

Stenographic Transcript
Before the

Subcommittee on Airland

COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON ARMY MODERNIZATION IN
REVIEW OF THE DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

Tuesday, April 14, 2015

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1 HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON ARMY MODERNIZATION
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5 Tuesday, April 14, 2015
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7 U.S. Senate
8 Subcommittee on Airland
9 Committee on Armed Services
10 Washington, D.C.
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12 The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m.
13 in Room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Tom
14 Cotton, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

15 Committee Members Present: Senators Cotton
16 [presiding], Inhofe, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Manchin,
17 Donnelly, and Hirono.
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1 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TOM COTTON, U.S. SENATOR
2 FROM ARKANSAS

3 Senator Cotton: The hearing will come to order.

4 The Airland Subcommittee convenes today to hear
5 testimony regarding Army modernization in review of the
6 defense authorization request for fiscal year 2016 and the
7 future years defense program.

8 On behalf of Senator Manchin and myself, I welcome all
9 the witnesses from the U.S. Army and thank each of you for
10 your years of dedicated service oftentimes overseas in
11 hostile environments.

12 The full committee in numerous hearings to date has
13 heard from many witnesses testifying to the many challenges
14 and threats our country and armed services face today. The
15 U.S. is facing the most diverse, complex, and dangerous
16 threats to our national security in recent memory.

17 However, instead of strengthening our forces and
18 ensuring our men and women in uniform have the training,
19 equipment, and logistical support they need, sustained
20 defense budget cuts, in combination with senseless
21 sequestration, are damaging our military's force structure,
22 modernization, and readiness.

23 In testimony before the full committee, Secretary
24 McHugh described that despite volatility and instability
25 around the world, America's Army is faced with an enemy here

1 at home: the return of modernization. Your Army faces a
2 dark and dangerous future unless Congress acts now.

3 General Odierno emphasized sequestration would force
4 another 70,000 soldiers over the next 5 years from the
5 active component and another 10 to 12 additional combat
6 brigades by 2020.

7 Does it really makes sense to cut the Army that is
8 presently operating in 144 countries around the world with
9 over 140,000 soldiers deployed to meet all mission
10 requirements? Our soldiers, after fighting for over a
11 decade in two separate theaters of war, are still very busy,
12 indeed.

13 Regardless of our Army's operational tempo and the load
14 our soldiers bear, the force must also modernize. It must
15 do so to keep the world's preeminent ground force relevant
16 and ready to meet the challenges of the 21st century. The
17 Army's Operating Concept, win in a complex world, envisions
18 an Army that is expeditionary, tailorable, scalable, and
19 prepared to meet the challenges of the global environment.
20 For our soldiers to be successful in their missions to
21 shape, deter, and win, they need the best equipment and
22 weapons our country and its citizens can provide.

23 One of my highest responsibilities as a Senator is to
24 ensure our military has the resources it needs to protect
25 and defend this country. To fulfill that responsibility,

1 Congress has the authority to oversee military spending, to
2 ensure the Department of Defense invests in programs that
3 meets the needs of the warfighter, and all at a cost that is
4 affordable to the American taxpayer.

5 In order to exercise effective oversight on military
6 spending, Congress and the military must be able to exchange
7 information about which programs are most important to the
8 success of our men and women in uniform and which programs
9 are not living up to their promises.

10 That is why the prospect of continued sequester of the
11 Pentagon budget is so damaging to our national security.
12 The blunt mechanism of sequestration does not afford
13 lawmakers and the Pentagon the ability to drive a budget
14 from a sound strategy, but rather imposes strategic
15 decisions across the board, many of which damage our
16 military's readiness and long-term investments.

17 But I want to be clear that my opposition to sequester
18 does not mean that there is no room for reform or efficiency
19 in the military's budget. Ultimately I believe one of the
20 best ways to remove the threat of sequester is to identify
21 areas where there is obvious room for reform in the system
22 and to encourage senior military leaders to justify
23 continued spending in those areas.

24 Today's hearing will only begin to touch on Army
25 modernization. There are several areas that I hope we can

1 begin a substantive dialogue with our Army acquisition
2 leaders. Today I hope to cover in particular three
3 important Army programs: the joint light tactical vehicle,
4 the distributed common ground system, and the aviation
5 restructuring initiative.

6 The JLTV recently completed limited user testing and is
7 now with the source selection committee to determine an
8 award of one to three vendors: Oshkosh, Lockheed Martin,
9 and AM General. This is an important procurement program
10 for the mobility of our infantry in modern operational
11 environments. I have concerns that the Army's tactical
12 wheeled vehicle strategy lacks operational detail about the
13 fielding of JLTV for active and reserve components.

14 In addition, I want to emphasize good acquisition
15 practices as the Army moves ahead with this program.
16 because this is a large program that will directly impact
17 operations across the force, it is important the Army gets
18 the program right. As the subcommittee examines programs
19 like JLTV, I am prepared to hold future hearings that look
20 at the details of each of the Army's acquisition programs to
21 evaluate the risks to success and ensure the Army spends
22 taxpayer money wisely.

23 Another area this hearing hopes to examine more fully
24 is the battlefield intelligence system, known as the
25 distributed common ground system-Army, or DCGS-A. The U.S.

1 Army has spent 10 years and more than \$3 billion developing
2 DCGS-A. The purpose of DCGS-A is to collect and process
3 information from a variety of military and intelligence
4 sources and share that information seamlessly to sites
5 around the world. Despite these investments, the failures
6 of DCGS-A are well documented. They include a series of
7 testing failures, program delays, cost overruns, and
8 negative reports from deployed commanders and soldiers. The
9 Army's is promise that the next version of the software
10 would fix the problems with the system, but units continue
11 to report that it does not meet their needs in theater or
12 their home stations. Instead of leveraging existing
13 technologies, the Army continues with an approach to
14 delivering a major software platform. They continue to try
15 to build core functions of a DCGS-A system according to
16 customer requirements rather than adopting commercial
17 components that work today.

18 In addition, today we will examine the Army's other
19 important priorities for providing the best and most modern
20 force: the Apache AH-64, UH-60 modernization, production
21 and fielding of the AMPV, JLTV, and Abrams, Bradley, and
22 Paladin upgrades. In regard to developing science and
23 technology initiatives, Army leadership has emphasized the
24 importance of key investments, including the joint multi-
25 role helicopter, combat vehicle prototyping, assured

1 position navigation and timing, and enhanced cyber
2 operations and network protection. Integrated into these
3 efforts is the Army's aviation restructure initiative. The
4 ARI is intended to both retain our best and most capable
5 aircraft and to divest our least capable. Its aim is to
6 field a total force of 10 fully equipped and modernized
7 active component combat aviation brigades and 12 National
8 Guard Reserve brigades by 2019. It will divest a total of
9 798 aircraft, 687 from the regular Army and 111 from the
10 reserve component. It is targeting \$12 billion in cost
11 savings but will require a total Army effort to be
12 successful.

13 Ever-increasing demands of a smaller Army translates
14 into increased risk for our operational plans and unforeseen
15 contingencies. Army operations in an increasingly unstable
16 world are vital to shaping the strategic landscape in favor
17 of U.S. interests.

18 General Odierno has emphasized the uncertainty of
19 strategic security, characterized by an increasing velocity
20 of global instability. This means risk to our soldiers,
21 those deployed and those on the bench prepared to deploy on
22 short notice. To mitigate these risks, our troopers need to
23 be armed and equipped with the best equipment that we can
24 provide. This will require sustained funding, effective
25 management of acquisition programs, fully resourced unit set

1 fielding, and strategic vision. Army leaders must ensure
2 unity of effort to ensure our modernization programs meet
3 cost, schedule, and performance objectives. They must
4 demand these programs produce equipment that give our
5 soldiers a decisive edge on tomorrow's battlefield, and we
6 must provide our soldiers with improved situational
7 awareness, assured communications, sustained mobility,
8 better protection, and overmatching fire power. Getting
9 these things right will save lives and ensure mission
10 success.

11 Again, I want to thank all the witnesses for appearing
12 today. Thanks for your flexibility in coming back after we
13 had to postpone 2 weeks ago because of the budget votes. I
14 look forward to hearing your testimony and having our
15 conversation.

16 Senator Manchin?

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1 STATEMENT OF HON. JOE MANCHIN III, U.S. SENATOR FROM
2 WEST VIRGINIA

3 Senator Manchin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I also
4 want to thank you all for your service and welcome you here
5 today.

6 Over the last 14 years, the Army has done everything we
7 have asked of them and more. They have performed with
8 selfless devotion and courage. The Nation could not be more
9 proud or more grateful, and I can assure you the people in
10 West Virginia feel the same.

11 We owe them much, but most importantly, the Army
12 deserves the resources necessary for what they are doing
13 today and for what they will be asked to do again tomorrow.
14 Regrettably, if caps under the Budget Control Act or
15 sequestration are allowed to stand, we may struggle to meet
16 these obligations.

17 The arbitrary drop in defense funding over the last 3
18 years has already hurt Army readiness and modernization,
19 indeed, has undermined the welfare of soldiers and their
20 families and eroded their trust that we will keep our
21 promises that they will be well trained, well equipped, and
22 well served.

23 The fiscal year 2016 request proposes further
24 reductions to the end strength of the Army. If approved, at
25 the end of fiscal year 2016, active Army end strength will

1 be down to 475,000 soldiers and combat brigades to 30. Our
2 National Guard will drop to 342,000, and Army Reserve to
3 198,000. We are interested to learn how the Army's request
4 this year would manage reductions and still continue to
5 build the strategic depth necessary to respond to unforeseen
6 contingencies.

7 I read with interest the speech last week by Deputy
8 Secretary of Defense Robert Work at the Army War College in
9 Pennsylvania. He spoke in concrete terms about operating
10 environment and technologies needed to retain our land
11 force's edge into the future. We would be interested to
12 hear our witnesses' views on Secretary Work's vision
13 relative to the Army's recently released Army Operating
14 Concept: Winning in a Complex World. What are the Army's
15 most important capabilities, capacities, and readiness
16 issues and how does this request address them to meet the
17 missions of today and tomorrow? How will BCA caps impact
18 the Army's management of these changes and the associated
19 strategic risk in readiness to meet urgent contingencies?

20 Over the last several years, the Department of Defense
21 and the Army have made tough choices in its major
22 modernization programs due to the high cost and performance
23 shortfalls in new technologies and the realities of
24 declining resources. For the most part, the process of
25 making these choices has resulted in an arguably more

1 reliable, technically achievable, and affordable
2 modernization program. However, this is not apparent for
3 the tactical network. Chronic performance of reliability
4 problems have plagued every aspect of the network's
5 development. The Army has over time lowered network
6 performance requirements, lowering the bar, if you will, for
7 program of record technologies. Evidence from operational
8 testing and feedback from field units raises legitimate
9 questions that a truly mobile, ad hoc technical network is
10 technologically achievable. The requirement for an air-
11 ground tactical communications network is indisputable but
12 can the current state of the art achieve it?

13 The fiscal year 2016 request includes a modest increase
14 over last year for research, development, and acquisition
15 emphasizing aviation and science and technology programs
16 while deferring for several years any large investment for a
17 next generation combat vehicle or replacement for the OH-58D
18 Kiowa Warrior armed scout helicopter. Under the
19 circumstances, this appears to be a prudent approach, but we
20 need to know what risks we may face tomorrow if we are not
21 investing today in the next generation technologies that our
22 next generation soldiers will need and deserve.

23 Mr. Chairman, it is apparent that a smaller Army only
24 partially ready and with a dwindling technology edge cannot
25 meet the current defense strategy of this country. We need

1 an Army that is large enough, well trained enough, well led,
2 ready, rapidly deployable, and technologically dominant to
3 respond to the crises we will likely face in the foreseeable
4 future.

5 So I look forward to this hearing and how the Army will
6 handle strategic risk in this fiscal environment and what
7 the impact of threatened BCA caps could be on the Army's
8 readiness and modernization and perhaps even more
9 importantly on the welfare of our soldiers, civilians, and
10 their families.

11 I also am very much concerned about how do we handle
12 this as far as new procurement of equipment that is going to
13 be needed in the field, how we can get a fast track on that,
14 if you will, how our efficiencies will work for all of our
15 benefit. And these are things I have been very interested
16 in.

17 But I want to thank you all again, and I look forward
18 to your testimony.

19 Mr. Chairman?

20 Senator Cotton: Generals, we have your written
21 testimony. General Williamson, do you care to add anything?

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1 STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL E. WILLIAMSON,
2 USA, MILITARY DEPUTY AND DIRECTOR, ARMY ACQUISITION CORPS,
3 OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, ACQUISITION,
4 LOGISTICS, AND TECHNOLOGY

5 General Williamson: So, sir, I think you have covered
6 the challenges that we have.

7 I think the only thing that I would offer is that we
8 have taken a very balanced approach to our modernization
9 strategy. We have looked at that in terms of really five
10 categories.

11 So the first is the preservation of the science and
12 technology investment. So we view that as the seed corn,
13 and without that investment, we are not going to be able to
14 take advantage of the new technologies when resources become
15 available.

16 The second would be procuring new items where needed,
17 and so as we have identified existing gaps in capabilities,
18 we are going to use our limited modernization funds to
19 address filling those gaps.

20 The third part of that would be tied to improving our
21 existing systems where we find, because of obsolescence,
22 because of gaps in the capability, that if we make an
23 improvement to an existing system, it extends the life or
24 provides more capability than what we have today.

25 There are two other aspects that people do not normally

1 think about as we talk about modernization. And the first
2 is the reset of the existing equipment. So as equipment is
3 coming back from theater, we have to bring that back up to
4 standard in order to support near-term contingency missions.

5 And then finally, it is the notion of divestiture. So
6 in order to free up space in our modernization strategy and
7 in order to address the continuing costs, we have to divest
8 ourselves of legacy systems that are no longer in use by our
9 force. It reduces our operational and sustainment costs.

10 Sir, as was mentioned, there are a number of challenges
11 that are there. What we are trying to do as an Army, in
12 light of the AOC, as you have mentioned in your statement,
13 is how do we now adjust our procurement in order to support
14 the goals of the Army.

15 Sir, I stand by, prepared to answer any of your
16 questions.

17 [The joint prepared statement of General Williamson,
18 General McMaster, General Ierardi, and General Cheek
19 follows:]

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1 Senator Cotton: Thank you, General Williamson.

2 Does anybody else have any opening statement they would
3 like to add to your joint written statement? General
4 McMaster?

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1 STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL HERBERT R. McMASTER,
2 JR., USA, DIRECTOR, ARMY CAPABILITIES INTEGRATION
3 CENTER/DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL, FUTURES, UNITED STATES
4 ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND

5 General McMaster: Sir, thank you. And I just want to
6 say thanks to you and Ranking Member Manchin and
7 distinguished members of the subcommittee, really in both of
8 your opening statements -- most of the content I have exed
9 out in my opening statements because I think you covered it
10 much more fully than I can.

11 But I just want to tell you that I appreciate the
12 opportunity to talk with you about the Army Operating
13 Concept, its relationship to Army modernization, and the
14 enduring importance of ready land forces in sufficient
15 capacity to accomplish the mission.

16 To prevent conflict, shape security environments, and
17 win in a complex world, Army forces must have both the
18 capability and the capacity to accomplish assigned missions
19 while confronting, as you both pointed out, increasingly
20 dangerous threats in complex operational environments. The
21 Army Operating Concept will guide our modernization efforts
22 and help us do the best we can with the resources that we
23 are provided and with the strength of our Army. It
24 prioritizes the integration of advanced technologies with
25 skilled soldiers and well trained teams and adaptive

1 leaders. That is what we believe is our differential
2 advantage over enemies today and in the future.

3 The AOC also establishes first principles for the
4 integration of new technologies and for the design of the
5 future force. And most importantly, I think it integrates
6 our learning activities, how we learn and adapt through
7 Force 2025 maneuvers, which are both physical exercises and
8 assessments, as well as intellectual exercises associated
9 with Army war-gaming and seminars, to develop solutions to
10 problems associated with armed conflict. Force 2025
11 maneuvers are oriented on 20 fundamental or first-order
12 questions, the answers to which will improve current and
13 future force combat effectiveness.

14 Our Army develops interim solutions to these
15 warfighting challenges and identifies requirements to
16 improve the combat effectiveness of the current and future
17 force. This is how we intend to do our best to prioritize
18 efforts in force modernization and make sure that we
19 maintain overmatch over future enemies. "Overmatch" we
20 define as the application of capabilities or the use of
21 tactics in a way that renders an adversary unable to respond
22 effectively.

23 As both of you have mentioned, budgetary pressures
24 associated with the Budget Control Act in particular could
25 make it tempting to overlook or undervalue the capacity of

1 ready land forces to accomplish current and future missions.
2 But strong, sufficient, and capable land forces are vital to
3 national security. As you know, Army forces are critical to
4 deterring conflict because they are capable of compelling
5 outcomes without the cooperation of the enemy. Importantly,
6 ready land forces are essential to compel sustainable
7 outcomes in war. The consolidation of gains is an integral
8 part of armed conflict and is essential to retaining the
9 initiative over determined enemies and adversaries. To
10 consolidate gains, Army forces often play a supporting role
11 by reinforcing and integrating the efforts of multiple
12 partners.

13 Replacing capacity with a strategy centered on
14 technology alone or on the rapid regeneration of forces is
15 risky. History provides evidence of the challenges inherent
16 in rapidly regenerating effective land forces. As I
17 mentioned earlier, our Army's differential advantage comes
18 from combinations of skilled soldiers, adaptive leaders, and
19 well trained teams with technology. Growing the Army while
20 maintaining overmatch is a complex endeavor requiring policy
21 decisions, dollars, soldiers, infrastructure, advanced
22 weapons systems, and most importantly time.

23 Efforts to compensate for reduced capacity alone or
24 with technology alone are also likely to prove insufficient.
25 Recent and ongoing conflicts reinforce the need to balance

1 the technological focus of modernization with a recognition
2 of the limits of technology. As we know, there are no
3 technological silver bullets in war, and although advances
4 in technology will continue to influence the character of
5 warfare, the effective technologies on land are often not as
6 great as in other domains due to geography, the interaction
7 with adaptive enemies, the presence of noncombatants, and
8 other complexities and uncertainties of war. Our challenge,
9 as you have already mentioned, is to mitigate these risks.
10 Our Army must maintain high levels of readiness and
11 sufficient capacity while also investing in future force
12 modernization.

13 The Army Operating Concept is a starting point for
14 developing the future force. But as historian Sir Michael
15 Howard observed, no matter how hard we think, how clearly we
16 think, it is impossible to anticipate precisely the
17 character of future conflict. The key is to not be so far
18 off the mark that it becomes impossible to adjust once that
19 character is revealed. If we base our future force
20 development efforts on flawed assumptions or wishful
21 thinking, we will increase the risk of being far off the
22 mark and are likely to pay a high price in blood and
23 treasure.

24 Thank you for the opportunity to be with you today, and
25 I look forward to your questions.

1 Senator Cotton: General?
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1 STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL ANTHONY R. IERARDI,
2 USA, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY, G-8

3 General Ierardi: Chairman Cotton, Ranking Member
4 Manchin, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for the opportunity
5 to testify today. I have a very brief statement to open
6 with.

7 As you know, our soldiers remain significantly engaged,
8 leading and contributing to the joint force in missions in
9 complex environments in multiple theaters of operation. As
10 always, they are performing magnificently.

11 The Army's top priorities are to care for these
12 soldiers and their families and to provide them and their
13 units with the training and equipment they need to
14 accomplish their tasks.

15 With significantly reduced budgets and the drawdown in
16 the size of the Army, the Army is carefully balancing the
17 allocation of resources among end strength, readiness, and
18 modernization. The Army will preserve current force
19 readiness to ensure units and our soldiers are prepared for
20 the demands they will encounter as they execute their
21 missions.

22 Conversely, we are being forced to invest less in the
23 modernization of the force to meet the strategic and
24 operational demands of the future. In this context, we must
25 carefully evaluate all programs to ensure our overall

1 modernization effort properly meets the needs of the Army
2 into the future to increase the lethality, protection,
3 mobility, and situational awareness of our soldiers and
4 units.

5 We ask for your continued support for the required,
6 sustained, and predictable funding to ensure we are able to
7 deliver our soldiers the capability they need and deserve.

8 I want to thank you and the committee for your
9 steadfast and generous support to our Army and our soldiers,
10 and I look forward to taking your questions today.

11 Senator Cotton: General Cheek?

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1 STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL GARY H. CHEEK, USA,
2 ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY, G-3/5/7

3 General Cheek: Thank you, Senator. Major General Gary
4 Cheek, Deputy G-3, and I do operations, plans, and policy
5 for the Army.

6 Just to add a couple of things to some of your great
7 opening comments, yes, we are an Army coming out of 14 years
8 of war. There is a lot of goodness in that for our Army.
9 We have a wealth of combat-experienced leaders throughout
10 our force. Surprisingly, the Army is really where it needs
11 to be at appropriate skills and grades across the Army in
12 our non-commissioned officers and officers. We are also
13 very well equipped with many of the resources provided by
14 Congress to give us some great equipment and, really, within
15 the reserve component, maybe never as strong as their
16 equipping status is now.

17 The thing that we lack, of course, are resources to
18 continue to train that force and then to continue to
19 modernize that force because that is where we have to take
20 risk given the constraints of sequestration.

21 The thing that I would offer to you is that if you were
22 to go back a year and see some of the world events that have
23 occurred, for example, in Russia, the United States Army
24 responded, and we have 2,500 soldiers in Eastern Europe
25 under the leadership of the 4th Infantry Division and 3rd

1 Infantry Division training with our Eastern European
2 partners in about 13 different countries.

3 When the crisis if Ebola struck West Africa, the 101st
4 Infantry Division deployed in support of USAID to assist in
5 that effort there.

6 And then, as you know, ISIS emerged in this past year.
7 We have the 1st Infantry Division and 3rd United States Army
8 leading that effort in support of the Iraqis there.

9 I bring that up because I think those events could
10 easily leave Members of Congress and the American public
11 with the impression that the Army is still ready to go, and
12 we do very well at meeting our current obligations that are
13 given to us by combatant commanders. But what you do not
14 see is our contingency force and the readiness of that
15 force, which is what General Odierno often refers to, where
16 we have about 50 percent of the readiness that we believe we
17 need to respond to a major contingency. This is where we
18 get very concerned about the effects of sequestration
19 because it leaves us with a lack of training of those teams
20 and soldiers and leaders to be able to respond to those
21 really unforeseen major crises that may be out there.

22 At any rate, we understand the commitment of Congress
23 for fiscal responsibility within our Government, but we also
24 have a strong commitment to our soldiers. We appreciate
25 your leadership and efforts to assist the Army through this

1 challenging period for the Nation. And like my fellow
2 general officers, I look forward to your questions.

3 Senator Cotton: Thank you, gentlemen, for your
4 statements, again for your service.

5 10 years ago, I was in officer candidate school. As a
6 young officer candidate, I had a TAC who used to always tell
7 us we can do things the smart Ranger way or the hard Ranger
8 way. I do not think I need to elaborate on those two
9 choices for anyone. I have to say that I probably chose the
10 hard Ranger way more often than I would like to confess.
11 But I want to make sure that the Army, to the greatest
12 extent we can, does things the smart Ranger way since the
13 Army can accomplish any mission given to it, but let us
14 accomplish the mission in the most efficient and effective
15 way.

16 I want to start talking about our wheeled vehicle
17 programs. This is obviously something that is very
18 important to all of us. We all lived through the challenges
19 we faced 9, 10, 11 years ago getting vehicles to our troops
20 down-range in Iraq that could sustain major roadside bomb
21 blasts. By the time I was in Iraq in 2006, our Humvees
22 could stop pretty much anything except the largest buried
23 bombs and Iranian-supplied IED's. That is part of why we
24 have the JLTV to replace the Humvee program.

25 I do have some concerns, though, about the strategy and

1 the operational detail it provides. And, General
2 Williamson, I will direct these questions to you first.

3 So the strategy says that the first units will receive
4 JLTV's sometime in fiscal year 2018. Full fielding will
5 occur sometime in fiscal year 2035. Also I understand it
6 says the JLTV's will not replace all Humvees in the Army.
7 So it is unclear to me what the basis of issue plan is for
8 units. When will specific units at, say, the division level
9 begin to receive JLTV's? What is the plan for the complete
10 fielding, and how will we integrate JLTV's with legacy
11 Humvee systems?

12 General Williamson: So, sir, thank you for the
13 question.

14 I hate to be evasive. So I can talk to the
15 programmatic. And I think the timeline that you described
16 and the capabilities of the JLTV are absolutely on target.

17 I would also offer that this is one of those programs
18 that I think, as you look at the three vendors who are
19 providing solutions, we probably have one of the best
20 vehicle programs that I have witnessed during my acquisition
21 career.

22 In terms of how those vehicles will flow, though, I am
23 going to defer to the operational side and the programmatic
24 in terms of the units that they go to first and the timing
25 to field those vehicles.

1 General Cheek: So I think the best way to capture it
2 is the priority for these vehicles will be those most
3 susceptible to those threats that you mentioned. So we will
4 probably focus initially on our combat arms formations, and
5 then for our echelons above brigade that are less likely to
6 be in those threat areas, there will still some, but that is
7 probably where you will see a residual Humvee fleet.

8 Senator Cotton: Could you elaborate on what you mean
9 specifically by combat arms formations below the brigade
10 level?

11 General Cheek: Well, it would be our brigade units but
12 also some of the supporting units that accompany them. And
13 I will use like a fires brigade, for example, and others.
14 But we can get you more specific information on that if you
15 would like to follow up.

16 Senator Cotton: At what level or what echelon do you
17 see units having a mix of both JLTV's and Humvees, and what
18 level do you see them having pure JLTV's?

19 General Cheek: Well, I do not have the exact answer.
20 My belief is that our tactical battalions, infantry armor
21 artillery -- you are going to see JLTV's there. I think
22 above the brigade, you are going to see some mix of those
23 dependent on that.

24 But again, I probably owe you to check that
25 specifically and come back to you with that.

1 [The information follows:]
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1 Senator Cotton: Okay.

2 General Ierardi?

3 General Ierardi: Sir, I would just add that I believe
4 it will be a total force issue plan from the outset based on
5 the operational requirements that the Army has. The idea
6 that we would replace Humvees as we go and as JLTV's are
7 manufactured and then integrated into the force I think is
8 right. We will have fewer Humvees as time goes on, and we
9 field these JLTV's to increase the performance, the payload,
10 and the protection for our units according to the
11 operational demands that we have. But I also believe we
12 will intend it to be a total force fielding across the total
13 Army.

14 Senator Cotton: General Williamson, if can come back.
15 An acquisition question. I know the RFP has laid out
16 several criteria: survivability, mobility, and so forth.
17 And three vendors are competing along that. Sometimes the
18 Army, like all services, also prioritizes protection of the
19 industrial base. Is that a criteria in this program?

20 General Williamson: So, sir, not in terms of the
21 actual selection of the vehicle, but as you look at how we
22 identified the requirements, the timing in terms of the
23 production of those, the goal is to make sure that we
24 support the industrial base in our capacity to build
25 tactical light vehicles.

1 So, again, I would like to point out that as I look at
2 the three vendors who have done this, each has brought an
3 innovative approach to protection, an innovative approach to
4 energy, the transmissions. And so from an industrial base
5 standpoint, I think you are seeing the best of what we can
6 do with current capabilities, and our ability to sustain
7 that over the production lifecycle I think will be a real
8 boon for our industrial base and a boon to our soldiers.

9 Senator Cotton: So I hear that as not protecting an
10 industrial base per se, but taking into account past
11 performance of the vendors as one component of risk?

12 General Williamson: Yes, sir. As you know, we are in
13 that source selection right now. That is going to happen.
14 So the criteria for how we are going to pick the vehicle.
15 So past performance is normally one of those criteria that
16 we use in any source selection.

17 Senator Cotton: Okay. Gentlemen, thank you. My time
18 has nearly expired.

19 Senator Manchin?

20 Senator Manchin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

21 First of all, just out of the chute, I would like to
22 talk about -- you know, when the sequestering first took
23 place, I was here just kind of fresh out of the State. And
24 when that came under the Budget Control Act, we talked about
25 flexibility. And at that time, everybody was pushing back.

1 I mean, to me that would have been something you would have
2 embraced -- the flexibility that you would have had with the
3 money that we already had in the system. Not being able to
4 move the money siloed, it would have made it much more
5 difficult for you all to manage.

6 And I do not know if you all feel any different about
7 the flexibility of the budgets you have to work with or the
8 way the money is siloed. If we could work with you there
9 and give you some freedom, would that help? Because money I
10 think is going to be a concern we are all going to have.
11 You know, you can see it every day here basically. We have
12 a lot of needs, and I think everyone is going to have to
13 look at how we work more efficiently. So I do not know how
14 flexibility -- if any one of you -- General Ierardi?

15 General Ierardi: Sir, if I could. I would open by
16 saying that the stable, predictable nature of funding is
17 important for our modernization programs. The sequester
18 law, as I understood it, would make across-the-board cuts if
19 it was implemented, and that is something that would take
20 away the discretion that we need as a service to make the
21 decisions that are appropriate to provide our soldiers and
22 our units what ultimately they require.

23 Senator Manchin: Are your hands still tied right now?
24 I mean, basically how you all are able to use your budget
25 funds.

1 General Ierardi: Right at this moment, I do not feel
2 that that is the case, sir, no.

3 Senator Manchin: Any of you?

4 General McMaster: Sir, I will just say I do not do the
5 math job that General Ierardi does, but I think that more
6 flexibility seems like it would be better.

7 Senator Manchin: It makes all the sense in the world.
8 But I am just saying politically you understand you did not
9 get the flexibility because everybody wanted to make sure
10 that the sequester would hurt so bad that we would get rid
11 of it. Well, we did not. So by not getting rid of
12 sequestering and not having flexibility, it was a double
13 whammy on you.

14 General Ierardi: Right. So, sir, if I could. The BCA
15 cap -- the funding levels -- we really essentially have been
16 there with the legislative relief we received over the past
17 couple years. That has certainly impacted us adversely.
18 The flexibility in how we administer the funding, at least
19 to this point, has been sufficient for us to have some
20 decisions base in what we needed to do.

21 Senator Manchin: This will be, I think, General
22 McMaster. What does it mean when you talk about sustaining
23 employing our reserve components as an operational reserve?
24 And what are your views of the resource implications or your
25 definition of operational reserve?

1 General McMaster: Sir, operational reserve obviously
2 entails a higher degree of readiness, you know, the ability
3 to respond more quickly than a strategic reserve in the
4 context of mobilization. So as you know, the critical
5 factor is just time. It is time and your ability to
6 maintain a high degree of readiness at the collective level.
7 Of course, as you know, our Army fights as teams, and we
8 conduct combined arms operations and integrate joint
9 capabilities. And so these are all competencies that take
10 time and resources to sustain. So we are limited in terms
11 of the amount of the force that can retain the level of
12 readiness necessary to be a viable operational reserve.

13 I think, sir, as small as our active force is getting,
14 we have got to do everything we can to maintain the National
15 Guard at the highest possible level of readiness.

16 Senator Manchin: How do you all factor in the Guard
17 and the Reserves? The only thing I could ever put between
18 the two -- why do we have both -- is that when I was
19 Governor, I had control of the Guard and the President had
20 control of the Reserves. Other than that, it is kind of the
21 same. I do not know why we could not have worked out
22 something more amicable. And Governor Rounds would
23 understand that also I think.

24 General McMaster: Well, sir, you know, there are
25 different authorities, as you already mentioned, in terms of

1 the ability to mobilize the Reserves. These are policy
2 issues that deal with responsiveness as well. Our Reserves
3 provides some critical capabilities that are essential very
4 early in a conflict, and many of the competencies that they
5 provide are competencies that are oftentimes compatible with
6 their civilian skill sets and so forth. And these are units
7 that are specialized for port opening and --

8 Senator Manchin: Well, here is the other problem I
9 have. It is contractors. I cannot get an accurate answer
10 on contractors. The cost of contracting is unbelievable,
11 and I cannot get anybody to speak towards the cost
12 effectiveness or efficiencies of doing more what we can do
13 with our service and our service's personnel and our Guard
14 and our reservists than what we are doing with outside
15 contractors. Anybody want to touch that? General Cheek?

16 General Cheek: So one challenge we have is there are
17 force management levels that we have for the different
18 theaters we operate in. So a lot of times, a contractor
19 allows us to stay under that. Or contractors are very good
20 if we only need the requirement for a short amount of time
21 rather than grow that within the structure of the Guard or
22 the Reserve. So there are places where I think there are
23 great advantages of contracting, but over the long term, it
24 is very expensive. And it is very difficult for us to
25 predict the number of personnel that are associated with a

1 contract because we purchase a service, not necessarily the
2 numbers of people. So that is another part that complicates
3 it.

4 General Ierardi: Sir, we have worked and will continue
5 to work to reduce contracted support in the force. At Fort
6 Hood and command of 1st Cav, we by and large had moved to
7 soldiers maintaining our ground equipment and our
8 helicopters, not in every case, but as we move forward, it
9 is the Army's intent to bring soldiers back into the
10 business of maintaining and sustaining our equipment and our
11 forces to the greatest extent possible.

12 Senator Manchin: My time is up. There may be a time
13 for another round and we will go through that. Thank you
14 very much.

15 Senator Cotton: Senator Rounds?

16 Senator Rounds: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

17 I would like to take a little about cyber liability and
18 about the exposures that are out there and what the Army is
19 doing. It seems to me an important consideration of your
20 modernization efforts would be its cyber capabilities. I
21 understand that the Army is undertaking a number of
22 significant initiatives in this regard. This includes the
23 creation of 11 cyber protection brigades in the National
24 Guard, a cyber center of excellence at Fort Gordon, Georgia,
25 and a separate cyber branch for officers, the same level as

1 the Army's other branches.

2 What is the current status of that initiative or that
3 series of initiatives or the current state of play, if you
4 would?

5 General McMaster: Sir, just a few things. I mean,
6 first of all, this is a huge priority for us. And as we
7 have become more reliant on network capabilities and
8 communications, that has become a vulnerability, and we can
9 see harbingers of really future threats in what just has
10 happened with Sony Pictures and so forth. But as General Ed
11 Cardon, who is testifying right now separately in a separate
12 forum, can tell you, this is a contested battle space every
13 single day.

14 So what we are doing is making this really a key
15 consideration for the design of obviously our communications
16 systems but really every weapons system to ensure that we
17 have weapons systems that can operate degraded, that can
18 degrade gracefully under some sort of a cyber or
19 electromagnetic attack, and that these are the environments
20 that we consider, these degraded environments, under this
21 kind of duress as we design our force.

22 You know, in the 1990's, we had based a lot of Army
23 modernization on the belief that advances in communications
24 technology and information technologies, automated decision-
25 making tools had shifted war fundamentally from the realm of

1 uncertainty to the realm of certainty. And I remember some
2 of the language of dominant battle space, knowledge, full
3 spectrum dominance, and so forth.

4 We have essentially turned that assumption on its head,
5 and we are now assuming that actually the advances in
6 technology are going to move more into greater uncertainty.
7 And so we have to design a force that can fight for
8 information, that can develop situations and understanding
9 in close contact with the enemy and civilian populations,
10 that can operate widely dispersed while maintaining mutual
11 support. And a lot of this has to do with communications
12 and our systems that can degrade, that can operate degraded.

13 In terms of the cyber support teams that Army is
14 generating, I will ask General Cheek to give you the
15 statistics on those.

16 But I think if you look at innovation, military
17 innovation, I think a case study of this will be our Army
18 cyber and what they have done. I think under General Cardon
19 and his predecessor, they have done a tremendous job of
20 providing a new capability to the force, designing it,
21 training and developing that expertise. And so what we have
22 now is the ability to support forces tactically in these
23 contested environments, to understand better what the
24 threats are to the organization and defend against those
25 threats, but then also to develop the knowledge and the

1 intelligence of that space, as well as, if necessary to do
2 so, conduct offensive operations.

3 Senator Rounds: And I will let General Cheek respond
4 to this as well. But what I am asking is where are we at.
5 Are we on target with it? Are we behind? Do you have the
6 resources to do it?

7 General Cheek: I would say, Senator, we are on track
8 with where we would expect to be. We are fielding cyber
9 protection teams, for example. In many cases we are getting
10 these to an initial capability, as many of these as we can,
11 and through all three of our components. So it is a full
12 effort. We are also standing up the school. We are
13 developing the training mechanisms which are very unique for
14 cyber. We have rifle ranges for all of our soldiers. We
15 have cyber ranges that we are developing as part of the
16 joint force, and then we are also working at the highest
17 level for U.S. Cyber Command and its future, which I am sure
18 is going to grow and expand as well.

19 So we are not complete by any stretch. I wish General
20 Cardon were here because he could give you much more
21 eloquent specifics on this. But we are well on our way, and
22 I would say we probably have about 2 to 3 more years of
23 continuing to build this force to flesh out these teams and
24 maybe a little longer with the reserve component.

25 General McMaster: Sir, just quickly on the stats.

1 From fiscal year 2013 when the Army had zero cyber teams, we
2 now have 24 Army cyber mission teams that have reached, as
3 Gary said, the initial operational capacity. By the end of
4 fiscal year 2016, the Army will have 41 cyber mission teams
5 at initial or full operational capacity. As you mentioned,
6 we continue to evolve and mature that over time. When we
7 get to 41, it will be approximately 1,900 personnel, sir.
8 And as you know, the quality, education of those personnel
9 is probably more important than the exact numbers.

10 Senator Rounds: Thank you.

11 I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman.

12 Senator Cotton: Senator Hirono?

13 Senator Hirono: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
14 all for your service.

15 As we are talking about cybersecurity, it cuts across
16 so many different -- it comes up in the Judiciary Committee.
17 It comes up in the Energy Committee. It comes up in all of
18 our committees. So as you develop these teams, of which you
19 will end up with 41 by the end of 2016, how important is the
20 coordination within the DOD to make sure that we are doing
21 what we need to do and what we are learning from each other
22 and we are basically working together across all of our
23 services?

24 General Cheek: It is absolutely critical. We
25 communicate with each other continuously at multiple levels.

1 So for General Cardon who leads the Army Cyber Command, he
2 has counterparts in the other services that he works with
3 directly, and they are also all underneath Admiral Rogers
4 for U.S. Cyber Command.

5 Also at the highest levels on the Joint Staff within
6 the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the operational deputies, of
7 which I am a part of, we also review the policies, the
8 future, the way ahead routinely, and we have just done that
9 here recently.

10 So there is a lot of dialogue, especially given the
11 threats that emerge continuously. So it is something we
12 take very seriously, and we also want to make sure that we
13 empower those organizations to be able to operate
14 effectively and not over-control it or over-supervise it in
15 a way that would inhibit their effectiveness.

16 Senator Hirono: And does your coordination also
17 include the National Guard?

18 General Cheek: It does. And in fact, the National
19 Guard's first three States are standing up their teams, and
20 over the next several years, many others, to include Hawaii,
21 will stand up their cyber protection teams as well. And
22 then we have just got to work through the authorities of how
23 they work when they are in a State status versus a Federal
24 status. So there is a little more work to do with that, but
25 we are pushing forward on all of these things. A lot of new

1 thinking has to go into how this works with the existing
2 policies and statutes to be effective.

3 Senator Hirono: And would you all agree that
4 cybersecurity is an ever-changing environment? It is like
5 the new arms race. Every time we do something, somebody
6 else is thinking of how to penetrate our systems and wreak
7 havoc.

8 General Ierardi: Ma'am, exactly right. The
9 environment changes very rapidly. Our task is to exceed
10 that change in some way, to become as flexible as we
11 possibly can to adapt the allocation of our resources and
12 our activities to be able to effectively exploit
13 opportunities and to counter the challenges that are
14 present. Your question, the premise of it, that there are
15 multiple capabilities involved in this is exactly right.
16 There are human capabilities, human capacity capabilities,
17 that are very important, mostly important, but there is also
18 software and how we operate. You know, in a modernization
19 hearing in the G-8 where I am, we talk about modernization
20 in terms of hardware. This is a different concept for how
21 we operate, and I think it is important for us to keep that
22 in mind.

23 Senator Hirono: Are you going to be facing some
24 shortages in people with the appropriate backgrounds to work
25 in this area of cybersecurity?

1 General Ierardi: We are certainly oriented on
2 attracting the right people for this mission set and to
3 leverage the folks that are currently in these units and in
4 these activities to the greatest extent possible. But it is
5 an important task for us to recruit and retain individuals
6 with the skills and attributes that we need for this
7 mission.

8 Senator Hirono: In this regard, you will be competing
9 with the private sector because they also need people who
10 are able to deal in this arena.

11 General Ierardi: Yes.

12 Senator Hirono: We had a Armed Services Committee
13 hearing this morning talking about how important the Asia-
14 Pacific area is to national security and the stability of
15 that part of the world, as other parts of the world continue
16 to be unstable.

17 General McMaster, I know that soldiers from the 25th
18 Infantry Division and other units participate in Pacific
19 Pathways and other important mil-to-mil training
20 opportunities with our allies in the Asia-Pacific region.
21 And this morning's hearing reiterated how important those
22 kinds of opportunities are.

23 So can you talk briefly about the importance of having
24 a modernized Army in the Asia-Pacific region projecting
25 forward from Hawaii, Alaska, Korea, and Japan?

1 General McMaster: Yes, ma'am. Thank you for that
2 question.

3 Our Army Operating Concept is different, I think, from
4 previous concepts in that it really looks at the range of
5 operations and the range of missions for our Army, which is
6 to prevent conflict, shape security environments, and then
7 also to win an armed conflict if deterrence fails. And as
8 you know, the positioning forward and rotational presence of
9 Army forces provides a very credible commitment to our
10 allies. You know, you can accomplish quite a bit from
11 standoff range in terms of deterring conflict and responding
12 to conflict, but really, you cannot do the positive things
13 often from standoff range, which is to reassure allies and
14 partners.

15 As you know, in the Pacific region, five of the largest
16 armies in the world are there. And so our engagement with
17 those armies is immensely important in that connection in
18 terms of theater security, architecture, and ability to
19 deter conflict.

20 We are also emphasizing really two key concepts in our
21 Army Operating Concept. One is expeditionary maneuver,
22 which is the ability to deploy forces rapidly, but not just
23 any forces, forces that possess the appropriate combination
24 of mobility, protection, and lethality to accomplish the
25 mission and to also be able to deploy forces of sufficient

1 scale to get that mission done. That is really what
2 deterrence, I think, comes from is really our ability to
3 compel an outcome consistent with our vital interests.

4 To do that, we are emphasizing some key modernization
5 initiatives that I think would be very helpful to forces in
6 the Pacific, and that is combat vehicle modernization. It
7 is also what we want to do with Army aviation and then also,
8 in particular, because of the contested domains of the
9 maritime, airspace, and cyberspace domains, we are saying
10 that Army forces have to deploy rapidly and transition into
11 operations with the right capabilities and in the right
12 capacity to defeat enemy organizations, deter conflict
13 obviously, but if that fails, defeat enemy organizations, to
14 establish control of territory and protect populations, to
15 consolidate gains, but now we think -- and this is very
16 relevant to the Pacific -- project our outward from land
17 into the maritime, airspace, and cyberspace domains to
18 ensure our freedom of movement in these increasingly
19 contested domains, but then also to restrict an enemy's
20 freedom of movement in those domains. And I think our
21 ability to do that could have a very significant deterrent
22 effect.

23 So we are working, for example, on the development of
24 new capabilities with a unit that can deploy rapidly, a
25 fires unit, but a fires unit that can do a lot of different

1 things. It can work surface to air. It can work shore to
2 ship, and it can help restrict, again, enemy movement and
3 then ensure our freedom of movement.

4 Senator Hirono: So there is a much more diverse
5 capability on our part, but at the same time, as you say, in
6 projecting our strength in that area, we need to do, I
7 think, exercises with our allies, the Japanese, the
8 Philippines. Those are important sort of manifestations of
9 our presence in that part of the world. Would you agree?

10 General McMaster: Yes, ma'am. But I will ask Gary
11 maybe to comment on this as well. As you know, in PACOM and
12 U.S. Army Pacific, that is our largest contingent of Army
13 forces of any of the combatant commands.

14 Senator Hirono: I would like to keep it that way,
15 coming from Hawaii as I do.

16 [Laughter.]

17 General McMaster: Pacific Pathways has been immensely
18 important to the development of our future force
19 capabilities. One of these 21st order questions that we ask
20 and warfighting challenges is how to improve our
21 interoperability with other nations. U.S. Army Pacific is
22 going to cosponsor our Army warfighting assessment, which
23 will be at Fort Bliss beginning in 2016 but in fiscal year
24 2017. And partner nations that are involved already this
25 October at Fort Bliss include the Australians. And so we

1 are hoping to expand that -- we are confident we will --
2 further to other Pacific partners for 2017.

3 Senator Hirono: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the
4 additional time. Thank you.

5 Senator Cotton: Senator Sullivan who, I caution the
6 witness, remains a marine to this day.

7 [Laughter.]

8 Senator Sullivan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that
9 reminder.

10 General McMaster, good to see you again, sir.

11 General McMaster: Good to see you, sir.

12 Senator Sullivan: I think you might remember I bumped
13 into you in Tal Afar, and then I worked for you when you
14 were the JSAT commander. So I understand my chain of
15 command here, Mr. Chairman.

16 So for all you gentlemen, I wanted to talk a little bit
17 about kind of the troops in Alaska and how they play into
18 both what Senator Hirono was talking about in terms of the
19 rebalance, but also what I think is becoming an increasingly
20 important area for the United States and that is the Arctic.
21 As you know, we have some great Army units up there, the 1st
22 Stryker Brigade, the 425. I was at NTC with the 1st Stryker
23 Brigade recently and saw their fantastic training. I was
24 with the 425 soldiers just last week as they were getting
25 ready to go do a jump.

1 But I know that you have been focused on what the
2 Russians have been doing in the Arctic, and it is a pretty
3 aggressive, pretty significant development of force
4 capacity. General Dempsey testified recently that four of
5 the new six combat brigades in the Russian military are
6 going to be Arctic-based. They have a new Arctic command.
7 They have dramatically increased their icebreaker fleet.
8 They undertook an exercise that I know a lot of us took a
9 look at. I think it caught a lot of people by surprise in
10 some ways. 45,000 troops, 41 ships, 110 aircraft, all in
11 the northern fleet, their Arctic capacity.

12 In your testimony, you talk about viable land forces
13 capable of opposing the Russian army and its irregular
14 proxies. Such adventurism is more challenging to deter.

15 So I am wondering. You know, one of the things the
16 Army is looking at doing, in terms of future force
17 structuring, is possibly removing one and maybe even two
18 combat brigades from Alaska. My sense on this is it would
19 be lunacy from the perspective of America's national
20 security to be decreasing even one combat soldier,
21 particularly the soldiers we have in Alaska in terms of
22 their capability for Arctic training.

23 I asked General Odierno about Spartan Pegasus recently,
24 if any other airborne unit in the U.S. military could have
25 undertaken that Arctic airborne exercise. He said no.

1 Could you just tell us how you are thinking through the
2 Arctic? Right now there is no OPLAN at all. The NORTHCOM
3 commander does not have an OPLAN. I think we need an OPLAN,
4 particularly as you help us help you think through
5 requirements. Can you give me a sense of how you are
6 thinking about the Arctic and our laydown in terms of Army
7 forces there?

8 General McMaster: Well, sir, based on your summary of
9 the threat, I would sum it up by saying probably not enough.
10 I mean, we are not thinking enough about it. So I know that
11 we have some venues that we can bring this right into,
12 Unified Quest, which is our annual war game. I mean, I
13 think it would be easy for us to develop a scenario that
14 would have us operating in the Arctic and other cold weather
15 environments and to understand better what the threats are
16 there.

17 We have been thinking in general terms about the
18 deterrent quality of land forces. As I mentioned, in
19 particular what we see with Russia is we see a country that
20 is using limited war for limited objectives, you know, to
21 make, in effect, a land grab as we have seen in Ukraine, and
22 to do that at low or no cost almost, and then to portray any
23 responses escalatory. I mean, I think it is plausible to
24 think of an analogous scenario in the Arctic, for example.

25 We know that a way to deal with a force that is using

1 this sort of limited war for limited objectives is forward
2 deterrence of land forces. And this is where I think we get
3 into the capacity issue. You know, it was the forward
4 positioning of 500,000 U.S. military personnel in Europe
5 from the 1950's to the 1980's and 1990's that deterred a
6 great power conflict over 70 years, sir. And then, of
7 course, the 28,500 soldiers in Korea.

8 Now, if you look at an active force that is planned to
9 go to 450,000 total in the Army and just do then Army math,
10 in terms of a 90,000 generating force with 60,000 soldiers
11 in training all the time, providing that ability to expand
12 that within the institutional Army, if you look at global
13 response forces that just have to be prepared for any
14 contingencies -- and those which were mentioned today --
15 nobody planned on the deployment to West Africa or the ones
16 that Gary was summarizing. And so if you just do that basic
17 math, you recognize that we are out of capacity to do what
18 the Nation may need us to do.

19 Senator Sullivan: Do you think it makes sense to
20 remove any combat brigades from Alaska, given what the
21 Russians are doing? And also in terms of our rebalancing to
22 the Pacific, that is another area where the President -- and
23 I agree with him -- has committed to look at optimizing our
24 force structure, obviously, Alaska forces, our Asia-Pacific
25 forces, as well as Arctic forces. Do you believe it makes

1 sense to be removing any combat units, even one soldier,
2 from Alaska given our Arctic challenges and given the
3 rebalance to the Pacific, which Senator Hirono talked about?

4 General McMaster: Well, sir, it is a question of risk
5 and how you can best manage that risk with severely
6 diminishing resources. So just again for just some context
7 -- and again, I mean, this would be a fully open effort to
8 look at how we manage that risk in consultation with your
9 committee and others.

10 But if you think about just in recent years, in recent
11 years we had to sustain a commitment overseas to Afghanistan
12 and Iraq of about 170,000 in those peak years. Of those
13 170,000 that we deployed, 117,000 were active duty and the
14 remainder, about 53,000, were reserve component. That
15 placed an Army, which at the time was at 482,000 that is in
16 severe strain, and then thanks to you and to the Senate and
17 our Congress, we expanded that Army to 560,000.

18 We are now in a global conflict. I mean, if you look
19 around the globe, several conflicts around the globe seeing
20 harbingers of potential future conflict. And we are now
21 down to about 492,000 today I think, Gary, and going to
22 450,000. So I mean, just the basic math I think you can see
23 that we are taking risk today already somewhere.

24 And to answer your question, I do not think --
25 certainly it is not a good idea to pulling soldiers out of

1 Alaska, but it will be a question of how to manage risk with
2 severe reductions in Army capacity.

3 General Cheek: If I could just add. So we do not want
4 to take anything out of Alaska. We do not want to take any
5 more of our brigades. So the unfortunate part that we face
6 is, under sequestration, we are looking at having to remove
7 two brigades from our structure. And we have a process, as
8 all of you are aware, both listening to communities and in
9 weighing through that. So there are some very, very
10 difficult choices there.

11 The one thing I will add, though, in recognition that
12 we do see how important this area is. So we are bringing in
13 Apache aircraft as part of the aviation restructure
14 initiative. So that is one positive thing that we can add
15 there.

16 The other one is our Gray Eagle unmanned aerial system
17 which is unique in its ability to operate in that
18 environment, as you know.

19 So I think there are a couple things that we are doing
20 that we recognize both the need and opportunity for us to
21 operate up there. If you left it up to all of us, we would
22 say we do not need to cut any more anywhere. So that is
23 where we would be on this.

24 Senator Sullivan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

25 Senator Cotton: Senator Donnelly?

1 Senator Donnelly: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

2 General Williamson, I know you in particular have been
3 briefed on my concerns regarding what I see as hesitation by
4 the Army to allow competition for tracked vehicle
5 transmissions particularly among the Bradley family of
6 vehicles. Last year's ATK study emphasized the transmission
7 production is one of the most fragile elements of the
8 tracked vehicle industrial base. I appreciate what the Army
9 has done to mitigate risks to the transmission industrial
10 base in recent years with funding provided by Congress.

11 But there is a long-term issue here. There have been
12 performance issues with Bradley transmissions. We know the
13 Army wants to move toward moving a common transmission
14 across the Bradley family of vehicles. That drive toward
15 commonality is motivated by the desire to drive down costs
16 and improve value.

17 If affordability is such a critical factor, my
18 difficulty is understanding why you would hesitate to allow
19 competition for a component as critical as vehicle
20 transmissions. Competition is good for improved
21 performance. It is good for driving down costs, and it is
22 good for ensuring we retain the strongest possible
23 industrial base.

24 So having said that, can I have your commitment that
25 the Army will take every appropriate action to ensure that

1 testing and other necessary analyses are completed on the
2 alternate Bradley transmission in a timely manner?

3 General Williamson: Sir, thank you for your question
4 and your concern about the industrial base.

5 As you stated, this Congress has been a huge supporter
6 of the industrial base and the transmission portion of that
7 industrial base. So this notion of competition is one that
8 we fully support, and as we have engaged with the primes, we
9 have asked them to look at where are there opportunities to
10 bring competition in to drive down the cost and the
11 efficiency associated with the procurement of those
12 powertrains and with transmissions.

13 Sir, I think the challenge that we have, though, is
14 that as we look at this particular portion of the industrial
15 base -- and it was mentioned in the very beginning of this
16 hearing -- we also have to look at efficiencies. And so as
17 we look at the manufacturers and we look at the kit as it is
18 going to be put into these different vehicles, where are the
19 opportunities for us to, one, support the industrial base
20 but, two, ensure that they are driving in efficiencies so
21 that we get transmissions at the best cost so that we can
22 reduce the overall cost of the platform. And so, sir, we
23 are committed to driving towards that level of competition
24 and that level of efficiency.

25 Senator Donnelly: Well, if other transmissions

1 demonstrate a better value to the Army, will we move forward
2 with the value engineering change proposal on the Bradley?

3 General Williamson: Yes, sir. Sir, absolutely. I
4 think the only thing that I would be disingenuous if I did
5 not say to you is that as you look at a value engineering
6 change proposal, it is the timing associated when you put
7 that into the production. So in many cases, sir, it is not
8 a buy an engine and just drop it in. In some cases, you
9 have to see how you integrate that if that transmission has
10 changed, if the connections have changed, if the seating of
11 that transmission. And so as we look and work with the
12 prime, we have to ensure what is the best opportunity to
13 insert this into their production runs.

14 Senator Donnelly: So it is value plus the logistics of
15 using the particular transmission.

16 General Williamson: Yes, sir. And I would assure you
17 it is not just in transmissions. It is in all aspects of a
18 platform. We look for opportunities where competition would
19 allow us to drive down the price.

20 Senator Donnelly: Could you provide me with a monthly
21 update on testing and analysis in the transmission area as
22 we move forward?

23 General Williamson: Sir, we can do that. As that
24 testing starts, we will be able to do that. And, sir, I
25 would also add that in many cases the original equipment

1 manufacturer, as they are doing their testing and that data
2 becomes available, we can ensure that that is provided to
3 you.

4 Senator Donnelly: Because my concern is, obviously --
5 and it is what I say about a lot of things in the industrial
6 area, which is, look, if we do not have the best at the most
7 reasonable cost that provides the greatest safety, that
8 seems to be the combination that we would be looking for
9 more than anything.

10 General Williamson: Sir, your instincts are
11 absolutely --

12 Senator Donnelly: Then whoever wins wins.

13 General Williamson: Yes, sir, and that is what I was
14 going to say. Your instincts are absolutely on target. And
15 I think as we look at probably the three main providers of
16 transmissions, their ability to go to the platform owners
17 and say, look, here is a better mousetrap is something that
18 we encourage both to the prime and also to the providers of
19 those transmissions.

20 Senator Donnelly: Thank you very much. And thank you
21 to all of you for your hard work, for your hard work in
22 maximizing value and, maybe more importantly, for your hard
23 work in protecting our men and women and protecting our
24 Nation. Thank you.

25 Senator Manchin: Thank you, Senator.

1 What we will do is start a second round now, if you all
2 are okay with that. I will start it off.

3 I say the Army is trying to create a mobile ad hoc
4 tactical network for over 10 years. Results from
5 operational tests, however, are still mixed for all
6 technologies both hardware and software.

7 So, General McMaster, late last year you expressed your
8 views on the Army's progress on developing and delivering a
9 truly mobile ad hoc technical network. What is your
10 assessment of the tactical network's operating concept and
11 tactical performance to date? And to both General McMaster
12 and General Cheek, what are the leaders and soldiers in the
13 field saying about the tactical network? So, General
14 McMaster?

15 General McMaster: Sir, as you mentioned, the way the
16 network developed, it developed in a way that kluged
17 together battle command systems and systems from across our
18 -- you know, which we say somewhat derisively -- cylinders
19 of excellence across our Army. And so the network was
20 fielded in a way that it has never been completed. It was
21 incomplete. As you mentioned, we are trying to kluge it
22 together over time.

23 We have made some significant progress in doing that in
24 recent years and see a way ahead through what is called the
25 common operating environment, which will allow us to

1 integrate what we have and address really the three
2 fundamental problems with the network, which is its
3 incompleteness is the first. The second is its complexity,
4 and the third that is related to that and it is also related
5 to Senator Rounds' question about the network also -- its
6 vulnerability based on operational security concerns and
7 cyber attack and EW capabilities.

8 So what we have done is we have developed a network
9 vision and way ahead and a strategy that will aim to address
10 these three fundamental issues. The first is to complete
11 it. So we are in a situation now where we are halfway down
12 the path, and until we can begin to field this network, we
13 cannot fix a lot of the issues that we have identified and
14 now see solutions. For example, the common operating
15 environment part of this which will simplify the network and
16 integrate the multiple systems.

17 In terms of the complexity of the network, we are
18 working very hard on user interface capabilities and the
19 reduction of what is needed to maintain these systems, to
20 simplify them as part of these programs.

21 On the vulnerability side of this as well, we are
22 looking at tactics that we can use to use it differently,
23 and then placing it in contested environments so that we can
24 develop solutions to the vulnerability for the network. And
25 that is, obviously, the network integration environment. We

1 will be able to get even more at some of these outside of
2 testing certain equipment during the Army warfighting
3 assessment.

4 But the bottom line is, I mean, your characterization
5 of the network is correct. I mean, it is incomplete. It is
6 too complicated, and it is vulnerable. We believe that
7 General Williamson's team has worked extremely well in
8 developing solutions to these problems. And from a
9 requirements perspective, what we have done for the first
10 time is we have looked across all of the network and said,
11 okay, what are the common requirements across all the
12 network and how do we build to those. So that is near- or
13 midterm.

14 Long-term, we need to go to a system that will address
15 all three of these fundamental issues, and that is really
16 going from thick client- to thin client-based networks to be
17 able to simplify the network by divesting a lot of the
18 hardware associated with the current systems. I mean, that
19 is sort of the longer-term approach.

20 And I will ask General Williamson to comment on this as
21 well.

22 General Williamson: Sir, the only thing I would add --
23 and I think General McMaster's characterization is on
24 target. Because we took fairly complex systems, new
25 technologies, and introduced these new software defined

1 radios with very sophisticated software and we introduced it
2 piecemeal without also addressing the tactics, the
3 techniques, and the training associated with those new
4 systems, I think there was a media perception, some of it
5 very real, that these radios did not provide the same level
6 of capability that they had in older systems.

7 I think the work that has been done over the last 2
8 years where we have brought these systems together,
9 conducted the testing and the training so that we understand
10 the performance parameters, and then went back to address
11 those shortfalls -- and you will see that in a series of
12 engagements over these next 2 years where we have pushed
13 radios down to the dismounted soldier all the way back up to
14 the brigade command post, so you have a very resilient
15 network that provides connectivity with these new
16 capabilities.

17 But I do not want to tell you that it is perfect. It
18 will continue to take improvements as you look at, again,
19 the sophisticated waveforms and the changes in hardware. So
20 what I would offer to you, sir, is that what you have are
21 very high speed computers running software now for
22 communications systems. And so getting those two to work
23 very well together, the hardware and the software, has been
24 part of the challenge, and then add the new complexity
25 associated with those two things. So as we move forward, we

1 have now put these systems into our network integration
2 exercises so that we see the pluses and minuses with our
3 engineers, with the warfighters there so that we can now
4 take and leverage the learning that occurs to update those
5 systems.

6 Senator Manchin: Thank you both.

7 Mr. Chairman?

8 Senator Cotton: Thank you, Senator Manchin, for
9 filling in for me while I was absent.

10 I want to talk now about DCGS. Over the past 5 years,
11 the current version of DCGS has struggled to provide its
12 promised capabilities. It has failed its own tests, the
13 head assessor of the Army's Test and Evaluation Command
14 calling it not operational, not suitable, and not survivable
15 in 2012. Maybe most important, though, it seems to have
16 continued to fail wartime commanders who have continued to
17 file operational needs statements to this day for a
18 commercial alternative that is successfully in use today by
19 the Marine Corps and special operations forces. Even with
20 more than 20 units calling for the alternative, because of
21 flaws in the current program of record, taxpayers are
22 continuing to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on the
23 DCGS program, and it does not seem to be getting much
24 better.

25 General Williamson, is there a point at which the Army

1 is going to cut its losses and look at alternatives?

2 General Williamson: Sir, I do not know if this forum
3 will give me the opportunity to give you a really detailed
4 response to the performance of DCGS, but I would like to
5 address some of your immediate concerns.

6 So what I would offer initially is that we have fielded
7 over 11,000 DCGS systems into the Army, and the Army has
8 been fighting with DCGS in very tough environments and
9 providing commanders with geospatial information and intel
10 which has allowed them to conduct their operations.

11 I will absolutely acknowledge that for some formations
12 the DCGS system, as large as it is and the requirements for
13 very well trained personnel to use, has not been optimal.
14 And so those requests that you see for a lighter weight,
15 very specific capability that we have provided to those
16 units is being addressed in the subsequent increments of the
17 DCGS program.

18 And one of those things, sir, I would tell you to
19 start, is an ease of use. We have acknowledged that the
20 complexity associated with the buttonology bringing that
21 information together has been difficult. And so we have
22 tried to invest a lot of time, and we have also engaged with
23 over 150 vendors through a series of industry days to find
24 out how we can improve the existing system.

25 But there are some pieces here that I think we often

1 disregard. So the completeness of the DCGS program is what
2 makes it so valuable. It is the range of capabilities that
3 it provides, not a very specific piece in terms of
4 situational awareness, that makes the DCGS tool so powerful.

5 I think as we go into the May timeframe where we go
6 through our next set of evaluations, I think you will see a
7 completely different perception of how that tool is
8 provided.

9 Senator Cotton: But it is being used by the Marine
10 Corps and special operations forces. What capabilities does
11 this commercially available alternative lack that the Marine
12 Corps does not need that the Army needs?

13 General Williamson: So, sir, what I have seen is that
14 they use a very specific piece for situational awareness
15 enhanced by contractors who do the detailed work behind, not
16 soldiers or marines, in terms of taking information. I
17 might add that comes from the DCGS system. They take that
18 information and present it in a faster, less complex way for
19 them to make decisions.

20 Senator Cotton: I mean, the information just comes
21 from any intelligence sensor. Whether it is a Joe out on
22 the beach or whether it is a satellite in the sky, I mean,
23 it is ultimately a database and then you have ways to
24 manipulate and understand and present the database.

25 General Williamson: If you have access to that

1 information, sir. So in some cases as you look at national
2 assets that come in, these systems do not have access to
3 that level of information.

4 Senator Cotton: Okay. Well, I mean, the National
5 Assessment Group says that Palantir, the commercial system
6 we are talking about, meets all requirements for advanced
7 analytics. It also says that our own Testing and Evaluation
8 Command found that 96 percent of soldiers said Palantir was
9 effective in supporting their mission. And the GAO reported
10 that it meets all the needs of the Marine Corps and the
11 special operations forces.

12 I would just say that in the Cold War, when we were
13 fighting a heavy mechanized war against the Soviet Union, we
14 produced unique capabilities that were not available in the
15 commercial space like tanks. And in the post-Cold War era,
16 as the information technology revolution has taken over, we
17 have to rethink the wisdom of trying to create these systems
18 in the Federal Government rather than using commercially
19 available, off-the-shelf systems.

20 General McMaster, when you were in Afghanistan most
21 recently on the Anti-Fraud Task Force, did you submit an
22 operational needs statement?

23 General McMaster: Yes, sir, I did.

24 Senator Cotton: Could you explain why you did that?

25 General McMaster: Well, sir, we were looking for a

1 system that could provide the capabilities you just
2 described, and we did not have DCGS at the time either. So
3 we had neither the other alternative to DCGS or DCGS
4 available to us. And essentially what we needed was a tool
5 to access multiple databases and then to be able to help us
6 understand using big data analytical tools, really
7 connections between, for example, nodes through networks and
8 the ability to see flows, for example, of people, money,
9 weapons, narcotics through those networks that were
10 influencing our mission. And so, as General Williamson
11 mentioned, this was a test of a certain capability, and what
12 we were limited by was the ability to access all the various
13 databases. I mean, that is really, I think, the key issue
14 here.

15 I am not familiar with DCGS personally because again,
16 as I mentioned, it was just getting fielded as I was
17 departing our task force in Afghanistan.

18 There will be a limited user test in May, next month,
19 that we will conduct, and I think the conditions are set for
20 that. And there is funding as well to, if we do identify
21 any deficiencies in terms of ease of use, which has been I
22 think the principal criticism of the system up to this
23 point, that we have the funds available to address those
24 deficiencies.

25 Senator Cotton: I apologize. I do not know if this is

1 better directed towards General Williamson or the G-3's.
2 Can we get an update on where these operational needs
3 statements responses stand? It is my understanding there
4 are about 20 of them, maybe a little more. For the record.
5 I do not expect you to do it right now.

6 General Cheek: Well, I am not tracking that many, but
7 I can tell you for any unit that requests a Palantir or
8 whatever the operational need is, we look at all those very
9 thoroughly. And for Palantir we are pretty much at about
10 100 percent approval for those.

11 There are some that between the unit and the
12 headquarters Department of the Army, their intermediate
13 headquarters may determine that they do not require that.
14 And I will just give an example. A unit could request one
15 that is not deploying, and for some other reason they
16 believe they need it. That intermediate headquarters may
17 say no.

18 What we do with them, though, we will be aware of that
19 request, and we will work it in parallel so we do not wait
20 sequentially for this thing to come to us. But for any
21 commander in war that needs something that submits an
22 operational needs statement, we pretty much do everything we
23 can to get that to them. So it is not something that we say
24 no to unless there is probably a recommendation that comes
25 with that that this is not needed.

1 Senator Cotton: Thank you. Just for the record, if we
2 can get an update on that for my staff and the committee
3 staff.

4 General Cheek: Yes, sir.

5 Senator Cotton: I appreciate it.

6 [The information follows:]

7 [SUBCOMMITTEE INSERT]

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1 Senator Cotton: Senator Sullivan?

2 Senator Sullivan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

3 Gentlemen, I just wanted to follow up quickly again on
4 the issue of the Arctic OPLAN. And I did not get a direct
5 answer. Do you think there is a need for that?

6 Let me give you just one kind of specific resource
7 example. The U.S. Army in Alaska has just over 50 small
8 unit support vehicles, SUSV's. As a matter of fact, in the
9 Spartan Pegasus operation, they actually jumped some of
10 these SUSV's. I am sure you have traveled in them. They
11 are outstanding vehicles. But to my understanding, right
12 now that program -- these are 30/40-year-old vehicles. The
13 program is no longer under development in any way. Again, I
14 worry about this being a bit of a symptom of us not being
15 Arctic-minded.

16 General McMaster, back to you. Knowing the ability to
17 actually resource what the Army needs can be generated by
18 OPLAN's. That is what we do around the world. Do you think
19 there is a need for an Arctic OPLAN to help you think
20 through some of these issues like SUSV replacement?

21 General McMaster: Well, sir, what we will do is work
22 with the Army staff and the G-3 in particular and engage
23 NORTHCOM and ask them what their assessment is, and working
24 together with them, we can offer our campaign of learning
25 under Force 2025 maneuvers, the experimentation that we do,

1 the wargaming we do as a venue to start thinking about
2 future threats along with NORTHCOM. And then in terms of
3 the requirements, falling out of the OPLAN and the
4 integrated priority lists of the combatant commanders, we
5 can make an assessment of how well prepared Army forces are
6 for Arctic and related contingencies and then work with the
7 Army staff on prioritization and resourcing strategies for
8 those.

9 Senator Sullivan: Thank you.

10 General McMaster: But I will definitely take this on
11 as part of our campaign of learning and work with the Army
12 staff and NORTHCOM.

13 Senator Sullivan: I appreciate it.

14 General Cheek, your comments about limited resources,
15 tough choices, strategic choices -- we appreciate that. We
16 know that all of you are working hard, all the armed forces,
17 we are on the committee. You know, I think part of what we
18 also need to be doing in terms of oversight in terms of the
19 different services is looking at the possibility not only of
20 strategic choices but redundancies.

21 I was just in Asia as part of our oversight
22 responsibilities in terms of the rebalance, redeployment of
23 forces throughout the Asia-Pacific mostly relating to the
24 Marine Corps, Air Force in Guam and Okinawa, Australia,
25 Hawaii.

1 And, General McMaster, you talked about issues such as
2 expeditionary forces from the sea on ships. I know there
3 has been some discussion on Pacific Pathways. Do you think
4 that that, in terms of redundancies, starts to bump up
5 against the mission of the United States Marine Corps in the
6 Pacific? And how does the Pacific Pathways initiative
7 differ from the Marine Corps' mission in the Pacific? Is
8 that redundancy that we need to look at, particularly given
9 that we are looking at possibly cutting forces elsewhere, or
10 is there room for both? You mentioned how important the
11 Pacific is. I agree with that. But can you speak to that
12 issue? I know that that is something that we heard a little
13 bit when I was out in the Pacific.

14 General Cheek: Yes, sir. We have been working with
15 Marine Corps leaders every step of the way in the
16 development of our concept work and especially working on
17 Pacific scenarios and so forth. We recently had a visit by
18 the Commandant and Joe Glueck who works at Marine Corps
19 Combat Development Command. He and I work together on all
20 these issues.

21 We believe that based on the lack of capacity in ready
22 land forces, the diminishing capacity in ready land forces,
23 both Marine Corps and Army, that there is no redundancy at
24 all. In fact, there is a lot more work to do across
25 prevent, shape, and win than there are forces maybe to do

1 it.

2 So the question is how do we work together to ensure
3 that we are complementary, and we think we can do that in a
4 number of ways. First of all, to complement the Marine
5 Corps expeditionary capabilities, we have to make sure that
6 we know how to use Navy sea-basing capabilities and Marine
7 Corps sea-basing capabilities in the context of
8 expeditionary maneuver with Army watercraft and joint
9 logistics over the shore. That is work that we are doing
10 with Marine Corps Combat Development Command right now. We
11 should have some tentative answers on a new concept,
12 implications for doctrine, organization, training that will
13 be done by the end of the summer.

14 The other key thing, sir, that we are looking at is a
15 new evolution of Army expeditionary maneuver which, because
16 of anti-access/area denial capabilities, that we need to go
17 into an offset objective. And if we go into an offset
18 objective to bypass the enemy area denial capabilities, how
19 do we ensure that force has the mobility, protection, and
20 lethality then to transition into an offensive operation?
21 And we think that the Army's ability to operate deep in land
22 with that kind of early entry force is complementary because
23 the forces could then be critical in defeating enemy A2/AD
24 capabilities or disrupting them such that an amphibious
25 assault could occur more effectively. So we are, I think,

1 complementary.

2 And then if you look at really the need to engage with
3 the land forces of Asian armies and marine corps, I mean,
4 certainly there is much more demand there than there is
5 capacity.

6 So I know that sometimes the Marine Corps -- when you
7 say the word "expeditionary," they are like, hey, you are in
8 my territory. But it is us and the Marine Corps working
9 together to ensure this kind of capability, the ability to
10 deploy rapidly in crises, transition quickly to operations,
11 and to operate in sufficient scale and for ample duration to
12 accomplish the mission.

13 Senator Sullivan: Okay. Thank you. I just want to
14 make sure we are not creating redundancies when, General
15 Cheek, as you mentioned, we are also looking at tough
16 choices about removing forces from critically strategic
17 locations like Alaska. Thank you.

18 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

19 Senator Cotton: Thank you, Senator Sullivan.

20 I have a question about history, and I have a Ph.D. in
21 history in front of me, General McMaster. Can you talk to
22 us a little bit about the so-called Abrams Doctrine that
23 developed in the late stages right after Vietnam, that the
24 civilian leadership of this country should not be able to go
25 to war without mobilizing the reserves? A, have I

1 accurately stated it? B, what do you think of the doctrine
2 as a matter of history and policy?

3 General McMaster: Sir, as my advisor told me when I
4 graduated, he said, congratulations. You now know more
5 history than you will ever know.

6 But, sir, I think that this is important because it was
7 an important legacy of the Vietnam War in that the belief
8 was that our armed forces must be connected with the people
9 in whose name we fight, and the best way to do that would be
10 to ensure mobilization when U.S. forces are committed. And
11 the way that General Abrams approached this was to put
12 critical capabilities that were needed early in a crisis
13 into the reserve component.

14 Sir, I think what we have to look at today is how do we
15 ensure that the capabilities within each of the components
16 are complementary to each other and that together, that we
17 provide the kind of responsiveness we need and the
18 operational strategic depth that we need.

19 And so this is a constant effort to assess our forces
20 under total Army analysis and to understand better how we
21 can build or grow or reduce capabilities in each of those
22 components relative to one another to be as responsive as
23 possible. So this is an ongoing effort. We do it in the
24 context of our experimentation and our war games to inform
25 policy decisions.

1 And again, the key element I think for us is to
2 continue to reassess it and we do, to some extent, still see
3 the legacy of that approach, but of course, there have been
4 a lot of years between that and organization, structure.
5 Each of the components has changed significantly since that
6 time.

7 Senator Cotton: Thank you, General McMaster.

8 I ask because the Abrams Doctrine is something about
9 which I and I assure you all of my colleagues on this
10 committee hear about from their TAC's in the context of the
11 aviation restructuring initiative, which would, as I
12 understand it, move all Apaches into the active duty,
13 replace them with utility helicopters, and save about \$12
14 billion, which even in Washington and even in the Army is
15 still a lot of money. The TAC's that we hear from express
16 reservations that this would violate the Abrams Doctrine.
17 They think it is not sound for our national defense.

18 General Ierardi, would you like to comment on the
19 aviation restructuring initiative kind of in general and
20 also address that specific term, what is its goals,
21 objectives, how are we going to see the impact played out on
22 the total Army, active duty and reserve?

23 General Ierardi: Sir, the aviation restructure
24 initiative really is borne from a high demand for a critical
25 capability that our Army provides and that is Army aviation.

1 In the context of reduced budgets and the reduced size of
2 the Army and pressure on modernizing the aviation force --

3 Senator Cotton: When you say "Army aviation," are you
4 talking about all --

5 General Ierardi: I am talking total Army aviation.

6 So this plan is really intended to enhance the
7 readiness in the future and the ability of the Army to
8 respond to needs of the combatant commanders in the future.
9 It focuses on ensuring that we are able to meet these needs
10 by having the capabilities required. One of these is the
11 armed reconnaissance mission that is important for us to
12 have. There are emerging abilities of the Army to
13 accomplish this through the use of manned/unmanned teaming,
14 which is a tactic, a capability that would be employed in
15 lieu of a Kiowa Warrior aircraft in order for us to be able
16 to manned/unmanned team Apache aircrafts with Gray Eagles,
17 for example.

18 The move of Apache aircraft from the National Guard to
19 the active Army was decided as we are proceeding, intend to
20 gain the movement of those Apache aircraft in order to have
21 the Apaches necessary while we bring down the number of
22 active component combat aviation brigades to effect that
23 mission set in the active component.

24 Conversely as part of this plan, the Army intends to
25 move a number of aircraft to the National Guard, and this

1 would include UH-60 aircraft which would enhance the
2 warfighting capabilities, if you will, the combat
3 capabilities, of the National Guard to perform a number of
4 tasks in support of our Army in difficult places. And my
5 own personal experience with the National Guard while
6 deployed in Afghanistan was nothing but favorable. There is
7 no question that the missions that they are assigned and
8 will be assigned will be done to the highest standard.

9 So taking those two considerations, the need for the
10 Army to conduct armed reconnaissance using manned/unmanned
11 teaming, creating an opportunity for us to do that with
12 Apaches, also created a concurrent opportunity for us to
13 have in the National Guard enhancement in the capabilities
14 there using UH-60's.

15 So this also allowed us to divest of three aviation
16 platforms, the Kiowa Warrior, the OH-58 Alpha Charlie, and
17 the TH-67 training aircraft that we use to train our initial
18 entry aviators. And as part of this plan, Lakota aircraft,
19 which are aircraft that are dual-engine aircraft, replicate
20 the kind of aircraft that future aviators will operate with,
21 moved into the training base and remain in large part in the
22 National Guard to conduct the kinds of missions that are
23 required there.

24 So on balance, the aviation restructure initiative
25 intends, will enhance readiness. It will allow us to

1 modernize and create opportunities from not having Kiowa
2 Warriors, a legacy aircraft that was reaching its shelf
3 life, for us to then take those dollars which are harvested
4 from the divestment of the Kiowa Warrior and invest in other
5 important aviation programs such as the ITEP engine
6 improvement program, continued improvements in our Apache
7 fleet, and other aviation enhancements, future vertical
8 lift, and joint technology work that would allow us to see a
9 future aviation. It created opportunities for the Army.

10 To your first question that you asked General McMaster
11 and you asked me to comment on, I understand the idea that
12 there is an idea for interchangeability in capabilities
13 between our components. I will tell you that we really need
14 to seek to be interdependent and that we bring all of the
15 components of the total force -- bring a professionalism and
16 a character to a number of different mission sets that match
17 the needs of the Nation. So interdependence is a very
18 important part of this, not interchangeability.

19 Senator Cotton: Thank you, General.

20 One more question for you, General McMaster. Your
21 immediately preceding assignment was at the Maneuver School
22 down at Fort Benning. This is obviously focused on the land
23 aspect of the Air and Land Subcommittee's jurisdiction, but
24 an ongoing topic with our friends in the air is the A-10.
25 And I have serious reservations, as does Senator McCain and

1 many other Senators, about the plans to stop using the A-10
2 especially before the F-35 has been demonstrated as an
3 adequate close air support platform for our troops on the
4 ground in contact.

5 Do you care to give your perspective on the A-10?

6 General McMaster: Well, sir, even independent of what
7 kind of platform, we do believe that close air support is
8 going to be more important in the future than ever. And the
9 reason is that our enemies are really doing four fundamental
10 things as they interact with our forces.

11 The first is they are evading our standoff
12 capabilities. I mean, they are using traditional
13 countermeasures of dispersion, concealment, intermingling
14 with civilian populations, and deception.

15 The second thing that we see them doing in terms of our
16 advanced capabilities is they are disrupting them. And we
17 see the threat of cyber attacks and electromagnetic pulse,
18 maybe even attacks on -- other EW sort of attacks on our
19 network capabilities.

20 The third is increasingly we see them emulating our
21 capabilities where we may have contested domains that were
22 not contested in the past and then they are expanding onto
23 other battlegrounds.

24 And so to cope with this, we are going to have to
25 develop the situation we think in close contact with the

1 enemy and civilian populations, and that will put a premium
2 on our ability to fight in three dimensions and to conduct
3 close air support in particular. We think that in the
4 future, Army forces are going to have to operate as joint
5 and combined arms teams in smaller levels. We may operate
6 while they disperse, but we need the mobility to be able to
7 rapidly concentrate, and for us to have mutual support
8 between these dispersed formations, we are going to have to
9 see and fight across wider areas.

10 So we know that close air support will be more
11 important than ever in the future, and what we are doing is
12 working with the Air Force in what will be a sustained
13 effort over the next several years. General Carlisle at Air
14 Combat Command is leading the effort on the Air Force side
15 to ensure that we maintain this critical differential
16 advantage for our armed forces, which is the ability to
17 conduct close air support, to pose that enemy with multiple
18 dilemmas, force the enemy to respond to multiple forms of
19 contact simultaneously, and to win in this game of rock,
20 paper, scissors, you know, where if the enemy's
21 countermeasure to our standoff capability is dispersion, the
22 answer is concentrated operations on the ground. And then
23 the enemy, to protect something of value to them, as we
24 encounter them with land forces, is going to have to
25 concentrate, which then makes them vulnerable to those

1 standoff capabilities.

2 So we know that we have to integrate our efforts more
3 closely than ever, and this close air support assessment and
4 sustained work with the Air Force is going to be immensely
5 important in that connection.

6 Senator Cotton: Does the A-10 provide that kind of
7 advantage and capability at present in your opinion?

8 General McMaster: The A-10 provides some very
9 important capabilities, you know, the ability to sustain
10 presence over our forces and the ability to use multiple
11 weapons systems. I mean, turning radius has something to do
12 with it, and obviously mindset of pilots, the training. I
13 mean, there are so many aspects to this, and this is what we
14 want to -- what we are working with with our Air Force
15 teammates who are committed to maintaining that close air
16 support capability.

17 Senator Cotton: Do any of the other three witnesses
18 have any comments about the A-10, not just in your current
19 positions but in previous lives in the Army?

20 General McMaster: So just to echo, we are working
21 pretty closely with the Air Force. The Chief of Staff of
22 the Air Force invited the Army in and other services to talk
23 close air support.

24 I will add one thing. The A-10 also, by operating at
25 lower altitudes, I think can discriminate friend/foe much

1 easier than another platform. It is a good platform. I
2 think the Air Force has concerns about its survivability
3 depending on the environment that it is in.

4 So we will continue to work with the Air Force. We are
5 not going to let them off the hook, not to provide us close
6 air support, and we will work closely with them. So I think
7 the concerns are well placed, but we are confident the Air
8 Force will come up with the right platform and capabilities
9 to support us.

10 Senator Cotton: Okay. Gentlemen, thank you again for
11 your time. Most importantly, thank you for your service to
12 your country and everything you do to serve those soldiers
13 underneath your command. Thank you for your families for
14 the sacrifices they have made.

15 As you have heard today, I would say all of the members
16 of this subcommittee, as the full committee, are intent on
17 increasing our defense budgets. That is the most immediate
18 thing that we can do to help. Even if we can accomplish
19 that, some of the important reforms, initiatives that we
20 have discussed today still need to move forward in an
21 efficient manner because we all want to be good stewards of
22 taxpayer dollars.

23 So thank you all very much. I appreciate your time and
24 your service.

25 The hearing is adjourned.

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[Whereupon, at 4:11 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]