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Before the

COMMITTEE ON

ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

To Receive Testimony on Global Challenges and the U.S. National Security Strategy

Thursday, January 29, 2015

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HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON
GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND
THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Thursday, January 29, 2015

U.S. Senate
Committee on Armed Services
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John McCain, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Committee Members Present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Graham, Cruz, Reed, Nelson, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, and Kaine.

1 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN, U.S. SENATOR
2 FROM ARIZONA

3 Chairman McCain: Well, good morning, all.

4 [Audience disruption.]

5 Chairman McCain: The committee will stand in recess
6 until the Capitol Police can restore order. I ask the
7 police to restore order. Could I ask our Capitol Police to
8 help restore order here? Can someone find out where the
9 Capitol Hill Police is?

10 I would like to say to my colleagues and to our
11 distinguished witnesses this morning that I have been a
12 member of this committee for many years, and I have never
13 seen anything as disgraceful and outrageous and despicable
14 as the last demonstration that just took place about -- you
15 know, you are going to have to shut up or I am going to have
16 you arrested. If we cannot get the Capitol Hill Police in
17 here immediately -- get out of here you low-life scum.

18 [Applause.]

19 Chairman McCain: So, Henry, I hope you will -- Dr.
20 Kissinger, I hope on behalf of all of the members of this
21 committee on both sides of the aisle -- in fact, from all of
22 my colleagues, I would like to apologize for allowing such
23 disgraceful behavior towards a man who served his country
24 with the greatest distinction. I apologize profusely.

25 The Senate Armed Services Committee meets today to

1 receive testimony on global challenges and U.S. national
2 security strategy. This is the third hearing in a series
3 designed to examine the strategic context in which we find
4 ourselves, one characterized by multiplying and accumulating
5 threats to our national security, and how that should inform
6 the work of this committee and the Congress.

7 We have had previous testimony from General Brent
8 Scowcroft, Dr. Brzezinski, General Mattis, General Keane,
9 and Admiral William Fallon, and we have heard consistent
10 themes:

11 Our foreign policy is reactive.

12 We need to repeal sequestration.

13 We should not withdraw from Afghanistan on an
14 arbitrary, calendar-based timeline.

15 And we need a strategy that matches military means to
16 the President's stated goal of degrading and destroying
17 ISIS.

18 We will explore these topics and many more with today's
19 outstanding panel of witnesses. I am honored to welcome
20 three former Secretaries of State, among our Nation's most
21 admired diplomats and public servants: Dr. Henry Kissinger,
22 Dr. George Shultz, and Dr. Madeleine Albright.

23 Our Nation owes each of these statesmen a debt of
24 gratitude for their years of service advancing our national
25 interests. Secretary Shultz has held nearly every senior

1 position of importance in our Federal Government during his
2 illustrious career. Dr. Albright was an instrumental leader
3 during key points in our Nation's history, influencing
4 policies in the Balkans and the Middle East.

5 And finally, I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge
6 the personal debt of gratitude that I owe to Dr. Kissinger.
7 When Henry came to Hanoi to conclude the agreement that
8 would America's war in Vietnam, the Vietnamese told him they
9 would send me home with him. He refused the offer. Quote.
10 Commander McCain will return in the same order as the
11 others, he told them. He knew my early release would be
12 seen as favoritism to my father and a violation of our code
13 of conduct. By rejecting this last attempt to suborn a
14 dereliction of duty, Henry saved one of my important
15 possessions, my honor. And for that, Henry, I am eternally
16 grateful.

17 Thank you again to all of our witnesses for being here
18 today and I look forward to your testimony.

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1 STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED, U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE
2 ISLAND

3 Senator Reed: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

4 Let me join you in welcome Secretary Kissinger,
5 Secretary Shultz, and Secretary Albright. You have provided
6 extraordinary leadership to this Nation in so many different
7 capacities, and we are deeply appreciative that you are
8 joining us this morning. It is an extraordinary opportunity
9 to hear from individuals who have witnessed and shaped
10 history over the course of many, many years, and thank you
11 again for joining us.

12 I also want to commend Senator McCain for this series
13 of hearings that have allowed us to look very, very
14 carefully at the strategy of the United States in view of
15 many complex problems that face us today. You all have done
16 so much. Again, let me reiterate our appreciation and our
17 thanks.

18 Each of you throughout your careers have demonstrated
19 an in-depth understanding of the historical, economic,
20 religious, ethnic, and political factors affecting foreign
21 policy and international security. And each of you
22 emphasized the need to use all instruments of national
23 power, not just military power, but also diplomacy and
24 economic power, to address the challenges facing the United
25 States.

1 The breadth and complexity of challenges to the
2 international order and the United States today seem as
3 complex and vexing as any we have faced previously. We
4 would be interested in your perspective on these challenges
5 and the principles that should guide our security strategy.

6 On Iran, in a recent hearing that Senator McCain
7 mentioned with General Scowcroft and Dr. Brzezinski, both of
8 them urged Congress to hold off on additional sanctions in
9 order to give multilateral negotiations on Iran's nuclear
10 program sufficient time to reach a conclusion. Indeed, the
11 Senate Banking Committee is considering that issue in a few
12 moments, and I will have to depart and participate in that
13 markup. But we would certainly be interested in your
14 perspectives on this critical issue.

15 Regarding the Middle East, during a hearing Tuesday on
16 the military aspects of the U.S. security strategy, General
17 Mattis emphasized the need to have a clear understanding of
18 what our political objectives are in the region. He also
19 made clear that any attempt to impose a purely military
20 solution to these conflicts would come at a very high cost.
21 General Scowcroft and Dr. Brzezinski talked about the
22 importance of the region but also warned against the United
23 States, in their words, quote, owning it. And we have to be
24 very, very careful going forward.

25 All of these issues and many, many more from Russia's

1 behavior in Crimea to the impact of cyber on national
2 security policy -- I think we would benefit immensely from
3 your advice and from your wisdom. Thank you very, very
4 much.

5 And, again, thank you, Senator McCain.

6 Chairman McCain: Thank you. We will begin with Dr.
7 Albright. Welcome, Dr. Albright, and thank you for being
8 here today.

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1 STATEMENT OF DR. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, CHAIR,
2 NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE AND FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE

3 Dr. Albright: I am delighted to be here, Chairman
4 McCain, Senator Reed, and members of the committee. Thank
5 you very much for inviting me to participate in this
6 important series of hearings. And I am very, very pleased
7 to be here alongside with my distinguished colleagues and
8 very dear friends, Secretaries Kissinger and Shultz.

9 I want to commend this committee for initiating this
10 timely discussion of U.S. national security strategy because
11 these hearings embody this chamber's best traditions of
12 bipartisanship and foreign policy, and I think they can be
13 tremendously helpful in framing the issues facing our
14 country.

15 As someone who began her career in public service
16 working as chief legislative assistant to the great Senator
17 from Maine, Ed Muskie, I have long believed that Congress
18 has a critical role to play in our national security. So
19 when I became Secretary of State, I valued my regular
20 appearances before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
21 then headed by Senator Jesse Helms. He and I did disagree
22 on many things, but we respected each other and built an
23 effective partnership we both believed because America had a
24 unique role to play in the world. And that belief still
25 shapes my world view and informs the perspectives that I

1 bring to our discussion today.

2 It does not take a seasoned observer of international
3 relations to point out that we are living through a time of
4 monumental change across the world. We are reckoning with
5 new forces that are pushing humanity down the path of
6 progress while also unleashing new contradictions on the
7 world scene.

8 One of these forces is globalization, which has made
9 the world more interconnected than ever before but also
10 added new layers of complexity to the challenges of
11 statecraft. With globalization, it is impossible for any
12 single nation to insulate itself from the world's problems
13 or to act as the lone global problem-solver.

14 Another force is technology, which has unleashed
15 unprecedented innovation and benefited people the world over
16 while also amplifying their frustrations and empowering
17 networks of criminals and terrorists.

18 Globalization and technology are reshaping and
19 disrupting the international system which is struggling to
20 keep pace with change. Nowhere is this more apparent than
21 in the Middle East where century-old state boundaries are
22 unraveling, a rising wave of violence and sectarianism is
23 producing the world's largest refugee crisis in 70 years,
24 and a dangerous competition is playing out between Iran and
25 Saudi Arabia for regional primacy.

1 Another key test lies in Europe where Russia's ongoing
2 aggression against Ukraine has fundamentally changed
3 security calculations on the continent and marked the first
4 time since World War II that European borders have been
5 altered by force. Events of recent days have shown that
6 what many have assumed would become a frozen conflict is
7 still in fact red hot.

8 Meanwhile, in Asia, the region's growth and the rise of
9 new powers are creating new opportunities for the United
10 States in areas such as trade, but these developments are
11 also testing security arrangements that have ensured peace
12 and stability since the end of World War II.

13 None of these challenges pose an existential threat to
14 the United States, but the intensity and complexity of them
15 can seem daunting, particularly after we have been through
16 more than 13 years of protracted war and threats such as
17 climate change, nuclear proliferation, disease, and food and
18 water shortages also looming on the horizon.

19 Still, they cannot be ignored. The American people may
20 be tired, but we must avoid another danger lurking in this
21 new era, the temptation to turn inward, because for all the
22 turmoil this young century has brought, America remains by
23 far the world's mightiest economic and military power with a
24 resurgent economy and an energy revolution giving us
25 newfound confidence in our future. We are the only nation

1 with not just the capacity and will to lead but also the
2 ideals to do so in a direction that most of the world would
3 prefer to go towards liberty, justice, peace, and economic
4 opportunity for all.

5 As the President said last week, the question is not
6 whether America should lead but how it should lead. And
7 that in many ways is the focus of today's hearing. So let
8 me just suggest a few basic principles that might help guide
9 this discussion.

10 First, we are the world's indispensable nation, but
11 nothing about the word "indispensable" requires us to act
12 alone. Alliances and partnerships matter, enhancing our
13 power and the legitimacy of our actions. Our national
14 security strategy must always encompass the security of
15 others and, where possible, we should work through
16 coalitions of friends and allies.

17 Second, given the fluid nature of today's threats, we
18 must make wise use of every foreign policy option from quiet
19 diplomacy to military force to protect America's national
20 interests.

21 Third, the foundation of American leadership must
22 remain what it has been for generations: our belief in the
23 fundamental dignity and importance of every human being. We
24 should not be shy about promoting these values, and that is
25 why I am proud to be chairman of the National Democratic

1 Institute. And I know you, Mr. Chairman, are very proud of
2 your leadership of the International Republican Institute
3 and the things that we do together. Working with allies and
4 partners, balancing our diplomatic, economic, and military
5 tools of national power, staying true to our ideals, these
6 will all be critical in navigating today's challenges. And
7 this means in the Middle East, we must continue working with
8 European and regional allies to apply direct military
9 pressure against the Islamic State while making clear that
10 these violent extremists are guilty not of Islamic terrorism
11 but of crimes that are profoundly un-Islamic. And we must
12 aid the millions of innocent refugees in Syria and its
13 neighbors that have fled both the terror of ISIS and the
14 depravity of the Assad regime.

15 Another key challenge in the region remains Iran. The
16 President has rightly made it the policy of the United
17 States to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. He
18 has taken no options off the table to achieve that goal, and
19 the administration is exploring a diplomatic resolution. If
20 these negotiations fail or if Iran does not honor its
21 commitments, then the United States should -- and I believe
22 will -- impose additional costs on Tehran with strong
23 support internationally. But I believe it would be a
24 mistake to do so before the negotiations run their course.

25 In Europe, we must reinforce our NATO allies and stand

1 united and firm against Putin's aggression even as we
2 continue to engage Russia as a global power on issues of
3 shared interest. But until Russia honors its commitments
4 and withdraws its forces from Ukraine, there can be no
5 sanctions relief. And if Russia continues its pattern of
6 destabilizing actions, it must face even more severe
7 consequences.

8 On economic reforms, the administration has made strong
9 pledges with Ukraine to work with our allies, however, to
10 secure more commitments in the areas on banking and energy,
11 but we do have to help them in terms of military assistance
12 so that they can defend themselves. We should not make the
13 road forward harder by suggesting that we see Ukraine's
14 future subject to Russia's veto.

15 I have many other comments but I would like to reserve
16 the rest to put in the record. And I thank you very, very
17 much for your kindness in asking all of us to come and
18 speak.

19 [The prepared statement of Dr. Albright follows:]

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1 Chairman McCain: Thank you, Madam Secretary.
2 Secretary Shultz?
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1 STATEMENT OF DR. GEORGE P. SHULTZ, THOMAS W. AND
2 SUSAN B. FORD DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, HOOVER INSTITUTION,
3 STANFORD UNIVERSITY AND FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE

4 Dr. Shultz: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

5 Chairman McCain: I think you have to push the button.

6 Dr. Shultz: And I appreciate the privilege of being
7 here. You can see I am out of practice.

8 [Laughter.]

9 Dr. Shultz: I have not been here for 25 years. I used
10 to appear a lot. And we had the idea when I was in office,
11 if you want me with you on the landing, include me in the
12 takeoff. And so we did lots of consultation, and I found I
13 always learned from it. So I appreciate the chance to
14 appear.

15 What I thought I would do is start by setting out basic
16 ideas that we used and President Reagan used in thinking out
17 his foreign policy and defense policy and then try to apply
18 those ideas to four areas that are important right now.

19 So first of all is the idea of execution. You have got
20 to arrange yourself and the way you go about things so that
21 you execute the ideas that you have in mind, make them
22 effective.

23 I remember when I returned to California after serving.
24 He knew I had served as Secretary of Labor and Director of
25 the Budget and Secretary of Treasury. I knew him somewhat,

1 and I got a phone call inviting me to Sacramento. He was
2 Governor then. And I got a 2 and a half hour drilling on
3 how the Federal Government worked. How do you get something
4 to happen? How does the President set up his policy? How
5 does he get people to follow that policy? How does the
6 budget get put together? What does the President do? What
7 do the cabinet officers do? What does the budget director
8 do and so on? And I came away feeling this guy wants to be
9 President but he wants to do the job and make things work.

10 And I remember not long after he took office, you may
11 recall the air controllers went on strike -- the air traffic
12 controllers. And people came running into the Oval Office
13 saying, Mr. President, Mr. President, this is very
14 complicated. He said, it is not complicated. It is simple.
15 They took an oath of office and they violated it. They are
16 out. And all over the world, people said, is he crazy
17 firing the air traffic controllers? But he had surrounded
18 himself and he had over in the Transportation Department a
19 man named Drew Lewis who had been the chief executive of a
20 large transportation company and Drew knew how to keep the
21 planes flying, which happened. So all over the world, the
22 message went, hey, the guy plays for keeps. You better pay
23 attention. But it was execution.

24 The second thing in his playbook was always be
25 realistic. Do not kid yourself. No rose-colored glasses.

1 Describe the situation as it is. That does not mean you are
2 afraid to recognize an opening when you see it, but do not
3 kid yourself. A very important principle.

4 Then next, be strong. The military, of course. And I
5 do not know. Sequestration seems to me like legislative
6 insanity. You cannot run anything on a percentage basis.
7 You have got to be able to pick and choose. So you better
8 get rid of that.

9 But at any rate, we need a strong military, but we need
10 a strong economy, something vibrant, something going to draw
11 on. And we need to have that kind of self-confidence that
12 Madeleine talked about. Do we have the winning hand? Do we
13 have the right ideas? All of that adds to your strength.

14 Then the next thing, of course, is to think through
15 your agenda so when you get to negotiating, you know you are
16 negotiating from your own agenda not the other guy's agenda.
17 Do not spend any time thinking about what he might accept or
18 she might accept. Stick to your agenda. Figure it out what
19 it is and that is what you are after.

20 I remember when President Reagan proposed the so-called
21 zero option on INF. People said you are crazy. The Soviets
22 have 1,500 missiles deployed. We have none. You are out of
23 your mind. Well, we went through a lot of pain and agony,
24 but we wound up with 0-0. So our agenda won. We stuck to
25 it.

1 Then I think it is very important to be very careful
2 with your words. Mean what you say. Say what you mean. I
3 remember, Mr. Chairman, at the start of World War II, I was
4 in Marine Corps boot camp. The sergeant hands me my rifle.
5 He says take good care of this rifle. This is your best
6 friend. And remember one thing: never point this rifle at
7 anybody unless you are willing to pull the trigger. Senator
8 Sullivan, you went through the same experience, I am sure,
9 in boot camp. So no empty threats. And you can translate
10 that into when you say you will do something, do it. If you
11 have that pattern of behavior, people trust you. They can
12 deal with you. If you do not do what you say you are going
13 to do, they cannot deal with it. They do not trust you. So
14 I think this has been a very important principle.

15 Then once you have all these things in place,
16 negotiate, engage with people. Do not be afraid to engage
17 with your adversaries, but do it on your agenda and from
18 your strengths. So that is the outline.

19 Now, let me turn first to something that I do not know
20 whether it is really on your agenda or not but I think it
21 should be and that is our neighborhood. I always felt and
22 President Reagan felt that our policies start in our
23 neighborhood. This is where we live. Canada and Mexico.
24 It is worth pointing out that since NAFTA was signed 20
25 years ago, trade between these three countries has

1 blossomed. Canada is our biggest trading partner. Mexico
2 is third. We are their biggest trading partner. And listen
3 to this. Our imports from Canada are 25 percent U.S.
4 content. Our imports from Mexico are 40 percent U.S.
5 content. So there is an integrated process going on here.

6 Furthermore, in terms of people, there are a million
7 Canadians living in California. That is fine. There is no
8 problem.

9 Fertility in Mexico now is down to a little below
10 replacement level. When we had that crisis not long ago
11 with all these kids showing up on our border, none of them
12 were Mexican. It only underlines the point that the border
13 that we need to be worrying about is Mexico's southern
14 border, and we need to be worrying about how can we help
15 them. And why is it that conditions are so bad in El
16 Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala that parents send their
17 children north to see if they cannot get something better?
18 We got to pay attention down there. That is all a part of
19 this problem of illegal immigration. It is not just ranting
20 about our border. It is much more diverse than that.

21 Then I want to turn to Iran. What is the reality? Let
22 us start with reality. The first point to remember is Iran
23 is the leading state sponsor of terrorism. It started right
24 away when they took people in our embassy hostage for close
25 to a year. One of their first acts also was to try to blow

1 up the Grand Mosque in Mecca. They act directly. They act
2 indirectly through Hezbollah. I think it is probably a fair
3 statement to say that if it were not for Hezbollah, Assad
4 would not be in Syria right now. But Hezbollah is an
5 Iranian entity, and we should not kid ourselves about that.
6 And they perpetrate terror. So that is point number one
7 about what they are like.

8 Point number two, they are developing ballistic
9 missiles. They are pretty advanced in that as far as I can
10 figure out. That is a menacing military item.

11 Number three, internally there is a lot to be desired
12 in the way they run themselves. There are lots of political
13 executions in Iran and that continues.

14 And fourth, they are trying to develop nuclear weapons.
15 There is no sensible explanation for the extent, the money,
16 the talent they have devoted to their nuclear thing other
17 than that they want a nuclear weapon. It cannot be
18 explained any other way. So we are negotiating with them.
19 At least as far as I can see, they have not got the table
20 set yet. There is nothing going on about ballistic
21 missiles, nothing going on about terrorism, let alone their
22 internal affairs. It is just about the nuclear business.
23 And we had innumerable UN resolutions in the Security
24 Council calling on Iran to dismantle its nuclear
25 capabilities. Now we seem to have granted that. And as I

1 say, we have granted the right to enrich. Already they
2 pocketed that. And we are just talking about how much.

3 I think it is also the case if you said to yourself
4 what is their agenda, their agenda is to get rid of the
5 sanctions, and they are doing pretty well. The sanctions
6 are eroding. The more you kick the can down the road, the
7 more the sanctions erode. And they are not so easy to put
8 back. I hear people talk about snap-back. There is very
9 little snap-back. If you have ever tried to get sanctions
10 imposed on somebody, you know how hard it is. You are
11 trying to persuade people who are making a perfectly good
12 living out of trade with somebody to stop doing it, and it
13 is not easy.

14 So I am very uneasy about the way our negotiations with
15 Iran are going on. I think it is not a bad thing if they
16 are reminded that sanctions can be put on and will be tough.

17 Then let me just say a word. Madeleine has covered it
18 already well about Russia. I think, in addition to the
19 obvious things about it, Russia is showing a lack of concern
20 about borders. It is, in a sense, an attack on a state
21 system. It is an attack on agreements. Remember when
22 Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons, there was an agreement with
23 us, with the Russians, and with the British that they would
24 respect the borders of Ukraine. You do not even hear about
25 that agreement anymore. It does not mean a thing. And all

1 their neighbors are nervous. Why? Because they are showing
2 a disrespect for borders.

3 I want to come back to this issue because -- and let me
4 just turn to the question of terrorism and ISIS because it
5 is related in an odd way to what Russia is doing. I think
6 the ISIS development is not simply about terrorism. It is
7 about a different view about how the world should work.
8 They are against the state system. They say, we do not
9 believe in countries. In that sense, there is an odd kind
10 of relationship with what Russia is doing and what they are
11 doing.

12 So what do we do about it? Well, first of all, I think
13 we do have to understand the scope of it. It is the scope
14 that matters.

15 We had at Hoover Institution at Stanford where I work
16 the other day the guy who is the head military person in
17 Pakistan. He was more worried about terrorism than he was
18 about India. And he was worried about ISIS establishing
19 itself in Pakistan. It was not just the Middle East. This
20 idea of no countries is something that is their ideology.
21 They are trying to pursue it.

22 So what do we do? Well, I think we, obviously, need to
23 recognize that this has been around a long time. And I
24 brought along -- perhaps I could put it in the record, Mr.
25 Chairman.

1 Chairman McCain: Without objection.

2 [The information follows:]

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1 Dr. Shultz: A speech I gave in 1984 just to make the
2 point that terrorism has been around a while. And in this
3 speech -- I will read a couple of things from it.

4 "The terrorists profit from the anarchy caused by their
5 violence. They succeed when governments change their
6 policies out of intimidation. But the terrorist can even be
7 satisfied if a government responds to terror by clamping
8 down on individual rights and freedoms. Governments that
9 overreact, even in self-defense, may only undermine their
10 own legitimacy."

11 So I am saying we have to figure out how to react but
12 not give away the store in the process.

13 I say, "The magnitude of the threat posed by terrorism
14 is so great that we cannot afford to confront it with half-
15 hearted and poorly organized measures. Terrorism is a
16 contagious disease that will inevitably spread if it goes
17 untreated."

18 "We cannot allow ourselves to become the Hamlet of
19 nations, worrying endlessly over whether and how to
20 respond."

21 But we have to be ready to respond. What should we do?

22 Well, a pretty good set of proposals is by your friend,
23 Mr. Chairman, former Senator Joseph Lieberman. I do not
24 know whether you saw the piece he had in "The Wall Street
25 Journal" recently.

1 Chairman McCain: I did.

2 Dr. Shultz: It was a very good piece.

3 Chairman McCain: We will include it in the record.

4 Dr. Shultz: He sets out things that we should do,
5 which I agree. If you could put this in the record, I think
6 that would be helpful.

7 Chairman McCain: Without objection.

8 [The information follows:]

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1 Dr. Shultz: But in addition to military things that we
2 should be doing, I think we also have to ask ourselves how
3 do we encourage members of the Islamic faith to disavow
4 these efforts. The President of Egypt made reportedly a
5 very important speech that we need to build on.

6 But I would like to call your attention to something
7 that has come out of San Francisco. Of course, I am a
8 little oriented that way. I know you people on the East
9 Coast think we are a bunch of nut balls, but we have a good
10 time.

11 [Laughter.]

12 Dr. Shultz: But there is a man in San Francisco named
13 Bill Swing. He is the retired Episcopal bishop of
14 California. And he started something called the United
15 Religion Initiative. And his idea is to get people -- he
16 found it was hard to get the people running these religions,
17 but if you get the people together and getting them to talk
18 together about subjects of interest to them, they basically
19 forget about their religion and they try to get somewhere
20 with these subjects. So by this time, he has what he calls
21 cooperation circles in 85 countries. He got millions of
22 people involved. And he has a big list of religions
23 involved. The most important in numbers are Christians and
24 Islam, and that is followed by Hinduism and Jewish, but a
25 whole bunch of others. And the kind of things they talk

1 about are like economic development, education, health care,
2 nuclear disarmament, refugee and displacement issues, and so
3 on.

4 But I think things like this are to be encouraged
5 because they get people from different religions and say
6 there are things you can get together on and work on
7 together, and that tends to break things down.

8 And he has given me a little handout on it, and I would
9 like to put that in the record also, Mr. Chairman.

10 Chairman McCain: Without objection.

11 [The information follows:]

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1 Dr. Shultz: So thank you for the opportunity to
2 present some views.

3 [The prepared statement of Dr. Shultz follows:]

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1 Chairman McCain: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
2 Secretary Kissinger?
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1 STATEMENT OF DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, CHAIRMAN OF
2 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES AND FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE

3 Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, thank you for this
4 invitation and to appear together with my friend of 50
5 years, George Shultz, from whom I have learned so much, and
6 with Madeleine, with whom I have shared common concerns for
7 many decades and who put me in my place when she was
8 appointed as Secretary of State. And I introduced her at a
9 dinner in New York, and I said, welcome to the fraternity.
10 And she said, the first thing you have to learn that it is
11 no longer a fraternity.

12 [Laughter.]

13 Dr. Kissinger: Now a sorority.

14 Mr. Chairman, I have taken the liberty -- I agree with
15 the policy recommendations that my colleagues have put
16 forward -- to try to put forward the conception statement of
17 the overall situation, and I will be happy in the question
18 period to go into specific policy issues.

19 The United States finds itself in a paradoxical
20 situation. By any standard of national capacity, we are in
21 a favorable position to achieve our traditional objectives
22 and to shape international relations.

23 Yet, as we look around the world, we encounter upheaval
24 and conflict and chaos.

25 [Audience disruption.]

1 Dr. Shultz: Mr. Chairman, I salute Henry Kissinger for
2 his many efforts at peace and security.

3 Chairman McCain: Thank you, Doctor.

4 [Standing ovation.]

5 Dr. Kissinger: Thank you very much.

6 The United States has not faced a more diverse and
7 complex array of crises since the end of the Second World
8 War. One reason is that the nature of strategy has shifted
9 from an emphasis on objective power to include also
10 psychological contests and asymmetric war. The existing
11 international order is in the process of being redefined.

12 First, the concept of order within every region of the
13 world is being challenged.

14 Second, the relationship between different regions of
15 the world is being redefined.

16 Third, for the first time in history, every region now
17 interacts in real time and affects each other
18 simultaneously.

19 The problem of peace was historically posed by the
20 accumulation of power, the emergence of a potentially
21 dominant country threatening the security of its neighbors.
22 In our period, peace is often threatened by the
23 disintegration of power, the collapse of authority into non-
24 governed spaces spreading violence beyond their borders and
25 their region. This has led to the broadening of the

1 challenge of terrorism from a threat organized essentially
2 from beyond borders to a threat with domestic networks and
3 origins in many countries of the world.

4 The current international order, based on respect for
5 sovereignty, rejection of territorial conquest, open trade,
6 and encouragement of human rights is primarily a creation of
7 the West. It originated as a mechanism to end Europe's
8 religious wars over 3 centuries ago. It spread as European
9 states advanced technologically and territorially. And it
10 evolved in the decades since World War II, as the United
11 States became its guarantor and its indispensable component.

12 In key regions of the world, that order is in the
13 process of change. In Europe, after two cataclysmic wars,
14 the leading states set out to pool their sovereignty, and
15 crises cast the question of Europe's identity and world role
16 into sharper relief and, along with it, the definition of
17 the transatlantic partnership, which in all the post-World
18 War II period has been the keystone of American foreign
19 policy. Europe is suspended between a past that is
20 determined to overcome and a future still in the process of
21 redefinition, with a willingness to contribute to so-called
22 soft power and a reluctance to play a role in the other
23 aspects of security. The Atlantic partnership faces the
24 challenge of adapting from an essentially regional grouping
25 to an alliance based on congruent global views.

1 Russia, meanwhile, is challenging the strategic
2 orientation of states once constrained in its satellite
3 orbit. The West has an interest in vindicating the
4 independence and vitality of these states that ended their
5 satellite status. But Russia is now mounting an offensive
6 on the border on which paradoxically it is least inherently
7 threatened. On many issues, especially Islamist extremism,
8 American and Russian interests should prove compatible. So
9 we face a dual challenge to overcome the immediate threats
10 that are posed along the borders, especially of Ukraine, but
11 to do so in a manner that leaves open a context for Russia's
12 long-term role in international relations where it is needed
13 to play an essential role.

14 In Asia, many economies and societies are flourishing.
15 At the same time, there exist local conflicts for which
16 there is no formal arrangement to constrain the rivalries.
17 This introduces a measure of volatility to seemingly local
18 disputes.

19 A special aspect of any Asian system will be the
20 relationship between the United States and China. It is
21 often described as one between a rising power and an
22 established power analogous to the relationship between
23 Germany and Britain before the war. Two successive American
24 and Chinese presidents have announced their joint aim to
25 deal with this matter on the basis of cooperation. Yet, it

1 is also true that significant spokesmen have stressed the
2 adversarial aspect in both countries.

3 Now, India is entering this equation. With its vast
4 economic potential, a vibrant democracy, and cultural links
5 to Asia, the Middle East, and the West, India plays a
6 growing role that the United States will naturally welcome.
7 The emphasis should be on social and political alignments,
8 not strategic groupings.

9 In the Middle East, multiple upheavals are unfolding
10 simultaneously. There is a struggle for power within
11 states, a conflict between states, a conflict between ethnic
12 and religious groups, and an assault on the international
13 system as it was constituted. And these various conflicts
14 often merge, and they have produced the phenomenon of ISIS,
15 which challenges all established institutions and which in
16 the name of a caliphate is establishing a territorial base
17 explicitly designed to undermine all the existing patterns
18 of legitimacy. So the continuation of a territory under
19 terrorist control that avows its aim the overthrow of all
20 existing institutions is a threat to security, and the
21 conflict with ISIS must be viewed within that context and
22 not within the context of individual episodes and the
23 ability to overcome that.

24 Iran has exploited this turmoil to pursue positions of
25 power within other countries beyond the control of national

1 authorities and sometimes constituting a state within a
2 state, for example, in Lebanon and Iraq and elsewhere, and
3 all this while developing a nuclear program of potentially
4 global consequences. Nuclear talks with Iran, which I
5 welcome, began as an international effort by three European
6 countries buttressed by six UN resolutions. And the United
7 States joined in only in 2006. Their avowed purpose has
8 been of all these countries, together with the six
9 resolutions of the Security Council, to deny Iran the
10 capability to develop a military nuclear option.

11 These negotiations have now become an essentially
12 bilateral negotiation over the scope of that capability, not
13 its existence, through an agreement that sets a hypothetical
14 limit of 1 year on an assumed breakout. The impact of the
15 exchange will be to transform the negotiations from
16 preventing proliferation to managing it and from the
17 avoidance of proliferation to its limitations. And these
18 stages need to be considered in assessing whatever agreement
19 emerges.

20 In all of these regions, the old order is in flux while
21 its replacement is uncertain.

22 The role of the United States is indispensable. In a
23 time of global upheaval, the consequence of American
24 disengagement is magnified and requires larger intervention
25 later. The United States, working together with Mexico and

1 Canada in an economic partnership and with its other allies,
2 can help shape the emerging world in both the Atlantic and
3 Pacific regions.

4 All this calls for a long-term bipartisan definition,
5 and we should ask ourselves the following questions. What
6 is it we seek to prevent, no matter how it happens, and if
7 necessary alone? What do we seek to achieve, even if not
8 supported by any multilateral effort? What do we seek to
9 achieve or prevent only if supported by an alliance? What
10 should we not engage in, even if it is urged by other
11 groups? And what is the nature of the values we seek to
12 advance? The answers require a process of public debate and
13 education. But we must understand that the answers will be
14 determined by the quality of the questions we ask.

15 American military power has and will continue to play
16 an essential role in upholding a favorable international
17 balance, restraining destabilizing rivalries and providing a
18 shield for economic growth and international trade to
19 follow. The sense of basic security that a strong and
20 consistent American political presence provides has made
21 possible many of the great strides of the post-World War II
22 era. It is even more important today.

23 The United States, as your chairman has often pointed
24 out, should have a strategy-driven budget, not a budget-
25 driven strategy. And in that context, attention must be

1 given to the modernization of our strategic forces.

2 America has played in its history a role as stabilizer
3 and it is a vision for the future. And all great ideas and
4 achievements are a vision before they become a reality. And
5 I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking
6 Member, for conducting hearings that hopefully lead us in
7 this direction.

8 I am happy to answer your questions. Thank you.

9 [The prepared statement of Dr. Kissinger follows:]

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1 Chairman McCain: Thank you very much, Doctor. Thank
2 you for your compelling statement. I thank all the
3 witnesses.

4 I will be brief so that my colleagues can have a chance
5 to answer questions. We will probably have to break within
6 about a half hour or so since we have votes on the floor of
7 the Senate.

8 Secretary Albright, should we be providing defensive
9 weapons to the Ukrainian Government?

10 Dr. Albright: Mr. Chairman, I believe that we should.
11 I think that they are moving forward with a reform process,
12 which I think can be healthy, but their security needs to
13 also be ensured. And I do believe that countries have a
14 right to defend themselves. We should be careful about a
15 confrontation ourselves, but I do think that we should be
16 providing defensive weapons to the Ukrainians.

17 Chairman McCain: Dr. Kissinger, you described it --
18 you and Secretary Shultz -- rather well. But I am not sure
19 that the average American understands the Iranian ambitions,
20 and maybe both of you could explain perhaps to the committee
21 and to, frankly, the American people what are the Iranian
22 ambitions and why should we care? Maybe beginning with you,
23 Secretary Shultz.

24 Dr. Shultz: Their ambitions are to have a dominant
25 role at least in the Middle East to continue their pattern

1 of terrorism directly and through Hezbollah and to enhance
2 their position by the acquisition of nuclear weapons. They
3 give every indication, Mr. Chairman, that they do not want a
4 nuclear weapon for deterrence. They want a nuclear weapon
5 to use it on Israel. So it is a very threatening situation
6 I think. Actually a nuclear weapon used anywhere would
7 dramatically change the world. Everybody would say we have
8 to do something about these awful things. But it can wipe
9 out a state like Israel.

10 Chairman McCain: Dr. Kissinger?

11 Dr. Kissinger: Every country is in part a result of
12 its history, and there are three strengths in Iranian
13 history. As a national state in the region, in this
14 capacity its interests and those of the United States are
15 quite parallel, and the United States and previous Iranian
16 governments found a reliable partner and that is a goal
17 towards which one can strive.

18 Secondly, Iran reflects a history of empire that
19 spreads across the entire Middle East and that was one of
20 the major themes of its history, extending into the 19th
21 century.

22 And third, Iran was the first state advocate of the
23 Islamic jihad uprising that sweeps away national borders and
24 based its foreign policy on the domination of the particular
25 interpretation of religion. Iranian foreign policy since

1 the event of the Ayatollah regime has been a combination of
2 the religious and imperial element and has asserted a
3 dominant position towards neighboring states and towards
4 states well beyond it, and of course, with respect to the
5 eradication of Israel.

6 So with respect to the current negotiations, insofar as
7 they are state-to-state negotiations, they have a positive
8 basis, but the existing Iranian regime has never disavowed
9 its policies that include Persian imperial and religious
10 domination. And it is supporting now groups like the
11 Hezbollah which are states within the state in other
12 countries. And we have just heard this week of a Hezbollah
13 attack from Syrian territory into an Israel border patrol.

14 So when one speaks of political cooperation, the
15 question is whether the political orientation of that regime
16 has been altered. It cannot be judged alone by the nuclear
17 agreement in which the removal of sanctions is a great
18 Iranian interest. So that is the challenge we face and that
19 we can only assess when we know the terms of the outcome of
20 the negotiations.

21 Chairman McCain: Senator Shaheen?

22 Senator Shaheen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

23 Thank you all very much for your service to the country
24 and for being here today.

25 I want to begin with a report that was asked to be done

1 by the Department of Defense that the RAND Corporation did
2 looking at the last 13 years of war and what lessons we have
3 learned from those 13 years. And the report draws a number
4 of conclusions. I will not go through all of them.

5 But first it suggests that the U.S. Government has
6 displayed a weakness in formulating national security
7 strategies and that the weakness is really due to a lack of
8 effective civilian-military process for national security
9 policymaking. And you all talked about the need to have a
10 clear strategy for what we are doing.

11 I wonder if you could comment on whether you think
12 those conclusions are going in the right direction in
13 thinking about how we address future foreign and military
14 policy or if you think that is totally off base. Secretary
15 Albright, do you want to begin?

16 Dr. Albright: Thank you very much. And it is a
17 pleasure to be here.

18 Let me just say I have not read the RAND report, but I
19 do think that one of the bases of our Government are
20 civilian-military relations, the control of the civilian
21 controlling the military. I think that the decision-making
22 process is one in which the military has to be heard, in
23 which there may be different opinions, but the whole basis
24 of the national security system in the United States is that
25 different voices are heard. I think that there needs to be

1 a process whereby -- and I agree in this in terms of what
2 George Shultz said -- is there have to be ideas and then
3 execution. And while there may be voices at times that
4 disagree, ultimately it is important to get a common policy.

5 I do think the last 13 years have been particularly
6 difficult in terms of determining why we were in two wars
7 and try to figure out what the decision-making process
8 really was in getting into those wars, not in terms of
9 rehashing them but in terms of trying to figure out what the
10 appropriate decision-making process is, what the channels
11 are. Are there those that operate outside the channels?
12 And I do think I am very much in favor of a process where
13 civilian and military opinions are both regarded, but
14 ultimately civilian control over the military.

15 Senator Shaheen: Thank you.

16 Dr. Shultz?

17 Dr. Shultz: I recall a time when President George H.W.
18 Bush deployed forces, along with coalition forces, to expel
19 Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. That was a clear mission,
20 endorsed by votes in the Congress, as well as in the UN.
21 And when that had happened, he stopped. It was one of the
22 most dramatic examples of not allowing mission creep to
23 control what you are doing. There was a mission. It was
24 accomplished and he stopped. He took a lot of heat for
25 that. Oh, you should have gone on to Baghdad or you should

1 have done this or should have done that. But I thought it
2 was a very important moment.

3 If you take Afghanistan, I think after 9/11 it was
4 practically a no-brainer that we should go and try to do
5 something there. And we did and we succeeded brilliantly.
6 And then our mission changed. And we are there forever
7 because of mission creep. I think to a certain extent we
8 failed to take some advice on Iraq of some of the generals
9 who said you have to have a greater amount of manpower there
10 so that you have some control. If there is looting, it
11 shows you are not in control, and there was a lot of
12 looting. So I think that was a case of we would have been
13 better off if we had taken more military advice.

14 But in terms of the decision to go ahead in both cases,
15 it would seem to be very well taken because the evidence, at
16 least -- it turned out not to be so, but the evidence seemed
17 to be clear that Iraq was moving on weapons of mass
18 destruction and we had, of course, 9/11 in Afghanistan.

19 So I think we have to be very careful in these things.
20 I sat in the situation room many times and there is a
21 mission and the military say you have got to tell me more
22 precisely what the mission is. Then I can tell you what it
23 takes to do it. And that gets decided. And then you go and
24 you are successful. Then you have to be careful that the
25 mission does not change into something that you did not

1 provide for to begin with.

2 Senator Shaheen: Thank you very much.

3 My time has ended. I do not know, Dr. Kissinger, if
4 you had anything you wanted to add to that.

5 Dr. Kissinger: The question has two aspects. Is the
6 organization adequate to give every significant group an
7 opportunity to express itself?

8 But the second challenge we have faced in defining a
9 national strategy is that we in our national experience have
10 had a different experience than most other nations. We have
11 been secured behind two great oceans. So for Americans
12 security presented itself as a series of individual issues
13 for which there could be a pragmatic solution, after which
14 there was no need for further engagement until the next
15 crisis came along. But for most nations and for us now more
16 than ever, the need is for a continuing concept of national
17 strategy. We think of foreign policy as a series of
18 pragmatic issues. Other countries, for example, the
19 Chinese, do not think in terms of solutions because they
20 think every solution is an admissions ticket to another
21 problem.

22 So it is a question of national education in answering
23 the question, what are our objectives. What are the best
24 means to achieve these objectives? How can we sustain them
25 over a period of time?

1 I have lived now so long that I have experienced six
2 wars, and in the five wars after World War II, we began them
3 with great enthusiasm and then had great national difficulty
4 in ending them. And in a number of them, including the last
5 two especially, withdrawing became the only definition of
6 strategy or the principal definition of strategy. We have
7 to avoid that in the future. And we must know the objective
8 when we start and the political strategy with which to
9 culminate it. That I think is our biggest challenge.

10 Senator Shaheen: Thank you very much.

11 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

12 Chairman McCain: Senator Inhofe.

13 Senator Inhofe: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

14 First of all, I just have to say I am just overwhelmed
15 to be before the three of you. There is nothing I can say
16 that would thank you enough for all that you have done.
17 Thank you so much.

18 One of the things I wanted to -- the only major thing I
19 wanted to accomplish at this hearing was to try to describe
20 to the American people, because they do not know. You
21 probably assume they do know the current condition of our
22 military. Now, I am going to read something that you will
23 remember, and this is going to be to Dr. Shultz and Dr.
24 Kissinger.

25 This is 1983. It was Ronald Reagan. He was talking

1 about how we should budget for our national security. I am
2 going to quote him. "We start by considering what must be
3 done to maintain peace and review all of the possible
4 threats against our security. Then a strategy for
5 strengthening peace, defending against those threats must be
6 agreed upon. And finally, our defense establishment must
7 evaluate to see what is necessary to protect against any and
8 all potential threats. The cost of achieving these ends is
9 totaled up and the result is the budget for national
10 defense."

11 Does that sound good to you?

12 Dr. Shultz: Right on the mark.

13 Senator Inhofe: Dr. Kissinger, do you agree with the
14 statement in 1983 of President Reagan?

15 Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

16 Senator Inhofe: Thank you.

17 The problem we are having right now is we have watched
18 what is happening to our force structure and people do not
19 realize. In a minute, I do want to ask you about the
20 Ukraine. But when you think about the places where we
21 should be and we could be and all of that, we have to
22 consider that we do not have the capability that we have had
23 in the past. We have always had that capability.

24 Our policy has been to be able to defend America on two
25 regional fronts -- roughly that. They changed the words

1 around a little bit -- at the same time, two regional
2 conflicts at the same time. We are not where we can do it
3 right now.

4 I would like to ask the two of you how you evaluate our
5 current condition of our military capability, starting with
6 you, Dr. Kissinger.

7 Dr. Kissinger: With respect to Ukraine?

8 Senator Inhofe: No, no. Our overall military
9 capability of our United States military. End strength.

10 Dr. Kissinger: I think our capability is not adequate
11 to deal with all the challenges that I see and which some of
12 the commitments into which we may be moving and needs to be
13 reassessed carefully in the light of the shrinkage that has
14 taken place on budgetary grounds in the recent decade.

15 Senator Inhofe: Dr. Shultz, do you agree with that?

16 Dr. Shultz: I think you have to recognize that a prime
17 responsibility of the Federal Government is to provide for
18 our security. That is number one. As you read from Ronald
19 Reagan, one of the things he did was build up our military.
20 He got a lot of objections from his budget director. But he
21 said this is the number one thing. And as our economy
22 improved, things got better budgetarily. But still, let us
23 build up our military. When he took office, we had the
24 Vietnam syndrome, and our people were not even wearing their
25 uniforms into the Pentagon. He said stand up straight, be

1 proud of yourself, wear your uniform. Then we had a
2 military buildup of considerable size. And the statement
3 was peace through strength. We actually did not use our
4 forces very much because it was obvious to everybody that if
5 we did, we would win. So you better be careful. Do not
6 mess with us.

7 Senator Inhofe: An excellent statement.

8 Dr. Albright, I do agree with your position on Ukraine
9 for probably a different reason. I happened to be there at
10 the time of the election in November. A lot of people do
11 not realize what really happened, not just Poroshenko but
12 Yatsenyuk and the rest celebrating the first time in 96
13 years that they have rejected any Communist seat in the
14 parliament. It has never happened before.

15 Now, in light of that, the free world is looking at
16 what is happening in Ukraine. What effect do you think that
17 has on many of our allies, the action that we have not taken
18 there?

19 Dr. Albright: I think that we do need to help them
20 defend themselves. Senator Ayotte and I were there also for
21 elections, and they took very many brave steps. The people
22 of Ukraine had been disappointed by what had happened after
23 the Orange Revolution in terms of their capability of being
24 able to bring reforms into place.

25 I think that generally -- and the larger question --

1 people do look at how we react when one country invades
2 another and takes a piece of territory. As both my
3 colleagues here have said, it is breaking the international
4 system. And therefore, I do think that it is important to
5 take a strong stand there by providing capability of
6 Ukrainians to defend themselves, but also that NATO, in
7 fact, can and is taking steps in other parts of Central and
8 Eastern Europe of providing some forces that move around,
9 and NATO has been a very important part.

10 I do think, if I might say to the questions that you
11 asked the others, that I am very concerned about
12 sequestration and the deep cuts that have been taken, and I
13 hope very much that this committee really moves on that
14 because I do think it jeopardizes America's military reach.

15 As somebody who worked for Senator Muskie at the
16 beginning of the budget process, I do know about function
17 150 and 050, having defended 150 a long time. I also admire
18 what Secretary Gates had said about the importance of
19 providing some money for the foreign policy aspect of our
20 budget because in answer to many questions here, I think we
21 are in the Middle East for a long time. And the military
22 part of this is important, but we also have to recognize --
23 and it is a little bit to what you said, George -- in terms
24 of longer-term aspects there where we need to figure out
25 what the environment is that has created this particular

1 mess and be able to use other tools of our policy to deal
2 with that.

3 Senator Inhofe: Thank you very much. My time has
4 expired.

5 If I could just ask one question for the record from
6 Dr. Shultz. You outlined, I thought, a very good course of
7 behavior for us in the United States. I would like for the
8 record for you to submit how we are doing relative to that
9 course of behavior that you recommend. Thank you very much.

10 [The information follows:]

11 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

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1 Dr. Kissinger: Could I say a word about the military?
2 In considering the Ukraine issue, in my view we should begin
3 with the definition of the objective we are trying to reach
4 and then see which measures are the most suitable. I am
5 uneasy about beginning a process of military engagement
6 without knowing where it will lead us and what we are
7 willing to do to sustain it in order to avoid the experience
8 that I mentioned before. Ukraine should be an independent
9 state, free to develop its own relationships with perhaps a
10 special aspect with respect to NATO membership. It should
11 be maintained within its existing borders, and Russian
12 troops should be withdrawn as part of a settlement.

13 But I believe we should avoid taking incremental steps
14 before we know how far we are willing to go. This is a
15 territory 300 miles from Moscow and therefore has special
16 security implications. That does not change my view of the
17 outcome, which must be a free Ukraine. And it may include
18 military measures as part of it, but I am uneasy when one
19 speaks of military measures alone without having the
20 strategy fully put forward.

21 Chairman McCain: Dr. Shultz -- Secretary, do you want
22 to add to that?

23 Dr. Shultz: Yes, I would like to add to that. I am
24 totally with Henry's statement of where we want it to wind
25 up as a free, independent Ukraine. But I think we have to

1 be active in trying to help that come about, and I would
2 point to two particular things that we should be doing.

3 Number one, we should be organizing an energy effort to
4 see to it that the countries around Russia are not totally
5 dependent on Russian oil and gas, which has been used as a
6 weapon. I am interested to know that there is an LNG
7 receiving ship in a port in Lithuania, and I think they are
8 getting their LNG from Norway. But we have a lot of gas in
9 this country. We should be ready to have LNG and get it
10 there. There is plenty of oil around that should get there.
11 And we want to relieve those countries of this dependence on
12 Russian oil and gas, and maybe it would teach them a little
13 bit of lesson because, in addition to the low oil prices,
14 they will lost market share probably permanently.

15 But then I would not hesitate -- I think I am here in
16 Madeleine's camp. Let us do everything we can to train and
17 equip decently the Ukrainian armed forces. They have boots
18 on the ground. They are their boots, but let us help them
19 be effective because there are Russian boots on the ground.
20 Don't anybody kid themselves about what is going on.

21 Chairman McCain: Thank you.

22 Dr. Albright, I will suggest that you become a member
23 of the Budget Committee again. We can use your expertise
24 and experience.

25 [Laughter.]

1 Chairman McCain: Senator Manchin?

2 Senator Manchin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this
3 outstanding hearing.

4 And thank you for attending, the three of you. It is
5 just such an honor to have you all here with your expertise
6 and your knowledge and the history of where we are as a
7 country and hopefully help us get to the place we need to
8 be.

9 With that, Dr. Kissinger, you said in your testimony
10 the United States has not faced a more diverse and complex
11 array of crises since the end of World War II. And I look
12 around at all of our generations. My generation is Vietnam.
13 The generation of today is 9/11, Afghanistan, Iraq. It has
14 kind of gone into another direction of concern that we all
15 have.

16 I would like to hear from the three of you. And I
17 think you all have touched on it and about how we would
18 approach it. But when you start looking at where is the
19 United States of America truly willing to spend its treasure
20 and contribute its blood, which is a horrible thing for any
21 of us to have to ask Americans to do, but if we are going to
22 be doing treasure and blood of where we are going to be
23 addressing the greatest threats that we have and we are
24 limited in such an array of complex problems that we have,
25 which ones would you identify first?

1 And I would ask simply this. We had gone to
2 Afghanistan because of 9/11. We turned left and went to
3 Iraq, and we can talk about that all day. We have Iraq that
4 did not do what we thought it would do, and we have ISIS in
5 Syria. We have all of that going on right now and we have
6 the Ukraine and Russia. So do we try to do a little bit of
7 everything, or should we really be pinpointing something
8 that we should be focused on right now? And whoever would
9 like to start. Dr. Kissinger, if you would like to start on
10 just pinpointing what you think our greatest concerns may be
11 and where our efforts should be put.

12 Dr. Kissinger: My thinking on international relations
13 was formed during the Cold War. And in terms of danger, the
14 conflict between a nuclear-armed Russia and a nuclear-armed
15 America was greater than any single danger we face today.
16 And the most anguishing problem one could face was what
17 happens if the strategic plans of both sides had to be
18 implemented or were implemented by accident or whatever.
19 But it was a relatively less complex issue than we face
20 today where we have a Middle East whose entire structure is
21 in flux.

22 As late as the 1973 Middle East war, American policy
23 could be based on existing states in the region and achieve
24 considerable successes in maneuvering between them. Today
25 Middle East policy requires an understanding of the states,

1 of the alternatives to these states, of the various forces
2 within the states, a situation like Syria where the two main
3 contenders are violently opposed to America, violently
4 opposed to each other, and a victory for either of them is
5 not in our interest.

6 And the rise of China, apart even from motivations of
7 leaders, presents a whole new set of problems, an economic
8 competitor of great capacity, a state that is used in its
9 tradition of being the central kingdom of the world as they
10 knew it, that by its very existence we and they are bound to
11 step on each other's toes, and the management of this -- but
12 it is a different problem from the Middle East problem.

13 Senator Manchin: The Middle East is the most dangerous
14 one that you think we are facing right now, a nuclear Iran?

15 Dr. Kissinger: And then we have nuclear Iran. So we
16 have -- I would say the most immediate, short-term problem
17 is to get rid of a terror-based state that controls
18 territory. That is ISIS. And we must not let that
19 degenerate into another war that we do not know how to end.

20 But more long-term problems also exist. And the
21 challenge to our country is not to switch from region to
22 region but to understand the things we must do and separate
23 them from the things we probably cannot do. So there is a
24 novel challenge in that magnitude for the current
25 generation.

1 Senator Manchin: Mr. Chairman, would it be possible
2 that Dr. Shultz -- Dr. Shultz, would you just give us your
3 idea of what you think our most greatest concerns are right
4 now?

5 Dr. Shultz: Well, of course, I agree with what Henry
6 has said, but let me put some additional points in it.

7 I think we tend to underestimate the impact of the
8 information in the communication age. It changes the
9 problem of government because people know what is going on
10 everywhere. They can communicate with each other and
11 organize, and they do. So you have diversity everywhere,
12 and it has been ignored or suppressed but it is asserting
13 itself.

14 Remember in Iraq with *Maliki was he had to govern over
15 diversity, but he wanted to stamp it out. He did not
16 understand at all how you govern over diversity.

17 So you have that problem which tends to fragment
18 populations and make governments a little weaker, just as
19 that is happening, the problems that demand international
20 attention are escalating.

21 I think as Henry said, as I said in my initial
22 testimony, there is an attack on the state system going on.
23 The attack on Ukraine is part of it. ISIS is a major part
24 of it. They are a major challenger to the state system.
25 They want a different system.

1 I have a sense, Henry, that China is drifting into a
2 kind of sphere of influence and way of thinking. That is
3 different from the state system. So that is a challenge.

4 I see nuclear weapon proliferation coming about. That
5 is devastating. A nuclear weapon goes off somewhere. Even
6 my physicist friends say that the Hiroshima weapon was just
7 a little play thing. Well, look at the damage it did. A
8 thermonuclear weapon would incinerate the Washington area
9 totally. So the spread of nuclear weapons is a really big
10 threat. And we were making progress but that has been
11 derailed and we are going the wrong way right now.

12 I think and I gather in Washington it is very
13 controversial, but I have a friend at Hoover who is a
14 retired chief of naval operations, Gary Roughead. And we
15 have started a project on the Arctic. Senator Sullivan
16 knows about the Arctic. There is a new ocean being created
17 there. That has not happened since the last Ice Age. There
18 are big melts all over the world taking place. The climate
19 is changing. And there are consequences. So that is
20 happening. And we will never get anywhere with it unless we
21 are able to somehow have actions that take hold on a global
22 basis.

23 I might say sort of parenthetically I have the
24 privilege of chairing the MIT advisory board on their big
25 energy initiative, more or less the same thing at Stanford.

1 So I see what these guys doing R&D and girls doing R&D are
2 doing, and it is really breathtaking. We had an MIT
3 scientist come to Hoover the other day, and I think he has
4 cracked the code on large-scale storage of electricity.
5 That is a game-changer because it takes the intermittency
6 problem out of solar and wind. And also, we must know how
7 vulnerable our grid is, and if you have some energy stored
8 where you can use it, you are much safer. At any rate, I
9 think these energy R&D things are beginning to get
10 somewhere. But that is a big threat.

11 So these three things are huge concerns of ours, and we
12 need to have a strong military. We need to have a strong
13 economy, and we need a strength of purpose in our country.

14 We have probably done the best job with all our
15 problems of dealing with diversity because we started out
16 that way. We are the most diverse country in the world, and
17 our Constitution provided that. You remember if you read --
18 I have been reading Lynn Cheney's book on Madison. It is a
19 wonderful book. And it is clear that George Washington,
20 having suffered because the Continental Congress would not
21 give him the money to pay his troops, wanted a strong
22 government. But he and his colleagues saw that they would
23 never get the Constitution ratified unless they provided a
24 lot of role for States and communities. So our Federal
25 structure emerged, and it is a structure that allows for

1 diversity. And it is very ingenious. You can do something
2 in Alaska. We do not have to do it in San Francisco, and
3 they certainly do not want to do the same thing in New
4 Mexico. There is a difference. Let the differences
5 prevail.

6 So we have these big problems, and then in a sense you
7 look at them and say tactically how do we handle Iran, how
8 do we handle Ukraine, how do we handle ISIS. It falls
9 within this broader framework.

10 Dr. Albright: Can I just say a word? I do think the
11 biggest threat is climate change and its national security
12 aspects, as has been described. And it leads me to say the
13 following thing. Our problem is that not everything can be
14 handled militarily and that we also have a short attention
15 span. These are very long-term problems. And also,
16 Americans do not like the word "multilateralism." It has
17 too many syllables and ends in an "ism." But basically it
18 is a matter of cooperating, and if you look at these issues,
19 it will require American leadership within a system that
20 other countries play a part in. And otherwise, I agree with
21 everything that both Henry and George have said. But I do
22 think short attention span and multilateral ways of dealing
23 with it.

24 Senator Manchin: I am sorry, Mr. Chairman.

25 Chairman McCain: Not at all.

1 Senator Sessions?

2 Senator Sessions: Well, thank you.

3 Thank you all.

4 It is time for us to think about our role, what our
5 strategy will be, and what we can realistically accomplish
6 in the future. The longer I have been around these issues,
7 the more less dreamy I become.

8 Dr. Kissinger, I think I am reading "World Order," and
9 thank you for your contribution to the world with that book.
10 And I think you quote Bismarck. Maybe you can get it
11 correctly. Unhappy is the statesman who is not as happy
12 after the war as he was before the war, something to that
13 effect. So we just got to be careful about power and how we
14 use it. Sometimes long-term thinking can avoid short-term
15 problems. I thank all of you for contributing to that.

16 Our subcommittee deals with nuclear weapons. I am very
17 concerned about proliferation, Dr. Shultz, as you indicated.
18 I am worried that our allies are losing confidence in our
19 umbrella and they may expand. And, of course, Iran will
20 clearly likely kick off proliferation if they achieve a
21 weapon. And as one of you noted, I think Dr. Kissinger you
22 have indicated we move from Iran not having a nuclear weapon
23 to Iran could get close to having a nuclear weapon but not
24 have one. You expressed some concern about that. Would you
25 expand on that a little bit? Yes, Dr. Kissinger?

1 Dr. Kissinger: I am concerned, as I pointed out, the
2 shift of the focus of negotiations from preventing Iran from
3 having the capability of building a nuclear weapon to a
4 negotiation which seeks to limit the use of their capability
5 in the space of 1 year. That will create huge inspection
6 problems. But I will reserve my comment on that until I see
7 the agreement.

8 But I would also emphasize the issue of proliferation.
9 Assuming one accepts the inspection as valid and takes
10 account of the stockpile of nuclear material that already
11 exists, the question is what do the other countries in the
12 region do. And if the other countries in the region
13 conclude that America has approved the development of an
14 enrichment capability within 1 year of a nuclear weapon and
15 if they then insist on building the same capability, we will
16 live in a proliferated world in which everybody, even if
17 that agreement is maintained, will be very close to the
18 trigger point. And I hope and I would wish that this
19 proliferating issue be carefully examined because it is a
20 different problem from not having a capability at all to
21 having a capability that is within 1 year of building a
22 weapon, especially if it then spreads to all the other
23 countries in the region and they have to live with that fear
24 of each other that will produce a substantially different
25 world from the one that we knew and from the one in which

1 the negotiations were begun.

2 Dr. Shultz: It should be pointed out that a bomb made
3 from enriched uranium is much easier to make. The Hiroshima
4 bomb was an uranium enrichment bomb. It was not even
5 tested. The Nagasaki bomb was a plutonium bomb. That was
6 tested. But you can make an unsophisticated bomb from
7 enriched uranium fairly easily. That is not a big trick.
8 So the enrichment process is key.

9 Senator Sessions: Well, in the short term then, Dr.
10 Kissinger, I think I hear you saying -- short term being the
11 next several years -- this could be one of the most
12 dangerous points in our foreign policy, this Iranian nuclear
13 weapon, because it goes beyond their capability to creating
14 proliferation within the area, the threat to Israel, and a
15 danger that we do not need to be facing, if we can possibly
16 avoid it.

17 Dr. Kissinger: I respect the administration's effort
18 to overcome that problem, but I am troubled by some of the
19 implications of what is now publicly available of the
20 implications of the objective on the future evolution of
21 nuclear weapons in the region and the impact of all of this
22 on an international system where everybody is within a very
23 short period of getting a nuclear weapon. Nobody can really
24 fully trust the inspection system, or at least some may not.
25 That is something that I would hope gets carefully examined

1 before a final solution is achieved.

2 Chairman McCain: Senator Kaine?

3 Dr. Shultz: We have historically tried to draw a
4 strong line between access to the technology to produce a
5 nuclear power plant and access to enrichment technology.
6 And we have tried to put that line in there very strongly.
7 And we have cast that line already in the Iran negotiations.

8 Chairman McCain: Senator Kaine?

9 Senator Kaine: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

10 And thank you to the witnesses for the very instructive
11 testimony.

12 Really just one question. A week from Sunday, we begin
13 the seventh month of a war, the war on ISIL, as described by
14 the President and by others in the administration. American
15 service personnel have lost their lives in Operation
16 Inherent Resolve and those from coalition partners have as
17 well. There has been no congressional debate or vote upon
18 this war. I think all agree that it will likely last for
19 some period of time. It was justified by the administration
20 based on two authorizations for use of military force that
21 were passed at different times under different circumstances
22 under slightly different geographies under a different
23 administration and under a vastly different Congress.

24 As former Secretaries of State, would you agree with me
25 that it is more likely that the Nation will sustainably

1 support a war if there is a full debate on it before
2 Congress and if Congress, in fact, weighs in as
3 constitutionally contemplated with respect to any war being
4 waged by this country?

5 Dr. Shultz: My experience is, as an administration
6 official, you get a much better policy and you get a much
7 better ability to execute that policy if it is discussed and
8 there is consultation between the administration and the
9 Congress. As I said in my testimony, our watchword was if
10 you want me with you on the landing, include me in the
11 takeoff. So I think the consultation will provide a better
12 policy and a better execution.

13 But I would say this war that we are now talking about
14 -- it started a long time ago. I read testimony from 1984.
15 That is 30 years ago. And I think this is a deep problem
16 that goes beyond terrorism. Terrorism is a tactic. The
17 object is to change the state system. And we need to
18 understand what these people are up to, and that will help
19 us design the kind of policies that are needed.

20 Dr. Albright: The President has asked in his State of
21 the Union message that there be an authorization of the use
22 of military force. And I do agree that there needs to be
23 discussion of it and consultation. I think it is very
24 important for there to be more education of the American
25 public as to what the stakes are.

1 Dr. Kissinger: I agree with what my colleagues said.
2 Congressional authorization should be sought. But I want to
3 reemphasize the point I made earlier. We should not let
4 this conflict with ISIS slide into the pattern of the
5 previous wars which start with support and after a while
6 degenerate into a debate about withdrawal, especially since
7 the existence of a territorial base for terrorists, which
8 has not existed before. A country that asserts that its
9 global objective is the eradication of the state system --
10 once America has engaged itself, victory is really an
11 important objective.

12 Senator Kaine: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

13 Thank you to the witnesses.

14 Chairman McCain: Senator Ayotte?

15 Senator Ayotte: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

16 I want to thank each of you for all that you have done
17 for the country and your leadership.

18 Secretary Albright, it was a privilege to be in Ukraine
19 with you during the presidential elections. So thank you.

20 I wanted to follow up to ask you about NATO presence in
21 the Baltics. And we had Dr. Brzezinski before the committee
22 the other day, and he had talked about putting a small
23 number of U.S. ground combat forces, in conjunction with
24 NATO obviously as part of a NATO contingency, in the Baltics
25 to ensure that there would be a trip wire, but the force

1 would obviously be of a size that would not be one where we
2 are trying to send a conflict message. I wanted to ask you
3 what you thought about that in terms of NATO's presence in
4 the Baltics and what you think we should be doing in
5 addition to providing defensive arms to Ukraine to help
6 buttress NATO?

7 Dr. Albright: I do think that when we were in Kiev and
8 Ukraine generally together, I think we understood, as we
9 together met with the leadership, the importance of American
10 support for what they are doing there.

11 And on NATO in the Baltics, I agree with Dr.
12 Brzezinski. I do think that it is important for -- the
13 Baltic countries are members of NATO, and I think it is very
14 important to show that kind of support. The question is
15 whether they are kind of rotating troops or there
16 permanently. But I do think that the United States needs to
17 be a part of a grouping which also requires other countries
18 from NATO to be there. I know Dr. Brzezinski spoke about
19 the importance of the Germans, the Brits, et cetera also
20 being there. But I do think that it is an important aspect
21 of our common approach to this through NATO.

22 I also do think that NATO is at a stage where it has to
23 -- we were talking about organizations that have been
24 started many years ago -- that our support for NATO and
25 getting the other NATO countries to pay up what they are

1 obligated to do under the 2 percent of the GDP for
2 activities. But I think, as I have understood the new
3 Secretary-General, he is talking a lot about the necessity
4 of this rapid reaction force really making NATO more capable
5 to deal with the kinds of problems that are evident in the
6 region.

7 Senator Ayotte: Thank you.

8 Dr. Shultz, Secretary Shultz, I wanted to follow up on
9 what you said about Iran's program, particularly their ICBM
10 program. I wrote a letter with others on this committee to
11 ask the President to include in the negotiations the missile
12 program because our estimates are that they will have ICBM
13 capabilities -- what we have heard from our defense
14 intelligence leaders -- perhaps by this year. And so I
15 wanted to get your thoughts. As we look at these Iran
16 negotiations, do you believe that their missile program,
17 their ICBM capability, should be included as part of a
18 result that is important in terms of our national security
19 interests?

20 Dr. Shultz: Certainly. I think their support for
21 terrorism should also be on the table because you get a
22 weapon and you are going to use it.

23 Senator Ayotte: As I look at these negotiations, those
24 two pieces are missing, and they are very, very important.

25 I was also very interested to hear what both you and

1 Secretary Kissinger have said in terms of concessions that
2 have already been made on enrichment that make, I think, a
3 very difficult outcome for a good result that does not lead
4 to some kind of race within the Middle East, a Sunni-Shia
5 race, in terms of a nuclear arms race if we are going to
6 allow a certain amount of enrichment.

7 Dr. Shultz: You have to remember the Iranians are not
8 known as rug merchants for nothing. They are good
9 bargainers. They have already crossed lines. They have
10 already out-maneuvered us in my opinion. So we have to
11 watch out.

12 Senator Ayotte: Secretary Kissinger, I wanted to
13 follow up on something that you had testified before the
14 Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the New START treaty
15 and you had called attention to the disparity between
16 Russian and American tactical nuclear weapons at the time.
17 I wanted to get your thoughts on what we have learned.

18 According to the State Department, Russia is developing
19 a new mobile nuclear ground-launched cruise missile in
20 direct violation of the 1987 INF Treaty that, of course,
21 Secretary Shultz has referenced as well, and that this
22 missile was likely in development even during these New
23 START negotiations, if you look back in the time window. I
24 wanted to get your thoughts on what our response should be
25 to the development of this ground-launched cruise missile.

1 As I look at this, in our response, it is not just a
2 response of a treaty violation, but what are the Russians'
3 interests in developing this type of cruise missile.

4 Dr. Kissinger: The direction, motivation for
5 developing this weapon is that -- as I said in my statement,
6 I have said that the western border is the least threatened
7 border of Russia paradoxically, but it has a long border
8 with China with a huge inequality of population and a long
9 border with the jihadis' regions of the world. So the
10 motivation undoubtedly is to use nuclear weapons to balance
11 the numerical inferiority of Russian forces along many of
12 its borders.

13 But to the extent that it is incompatible with signed
14 agreements, the United States, even if it theoretically
15 understands the motivation, cannot accept that nuclear arms
16 control treaties are violated because a new strategic
17 opportunity develops. And so I believe that we have to be
18 very firm in insisting on carrying out these agreements.

19 Senator Ayotte: Thank you all.

20 Chairman McCain: I want to say to the witnesses -- I
21 have asked you to stay longer than I originally bargained
22 for, and I apologize for that. This has been a very
23 important hearing not only for this committee but also for
24 the Members of Congress and the American people. With the
25 benefit of your many years of wisdom and experience, you

1 have provided us with important not only information but
2 guidance has to how we should conduct not only this hearing
3 but our national security policy. We are honored by your
4 presence, and we thank you.

5 And this hearing is now adjourned.

6 [Whereupon, at 11:22 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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