

Stenographic Transcript
Before the

Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities

COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ALL-
DOMAIN ANOMALY RESOLUTION OFFICE

Tuesday, November 19, 2024

Washington, D.C.

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1 TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ALL-DOMAIN
2 ANOMALY RESOLUTION OFFICE

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4 Tuesday, November 19, 2024

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6 U.S. Senate
7 Committee on Armed Services
8 Subcommittee on Emerging
9 Threats and Capabilities
10 Washington, D.C.

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12 The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:30 p.m. in
13 Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Kirsten
14 Gillibrand, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

15 Committee Members Present: Senators Gillibrand,
16 Peters, and Ernst.

1 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. KRISTEN GILLIBRAND, U.S.
2 SENATOR FROM NEW YORK

3 Senator Gillibrand: This hearing will come to order.
4 I would like to first thank our witness, Dr. Jon Kosloski,
5 for testifying. He is our newly appointed Director of the
6 All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office, or AARO, an office
7 Congress established in the fiscal year 2022 NDAA, to
8 investigate the very serious problem of unidentified
9 anomalous phenomenon, or UAP.

10 Dr. Kosloski comes to AARO from the Research
11 Directorate of the National Security Agency, where he worked
12 in areas of optics research and crypto mathematics. He
13 previously served at the DoD Special Communications
14 Enterprise Office. We look forward to regular engagements
15 between you and the Committee.

16 When unidentified anomalous phenomenon enters our
17 airspace we need to know about it. We need to identify it,
18 but in order to do that we need to reduce the stigma and
19 credibility challenges associated with these events. Our
20 servicemembers, scientists, foreign partners, and the
21 general public need to know that their reporting, research,
22 and analysis will be taken seriously and acted on in good
23 faith.

24 In the spirit of transparency, AARO recently released a
25 consolidated annual report, just a few months after

1 releasing the first volume of a historical record report in
2 March of this year. These public documents help highlight
3 the challenges still facing this office, including the lack
4 of timely and actionable sensor data, the need to revisit
5 cases placed in the active archive, and the importance of
6 improving reporting sources, both in the interagency and
7 internationally.

8 In this hearing I want to probe a series of specific
9 issues. First, as incidents at Langley and elsewhere have
10 demonstrated, unmanned aerial systems, or UAS, continue to
11 pose significant threats to our national security. In
12 addition to safety of flight issues these UAS create for our
13 own pilots and air crew, the UAS present clear and
14 undeniable counterintelligence concerns around some of the
15 most sensitive airspace. While standard UAS are not part of
16 AARO's mission, your work on sensors at military
17 installations across the country will be critical to making
18 sure that we have the domain awareness necessary to
19 accurately identify and track these objects. I expect your
20 office to also pay close attention to any anomalous
21 characteristics that these systems could present in the
22 future.

23 Second, I look forward to your presentation of three
24 case studies demonstrating cases that AARO has resolved,
25 including the GOFAST, which is one of the most prominent UAP

1 cases. However, I believe it is important to acknowledge
2 ongoing public interest in the Nimitz incident, the GIMBAL
3 video, and other prominent UAP cases, and for AARO to share
4 what it can about those cases, as well.

5 It is also important that AARO speak to unresolved
6 cases and what types of anomalous activity have merited
7 further analysis. And while I know AARO has gone through a
8 period of transition over the past year, it is important to
9 share these disclosures, both resolved and unresolved cases,
10 with the public, even when a Senate hearing is not
11 scheduled.

12 Lastly, while some have been hesitant to come forward
13 to AARO in the past, I hope that potential individuals with
14 firsthand knowledge of unreported programs view your arrival
15 in this position as an opportunity for a new start. AARO
16 was created by Congress to do this work. Congress waives
17 nondisclosure agreements for those who disclose information
18 to AARO, and gave AARO the authority to go and turn over
19 every rock. I hope those with information to share use this
20 opportunity so that we, as your Senators who represent you,
21 can do our job.

22 I look forward to hearing more on these issues from Dr.
23 Kosloski, and for members to start a dialogue on this
24 important topic.

25 With that I would like to turn to Senator Ernst for her

1 opening statement.

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1 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JONI ERNST, U.S. SENATOR
2 FROM IOWA

3 Senator Ernst: Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you,
4 Dr. Kosloski. Our hearing today is about identifying UAPs
5 and understanding their potential implications, which could
6 range from technological advancements to potential threats
7 to our national security. Are these phenomena tied to
8 foreign adversaries such as China or Russia, leveraging
9 advanced technologies beyond our current capabilities, or do
10 they represent unknown scientific phenomena that challenge
11 our current understanding?

12 We must answer these critical questions to ensure that
13 our national security is not compromised. It is vital that
14 all agencies work in tandem to aggregate data, identify
15 patterns, and develop robust analytical frameworks. Our
16 ability to detect, track, and respond to UAPs requires the
17 latest technology and full cooperation from all government
18 branches.

19 Thanks very much, Dr. Kosloski, for your attention to
20 this matter, and I look forward to the valuable insights
21 that you and AARO can provide to our Committee. And I yield
22 back. Thank you.

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1 Senator Gillibrand: Dr. Kosloski, please make your
2 opening statement.

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1 STATEMENT OF JON T. KOSLOSKI, Ph.D., DIRECTOR, ALL-
2 DOMAIN ANOMALY RESOLUTION OFFICE

3 Dr. Kosloski: Thank you, Chairwoman Gillibrand,
4 Ranking Member Ernst, and distinguished members of the
5 Subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be here on behalf of the
6 Department of Defense as the new Director of the All-domain
7 Anomaly Resolution Office. I appreciate the opportunity to
8 provide a status update on AARO's work and respond to your
9 questions about unidentified anomalous phenomena, or UAP.

10 On behalf of the Department and the entire AARO team, I
11 want to say how grateful we are to Congress for its
12 continued support. Unidentified objects in any domain pose
13 potential threats to U.S. safety and security. Reports of
14 UAP activity, particularly near national security sites,
15 must be treated seriously and investigated with scientific
16 rigor by the U.S. government.

17 By way of introduction, I am Jon Kosloski. I am a
18 researcher at my core, with an academic background in
19 mathematics, physics, and engineering. I have spent most of
20 my career at the National Security Agency leading advanced
21 research in the areas of optics, computing, and crypto
22 mathematics. By nature, I am drawn to tough scientific
23 problems, which is what brought me to AARO and the UAP
24 mission.

25 Since I arrived at AARO in August, I have been

1 impressed by the breadth and depth of my team's experience
2 and the framework they have established to rigorously
3 analyze UAP reports. AARO has taken meaningful steps to
4 improve data collection and retention, bolster sensor
5 development, effectively triage UAP reports, and reduce the
6 stigma of reporting UAP events. Last year, AARO worked with
7 DoD's Joint Staff to issue guidance to defense personnel
8 worldwide on how to report UAP observations, and is working
9 with the military services regarding implementation. AARO
10 has also launched a public website that features UAP
11 imagery, case resolutions, material analysis, archival
12 records, and more. These are only a few examples of AARO's
13 recent progress, and we are just getting started.

14 To date, AARO has over 1,600 UAP reports in its
15 holdings from across the U.S. government. I will share a
16 slide in just a few minutes with updated UAP analytic
17 trends. You will see that many reports resolve to
18 commonplace objects like birds, balloons, and unmanned
19 systems, while others lack sufficient data for comprehensive
20 analysis. Although only a very small percentage of reports
21 received by AARO are potentially anomalous, these are the
22 cases that require significant time, resources, and a
23 focused scientific inquiry by AARO and its network of
24 partners. It is important to underscore that, to date, AARO
25 has not discovered any verifiable evidence of

1 extraterrestrial beings, activity, or technology.

2 To accomplish AARO's national security mission, I have
3 set three priorities for the office: building strong
4 partnerships, promoting transparency, and scaling up the
5 work of the office.

6 AARO cannot do its work alone. Building partnerships
7 across government, academia, industry, and with the public
8 is essential to the success of the office. Strong
9 cooperation with the military services is particularly
10 important. We rely on their support to implement our
11 reporting guidance and to amplify the message that there
12 should be zero stigma associated with UAP reporting.

13 We also rely on partnerships with the National Labs,
14 the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, FBI,
15 Department of Homeland Security, and NASA, all of which play
16 a role in the whole-of-government effort to address UAP.

17 Recognizing the talent and expertise that reside
18 outside of government, AARO will continue to explore new
19 ways to partner with the academic and scientific communities
20 to investigate its most complex UAP cases.

21 A related priority for AARO is transparency. Our
22 ability to collaborate with key partners, including the
23 scientific community and the public, relies on information
24 sharing, to include downgrading and declassifying UAP-
25 related information. In some cases, it may be unclear to

1 the public why the DoD classified a piece of information in
2 the first place. Why are photos of seemingly benign objects
3 such as balloons classified? It is often the case that an
4 object or phenomenon itself is not a security concern, but
5 the location, source, or method used to capture it is still
6 sensitive. Many cases are difficult to quickly release to
7 the public but are reported to the appropriate committees in
8 Congress that are authorized by the law or House and Senate
9 leadership to receive the information.

10 It is important to note that AARO does not unilaterally
11 declassify information. Instead, we work with the
12 originator of a classified record to ensure that
13 declassifying that record does not inadvertently harm
14 national security. This can take time. Nonetheless, the
15 Department is committed to declassifying and publicly
16 sharing more information on UAP, while protecting sensitive
17 sources and methods. I will be sharing some newly
18 declassified imagery in just a few minutes.

19 AARO is also working closely with the National Archives
20 and Records Administration to make UAP-related documents
21 publicly available in a digitized collection. Meanwhile,
22 AARO continues to review the U.S. historical record relating
23 to UAP. We welcome any former or current government
24 civilian, contractor, or military servicemember with
25 relevant information to reach out to us at www.aaro.mil.

1 My final priority is scaling up AARO's work to match
2 its mission. AARO needs to bolster the quantity, quality,
3 and diversity of data that it acquires and examines. This
4 means tapping into existing data sources within the
5 interagency while deploying AARO's own organic sensor
6 capabilities. To the extent that UAP result from domain
7 awareness gaps, more and better data will help us fill those
8 gaps and help us understand what is being encountered.

9 In closing, AARO is committed to the highest standards
10 of scientific integrity. We will not foreclose on any
11 explanation for UAP prematurely. We will continue to follow
12 the science and data wherever they lead. We will continue
13 to have an open and frank dialogue with Congress in settings
14 like these and in classified briefings. We will continue to
15 keep you fully and currently informed of all UAP
16 information, active or historical. And finally, we will
17 share as much information as possible at the unclassified
18 level to inform the public of AARO's activities and its
19 findings.

20 For now I would like to turn to a brief presentation of
21 UAP trends and cases, and then I would be happy to take
22 questions.

23 This chart represents the UAP reporting since 1996, and
24 as has previously been discussed by AARO, sensor placement
25 seems to have caused a bias in our data, both geographic and

1 at altitude. And we are working to resolve that bias in
2 2025, or reduce that bias, through broader engagements with
3 the DoD as well as the IC and the rest of the government,
4 also by incorporating broader sensors into our data and
5 through a public reporting mechanism that we hope to have
6 live in mid 2025.

7 On the left side it shows the altitudes, and we will
8 see -- it is a bit cut off -- we will see that most of the
9 reporting occurs between 15,000 and 25,000 feet. That
10 happens to be where most of our sensors are. And the
11 reporting above and below that is also often coming from
12 those same platforms.

13 In the center we will see that the resolved cases have
14 the vast majority being balloons and UAS. We are seeing a
15 great increase in satellites recently, particularly with the
16 launch of mega satellite constellations such as Starlink,
17 where the satellites are catching what is called satellite
18 flares or glint off the sun, just after sunset or just
19 before sunrise.

20 And on the right-most we will see the morphology or the
21 shapes that have been reported. The majority have been
22 lights or orbs. We think that there is going to be an
23 increase in the lights with the mega constellations. But
24 our most interesting cases, some of which I will discuss
25 later, our actually the E-shape such as the triangles or the

1 cylinders.

2 And at the bottom we will see the geographic bias that
3 I mentioned before, where most of the reports historically
4 have been near the government sites. This bias has been
5 reduced recently by reporting from the FAA. We now get
6 weekly reports from them. And a great thank-you to our
7 aviators for making those reports. It helps our analysis
8 quite a bit.

9 Okay. A case that we thought would be a transmedium
10 case as it was reported, is well-known on the outside, known
11 as the Puerto Rico case. It was data collected in 2013,
12 when a Customs and Border Patrol aircraft observed an object
13 flying near an airport in Puerto Rico. The green line in
14 this diagram is the track that the airplane was taking, and
15 those many crossed lines are the directions that the camera
16 was facing at the time that the airplane was flying around
17 the airport. And we will watch the video in just a moment.

18 The orange arrow in the center is where we assessed
19 that the UAP was actually flying, and transmedium means that
20 it goes from one domain into another. In this case, it
21 looks like it goes from the air into the water and then back
22 into the air. We assessed that it was actually flying over
23 the airport the entire time.

24 And this video was taken with infrared, and what
25 appears to be the transmedium part, where it goes into the

1 water, is actually where the temperature of the water is
2 equal to the temperature of the object, and the camera can
3 no longer distinguish between the two. It is not that the
4 object actually goes into the water. So we assessed that
5 the object, likely a pair of balloons or sky lanterns, was
6 floating at about 7 knots over the airport and descending to
7 about 200 meters. And this video will be released, and our
8 report will be released later this year.

9 The GOFAST captured the public attention and
10 congressional attention when it was made public in 2017. It
11 looks like an object flying very fast over the water, very
12 close to the water. Through a very careful geospatial
13 intelligence analysis, using trigonometry, we assessed with
14 high confidence that the object is not actually close to the
15 water but is rather closer to 13,000 feet. The diagram here
16 shows as the platform is flying and capturing the object, if
17 it is closer to the platform at higher altitude a trick of
18 the eye called parallax makes it look like the object is
19 moving much faster. And so we have written a detailed paper
20 on parallax, released on our website, so that the public can
21 literally check our math on this analysis.

22 An interesting case, which I do not believe the public
23 is familiar with, is captured in 2018 from a UAV flying in
24 the Mediterranean, watching Mt. Etna as it was erupting.
25 And it appears that that object is flying through the plume

1 of superheated gas and ash.

2 This was a rather difficult case to resolve. We had to
3 pull in support from a number of IC and S&T partners, and
4 even reach out to a volcanologist. And through very
5 detailed 3D modeling and pixel-by-pixel analysis of the
6 object as it is traversing across the clouds, they assessed
7 that the object was actually 170 meters away from the plume
8 and not flying through it.

9 And to be clear, AARO does not believe every object is
10 a bird, a balloon, or a UAV. We do have some very anomalous
11 objects. It is just the nature of resolution. We can only
12 resolve things that we understand. So we are now working on
13 additional products where we can inform the public,
14 Congress, and others of the objects as we are studying them,
15 rather than once we have resolved them.

16 With that I will take your questions.

17 [The prepared statement of Dr. Kosloski follows:]

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1 Senator Gillibrand: Thank you, Dr. Kosloski. I
2 appreciate your testimony.

3 It has been widely reported that individuals claiming
4 firsthand knowledge of unreported UAP programs have been
5 reluctant to engage with AARO. What message do you have for
6 those individuals, and how will you work to gain their
7 trust?

8 Dr. Kosloski: I would let them know that Congress has
9 gone out of its way to create the organization AARO
10 specifically to conduct these sorts of investigations and
11 has uniquely empowered them to have access to all UAP-
12 related information, whether that is historic or current.
13 And we take that responsibility and those authorities very
14 seriously.

15 So we have been reaching out to a broader community,
16 encouraging folks who had talked to AARO personnel in the
17 past and maybe felt uncomfortable, to come back to us. We
18 have met with several of their interlocuters and a couple of
19 firsthand witnesses, and we are making great progress in
20 those firsthand witnesses that we have talked to do feel
21 comfortable coming back to us. And so we hope that more
22 folks that do have information would go to www.aaro.mil,
23 fill out the form, send it to us so we can bring them in for
24 interviews, and add their information to our investigations.

25 Senator Gillibrand: Thank you. I recently just read

1 your report from March, your historic report, and I would
2 encourage anyone who is interested in this topic to read the
3 report. Because when I was asked by a reporter about it
4 they said, "Well, it doesn't show any evidence of secret
5 programs that have aliens."

6 That is not how I read the report. What I read in the
7 report is the U.S. government took sightings extremely
8 seriously over the last 75 years, put some of the greatest
9 mind ever to analyze these cases, because they assessed them
10 as some deeply unknown phenomena that may or may not cause
11 threats, that may or may not be related to adversaries, but
12 are certainly something that the U.S. government needed to
13 know about.

14 And what I read from this report is that we resolved
15 numbers of cases, but in almost every instance, whether it
16 was in the '40s, the '50s, the '60s, the '70s, the '80s, the
17 '90s, the '00s, half the cases were unresolved. So I do not
18 think this is an example of the government not taking these
19 cases seriously. I think this is an example of our
20 government spending 75 years taking these cases very
21 seriously.

22 And interestingly, for the group that put together this
23 report, they did not have access to any firsthand reporting.
24 And so from my perspective, for whistleblowers and people
25 who want to come in, please come in, because the purpose of

1 AARO is so that the Senators can do our job to provide
2 oversight, accountability, and transparency. We find it
3 very concerning that our pilots, that our Navy officers,
4 that people who have sightings of UAPs are denigrated, are
5 somehow dismissed or disregarded. They need to be
6 protected.

7 This is a huge issue for national security because,
8 number one, we do not have domain awareness, which is very
9 problematic. Number two, we do not have domain superiority
10 if we do not understand how different UAPs are flying, what
11 technology they are using, what their mission is, what their
12 purpose is. And at the base level, we have so many UAPs
13 around our bases, around our military sites, around our
14 nuclear sites, and it is a deeply disturbing that
15 adversaries, at a minimum, could be using these
16 opportunities to spy, to glean intelligence that will harm
17 our long-term national security.

18 So I am grateful that you are taking the whistleblowers
19 very seriously. I am grateful that AARO is trying its best
20 to integrate the private sector, the public into their work.

21 Interestingly, in this hearing, we heard that the FAA
22 is now working hand-in-glove, which is very helpful. We
23 want this public-facing accessibility to be put in place by
24 2025, so that people can upload their videos, their data,
25 their reports.

1 I have met with people who have followed this issue for
2 decades, and they have thousands of examples, thousands of
3 pieces of data, that ultimately I want uploaded into AARO so
4 you can cross-reference historic information with current
5 information. Because this group at AARO are the best
6 scientists that we can find anywhere, and they will do the
7 work that is needed to be done. So I just want to thank you
8 for that.

9 And then with my last 42 seconds, can you tell us about
10 any of the cases that merit further analysis by your IC and
11 science and technology partners? What is it that makes
12 these cases anomalous? And a large number of reports are
13 placed in the active archive because AARO does not have
14 enough information. What might prompt you to reopen a case
15 like that, and do you have any examples?

16 Dr. Kosloski: Sure. I will start with the active
17 archive case. That is just the place where we put cases
18 where we do not have enough scientific information to
19 resolve them at that time, but we are always looking for
20 opportunities to correlate them to new cases that come in,
21 as the new cases come in, as well as enrich those cases with
22 additional data.

23 We do have one example that I am aware of where we were
24 able to correlate a number of observations of interesting
25 lights in the sky, and eventually we concluded that it was

1 multiple people observing Starlink flares, just as an
2 example.

3 Three cases that merit analysis that we are working on
4 right now, one we might be in the process of resolving, but
5 nonetheless, it is still interesting.

6 The first one was brought to us by a law enforcement
7 officer out West, where he observed a large orange orb
8 floating several hundred feet above the ground, a couple of
9 miles away. He went to investigate what was going on with
10 that orb, and as he was pulling up to the location where he
11 thought would be below the orb, about 40 to 60 meters away
12 from some object, the area was well lit, he saw a blacker
13 than black object. He said it was about the size of a
14 Prius, 4 to 6 feet wide. And as he got 40 to 60 meters away
15 from the object it tilted up about 45 degrees, and then it
16 shot up vertically, he says 10 to 100 times faster than
17 anything drone he has ever seen before. And it did that
18 without making a sound, as far as he could tell from inside
19 of his vehicle. And just as it left his field of view
20 through his windshield then it emitted very bright red and
21 blue lights that illuminated the inside of his vehicle, as
22 brightly as if someone had set off fireworks just outside
23 his vehicle, or street flares.

24 So that is anomalous because of the size of the vehicle
25 with the great acceleration, and when he came back to

1 investigate that area he found no disturbance of the ground
2 beneath it. So that is one interesting one.

3 Another one comes to us from Southeast U.S. There was
4 a U.S. facility where two cars of government contractors
5 were leaving the facility, around 9:00 in the morning. They
6 looked up in the sky and saw a large metallic cylinder,
7 about the size of a commercial airplane, and it was
8 stationary. They observed that there was a very bright,
9 white light behind or around the object. The saw it
10 stationary for 15 to 20 seconds, and then it disappeared.
11 Obviously, an object that large, stationary unless it is a
12 blimp, is unusual, but then disappearing, we cannot explain
13 how that would happen.

14 And then the last case was interesting. We had an
15 aircraft that was flying parallel to another aircraft and it
16 was capturing imagery of it, and a small-looking object
17 appeared to fly between the two of them, much faster than
18 them. Through very careful analysis we think that the
19 object might have actually been further away than the object
20 that it was videotaping, but it requires very careful
21 analysis to come to those conclusions, and we do not have
22 the metadata to support that yet.

23 Senator Gillibrand: Senator Ernst.

24 Senator Ernst: Yes. Thank you, Madam Chair. And Dr.
25 Kosloski, you mentioned that you do work with the

1 intelligence community. You are working with the FAA. Has
2 AARO involved academia? Have you gone to universities? Do
3 you have outside organizations that you are working with,
4 and if so, can you walk us through some of that
5 collaboration?

6 Dr. Kosloski: Sure. Right now most of our
7 collaborations that are veering towards academia are with
8 your university affiliate and research centers associated
9 with universities or with FFRDCs. Our partnership with
10 university, I would say, is lacking right now. We have some
11 one-off associations with university professors. However,
12 that is our fault, and it is largely because of the need to
13 be classified data. We need to give the professors
14 something to work on before we can really engage them.

15 So we are working significantly on the declassification
16 effort. We have hired a number of declassification experts,
17 and we are going to be trying to get cases like the ones
18 that I just discussed here declassified so that we can
19 engage with the universities on a regular basis and provide
20 them the data. Talking to a scientist without data is going
21 to be rather disappointing. So hopefully in 2025, we will
22 be increasing those efforts.

23 Senator Ernst: All right. Well, I appreciate that. I
24 think there is a huge pool of talent out there that you
25 should tap into.

1 Given the public's growing concern and interest in
2 UAPs, how do you balance the need for the transparency that
3 our public is demanding with the potential risks of
4 revealing classified defense information?

5 Dr. Kosloski: Yeah, that is always a concern that is
6 on the front of our minds. We want to make sure that we are
7 deconflicting both on potential U.S. programs and what the
8 IC might be tracking for adversarial programs, as we are
9 aggregating that information and preparing to share it.
10 However, oftentimes we can remove the discussion of the
11 unidentified and anomalous activity from the sensitive
12 information that our partners are concerned with. And that
13 is usually going to be the platforms that the information
14 was collected with, if it is truly anomalous. And so we
15 have our partners working alongside in the declassification
16 of that data.

17 Senator Ernst: Very good. And then without having to
18 explain the UAP, what do we need to begin really doing about
19 them? What precautions can we take? What should we be
20 doing about them?

21 Dr. Kosloski: I think that removing the stigma,
22 reducing the stigma, is the first step. We need to make
23 sure that we are having honest and transparent conversations
24 about them. Because if we are hesitant to discuss them,
25 then it opens the opportunity for an adversary, as you had

1 mentioned earlier, Senator Gillibrand, to come in and
2 conduct some activity.

3 So we need to do that, and we need to have more
4 persistent monitoring and understand that whether it is a
5 UAP or a counter-UAS issue, that we need to have that
6 complain domain awareness around our national security
7 facilities.

8 Senator Ernst: Wonderful. Thank you. Thank you,
9 Madam Chair.

10 Senator Gillibrand: Just a couple of follow-up
11 questions. We did not discuss in this setting the most
12 recent UAP, or UAS, encounter with bases like Langley. I
13 know that the incursion by UASs that were publicly made
14 available through the press that took over 2 weeks was
15 fairly alarming to Senators, because there was a question
16 about what technology they were using, there was a question
17 about why it was so hard to detect.

18 Can you speak to how AARO will be integrated into the
19 review of these kinds of cases and how you can be helpful to
20 both the intelligence community and the Department of
21 Defense in analyzing or being able to more quickly analyze
22 what is knowable and what is not knowable. Because once you
23 do identify it is a drone, for example, it then goes to the
24 right department at DoD or the intelligence community to
25 assess, deal with, or take down, as the incident might be.

1 But talk to us a little bit about what role you can
2 play, for both the DoD and the IC community in these kinds
3 of incursions that are happening when we do not know what
4 tech is being used and we do not understand a flight
5 pattern, we do not understand how they arrive and depart in
6 the way they do.

7 Dr. Kosloski: Yeah. We are generally going to be
8 supporting them through an advisory capacity. As an
9 organization that naturally needs to conduct baseline
10 experiments of the environment to see what normal looks
11 like, whether it is balloons, birds, anomalous activity, or
12 drones flying through an environment, we are going to gather
13 a lot of data that will allow us to characterize an
14 environment very well and then detect and follow those
15 tracks, hopefully rather efficiently.

16 There is also a lot of overlap in the type of sensors
17 that are going to be used for the counter-UAS mission and
18 the UAP mission, whether that is active detection like
19 radars, or passive like cameras. So as AARO is trying to
20 push the bounds on detectability for UAP, we are hopefully
21 going to have best practices that we can also provide to the
22 counter-UAS, and potentially we might have additional
23 technologies that we can offer them to support.

24 Senator Gillibrand: I would like to just address a
25 little bit of reporting and feedback. As you know, AARO is

1 required to develop a mechanism for the public to report UAP
2 information. Now that that mechanism for current and former
3 military, civilian, and contractor personnel has been
4 established, can you speak to AARO's plans for a public
5 reporting mechanism, and how did AARO arrive at this
6 approach, and were other options considered?

7 And second, for pilots and operators who have reported
8 a UAP, what feedback, if any, has AARO provided to these
9 individuals related to what AARO is doing with their report
10 and how the report has been resolved? How does such
11 feedback, or lack thereof, impact the frequency of UAP
12 reporting?

13 Dr. Kosloski: Yeah. The public reporting mechanism
14 that we have decided to go with is going to look similar to
15 the reporting mechanism that we currently have for
16 historical events, where we are going to ask folks to go to
17 our website, download a PDF form, put in the narrative for
18 their account, and then email that to us with accompanying
19 media. Usually it will probably be imagery.

20 We went with that option because we thought, one, we
21 could do it rather quickly, we could do it efficiently, make
22 it very cost effective for the taxpayer. But also we think
23 we can gather all the data that we are going to need to
24 conduct our analysis. And then we are going to have that
25 feed into an automated processing system that will cross-

1 correlate that against all the other public reported cases
2 as well as the U.S. government cases.

3 We did consider a number of other reporting mechanisms,
4 to included automated online forms as well as cellphone
5 apps, and we ultimately decided that this would be the
6 safest, cheapest, and easiest to maintain in the future,
7 while protecting the private information of the individuals
8 who are reporting.

9 Regarding the feedback from the result reports, right
10 now we do not have a good feedback mechanism. It is fairly
11 informal. We are working on building a case management
12 system that AARO will use at all classification levels, and
13 hopefully in that we will be able to provide feedback. As
14 the case is going through the resolution process -- we have
15 multiple phases -- then the folks who report that, whether
16 it is a pilot at the classified level or someone potentially
17 reporting through another mechanism, they will get that
18 automated feedback.

19 And then it is not determined at this point yet how
20 much information we will be able to include in that feedback
21 where it is in the process. It will depend on the
22 classification of the resolution of the case.

23 Senator Gillibrand: My final question is, is there
24 anything that you need to tell the Senate that you need from
25 us, whether it is funding, whether it is support, whether it

1 is legislation. Is there any request that AARO has of us,
2 or anything else you need to brief us on, for us to be able
3 to do our job to protect our servicemembers as well as
4 integrate public interest and public data and information
5 into the future analysis efforts of AARO?

6 Dr. Kosloski: First of all, I want to say thank you
7 again. I think that the authorities that we have are
8 remarkable, and I think that we are well-resourced as an
9 office. The only ask I would have is that you continue to
10 champion us, particularly with witnesses, encourage them to
11 come forward and report to us so that we can have a more
12 fulsome investigation of the potential historic or ongoing
13 legacy programs.

14 Senator Gillibrand: Thank you so much. Hearing
15 adjourned.

16 [Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m., the subcommittee was
17 adjourned.]

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