we have to be a little bit
25 careful. It's not always proportional when we cut those

1 down. But, you -- I think your point, though, was well
2 taken, that there may be some need to see some reductions.

3 Senator Sessions: Thank you.

4 Chairman McCain: Senator McCaskill.

5 Senator McCaskill: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

6 I particularly noticed in the report those areas that
7 were cited as an unacceptable risk, because it seems to me
8 that we need to really pay attention to where you have
9 determined we have an unacceptable risk. And contained in
10 those things were -- that you characterized as an
11 unacceptable risk was chemical, biological, radiological,
12 and nuclear response, and also military police. Now, I
13 obviously am aware that Fort Leonard Wood is incredibly
14 important to all of the above, so I would like -- General
15 Ham, if you could, briefly talk about what are the potential
16 consequences to our strength and our capabilities if we are
17 not really drilling down on this unacceptable risk that you
18 all reported on.

19 General Ham: Thanks, Senator. I would, first,
20 recommend the classified annex, which gets into some of the
21 particulars, particularly with regard to the chemical,
22 biological, radiological, and nuclear units of the Army. In
23 general, I would say that both of those capabilities that
24 the Army possesses in its various components reflect a
25 structure that was based on a different operating

1 environment than exists today, with the necessity that the
2 Army and the likelihood that the Army will operate in a
3 chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear environment
4 at home or overseas, I think, drives some added emphasis in
5 that area. And there is -- I would note, we believe that
6 there is a particular role for the Army National Guard for
7 domestic response in that area.

8 With regard to military police, as many parts of the
9 world are increasingly urbanized and soldiers will be
10 operating in and amongst populations, the military police
11 provide a very special capability that facilitates the
12 ability of other Army units to operate in that environment.
13 And again, it was our general assessment, in both of those
14 capabilities -- CBRN and military police -- that the
15 capacity within the Army across the three components has not
16 kept pace with the demand.

17 Senator McCaskill: And I assume, since engineers were
18 not cited, that you all are comfortable with our
19 capabilities in the -- with the Army Corps and the
20 engineering force?

21 General Ham: Yeah, Senator. So, two different things.
22 We didn't spend a lot of time with the Army Corps of
23 Engineers. An absolutely vital part of the Army and its
24 contributions to many facets of American life and
25 foundational for the economy are well known to you and the

1 members of this committee.

2 With regard to the operating force of the engineer
3 corps, we didn't find significant shortfalls in engineers,
4 themselves. We found significant shortfalls in tactical
5 mobility, meaning that engineer units across the Army, all
6 components, many of them have much of the equipment that
7 they require, but they can't move it. In simple terms, I
8 may have my bulldozer, but --

9 Senator McCaskill: But don't know how to get it there.

10 General Ham: -- I have no way to move my bulldozer
11 from where it gets off at a port to where it's needed to be.
12 So, that's a needed area to be addressed.

13 Senator McCaskill: I also looked at the report as it
14 relates for the generating force. And I know, Mr. Lamont,
15 you just referenced the generating force. Does the
16 Commission believe the Army has cut too much from the
17 generating force? And how much risk has been taken in the
18 Army's ability to expand the generating force, if necessary?
19 I mean, obviously, you know, if we don't have the folks in
20 place to train up what we need, then we are really in
21 trouble. And if one of you would address the issues around
22 the -- what is the appropriate size of the generating force?

23 And do we really even know?

24 Mr. Lamont: Well, let me take a stab at that.

25 One, we are quite concerned with the generating force,

1 as I just mentioned, and the -- although the Commission did
2 not delve deeply into that, I think you hit a key point when
3 you said, "What's our ability if we have to expand?" Those
4 -- the generating force are our trainers, our schoolhouses,
5 our medical, and things of that nature. As the war
6 progressed in, I want to say, 2008, 2009, 2010, the demand
7 for troops grew, and we moved any number of troops out of
8 the generating force and sent them off to war. They were
9 replaced, often, by civilians. And I think that that ratio
10 remains much the same.

11 But, we are quite concerned with the size of the
12 generating force. I don't know that there is an ideal
13 number, an optimal number. But, we'd better have them when
14 we need them.

15 Senator McCaskill: Do you think the ratio of 60
16 civilian, 40 military is appropriate for the generating
17 force? That seems awfully high civilian, which I understand
18 how it happened and why it happened, but shouldn't we try to
19 reverse that?

20 Mr. Lamont: Well, speaking as -- personally and not as
21 a member of the Commission, I agree that that's quite bad.
22 In fact, when I left, it was over 62 percent were civilian.
23 And that seems dramatically small -- or large.

24 General Ham: Senator, would it be okay if Sergeant
25 Major --

1 Mr. Chandler: Senator, just -- another item of
2 information. So, the Army uses modeling to develop force
3 structure --

4 Senator McCaskill: Right.

5 Mr. Chandler: -- for operational forces, but we don't
6 currently have a model for the generating force.

7 Senator McCaskill: For generating.

8 Mr. Chandler: There is a great deal of work that's
9 going into developing a generating force model. And I --
10 when the Army achieves that, I think you'll be able to have
11 better granularity on the questions that you're asking.

12 One thing I would tell you is, is that there is no
13 proportional ratio, from my perspective, having been in the
14 training and doctrine business for quite a bit of time, that
15 says, "Okay, if you cut this from the operational force,
16 then you can see a reduction in -- a similar reduction in
17 the generating force." If you've got to train soldiers at
18 basic combat training, it takes a certain amount of people.
19 And that ratio never changes.

20 So, I applaud the Army's effort for the generating
21 force model. I'd ask them to move on that as quickly as
22 possible. And then I think you can get to the real --
23 instead of throwing darts at a dartboard -- to a real level
24 of granularity on where the generating force should be.
25 But, I think most of us are uneasy about the fact that we've

1 cut it to -- maybe into the bone.

2 Senator McCaskill: Thank you, Sergeant Major.

3 And thank all of you for your work on this.

4 Thank you.

5 Chairman McCain: Senator Ayotte.

6 Senator Ayotte: I want to thank all of you for your
7 distinguished service and work on this Commission.

8 I know that the Chairman had asked you about the total
9 force size and thinking about, What's the optimal size of
10 the Army? That's what I would like to hear from you. Let's
11 -- given the threats we're facing around the world, given
12 the challenges that we face -- as I understand, General Ham,
13 you also noted that the President's FY2016 plan does not
14 take into account recent changes in strategic environment.
15 So, can you tell us what is the optimal size for our Army?
16 Because I think it's important for us to understand what the
17 optimal size is if we really want to protect the American
18 people and not in a budget-constrained environment. I
19 understand we're in that, but we should understand -- With
20 the threats we're facing, what is the number, if you could
21 decide that number today?

22 General Ham: Yeah, Senator, it is -- it's a great
23 question, and a tough question -- it is important to note
24 that, of course, that was not the task that we had in the
25 law. The task that we had in the law was constrained by

1 resourcing. And so, that's how we approached our work.

2 But, I think I'm on a firm ground that I would speak
3 for the Commission that said if you -- if the law had not
4 contained that constraint, if it didn't say you have to
5 provide recommendations --

6 Senator Ayotte: See, this is the great thing about
7 hearings. We can sort of ask anything, even if we --

8 General Ham: Right.

9 Senator Ayotte: -- said "in the law." So --

10 General Ham: Right.

11 Senator Ayotte: -- I'm asking for your opinions today.

12 General Ham: Yeah. So, the Commission -- I think the
13 Commission did not address that. I would offer you my
14 personal opinion that would say -- again, let me backtrack
15 and speak one moment for the Commission.

16 We were careful in the words that we chose. We chose
17 "minimally sufficient" at -- of an Army of 980,000.
18 Minimally sufficient. I think it's a real question to say,
19 Is that the Army the Nation wants? Do -- does America want
20 a minimally sufficient Army? I think that's a discussion
21 for many to have.

22 So, I think if the -- if additional funding were
23 available, then certainly a larger force -- again, let me
24 speak personally -- I would say, halt any further drawdown
25 now, and make a more -- much more comprehensive assessment

1 of the operating environment, and then see what that cost
2 may be, and then come back to this committee and others to
3 say, "Here's what we think the bill is."

4 Senator Ayotte: So, "minimally sufficient," to me,
5 doesn't sound like protecting our national security
6 interests. So, that's really -- I'm not going to ask you to
7 give me an opinion as a Commission, but you, given the
8 breadth of experience on this panel, based on your
9 experience, General Thurman, where do you think we need to
10 be, versus putting aside the budget issue for a moment?
11 Because this is an important, I think, understanding that we
12 have to have of where we are versus where we should be.

13 General Thurman: Yes, ma'am.

14 Senator, I will tell you, I'm very concerned, because I
15 think we've got major warning signs in front of us right
16 now. Not speaking as a commissioner; I'm telling you what I
17 see as I watch the resurgence of Russia -- they're basically
18 in Syria, they're conducting their own NTC rotation. They
19 have gone to school on us, and, as I watch that unfold; and
20 then I turn to Korea and I watch what's occurring over there
21 in Korea today, it's probably more dangerous today than it's
22 been in a long time, given we're dealing with a maniac over
23 there, frankly. So, those forces over there have got to be
24 trained, ready to fight tonight, because it's a
25 miscalculation on either side that could get us in a war.

1 So, I think, if you look back what happened over the
2 course of the last few years when we had the Budget Control
3 Act go into effect, the assumptions have changed. One,
4 we're not out of Afghanistan, probably putting more back in.
5 We've got ISIS, ISIL, Iraq, Syria. We've got Africa, the --
6 North Africa, that whole issue that's going on in there.
7 So, one of the recommendations that we got in the report is
8 to go back and review the national security strategy that we
9 currently have in the budget, because I believe it's
10 seriously out of balance and -- as I look at this.

11 So, the number -- there needs to be another analysis,
12 in my opinion, to go back and look at, What is the right
13 size Army that this Nation needs? And, frankly, it's going
14 to be expensive, and we've got to, I believe, come to grips
15 with that. But, the -- frankly, the assumptions that --
16 when we reduce the force, they're not true anymore. So, we
17 have a set of failed assumptions. That's my opinion.

18 Mr. Chandler: Senator, if you don't mind, I'll add my
19 two cents. I think I can be blunt. I don't think it's wise
20 for us to consider growing the Army until we totally use the
21 entire force and then determine from there what additional
22 capabilities we may need. We've used the Active component,
23 the regular Army, significantly, and the Guard and Reserve
24 less. We need to use and execute the total-force policy to
25 get the Guard and Reserve engaged on a predictable

1 rotational basis --

2 Senator Ayotte: Well --

3 Mr. Chandler: -- which will allow us --

4 Senator Ayotte: I don't want to interrupt, here,
5 because I know we have a vote, but I'm not sure, if I asked
6 my Guard and Reserve members if they've been used less,
7 given the nature of many of them holding down civilian jobs
8 at the same time, they would necessarily agree with that
9 calculation, especially with what we've had to do in Iraq
10 and Afghanistan. We couldn't have done it without them.

11 Mr. Chandler: I would tell you that the vast majority
12 of guardsmen and reservists that we talked to want to be
13 utilized more frequently, in a predictable manner.

14 Mr. Lamont: I would concur with that, by the way, as a
15 traditional guardsman for 26 years. We found this every
16 visit we went, "If you're going to train us up and then not
17 use us, why are we here?" It's much different than my
18 years, back in the '80s and early '90s.

19 Senator Ayotte: Well, I have great confidence in our
20 Guard and Reserve, but I don't think that gets to the
21 fundamental question. Because they're asking -- we're
22 asking to downsize them, too, in terms -- I mean, the
23 decisions you're making at today are how much training, how
24 much aviation assets they're going to get, what are they
25 going to get for their readiness? So, to me, I think it's a

1 total-force question for the Army, and it's one that we need
2 to face, of: Where are we, versus the threats that we're
3 facing? And it seems to me that -- as I hear some of these
4 threats, that it's time for us to really think about not
5 drawing down, but looking at, How do we make sure we can
6 protect this Nation? And also that we don't drain our
7 people. So, you know, the dwell-to-deploy ratio and really
8 making sure our most precious resource, that they have what
9 they need, and the support that they need.

10 Senator Reed [presiding]: Well, thank you very much,
11 Senator.

12 I -- the Chairman is voting. Most of my colleagues are
13 voting. They shall return. I think someone famous once
14 said something like that. But, I'm going to take the
15 opportunity, and, as soon as one of my colleagues arrives,
16 I'll recognize the person.

17 But, Sergeant Major, what's the most interesting,
18 insightful thing that some of the soldiers told you when you
19 were out with your colleagues in the field that we should
20 know?

21 Mr. Chandler: Well, I think the one thing that I would
22 ask the committee to take away is, the soldiers are
23 extremely proud of what they do, regardless of what
24 component they're in, and that they want to serve, they're
25 proud to serve, their families are proud of what they do.

1 They want to be ready to do what it is that the Nation asks
2 us to do, asks them to do. You know, whether you're --
3 you're dusty and sweaty and haven't taken a shower in 3 days
4 at the National Training Center, you know, these kids were
5 motivated. They were going to finish their final live-fire
6 objective. They were excited about what they were doing.
7 If you went to a drill and saw what some of these kids are
8 doing, yeah, they don't want to do a lot of mandatory
9 training, they don't want to look at PowerPoint slides, they
10 want to get after it, they want to be what they came in the
11 Army to be, which is a United States Army soldier of the
12 proud tradition that wants to do the Nation's bidding.

13 And, you know, you can't -- having been away from the
14 Army for a year and coming back and trying to be objective,
15 you can't but be filled with pride in the service that these
16 kids -- we -- I spoke to a specialist in -- at -- and
17 actually came to a hearing in Washington. And this kid had
18 tried to do many things before he entered the Army, but the
19 Army gave him a sense of purpose and a desire to do and be a
20 part of something bigger than himself. He was almost in
21 tears, moved me to tears, about his sense of who he was and
22 what he was about. And that's the thing I'd ask you to take
23 away. These kids are proud of what they do. They need the
24 Nation's support.

25 Senator Reed: Thank you very much, Sergeant Major.

1 Again, thank you, gentlemen.

2 And, on behalf of the Chairman, I would like to
3 recognize Senator Ernst.

4 Senator Ernst: Thank you.

5 Thank you, gentlemen, so much for being here today and
6 for your testimony. I certainly appreciate all the years of
7 service that all of you have given.

8 I'd like to start with some discussion about the State
9 Partnership Program, which has been really important to Iowa
10 and many of our other States. But, throughout your report,
11 you stress the need for the Army to enhance its total-force
12 approach to ensure the Army can meet its mission
13 requirements, and the importance of the National Guard in
14 achieving that goal. And I do appreciate the thoughtful
15 analysis of the importance of the Guard, especially, since
16 9/11. In particular, I would like to talk about the State
17 Partnership Program. And I do think that this program is
18 key in allowing our Army and our country to better partner
19 with foreign countries and develop these nations and enhance
20 our security and the security of our allies, and doing so at
21 a low cost to American taxpayers.

22 Last week, this committee had a hearing on the Asia
23 Pacific, and the witnesses stressed the importance of SPP
24 and their belief that it should be expanded more into the
25 Asia Pacific, in particular. And is this a program that was

1 looked at during this study? And if any of you could
2 address that, or, General Ham, if you would like to take
3 that. National -- the impact to our Army with use of the
4 Guard as well the State Partnership Program, was that looked
5 at, at all?

6 General Ham: Thanks, Senator. We heard, loud and
7 clear, from all six geographic combatant commanders, their
8 praise and reliance upon the State Partnership Program, and
9 every one of them wants that program, not only to be
10 sustained, but to be increased. They're looking for more
11 and more opportunities to expand State Partnership into
12 other nations, particularly new and nontraditional partners
13 in some parts of the world. And so, I would agree with you,
14 and it's certainly what we found in our work, was the State
15 Partnership is a very low-cost, high-payoff program for the
16 Army and for the Nation.

17 Senator Ernst: Thank you.

18 Any other thoughts, gentlemen, on that? Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Lamont: Yes, ma'am. Being from your neighboring
20 State of Illinois and a guardsman, and our partner was
21 Poland. But, in my previous life, as the Assistant
22 Secretary of the Army, I happened be in Poland at the same
23 time as the Illinois Adjutant General. I was absolutely
24 irrelevant to the Polish army, because their connection was
25 with the Illinois Guard. That partnership is so vital to

1 our country partnerships; it is extremely important. They
2 didn't care about me or anybody else, but they cared about
3 the people they worked and served with, visited with, went
4 to war with. And Poland, as you probably know, have
5 provided us, and maybe still provide us, with a brigade at
6 least once a year when we were in Afghanistan and Iraq. And
7 what that saved U.S. taxpayers, for instance, and our
8 soldiers, was enormous. So, it is vitally important, as you
9 know.

10 Senator Ernst: Very good. Well, I appreciate that.
11 Iowa has a very strong partnership with Kosovo, and, through
12 that, we've developed -- even outside of our State
13 Partnership Program, between our soldiers and Kosovo
14 Security Forces, have developed now an economic relationship
15 through our State with the nation of Kosovo. And, just the
16 last couple of weeks, we opened a brand new consulate in Des
17 Moines. That's our State's first consulate. So, we were
18 really excited about that. But, that started and grew out
19 of the State Partnership Program. So, I appreciate your
20 thoughts on that.

21 I'd like to turn to a different topic just very
22 briefly. One of the recommendations is to reduce mandatory
23 training, as prescribed by the Army Training and Leader
24 Development Regulation. And, while I agree with this
25 recommendation, I can't tell you how many times I have

1 spoken to Active-component commanders as well as Reserve-
2 component commanders, and they have said that they are
3 assuming risk rather than mitigating the risk due to the
4 mandatory training requirements. And the over-burdensome
5 requirements mean that commanders aren't able to use that
6 time to train on their unit's mettle or their mission-
7 essential task list, which ultimately harms the readiness of
8 their units and the Army as a whole. So, you know, we're in
9 a politically correct environment. We seem to be very risk-
10 averse. Can you talk to that, maybe, a little bit more
11 about -- and maybe, Sergeant Major, if you would address
12 this -- on how we get back to being soldiers, but also
13 giving back some of that risk?

14 Mr. Chandler: Well, thanks for the question, Senator.

15 The -- I would start off by saying that the Army is
16 making inroads to reduce mandatory training, in line with
17 the doctrine of mission command. And so, you know, the
18 mitigation of risk is by the higher commander. It's -- if I
19 was in command of a unit, it would be my responsibility to
20 tell my higher commander, "These are the areas of risk that
21 I am assuming, based off of what you told me to do." The
22 challenge really is even exacerbated for Army National Guard
23 and Army Reserve units because of the limited amount of
24 time, as you well know, for IDT weekends or battle assembly
25 weekends. And where do you find that balance? I applaud

1 the Army's effort. The Commission does, highly recommends
2 that the Army move out a little bit quicker on reducing the
3 overhead burden, so to speak, of the mandatory training
4 requirements. Look, we ask these commanders to make life-
5 and-death decisions on the battlefield. We should entrust
6 and empower them to make those same decisions at some home
7 station or IDT battle assembly weekend event. Same with
8 Active component. We're not going to get to the level of
9 readiness that we need to if we continue to add necessary,
10 but mandated, requirements with a certain frequency. The
11 commander knows the unit. They should be able to make the
12 decisions on when and where they need to make the mandatory
13 training occur and still maintain an acceptable level of
14 readiness.

15 Senator Ernst: Very good. I also agree with that,
16 Sergeant Major. Our company commanders and first sergeants,
17 our battalion commanders and sergeant majors know their
18 soldiers best, and they know what they need to work on. So,
19 I'm glad to see that we have a recommendation that moves us
20 in that direction.

21 Thank you much, Senator Reed.

22 Senator Reed: On behalf of the Chairman, Senator
23 Donnelly, please.

24 Senator Donnelly: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will
25 pass to Mr. King.

1 Senator King: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

2 First, an observation. The budget control caps were
3 set in 2011. And I was just making some notes. That's pre-
4 ISIL, pre-Syria, pre-Ukraine, pre-South China Sea, pre-North
5 Korea launch. And here we are, trying to fit the defense
6 posture of this country, subsequent to all those events,
7 within caps that were established 5 years ago. Now, they
8 were adjusted somewhat last year, but not all that much.
9 And it just -- it -- I mean, I'm all for planning and
10 thinking ahead and having constraints, but when the
11 constraints keep you from responding to the threats that the
12 country is facing, it's just not a rational or prudent
13 policy, it seems to me.

14 And I wanted to start with a question. General Ham,
15 when you made your recommendations, were you consciously or
16 unconsciously operating under those caps? In other words,
17 are your recommendations based upon those budget realities
18 or were they based upon what your best judgment of what the
19 Army needs to look like in order to meet the threats that
20 this country faces?

21 General Ham: Senator, a little bit of both.
22 Certainly, the judgment of the eight commissioners -- lots
23 of experience in a lot of different fields represented
24 there. But, again, we were instructed in the law that we
25 had to conduct our assessments and make our recommendations

1 consistent with an anticipated level of future resource. It
2 wasn't further defined. And so, you could kind of pick and
3 choose, What do you think the anticipated level of future
4 resourcing would be? It was our general assessment that
5 it's unlikely, at the time that we were doing our work, that
6 there would be a significant increase in funding. And so,
7 we -- that's why we -- we've centered on this notion of the
8 level of funding in the President's budget for fiscal year
9 '16 in the -- and was kind of the -- again, the floor of
10 ceiling. And, of course, as you know, Senator, we're not at
11 that level yet. So, I think that's at least a start point.
12 So, it was -- I guess to summarize, it was a -- looking at
13 the anticipated security environment, but certainly informed
14 by the level of funding we thought might be attained.

15 Senator King: But, you understand the thrust of my
16 concern.

17 General Ham: I do, sir. And one of our most important
18 recommendations, already been referred to, is that, because
19 the global security environment has changed so significantly
20 from those days of budget and strategic plans, it is time
21 for, we believe, new strategic guidance.

22 Senator King: I certainly agree with that
23 wholeheartedly. To put a point on this, you recommend going
24 down to 30 Active BCTs, which is actually less than we had
25 before September 11th, and then perhaps a reduction to 28.

1 Here's my question. How long does it take to recruit,
2 train, and equip a BCT if we wanted to increase that number,
3 from a standing start?

4 General Ham: Senator, let me take a stab at it and
5 maybe ask the Sergeant Major of the Army to comment.

6 I actually had to do this when I was a division
7 commander. A brand new infantry Brigade Combat Team was
8 formed, stood up, equipped and deployed. And with all of
9 the very, very high priority -- this was in the mid-2000s --
10 it took about 18 months to be able to do that. I would say
11 in a -- on a more normal basis, it would probably take --
12 and again, that was in a period of almost unconstrained
13 resources -- typically, I would say 2 to 3 years would be a
14 more likely timeframe to start from scratch and build a
15 Brigade Combat Team.

16 Senator King: That reminds me of the old thing I
17 learned in Driver's Ed, that your headlights only illuminate
18 a certain distance down the road, and, if there's a wall 1
19 foot beyond that distance, you can't stop. And we're not
20 going to have the ability to respond to a threat if we're
21 talking a minimum of 18 months to 2 and a half to 3 years.
22 I mean, that's the risk that we're undertaking as we make --
23 as we're making these decisions.

24 I -- General, your reaction to that kind of --

25 Mr. Chandler: Senator, I would say -- and I agree with

1 what General Ham said -- the greatest challenge is the
2 leader development in order to fill that brigade.

3 Senator King: And that's not something you can just
4 turn off and on.

5 Mr. Chandler: No, those -- you know, it takes 20 years
6 to make a battalion commander or a brigade commander. I
7 mean, it takes 20 years to grow a sergeant major, 15 years
8 to grow a first sergeant. So, expansion will get the people
9 into the Army, will get the equipment to where it needs to
10 be, but to find the leadership in order to fill out that
11 organization and make it effective takes time. And there's
12 just not a lot of them to spare.

13 Senator King: Okay. And I have the same concern about
14 the end-strength numbers, that those were numbers derived
15 from a different strategic world, and that we really do
16 need, as you say, a strategic reset to take account of the
17 current challenges.

18 Yes, sir.

19 General Thurman: Senator, I was a G3 of the Army for 3
20 years, and I was there for the grow-the-Army piece, where we
21 grew Brigade Combat Teams up to 43 Brigade Combat Teams. I
22 was there for Iraq surge, Afghan surge, and watched what
23 goes on inside the Army. The biggest issue is manpower
24 because of what it takes to get the right people in these
25 jobs. And so, it varied on the length of time. Also, as

1 division commander, my experience, just -- much like General
2 Ham, we deployed a brigade for a specific set of missions,
3 and we were able to man, train, and equip that in 18 months.
4 But, that's a stretch. That's a big stretch. And so,
5 again, that's having all the resourcing you need, with the
6 right levels of modernization.

7 Senator King: And two --

8 Mr. Chandler: And that's something that's a concern.
9 Yes, sir.

10 Senator King: Two days ago in this committee -- and
11 I'll end my comments; I know I'm over time -- 2 days ago, we
12 had General Clapper here, who said that, in his 50 years of
13 service to this country, he has never seen a more diverse or
14 serious set of threats. And, at the same we're getting that
15 testimony, we're talking about reducing end strength and
16 developing a situation where it's going to be very difficult
17 to respond to a crisis.

18 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

19 Thank you, Senator Donnelly.

20 Mr. Lamont: Senator, I just want to point out one
21 thing. In that recommendation for perhaps removing two
22 ICBTs -- IBCTs, that was conditional. If there were no
23 other alternatives inside the Army, the resourcing, or
24 anyplace else, that's what we might have to look for. But,
25 that was a big "if."

1 Senator Reed: On behalf of the Chairman, Senator
2 Tillis, please.

3 Senator Tillis: Thank you, Senator Reed.

4 Thank you all for being here, and thank you for your
5 service.

6 I have a question. How do -- what are your opinions
7 about the current balance between the number of general
8 officers in the Army and the current force structure,
9 overall end strength?

10 General Ham: Senator, we did not assess that. I would
11 offer a personal opinion, and -- just from my own personal
12 experience. That is a thing that's continually looked at to
13 see if it's quite right, not only in terms of number, but in
14 terms of grade structure -- one, two, three, or four stars.
15 And the Army has made some adjustments over the past couple
16 of years. But, it is a constant evaluative process.

17 Senator Tillis: Any other comments?

18 [No response.]

19 Senator Tillis: Talk a little bit about acquisition
20 and reform. To what extent have you all looked into some of
21 the reforms that are detailed in the FY16 NDA. And do you
22 agree with them? Do you think that they make sense? Are
23 there any concerns with them?

24 General Ham: Senator, again, it got outside the
25 mandate given to the Commission, so we didn't spend a lot of

1 time on acquisition reform or, for that matter, for
2 modernization. But, clearly that's a -- an issue -- in
3 order for the Army to keep apace with the technological
4 advances, for our soldiers to be equipped so that they can
5 go into battle, as we say, never into a fair fight, I think
6 modernization and the acquisition reform that will lead to
7 cost-effective modernization are clearly critical items for
8 the Army and for the Nation to address.

9 Senator Tillis: Yeah, it seems to me that we really
10 need to have that considered in any kind of overall
11 assessments of the Army or any branch, because we're -- the
12 money and the inefficiency that we have there is at the
13 direct expense of other things that we need to spend our
14 money. And this is one area I would like for you all to
15 touch on. In my time -- I'm from North Carolina, and spend
16 a lot of time down at Camp LeJeune and Fort Bragg. And one
17 consistent theme that I'm hearing down there is a concern
18 that our readiness levels are at a very low point. If you
19 take a look at Fort Bragg and you're talking about the
20 number of jumps that they want to do now, at -- we've had
21 this discussion about Pope Air Field and little bit of a
22 disagreement with the Air Force on what we should do with
23 those assets down there. That stimulated a discussion about
24 just how many jumps we should have. It's substantially
25 higher than what they've been doing over the past 10, 15

1 years. So, my concern is, that points to, I think, a
2 readiness deficiency. To what extent do you all agree with
3 that?

4 Sergeant Major, I see your shaking your head. We'll
5 start with you.

6 Mr. Chandler: Well, Senator, I think, you know, the
7 Army developed a capability called a Rapid Equipping Force,
8 which was able to generate and fill requirements much more
9 quickly than I think the normal acquisition process takes.
10 My only recommendation was, maybe there should be some look
11 at how that process worked, and does it apply to the overall
12 acquisition program. You know, I think there were some
13 decisions made about how many jumps folks would make in
14 airborne units, because of the necessity to get them
15 prepared to do the directed mission they had in Iraq or
16 Afghanistan. Getting those guys back, jumping of planes --
17 guys and gals jumping out of planes is a great thing. And,
18 you know, personally, I'm all for it. How that fits into
19 the overall picture, I'm not aware of right now.

20 General Thurman: I would add two points to your
21 question. That has to do with acquisition. I think it is
22 right to do acquisition reform. It takes too long to field
23 equipment. And why does that happen? It happens because we
24 never seem to get the requirements right. And so, you have
25 to lock down the requirements in a more timely manner. I

1 mean, if you look at the Army, the Army's track record is
2 not good. Ground combat vehicle, armed aerial Scout, all
3 those were killed because, over time, it takes too long to
4 field that equipment. Requirements change, threats change.

5 And so, that is right, in my opinion, to really take a good
6 look at that.

7 I think, in terms of readiness, there's always the
8 question about proficiency verses currency. We need to be
9 proficient. And that comes to light in aviation. Because,
10 right now, I believe aviation is on the ragged edge. That's
11 our recommendation on increase in flying hours. And that's
12 flying hours to support combined arms maneuver with maneuver
13 formations. It's one thing to go fly a helicopter, it's
14 another thing to integrate it in a combined arms formation.
15 That's what's missing.

16 And so, the recommendation we had, which is going to
17 cost some money, was to increase flying hours, not only for
18 the regular Army, but also for the Reserve components --
19 Army National Guard, Army Reserve -- to get their
20 proficiency levels up. Because that's not happening out
21 there, even today. And that's what we found when we went
22 around and visited units.

23 Senator Tillis: Thank you.

24 Well, in closing -- and I know this is a theme that the
25 Chair has struck many times in the year that I've been here

1 -- I'm trying to figure out how we have an -- in any
2 discussion about things that we can do to better prepare men
3 and women, and better equip men and women, we have to talk
4 about acquisition reform, we have to talk about why I've got
5 in my office a 600-page RFP for the new-generation handgun.
6 It's got 39 pages that -- and when I go back to the
7 Department, they said, "But, it's only 39 pages of
8 specifications." I said, "Great. Then that means we can
9 delete everything else that doesn't speak to the complexity
10 of the process and the selection process?" Of course not.
11 So, the reason that I try to bring these things up, even in
12 things where we're talking about capability and readiness,
13 that sort of behavior has a direct deleterious effect on our
14 ability to provide men and women with training and the
15 equipment they need to bring the fight to the enemy. And we
16 have to make sure that it's integrated and stay on the front
17 stage. I know that -- I know the Chair agrees.

18 And thank you. I've gone over my time.

19 Chairman McCain [presiding]: Well, I thank Senator
20 Tillis.

21 And I know our panelists agree that it harms our
22 credibility when we ask for more funding and we have a \$2
23 billion cost overrun on an aircraft carrier and we have,
24 starting with the FCS, a long line of programs where
25 billions of dollars were wasted, with no result. So -- and

1 I appreciate the emphasis that you have given on this issue.
2 We have to fix it.

3 Senator Donnelly.

4 Senator Donnelly: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

5 And I want to thank all the witnesses.

6 Indiana doesn't have a large Active Duty presence for
7 many of the services, but it's home to our Nation's fourth-
8 largest National Guard unit. Many of the 14,000 Hoosiers
9 who serve in the Guard also have spent time on Active Duty.
10 In your report, you write of how disheartening it was to
11 hear the discord within the Army ranks, pitting the Army
12 National Guard against the regular Army. I heard that same
13 disheartened sentiment among our Hoosier Guard members.
14 From the top down, their focus has been on serving our
15 country, our State, and our local communities. I appreciate
16 your call for leaders in the DOD and in Congress to do our
17 part to keep these conversations professional and respectful
18 while keeping in mind that there can be different viewpoints
19 on how to best accomplish these objectives. And, as all of
20 you know so well, one of our hopes in convening the
21 Commission was to get objective input as to how to resolve
22 this difference and others.

23 So, General Ham, how do you believe the findings of the
24 Commission will help support the reset in that relationship
25 between the regular Army and the Guard?

1 General Ham: Senator, I believe many of the
2 recommendations that we make with regard to the total force,
3 whether it be a legislative change that would allow for the
4 assignment of regular Army soldiers into Army National Guard
5 units, multi-component units that bring soldiers from all
6 three components together in common mission, in my view,
7 also increased readiness within the Reserve components on
8 the cyclical basis, called the Sustained Readiness Model,
9 that the Army has developed, and in the operational
10 employment of the Reserve components along with the regular
11 Army. I think all of those tend to build this sense of one
12 Army. The same would be true for leader development courses
13 for noncommissioned officers and officers.

14 General Milley, the Chief of Staff, who you all know
15 very well, begins many of his addresses to soldiers of all
16 components, he said, "Look at your uniform. Over your
17 breast pocket, it says U.S. Army. It doesn't say regular
18 Army, doesn't say Army National Guard, doesn't say Army
19 Reserve. It says U.S. Army." And so, that common start
20 point is -- I think is a place to begin.

21 Senator Donnelly: And just to follow up on that, in
22 the recommendations, what do you see as the most vital in
23 helping to create that one Army and to resolve that tension?

24 General Ham: Senator, I'll offer two that I think are
25 vitally important, and others may have some other views.

1 The first and foremost, I think, is the overarching
2 recommendation to sustain the All-Volunteer Force. I think,
3 if we don't do that, the rest of it might not matter. And
4 secondly, I think is this element of adequate funding,
5 reliably and predictably developed and delivered to the Army
6 in all of its components, I think will go a long way to
7 removing some of the doubt and uncertainty that exists.

8 Senator Donnelly: Well, I'd like to ask the panel a
9 different question, which is -- we have 63 different
10 recommendations for the future of the Army, and we're in a
11 resource-constrained environment. So, of those 63, what
12 would each of you prioritize as your most important
13 recommendation, going forward.

14 Mr. Lamont?

15 Mr. Lamont: Manning and resourcing the total force.
16 We're very concerned, as we've mentioned, about keeping our
17 levels of manning such that we can respond to acceptable
18 levels of risk. It's not just enough to have a larger Army.
19 You'd better have them trained, equipped, and ready, or you
20 don't gain a whole lot. So, it's going to be a resourcing
21 -- frankly, a resourcing picture for that manning and
22 readiness level, as you mentioned.

23 Senator Donnelly: Thank you.

24 General Ham?

25 General Ham: Senator, I think I would fall back to

1 recommendation 6, the Congress and the administration should
2 return to predictable and responsible budgeting processes
3 that meet minimum funding requirements.

4 Senator Donnelly: General Thurman?

5 General Thurman: Thanks, Senator.

6 I would agree with General Ham on that. However, I
7 would add that I believe readiness in maintaining the All-
8 Volunteer Force is fundamental to this country. And why do
9 I say that? I'm very worried about the declining population
10 that is actually eligible in this country to serve in the
11 United States military. It is -- less than one-third is
12 what can meet standards, in terms of the medical fitness,
13 the aptitude, and -- and that's declining. And I think
14 that's something that we've really got to pay attention to
15 as we go down the road.

16 Senator Donnelly: Thank you.

17 Sergeant Major?

18 Mr. Chandler: Senator, I think -- it's hard for me to
19 prioritize, because each one of these are interwoven in some
20 aspect of preserving and sustaining the All-Volunteer Force
21 in a total-force policy. So, if you're going to pin me
22 down, budgetary stability, budgetary predictability is
23 important.

24 But, I want to give you one area that I think is a
25 resounding theme throughout this. And this is the Army

1 culture, the culture that all three components are
2 interwoven, that rely on one another, that we have to do
3 some work in order to break that culture down. And that are
4 -- where many of the recommendations come from, especially
5 in multi-component units and leader development training. I
6 mean, if people don't want to get along, one of the best
7 ways you can solve that is, make them stay in the same room
8 until they work it out. I'm sure you probably have had some
9 experience with that here.

10 Senator Donnelly: Indeed, I have.

11 Mr. Chandler: But, I had the opportunity to serve with
12 the Army National Guard unit in Mississippi for 3 years as a
13 regular Army soldier, and that was probably the most
14 important assignment for me in my military career
15 culminating as the Sergeant Major of the Army, because I was
16 forced to be in an environment, post-Desert Shield/Desert
17 Storm, right after the brigade that I was assigned to had
18 been declared unfit for deployment, to be a regular Army
19 unit stationed in the same armory with the same persons.
20 And I was forced to change my view of what the Army National
21 Guard does for the Nation. And I've never forgotten it.
22 And I still stay in contact with some of those individuals
23 that were in that brigade.

24 And that's the type of thing that, when we talk about
25 the total-force policy and the questions that you asked us,

1 that we really have to get after. It's not just a policy,
2 but that the policy is executed at the grassroots lever.
3 And the questions that you had about, you know, some -- what
4 I think -- very unprofessional and uncalled for comments in
5 open media and so forth -- will get resolved over time, but
6 it's not going to get changed in one administration. It's
7 going to take, you know, a commitment to a long-term vision
8 to make this work for what's best for the Army and the
9 Nation.

10 Senator Donnelly: Thank you so much.

11 Mr. Chairman, thank you.

12 Chairman McCain: Senator Lee.

13 Senator Lee: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

14 Thanks, to all of you, for your testimonies today and
15 for devoting a year to this Commission and to the future of
16 the Army.

17 One of the key issues that Congress asked your
18 Commission to report on was the Aviation Restructuring
19 Initiative, or ARI, and the future of combat aviation in the
20 Army. In recommendation number 57, the Commission
21 recommended retaining four Apache battalions in the National
22 Guard, each with 18 aircraft, and committing to using the
23 National Guard Apache battalions regularly. The report
24 states that this would provide more wartime capacity than
25 ARI, and would be more cost-effective. So, can you please

1 discuss for us and explain to the committee, if you would,
2 why you determined that the -- that surge capacity and
3 strategic depth were important factors in your
4 recommendation -- in developing and making your
5 recommendation, and what problems would the Army face if it
6 lost strategic depth, you know, provided by the National
7 Guard, of Apache battalions.

8 General Thurman: Senator, thank you.

9 First off, we looked at four areas, after extensive
10 analysis. We visited over 31 aviation units across all
11 three components. And the first thing we looked at was
12 wartime capacity, the ability to respond and meet the war
13 plan requirements, and then wartime surge capacity, and then
14 to ease the burden on peacetime deployments, and then we
15 factored in the cost, because we didn't want to come forward
16 with a recommendation without some cost offsets. So, you
17 mentioned strategic depth. There is no strategic depth if
18 you move all of the AH-64 aircraft inside the regular Army.
19 I would refer you to the classified annex. It has a lot of
20 our work -- analytical work in there that talks about the
21 requirements for AH-64 attack aircraft, which, in a lot of
22 cases, was very short as we looked at that.

23 One -- to get to your point -- it takes time to train
24 an Apache aviator. That's a very complex system. I am a
25 rated AH-64 Alpha pilot, not a Echo or a Delta model. That

1 is a very sophisticated aircraft. Not only do you have to
2 master that skill of flying the platform, but, one, can you
3 integrate it with combined arms maneuver? And so, we felt
4 there needed to be depth in the force with -- and what the
5 recommendation calls for, it would give you about 280 pilots
6 inside the National Guard -- Army National Guard.

7 Now, the other point was, these formations need to be
8 put on a rotational cycle, inside the force generation and
9 actually utilized so it could offset the stress that's on
10 the current peacetime deployments. That's what we tried to
11 do. And we offered up some cost, modest cost, in terms of
12 reduction of Black Hawk, to offset what it would cost to put
13 four battalions inside the Army National Guard. And that is
14 in the report. And again, a onetime cost for the Delta-
15 model-to-Echo conversion, which would be required, is
16 roughly a \$420 million, and then another 165 million, in
17 terms of operating and sustainment cost, is what we did.

18 Senator Lee: Right. Right. No, I'm pleased to hear
19 the careful manner in which you've gone about it. I would
20 -- my staff and I have visited with members of the Utah
21 National Guard's 1st Battalion, 211th Aviation Regiment, and
22 there's definitely a degree and quality of Apache experience
23 in those Guard units that I don't think can be replaced or
24 replicated or matched anywhere else.

25 Last fall, Chief Warrant Officer Kent Jones, one our

1 National Guard instructors, reached the milestone of 10,000
2 flying hours in the Apache, which is a record. The past 2
3 years, I've been greatly concerned about using this type of
4 experience. So, how and to what extent did the Commission
5 view these issues of pilot and crew experience as you
6 factored in -- those into this analysis?

7 General Thurman: Senator, we looked at that as a -- an
8 investment, in terms of personnel. And absolutely you would
9 want to retain some of that experience, because if you got
10 into a major conflict, that's going to be required. And if
11 you go back to the Iraq War, we called a lot of our aviators
12 to Active Duty that were retired, because we needed that
13 experience back. And again, you don't build that overnight,
14 and it takes time to do that.

15 Senator Lee: Great. Thank you very much.

16 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

17 Mr. Lamont: You might want to know that, in fact, one
18 of the key members of our staff, on the aviation side, came
19 from the Utah National Guard as an aviator instructor pilot.

20 Senator Lee: Sounds like you know how to pick them.

21 That's great.

22 Thank you.

23 Chairman McCain: Senator Shaheen.

24 Senator Shaheen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

25 And thank you --

1 General Ham: Senator, may I -- Mr. Chairman, if I may,
2 just for a moment, correct the record. General Thurman said
3 that he's a rated pilot. I would, for the record, note
4 General Thurman "was" a rated pilot. I love him dearly, but
5 I would not get in an aircraft with him today.

6 [Laughter.]

7 Chairman McCain: So, the airways are safe.

8 [Laughter.]

9 Chairman McCain: Senator Shaheen.

10 Senator Shaheen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

11 And thank you all very much for your past service and
12 for your willingness to be part of this Commission and work
13 on this report.

14 A recent RAND report found that current NATO force
15 structure in Europe, and I quote, "cannot successfully
16 defend the territory of its most exposed members. And, in
17 the worst-case scenarios for NATO, Russia would be able to
18 conquer the capital of Estonia in 36 hours." The Commission
19 recommends that the Army should forward-deploy an Armored
20 Brigade Combat Team in Europe and convert the U.S. Army-
21 Europe Administrative Aviation Headquarters to a warfighting
22 mission. So, I wonder if you could elaborate. I don't
23 know, General Ham, if you would like to do that or if
24 there's someone else on the panel who would like to
25 elaborate on these recommendations and our need to bolster

1 U.S. forces in Europe to deter Russian aggression.

2 General Ham: Thanks, Senator.

3 Let me begin, and I suspect a couple of others may want
4 to weigh in.

5 With regard to the Armored Brigade Combat Team, there
6 are two issues at play here. The regular Army has nine
7 Armored Brigade Combat Teams. They're presently all
8 consumed in rotational assignments. There's an Armored
9 Brigade Combat Team that rotates to Korea. Under the model
10 that basically is "three to make one," there are three.
11 Same for the Mideast, and the same for Europe. So, there's
12 no excess capacity in the regular Army to meet an unforeseen
13 contingency with Armored Brigade Combat Teams. So, we felt
14 there was needed capacity.

15 One way to get additional capacity would be to forward-
16 station an Armored Brigade Combat Team in Europe, thereby
17 freeing up two other regular Army Armored Brigade Combat
18 Teams for unforeseen contingencies, but it also has the
19 significant effect -- we believe, has a significant effect
20 on both deterrence against Russian aggression and assurance
21 of the NATO allies. They are sorely lacking in armored
22 brigade -- or armored capability, and we think a U.S.
23 brigade would be helpful.

24 Senator Shaheen: And so, does the National Guard have
25 any role to play as we're looking at how we can cycle forces

1 in and out?

2 General Ham: Yes, ma'am, absolutely they do. The --
3 in our discussions with the Chief of Staff-Army, Chief
4 National Guard Bureau, they're already looking at, How can
5 you, on a predictable basis, employ those Armored Brigade
6 Combat Teams -- six, I believe, in the Army National Guard
7 -- how can you employ them on that rotational basis? So, I
8 think, in the not-too-distant future, it might not at all be
9 unusual to see an Army National Guard Armored Brigade Combat
10 Team rotate for a year to Korea or to the Mideast.

11 Senator Shaheen: Thank you.

12 I think, given the challenges we're -- that Europe is
13 facing right now, that looking at how we can provide that
14 kind of additional support is really important.

15 I want to get parochial for a bit, because the New
16 Hampshire National Guard has experienced a 32-percent
17 decline in force structure since 2007. This percentage is
18 ten times the decrease in the National Guard, as a whole,
19 during the same period. There are seven States that are
20 smaller than New Hampshire but have a larger Guard force
21 structure. So, does the Commission have any recommendations
22 for how to address the right Guard force structure in a
23 State?

24 General Ham: We do, Senator. In fact, there's a
25 chapter in the report dedicated to that. The law required

1 us to conduct an assessment of the process by which Army
2 National Guard forces are allocated amongst the States and
3 territories. We made three recommendations. They are
4 largely administrative. We found, in general, that the
5 process that is used to determine the stationing of Army
6 National Guard forces is largely sound, and there is an
7 opportunity for all of the stakeholders, both Federal and
8 State, to participate in the process. The one
9 recommendation that we think was -- that -- or one part that
10 was a shortcoming was that, with the establishment of the
11 Chief of the National Guard Bureau as a four-star officer
12 and a full member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that role
13 had not been codified in that process, and particularly with
14 relation to the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of
15 Army, who have significant responsibilities.

16 But, we thought that the process was pretty sound for
17 all -- again, for all stakeholders to weigh in when
18 decisions were being made with regard to the allocation of
19 Army National Guard forces.

20 Senator Shaheen: So, I guess I'm not quite clear. How
21 would that affect what's happening in New Hampshire, where
22 you've had that decline? How would that helpful -- be
23 helpful in reversing that?

24 General Ham: So -- well, I'm not sure that -- I'm not
25 sure that -- reversing might not be in the cards, but when

1 there are -- when there are force-structure changes that are
2 recommended. So, for example, as we see the Army National
3 Guard go down from a -- I think, from 353,000, eventually
4 stepping down, perhaps, to the 335,000, with the changes in
5 aviation, there is a process by which all of the
6 stakeholders -- the adjutants general, the Governors, the
7 State legislators, the Army staff, the National Guard
8 Bureau, indeed the -- you know, there is a role for the
9 Congress, here, in terms of funding -- for all of those
10 voices to be heard in that allocation process. There are a
11 number of factors that are considered: ability to recruit
12 and retain, access to training areas, the demographics of
13 the particular State or territory that's being addressed.
14 And again, we -- while we didn't look at individual cases,
15 we looked at the process, and it was our assessment that the
16 process was largely found -- and I think the -- with the
17 Chief of the National Guard Bureau, the Chief of Staff-Army,
18 Secretary of the Army, and to include leadership at the
19 Joint Staff and OSD, I think there is a willingness to have
20 those discussions, but albeit at some point there are some
21 very, very difficult decisions that have to be made with
22 regard to allocation of forces to the States and
23 territories.

24 Senator Shaheen: Thank you very much.

25 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1 Chairman McCain: Senator Blumenthal.

2 Senator Blumenthal: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

3 I want to come back to helicopters, specifically Black
4 Hawks and the recommendations that have been made. The
5 Army's proposed Aviation Restructuring Initiative would move
6 all Apaches from the Army National Guard to the regular
7 Army, leaving the regular Army with 20 battalions. The
8 National Guard Bureau's alternative proposal asks for 24
9 battalions, six with the National Guard, and 18 with the
10 regular Army. Your report seems to find a middle ground,
11 recommending that the Army maintain 24 AH-64 Apache
12 battalions, 20 battalions in the regular Army and four in
13 the National Guard. My feeling is, we need a strong Army
14 National Guard, which does not equate for it to have
15 Apaches, helicopters that are designed solely for combat.
16 The Army National Guard should have combat components, and
17 Black Hawks have, again and again over our history, proved
18 to be, in combat situations, a critical asset and should be
19 -- should continue to be used by the National Guard, for all
20 the reasons that you have set forth in your report, not the
21 least of which is that an Army that trains together will
22 fight together more effectively.

23 So, let me ask you, General Lamont, do you agree that
24 Black Hawks are a vital component of the Army National
25 Guard?

1 Mr. Lamont: Absolutely. And not only for their
2 ability to -- as a lift force in a combat asset, but in your
3 domestic responses. Particularly, as you know, the Guard
4 makes very great use of Black Hawks throughout all the
5 domestic response issues, be it floods, be it tornados, be
6 it whatever is the situation. So, they're very, very
7 important to the Guard.

8 Senator Blumenthal: As a Senator from a State that has
9 seen those Black Hawks used in those domestic situations,
10 and a State that has experienced hurricanes, floods,
11 tornados, I strongly agree with you.

12 Let me ask, General Thurman. Do you see a specific
13 need for the Army National Guard to have Apaches, rather
14 than keeping them in the Active component under the total-
15 force strategy?

16 General Thurman: Yes, sir, Senator, for the purpose of
17 having strategic depth for the Nation to meet emerging
18 requirements and the -- what we found was that we don't have
19 that once you eliminate them out of the Army National Guard.
20 And our analysis, inside the classified annex, will lead you
21 to that conclusion, I believe.

22 Senator Blumenthal: Thank you.

23 General Thurman, you mentioned one of the elephants in
24 the room, in my view, just a few moments ago, the rejection
25 rate of Army volunteers for reasons relating to physical

1 fitness and perhaps other reasons. That number that I've
2 seen is two-thirds to three-quarters are rejected because
3 they can't pass the physical test. And I wonder how
4 important you feel that issue is for our Army and our Marine
5 Corps and other services that have to rely on a ready
6 recruit force in an all-Volunteer Army.

7 General Thurman: Senator, I feel very strong about
8 that. And I think fundamental to this country is
9 maintaining the All-Volunteer Force. That is something that
10 is easily broken, in my view. And having available manpower
11 to -- that you can recruit from, I think, is very important,
12 and it's something that we ought to take notice of in the
13 country as we see this population decline.

14 Senator Blumenthal: It really is an issue of national
15 security. If we can't field the force, we can't send them
16 into combat, and we can't protect our Nation. And I would
17 suggest, since my time is about to expire, that there be a
18 very intense and aggressive focus on this issue of the
19 readiness of our young men and women seeking to come into
20 our Volunteer Force, and what can be done in our schools,
21 our communities, and elsewhere to send that message.

22 Thank you very much for your service and your excellent
23 work on this report.

24 Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

25 Chairman McCain: Senator Hirono.

1 Senator Hirono: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

2 And thank you for your service, all of you, and for
3 your work on this Commission.

4 I'd like to follow up on concern regarding recruiting
5 people into our military branches. So, General Thurman, you
6 mentioned once again how important it is. And this is not
7 the first time that this committee has heard those concerns.
8 Do any of you have any specific suggestions on what we can
9 do to change these outcomes, where so few people qualify to
10 even join our military? I mean, for example, should we be
11 looking to expand Junior ROTC or ROTC? I'm looking for
12 specific suggestions that you may have.

13 General Ham: Senator, I'll start, and perhaps
14 Secretary Lamont, who lived in this world for a long time,
15 may have some thoughts.

16 My thought was the same that you just expressed. And
17 that is a continued emphasis, or perhaps renewed emphasis,
18 on the Junior ROTC program. While that doesn't necessarily
19 lead directly to enlistments or to service, I think it does,
20 in terms of building character, physical fitness, and
21 leadership amongst America's youth, I think is a very wise
22 investment.

23 Mr. Lamont: Specifically about JROTC, they are very,
24 very important, although I will caution you that I think we
25 are legislatively prohibited from actually recruiting from

1 that base. The mayors of the cities in which those schools
2 exist love them. I have had the opportunity to visit JROTC
3 units in Chicago, under Mayor Daley. He said, "Give me
4 more. Give me more." So, we went to Philadelphia, we went
5 to New Orleans. And what they do to get these kids away
6 from the gangs, away from inappropriate family situations --
7 we have found that their graduate rates, their grade rates,
8 their ability to go into higher education -- far greater --

9 Senator Hirono: Yes.

10 Mr. Lamont: -- than in our other schools. And we'd
11 love to have the ability to recruit from those people, but
12 we're -- we really can't do that. But, it -- they're
13 vitally important to us, let's put it that way.

14 Senator Hirono: So, you would find that, generally,
15 when young people are exposed to these programs, then they
16 have an understanding -- better understanding of the
17 military and what it means, and that one would hope that
18 there is a higher of enlistment as a result.

19 So, if the other two gentlemen would like to add, but
20 if you pretty much agree with ROTC -- but, if you have any
21 other suggestions.

22 Mr. Chandler: Well, I think, first of all, we're
23 limiting the conversation to what the military can do. And
24 this is not a military issue. This is a national issue,
25 which is going to take a great deal of courage and

1 commitment and a long-term vision to solve. By the time a
2 person is in the JROTC program, fundamentally they're
3 cooked. Okay? Their diet, their nutrition, the way that
4 they exercise -- although it can be adapted, their
5 lifestyle, the way that they are brought up by their family,
6 is going to determine whether or not they are going to be
7 able to meet standards.

8 So, you really have quite -- the military has, really,
9 two options. They can either extend -- reduce the standard
10 and bring a person in, accepting more risk and spending more
11 time in the training base to get them to an acceptable
12 level, or you're going to have to increase recruitment
13 efforts -- and that's primarily other options and dollars --
14 to get people who are qualified at the current standard to
15 come in. I mean, all of the services compete against one
16 another. They also compete against colleges, universities,
17 and businesses that are looking for the same type of person.
18 And so, the challenge will be, Where is it, once they come
19 into the military service, and specifically the Army -- what
20 are we willing to accept that risk? But, you have to get
21 ahead of the bang, so to speak. And that --

22 Senator Hirono: Thank you.

23 Mr. Chandler: -- starts at the pre-K --

24 Senator Hirono: I --

25 Mr. Chandler: -- you know, and the --

1 Senator Hirono: -- completely agree.

2 Mr. Chandler: -- elementary school level of how you
3 help adapt lifestyle choices.

4 Senator Hirono: Thank you for recognizing that it's a
5 continuity. And this is one of the reasons that there are
6 generals who have come forward to express how important it
7 is for us to support quality early education as laying a
8 foundation, the very kind of foundation you're talking
9 about.

10 Mr. Lamont, I understand that you had the opportunity
11 to meet with Governor Ige and General Brooks and General
12 Logan, our TAG. And so, you know that we have a huge
13 military presence in Hawaii, of course. The rebalance to
14 the Asia Pacific is a commitment that I have paid particular
15 attention to, representing Hawaii as I do. And it includes
16 many seapower-related actions, but there is also a strong
17 Army presence. So, would an Army of 980,000 be able to
18 support our rebalance to the Pacific, especially recognizing
19 the provocative behavior of China and North Korea and other
20 global requirements?

21 Mr. Lamont: As General Ham mentioned, that was --
22 wasn't within our task, but if you want a personal opinion,
23 I'll be happy to address it.

24 Senator Hirono: Yes.

25 Mr. Lamont: By the way, my visit to Hawaii was --

1 although quite short, it was very well informed, having
2 dealt with all three components there, and it also helped us
3 inform on how we push forward multi-component units, because
4 the Reserves and the Army National Guard and PACOM --
5 Pacific Command --

6 Senator Hirono: Yeah, all the --

7 Mr. Lamont: -- work so well --

8 Senator Hirono: Yes.

9 Mr. Lamont: -- together. Now, maybe that's --

10 Senator Hirono: I think --

11 Mr. Lamont: -- brought together --

12 Senator Hirono: -- that's the perfect model.

13 Mr. Lamont: -- by geographic requirements, but they
14 truly are a model in how they work together.

15 To get to your question, if I can't avoid it --
16 answering that --

17 Senator Hirono: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

18 Mr. Lamont: -- the situation, we're quite concerned
19 with that level of force, quite frankly, to meet the
20 challenge that we have in the Pacific.

21 Senator Hirono: Thank you.

22 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is --

23 Chairman McCain: Senator Kaine.

24 Senator Kaine: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

25 And thanks, to all of you, for your service on the

1 Commission and your testimony today.

2 I want to follow up in a way related to the question of
3 Senator Hirono and other colleagues about, kind of, the
4 young people's ability to meet standards, but sort of coming
5 at it from a different direction, which is -- Sergeant
6 Major, your -- you talked about the recruitment challenge.
7 You know, as we're dealing with this workforce of tomorrow,
8 the Millennials and those younger, they're a very different
9 breed. I learn that all the time with my own kids, in terms
10 of what they want to do. And you're right that, you know,
11 the best and the brightest at that period of life -- say,
12 high school -- colleges are competing for them, and the
13 private sector wants to get these folks. We had a military
14 commission -- Military Compensation Review Commission that
15 reported back to us last year, and they looked at all the
16 compensation and benefits. And a lot of that analysis was
17 about, sort of, the fiscal realities of the personnel side
18 of the military budget, but it was also looking at it in
19 terms of the recruiting and the retention side. Your all's
20 first, kind of, pillar of your recommendations is, got to
21 maintain the All-Volunteer Force, and that assumes
22 recruitment and retention. And I would just like each of
23 you, from your own experiences, talk about, you know, what
24 is your sense, right now in the Army? Do we have the right
25 recruiting and retention strategies with respect to the

1 workforce of tomorrow, the talent pool that's out there that
2 we want? And either as Commission members or from your own
3 personal experiences, what things would you recommend to us
4 that we think about to enhance the recruitment and retention
5 ability into the Army?

6 General Ham: So, thanks, Senator. I'll start and then
7 -- and turn to the others.

8 I think two elements I would highlight. In our
9 engagements across the force, there's a lot of uncertainty.
10 And so, in the retention aspect, whether you're regular
11 Army, Army National Guard, or Army Reserve, is my -- they
12 watch their numbers, they see what's happening -- is my unit
13 going to still be here in a year or two? Am I still going
14 to be relevant? That uncertainty, I think, has certainly an
15 effect on retention.

16 From the recruiting and bleeding-into-retention aspect,
17 we heard loudly and clearly from soldiers of all components.
18 They would like the ability to move between components more
19 seamlessly and more easily, depending how their life
20 situation changes. So, you're 18, the regular Army might
21 make all the sense in the world. You get married, want to
22 go to college, the Army National Guard might make all the
23 sense in the world to do that. And then perhaps you find
24 attracted to civil affairs, and so the Army Reserve might be
25 a good place for you. Right now, the policies are

1 constraining with that kind of movement.

2 Senator Kaine: Tom?

3 Mr. Lamont: A couple of things, sir.

4 Our recruiting cohort's primarily 18 to 25 years of
5 age. And, as you've heard today, we're roughly at the
6 ability to look at about 25 percent of the eligible
7 population within that cohort. And that's -- it's narrowing
8 down, particularly as our economy may continue to grow and
9 they may have other opportunities outside of the military.
10 Our -- what we call the DEP, that's Delayed Entry Program --
11 2 years ago, we were roughly at 32,000 waiting to come in
12 when the opportunity and the spaces became available. We're
13 roughly around 10,000 now, which is considered very much a
14 floor of where we need to be to be able to reach out.

15 And we've also mentioned today so much about the
16 physical concerns of some of that cohort, but the behavioral
17 aspect, as well. And, as we look at States, for instance,
18 in the drug programs, where marijuana, for instance, is
19 becoming quite common, the -- available in other States --
20 well, we still have prohibitions against folks coming in, in
21 that regard. So, we're narrowing, in many respects, the
22 eligible cohort that we have to recruit from.

23 We have 11,000 recruiters throughout the Army. Our
24 marketing budget's 280 million a year. So, we're also
25 making a recommendation that we look at how we can integrate

1 the recruiting. They're all competitive -- all three
2 components are competitive here. The Army recruits for
3 itself. The National Guard recruits for itself. The Army
4 Reserve recruits for itself. How can we -- that competition
5 for that same eligible person is there, but we've got to
6 bring them together so we can all recruit. And I -- it's
7 not going to be easy, and there is cultural issues, and the
8 universal recruiter isn't -- this isn't a new concept. But,
9 we have to make an effort and try.

10 Senator Kaine: Thank you, Secretary.

11 Other comments? If I may, Mr. Chair, just -- if I
12 could hear from the other two witnesses if they have
13 additional comments?

14 Mr. Chandler: Yeah, Senator. So, I agree with General
15 Ham and Secretary Lamont's statements. I think that the
16 Military Compensation and Reform Commission that made some
17 recommendations -- I was a signator of that while I was on
18 Active Duty as part of the Department of Defense's
19 recommendation. I think it's a very forward-looking
20 approach. A lot of the folks that have questions are those
21 that are currently in the current retirement system and are
22 not going to be affected by these changes. And I think it
23 does look at a more future approach to what Millennials and
24 others are interested in.

25 I would also applaud the Army's efforts with trying to

1 think about how we can maybe change some policies that
2 prevent us from reaching our -- the higher objective. And
3 I'll use Cyber Command as a -- Army Cyber as an example.
4 You know, a big struggle with, How do you get this very
5 specialized and unique individual -- and "unique" can mean
6 many different things -- how do you get them to want to be a
7 part of the Army, which, in general terms -- and I am
8 generalizing -- is a little bit different from their
9 experiences either in college or in -- working for some
10 corporation -- and to look at things? Like, maybe the
11 tattoo policy needs to be loosened more for them, or that we
12 provide an opportunity to move in and out of, not only the
13 Army, but back into the -- you know, the Microsofts and the
14 Dells of the world, and bring them back. So, I think those
15 are things that we should be patient with, we should allow
16 some experimentation with, and that we should try and focus
17 on the strategic objective. How do we find the best people
18 that want to come in and serve the Nation, serve their
19 State, and be productive members of the military? And I
20 think we're on a path. We've just got to be patient with
21 it.

22 Senator Kaine: General?

23 General Thurman: Senator, I would add two things here
24 to what's already been said, but I think there has to be a
25 renewed emphasis on service to Nation in this country. And

1 that starts in the family and in the schoolhouse. And we
2 really need to get back to some of the basic values of what
3 our principles are in the country. That's my personal
4 opinion after watching my whole family serve throughout
5 World War I, II, and so forth, into Vietnam.

6 The second thing that we looked at was having -- was
7 implementing the one Personnel and Pay System for the Army.
8 Right now, you have separate personnel databases between the
9 Army National Guard and the regular Army. You've got to see
10 your people enterprise. And right now, you can't. And
11 there's a program called the Integrated Pay and Personnel
12 System that is out there being developed, and I'd highly
13 recommend that that funding continue for that, because I
14 think that will help what General Ham talked about, of how
15 you can transition between components so you don't lose the
16 talent. That would be one of my recommendations, sir.

17 Senator Kaine: Thank you so much, to the witnesses.

18 Thank you, Mr. Chair.

19 Chairman McCain: Senator Cotton.

20 Senator Cotton: Thank you, gentlemen, for your
21 important work on this matter. I apologize that I have been
22 detained at the Banking Committee, where we had Federal
23 Reserve Chair Yellen in her semiannual testimony.

24 But, I have reviewed the report carefully. And I
25 wanted just to get on the record a discussion about one

1 particularly interesting idea, recommendation 22 from
2 Appendix B on page 112, which I'll just read in full rather
3 than asking you all to turn to it.

4 "The Congress should require the Secretary of Defense
5 and Joint Staff to oversee the modeling of alternative Army
6 design and operational concepts, including: (1) the
7 Reconnaissance Strike Group, (2) Hybrid Battalion Task
8 Force, (3) Striker Global Response Force, and (4) the
9 Reconnaissance and Security Brigade Combat Team -- and
10 report on their findings within 1 year. The report to
11 Congress should explicitly address the value of follow-on
12 pilot programs to test further any promising any alternate
13 force design-and-concept approaches."

14 This seems to me like a far-reaching, maybe even
15 radical, proposal, and I would like to hear more on the
16 record about it and what might be necessary to undertake
17 that kind of transformation. Maybe if we could start with
18 General Ham and then go to General Thurman for your
19 comments.

20 General Ham: Good. Thanks, Senator.

21 You asked us in the law to be comprehensive in our
22 work, and so we did. We reached out to a lot of different
23 agencies, to include some who have thought seriously about
24 the size, structure, and capabilities that ought be resident
25 in the Army. Some of those viewpoints have been

1 controversial within the Army and from those outside. But,
2 we felt, nonetheless, it was important to hear from them.
3 So, we did hear from a number of those who have offered
4 these kinds of recommendations.

5 And I guess I would say that, Senator, we didn't find
6 any of those notions were sufficiently mature for us to make
7 a recommendation to say we think the Army ought to adopt
8 this model or that model, but we found elements of the four
9 particular proposals that were mentioned, but several
10 others, that we think certainly merit further evaluation by
11 the Army, and indeed by the Joint Force, because recognizing
12 that the Army is always a part of a Joint Force. And some
13 of these implications would have -- or some of these
14 recommendations would have implications for the other
15 services, so it's important to view this in a joint
16 perspective.

17 So, that's -- that was the genesis of that
18 recommendation. We think there's merit in looking at these
19 things. There are systems within Army Training and Doctrine
20 Command and other agencies, and we think they should take a
21 serious evaluation of these proposals.

22 Senator Cotton: And General Thurman.

23 General Thurman: Yes, sir, Senator.

24 What I would say, in addition to that, I think it's
25 important to look at these concepts and see what benefits

1 that you can gain, in terms of overall capabilities, given
2 the threats that we have today. There are emerging threats,
3 as you're well aware of, out there that we may have a
4 different look at how we may want to provide the capability
5 to the Joint Force Commander or the Global Combatant
6 Commander. So, I think these all warrant serious review and
7 a look what can be used to -- maybe to advance capabilities
8 inside the Army for the future, really, is what you're
9 looking at.

10 Senator Cotton: Thank you.

11 And, Mr. Lamont, Sergeant Major, anything to add to
12 General Ham and General Thurman's comments?

13 Mr. Chandler: I'd just concur with what they said. I
14 mean, you know, you -- the Army that I've been a part of is
15 an evolving and learning organization; and another set of
16 eyes on how to get after the challenges, I think, is
17 important, and I highly recommend that they move forward.

18 Senator Cotton: Yes. Well, sometimes evolutions can
19 be slow, and lessons learned can be hard. But, I do think
20 it's a very intriguing idea that we should take seriously as
21 a committee and explore, going forward in the future.

22 So, again, thank you all for your service to the
23 country, not just now, but in many iterations previously.

24 Chairman McCain: I'd like to thank the panel again for
25 their great work. I think it's given us some very valuable

1 input. And I know that Senator Reed and I will look
2 seriously at some of your proposals and discuss them with
3 the other members of the committee, who obviously, as you
4 can see by the participation, are very interested. And we
5 appreciate your significant contribution.

6 Senator Reed?

7 Senator Reed: I'd just thank the commissioners, your
8 colleagues that are not here, all of you, for --
9 extraordinarily well done.

10 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

11 Chairman McCain: Thank you.

12 This hearing is adjourned.

13 [Whereupon, at 11:56 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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