

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2015 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE
PROGRAM**

TUESDAY, APRIL 1, 2014

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING
THREATS AND CAPABILITIES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

**PROLIFERATION PROGRAMS AT THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY AND AT THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m. in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Kay R. Hagan (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Hagan and Graham.

Majority staff members present: Jonathan S. Epstein, counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; and Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Thomas W. Goffus, professional staff member; and Robert M. Soofer, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Daniel J. Harder and Alexandra M. Hathaway.

Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Cannon, assistant to Senator Hagan; Peter W. Schirtzinger, assistant to Senator Fischer; and Craig Abele, assistant to Senator Graham.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KAY R. HAGAN,
CHAIRMAN**

Senator HAGAN. We're going to go ahead and start because we do have several votes and we'll probably take turns with Senator Fischer chairing while I go vote, et cetera.

But the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee meets today to review the President's fiscal year 2015 request for proliferation prevention programs at the Departments of Defense and Energy. We plan to end this open session at 3 p.m. so that we can adjourn to the Office of Senate Security in the Capitol Visitors Center for a closed session with today's witnesses, and that session will start at 3:15 p.m.

In the interest of time, I want to ask that each witness to please give a very brief, 1- to 2-minute opening statement. We're joined today by three expert witnesses to help us understand these pro-

grams. Anne Harrington is the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security Administration of the Department of Energy. Welcome back to the subcommittee, Ms. Harrington.

Rebecca Hersman is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I understand this is your first time before the subcommittee, so let me issue you a warm welcome.

Then Ken Myers—welcome back—is the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency at the Department of Defense, which is focused on reducing the threats from weapons of mass destruction. The Agency is responsible for executing the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Ken Myers is also the Director of the U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, located at the Agency.

Thanks for all of your service and thanks for joining us today.

For fiscal year 2015, the Departments of Defense and Energy propose to spend roughly \$1.9 billion for nonproliferation activities to help stem the flow of weapons of mass destruction. I would note that this is a 21 percent reduction from the \$2.4 billion appropriated to both programs in fiscal year 2014. As I understand it, the lower funding levels are related to the termination of the CTR umbrella agreement with Russia, the planned completion of Syrian chemical weapons destruction, a proposed cold standby of the Mixed Oxide Fuel facility in South Carolina, and various other program milestone completions.

Although Congress has mandated tight budget constraints, the President recently completed his third international summit meeting on securing loose nuclear materials, and it is not clear that the lower budget request will fully support the aims of that meeting and other important nonproliferation goals. In my opinion, there is no shortage of work to be done in this area, since even the smallest quantities of weapons of mass destruction would pose a significant threat to the United States and our allies. We must not forget what just a few grams of anthrax released from two envelopes did to this Senate complex in 2001. So we will review the budget request against these needs.

Among other missions, the CTR program is implementing DOD's role in helping to destroy Syria's chemical weapons program. The committee provided legislative authority last year to allow the Department to move quickly to address this rapidly developing requirement. We would be interested to know the status of this critical mission and its prospects for success.

I would also note that the program recently completed the successful destruction of Libya's chemical weapons, which was a remarkable accomplishment in that country.

Ms. Hersman, you are charged with developing DOD's policy for countering weapons of mass destruction, including the CTR program. The largest share of CTR funding is for the Cooperative Biological Engagement Program, operating in numerous countries to reduce biological threats of concern to DOD. We are interested to know how this program responds to such biological threats and

how it is coordinated with other U.S. international public health programs.

Ms. Harrington, your Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program funding decreased by 20 percent in the fiscal year 2015 budget request. This subcommittee needs to understand the large decrease, and I understand 60 percent of that amount is tied to a proposal to put the Mixed Oxide Fuel program in cold standby. We obviously want to know what you mean by “cold standby” and whether you have an alternative disposal path to justify putting the program in cold standby.

Mr. Myers, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency implements the CTR program and led the remarkable effort to outfit the Merchant Marine vessel *Cape Ray* to destroy the most dangerous Syrian chemical weapons agents and precursors. We will want you to explain to the subcommittee the interagency process involved in outfitting the ship, how the chemical weapons destruction process will work, and where the waste will go afterwards.

Again, let me thank all three of you for testifying today, and before asking our witnesses to summarize their testimony briefly I want to turn to my colleague and ranking member, Senator Fischer, for any other comments.

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I thank the witnesses for appearing before us today to discuss proliferation prevention programs at the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense.

First, I would like to commend the Department of Energy for doing difficult but necessary prioritization in its budget submission. By bringing completed programs to a close and applying prior year balances to offset reductions, critical work is sustained while less is asked of the American taxpayer.

I join the chair today in emphasizing the importance of these programs. Proliferation prevention is intimately linked to many of the biggest challenges facing our Nation today. Media attention on events in Iran and Syria often focuses on the elegant diplomatic meetings and weighs the prospects for a deal against the odds of military action, but comparatively little attention is paid to the significant nonproliferation issues at stake.

Similarly, with respect to Russia world leaders are quick to point out that its annexation of Crimea violates international law, but the harm done to the nonproliferation agenda receives only limited acknowledgment. I look forward to hearing more from the witnesses today on this subject, as well as the other issues they face and how this budget request supports their mission.

I thank the chair and the witnesses for their service.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Senator Fischer. The plan is for—I know we have got votes during this hearing, so we will try to sort of tag team on this.

Let's see. Ms. Harrington, your opening statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. ANNE M. HARRINGTON, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Ms. HARRINGTON. Thank you very much. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Fischer, and Senator Graham: I am here to discuss the President's fiscal year 2015 budget request for the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. I am very pleased to appear today with my colleagues from the Department of Defense. We share a strong commitment to the security of the Nation and to finding ways for our programs to work together to that end.

Last week, as you noted, I did attend the third Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, where the President gathered with world leaders to reaffirm the high priority they placed on nuclear security. The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation plays the central role in implementing U.S. summit commitments and to advancing global nuclear and radiological security. I will not give the highlights in the interest of time, but would be happy to come back to those later.

The President's 2015 request of \$1.55 billion provides the funding necessary to build on these successes. To meet the dynamic range of security challenges that we face, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation draws on its core competencies, which are to remove, eliminate, and minimize the use of proliferation-sensitive materials, safeguard and secure materials, technologies, facilities, and expertise, detect and prevent the illicit trafficking of materials, technology, and expertise, provide R&D technology solutions to nuclear security and nonproliferation efforts, and provide policy solutions to reduce nuclear and radiological dangers.

In the area of material elimination, the administration remains firmly committed to disposing of 34 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium and to the Plutonium management and Disposition Agreement. While we further study more efficient options for plutonium disposition in an effort to decrease costs, the Mixed Oxide Fuel fabrication will be placed in cold standby. With your support, the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation will continue to pursue a multi-layered approach to protect and account for materials at their sources, remove, downblend, or eliminate materials when possible, detect, deter, and reduce the risk of additional states acquiring nuclear weapons, and support the development of new technologies to detect nuclear trafficking and proliferation, as well as verify compliance with arms control treaties.

Thank you for your attention and I would be happy to answer any questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Harrington follows:]

Senator HAGAN. Thank you.

Ms. Hersman.

STATEMENT OF REBECCA K. C. HERSMAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Ms. HERSMAN. Chairman Hagan, Ranking Member Fischer, and Senator Graham: I'm pleased to testify today with my colleagues

from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the National Nuclear Security Administration about our efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction.

Today WMD threats can proliferate at the speed of an airliner, a missile, or even the Internet. Countering such complex and dynamic threats requires flexible, innovative, and agile responses, as well as whole of Department, whole of government, and indeed even whole of international community solutions.

The international effort to deal with serious chemical weapons, unprecedented in scale, speed, and complexity, is a vivid example. Today, thanks to the efforts of many contributors and the support of Congress, Syria's chemical weapons program is on the path to elimination. The centerpiece of the U.S. contribution, the Motor Vessel *Cape Ray*, outfitted with DOD's recently developed Field Deployable Hydrolysis System and funded predominantly through the Department's Cooperative Threat Reduction program, or CTR, is ready to neutralize the most dangerous chemicals in the Syrian arsenal, and to do so in a safe, secure, and environmentally sound fashion. This type of creative, collaborative approach to a WMD challenge can't be the exception; it must be the rule.

Another case in point is the January announcement of the complete destruction of the chemical weapons munitions that Libya declared in 2011 and 2012. This success was possible only through CTR's resources and expertise, coupled with cooperation from the OPCW and the Libyan Government, and with contributions from the government of Germany.

Looking ahead, we must address future challenges, not only chemical, but nuclear and biological as well, in similar fashion, bringing CTR and the rest of the countering WMD toolkit to bear.

I thank you for your support for our fiscal year 2015 budget request.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Hersman follows:]

Senator HAGAN. Thank you.

Mr. Myers.

Mr. MYERS. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Fischer, Senator Graham: It is an honor to be here today to discuss the work being done to counter the threats posed by the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction. I would like to use my testimony today to highlight three of our recent activities.

One of the best examples of the capabilities that DTRA-SCC can provide and the missions we take on is related to our work in Syria. We had the expertise to evaluate a serious WMD threat, we developed the needed technologies and we provided planning support to all aspects of the operation. Now, the *Cape Ray*, the ship that houses the two Field-Deployable Hydrolysis Systems, stands ready to begin destruction once all the chemical materials are out of Syria.

Another mission-critical area for us is the intersection of terrorism and the acquisition of WMD materials, particularly biological threats. This is an emerging and evolving threat and we are expanding our areas of cooperation to stay one step ahead. We work closely with the Centers for Disease Control and we often pursue global health security projects together internationally. The CDC

handles public health issues, but they are not equipped to address the security threats posed by deadly pathogens. We are.

I am proud to announce that earlier this year we signed a memorandum of understanding and a strategy for joint work with the CDC. These documents will maximize our effectiveness related to bio threats around the world and ensure that there is no duplication of efforts.

Finally, DTRA–SCC recently completed the destruction of weaponized mustard agent in Libya. We destroyed 517 mustard-filled artillery rounds, 8 500-pound aerial bombs, and 45 insert tubes.

I am proud of what our team has achieved and believe that we have served as good stewards of the taxpayers' dollar. As we look to fiscal year 2015, I am confident that we are prepared to address future WMD threats around the world.

Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today and I would be pleased to respond to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Myers follows:]

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Myers. As I said earlier, it is a very good job well done in Libya.

We will have 7-minute questions and I will start. Ms. Hersman and Ms. Harrington, our understanding is that the CTR umbrella agreement has terminated with Russia, but continues in some form through the Department of Energy. Ms. Hersman, can you explain the status of the activities that were ongoing with Russia and whether or not they have been terminated or are on hold? And Ms. Harrington, can you please explain with what framework the Department of Energy is continuing this relationship with Russia and the status of the project?

Ms. HERSMAN. Thank you. Even as the traditional DOD CTR program of assistance that had operated in Russia for the last 20 years draws to a natural conclusion, the United States and Russia have agreed to continue in a number of important efforts on a collaborative basis through the Framework Agreement and Protocol on Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation, the MNEPR, on which we partner with the NNSA.

Russia and the United States plan to proceed through the DOD CTR program with two already-agreed projects: to dismantle a Delta 3 strategic submarine and to fund transportation of highly enriched uranium submarine spent fuel from a less secure to a much more secure location in Russia. We believe these continue to be priority threat reduction activities and important to the U.S. national security interest.

Of course, given the unfolding situation in the Ukraine and the Crimea, we are carefully evaluating our activities in the region to ensure full consistency with the President's guidance. We're mindful, however, that the DOD CTR program has a history of continued cooperation on vital threat reduction matters even through difficult periods of the U.S.-Russia relationship and we hope this will continue to be the case.

Ms. HARRINGTON. I'm glad that Ms. Hersman went first because a lot of her answer applies to ours. We also have had a history with Russia where even during times of high politician tension both sides have recognized the importance of the work, certainly from

our perspective, the work we do there to secure nuclear warheads, weapons- capable material, and other activities are vital to U.S. national interests.

We do work under the same MNEPR protocol and under that our teams continue to work with Russian counterparts to improve the security of Russian nuclear and radiological material at fixed sites and in transit and to develop strong and sustainable national-level nuclear security infrastructure, including strengthening regulatory requirements related to the security of nuclear and radiological material in Russia.

The cooperation remains an essential element to the global effort to address the threat posed by nuclear terrorism and therefore supports key interests of both the United States and the international community.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you.

Ms. Hersman, if you can frame where the CTR program is with respect to Syria and removal of the chemical weapons, in addition to destroying them outside of Syria.

Ms. HERSMAN. Thank you. The CTR program has taken on two major elements of support to the Syrian elimination program. On the one hand, we've provided more than \$15 million worth of support for the removal activities, to include equipment and logistics support to the joint mission and to the OPCW to facilitate inspections and consolidation and removal and transit, so that those items can be removed for destruction externally.

In addition, the CTR program has provided and is providing the bulk of the funding to support the outfitting and operations, as well as the follow-on activities associated with the *Cape Ray*, which will then through neutralization destroy the rest of those chemicals.

Senator HAGAN. Also, can you explain the approach that the CTR program is taking with respect to the rest of the Middle East and North Africa?

Ms. HERSMAN. In the rest of the Middle East, we continue to focus on our proliferation prevention efforts. We ramped those up substantially in fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2014, with the most significant efforts being in Jordan, where we embarked on the Jordan border security project to help shore up border security between Syria and Jordan, but also began efforts in Iraq, Turkey, and some nascent efforts in Lebanon as well.

We don't have the same level of funding into fiscal year 2015. The environment's still a little uncertain about what will be necessary, but we recognize that there will certainly be residual proliferation risks in the aftermath even of the removal of the bulk of Syria's chemicals, and this will remain a big priority for us.

Senator HAGAN. Speaking of that, 70 percent of the CTR program is devoted to the cooperative biological engagement program. Can you explain what threat you are addressing and how it differs from the efforts of the other agencies, such as the Centers for Disease Control, and how do you work together?

Ms. HERSMAN. The CTR bio program, or CBEP, starts with a fundamental premise, and that is where dangerous pathogens, hostile actors, endemic disease, and weak government controls and capacities exist, a lot of bad things could happen, especially when we

have hostile actors in proximity, whether those are lone wolf actors, terrorists, non-state actors, or insider threats.

The CTR CBEP program looks to try to reduce those risks by focusing on security, enhanced security measures, securing pathogens, as well as improving our ability to surveil disease threats, to detect them better, and to provide better strategic warning. We see this as really the unique niche of the CTR CBEP program, something not done with the same focus elsewhere across our inter-agency partners. But we do collaborate very closely both with the State Department and their diplomatic outreach and all of the expertise resident in the CDC, where they also have in some areas access and opportunity that we can build on.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you.

My next question is on the Mixed Oxide Fuel. I know Senator Graham also will be asking about that. And I have like 25 seconds left. But, Ms. Harrington, I really want to know what the definition of "cold standby," how that is defined?

Ms. HARRINGTON. All right. The definition of "cold standby" means that we will cease construction activities in order to control and minimize costs, while working with the contractor to develop a cold standby execution plan. Currently, we go through about \$1.1 million per day at the construction site, and looking forward into the future that amount of money accumulates very rapidly.

Any construction work that is performed would only be in support of placing the Mixed Oxide Fuel facility and equipment in a safe and secure state, and most importantly, going to Senator Fischer's point, a recoverable state. We have very much the interest of the U.S. taxpayer in mind here, and the option of moving forward with this project is not off the table. That is part of what is under consideration right now.

Senator HAGAN. I'm sure we will go over that a little bit more, too.

Mrs. FISCHER. Thank you.

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

I know that Senator Graham has another commitment and so I would suggest that you recognize him. Madam Chairman, would you like to recognize Senator Graham? He has another commitment.

Senator HAGAN. Oh, certainly. Senator Graham.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Thank you both, Madam Chairman.

Let's just get right to it. Last year in the budget we appropriated \$430 million, the Congress did, for construction of the MOx facility; is that correct?

Ms. HARRINGTON. I would have to recheck that, but I believe it is, yes, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Are you doing with the money what the Congress told you to do?

Ms. HARRINGTON. We have proceeded with a plan according to the scope of work that we had established initially.

Senator GRAHAM. Well, we gave you \$430 million to complete construction on a facility that's 60 percent complete. From what you just told Senator Hagan, it's my understanding you've stopped construction; is that correct?

Ms. HARRINGTON. The order to stop construction has not yet been given.

Senator GRAHAM. That's the plan.

Ms. HARRINGTON. But we expect it to be.

Senator GRAHAM. How can you do that?

Ms. HARRINGTON. As you know, the issue of appropriate use of 2014 appropriations is currently an issue of a lawsuit and therefore it would be inappropriate for me to comment further on that matter, as it currently is before the courts.

Senator GRAHAM. There is an agreement between us and the Russians and that's what the MOx program is all about. It's 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium determined to be in excess of both nations' defense needs, that could be used to create thousands of nuclear warheads. The MOx program in 2011 was designated by the United States as the disposition path that we would pursue; is that correct?

Ms. HARRINGTON. That is correct.

Senator GRAHAM. Have you talked with the Russians about this idea of changing course?

Ms. HARRINGTON. We have had some consultations with the Russians, yes.

Senator GRAHAM. What did they say?

Ms. HARRINGTON. They have commented in return that—

Senator GRAHAM. Who did you talk to and when?

Ms. HARRINGTON. I would have to look at that in detail. The Secretary has had a brief conversation with the Russian ambassador—

Senator GRAHAM. How—okay. Please tell me when and who had the conversation and provide me information about what they said, please?

Ms. HARRINGTON. We will take that back.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Now, how much plutonium is in South Carolina as a result of the agreement by the State of South Carolina years ago to take this material as a result of the MOx program? How much is in South Carolina?

Ms. HARRINGTON. About 13 metric tons.

Senator GRAHAM. How much of that is MOx-able?

Ms. HARRINGTON. About 8.

Senator GRAHAM. Where's the rest of the plutonium?

Ms. HARRINGTON. The rest of the 34 metric tons?

Senator GRAHAM. Uh-hmm.

Ms. HARRINGTON. It's still in pit form.

Senator GRAHAM. When is it supposed to be sent to South Carolina

Ms. HARRINGTON. At this point we are not sending further shipments of plutonium to South Carolina for—

Senator GRAHAM. How much does it cost to guard or manage that stockpile per year?

Ms. HARRINGTON. That is a stockpile at the Pantex facility that is incorporated into annual costs there.

Senator GRAHAM. So there is a cost to be borne by watching this material, I would hope?

Ms. HARRINGTON. Yes, yes.

Senator GRAHAM. In the President's budget does he lay out a disposition alternative other than MOx?

Ms. HARRINGTON. No, the disposition alternative is not yet identified.

Senator GRAHAM. Even though Congress told you to keep constructing the facility, you decided not to. You're going to put it in cold standby and you don't have an alternative to move forward. Also, you have an agreement with the Russians where we signed in 2011 saying this would be our exclusive path of disposition. Is all that correct?

Ms. HARRINGTON. That is correct.

Senator GRAHAM. Now, when it comes to 50 U.S.C. 2566—are you familiar with that statute?

Ms. HARRINGTON. If you tell me what it relates to, I'll probably—

Senator GRAHAM. It's the requirement to meet disposition goals—

Ms. HARRINGTON. Or—

Senator GRAHAM.—or pay \$100 million a year fine for 5 years.

Ms. HARRINGTON. Yes, I am very familiar with it.

Senator GRAHAM. The statute was written by myself and I think Senator Thurmond—it goes that far back—to protect South Carolina in case something happened with us receiving this plutonium. Is there any way you're going to meet, if you put this in cold storage, the obligations under the statute to have one metric ton processed by 2016?

Ms. HARRINGTON. We believe that there are options, but again that is going to be an element of what we study.

Senator GRAHAM. I don't want to get this thing overly nasty, but I have been dealing with this forever. There is no option. There is no viable option to MOx that would be cheaper and meet the target dates of disposition. That's just a complete, absolute absurd concept, and I know that to be the fact.

This program has had cost overruns. I want to work with you to deal with that. But you're taking an agreement with the Russians, the State of South Carolina. You're breaking the direction given to you by the Congress, without any viable alternative. This is incredibly irresponsible. It's going to cost us more money. It's going to create problems with weapons-grade plutonium in the hands of the Russians at a time we need no more problems with the Russians.

So I just promise you this will not go away and it will not be allowed to stand, because it is so, so irresponsible.

How much will it cost to terminate the MOX program?

Ms. HARRINGTON. We do not yet have a projection for what it would cost to terminate, because that's not part of the plan.

Senator GRAHAM. I've been told at least a billion dollars. Is that correct? Would that be true? The taxpayer would be on the hook for a billion dollars in costs if we terminated the program?

Ms. HARRINGTON. I do not believe that there is a detailed cost estimate.

Senator GRAHAM. I'm going to give you a series of questions. I don't have time now. I would appreciate a prompt response. Particularly, I will be talking to the Russians myself. I have talked to DOE. They very much hope we don't lay off the workforce until we can find a way forward.

Ms. Harrington, I will work with you and others to try to make this program more cost efficient. I don't think that's an unreasonable request. But what you have decided to do, this administration has decided to do, in the budget is irresponsible financially. I think it's reckless in terms of trying to take material that would present a proliferation threat. I think it makes no business sense, and we will continue to have this discussion.

So thank you very much.

Ms. HARRINGTON. Thank you, Senator, and thank you for all of the efforts you've put into this, and we would look forward to working with you.

Senator Graham [presiding]: Yes, ma'am, we will.

And we'll be in recess until after the vote. Thank you.

[Recess from 2:44 p.m. to 2:46 p.m.]

Senator HAGAN [presiding]. We're going to bring the meeting back to order.

On the—Ms. Harrington—and I'm sorry I missed all the other discussion on this issue. But in the fiscal year 2015 budget submission, it has a \$114 million reduction for the Second Line of Defense program, reducing it to \$305 million. Overall, this is the second year of a decrease, from a fiscal year 2013 amount of \$527 million. This is an important program to help stem the flow of illicit nuclear material across the borders.

Will you please explain why these reductions continue?

Ms. HARRINGTON. Yes, thank you, Senator. First of all, the fiscal year 2013 \$527 million number is a bit of an accounting anomaly because 2013 was based—the 2013 CR was based on 2012, where we had a quite high level for that particular program. So it bumped that number up a little bit.

Senator HAGAN. Based on what? I mean, the high level was based on?

Ms. HARRINGTON. A scope of work that we had under way at the time.

The \$527 million was actually the target of some of our reprogramming, which we thank you and our other oversight committees for allowing to move forward at the end of 2013, early 2014. The reduction that's being referenced is actually the reduction for the entire international material protection cooperation budget. The SLD budget itself in 2014 was \$190 million and in 2015 is \$117 million. Of the \$190 million in fiscal year 2014, a piece of that is from the reprogramming. So that allows us to front load some of the activities in fiscal year 2014 and absorb a reduction in the fiscal year 2015 budget.

We only just released—sorry—received at the end of February of this year that reprogrammed money. So that is now being carried into the remainder of 2014. So we feel that in calendar 2014 SLD will be able to accelerate important work that's laid out in its strategic plan and forward fund a number of activities to prepare for a slight reduction next year.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you.

In your opening remarks, I think you wanted to talk a little bit about the summit that was just completed. So I'd like to ask you about the summit in The Netherlands last week. Can you explain

the principal actions of the summit and how they're reflected in the fiscal year 2015 budget?

Then I'm also concerned why Russia, China, India, and Pakistan did not sign up to these actions along with the other 35 nations.

Ms. HARRINGTON. Let me clarify that last point first. That was on a particular group action to strengthen nuclear security. It's what we call in summit parlance a "gift basket," when a group of countries band together and basically make a common commitment. China, India, other countries, all countries participating, fully supported the communique. This was a separate action and there were a number, probably about a dozen, of these so-called gift baskets offered up by different states. It just was some countries like this particular format, a voluntary format of banding together and offering to do something. Other countries simply do not.

So I would not gauge their interest or commitment to nuclear security on whether or not they signed up to this particular gift basket.

Senator HAGAN. I'm not sure I understand what the gift basket was that these countries didn't agree with.

Ms. HARRINGTON. That was—it was a commitment to essentially try to go above and beyond what is expected of our nuclear security behavior, to explore ways of being transparent with each other, of offering assurances that our security is adequate, and so forth, things that are not currently required under international guidelines.

As for the accomplishments at the summit, I think the highlight of the summit certainly was the joint U.S.-Japan announcement to eliminate hundreds of kilograms of highly enriched uranium and plutonium from the Japanese Atomic Energy Agency's Fast Critical Assembly. We had been working with Japan for some time on this. It's a very, very important accomplishment for both countries and something that we will now energize.

We also announced the successful removal of quantities of highly enriched uranium from both Italy and Belgium. We announced the completion of the President's 4-year effort to secure the most vulnerable material across the globe, and that included removing or confirming the disposition of almost 3,000 kilos of highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium, including removing all highly enriched uranium from 11 countries and Taiwan, enhancing the security of 32 buildings containing metric tons of weapons-useable material, and installing almost 1,600 radiation portal monitors at border crossings, airports, seaports, among other activities.

Those were some of the U.S. highlights, but many other countries came bringing their accomplishments as well. If you're interested in a more detailed accounting of all of the things that were announced at the summit, we certainly can get that for you.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you.

Mr. Myers, thank you for your patience. On the Syrian chemical weapons, DTRA is implementing the CTR program, including the Syrian chemical weapons destruction effort. Please explain the interagency effort to outfit the *Cape Ray* and the technologies you're employing to destroy the chemicals and their precursors?

Mr. MYERS. Yes, Senator, thank you. First and foremost, the efforts with regard to eliminating the Syrian chemical weapons

stockpile is truly an interagency effort. From the very beginning, strong cooperation between the Department of State and the Department of Defense in terms of the activities, discussion, negotiations with Russia, with Syria, through the OPCW, and a number of other international forums. That carried through through a number of different efforts and layers that brought us to the *Cape Ray*, to outfitting the *Cape Ray*.

It is a very complicated, very difficult process, but it could not have been possible without the Department of Transportation, who oversee the Maritime Administration, which in turn maintains the National Defense Reserve Fleet, which is where the *Cape Ray* came from, a fleet of ships on standby, ready to respond in short order. So the cooperation between the Department of Transportation and the Maritime Administration to get the *Cape Ray* to the right spot for us to do our work was absolutely critical.

In addition to that, the cooperation of the Coast Guard, again just a Herculean effort to make sure that everything that we were doing on the *Cape Ray* in terms of installing the Field-Deployable Hydrolysis Systems, storing all the different chemicals and reagents that we would need, locking down various generators and berthing modules for the crew to stay in during the destruction effort, all required—all had to meet international shipping standards, and the Coast Guard was absolutely critical in that, as were a number of other entities both in the public and private sector, for which we are very thankful for their cooperation.

So this truly was an interagency effort and, quite frankly, even within the Department of Defense the number of different entities that were involved—obviously, Ms. Hersman's office, and OSD Policy, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, multiple elements in the chemical and biological defense program; my boss Frank Kendall, Under Secretary for AT and L, was critical in leading senior groups together to come behind and gain consensus behind paths forward. This truly was a tremendous effort.

In addition to that, you asked about the technology that we're using. We're using the Field-Deployable Hydrolysis System. From the very beginning, we've had a close relationship with the chem-bio defense program, our R&D arm at DTRA. We have had seed money, if you will, with the chem-bio defense program to begin building this capability. Within a 20-week turnaround design and development were completed. This was because a lot of early work and a quite Herculean effort by our friends up at Aberdeen, Maryland, at the Edgewood Chemical and Biological Command, so hats off to them. They did a phenomenal job.

But the neutralization really comes through chemical reaction involving a number of reagents, which are mixed with the chemical material and then heated. In effect—and please excuse the plain language—we basically turn it into sludge. The sludge in turn will be incinerated at commercial incinerators in Europe and elsewhere.

Now, obviously this is a big undertaking, something that we've done on land obviously on a number of occasions here in the United States and around the world. But this will be the first time we've done it on a ship. All of this time since the launch of the *Cape Ray* back in January until today, they are exercising. They are preparing for the day when the munitions—excuse me—when the ma-

materials are delivered to the *Cape Ray* and they are able to start work.

They're learning a lot of important lessons and we're learning from those lessons, providing them with additional materials, additional tools they may need on board to ensure that we do it in the most safe and secure way possible and we do it in a way that completely eliminates the Syrian chemical weapons stockpile.

Senator HAGAN. And they are waiting right now for the delivery; is that correct?

Mr. MYERS. That's correct.

Senator HAGAN. All right.

I'm going to go ahead and ask one more question and then see if somebody else comes. But then we might actually convene to the closed briefing.

I wanted to ask, Mr. Myers, on the nuclear inspections. One high profile activity that's made the news lately is the nuclear surety inspections at the ICBM bases. My understanding is the Navy conducts separate inspections for their fleet of our nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines. Do you think it would make sense to develop a common inspection procedures where possible between the two services, and can you elaborate on that?

Mr. MYERS. Yes, thank you. We do in fact have a common inspection procedure that the Defense Threat Reduction Agency implements, and the two services. This was put forward by an instruction from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff back in 2013, and the instruction identifies common guidance for both the Services and DTRA to conduct nuclear weapon technical inspections.

Now, in addition to that, the services have also identified additional items that they want to inspect. In other words, they broadened the scope of the inspection beyond the Chairman's instruction. So they've each added some individual or independent elements that are applicable to their Service. But those are in addition to the aspects of the nuclear weapons inspections the Defense Threat Reduction Agency carries out under the mandate from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator HAGAN. So do you have any comments on some of the actions that were taken that were in violation of security measures?

Mr. MYERS. No, ma'am. We have had a long history of carrying out those inspections. We try to do it in the most deliberate, transparent way possible. I think we do a very good job at it and I think it's done in a manner that provides the highest amount of confidence that the results are accurate and carried forth in a very straightforward manner.

[Pause.]

Senator HAGAN. These votes really do complicate having a hearing. I'm going to recess. Senator Fischer is on her way back. She will pick up with her questions for maybe five to seven minutes, and then we'll recess this and then I will meet you back over at the closed briefing.

Thank you.

[Recess from 3:02 p.m. to 3:04 p.m.]

Senator FISCHER [presiding]. I'll catch my breath here, because we're running back and forth here. What I'd like to do is just take

five minutes to ask a few questions, and then we'll head over to Security to have a further discussion, if that's okay.

Ms. Hersman, what effect does Russia's violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum have on proliferation? Do you think some of these nations and some that are aspiring to become nuclear powers will see this as diminishing the value of security guarantees and increasing the value of nuclear weapons?

Ms. HERSMAN. I think the value of pursuing a policy of non-proliferation and the rejection of nuclear weapons by countries like Ukraine will continue to be the best path forward for them.

Senator FISCHER. So you believe that's the best path forward?

Ms. HERSMAN. I do. I think that it won't really change their policy or the approach, despite some of these concerns from Russia.

Senator FISCHER. Mr. Myers, do you agree with that?

Mr. MYERS. Senator, we play a number of different roles at DTRA-SCC and one of them is in support of U.S. Strategic Command. So we play a lot of roles in terms of eliminating threats of nuclear weapons as well as supporting the U.S. nuclear stockpile. I will defer on the specific matter on the arms control issue you raised to DASD Hersman on the policy side.

Senator FISCHER. Thank you.

I'd have to say, Ms. Hersman, I disagree with you. The Ukraine was the third power with regards to nuclear weapons. They signed an agreement with Russia and the United States that I understand basically says give up your nukes and we'll take care of you forever. So is forever now 20 years? Is that the mark that we're going to go by? And do you think other nations are going to look at that and think we can give up our weapons as well and be protected?

We see Russia move into the Crimea. I guess how would you respond to my concerns and what I believe would be concerns with any other nation sitting back and watching our lack of action in honoring that agreement?

Ms. HERSMAN. What I'd like to do is perhaps take that question back. I think that, again, I think they remain very committed, but I'd like to pursue the more specific question about that agreement perhaps in a written answer for you.

[The information referred to follows:]

[SUBCOMMITTEE INSERT]

Senator FISCHER. We will follow up then. Thank you.

When we talk, Ms. Harrington, about the recent nuclear security summit in The Hague, can you tell me if there were any new commitments that were made at that summit?

Ms. HARRINGTON. In fact there were a number of new commitments made at that summit. I don't have the entire list with me, but the highlight was our joint announcement with Japan that we are going to remove hundreds of kilos of highly enriched uranium and plutonium from their Fast Critical Assembly that belongs to the Japan Atomic Energy Agency. This is a huge step forward in a number of regards and reflects the close working relationship we have with Japan.

There are a number of new commitments that came out of the summit and we'd be happy to get a complete list of those back to the committee if that would be of interest.

[The information referred to follows:]

[SUBCOMMITTEE INSERT]

Senator FISCHER. That would be great.

Can you tell me if Russia, China, India, and Pakistan joined in on that statement?

Ms. HARRINGTON. They did certainly join in on the summit communique. But I was trying to explain to Senator Hagan the complicated system of different documents that come out of the summit process. When a group of countries join together around a certain principle, whether it's radiological security, whether it's maritime security, they—it's called a "gift basket" in summit language.

Senator FISCHER. Did we get a good gift basket from Russia and China and India and Pakistan? It seems to me those are the countries that I would have the most concern with, rather than Japan.

Ms. HARRINGTON. Right. They are not very fond of the concept, but Russia certainly did sign up on the statement on combating nuclear terrorism under the global initiative, and Pakistan and China have made a number of other of their own unilateral commitments to do other things.

Senator FISCHER. But these are voluntary standards is my understanding. So these, the four countries that I mentioned, wouldn't even sign onto voluntary standards?

Ms. HARRINGTON. And I would say neither did perhaps another 20 participants in the summit. Again, it's—

Senator FISCHER. So was it a success?

Ms. HARRINGTON. The summit? Absolutely. We may have our issues with Russia right now, but one of the reasons that we were successful going into this summit was the removal of all highly enriched uranium in partnership with Russia from a number of countries, for example like the Czech Republic, Hungary, where the material was of Russian origin. And we continue to be able to execute under that kind of partnership.

So different countries express their commitment to nuclear security in different ways.

Senator FISCHER. Thank you.

My time is up. With that, I will close this hearing and we'll move into the secure setting. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 3:10 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]