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Before the

COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

Hearing to Receive Testimony on Supporting the Warfighter of
Today and Tomorrow

Thursday, December 3, 2015

Washington, D.C.

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1 HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON SUPPORTING THE WARFIGHTER OF
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U.S. Senate

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Committee on Armed Services

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Washington, D.C.

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10 The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in
11 Room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John
12 McCain, chairman of the committee, presiding.

13 Committee Members Present: Senators McCain
14 [presiding], Ayotte, Fischer, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Reed,
15 McCaskill, Manchin, Gillibrand, Donnelly, Hirono, and King.

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1 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN, U.S. SENATOR
2 FROM ARIZONA

3 Chairman McCain: The Senate Armed Services Committee
4 meets to continue our series of hearings on defense reform.
5 In our three previous hearings, we have reviewed the effects
6 of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms on our defense acquisition,
7 management, and personnel systems. In today's hearings and
8 the two that will follow it, we will consider what most view
9 as the essence of Goldwater-Nichols: the roles and
10 responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman
11 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service secretaries and
12 service chiefs, and the combatant commanders. This morning
13 we seek to understand whether these civilian and military
14 leadership organizations can function better to support the
15 warfighters of today and tomorrow.

16 We are fortunate to welcome a distinguished panel of
17 witnesses who have grappled with these challenging issues
18 over their many years of service to our Nation: the
19 Honorable Michael B. Donley, former Secretary of the Air
20 Force; Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn, former Director
21 of the Defense Intelligence Agency; and General James Jones,
22 former National Security Advisor; Supreme Allied Commander
23 and Commander of U.S. European Command; and Commandant of
24 the Marine Corps. We welcome you this morning.

25 30 years ago, Congress passed Goldwater-Nichols in

1 response to serious concerns about the effectiveness of our
2 military. The failure of the Iranian hostage rescue mission
3 in 1980 and poor coordination between the services during
4 the invasion of Grenada in 1983 were clear signs that
5 something was wrong. Congress and others concluded that
6 these failures were driven by a number of factors, including
7 the absence of unity of command and an inability to operate
8 jointly.

9 Goldwater-Nichols sought to address these problems by
10 making the unified commanders explicitly responsible to the
11 President and the Secretary of Defense for the performance
12 of missions and preparedness of their commands. Combatant
13 commanders were given the ability to issue authoritative
14 direction on all aspects of operations, joint training,
15 logistics, internal chains of command, and personnel within
16 their assigned areas of responsibility. Goldwater-Nichols
17 also removed the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the operational
18 chain of command and prevented the services from moving
19 forces in and out of regional commands without approval.

20 Just 5 years after the passage of Goldwater-Nichols,
21 America's rapid and stunning victory in the 1991 Gulf War
22 seemed to suggest that these reforms had worked. However,
23 more recent experience on the battlefield has led to renewed
24 concern about the respective roles and responsibilities of
25 the service chiefs and the combatant commanders as conceived

1 in Goldwater-Nichols.

2 A decade and a half of war in Afghanistan and Iraq
3 suggests that the Department of Defense is not optimally
4 organized for protracted conflicts. As Secretary Gates
5 recently testified to this committee, his experience as a
6 wartime secretary led him to conclude that the Department of
7 Defense is, quote, designed to plan for war but not to wage
8 war, at least for the long term. Indeed, whatever one
9 thinks about the circumstances by which we all went to war
10 in Iraq 12 years ago, it should be deeply concerning to all
11 of us that our Nation was losing that war for 3 years, and
12 the strategy that ultimately turned things around did not
13 emerge from the system, but rather from a small group of
14 internal insurgents and outside experts working around the
15 system. That is a compelling indictment of our defense
16 organization.

17 For some, including Secretary Gates, Goldwater-Nichols
18 succeeded all too well by turning the services into force
19 providers that are perhaps too walled off from operational
20 responsibilities. With a confined focus on the train and
21 equip mission, the services have overwhelmingly concentrated
22 more on delivering long-term programs of record than
23 urgently needed capabilities in current conflicts.

24 While this problem raises serious questions, we must be
25 cautious of the other extreme. If combatant commanders were

1 fully resourced with everything they believe is necessary
2 for their theater, the Department of Defense would be
3 totally sapped of resources to invest in critical
4 technologies needed to counter future adversaries. I look
5 forward to our witnesses' views on whether the Department
6 could strike a better balance between supporting both the
7 warfighters of today and tomorrow and if so, how.

8 At the same time, we must also ensure that the
9 operational organization of our military accurately reflects
10 and responds to our present and future national security
11 challenges. Our Nation confronts the most diverse and
12 complex array of crises since the end of World War II, from
13 ISIL and Al Qaeda, to North Korea and Iran, to Russia and
14 China. What all of these threats have in common is that
15 they are not confined to a single region of the world. They
16 span multiple regions and domains of military activities.
17 And yet, our combatant commands are still predominantly
18 geographically. We must ensure that our defense
19 organization has the regional and functional flexibility and
20 agility to address cross-cutting national security missions.

21 Many of our prior witnesses have observed that
22 combatant commands no longer directly fight wars, as
23 Goldwater-Nichols originally envisioned. Instead, that is
24 done by joint task forces established on an ad hoc basis and
25 tailored to a given contingency operation. This makes the

1 dramatic growth of the headquarters staffs at the combatant
2 commands all the more difficult to justify. I would be
3 eager to hear from our witnesses whether, 30 years after
4 Goldwater-Nichols, we should consider re-imagining
5 reorganizing, or consolidating our combatant commands.

6 I thank our witnesses and look forward to their
7 testimony.

8 Senator Reed?

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1 STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED, U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE
2 ISLAND

3 Senator Reed: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
4 And let me join you in thanking the witnesses for not only
5 being here today but for their extraordinary service to the
6 Nation.

7 We have been holding a series of hearings that looks at
8 the organization and processes of the Department of Defense,
9 and the whole focus is to provide the best possible support
10 for our warfighters. And you gentlemen know more about that
11 than practically anybody else. So thank you for joining us
12 today.

13 A constant theme that has emerged in testimony from
14 previous hearings is that the Department of Defense has a
15 20th century organization facing 21st century challenges:
16 globalization, rapid adoption of new technology and
17 particularly cyber, free flow of information. These are
18 developments that have complicated the security environment
19 by facilitating a rise of near-peer competitors and
20 irregular threats from transnational terrorist groups.
21 However, I believe these trends also provide opportunities
22 to improve U.S. military capabilities which will support the
23 warfighter if they can be effectively harnessed through
24 updated organizational structures and processes. As
25 yesterday's hearing made clear, the men and women who make

1 up the all-volunteer force remain this committee's top
2 concern. And we must ensure they have the resources they
3 need to complete their mission and return safely home.

4 Testifying on these issues earlier this fall -- and I
5 will again like the chairman quote Secretary Gates -- he
6 described the challenges he faced in delivering rapidly
7 needed capabilities to troops in the field. And he
8 indicated that "the only way I could get significant new or
9 additional equipment to commanders in the field in weeks or
10 months -- not years -- was to take control of the problem
11 myself through special task forces and ad hoc processes."
12 He pointed out the MRAP as an example of one of those
13 situations.

14 But he also pointed out that relying on this "intense
15 personal involvement" by the Secretary of Defense just does
16 not work. There is not enough time in the day. So we have
17 to, I think, together with the Department of Defense create
18 structural changes that enable this rapid deployment and
19 rapid support of our troops in the field. And that is where
20 your advice comes in very critically.

21 Goldwater-Nichols was enacted more than 30 years ago,
22 and the Department continues to face difficulties to provide
23 for the warfighter. And that again is the essence of what
24 we are all here to do, provide a process, an organizational
25 structure, and a culture that delivers the support to the

1 troops they need to protect the country.

2 And, again, let me thank you, gentlemen, not only for
3 your testimony but for your service.

4 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

5 Chairman McCain: I thank the witnesses and we will
6 begin with you, Secretary Donley.

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1 STATEMENT OF SECRETARY MICHAEL B. DONLEY, FORMER
2 SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

3 Mr. Donley: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
4 Reed, for holding this series of hearings. It has been a
5 little over 30 years since I left this committee as a
6 professional staff member and it is great to back.

7 While I was here, I did have any opportunity to work on
8 Goldwater-Nichols and then, following my service here, went
9 to the National Security Council where I also worked on
10 these issues. So they are of special interest to me.

11 And the hearings that the committee held in the mid-
12 1980s on Goldwater-Nichols were extremely formative in my
13 career in educating me and I think other staff members of
14 the committee on the operation of the Department of Defense.
15 It stuck with me all these years. It has been of great
16 benefit. And I hope that one result of this great series of
17 hearings that you have kicked off is that it will stimulate
18 a deeper understanding of how our defense organization
19 works.

20 My testimony today -- by the way, this is a great panel
21 to be part of, and I am honored to be here with General
22 Flynn and longtime friend, General Jones, who I think when I
23 was here before we referred to as Major Jones. And it was
24 Captain McCain. That goes way back, Mr. Chairman.

25 Chairman McCain: He was much more pleasant in those

1 days.

2 [Laughter.]

3 Mr. Donley: My testimony today is focused on the roles
4 and relationships between the military departments and
5 combatant commands and how and where these components
6 interact to produce warfighting capabilities. I offer six
7 recommendations for reducing resource-intensive military
8 department and combatant command headquarters and better
9 preparing joint and service headquarters for the demanding
10 21st century environment that you described, Mr. Chairman.

11 The context for my recommendations is section 346 of
12 the just-signed fiscal year 2016 National Defense
13 Authorization Act in which the committees require DOD to
14 report on planned reductions to its major headquarters
15 activities by March of next year.

16 The services interact with combatant commands in many
17 ways on many levels to support joint operations. I would
18 highlight two, command relationships and resource
19 allocation, as representative of how services and COCOMs
20 interact to support warfighters of today and tomorrow.

21 Command relationships are at the intersection of how
22 combatant commands choose to organize their subordinate
23 commands and how services internally organize and present
24 forces. In general, regional combatant commands choose to
25 organize forces in land, maritime, and air domains within

1 their assigned area, but both the regional and functional
2 combatant commands also task organize with subunified
3 commands or task forces for subregions, specific missions,
4 or functions.

5 The services, of course, have major commands and
6 subordinate commands such as numbered air forces, fleets,
7 corps, armies, which are dual-hatted as components of the
8 combatant commands. The services need to create internal
9 command arrangements that satisfy both efficiency in their
10 administrative command and organize train and equip
11 responsibilities and effectiveness in their presentation of
12 forces and in satisfying the operational command
13 requirements as defined by nine combatant commanders. This
14 intersection between the command relationships of four
15 services and nine combatant commands is critical to the
16 proper alignment of service forces under a unified command
17 and it is directly pertinent to congressional and DOD
18 interests in improving the efficiency of DOD's major
19 headquarters.

20 So my first recommendation is that DOD and Congress
21 review the service and combatant command relationships, but
22 there are four important caveats here.

23 First, we should avoid generalizations. These command
24 relationships are unique to each service and each combatant
25 command.

1 Second, we probably should not assume that complex
2 command arrangements reflect duplicative or unnecessary
3 staff. You have to look. Dual-hatting, even triple-hatting
4 where allied forces might be involved, makes good sense.

5 Also, we should not assume that opportunities for major
6 savings might result. We need to review and take stock of
7 previously harvested savings and efficiencies that have been
8 taken by the services over the past several years.

9 And I do have a predilection that Congress should not
10 legislate command relationships at this level.

11 In resource allocation, executing roughly 80 percent of
12 DOD resources, the services have to balance the size and
13 capacity of their forces across multiple combat elements
14 with the readiness of today's forces and investment in
15 future capabilities. Combatant commands express their needs
16 through multiple channels in the planning, programming,
17 budgeting, and execution system, which is DOD's primary
18 resource allocation process. These include their service
19 components, integrated priority lists, and through the
20 integrating role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
21 Staff and the Joint Staff J-8 and the Joint Requirements
22 Council. These responsibilities and organizational
23 relationships established in DOD's key management processes
24 ensure there is joint input and review in service resource
25 allocation and acquisition. They provide combatant commands

1 the necessary link and voice, but they are also intended to
2 keep combatant commands focused on their deterrence,
3 warfighting, planning, and engagement responsibilities
4 minimizing the need for combatant command headquarters to
5 have large programming staffs duplicating the work of their
6 service force providers.

7 At the same time, the combatant commands need J-8
8 functions to interact with the joint staff and the services
9 on matters related to program evaluation and resource
10 allocation. And the size and scope of combatant command
11 J-8's will vary according to the command's mission and
12 especially so for the functional commands, SOCOM, STRATCOM,
13 and TRANSCOM.

14 In reviews of major headquarters, I recommend that DOD
15 and Congress review the purpose and size of these combatant
16 command J-8 functions to ensure they are not duplicating
17 program and resource activities that are primarily the
18 responsibility of others.

19 For reasons outlined in more detail in my testimony, I
20 do not believe we need to establish more services. In
21 response to new technologies or the need for new
22 capabilities, I would observe that creating new staff
23 organizations, agencies, and command arrangements has thus
24 far proven to be more attractive and flexible over time.

25 However, I do believe the existing service headquarters

1 could be more effective and efficient, and I support the
2 consolidation of the secretariat and service staffs within
3 each military department.

4 Current arrangements have a long history and a benefit
5 of strong alignment with the existing structure of a
6 separate OSD with its under secretaries and joint staff with
7 a common military staff structure. Nonetheless, the abiding
8 presence of two staffs in the same headquarters, three in
9 the Department of the Navy, has periodically been a source
10 of both tension and confusion both internally within the
11 respective services and externally to those with whom the
12 services interact. It is duplicative in several areas and
13 generally inefficient.

14 Consolidation of military department headquarters
15 staffs has been in the "good idea but too hard" box for many
16 years and it will require a careful approach. It has a long
17 history with great potential for missteps. Congress should
18 take a deliberate approach, provide time for the services to
19 carefully prepare legislative proposals and take a close
20 look at the details before signing up to the concept. As
21 much as possible, Congress should also provide for
22 uniformity across the military department headquarters, as
23 was done in Goldwater-Nichols, while accommodating the
24 special circumstances of two services in the Department of
25 the Navy.

1 With respect to combatant commands, I have views on the
2 current unified command plan but no recommendations for
3 increasing or decreasing the number or type of commands
4 except to note that for the past 15 years it appears that
5 DOD has been self-limiting the total number of such commands
6 at about nine to ten.

7 Taking the number and type of combatant commands as
8 roughly correct, I believe the preferred way to manage them
9 is to maintain close control over their assigned forces and
10 low-density/high-demand assets and how well these commands'
11 staffs are resourced. Congress should expect DOD to
12 carefully review the size of combatant command headquarters
13 and each of their staff directorates and make choices on
14 which to staff more or less robustly according to their
15 mission and current needs.

16 Sizing decisions for staff directorates need to
17 accommodate differences in combatant command missions and
18 between the combatant commands and other components. In
19 addition to the differences in the J-8 functions that I
20 mentioned, the combatant command J-1 personnel office, for
21 example, performs a substantially smaller and more discrete
22 personnel function than you find in military departments.

23 And finally, any review of combatant command
24 headquarters should ensure that all of these commands
25 maintain sufficient resources to support their core

1 capabilities for planning and executing joint operations.

2 Joint intelligence operation centers and regional
3 centers for security studies such as the Marshall Center in
4 EUCOM and the Asia-Pacific Center in PACOM also deserve
5 close attention. These are subordinate components or direct
6 reporting units, technically not part of the combatant
7 commands' headquarters, but nonetheless resource-intensive
8 elements within the commands' scope of responsibilities.

9 I strongly support the alignment of these intelligence
10 and security study centers within their respective commands,
11 but due to their size, I recommend that they be revalidated
12 as necessary and appropriate in combatant commands.

13 More important, Mr. Chairman, than how many or what
14 type of commands DOD has is how well they work together,
15 which is a matter of increasing urgency given the current
16 security environment. Today's environment requires us to
17 take joint commands to new levels of operational competency,
18 including more coordination and collaboration with U.S.
19 Government agencies and increasing collaboration with
20 international partners and allies. And we need to move in
21 these directions if possible without increasing the total
22 number of personnel in combatant command headquarters.

23 I recommend that DOD and Congress support the evolution
24 of combatant command headquarters to accommodate these
25 increasing requirements.

1 We also need to recognize that in this environment,
2 cross-domain, cross-regional, and cross-functional
3 operations put higher demands on our ability to integrate
4 the work of multiple combatant commands, further
5 complicating the web of supported and supporting command
6 relationships. In this context, the U.S. needs to enhance
7 strategic planning for global operations in which multiple
8 regional and functional commands will be operating
9 simultaneously. And in the midst of this demanding
10 environment, we need robust gaming, joint training and
11 exercises across combatant commands that will facilitate the
12 test and evaluation of new operating concepts and validate
13 plans.

14 In the aftermath of disestablishing JFCOM, I recommend
15 that Congress ask DOD what it has in place as the mechanisms
16 and resources for joint experimentation.

17 We must also act to ensure the necessary
18 responsibilities, authorities, and resources are in place
19 for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to effectively
20 integrate the combatant commands' planning activities on a
21 dynamic and global basis.

22 I recommend that this committee and DOD work together
23 to ensure the responsibility for development of strategic
24 integrated planning across all combatant commands is
25 properly assigned with the necessary authorities and

1 resources to support this work.

2 Mr. Chairman, Congress should partner with DOD in all
3 this work and choose carefully and jointly to set priorities
4 to generate mutual confidence and enhance prospects for
5 successful implementation of any resulting reforms. Not all
6 improvements require statutory changes, and many
7 opportunities for improvement fall within DOD's existing
8 authorities.

9 There will always be a need for greater efficiency in
10 DOD, and I commend the DOD leadership and Congress for
11 keeping up this pressure. Transferring the savings from
12 headquarters efficiencies and other reforms to combat
13 capabilities is a model we should pursue, but we should also
14 keep in mind that these savings and efficiencies alone will
15 not close the business case. To meet the demands of the
16 current strategic environment and support the warfighters
17 today and tomorrow, DOD will need more resources and
18 flexibility to sustain and in some areas increase capacity
19 to rebuild readiness and to modernize the force.

20 Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to present
21 my views. And again, thank you for this important series of
22 hearings that you have kicked off. I look forward to your
23 questions.

24 [The prepared statement of Mr. Donley follows:]

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1 Chairman McCain: General Flynn?
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1 STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL T. FLYNN, USA,
2 RETIRED, FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

3 Mr. Flynn: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman McCain,
4 Ranking Member Reed, thanks. Great seeing you again.

5 I actually was a lieutenant and my first combat
6 experience was in Grenada in 1983. So it is interesting
7 that I am sitting here today because it was a mess. It was
8 very confusing.

9 Thanks for inviting me to participate alongside these
10 other great patriots.

11 Chairman McCain: Good thing it was not a formidable
12 opponent, do you not think?

13 Mr. Flynn: Yes. I have a few choice words today for
14 the Cubans.

15 Anyway, I appreciate sitting aside these two really
16 unbelievable patriots of our country and longtime servants
17 and to really just offer some thoughts on this defense
18 reform. I hope that I offer thoughts that I think that are
19 going to be consistent with the other themes that you have
20 already heard from other people that have testified, as well
21 as I think today maybe I will add a few new ideas.

22 In the times that we face and we will likely face in
23 this very complex and unpredictable world, addressing
24 defense reform is probably the single biggest strategic
25 issue that we must deal with, and I believe we have to deal

1 with it immediately.

2 The days of large organizations moving at the speed of
3 an elephant with bulky, expensive, overly bureaucratic
4 acquisition programs with little value to our warfighters
5 and even less value to our national security are forever
6 gone.

7 Speed is the new big. Innovation is the new norm. The
8 pace of change is so stunningly fast, and the Defense
9 Department, at least inside the Pentagon, is not capable of
10 meeting the demands of future threats.

11 Rearranging the deck chairs on this Titanic will only
12 make the chairs slide in a different direction on that deck,
13 but the ship will still likely sink.

14 As you said, Chairman, former Secretary Robert Gates
15 stated it best. I think it was in the fall of 2008 is when
16 he said it, that the Pentagon is good at planning for war,
17 but on its best day cannot fight a war. And that has been
18 proven in spades over the past decade and a half with few
19 exceptions.

20 And if the past 14 years of conflict have proven
21 anything, it has proven Secretary Gates to be spot-on when
22 it came to making that fateful statement.

23 Neither our Nation nor the citizens our defense system
24 is designed to protect and defend can operate in the future
25 the way we operate today.

1 I would add that even though a nice glossy and well
2 meaning report will come out of this committee, there are
3 people inside the Department -- and I am serious about this
4 -- that are looking at your efforts today as a joke and
5 wondering why do you bother, nothing will ever change.
6 Please, Chairman and members of this committee, please prove
7 them wrong.

8 We have forgotten how to win wars because we have lost
9 sight of what winning looks like. Instead, we plod along,
10 participating in conflict and allowing an overly bulky and
11 bureaucratic Department of Defense and a completely broken
12 interagency process, led by the White House and rightly so,
13 that has choked itself practically to death. It simply does
14 not work in support of our warfighting needs today. The
15 President in his role as commander-in-chief and the
16 Secretary of Defense in his role as leader of our defense
17 establishment are ill-served. There is no soft or kind way
18 of saying that. And in a giant organization like the
19 Department of Defense, change is not easy. Reforms will
20 take time, and I applaud this committee's efforts to give it
21 your best shot.

22 At the end of the day, still the budget process and not
23 the mission is what truly changes anything in our
24 government. We have to reverse that thinking particularly
25 when it comes to defense. And that is just simply the sad

1 truth. Where the money goes, things happen. And despite
2 where that money goes, most times has no bearing on our
3 ability to win wars. If you do not get any money, you
4 either change or you disappear. If you get money, you are
5 able to survive another day.

6 My experience comes serving over 33 years in uniform,
7 12 in joint assignments, and nearly 10 of those as a flag
8 officer. I have also served many years in combat and have
9 suffered from the lack of many capabilities that we needed
10 to fight our enemies and found myself fighting the Pentagon
11 as much or more than our enemies. The bureaucracy of our
12 lethargic system filled with people who depart for the day
13 from their major headquarters or from the Pentagon and leave
14 an inbox filled with actions to await tomorrow while we were
15 sitting in a combat zone waiting for an answer is not a good
16 way to fight a war.

17 I have many personal examples and personal scars and I
18 have witnessed many examples of this in many days deployed to
19 the wars primarily in the Middle East and Central Asia. We
20 must and can do better for our Nation and for those that
21 serve this Nation.

22 Today I will highlight a couple of points and provide
23 some ideas, and hopefully a few of these are new.

24 First, we will never correctly predict the next war.
25 We can warn about the many threats that we face, and there

1 are numerous and very dangerous threats. You mentioned a
2 few in your remarks, Chairman. ISIS is the latest in a long
3 line of threats to our Nation that we must do more to
4 contain, defeat, and ultimately eliminate this radical
5 Islamist ideology. And there are many more threats than
6 this very dangerous enemy.

7 And second, the connection between people, processes,
8 and systems is completely broken.

9 Regarding people, we recruit still using old, outdated
10 mechanisms and tools, and then we train people with
11 equipment that is aging, not the most advanced even though
12 we, our country, has the most advanced technologies
13 available to anyone in the world. Bottom line in this
14 regard is our recruiting and training are being done with
15 less than stellar rules, tools, and advanced capabilities.
16 We can do better.

17 We force our warriors to fight wars by forcing them to
18 push joint urgent operational needs or urgent needs
19 statements from the battlefield up the chain of command.
20 That is no way to fight a war. It is reality because our
21 people do not have, they do not train with, they do not go
22 to war with the right tools. And I have seen this numerous
23 times. Essentially they are not prepared to go to war with
24 the equipment in our current inventories. We have to do
25 better, and as the best military in the world, we cannot

1 afford to not look serious to the men and women that we are
2 supposed to serve. And we do not look very professional in
3 the eyes of our international partners, never mind our
4 enemies.

5 Lastly, we must consider retooling our high-tech
6 training. We must radically move from the information age
7 to the digital age, and we have to do this quickly. China,
8 for example, has an organization of 800,000 cyber warriors,
9 and I highlight this in my statement for the record.
10 800,000 cyber warriors. I was just briefed on this about 2
11 weeks ago at a cyber training event that happened out at
12 Camp Dawson, West Virginia. A fantastic capability. These
13 800,000 cyber warriors in China are associated with their
14 Department 61398 that we all became familiar with when the
15 Mandiant report came out. And we are struggling in the
16 Department to recruit I think 6,000 within our own
17 Department of Defense that Mike Rogers, our great cyber
18 commander, has highlighted as a need. And that number
19 fluctuates. But this is the problem that we are facing.
20 And again, I will give you a little bit more information on
21 that number. Something is wrong with that picture. Any
22 reform must consider retooling for future jobs and not hold
23 desperately to these 20th century tools and models that we
24 have.

25 On processes, the processes that we use are antiquated

1 and usually one war behind, if not more. I went to war in
2 Afghanistan the first time based still on airland battle
3 doctrine, a doctrine designed for the Cold War, originally
4 written in the early 1980s. Yet, that doctrine was still
5 being trained right up until 2006, 5 years into the war when
6 Generals Petraeus and Mattis came out with the
7 counterinsurgency manual or counterinsurgency doctrine. We
8 can and must do better. We have to either understand the
9 type of war that we are in and make the decisions upfront to
10 get to where we need to be.

11 But why did it take us nearly 5 years to change our
12 doctrine when we were directly engaged in a
13 counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaign? Two
14 reasons are -- and there are others. Bureaucracy and
15 service parochial infighting are two of those. Thank God
16 our superb men, women, soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
17 marines and those civilians serving in combat innovate
18 better than any other military in the world. When they
19 realize that something is broken, they fix it on the
20 battlefield instead of using the Pentagon's motto of if it
21 is broke, let somebody else fix it. We still need the
22 money.

23 And lastly, the systems we have and the acquisition
24 system that drives much of how our services and combatant
25 commanders operate may as well be in separate solar systems,

1 and none of these, with few exceptions, seem to be anywhere
2 near the battlefields we operate on today.

3 It is tempting to sit here and beat up those in the
4 Pentagon, and that would be unfair. But there are there
5 some in our system that see a jobs program, some who have
6 never seen a program of record they did not like, and some
7 who abuse the system so badly that it makes corrupt
8 governments in the third world nations blush.

9 Additionally, after nearly 14 years of war, conflict,
10 call it what you will, we are engaged with enemies of our
11 country and they want to win. I am not certain we have
12 demonstrated the resilience or the fortitude to do the same,
13 at least not yet.

14 There are many in the defense system that have yet to
15 experience that and do not understand the demands of combat,
16 and there others who avoid it wishing it will go away. It
17 will not. We, you, Chairman, committee have to fix a number
18 of things, but one of the most important is the acquisition
19 system, I think has been highlighted by many who have
20 testified to this committee. It must be joint and it must
21 include the warfighter requirements and not simply serve the
22 service chiefs, secretaries, and their constituents' needs.
23 Secretary Gates found this, as you highlighted, and fixed
24 it, but to do so, he had to become the best action officer
25 in the Pentagon.

1 That said, let me list a couple of ideas to consider as
2 we go through the rest of this session and as you
3 contemplate what steps you need to take forward. And I will
4 be prepared to address any of these in Q and A.

5 Number one, tooth-to-tail ration must change. Reverse
6 it before we find ourselves not ready to fight, never mind
7 win. We have way too much overhead and our staffs have
8 become bloated beyond the nonsense stage.

9 Number two, related to the above, we have way too many
10 four-stars, commands and otherwise, around the world and too
11 many four-star headquarters in each of the services. In
12 terms of our warfighting that the Secretary mentioned, we
13 have 11 warfighting commands if you count USFK as a
14 subcomponent and you count Cyber Command as a unified
15 component. 11, not to mention the service four- and three-
16 star positions that could easily be reduced a rank or cut
17 and the staffs could subsequently be reduced.

18 Number three, cut the civilian system in half or more
19 because the growth has just been unbelievable. I saw that
20 in my own agency looking at 10 years of history before I
21 even took over the Defense Intelligence Agency. Turn those
22 dollars into readiness and place more tooth into our
23 warfighting forces. Be cautious about salami slicing and
24 help the SecDef and the senior civilian and military leaders
25 make the best decisions based on a unified and strategic

1 national security vision approved by the President instead
2 of slicing to benefit some constituency. You must play a
3 role, but very candidly and over many years, Congress
4 created much of this mess and now you have an opportunity
5 and I believe a responsibility to correct it. And so thank
6 you for taking this on.

7 Number four, we need to seriously look at how we
8 organize to fight and win in wars. We man, train, and equip
9 as services, i.e., Title 10. We go to war as a joint force,
10 and in general Air Force takes the Army, the Marines take
11 the Navy -- and again, I am generalizing there. But we only
12 win as a coalition. We need to determine -- in fact, in
13 here I say please name one time when we did not fight as a
14 coalition. And I mean that, and if you go back in our
15 history, even to the days of George Washington.

16 So we need to determine if we are creating a force that
17 is not only technically qualified but also culturally and
18 societally understanding and smart. Language training, for
19 example, is something that we need to place greater emphasis
20 on for those officers serving in maneuver and operational
21 assignments. You know, foreign languages are not just for
22 the intelligence community and attaches. For example, maybe
23 we make it a prerequisite for combatant commanders to speak
24 a foreign language before they can even be considered for a
25 combatant command assignment. Maybe we do that for a

1 majority of our three- and four-star assignments. That
2 example, that message would go a long way and reverberate
3 across the entire force, and it would change the culture all
4 the way down to our ROTC programs, our junior ROTC programs,
5 and in our service academies. And it would take a
6 generation, but I think we need to think like that.

7 Number five, we need to significantly increase the
8 tenure and stature of the Chairman of the Joint
9 Chiefs of Staff and the Vice Chairman. Tenures with a
10 minimum of 5 years -- my recommendation -- without
11 reconfirmation. It does not mean that the President cannot
12 lose confidence and you cannot get rid of that person if
13 they are not doing their job, but I think a tenure with a
14 minimum of 5 years should be considered. Why 5 years? In
15 order to last longer than the service chiefs and potentially
16 serve or overlap two Presidents. This maintains the
17 unbiased responsibility that the Chairman and the Vice with
18 serving in that role as required has as the principal
19 military advisor to the President.

20 Number six, conduct a thorough and comprehensive
21 overhaul of the defense acquisition system. Look at every
22 single program of record. Every program not currently
23 meeting its timelines or budgets should be immediately cut.
24 Now, that is a big statement, but when you send a message
25 that waste and substandard performance will no longer be

1 tolerated, that would send shockwaves through the system and
2 my belief is it would be nearly impossible to do. It would
3 be the harder right thing to do. I do not believe
4 necessarily that you could do it, but it would be
5 interesting to see how many programs in an analysis of that
6 that are actually up to standard. And there are very few
7 exceptions or very few in my experience and in my judgment
8 today sitting here.

9 Number seven, increase the investment in small
10 businesses. Today I believe the Defense Department policy
11 states a goal of 25 percent investments in small businesses
12 across the Department. Small businesses are the engine of
13 change in our country right now, and with the rapid
14 advancement in technologies across the board from health
15 care to intelligence, we must seek new, innovative, and
16 disruptive ways to force fundamental change. Most on this
17 committee would be challenged to recognize the Fortune 100,
18 never mind Fortune 500. They are all relatively new and
19 many started as small businesses within the last decade. As
20 stated, small businesses also innovate. They have to in
21 order to survive. My strongest suggestion for consideration
22 at this stage is to increase the small business investment
23 goals of the Department to as high as 50 percent. I believe
24 the Department and especially our warfighters would benefit
25 most and many would benefit overnight. Lastly, small

1 businesses are the best way to increase our Nation's
2 economic strength, a drive change in this country. They
3 would help us retool our Nation for the digital age.

4 Number eight and the last recommendation is decide who
5 and where decisions about acquisition reform can be made.
6 The SecDef cannot make them all. But if a service chief
7 comes in and says we need this program, cannot live without
8 it, and a combatant commander comes in and says that program
9 is not working, then do not let the system decide to keep it
10 and only fix it on the margins. Get rid of it, or make the
11 necessary decisions that actually make a difference. If
12 they see something elsewhere and that is a capability they
13 want, especially our warfighting commanders, and it can be
14 produced in the requisite amounts within existing budgets,
15 get it to them rapidly or allow them to acquire it without
16 going through the whole morass of bureaucracy.

17 In this context, the questions that this committee is
18 considering are in my judgment the correct ones, namely,
19 whether our Nation's institutions of national defense are
20 organized, manned, equipped, and managed in ways that can
21 deal with the security challenges of the 21st century and
22 that efficiently and effectively spend our Nation's dollars.

23 The Department is not meeting those challenges today,
24 and we are not ready to deal with the challenges we, as the
25 global leader with the premier military capability on the

1 planet, should be capable of in the future.

2 Without fundamental and massive reform, as well as some
3 smart, numerous, and targeted reductions in areas that have
4 grown bloated, irrelevant, and useless, we could find
5 ourselves on the losing end of a major war, Chairman, one
6 that sitting here today we are unable to predict.

7 If our Nation is proud of being the world's leader, let
8 us start acting like it and as our very first President,
9 George Washington, stated, "To be prepared for war is one of
10 the most effective means of preserving peace."

11 Thank you for this opportunity. I look forward to your
12 questions. Thank you.

13 [The prepared statement of Mr. Flynn follows:]

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1 Chairman McCain: Thank you, General.

2 General Jones?

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1 STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, USMC, RETIRED,
2 FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
3 UNITED STATES; SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE AND
4 COMMANDER OF U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND; AND 32ND COMMANDANT OF
5 THE MARINE CORPS

6 Mr. Jones: Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator
7 Reed, members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me
8 to add to the expert testimony that you have already
9 received from many other witnesses. I am honored to be here
10 with my colleagues, General Flynn and Secretary Donley, to
11 add my own views.

12 But before I start, may I also thank the committee for
13 section 1227 of the NDAA that was recently passed, which
14 pledges that the United States will do more to protect the
15 residents of Camp Loridi who have since my last testimony
16 been attacked and lost over 20 lives and multiple injuries
17 with very little global interest on their fate. There are
18 2,000 people sitting there, trapped, and we need to get them
19 out of there. But I thank the committee very much for your
20 support.

21 Mr. Chairman, I too would like to commend the committee
22 for its leadership in undertaking this Goldwater-Nichols
23 analysis concerning what changes might be necessary in our
24 security architecture based on today's new and swiftly
25 evolving environment.

1 I have a full statement, but I will summarize it as
2 briefly as I can.

3 At the outset, let me say that I wish to identify
4 myself fully with the testimonies previously offered by Mr.
5 Jim Locher, Major General Punaro, and Dr. John Hamre and
6 likewise Secretary Donley here today and General Flynn.
7 Most of the people I just mentioned were among those who
8 throughout their distinguished careers contributed
9 significantly to the passage and implementation of
10 Goldwater-Nichols in 1986. So it is not my intent to repeat
11 their testimonies phrased in different words, but rather I
12 hope to be of service to the committee and its work by
13 focusing on just a few points gathered from the experience
14 of my serving in senior military positions and as National
15 Security Advisor.

16 Until this committee's current efforts, the most
17 comprehensive review of Goldwater-Nichols and its so-called
18 unintended consequences across the Department was
19 commissioned in 1997 by then Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen
20 when I served as his military assistant. While 18 years old
21 now, in my view that study still stands in my opinion as the
22 best effort to date in identifying necessary Goldwater-
23 Nichols impacts and reforms, and I highly recommend that
24 this committee revisit the task force's findings as you
25 undertake the task of modernizing the Defense Department and

1 our military forces to face 21st century challenges.

2 In the course of the important work the committee is
3 undertaking, we should remember distinctly that the Senate
4 passed the original Goldwater-Nichols Act by a vote of 95 to
5 nothing. This overwhelming consensus was achieved despite
6 the strong objections from the Department of Defense
7 civilian and military leadership of the time. And this
8 clearly suggests to me that any future revision of
9 Goldwater-Nichols should again be undertaken objectively and
10 externally to the Department of Defense for three reasons.

11 One, the Department is consumed with everyday problems
12 around the globe of increasing complexity.

13 Two, moreover large bureaucracies have inherent
14 difficulty in implementing change from within.

15 And lastly, as we all know, reform challenges and
16 entrenched interests will fiercely resist many of the
17 recommendations proposed by our previous witnesses and
18 perhaps my own included.

19 So my full statement focuses on four areas that I
20 believe should be part of any effort to produce a Goldwater-
21 Nichols II to improve our national security.

22 The first is fixing the overwhelming and unsustainable
23 "all in" personnel costs for the all-volunteer force in
24 addressing the systemic imbalances that endanger the
25 Department's capacities and capabilities.

1 Second, to reform the appallingly wasteful and
2 inefficient DOD business model for operations.

3 And three, moving towards a new interagency balance
4 centers around unified commands.

5 And four, modernizing the roles, missions, and
6 organizations of the National Security Council. That last
7 point was not in the original Goldwater-Nichols, but in view
8 of the importance of the National Security Council, I think
9 that it should be part of any consideration of a Goldwater-
10 Nichols II.

11 So with regard to personnel costs, the past three
12 Secretaries of Defense, Secretaries Gates, Panetta, and
13 Hagel, have each publicly stated that the cost growth of
14 personnel expenditures in general is unsustainable. The
15 cost growth in military pay, quality of life, retired pay,
16 and VA and DOD health care costs far exceed both the GDP and
17 the Employment Cost Index.

18 And interim report of the Military Compensation and
19 Retirement Modernization Commission stated that there was a
20 \$1 trillion unfunded liability over the next 10 years in
21 military retirement that is not in any budget.

22 The current Commandant, General Robert Neller, is
23 challenged, for example, by the reality of having to spend
24 approximately 68 percent of his budget on those same costs.
25 By comparison, 12 years ago when I was in the similar job as

1 Commandant of the Marine Corps in 2003, my expenditure for
2 those same costs was approximately 49 percent. So you have
3 a significant cost growth over 12 years, and left unchanged,
4 10 years from now or 12 years from now, our budget will be
5 increasingly consumed by personnel costs. This disturbing
6 trend will accelerate and will weaken the armed forces'
7 capabilities to fulfill their roles and missions.

8 The remedy is to modernize the pay and benefits for the
9 active duty, reserve, DOD civilian, and retired communities
10 and reform a system built for a different force in a bygone
11 era featuring numerous anachronisms, as noted in my full
12 statement.

13 In fairness for all who served on today's active or
14 reserve duty, the terms under which they entered active duty
15 service should be honored before making any reforms that
16 would affect the total force. I think billions of dollars
17 could be saved by keeping the faith with our service members
18 and those who enter service the day after the legislation is
19 passed.

20 Resources once allocated to recruiting, training, and
21 equipping front line forces are now being reallocated to
22 support the increasingly top heavy headquarters components
23 or, put another way, the tooth-to-tail ratio is spiraling
24 out of control. The stifling bureaucracy yielded processes
25 and procedures that are far too complex to perform once

1 simple tasks. This dynamic has produced a paralyzing
2 environment in which micro-management and endless consensus
3 building impede initiative and impede action.

4 \$113 billion to support 240,000 members of OSD, Joint
5 Staff, and DOD headquarters illustrates the point. In 1958,
6 the Joint Staff was authorized 400 personnel. Today the
7 Joint Staff directorates have 4,000. Medical treatment
8 facilities that are now being used at a 50 percent
9 utilization rate but have a division's worth of medical
10 administrators are still allocated \$41.7 billion.

11 The enlarging tail is largely responsible for a broken
12 acquisition system. Examples in each of the services. The
13 Air Force's F-35 program, the Marine Corps' ill-fated AAV
14 program, the Navy's Ford Class carrier program, the Army's
15 future combat systems. May I thank the committee also for
16 your support in putting service chiefs back in the
17 acquisition process. I think this is something that was
18 long overdue and something that was an incredible
19 frustration during my time as service chief.

20 Point number two was reforming wasteful, inefficient
21 DOD business operations. DOD's agencies, once relevant and
22 once perhaps a good idea -- many have outlived their
23 usefulness and they contribute little to our warfighting
24 capabilities at huge, enormous expense, as General Flynn
25 just referred to. They have avoided serious but needed

1 reforms. The DOD agencies themselves consume 20 percent of
2 the Defense Department's budgets.

3 As General Punaro testified, DOD's top two clients are
4 DLA, which consumes \$44.1 billion, and the second is the
5 defense health programs, \$41.7 billion. Number three is
6 Lockheed Martin Corporation, \$13.5 billion behind the top
7 two DOD agencies at \$28.2 billion.

8 I experienced significant frustration in dealing with
9 agencies as a service chief back in 1999 to 2003, and listed
10 in my detailed report is the story of how the Marine Corps
11 changed its combat uniform and modernized it. Essentially I
12 discovered in negotiating with DLA that my service would be
13 assessed a 22 percent carrying charge for the service of
14 going out and buying the uniform, and I politely declined,
15 formed a small group of marines. We went out and did it
16 ourselves at a cost far cheaper, far quicker, and more
17 efficiently than anything DLA could do.

18 One question that I have frequently wondered is why are
19 flag and general officers running businesses instead of
20 commanding troops. Business-intensive defense agencies
21 headed by active duty flag and general officers do not make
22 a lot of sense to me. We need business experience to ensure
23 fiscal solvency of agencies. We should staff these agencies
24 with business executives and return military personnel to
25 operational ranks to reduce the tooth-to-tail ratio that is

1 spiraling out of control.

2 The tenth largest client of the Department of Defense
3 is the Defense Commissary Agency, which is subsidized to the
4 tune of \$1.4 billion annually. What is the remedy?
5 Outsource it. Walmart and other agencies like it can
6 compete for the same job that the Defense Commissary
7 Agencies are doing on our base at reduced cost to the
8 taxpayer, lower inventory, transportation costs, without any
9 subsidies, and higher potential savings for military
10 families. In 2001, I volunteered my service as an
11 experiment to test this, and it was soundly rejected as a
12 result of the entrenched bureaucracies and the fact that I
13 ran out of time as service chief and could not get it done.

14 Rebalancing the interagency and unified commands to
15 meet 21st century threats is my third point. AFRICOM is a
16 good example of what I am about to talk about.

17 AFRICOM was created out of EUCOM. It was proposed by
18 General Wald and myself, recognizing that Africa as a
19 continent had arrived as a 21st century reality that needed
20 to be recognized. And ironically, although most of Africa
21 except for the horn, was tasked to EUCOM, the word "Africa"
22 does not appear in the EUCOM title. We proposed AFRICOM in
23 order to change that span of control which was much too big
24 for one commander of Europe and Africa totaling some 85
25 countries.

1 But the value of unified commands fosters military
2 interoperability, training, common military architectures,
3 and requisite support to our friends and allies. And they
4 are extremely important. They are a gift of the 20th
5 century. But they need to be changed to recognize the
6 realities of the 21st century.

7 In my view, ideally unified commands should be in the
8 geographical areas they purport to affect and to work in.
9 We have taken some steps back over the years, but if I could
10 change any one thing, I would place CENTCOM, the Central
11 Command, in its AOR as opposed to just a forward command,
12 and I would, as I proposed to Secretary Rumsfeld, place
13 AFRICOM in Africa where it would do the most good.

14 Absence of military unified commands in the regions
15 creates vacuums. Vacuums are filled by people who do not
16 have our interests, and routinely as I travel around the
17 African continent, I am asked why is the U.S. not here. Why
18 are we not more involved? Why are we not competing with
19 China more successfully? We need America. We want America.

20 The presence of U.S. companies, NGOs, academic
21 institutions, in a combined unified command headquarters
22 would send powerful messages to that continent's 54
23 countries. And the whole-of-government approach to 21st
24 century engagement would show the U.S. as an enduring
25 partner for all African nations seeking freedom and

1 prosperity.

2 With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to
3 submit for the record a study called "All Elements of
4 National Power: Moving Toward a New Agency Balance for the
5 U.S. Global Engagement," prepared under the auspices of the
6 Brent Scowcroft Center at the Atlantic Council, which I was
7 privileged to chair.

8 Chairman McCain: Without objection.

9 [The information follows:]

10 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

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1 Mr. Jones: Thank you, sir.

2 The last point, the whole-of-government coordination.
3 I believe that a look at the National Security Council and
4 how it is resourced and what it does must be included in any
5 Goldwater-Nichols review. New global challenges require
6 interagency response not former stovepipe solutions. For
7 example, early in 2009, we combined the Department of
8 Homeland Security staff with the National Security staff in
9 recognition of the fact that security threats are not
10 contained by borders. But the new National Security staff
11 was awarded an anemic budget of \$4 million to perform the
12 task at hand, which is was absolutely impossible. We were
13 able to get a modest increase, but a detailed study in 2010
14 suggested that \$23 million would be appropriate to create a
15 small NSC staff with agency-like functions and expertise to
16 do the job.

17 But the overwhelming difficulty with the NSC is one of
18 management of personnel, not so much the size, although I
19 recognize that it needs to be reformed. The detailees who
20 are assigned to the NSC are there for very short periods of
21 time, and in 2010, because of the lack of funding to pay
22 salaries and compensation for the entire staff, most of the
23 people at the NSC were detailees from other agencies and
24 they were allowed to stay for about a year. So in 2010, 50
25 percent of the National Security Council rotated back to

1 their parent agencies and was replaced. My view is that
2 three-quarters of the people in the NSC ought to be
3 permanent personnel, and one-fourth ought to be augmentees
4 from the agencies. Today it is exactly the opposite.

5 I believe that the National Security Council must be a
6 policy communicating, disseminating organization, not one
7 that micromanages implementation, and we should avoid that
8 micromanagement. But it is a slippery slope that all NSCs
9 eventually have to confront as they mature in any
10 administration. And it must serve as a coordinating agency
11 to effectuate the national security policies that require
12 presidential decisions.

13 Secretary Gates in his testimony underscored the
14 important role of the NSC and the National Security staff as
15 a presidential instrument ensuring proper implementation by
16 the interagency. Destructive consequences of DOD and
17 national security interests pertaining to partisan gridlock,
18 budget impasses, and the recurring threat of government
19 shutdowns was also emphasized.

20 Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, thank you very much for
21 inviting me to be here today. I firmly believe that your
22 work is an important work. It will serve the country well
23 for the next 30 years, and I would recommend use of the
24 original Goldwater-Nichols architects in the Defense Reform
25 Task Force to make a major contribution to a new Goldwater-

1 Nichols, as all are still current on the issues and all are
2 still very influential and providing wise advice to our
3 government.

4 Thank you.

5 [The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]

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1 Chairman McCain: Thank you, and I thank the witnesses.

2 I would just add it is my understanding, General, that
3 under Henry Kissinger, the NSC staff was 50 people. I
4 understand now it is 400. I might argue that in the days of
5 Kissinger, we were more successful than we are today. It is
6 not clear to me that increasing sizes of the staffs is
7 necessarily the answer.

8 I guess one of the fundamental questions I think that
9 we are trying to confront here, that we have the COCOMs, but
10 every time that there is a major contingency or emergency or
11 some challenge, that we form up a joint task force, and they
12 address it rather than the COCOMs themselves. And in
13 addition to that, obviously, we do not know the number of
14 people on these staffs because we have never had a full
15 accounting for not only the military personnel but the
16 contract personnel and the civilian personnel that are all
17 assigned to them as well. So some argue that the COCOMs
18 should be reduced significantly in size and number because
19 these standing task forces seem to be the vehicle for
20 addressing the national emergencies.

21 I guess we can begin with you, General Jones.

22 Mr. Jones: Well, I think, first of all, the term
23 "combatant command" is one that was coined during Secretary
24 Rumsfeld's tenure. In my view the correct title for these
25 commands is "unified command." One of the reasons that

1 AFRICOM wound up in Stuttgart, Germany was that we refused
2 to change the title "combatant command," and no African
3 leader was going to welcome a combatant command of the
4 United States in their country. And so Germany has a long
5 history with us. They understood what we were trying to do,
6 and they extended the invitation to put it in Stuttgart,
7 Germany.

8 The overall functions of the 21st century unified
9 command in my view are, number one, warfighting but also,
10 number two, to by their presence, which is I think a gift of
11 enormous value to the United States, be molded I think, as
12 this report suggests, into a much more useful instrument of
13 American engagement in foreign policy. I would advocate
14 that there could be a structure where senior elements of the
15 interagency could also be present. They would be working in
16 the same time zone as their colleagues. And it would bring
17 a regional focus to our strategic thinking that would be
18 extremely important. Right now in the State Department, the
19 strategic and the operational level of involvement is
20 located here in Washington, and as a result, we have a soda
21 straw mentality approaching each country country by country
22 when the world is much easier to understand if you did it by
23 regions.

24 And so modernizing and transforming these unified
25 commands into a more cogent expression of our national

1 capabilities I think makes a lot of sense and should be
2 seriously considered for the future.

3 Chairman McCain: General Flynn?

4 Mr. Flynn: Thanks, Chairman.

5 So I am going to be a little bit hypothetical here.
6 You asked about sort of re-imagining. You used the word
7 "re-imagining." To specifically answer your question, the
8 fighting forces inside of our combatant commands are not
9 resourced the way you believe they are. So Army components,
10 Marine Components, naval components within a combatant
11 command in some cases AFRICOM, parts of EUCOM -- they do not
12 exist or they do not exist in the capacity and capability to
13 be able to actually combine themselves together with joint
14 forces or coalition forces to do the job.

15 So that said, imagine only two geographic combatant
16 commands -- only two -- an east and a west. You would have
17 to have specific other commands like STRATCOM, which I
18 believe is necessary because we do have a nuclear
19 responsibility for this Nation for this century; Cyber
20 Command because this is definitely a new world as I
21 highlighted in some of the things I said. So if that is all
22 you had, you just had an east and a west four-star that did
23 a lot of things -- they would take on a lot of things. What
24 we have to figure out is how do we flesh out the resources,
25 the warfighting resources, the ready capabilities that we

1 need from all these other places that have been highlighted
2 by the testimony that you have heard today and others and
3 get that stuff out of the tail of the Department of Defense
4 and get it down into the warfighting forces that we need
5 because otherwise we are going to -- you know, we have
6 Ebola, we have some problem somewhere around the world. And
7 it is like, okay, give me some bits and pieces and we throw
8 it together. It really has nothing to do with coming out of
9 that combatant command.

10 So could you get to that? Could you get to an east and
11 a west geographic combatant command? You know, they do not
12 need to be services. They are headquarters. Would they be
13 relatively large? I am not so sure if they need to be much
14 larger than what they are doing. If you look at like a
15 PACOM, you look at -- I mean, when we talk about EUCOM,
16 AFRICOM, CENTCOM, I mean those are interesting. Could you
17 bring something together that commanded all those? And then
18 what you do is you drive down the size of these
19 headquarters, starting with the building across the river
20 here, and the resources that they need, as well as the
21 agencies and activities of the Department of Defense. I
22 tell you the one that I led is way over. It is overpriced
23 and there are too many people in it. And when you look at
24 9/11 to the size of it today, just in that example -- and I
25 think General Jones -- he nailed it when we talk about some

1 of what these agencies and activities are doing and how
2 bloated they are.

3 So could we get to that? Could we get to an east and a
4 west? Could we drive down the number of four-stars and
5 three-stars that we have? I mean, when I look around the
6 world, there are not a lot of four-stars out there. There
7 is a few when we are talking about colleagues and we talk
8 about what exists out there. It does not mean that we get
9 rid of every one of them, but it means that we really take a
10 hard look and do sort of a red team analysis of what it is
11 that I am imagining here in this hypothetical, which I
12 actually think that it is practical. Now, could it be
13 achieved in 4 years? It would take some time and it would
14 certainly take a lot of effort.

15 Is it possible? It is possible. Can you imagine it?
16 I can imagine it because when I look at how we fight today
17 and how we have been fighting and how I think we will fight
18 for at least the next 10 years, we are going to continue
19 down this road that you have already recognized. We are
20 stealing -- so CENTCOM -- I am pulling people on the
21 battlefield. I am pulling people from PACOM, USFK, EUCOM,
22 AFRICOM to fight a war in Iraq. From the intelligence
23 perspective, we are pulling people from all over the place.
24 They had no rhyme or reason to any kind of structured system
25 that we had in place. So all those combatant commands had

1 to pile on. It just made no sense.

2 It is almost like take the whiteboard, wipe it clean,
3 and then have some effort, some analytical effort, that
4 takes a really hard look at sort of what I would just call a
5 team B approach to what I am addressing.

6 Chairman McCain: Senator Reed?

7 Senator Reed: Well, let me start with Secretary
8 Donley. If you want to make a comment, that would be
9 appropriate, Secretary. But there is one point in your
10 testimony that I thought was interesting because we are
11 going to have a huge process here of reform, and you have to
12 start off with some tangible first steps. And one step you
13 suggested was integrating the staffs of the services.
14 Currently the uniformed staff is there and then the civilian
15 sector staff is here.

16 Can you just for a moment sort of comment on that
17 proposal? And then I will ask General Flynn and General
18 Jones for their perspective since they have served in
19 different areas. Mr. Secretary, please.

20 Mr. Donley: Sir, I will turn to that just quickly in
21 answer to Senator McCain's question about COCOMs, a couple
22 of points real quick.

23 The committee's effort to redefine management
24 headquarters and to get the Department to rebaseline all
25 that work will be very important I think in getting a new

1 updated baseline of the COCOM headquarters, the service
2 component headquarters, et cetera. That is very important
3 as you consider the way forward. That is why I focused on
4 that area.

5 Second, I do think having global coverage is important
6 across the regional combatant commands. We actually did not
7 have global coverage until the early 2000s. We had several
8 countries that were, quote/unquote, unassigned. So it has
9 taken us a long time to get to the global configuration we
10 have. You can expect changes at the margins as commanders
11 talk about the seams and they get adjusted. But I think
12 trying to collapse the regional structure at this point
13 would be a step backwards.

14 Third point quickly on how COCOMs task organize. It
15 makes a lot of sense to assign regional responsibilities to
16 subunified commands or to component commanders. COCOM
17 headquarters are not capable of doing everything themselves
18 on their headquarters staff. One prominent example that is
19 out there right now is the need to develop missile defense
20 architectures. We are doing that in at least three places
21 that I am aware of. We are doing that in the Gulf. We are
22 doing that in Europe, including the eastern Med, and we are
23 doing that in Asia. We need the technical expertise of the
24 service components, air and land, to work that together, and
25 they are doing it with allies at the operational level. So

1 these are things that COCOM headquarters cannot do by
2 themselves. It makes a lot of sense to task those.

3 On the military department headquarters, so this has a
4 very long history. And as provided for in Title 10 coming
5 out of Goldwater-Nichols, it sort of cements these two
6 staffs in the same headquarters. But there are functions on
7 both sides that in some cases are almost the same function.
8 The assistant secretaries and the services, for example, for
9 manpower and reserve affairs, have functional
10 responsibilities for policy and oversight that look a lot
11 like the deputy chiefs of staff for personnel on the
12 military side. So they are compelled to work together, but
13 they are organizationally separated. And depending on who
14 is assigned there, the personalities and the guidance they
15 get from their chief or their secretary, sometimes offices
16 such as these and these two staff do not always work well
17 together. If you are in the field, sometimes there is
18 confusion about where you go in the headquarters. Do you go
19 to the secretariat for this or do you go to the deputy chief
20 of staff for this?

21 Other parts of the staff that are separated actually
22 ought to come together. Acquisition and logistics is one of
23 those. As the committee knows, there is a long history of
24 trying to work lifecycle management and put acquisition and
25 logistics functions together. AT&L does that at the OSD

1 level, but in the services those are still separated.

2 So there is a lot of potential here to get to a single
3 staff. It will be hard work, but it is I think worth doing.

4 Senator Reed: Very quickly because my time is
5 expiring. General Flynn, any comments? General Jones, any
6 comments?

7 Mr. Jones: I do. I am sorry, Mike. Go ahead.

8 Mr. Flynn: I would just say briefly having witnessed
9 this integration between services and the department level,
10 I think that is the right approach. And I do think that
11 there has to be more -- you know, the recognition of our
12 civilian leadership has got to be very clear. But military
13 officers to be able to work in there because it gets into
14 what General Jones talked about is the interagency roles.
15 And you do not have to duplicate staff. So I think that
16 that is a good idea.

17 Senator Reed: Thank you.

18 General Jones, please.

19 Mr. Jones: Senator, I believe that we should consider
20 all kinds of ideas, and I think we should not probably pick
21 any one as being the best way to do it. I think that is the
22 value of studying things.

23 But just for information, the civilian-to-active duty
24 ratios of the Department right now, with the Air Force is 1
25 to 1.7, civilian to military. In the Navy, it is 1 to 1.8.

1 In the Army, it is 1 to 2.3, and in the Marine Corps, it is
2 1 to 8.3. So we clearly have inflated numbers in our
3 bureaucracy both military and civilian. And we need to
4 become more efficient. We need to do things quicker. We
5 cannot continue to take 15 years to produce a major end
6 item, important system for the warfighter. And we just have
7 to be leaner and really reduce the size of military staffs
8 in headquarters just across the board.

9 How you do the civilian secretariats and the military
10 staff I think is something worthy of study. I do not have a
11 clear view on how that would work. But it is certainly
12 something we should consider.

13 Senator Reed: Thank you very much.

14 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

15 Chairman McCain: Senator Ernst?

16 Senator Ernst: Thank you, gentlemen, for joining us
17 today, and thank you, Mr. Chair, for your very kind words on
18 the floor yesterday. I certainly appreciated that.

19 General Flynn, I am very concerned about the military
20 intelligence force structure and the support actually going
21 out to the warfighter. For example, AFRICOM. Despite ISIS
22 surging in Libya and many of the other threats on the
23 continent, the Army has stated there is likely going to be
24 about a 2-year delay in getting an Army theater intelligence
25 brigade established for support in that area.

1 General Breedlove has also stated that in Europe the
2 current levels of MI support are very inadequate. They are
3 lacking considering the threat that we have coming from
4 Russia and other transnational threats and terrorism. And
5 not much is being done to provide EUCOM with MI support.

6 So we have ENSCOM at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and it is
7 this Army senior intelligence integrator. It equips,
8 trains, and mans the Army intelligence units all around the
9 globe. You have spent 30 years in MI. If you could please
10 tell us in your experience if ENSCOM could be better
11 reformed to support the warfighter and how we can achieve
12 that.

13 Mr. Flynn: Okay, and this really gets to the
14 chairman's question about what we have been talking about
15 with combatant commands' ability to organize, to fight.

16 So ENSCOM was a creation of the Soviet Union Cold War
17 system that we fought at least 25 years ago now. So it is a
18 -- I am going to be very candid here. It is a bloated,
19 almost irrelevant headquarters. We have Army component
20 commanders underneath every geographic combatant command,
21 actually underneath all of them. So we have an Army service
22 component underneath EUCOM. You have one underneath
23 CENTCOM. And they are three-stars. I think in Europe it is
24 still a four-star. But those are senior officers. And yet
25 the Army intelligence forces are aligned back to ENSCOM. It

1 just does not make any sense. Talk about more headquarters
2 that you do not need.

3 So I think that there is a fundamental need to take a
4 real laser focus at what you are addressing and decide
5 whether or not ENSCOM can be dissolved. You take resources
6 and you push them out to those theater intelligence brigades
7 which are necessary, and they function very well and they do
8 actually work for those commanders. But the way that we
9 have them aligned -- I know the size of ENSCOM's
10 headquarters, and I honestly do not know -- I cannot sit
11 here today and tell you that I have served 5 years in combat
12 in the last decade, and I am not sure what that particular
13 headquarters did for me. I know what the intelligence
14 brigades did, and I would work it through the warfighting
15 command system.

16 So I think part of this reform -- it is like agencies
17 and activities and some of these other headquarters that
18 have grown. This is one that goes back to the Cold War, and
19 it is time to take another look at whether or not that is
20 necessary.

21 Senator Ernst: That is great. Thank you for the
22 input, General Flynn.

23 General Jones, in January of 2013, former Secretary of
24 Defense Leon Panetta signed a memorandum eliminating the
25 direct ground combat definition and assignment rule which

1 directed the services to open the direct ground combat
2 specialties previously closed to women by the first of
3 January 2016 or to request an exception to policy for any
4 direct ground combat specialties they determined should
5 remain closed.

6 In your experience as the former Commandant of the
7 Marine Corps, what would your best military advice or
8 recommendation for the Marine Corps have been to the
9 Secretary of Defense for 1 January? And if you could
10 expound on that please.

11 Mr. Jones: Well, thank you, Senator. I would like to
12 think that my time as Commandant was one that advocated for
13 more billets being opened for women and broader integration.
14 I was in the Marine Corps long enough to see the
15 separateness become one Marine Corps where we had two
16 separate organizations for a long time and they were brought
17 together in the 1970s I think. And so I have been a staunch
18 advocate for making as many billets as possible available to
19 women.

20 The one exception that I feel strongly about is
21 combining genders at the rifle squad, platoon, and company
22 level simply because of the physiological differences
23 between men and women. And overwhelmingly, that is my
24 objection. I have served in combat as a platoon commander
25 and a company commander in Vietnam. I have been a battalion

1 commander. And I do not see that as something that would
2 enhance the combat warfighting capability of our units.
3 When you look at professional sports and the National
4 Football League, the National Hockey League, the National
5 Basketball Association, professional tennis, professional
6 golf, they make a distinction between men and women in terms
7 of putting them on the same teams at the same time. And I
8 think that that analogy applies to women serving in line
9 outfits at the very, very -- at the warfighting level, as I
10 said, at the rifle squad, platoon, and company level where I
11 would be very careful about mandating 100 percent inclusion
12 because I actually think that would decrease our combat
13 capability.

14 Senator Ernst: Thank you. I respect your opinion very
15 much.

16 Mr. Jones: Thank you.

17 Senator Ernst: Thank you, gentlemen.

18 Thank you, Mr. Chair.

19 Chairman McCain: Senator McCaskill?

20 Senator McCaskill: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

21 Thank you all for your service to our country and thank
22 you for being here today.

23 I am going to start with you, Secretary Donley. I am
24 aware of the pressures that have been put on the Air Force
25 as it relates to drone operators because of the incredibly

1 capable unit that we have in Missouri at Whiteman. And I
2 know that the Air Force is working on this problem.

3 But it seems to me that this is something that we did
4 not see coming because now I have learned that the Air Force
5 is actually considering using contractors in order to ease
6 the burden on these drone operators.

7 At large, I think the issue of contractors versus
8 active military is something that we are struggling with in
9 our military. Certainly there is a role for contractors.
10 Certainly we all acknowledge there is a role for
11 contractors. Hopefully contracts that have been well scoped
12 and competed and that are not cost-plus and that are
13 overseen with capability and confidence as opposed to what
14 we saw with CORES when I first arrived in Washington in
15 connection with what we were spending in Iraq on
16 particularly logistic support, LOGCAP.

17 So I guess my question for you, Secretary Donley, is
18 are you comfortable that we are at a position that we are
19 hiring contractors to do the drone work, which in fact our
20 warfighters -- the reason they are under such stress right
21 now is because they are being asked to target and kill the
22 enemy during the day and going home to dinner with their
23 families. And it is a new kind of warfighting. And it just
24 appears that we were not really ready to support these
25 warfighters. And I am uncomfortable that the answer is to

1 hire civilians.

2 Mr. Donley: Senator, I cannot speak to the current
3 state of readiness or personnel pressures on the RPA
4 operator force, but it certainly was significant and has
5 been for quite some time.

6 The demand for this capability has been off the charts,
7 and the Air Force had discussions with Secretary Gates and
8 his staff about what the upper limit would be. We always
9 had difficulty. Working with my colleague, General Flynn, I
10 remember when he was in Afghanistan. We were working these
11 issues. The Department set targets for the Air Force to
12 grow the number of orbits. Each time the Air Force met that
13 goal, the goalposts were moved.

14 Senator McCaskill: Right.

15 Mr. Donley: And this happened two or three times in a
16 2- or 3-year period. So the Air Force was playing catch-up.

17 These aircraft take a special training, obviously, and
18 the mission integrating these aircraft with the intelligence
19 system and providing that instantaneous sort of sensor-to-
20 shooter capability netted into the entire intelligence
21 network through the DCGS has been a tremendous capability
22 for our country. But it has also been manpower intensive,
23 and the Air Force has been behind the power curve in doing
24 this.

25 It seemed much easier and frankly the focus had been in

1 the Congress and in the Department to just continue to buy
2 more aircraft, which made sense. But what the Air Force was
3 doing behind the scenes, at a time when the Air Force budget
4 was stagnant and the Air Force was actually decreasing in
5 size, is we had to man this force. We had to create a new
6 job series and invent the career force for RPA operators,
7 and we had to set up the schoolhouses. And there was so
8 much pressure on operations that it was difficult to keep up
9 because they were also robbing from the schoolhouses.

10 So your point is well taken. The force has been
11 tremendously stressed.

12 I am uncomfortable with having civilian contractors
13 performing military missions. That does not sound right to
14 me, and we need to take a close look at that interface
15 between what is an appropriate civilian activity and what is
16 an appropriate military activity in the sensor-to-shooter
17 kill chain.

18 Senator McCaskill: Correct.

19 I am almost out of time, but I wanted to briefly,
20 General Jones -- any of you. And if you want to respond to
21 this on the record. But I am still looking for some kind of
22 data that would support the morphing that occurred during
23 Iraq and Afghanistan from the military with SURP to building
24 highways and how we got to the point that there was a lack
25 of accountability because it was never clear whether AID was

1 doing infrastructure and development or whether it was the
2 active military. And obviously, there were security
3 concerns. We had highways that probably should not ever
4 have been built and were built under the aegis of this is
5 fighting counterinsurgency by winning the hearts and minds,
6 but in reality, it was probably more about our supply chain
7 and reliability of our supply chain. And this all got very
8 murky. And I have yet to see data that shows a direct
9 relationship between the money we spent, which began with
10 fixing the storefront broken window to the billions that
11 were spent on vacant health centers, power plants that do
12 not work. I could sit here and list dozens and dozens of
13 projects.

14 And we have got to figure this out because just because
15 we decided using this money in fighting counterinsurgency
16 was a good idea does not mean it necessarily was. Somebody
17 has got to show me that it worked. And I do not think
18 anybody has been able to show that yet, and I do not want us
19 to go down that road again until somebody produces the data
20 that showed it had an impact.

21 Mr. Jones: Senator, I think that is a great question.
22 My recollection of those days leading up to the invasion of
23 Iraq was that the Defense Department was specifically
24 informed that we would not do nation building. And
25 therefore, there was no nation building plan. My

1 recollection of the plan basically saw a military force go
2 to Baghdad, pull down Saddam Hussein's statue, and they
3 said, okay, we are going home. And that was not the case.
4 And everything that happened after that was very, very ad
5 hoc and not well done. And the lessons I think of that
6 mission I think should stay with us for quite a while
7 because I think engagement -- if you are going to engage at
8 that level in this 21st century, you need to have the
9 operational plan to bring about the security that you need,
10 but you also need an economic plan and you also need -- if
11 you are going to change the government, you need to make
12 sure you have governance and rule of law in what is going to
13 happen afterwards. And the Central Command of that time did
14 not have that plan.

15 Senator McCaskill: I want to make sure those lessons
16 get to Leavenworth.

17 Mr. Jones: Exactly.

18 Senator McCaskill: Thank you.

19 Chairman McCain: I might point out that the latest
20 example of that is Libya, completely walking away, and many
21 of us warned that the outcome now seems to be a new base for
22 Al Qaeda.

23 Senator Ayotte, the Democrats have a gathering and if
24 it is okay with you, I would like to recognize Senator King
25 to go, if you do not mind. I know you do not mind.

1 Senator Ayotte: Of course, absolutely.

2 Chairman McCain: Thank you.

3 Senator King: Thank you, Senator.

4 We are talking about supporting the warfighter. And I
5 think one of the most dramatic examples of the failure to do
6 so and then eventually turning it around and doing so was
7 the MRAP program.

8 General Jones, what have we learned from that and the
9 fact that Secretary Gates had to move heaven and earth to
10 make that happen? What have we learned from that experience
11 in order to be more nimble in terms of dealing with threats
12 on the battlefield?

13 Mr. Jones: Senator, this is one of the largest
14 problems that we have in the current construct of the
15 Defense Department. And I might even say that even
16 presidential directives are ignored. I will give you an
17 example of a meeting between the President of Algeria,
18 President Bouteflika, and President Bush in which the
19 President of Algeria asked the American President for night
20 vision goggles for his air force, pretty standard stuff.
21 The President said let us do that, and he said we will do
22 that. And to this day, the Algerian air force have never
23 received them. And it is simply because in the bureaucracy
24 that we built, there are too many people that can say no and
25 too many areas in which it can be blocked. I can give you

1 chapter and verse of other examples in dealing with foreign
2 countries who really want to have a relationship with the
3 U.S. and really want to buy U.S. products and eventually
4 just throw up their hands and go buy French or Israeli or
5 another country simply because it is just too hard and too
6 slow. And as I said, there are examples of presidential
7 directives being consumed by the bureaucracy and its
8 inertia.

9 Senator King: But we have got to try to figure this
10 out because lives are at stake. American lives are at stake
11 if we cannot do an MRAP, if takes 2 years instead of 2
12 months, and there was a clear need. And not necessarily in
13 this setting but perhaps following up in writing, you could
14 give us some suggestions about how to deal with this
15 bureaucratic issue. There has got to be some kind of
16 expedited path. Are lives at stake? Yes. Then it goes in
17 a different direction.

18 Mr. Jones: Absolutely. But my opinion is you have got
19 to reduce the bureaucracy. There are simply too many people
20 that can say no and too many people that can block it. And
21 if we cannot do it for our own troops, let alone the troops
22 of our allies and our friends, we are at risk I think in
23 terms of, as you said, Senator, costing more lives because
24 of our inefficiency. And that is something that I think
25 Goldwater-Nichols II could really take a look at and trim

1 the bureaucracy so that there are fewer people who can say
2 no.

3 Senator King: And it seems to me we have parallel
4 bureaucracies now. We have the Secretary of Defense with
5 all that that entails, and then we have the Joint Staff. We
6 have got sort of two very large entities. Would that be
7 where you would start?

8 Mr. Jones: I think those are two very large
9 bureaucracies. I noticed on the Secretary of Defense's
10 staff, we have 70 flag and general officers. On the
11 Secretary of Defense staff, 70 flag and general officers
12 working today. So this is enormous and contributes to the
13 inversion that we have created with huge headquarters and
14 their survival, and the amount of resource they consumes
15 comes at the direct expense of the fighting forces, our
16 fighting capabilities.

17 Mr. Flynn: If I can just make one quick comment.

18 Senator King: Yes, Secretary Donley, please.

19 Mr. Flynn: In my last deployment, I spent almost 18
20 months in Afghanistan. The first office that I went back to
21 the Pentagon and thanked -- I purposely did this -- was the
22 Rapid Fielding Office, which was a creation of the inertia
23 that was required on the battlefield because just literally
24 the dozens of urgent need statements that were coming from
25 the battlefield. So this Rapid Needs Office was stood up, a

1 bunch of really great Americans, and they were rapidly
2 turning as fast as they could those kinds of things. And
3 the Secretary, both Rumsfeld and Gates, really turned it on.
4 They were able to move things faster. But even then, they
5 had to work around all this mess that we have all
6 highlighted here. And I just think that we have got to
7 figure out how we can speed up the process when we go to
8 war. We have to.

9 And I will leave one other comment. Secretary Rumsfeld
10 came out to visit us in Balad, Iraq early as in the 2004
11 time frame. I will never forget the conversation. A small
12 group. And we told him. We told him if you told us that we
13 were going to go to war and we were not going to come home
14 until we won, we would fight this war differently. But when
15 you tell me that I am on a 9-month deployment, I am on a
16 6-month deployment, I am on a year deployment, what you have
17 just told is I am going to participate in this conflict. I
18 am going to return forever. If you told me, Flynn -- and we
19 were looking right at him. If you told me, Flynn, you are
20 not going to come home until we win, how would you fight
21 this war differently. And trust me, Senator. We would have
22 fought it differently, much differently.

23 Senator King: Well, I appreciate this.

24 Mr. Chairman, I think this is one of the areas we
25 really have to look at, the whole issue of bureaucracy

1 because it is one thing how long it takes to get socks
2 through the process, but if we are talking about an MRAP or
3 ammunition or lifesaving equipment and we are in a battle
4 space that is changing so fast that you just cannot fight
5 the last war. So I hope you fellows can help us think this
6 through because the tendency of any bureaucracy -- and these
7 are not bad people, by the way, but the tendency of any
8 bureaucracy is, A, to say no and, B, to grow. And I think
9 it is something we are going to have to -- this is the
10 purpose of these hearings is to help us to address these
11 questions. But this puts a very fine point on the
12 necessity, it seems to me.

13 Thank you very much, gentlemen.

14 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

15 Chairman McCain: 70 flag and general officers that
16 work for the Secretary of Defense?

17 Mr. Jones: That is correct.

18 Senator King: I wonder how many there were in all of
19 World War II.

20 Chairman McCain: There was a PACCOM and there was a
21 European Command.

22 Senator Ayotte?

23 Senator Ayotte: Thank you, Chairman.

24 I want to thank all of you for your distinguished
25 records of service to the country.

1 And, General Flynn, I wanted to ask -- really have all
2 of you comment on something -- your comments where you said
3 I have also served many years in combat and have suffered
4 from the lack of many capabilities we needed to fight our
5 enemies and found myself fighting the Pentagon is much more
6 than our enemies.

7 The one thing that I have noticed in my first term in
8 the Senate here is that when we get feedback from the ground
9 and we get feedback from the soldiers, the airmen, the
10 sailors, and they tell us about something, it becomes almost
11 retributive in terms of when they are telling us something
12 and what happens to them to give us the honest opinion of
13 what they need from the ground and what they think. And I
14 feel like I have a responsibility to get that opinion, not
15 just to hear from the service chief but to hear from the
16 people who are really affected. And yet, the experience
17 that I have seen around here is that, listen, you got to do
18 it secretly. You got to do it quietly, and if they find you
19 out, they will root you out.

20 So how do we change that culture? And you know there
21 is a law that says if a Member of Congress -- you legally
22 can talk to a Member of Congress about your opinion. And so
23 how do we change that cultural problem that seems to be, in
24 my view, something that I have been shocked by.

25 Mr. Flynn: I could spend all day, and I will try to be

1 very, very brief. I once wrote and sent in an urgent needs
2 statement because we were actually using the equipment. So
3 it was an off-the-shelf buy that we did and we are using it
4 and it is working. Our operational guys going and doing
5 raids in houses were using it. And we pieced it together,
6 and we said, okay, this is something that we want to go to
7 our larger joint task force. And so I wrote it, sent it up
8 through the channels. I did all my back channel stuff to
9 all my buddies because we were trying to move at a different
10 speed. And when it made it through the system, it got into
11 the Army, in this case -- but not always the Army is the bad
12 guy. And folks on the Army staff said that is not what they
13 need. He does not need that. Who does he think he is?

14 Now, at the time, I was a colonel. These senior guys
15 come out and they say, Flynn, if one of you ever need
16 anything, call me. So I called up the boss, in this case
17 the Deputy Secretary of Defense. And I was calling from
18 combat. So they took the call. And good enough, the
19 DepSecDef said let me look into it and we were able to get
20 the capability.

21 Now, that is about as bold as you can get because you
22 know what? I was, in this case, in Iraq and I was like,
23 okay, what the hell are they going to do. We need this
24 capability. And I am finding a system that just could not,
25 did not respond.

1 Senator Ayotte: What worries me is that you were able
2 to do that. I can assure you that that has happened, and
3 the person who tried to do that in your shoes, instead of
4 getting what they need, got punished in some way. That is
5 what worries me. Am I wrong about this?

6 Mr. Flynn: No. I think you are right. I see it right
7 now. I actually see it happening right now because I have a
8 lot of friends that are still serving, especially in the
9 intelligence community where they feel so -- it is not just
10 about this assessment stuff. It is actually about other
11 things that are going on, and it is like they feel
12 encumbered, limited, constrained to say something because
13 particularly with systems, there is some equipment out there
14 that is just flat not working.

15 We are getting ready to send some more forces to combat
16 here. The Secretary of Defense was in here the other day
17 talking to you about it. And I know down at the troop level
18 because I see it, they are asking for a particular piece of
19 equipment and their headquarters are saying do not ask for
20 that piece of equipment. And in fact, in one case, one
21 headquarters has said I do not want to see any more urgent
22 needs coming through this headquarters. Now, for a
23 commander to say that, it is -- I guess I am not surprised,
24 Senator, but --

25 Senator Ayotte: What can we do to empower that, I

1 mean, to empower that people can speak freely? What more
2 can we do?

3 Mr. Jones: I think it is, first and foremost, a
4 leadership problem, and I think service chiefs owe it to put
5 out guidance to their forces that this is our system. This
6 is what happens. You are going to be -- in the course of
7 your career, you are going to talk to Members of Congress.
8 You are going to talk to staff. And the only thing we would
9 ask is that what you tell them you have told us so that
10 everybody is on the same sheet of music. You do not, on the
11 one hand, keep your mouth shut while you are talking to your
12 commander and then unload on your commander behind closed
13 doors.

14 So I think that we can do a lot more in the leadership
15 department to try to educate our men and women in uniform
16 exactly why this is part of the system. And the other thing
17 is positive leadership means that you do not take
18 retribution out on people for speaking honestly about what
19 they feel. So I think there is a way to do it. I just
20 think it takes more focus and it takes positive leadership
21 and guidance to make sure that people in the respective
22 service understand that this is the policy. That still will
23 not stamp it out, but it will help.

24 Mr. Donley: I would associate myself 100 percent with
25 General Jones' remarks. This is a leadership issue. As

1 Members of Congress, I encourage you to keep those channels
2 open and exercise your prerogative to talk to anybody you
3 feel you need to talk to, to mix it up with our men and
4 women in uniform.

5 At the same time, as a service leader, we tell our
6 forces, our civilians, our military personnel, use the chain
7 of command. I would ask if something gets into a
8 congressional channel, I am asking why is it not coming to
9 me or the chief. Why is it not coming up through the
10 leadership channels? So it is a leadership issue, and we
11 should be encouraging our people to be straight with their
12 chain of command and with anybody who asks from the outside.

13 Senator Ayotte: So I appreciate all your comments on
14 this. And I think people would be straight with their chain
15 of command if they felt that they were not going to get
16 punished for doing so. So that is my big concern.

17 Mr. Jones: Senator, I think you probably had this
18 experience as well too that in units that are well led, you
19 do not have that problem.

20 Senator Ayotte: Right.

21 Mr. Jones: Units that demonstrate that trait, that
22 negative trait, are generally led by people who are somewhat
23 insecure and cannot tolerate that just psychologically.

24 Senator Ayotte: Right, because the leader will take
25 feedback of all forms and be able to address it.

1 Mr. Jones: You can overcome that.

2 Senator Ayotte [presiding]: Thank you.

3 It looks like I am here. So I am going to call on
4 Senator Sullivan.

5 Senator Sullivan: Well, I appreciate everybody's
6 testimony and again your service, gentlemen.

7 I want to dig in again. I think you might be seeing
8 here maybe a little bit of consensus on the committee on the
9 issue. General Jones, you wrote about it very articulately
10 in your testimony, and all of you have been speaking to it
11 on the tooth-to-tail ratio issue.

12 I know this is a big question, but why do you think it
13 has exploded so much? Is it just the normal kind of desire
14 of bureaucracies to always grow whether it is at DOD or NATO
15 or the EPA? I mean, why do you think it exploded? Because
16 I think that can help us get to some of the answers.

17 And then on this issue of just 77 flag officers, do you
18 think it would make sense for us, as opposed to try and
19 reposition each flag officer position, say, in the
20 Secretary's Office, to just pass a law saying, hey, you will
21 have no more than 25 flag officers. You figure out what
22 they should be doing?

23 Why do you think it has grown, and then how do you
24 think we can get a handle on it?

25 And I will ask one final question. General Milley has

1 been really focusing on this issue because the Army has been
2 required to undertake a lot of cutbacks, at least for now.
3 And I think he is looking at the wisdom of these cutbacks
4 and to what degree the tooth-to-tail ratio is out of whack.
5 What advice would you give him, who is really real-time
6 struggling with this issue? But I think it is an important
7 one that you could see some consensus building here in the
8 committee. I know I threw a lot at you, but feel free to,
9 any of you, take a crack at any of those questions. Thank
10 you.

11 Mr. Donley: Senator, I will take a first cut at it.
12 First of all, I think it is the nature of bureaucracies to
13 grow over time. So this issue of regularly addressing the
14 need for greater efficiencies is an extremely important one.
15 And DOD's bureaucracy is no different than any other. It
16 needs to be pruned.

17 Senator Sullivan: And do you think we are only entity
18 that can really do that effectively?

19 Mr. Donley: I think Congress has a very strong role to
20 play because this is your role to oversee the Department in
21 this kind of a context.

22 I do think Congress has effective tools that it can
23 use. At times in the past, Congress has put ceilings on
24 headquarters activities in the Department down to the
25 service level, and the Congress currently has limits on

1 general officers at each grade. So you do have tools
2 available.

3 The one aspect that I would ask you to think about --
4 and it is a little bit new from our decades' old experience
5 -- is the rise of the contractor workforce. And I think the
6 Department needs to get a handle on that and is in the
7 process of doing that and trying to figure out how many
8 contractors are supporting its headquarters activities. So
9 the way I advised Secretary Hagel on this, when we did the
10 OSD review a couple of years ago -- you will recall that he
11 had given direction for 20 percent reductions in all
12 management headquarters in the Department, including OSD.

13 Senator Sullivan: And did that happen? You hear that
14 everybody does that. And yet, the bureaucracies grow. So
15 it does not look like it always works.

16 Mr. Donley: No. I think it is underway, and it has
17 been underway for a couple of years. Secretary Gates
18 started this in his efficiencies work in 2011. It got
19 reinforced by Secretary Hagel. Now it is getting reinforced
20 again by Congress. And actually one of the complexities the
21 Department is going through now is to how to unite all those
22 efficiencies that had been set in motion that are now piled
23 on each other sort of in three different time frames over
24 the last 3 or 4 years. So I think the work is underway, and
25 what the committee has directed the Department to do in this

1 management headquarters review will help set a new baseline
2 for that.

3 But getting back to the contractors, you have to not
4 just control the authorizations, but you have to control the
5 money because if you allow the headquarters to have more
6 money to work with, then they will buy contractor support
7 with those resources. So getting a handle on how many
8 contractors are supporting the headquarters and in what
9 contexts is an important part of reestablishing a good
10 baseline over these headquarters activities.

11 Senator Sullivan: General Jones, General Flynn, any
12 comments?

13 Mr. Flynn: Just really quick because I am not sure you
14 were here, Senator, when General Jones talked about
15 civilian-to-military ratios.

16 Senator Sullivan: No. I did hear that.

17 Mr. Flynn: Of everything I have heard today, that is a
18 really, really important set of data to really hone in on
19 and take a look at because it addresses a bigger issue than
20 what you are talking about. So when we are really looking
21 at reform, I think that is super important.

22 The other is the flag officer ratio within the
23 military. If you look at historical ratios, you know, how
24 many flag officers per how many troops, as far back in time
25 as you want to go, I would recommend that you go take a look

1 at that because we actually have more flag officers per
2 fighting unit than we did when we were doing really, really
3 big things. So it is worth taking a look at as part of this
4 effort.

5 Mr. Jones: I do not have the figures, but I do have
6 the active duty-to-enlisted ratios in the militaries. In
7 the Air Force, it is 1 officer for every 4.1 enlisted. In
8 the Navy, it is 1 officer for every 4.9; in the Army, 1
9 officer for 4.1; and in the Marine Corps, 1 officer for
10 every 7.8 enlisted. And that is the officer-to-enlisted
11 ratios. That has been fairly consistent over time.

12 With regard to your question about how do we get here,
13 I completely agree with my colleagues. As a matter of fact,
14 I noticed, when I was in the Pentagon, that everybody is for
15 change as long as the change is done to somebody else. And
16 that is just the inherent personality of a bureaucracy. And
17 I believe honestly to enact the kind of change that we
18 critically need here, it is going to take an external
19 effort. And I do not mean this pejoratively or critically
20 of my former colleagues in the Pentagon. They are working
21 like crazy trying to keep up with this very difficult world.
22 But it is going to take an outside -- and they should
23 participate in it, but it is going to take a focused,
24 separate outside organization much like the Defense Reform
25 Task Force of 1997 to really think this through and how to

1 do it.

2 Senator Sullivan: Thank you, gentlemen.

3 Thank you, Madam Chair.

4 Senator Ayotte: Thank you.

5 General Jones, it sounds like you are signing up for
6 duty -- I like that -- with this outside task force.

7 So since the chairman left me to close out this
8 hearing, I cannot help myself since I have such a great
9 panel here of incredible experts on national security
10 issues. I have to ask you about something that has just
11 been developing, which is yesterday the IAEA issued its
12 report on the prior military dimensions of Iran's nuclear
13 program. Have you had a chance to take a look at that?

14 One of the pieces of it talks about the fact we know
15 that Iran -- we have had serious concerns about the Parchin
16 facility and what they have done there in terms of
17 conducting experiments related to the design of the core of
18 a nuclear bomb. And we also know that they took activities
19 even during the negotiations process to demolish and change
20 things at that facility.

21 So the IAEA report -- one of the pieces of it concerns
22 me because the IAEA concluded that the extensive activities
23 undertaken by Iran at that facility since February of 2012
24 have seriously undermined the agency's ability to conduct
25 effective verification.

1 So I just wanted to ask you sort of post-agreement here
2 -- the IAEA report issued yesterday. So I am not going to
3 ask you to render an opinion on it. You have not seen it
4 yet. But I think it raises some verification concerns. And
5 we had the testing of the long-range missile in October,
6 which I have not seen a response yet from our administration
7 on, that is in violation of existing U.N. resolutions, and
8 many of us have long been concerned about their missile
9 program because you do not need an ICBM unless you are
10 interested in delivering a nuclear weapon to the U.S.

11 So I just wanted to get your opinions, especially
12 General Flynn and Jones, on where we are with Iran and where
13 we are post-agreement, if you have concerns, what they are
14 and what we should be doing.

15 Mr. Jones: I have just spent some time in the Gulf
16 region talking to various leaders of our friends and allies.
17 And the word that most came up in conversations is the word
18 "existential threat." Most of our friends and allies in the
19 Gulf, quite apart from the agreement that was reached with
20 Iran, still consider Iran to be an existential threat for
21 the foreseeable future. And as a matter of fact, one of the
22 leaders said this agreement may paper over our concerns for
23 a few years, but make no mistake about it. We are going to
24 be fighting Iran for 25 years or 30 years. This is not
25 going away.

1 So I think time will tell whether Iran is going to be
2 trusted. My personal view is they are not going to be.

3 Senator Ayotte: I think even just even in the
4 immediate aftermath of the agreement --

5 Mr. Jones: You would think.

6 Senator Ayotte: -- things are not going exactly how
7 you would think they would.

8 Mr. Jones: Yes. You would think.

9 But we entered into this agreement not just in
10 isolation but with our P5 Plus 1 partners, and they are
11 bright people, intelligent, and trying to do the right
12 thing.

13 But I just think Iran has yet to prove itself that it
14 is ready to join the family of nations in the way of doing
15 trade, in the way of normalized relations, and do not worry
16 about Hezbollah, do not worry about Hamas, do not worry
17 about the fact that they are supporting a war in Yemen, and
18 all the other things that they are doing. And so until
19 there is really a behavioral change at the leadership level
20 in Iran, we should be very, very careful about what we buy
21 into with them. I have seen no evidence that they are
22 trustworthy.

23 Chairman McCain [presiding]: I thank the witnesses and
24 I thank you for your service, and I thank you for helping us
25 in this very significantly difficult challenge. And the

1 more we talk, the greater the challenge becomes. So I thank
2 you. And it has been extremely helpful, and we will be
3 calling on you in the future. Thank you.

4 This hearing is adjourned.

5 [Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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