

Stenographic Transcript
Before the

COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE POSTURE OF UNITED
STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND UNITED STATES
SOUTHERN COMMAND IN REVIEW OF THE DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2027 AND THE
FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

Thursday, March 19, 2026

Washington, D.C.

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1 TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE POSTURE OF UNITED STATES
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7
8 U.S. Senate

9 Committee on Armed Services

10 Washington, D.C.

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12 The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in
13 Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Roger
14 Wicker, chairman of the committee, presiding.

15 Committee Members Present: Senators Wicker
16 [presiding], Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan,
17 Cramer, Scott, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Reed, Shaheen,
18 Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
19 Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin.

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1 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER WICKER, U.S. SENATOR
2 FROM MISSISSIPPI

3 Chairman Wicker: The committee will come to order.
4 Thank you all for being here.

5 The committee meets today to receive testimony on the
6 posture of the United States Northern Command and the United
7 States Southern Command. We are joined by General Gregory
8 Guillot from the U.S. Northern Command and General Frank
9 Donovan from the U.S. Southern Command. I want to thank our
10 witnesses for appearing today and for their decades of
11 service to our Nation. Thank you, gentlemen.

12 Protecting the homeland is the first and most important
13 duty of the Federal Government. Without a credible and
14 effective homeland defense, there can be no United States of
15 America for our 250th anniversary. During the Cold War, the
16 Soviet Union represented the only true threat to the United
17 States homeland. Today, the threat environment is much more
18 complicated. Both Russia and China possess a range of
19 nuclear, conventional space and cyber capabilities that
20 threaten the U.S. homeland. Iran and Sunni jihadis remain
21 intent on carrying out terrorist attacks in America. Tehran
22 and Pyongyang have conducted cyberattacks against our
23 critical infrastructure, and cartels are using innovative
24 methods to traffic drugs and humans across our borders.

25 All these adversaries share a common goal; to reduce

1 our influence in the Western Hemisphere, and to harm
2 Americans at home. To counter these threats, we need a
3 coordinated homeland defense strategy. It must weave
4 together conventional defenses and new partnerships with
5 allies and partners in our region, and we certainly
6 appreciate our allies and partners. We are poised to make
7 great progress on Golden Dome and similar efforts to protect
8 the homeland from incoming drone and missile threats. I
9 enthusiastically support these efforts. Golden dome will
10 reduce the threat posed by ballistic and cruise missiles
11 from Russia, China, and North Korea. I look forward to
12 hearing how General Guillot is working with the Golden Dome
13 team to make these defenses a reality.

14 In particular, I'd like to learn how his coordination
15 with the Joint Interagency Task Force 401 will help counter
16 the threat of small drones, also apply NORTHCOM's
17 professionalism in support of the Department of Homeland
18 Security. This has helped reinforce our border and help
19 stop virtually all illegal immigration. A singular
20 achievement.

21 We know that Homeland Defense does not stop at our
22 border with Mexico. More than 100,000 Americans are killed
23 annually in drug-related deaths. These immense and tragic
24 losses come at the hands of South American cartels. Cartels
25 contribute to violence, undermine regional stability, and



1 are linked to human trafficking, weapons smuggling, and
2 financial crime.

3 I commend SOUTHCOM for its execution of Operation
4 Southern Spear, which is helping to stop narco terrorists
5 from bringing drugs to our shores. It is also deterring
6 future traffickers from attempting the same. I hope General
7 Donovan can expound on the Department's efforts to
8 coordinate more closely with our Central and South American
9 partners to fight back against cartels.

10 China, Russia, and Iran all target the Western
11 Hemisphere in their influence operations. XI Jinping seeks
12 to control telecommunication systems, critical
13 infrastructure such as the Panama Canal and major deepwater
14 ports such as Chancay Peru. China has also expanded defense
15 cooperation across South America through arms sales, police
16 training, and space and cyber partnerships. Likewise,
17 Russia is selling arms, providing military advisers, and
18 expanding intelligence cooperation to South American
19 nations. In exchange, it gets permission to deploy Russian
20 military aircraft and naval vessels to the region.

21 Together, China and Russia exploit local corruption,
22 and partner with hostile authoritarian regimes like Cuba and
23 Nicaragua. They build influence and gain political leverage
24 to target the United States close to home. We must resist
25 these malign influence campaigns in our neighborhood, and



1 that's what we're about today. I'd like to hear General
2 Donovan's ideas about how we could do so, especially through
3 increased coordination with the Economic Defense Unit
4 Intelligence Committee and the Office of Strategic Capital.
5 So, expect that question.

6 I commend the Trump administration for the decisive
7 action it has taken to reassert U.S. interests near the
8 homeland, including the capture of Venezuelan President,
9 Nicolas Maduro, and his wife, Cilia Flores. I strongly
10 support the more aggressive counter-drug strategy. This
11 must emphasize border security, cripple the cartels, and
12 expand security partnerships with Latin American countries
13 in order to eliminate safe havens for the illicit networks
14 that plague our hemisphere. So, thank you, gentlemen, for
15 being here.

16 And I now recognize my friend and colleague, the
17 Ranking Member, Senator Reed.

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1 STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED, U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE
2 ISLAND

3 Senator Reed: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And
4 General Donovan, and General Guillot, thank you very much
5 for being here this morning and for your leadership. And
6 please pass our commendations on to the men and women you
7 lead. Thank you very much.

8 General Guillot, Northern Command has been at the
9 center of several significant and at times controversial
10 domestic operations over the past year. Thousands of
11 National Guard and active-duty troops have been deployed to
12 Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, Chicago, and Portland over
13 the objections of the respective governors and mayors.
14 Multiple Federal courts have ruled against these
15 deployments, and the Supreme Court itself has acted to limit
16 the use of federalized National Guard forces.

17 I want to be clear, the safety of our local communities
18 is of the utmost importance, but the legal and
19 constitutional framework that governs our military must not
20 be eroded. Our Nation has clear, long-standing laws to
21 enforce the boundary between military and civilian law
22 enforcement, and the boundary exists for reasons deeply
23 rooted in our democratic traditions. General, I would like
24 to know what guardrails you have in place to ensure
25 compliance with these laws, and an update on the financial



1 and readiness costs from the missions to date on your
2 command.

3 Additionally, I would appreciate an update on the use
4 of multiple Department of Defense-developed high energy
5 laser systems at the southwest border. I understand that
6 these military systems were used despite explicit objections
7 from the FAA, which warned that the technology poses a grave
8 risk of fatalities or permanent injuries to civilian
9 aircraft and pilots. The shutdown of the airspace over El
10 Paso raises serious questions about the legal authorities,
11 the coordination process among Federal agencies, and the
12 standards governing the transfer and use of such weapon
13 systems.

14 Finally, on the subject of homeland missile defense and
15 the proposed Golden Dome program, I would emphasize that
16 this committee is supportive of robust homeland defense. We
17 recognize the urgency that recent drone incursions and our
18 adversaries' advanced missile capabilities create for the
19 NORTHCOM. General, I would appreciate our assessment of the
20 Golden Domes projected cost beyond the 2028 timeframe, and
21 its technical realism with respect of such systems, such as
22 space-based interceptors. In particular, I'd like to know
23 how it fits within the broader architecture of deterrence,
24 including its potential effect on strategic stability with
25 Russia and China.



1 General Donovan, the scope of military activity in
2 Southern Command has expanded dramatically over the past
3 year. The deployment of thousands of military personnel,
4 and hundreds of ships and aircraft into your area of
5 responsibility represents an extraordinary expansion of
6 American military force in the Western Hemisphere. In
7 January, that buildup culminated in the raid to capture
8 former Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. The operation
9 itself was a testament to the skill and courage of American
10 service members, and every member of this committee joins in
11 recognizing their incredible service.

12 But military excellence does not resolve the strategic
13 and political questions that must follow. General, I would
14 ask for an update on the current status of our forces in the
15 region, their assigned missions going forward, and any
16 contingency planning for political instability in Venezuela.
17 Additionally, today, Operation Southern Sphere has resulted
18 in 156 fatalities from 45 airstrikes on suspected narco
19 trafficking boats. I continue to believe that this
20 operation is strategically misguided and of dubious
21 legality.

22 General Donovan, I would ask you to explain the
23 objective of continuing this operation, given that Maduro is
24 no longer in power, and to provide any measure of effects on
25 illicit drug flows into the United States. Finally, I would

1 like to understand what operations, if any, are being
2 planned or contemplated in or around Cuba, both military and
3 humanitarian, and what objectives your command is pursuing
4 in this area.

5 Gentlemen, thank you again for your leadership, and for
6 the service of the men and women under your command, and I
7 look forward to your testimonies. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

8 Chairman Wicker: Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member.

9 General Guillot, you are now recognized for your
10 opening statement.

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1 STATEMENT OF GENERAL GREGORY M. GUILLOT, USAF,
2 COMMANDER, UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN
3 AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND

4 General Guillot: Thank you, Chairman Wicker, and good
5 morning to you, Ranking Member Reed, and the distinguished
6 members of this committee. Thank you for the opportunity to
7 appear today alongside General Donovan, and represent the
8 dedicated and disciplined men and women of the United States
9 Northern Command, and North American Aerospace Defense
10 Command.

11 As the strategic environment has grown more complex,
12 NORAD and USNORTHCOM have responded by transforming both
13 commands, executing new missions, and implementing
14 innovative approaches to safeguard North America. Both
15 commands campaign 24/7 to deter adversaries and defend
16 against threats in all domains. Since March of 2025, NORAD
17 intercepted long range bombers off the coast of Alaska and
18 Canada 19 times, scrambled fighters 82 times, and committed
19 fighters from airborne patrols 156 times in support of
20 Operation Noble Eagle, protecting the President, Washington,
21 D.C., and national special security events.

22 The command's tracked Russian and Chinese submarines
23 and surface vessels in the approaches to North America, and
24 remain ready to defend against ballistic and cruise missile
25 attacks. Our commands remain vigilant, capable, and

1 committed. That commitment is evidenced by the operational
2 units activated over the last year to secure the U.S.
3 southern border.

4 USNORTHCOM established Joint Task Force-Southern Border
5 in March of 2025. Since then, JTF-SB has supported Customs
6 and Border Protection with unique military capabilities in
7 all domains that have helped reduce illegal border
8 activities to historic lows. Those service members are now
9 executing the southern border mission with expanded
10 authorities and within their occupational specialties, which
11 has enhanced readiness and increased reenlistment rates.

12 USNORTHCOM also established Joint Interagency Task
13 Force-Counter Cartel, a whole-of-government enterprise
14 dedicated to fusing intelligence used to help dismantle
15 cartel networks. And to accelerate our integrated air and
16 missile defense capabilities, USNORTHCOM activated Joint
17 Task Force-Gold to serve as the operational arm for the
18 future layered defense systems provided by Golden Dome for
19 America.

20 USNORTHCOM is the Department's synchronizer for
21 counter-small UAS activities in the continental U.S. and
22 Alaska. Thanks to the counter-small UAS authorities
23 provided by Congress, and policies updated by Secretary
24 Hegseth, the service members along the border defeated 93
25 UAS that crossed the border and posed a threat to our

1 personnel.

2 Assuring our ability to operate in the High North is a
3 strategic necessity. With the inclusion of Greenland into
4 the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility, we are executing
5 seamless defensive operations across the harsh environment
6 of the Arctic, ensuring we are ready to defend the High
7 North any time and under all conditions.

8 Domestically, USNORTHCOM mission to provide defense
9 support of civil authorities remains a critical
10 responsibility, and we stand ready to support lead Federal
11 agencies during natural disasters and key events, including
12 America's 250 celebrations and World Cup 2026, co-hosted by
13 Canada, Mexico, and the United States.

14 All NORAD and NORTHCOM missions are reinforced by
15 partnerships from our unique binational relationship with
16 Canada through NORAD, our close cooperation with Mexico, the
17 Bahamas, and now Denmark and Greenland, trusted
18 relationships are a cornerstone of regional security and
19 homeland defense.

20 The men and women of USNORTHCOM and NORAD have embraced
21 these new challenges and are unwavering in their no-fail
22 mission; the disciplined defense of our homelands in all
23 domains from all avenues of approach against all those who
24 intend us harm.

25 We appreciate the steadfast support of the committee,



1 and I look forward to answering your questions today. We
2 have the watch.

3 [The prepared statement of General Guillot follows:]

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1 Chairman Wicker: Thank you very much.
2 General Donovan.

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1 STATEMENT OF GENERAL FRANCIS L. DONOVAN, USMC,
2 COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

3 General Donovan: Chairman, Ranking Member Reed,
4 distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
5 opportunity to discuss the posture of the United States
6 Southern Command.

7 I would like to thank the members of the committee for
8 their trust and confidence you have placed in me to lead
9 this organization at such a critical moment. On behalf of
10 the men and women of SOUTHCOM, Sergeant Major Rodriguez and I
11 appreciate your continued support. I'm joined today by my
12 good friend, General Greg Guillot. We are aligned with the
13 Department's focus on the Western Hemisphere. We are
14 dedicated to rebuilding U.S. leadership and presence in this
15 critical part of the world.

16 Let me begin by saying I've learned a lot in the past
17 42 days about the dynamic region I'm responsible for and the
18 incredible organization I am now leading. As this committee
19 knows, last year was a pivotal moment in SOUTHCOM history,
20 the command responsible for multiple priority missions and
21 operations, each with enormous national security
22 implications. The SOUTHCOM team rose to the challenge while
23 remaining true to its legacy of partnering and
24 collaboration. I want to specifically thank the leaders of
25 Joint Task Force Southern Spear. This is SOUTHCOM's comes

1 warfighting headquarters, who are leading our efforts
2 against drug cartels and terrorist networks with incredible
3 levels of professionalism and precision.

4 Now, we are ready to evolve for the future. The 2026
5 National Defense Strategy lays out the threats we face in
6 this hemisphere and SOUTHCOM's role in addressing them. In
7 response, I've developed four imperatives. First, SOUTHCOM
8 strengthens hemispheric command and control by redesigning
9 and building the SOUTHCOM headquarters for strategic level
10 operations at range, speed, and scale. Second, SOUTHCOM
11 imposes total systemic friction on drug cartels and
12 terrorist networks. This requires a hemispheric-wide
13 approach led by SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM, to help our partners
14 degrade these organizations and reduce the threat they pose
15 to our partners and to our Nation.

16 Third, SOUTHCOM develops and fields cost effective,
17 modernized forces tailored for the missions in this
18 hemisphere. These forces fully maximize operational
19 maneuver, autonomous systems, and human machine teaming to
20 greatly increase lethality, all domain awareness, and most
21 importantly, data sharing for U.S. and partner forces. And
22 finally, SOUTHCOM denies adversary footholds and undue
23 influence in this hemisphere. That includes their ability
24 to position forces or other capabilities that threaten our
25 homeland or our regional partners, and challenge our access



1 to key terrain like the Panama Canal and its approaches.

2 These imperatives, in the dynamic security environment
3 we operate in, will require the right structures,
4 authorities, and forces to keep pace with mission needs.
5 SOUTHCOM is moving out with speed and urgency and stands
6 ready to work with Congress to defend our homeland and our
7 hemisphere.

8 I thank this committee for their unyielding support to
9 U.S. Southern Command, and look forward to our discussion
10 this morning. Thank you very much.

11 [The prepared statement of General Donovan follows:]

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1 Chairman Wicker: Well, thank you, gentlemen.

2 And, without objection, the entire statement of General
3 Guillot -- the entire prepared statement of General Guillot,
4 consisting of 21 pages, provided to us in advance, and the
5 entire statement of General Donovan, again, provided to us
6 in advance, consisting of 11 pages will be added into the
7 record at this point, without objection.

8 Okay. Well, General Donovan, tell us how the Maduro
9 effort, the removal of him and the installation of his Vice
10 President, has affected our interests in the area.

11 General Donovan: Mr. Chairman, soon after assuming
12 command of SOUTHCOM, I was directed to take a trip to
13 Venezuela, to Caracas, and meet with the current leadership
14 of the Venezuelan Government. And I will pause just for a
15 second to highlight.

16 Chairman Wicker: Who did you meet?

17 General Donovan: We met Delcy Rodriguez --

18 Chairman Wicker: Okay.

19 General Donovan: -- and a number of her senior
20 generals, the top four, Mr. Chairman, we speak of, but I
21 will highlight for one second the incredible work Ambassador
22 and Charge d'Affaires Dogu is doing down there as our
23 representative with a small team of 10 diplomats. The work
24 they're doing with the Venezuelan Government is staggering.

25 Chairman Wicker: Is the Charge d'Affaires as high as

1 we'll get down there?

2 General Donovan: Chairman, I hope eventually we'll
3 have an ambassador one day, and she was just recognized on
4 the 5 of March as an official charge, and we put the --
5 raised the flag over the embassy the first time in, I think,
6 9 years. So, a good moment, but we got a chance to meet
7 with the government there, highlight our concerns that had
8 developed over time since the Maduro event. It was 46 days
9 since that event. So, it was a pretty remarkable setting,
10 and we laid out what our concerns were. And since then,
11 that -- those actions have all been acted on by that
12 government.

13 Chairman Wicker: In a positive way that met with your
14 approval?

15 General Donovan: Yes, Mr. Chairman. I think in a
16 classified setting, one specific action against an actor
17 we're very concerned about aggressive action was taken.

18 Chairman Wicker: All right. We certainly have an
19 opportunity to do that later on. Well, tell us then about
20 coordination with the Economic Defense Unit Intelligence
21 Committee and the Office of Strategic Capital. Can you
22 enlarge on my statement about that?

23 General Donovan: Chairman, yes, I can. As we look at
24 all the tools available to SOUTHCOM, and really, our
25 strength remains our ability to partner with these allies

1 and partners. If you look at the recent America's Counter
2 Cartel Coalition, now that we've set up, that the Secretary
3 has set up and that we believe SOUTHCOM will take a key role
4 in, we have more tools through OSC, through EDU, to bring to
5 bear. So, you have the exercises, you have the -- you have
6 even for military sales. But we have 17 -- actually, now
7 with Chile, 18 key partners that have signed up to the --
8 for the Triple C to be part of this now, and now we have
9 more tools with --

10 Chairman Wicker: Our partner nations -- partner --

11 General Donovan: Yes, sir, the partner nations that
12 signed the agreement to be part of the Americas Counter
13 Cartel Coalition, and the EDU, and OSC give us additional
14 capabilities we haven't had in the past. Specifically, we
15 can counter other maligned actors like China directly with
16 some economic incentives, Chairman.

17 Chairman Wicker: Is OAS being utilized to the extent
18 that it could?

19 General Donovan: Chairman, I'll put it this way. In
20 43 days, I have not contacted the OAS yet or really been
21 fully involved. That is something I need to do, and I
22 intend to pursue to ensure that we're fully aligned or
23 they're fully in support of the way forward.

24 Chairman Wicker: I think it's an opportunity that we
25 ought to try to enlarge, and I say that for the benefit of



1 my colleagues also. Let's see. General Guillot, how are
2 you working with the Golden Dome team to improve our
3 defenses, and particularly I promised to ask you about Joint
4 Interagency Task Force 401.

5 General Guillot: Chairman, I'm working very closely
6 with General Guetlein and his program office. In fact, the
7 day after he was confirmed, he flew to Colorado Springs,
8 where we outlined what, I felt, were the operational
9 necessities for the Golden Dome. And then, he agreed at
10 that time, that it, one, aligned with his approach, and,
11 two, that he felt he could build the architecture necessary
12 to deliver that on time. And we also brought General
13 Stephen Whiting, who is the commander of U.S. Space Command,
14 who was in Colorado Springs, and he was in on the meeting,
15 too. And so, the three of us left fully aligned.

16 Since then, as he's worked with industry and developed
17 this architecture, anytime he finds something that either
18 the technology isn't there yet, or maybe the cost is too
19 high, he comes back to me and explains his adjustment, and
20 confirms that it still meets our operational needs. I also
21 gave him a general officer that is working as a liaison in
22 his office to ensure that there's no separation between the
23 operational requirements and his development of the
24 architecture. So, in short, I think it's a very tight
25 relationship. I'm very encouraged by it, and I think that

1 we will be able to demonstrate the capabilities that have
2 been advertised on or ahead of schedule.

3 Chairman Wicker: Thank you very much. Ranking Member
4 Reed is now recognized.

5 Senator Reed: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

6 General Donovan, the lethal bolt trikes that are being
7 conducted in your AOR are based on a still secret directive
8 signed by the President ordering the Pentagon to conduct
9 maritime strikes on these alleged drug trafficking boats,
10 and the affiliation is with organizations that are still
11 secret, have not been revealed to the public yet. Those
12 operations have been going on for over 6 months, and as I
13 indicated, there are 157. Killed in action or killed
14 personnel. When you came before the committee, you
15 indicated that you would check each one of these operations.
16 Have you been able to do that, and what conclusions have you
17 reached?

18 General Donovan: Well, Ranking member, before assuming
19 command on 5 February, I actually took a number of steps.
20 I'd like to highlight them, if I could. First one, is I
21 read all the legal opinions tied to these operations. Next,
22 I read every single execute order SOUTHCOM has been given
23 since -- well, prior to Southern Spear -- to ensure that I
24 could link those together so when I stepped into command, I
25 could carry out those specific strikes, if required, and if



1 they were part of the tactical solution.

2 Senator Reed: Well, thank you, General. What is the
3 metrics of success in this operation? Is it the reduction
4 of drugs entering the United States, and by how much? Are
5 there metrics involved?

6 General Donovan: Ranking Member, as I've looked at
7 this over the last 43 days, I cannot stand before you and
8 tell you that there's a percentage drop in American deaths
9 in the United States or a number of a certain percentage of
10 drugs reaching the United States. Looking forward, what I'm
11 -- what we're building is an actual campaign against these
12 cartels that will actually look at really more systemically
13 across the board from point of production to point of
14 delivery up in the plazas. And look at it more
15 holistically, and really, what I'd like, what I'm planning
16 on applying, is total systemic friction on these networks,
17 and I believe these kinetic strikes are just one small part
18 of that.

19 If you look at all the tools available, specifically
20 the tools that will strengthen partners so they will have a
21 better economic future in these towns, villages, cities
22 where a lot of the production takes place, where these
23 cartels and other nefarious actors like China can step in
24 and influence, I believe that's the step in the measure of
25 success that those partner nations can actually create

1 security environments where we start to stop this at the at
2 the actual source itself.

3 Senator Reed: Can you indicate the chain of command
4 above you, who is immediately above you, then all the way up
5 to the very top.

6 General Donovan: The secretary of the war to the
7 President of the United States.

8 Senator Reed: And do you have contact with the White
9 House directly through individuals in the white House?

10 General Donovan: No, Ranking Member Reed.

11 Senator Reed: So, you get all your orders from the
12 secretary of defense?

13 General Donovan: Those orders are from the secretary
14 of defense, translated through the Joint Staff in the form
15 of execute orders, which are the ones I referenced, I've
16 read every single one.

17 Senator Reed: Thank you very much.

18 General Guillot, as I indicated in my opening
19 statement, you have, at the orders of the President,
20 deployed significant forces throughout the United States,
21 and you've drawn -- the action has drawn criticism by many
22 governors, mayors, and also the courts. I'm really
23 concerned, though, is looking beyond just what these
24 deployments, the secretary of defense has set up a response
25 force for the National Guard, quick reaction force for the



1 National Guard, which mobilized within 24 hours and can be
2 sent anywhere at the order of the President to "quell
3 civilian disturbances."

4 All of that adds up to the obvious question, the
5 concern that these forces could be used to interrupt the
6 First Amendment rights of Americans, particularly their
7 right to vote. As you know, Federal law explicitly bans the
8 deployment of armed Federal troops or any armed troops, to
9 polling places. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. Section 592 makes
10 it a crime punishable by up to 5 years in prison to deploy
11 Federal troops or armed men, which presumably would include
12 ICE, to any location where voting is taking place or
13 elections being held, unless such force be necessary to
14 repel armed enemies of the United States. Armed enemies of
15 the United States. Other than that, narrow legal exception
16 that I just described, do you agree that it is illegal to
17 deploy the armed forces to polling places?

18 General Guillot: Senator, I am aware of the code, and
19 I recognize that it is against the law, and I would not
20 follow an unlawful order. And then, thank you for noting
21 the exception.

22 Senator Reed: Thank you very much, sir. With that,
23 Mr. Chairman, I will yield my 6 seconds.

24 Chairman Wicker: Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member.
25 Senator Fischer.

1 Senator Fischer: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

2 General Guillot, I've appreciated our conversations
3 over the years about the increasingly complex and diverse
4 threats that we face to our homeland. You are always
5 insistent that improving domain awareness is foundational to
6 protecting the homeland, because, after all, we cannot shoot
7 what we cannot see. How are you seeing our ability to
8 detect and characterize threats earlier improve?

9 General Guillot: Senator, thank you for your support
10 in those efforts. I am seeing immediate improvement. We
11 can see at longer ranges with more fidelity, and also, in a
12 layered approach where one phenomenon or one system is no
13 longer responsible solely to detect. We have backup systems
14 as well. And then, I also note, because of the partnership
15 with the Golden Dome for America program office, many of the
16 domain awareness systems that we need for improved NORAD and
17 NORTHCOM detection also serve the purpose of Golden Dome.
18 And so, we're really getting two or three for one with many
19 of these systems that are either in development now, or
20 being implemented now, or will be implemented in the near
21 future.

22 Senator Fischer: Yeah. I really appreciated your
23 comments about working with General Guetlein on Golden Dome
24 and how and how you are working together to make sure, first
25 of all, that we have what we need in order to protect this



1 homeland, and the collaboration there will hopefully hold
2 down expenses as well as you each bring forth ideas that are
3 necessary. So, I really appreciate your comments there. As
4 we're looking to improve on the threats, do you have
5 anything specific you could say in this setting on what you
6 think needs to be improved?

7 General Guillot: Senator, I'd like to see continued
8 improvement in the persistence of our ability to detect and
9 track adversaries from seabed all the way to space. As I
10 mentioned, it's a layered approach, and I have confidence in
11 all layers. But as the adversary grows capability, we need
12 to see them further away from our continent than we have in
13 the past. And so, I'd like to see incremental improvement
14 in reaching out further from our shores to ensure that we
15 stay ahead of the adversary as they improve their
16 capabilities.

17 Senator Fischer: Thank you. Turning to your role as
18 the NORAD commander, how are the U.S. and Canadian
19 military's deepening their military partnership in the face
20 of greater threats?

21 General Guillot: Senator, at the mil-to-mil level,
22 we're working very closely together, as we have since 1958,
23 when NORAD was established, with Canadians and U.S. members
24 side by side in headquarters and out in the field. Most
25 recently, you may have seen that a combined force of NORAD



1 fighters and tankers, both us and Canadian, intercepted
2 Russian aircraft north of Alaska that went from the Alaska
3 Natives into the Canadian ADIZ and then back across.

4 And because of the seamless approach that we have from
5 the headquarters on down to units, that is fully integrated
6 on the same data links, the same mission planning systems,
7 using the same refueling tankers operating sometimes from
8 the same base. It's an incredibly tight, and, I think,
9 inseparable relationship that we have to defend North
10 America.

11 Senator Fischer: It sounds like you're evolving and
12 adjusting the relationship to meet the new threats that are
13 out there?

14 General Guillot: Yes, ma'am. We absolutely are, and
15 both of our countries are pursuing NORAD modernization
16 capabilities that will make sure that we can stay ahead, as
17 I mentioned.

18 Senator Fischer: Thank you.

19 General Donovan, what actions is SOUTHCOM taking to
20 increase and leverage partnerships to advance our country's
21 interests in the region?

22 General Donovan: Senator, we've had an opportunity to
23 meet with almost every leader, my equivalent, the MODs or
24 CHODs, of southern countries that were tied to through the
25 CHOD conference we had with the chairman here in D.C., and



1 then this Americas Counter Cartel Coalition. Their ask is
2 the same thing, they need assistance with domain awareness,
3 and really, it's key between air domain awareness, as we
4 believe some of these drug trafficking flows are moving into
5 the airspace again. And maritime domain awareness to look
6 out over the horizon, not only for the cartel efforts, but
7 really the PRC, the Chinese influence, illicit fishing. So,
8 really, domain awareness is the is the thing they asked for
9 more than anything else, Senator.

10 Senator Fischer: To what extent can lessons from the
11 Joint Security Cooperation Group-Panama, how can those be
12 applied to SOUTHCOM relationships to other countries?

13 General Donovan: I think that's an exemplar, Senator,
14 that we're just starting to realize how we could export that
15 to other places in South America, in the Caribbean, and
16 Central America.

17 Senator Fischer: Okay. Thank you very much. Thank
18 you, Mr. Chairman.

19 Chairman Wicker: Thank you, Senator Fischer. Senator
20 Shaheen.

21 Senator Shaheen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
22 you both for being here this morning, and for your service
23 to our country.

24 General Donovan, throughout the past fall, this
25 committee was briefed several times on ongoing operations in



1 the Caribbean, as you've heard from Senator Reed. And when
2 we ask point blank about plans to remove Nicolas Maduro from
3 power in Venezuela, we were told, both at the cabinet level
4 and from senior military leaders, that there were no plans
5 to conduct regime change. And there -- and yet, come to
6 find out, the military was in the process of conducting
7 rehearsals to remove Nicolas Maduro from power.

8 So, General Donovan, now we're hearing President Trump
9 make several comments about his intent to remove from power,
10 the current President of Cuba, to own Cuba. And while both
11 Cuba and Venezuela are repressive regimes, and I don't have
12 any sympathy for their leadership, they pose no immediate
13 threat to the United States. So, I'm going to ask you very
14 directly, are we currently conducting any military
15 rehearsals that involve seizing, occupying, or otherwise
16 asserting control over Cuba?

17 General Donovan: Senator, U.S. Southern Command does
18 not.

19 Senator Shaheen: Thank you.

20 Senator Reed: Is there any other?

21 Senator Shaheen: Pardon me?

22 Senator Reed: Is there any other?

23 Senator Shaheen: Is any other command that you know
24 of?

25 General Donovan: No, Senator.



1 Senator Shaheen: Thank you. Thank you, Senator Reed.
2 General Guillot, U.S. space and satellite tracking
3 infrastructure in Greenland now falls under your area of
4 responsibility, as you pointed out in your testimony. And I
5 noticed in your statement for the record, that in addition
6 to the U.S.-Canada relationship through NORAD, you benefit
7 from cooperation with the Danish armed forces, and with the
8 inclusion of Greenland in your AOR. So, can you tell us,
9 has the United States ever made a request of Denmark or
10 Greenland regarding military cooperation that has not been
11 granted or accommodated by the Danish and Greenlandic
12 authorities?

13 General Guillot: No, Senator, we have not. I enjoy a
14 very strong relationship with the Danish CHOD, and every
15 request and partnership opportunity has been fulfilled.

16 Senator Shaheen: Thank you. And, in your exchange
17 with Senator Fischer, you talked about the efforts underway
18 with Canada on NORAD. Can you speak a little -- in a little
19 greater detail to the benefit that Canada provides us as a
20 partner in NORAD?

21 General Guillot: Senator, as I mentioned, they're
22 fully integrated in all of our operations for NORAD. The
23 benefits that I see, underway and coming in the future are,
24 long range radar systems that could help detect threats at
25 range, an interest in joining us in satellite detection



1 capabilities, which would give persistence, and then the
2 purchase of advanced fighter aircraft such as the F-35,
3 which would give us lethality to defeat threats further away
4 from our continent.

5 Senator Shaheen: So, is it fair to say that we're
6 safer and stronger because of our partnership with Canada?

7 General Guillot: Yes, ma'am, in NORAD for sure.

8 Senator Shaheen: Thank you.

9 As you point out in your testimony, General Guillot,
10 drone incursions over the United States pose a real threat
11 to our homeland, especially over critical U.S. military
12 infrastructure. The Ukrainian armed forces have really made
13 progress on both offensive and counter-drone technology, and
14 are, as you know, now assisting in with air defense in the
15 Middle East. Can you talk about the lessons that have been
16 learned from the Ukrainian military as you think about
17 developing counter-drone technology?

18 General Guillot: Yes, Senator. And we're very
19 fortunate, as the chairman mentioned, to have JIATF 401,
20 which is a newly established organization that looks at the
21 procurement and development of counter-UAS systems, which
22 can be passed to combatant commands like ours and others.
23 First, I see that it's important to move from a point
24 defense, which counter-UAS in the last few years has been
25 into more of a regional area because of the longer range and



1 indiscriminate nature with which they -- the adversary has
2 employed these systems. Also, they've helped illuminate
3 that you can't have just 1 or 2 different defeat mechanisms.
4 They have to be across multiple mediums, everything from,
5 denying satellite guidance all the way to first-person view
6 and everything in between, which means that we have to
7 expand our arsenal in ways that we didn't think 2 or 3 years
8 ago. And we wouldn't have known that without the benefit of
9 the Ukraine.

10 Senator Shaheen: Thank you.

11 And General Donovan, when I was recently -- Senator
12 Blumenthal and I actually were recently in Odesa in Ukraine,
13 and one of the people we met along the way was an official
14 from Columbia who was working with the Ukrainian armed
15 forces to combat drug cartels in Latin America and in
16 Colombia, specifically. Can you -- are you looking at some
17 of those efforts to address what you're trying to do in
18 SOUTHCOM to address cartels and the narcotics trade?

19 General Donovan: Yes, we are. Colombia after decades
20 of playing Colombia, they're very effective organization and
21 we still have very strong mil-to-mil ties, and we actually
22 fusion cell in Bogota. So, we continue to learn from their
23 successes they're having against the cartels.

24 Senator Shaheen: And what they're learning is from the
25 Ukrainians as well. Correct?



1 General Donovan: Absolutely, Senator.

2 Senator Shaheen: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

3 Chairman Wicker: Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator
4 Cotton.

5 Senator Cotton: Thank you, gentlemen, for your
6 appearance and for your service.

7 General Donovan, I want to return to the question of
8 Cuba. I understand that you may not be actively rehearsing
9 an invasion of Cuba, but surely, we have plans to deal with
10 any contingency related to Cuba. I mean, there's a vast
11 cadre, thousands of majors and colonels just sitting around
12 the Pentagon making plans for every possible contingency in
13 the world. It'd be a mass unemployment event if we didn't
14 have plans for every potential crisis around the world. So,
15 I want to ask specifically about one potential crisis given
16 the state of play in Cuba, which has never been able to
17 stand on its own two feet, it relied for 30 years on support
18 from Soviet Russia, and then it was wobbly in the 1990s
19 until Chavez's Venezuela came to the rescue and supported it
20 for the last 30 years.

21 Are we prepared for any kind of humanitarian crisis in
22 Cuba, the possible flow of refugees or other civil disorder
23 that may threaten our interests, especially if the decrepit,
24 corrupt Castro regime finally falls or flees?

25 General Donovan: Senator, yes, we are. SOUTHCOM, our



1 core task, we have an execute order to be prepared to
2 support DHS in a mass migration event. They would take the
3 lead. We would follow either at sea or primarily ashore in
4 Guantanamo Bay, where we would set up a camp to deal with
5 those migrants or any overflow from any situation in Cuba
6 itself. Otherwise, my other core task is to protect the
7 embassy, which we are in contact with the embassy every
8 single day. We had the CDA, the Charge d'Affaires, Hammer,
9 in my office about a week ago, and we talked about what he
10 thought was going to happen in Cuba, and so we're very much
11 aligned with the diplomats there. That's my responsibility
12 in Cuba.

13 The responsibility I have is protecting the base, and
14 those families, and us Americans living on the eastern part
15 of the island. So, all those together, we're constantly
16 watching. If asked to support a humanitarian event, that's
17 what we do actually very well. Also, we are very strong in
18 logistics, and we could move support and supplies if asked
19 to do so.

20 Senator Cotton: Okay. Thank you.

21 You've been on the job now for a little over a month.
22 What's been your assessment of the state of our
23 infrastructure in Latin America, especially in the
24 Caribbean? Has it -- does it need additional support given
25 the fact that SOUTHCOM is now a much more active combatant



1 command than it has been in the past?

2 General Donovan: Senator, in the last 43 days, I've
3 learned a lot about the budget of SOUTHCOM. And I've looked
4 at the base and the stations that we've had in the past,
5 like, like Guantanamo Bay and other locations that were
6 coming back to like in Puerto Rico, and areas like Soto Cano
7 where we have a great relationship with the Hondurans. All
8 in different degrees need a refresh.

9 I'd like to pause for a minute on Guantanamo Bay. I
10 think that is one of the more key locations we have, and I
11 won't pull any punches, it's in rough shape. Because of the
12 hurricane damage, we're down to one working pier and one
13 refueling pier. I believe that is a pivotal point for any
14 operations in the Caribbean is GITMO, and so right now,
15 we're working for opportunities, and the funding, and the
16 resources at MILCOM, at other contingency funds to really
17 figure out how to go to those key locations.

18 And they become both not just logistics hubs, but
19 maneuver hubs as we look at going on a consistent counter-
20 cartel campaign and/or better partners and use those hubs
21 for hubs of partnership, like we mentioned before, how to
22 export some of the good things we're doing in Panama.

23 Senator Cotton: Okay. And I trust that your budget
24 request will reflect the needs for those infrastructure
25 upgrades, especially at Guantanamo Bay?



1 General Donovan: Yes, Senator. And how our budget is
2 structured right now, executive agents, United States Army.
3 So, we're working with the United States Army on looking at
4 that budget structure. And then, how do we actually have a
5 budget built over time with the right amount of O&M to
6 actually make improvements and sustain those, not just 1-
7 year shots in the arm, but a sustained budget approach that
8 will actually let us campaign from very effective forward
9 locations.

10 Senator Cotton: Thank you.

11 I think your appointment reflects, in part, that
12 Southern Command is a combatant command, not a training
13 command, and certainly not a diplomatic command. And I
14 think the budget needs to reflect that as well.

15 General Guillot, as the commander of NORAD, one of your
16 central missions is the defense of American and Canadian
17 airspace. That depends on a robust fighter force, but
18 today's Air Force fleet is the smallest and the oldest it's
19 ever been. The Air Force also struggles with low readiness
20 rates for its fighters. Do you believe that NORTHCOM and
21 NORAD would benefit from an expanded fighter force?

22 General Guillot: Yes, Senator, we would. I would like
23 to see continued modernization of fourth-generation fighter
24 fleet. Frankly, sir, we don't need fifth-gen to defend our
25 borders. Those capabilities are better used overseas, where



1 their stealth air to ground weapons and penetration
2 capability are needed. So, revamped and modernized fourth-
3 gen to include F-15EX in select locations would meet all of
4 our requirements.

5 Senator Cotton: I'm glad you said that. I think we
6 need more fourth-generation fighters as well, like at the F-
7 15EX, and for that matter, they can be pretty useful
8 overseas once those fifth-generation fighters and bombers
9 plow the road and knock out the air defenses as we're seeing
10 right now in Iran. Thank you, gentlemen.

11 Chairman Wicker: General Donovan, how many Americans
12 are at GITMO right now?

13 General Donovan: Senator, I'm going to look at my
14 cheat sheet because as I learned the --

15 Chairman Wicker: I do that often.

16 General Donovan: Let me get back to you on it.

17 Chairman Wicker: Okay. That's fine.

18 General Donovan: I'll let you know. I know what we
19 are prepared for if migrants come in. I don't have the base
20 structure and what we have down there right now.

21 Chairman Wicker: Okay. Are the Russians resupplying
22 Cuba now, and how much of a game changer is that, or would
23 that be?

24 General Donovan: Chairman, we haven't seen an active
25 resupply of Russians coming to the aid of Cuba.



1 Chairman Wicker: I saw a news article about that.

2 General Donovan: What we're tracking right now is one
3 destroyer with an accompanying oiler, which -- a
4 replenishment ship heading towards Cuba on a port call. I
5 believe that oiler is just supporting that ship moving
6 there. I don't think it's going to deliver any. If it did,
7 it wouldn't have the impact at scale. So, that's the only
8 event I'm tracking, Chairman.

9 Chairman Wicker: Thank you. Senator Blumenthal.

10 Senator Blumenthal: Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
11 both for your service and to your families. General
12 Donovan, to your wife, and I understand your two children
13 are Marines. Thank them as well for their service.

14 There have been reports of a request by the Pentagon
15 for \$200 billion, supplemental. Seems to me that a
16 supplemental to support a war that the President has never
17 asked Congress to approve as constitutionally required
18 without a clear statement of objectives or strategy and
19 disclosure of accurate information about the cost of the war
20 or public hearings with relevant officials would make it a
21 non-starter at this point, and it's added to a \$1.5 trillion
22 Department of Defense fiscal year 2027 request, and could be
23 misinterpreted or spun as congressional approval for the
24 war. Are you aware of the requests made by the Department
25 of Defense Department of War for \$200 billion, supplemental.

1 Either of you.

2 General Donovan: Senator, I read in the news this
3 morning.

4 Senator Blumenthal: General?

5 General Guillot: Senator, I'm in the same position as
6 General Donovan.

7 Senator Blumenthal: Thank you. You've been asked,
8 General Donovan, about plans and rehearsals for Cuba. Are
9 you aware of any plans to aid non-governmental groups, exile
10 groups, or any other groups in potentially action within
11 Cuba to overthrow this government or to take over if there
12 is an overthrow?

13 General Donovan: No, Senator.

14 Senator Blumenthal: And are you aware of any
15 contingency plans to put American troops in Cuba if there is
16 unrest there that threatens Americans who are there now?

17 General Donovan: Senator, that situation, if it
18 developed a physical security threat to the U.S. embassy or
19 the base at GITMO, we would put U.S. troops to defend
20 American lives.

21 Senator Blumenthal: Thank you.

22 As Senator Shaheen has said, I have no sympathy for the
23 repressive regime there, which has caused deaths and
24 economic turmoil, but I think we should be informed about
25 any such plans if they are made. Would you agree?



1 General Donovan: Yes, Senator.

2 Senator Blumenthal: Thank you. In terms the seizure
3 of boats emanating from Venezuela, is that -- those
4 operations continuing, General Donovan?

5 General Donovan: Senator, Southern Command continues
6 to track the Dark Fleet. Those vessels have been designated
7 carrying illicit oil from or to Venezuela. We continue to
8 track those right now. All in our AOR are actually in port
9 or not transiting. There have been a number of engagements
10 called maritime interception operations. Some have happened
11 in SOUTHCOM, one has happened in EUCOM in the middle of the
12 Atlantic, and one's happened also in INDOPACOM in the Indian
13 Ocean. So, we continue to track those illicit shipping, and
14 when directed, we can conduct interception operations.

15 Senator Blumenthal: To what extent are other nations
16 in the hemisphere aiding the United States in those
17 operations?

18 General Donovan: Senator, I do not know if we're
19 getting direct aid in the sense of a tactical action. It is
20 all us, U.S. personnel involved, led by law enforcement, the
21 Coast Guard. But I am not aware of other, unless it's Intel
22 or information sharing. We depend on partners, but no other
23 direct support. I will tell you that we -- part of our trip
24 to Venezuela was to put pressure on that government to let
25 us board two of the ships that they have in port, pier side



1 in Caracas. They executed the boarding and determined --
2 for us to determine what was actually on board.

3 Senator Blumenthal: During your nomination hearings, I
4 asked you whether you supported releasing various Office of
5 Legal Counsel opinions. I think there are at least two of
6 them, which right now are classified. You deferred to the
7 policy and legal advisors in the Office of the Secretary.
8 Now that you're confirmed, I'll ask you again. Do you
9 believe that the American people should have available or
10 have access to those opinions that are the legal basis for
11 the administration carrying out the strikes?

12 General Donovan: Senator, the Department has kept the
13 information release authority. I'm just carrying out the
14 assigned tasks.

15 Senator Blumenthal: Thank you. My time has expired.
16 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

17 Chairman Wicker: Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
18 Senator Ernst.

19 Senator Ernst: Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you,
20 gentlemen, and your teams as well for your exceptional
21 service to our Nation.

22 General Guillot, I'll start with you, sir. I want to
23 start by highlighting the 185th Air Refueling Wing in Sioux
24 City, Iowa, which plays a critical role in supporting both
25 global operations and homeland defense missions. Our airmen



1 are operating the KC-135 tankers and they do an exceptional
2 job. That mission provides essential air refueling, which
3 enables everything from strategic bomber operations to
4 fighter alert missions and rapid response here at home.
5 This capability is essential to projecting power abroad
6 while also supporting NORTHCOM homeland defense function.

7 Ensuring the Sioux City runway renovations are
8 completed is critical to sustaining this tanker mission and
9 maintaining the Air National Guard's ability to support
10 combatant command operations overseas and contingency
11 response in the United States. So, sir, can you speak to
12 the operational importance of maintaining strong aerial
13 refueling capabilities in the Nation's interior, and how
14 critical it is to maintain infrastructure like the Sioux
15 City runway to ensure those missions continue to support
16 both homeland defense and global force projection?

17 General Guillot: Yes, Senator, I absolutely can. But
18 first, I'd say you mentioned the Air National Guard. The
19 National Guard as a whole, and the success of the NORAD and
20 NORTHCOM mission starts and stops with our relationship with
21 the Air National Guard and the National Guard to include
22 that of Iowa. Regarding refuelers, that's our lifeline. We
23 rely on some very incredible and incredibly capable fighter
24 aircraft, but the range and duration, is limited, especially
25 when you're defending a vast homeland like the United



1 States.

2 And so, with every launch of an alert fighter that
3 seems to get more attention, there's a launch of 1 or 2
4 tankers to make sure that they can stay on station and
5 flexible and mobile to meet the threat wherever it is. We
6 could not do our job without the air refueling tankers.

7 Senator Ernst: Thank you. I appreciate that. And
8 with that, I'm going to yield back my time, Mr. Chair.

9 Chairman Wicker: Thank you. Thank you very much. We
10 now have Senator Hirono.

11 Senator Hirono: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

12 So, the picture that is being painted with regard to
13 our ability to engage in any kind of an operation in Cuba,
14 the picture that is being painted in spite of assurances
15 that there are no ongoing preparations to do anything,
16 particularly militarily, but the picture I have is -- that
17 I'm getting is that it would not take very long for us to be
18 able to respond in some fashion. If the President said we
19 are going to go and we should seize Cuba, wouldn't we be
20 able to execute on that in a pretty expeditious way, General
21 Donovan?

22 General Donovan: Senator, since we do not have that
23 plan that -- we have a number of tasks for Cuba, but since
24 we have not -- we're not executing any rehearsals for that
25 plan, the number of forces required. We have general ideas,



1 but the focus right now is purely on securing Guantanamo Bay
2 and the U.S. embassy to protect American personnel. That is
3 the only facts and figures in planning we have underway at
4 this time.

5 Senator Hirono: How long would it take for -- if the
6 President gave an order to seize Cuba, because it's a pretty
7 unstable situation there now. How long would it take for
8 you to be able to execute on that order?

9 General Donovan: Senator, I'd have to go through a
10 planning process with the SOUTHCOM team to determine what
11 are the actual objectives of the operation, to determine
12 what size force would be required. But again, we are
13 currently not executing that plan at this time.

14 Senator Hirono: Well, the picture I'm painting -- and
15 I don't want to get into an argument with you about this,
16 General, but I do think that you're already there and
17 therefore you're paying attention to what's going on there.
18 It doesn't seem as though it would take very long for us to
19 execute any kind of a plan there.

20 Southern Command has previously worked with USAID on
21 humanitarian aid, to Cuba. And now that this aid has been
22 cut, has that not really made your, the humanitarian aspects
23 of what you're doing, with regard to Cuba more difficult?

24 General Donovan: Secretary, as the U.S. State
25 Department is restructured and those elements that were



1 USAID in the past -- actually, I've asked a lot of questions
2 about this because I grew up for 37 years, have operated
3 with state and USAID across the globe. There are other
4 entities that have taken up those roles inside of the State
5 Department, and now we are connected with them on the aid
6 front in many ways similar, both in disaster relief and in
7 planning. So, we have some of the similar capabilities,
8 just not the name, and we are learning how to actually work
9 together in the new structure from the State Department.

10 Senator Hirono: General, based on the questions from a
11 number of the members of this committee, you can see that
12 there are definitely expressed concerns about what might be
13 in the President's mind with regard to Cuba.

14 General, I know you are working closely with General
15 Guetlein -- I don't know if I'm pronouncing that correctly -
16 - on Golden Dome. And as you know, Hawaii is unique for
17 purposes of missile defense with you and Admiral Paparo
18 shaping or sharing responsibilities based on the kind of
19 threat being posed in terms of our need for missile defense.

20 So, General Guetlein previously committed to me that
21 defense of Hawaii will be included as part of the Golden
22 Dome mission missile defense architecture, and I just want
23 to get that kind of commitment from you.

24 General Guillot: Senator, absolutely. The defense of
25 Hawaii from ballistic missiles is a responsibility of U.S.



1 Northern Command. And from the very inception of our
2 planning for Golden Dome with General Guetlein, it has
3 included the ability to protect those islands from ballistic
4 missile defense. And to your comment, ma'am, on the
5 cooperation with Admiral Paparo, since it's a shared
6 defense, of Hawaii, between our two commands, we've combined
7 our main exercises, Northern Edge, and Arctic Edge to ensure
8 that that it is seamless protection.

9 Senator Hirono: Thank you. That's reassuring.

10 General Donovan, in light of what happened with the
11 strike on the school in Iran, there is a concern that we
12 ought to be doing everything we can to mitigate harm to
13 civilians. So, during your confirmation hearing, I raised
14 concerns about reports that SOUTHCOM lacked a functioning
15 mechanism to receive civilian casualty reports, and that
16 SOUTHCOM civilian harm mitigation staff have been cut from
17 four personnel to a single contractor. You had not assumed
18 your responsibility at that point, and I'd like to hear what
19 steps SOUTHCOM has taken to address the issue of mitigating
20 civilian harm in any of your actions.

21 General Donovan: Senator, yes, and I did -- that's one
22 of the first things I did to look at our program for, not
23 only planning, but response to operations. And what I
24 found, as you mentioned, four positions. We had four
25 positions. One I'm paying for out of my own budget to



1 ensure that I do have that capability built as a separate
2 entity, move the other capabilities into our J3 fires and
3 kinetic effects. So, they're part of the planning cell and
4 part of the -- any investigations post.

5 Senator Hirono: I take it that you are increasing your
6 capacity to be able to mitigate civilian harm?

7 General Donovan: Yes, Senator.

8 Senator Hirono: Thank you.

9 Chairman Wicker: Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator
10 King.

11 Senator King: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

12 General Guillot, I want to follow-up a little bit on
13 Senator Shaheen's questions with regard to discussions,
14 consultations, negotiations with Denmark and Greenland with
15 regard to additional security assets in Greenland. Number
16 one, are those discussions taking place? And number two,
17 are they productive? And number three, are you meeting any
18 resistance to establishing additional security assets in
19 Greenland?

20 General Guillot: Senator, we are pursuing with Denmark
21 expansion on the defense areas, which are allowed under the
22 1951 agreement, and, we've --

23 Senator King: The 1951 agreement is quite
24 comprehensive --

25 General Guillot: Yes, sir, it is.



1 Senator King: -- we don't really need a new treaty.

2 General Guillot: It's very comprehensive, and it's
3 frankly very favorable to our operations or potential
4 operations in Greenland. And so, working with the
5 Department of State, we have three areas that we would like
6 to negotiate with Denmark and Greenland to see if we could
7 expand the defense areas from where we are now into these
8 other areas, which would help our homeland defense mission.

9 Senator King: And my final question is, are you
10 meeting any resistance? Are they being cooperative and
11 receptive to these discussions?

12 General Guillot: Senator, very cooperative, with both
13 Greenland and Denmark, and very eager to discuss ways to
14 move forward to improve our defense capabilities.

15 Senator King: Let me expand the vision a little bit to
16 the Arctic. Do we have sufficient assets in the Arctic?
17 I'm worried about, for example, a lack of a port, deepwater
18 port facility, on the Arctic Ocean, whether or not we have -
19 - well, I'm sort of almost laughing because of our lack of
20 icebreakers. We have about one and a half icebreakers. The
21 Russians have 40. What are our gaps in the Arctic in terms
22 of our ability? Because the Russians are building up their
23 assets on the Arctic side very extensively.

24 General Guillot: Senator, our challenges in the Arctic
25 start with what you mentioned, ports and the ability to



1 navigate freely through the harsh conditions of the Arctic,
2 both in maritime, land, and air. So, I'm working, with our
3 department and others to try to develop more ports, more
4 airfields, which leads to more options for our secretary and
5 for the President, should we need them, up in the Arctic.
6 And that is from Alaska, all the way across through Canada
7 and into Greenland.

8 Senator King: Final question on this area. One of
9 your principal responsibilities is sensing, is knowing
10 what's coming: domain awareness. My concern is that a lot
11 of our doctrine and technology, frankly, is geared toward
12 yesterday's threats. We're not going to have time if a
13 hypersonic is coming from somewhere in Siberia or somewhere
14 in the northern Pacific. Are we extending our sensor sense
15 further off the coast of Alaska, for example, so that we
16 have more time to assess the risk and to try to defeat it?
17 It's a big difference between an ICBM when you have 20 or 30
18 minutes and a hypersonic is coming at 100 feet off the water
19 at 6,000 miles an hour. Can we detect that hypersonic right
20 now?

21 General Guillot: Senator, we have the ability to
22 detect the hypersonics now, but I agree with you that we
23 need to get better and see further so we have more decision
24 space, and that would require us to move from one
25 phenomenology into multiple. We have to have space, ground,



1 surface, and undersea capability to detect all of those
2 threats from further away.

3 Senator King: Well, as you know, we're moving into the
4 defense bill season here at this committee. Please let us
5 know what's necessary in that area so that we can be sure
6 that we address it in the in the defense bill that's coming
7 up in several months.

8 General Guillot: Thank you, Senator --

9 Chairman Wicker: Amen.

10 General Guillot: -- I will.

11 Senator King: General Donovan, are the SOUTHCOM
12 countries cooperating on this anti-drug mission? In other
13 words, are the governments, our partners, are they standing
14 aside? Are they corrupted by the cartels? What's the level
15 of cooperation from the other countries in the region?

16 General Donovan: Senator, obviously, on the surface,
17 the recent announcement at our headquarters, the Americas
18 Counter Cartel Coalition, we have 18, you know, signing
19 members that do want to get at these problems that all with
20 different degrees of capabilities, whether that's a
21 functional military, or police capability, or even a legal
22 system that will actually support getting at these problem
23 sets. So, really, that's the goal of the coalition is to
24 determine how best to help each of those partners actually
25 find the way forward to counter in their location. And



1 then, the U.S. would play the role maybe as a synchronizer
2 or bring in the capabilities to enhance their capabilities
3 and each have a different degree.

4 Senator King: But do they have the will? That's the
5 real question. I guess it varies.

6 General Donovan: It varies. But Senator, I've been
7 from that CHOD conference here in D.C. and then ACCC we had
8 in our headquarters of -- I believe they do have the will,
9 and they're looking to follow and really execute operations
10 that could, again, range from local security and improving
11 the lives of their citizens all the way to offensive options
12 if required.

13 Senator King: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
14 have a couple more questions I can follow-up after the next.

15 Chairman Wicker: Yes. Thank you. We will take
16 another round. Senator Slotkin.

17 Senator Slotkin: Thank you. Thanks to both of you for
18 being here.

19 General Guillot, you know, I was in the Homeland
20 Security hearing yesterday for the incoming secretary of
21 homeland security talking about what he would do if asked to
22 put armed ICE agents at polling locations. And so, could
23 you just state for us very clearly, do you believe that it
24 is legal to put uniformed military, active duty, at polling
25 locations or any other parts of the voting process, ballot,



1 you know, centers, for political purposes?

2 General Guillot: Senator, it is strictly illegal to do
3 what you described, putting military at a polling place
4 unless the -- as Senator Reed mentioned, the exception for
5 countering an armed rebellion.

6 Senator Slotkin: Right. There is an exception for
7 countering an armed force, an armed rebellion. We didn't
8 need uniform military at our polls during World War II,
9 after Pearl Harbor, in Korea, during Vietnam, during the
10 riots in the '60s, and after 9/11 when we had been attacked
11 on our soil, and yesterday, the director of national
12 intelligence mentioned in her -- well, mentioned no mention
13 in the worldwide threat briefing of any threats to our
14 elections. So, are you aware of any threats that meet the
15 definition of armed force, you know, countering the United
16 States, that would be -- that would require you to consider
17 deploying to the polls?

18 General Guillot: Senator, I'm not aware of any threats
19 at this time.

20 Senator Slotkin: And if you were asked to move
21 uniformed military into polling locations without any
22 credible threat reporting of an armed force countering the
23 United States, would you send those forces in?

24 General Guillot: Ma'am, I recognize that that's
25 against the law, and I would not follow an unlawful order.



1 Senator Slotkin: Thank you. That hits my ears in an
2 important way since I made a 90 seconds video with Senator
3 Kelly that said uniformed military has a requirement to
4 refuse illegal orders. And because of that, we they
5 attempted to criminally indict us in front of a grand jury
6 for sedition. So, I appreciate the ease with which you say
7 just what should be a very standard thing, and what I know
8 you all learn in sort of basic training.

9 Let me turn to a very different issue, and that's
10 artificial intelligence. You know, there's been a bunch of
11 talk lately about the use of artificial intelligence in
12 military targeting in the kill chain and sort of the
13 decisions on life and death. And there's also been
14 discussion about domestic surveillance, right. Do you agree
15 that it is illegal for the Department of Defense to surveil
16 the American people unless individual Americans have proven
17 a threat to U.S. security?

18 General Guillot: Yes, Senator, that falls under the
19 Intel oversight, and I'm very aware, and we follow all of
20 those rules.

21 Senator Slotkin: Yeah. And I think, you know, the --
22 we never want our military -- you know, we don't want anyone
23 to be questioning that our military is looking at, you know,
24 Americans, as a topic to surveil. So, do you believe that
25 we should have restrictions in place that would just say for



1 everybody, for the AI companies, for any future or current
2 secretary of defense, that you cannot use artificial
3 intelligence for mass surveillance of American citizens?

4 General Guillot: Senator, doing so would violate the
5 Intel oversight rules that I mentioned, and so, I support
6 the rules that are in place.

7 Senator Slotkin: Great. And what about having a human
8 being in the loop on decisions of life and death, you know,
9 of targeting. I think about nuclear weapons, right? Right
10 now, there's no law saying that you couldn't have artificial
11 intelligence and sort of an autonomous system make decisions
12 on the deployment of nuclear weapons. What do you think
13 about having a human being in the decision tree on the use
14 of lethal force?

15 General Guillot: Senator, having a human being on the
16 loop in all decisions, I think, is important. Some more
17 than others, obviously, and every use of artificial
18 intelligence that we use in our command does have humans at
19 the appropriate places on the loop to make sure that we are
20 making the right decision with the right information.

21 Senator Slotkin: Yeah. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman,
22 this is an issue that we should, on a bipartisan basis, take
23 up in the committee for this NDAA, because, I think, you
24 know, we shouldn't be leaving decision-making up to any
25 private company or any one secretary of defense or



1 administration. We need to do our job and put some rules of
2 the road in place. So, look forward to discussing that in
3 this year's NDAA. Thank you.

4 Chairman Wicker: Senator Budd.

5 Senator Budd: Thank you, Chairman. Thank you all for
6 being here. It's good to see you both.

7 So, General Donovan, in your short time in the seat,
8 how have you seen special operations forces contributing to
9 countering the expanding influence of China, Russia and
10 other adversaries in the Western Hemisphere?

11 General Donovan: Senator. Thank you. The role of
12 special operations forces, I think we all believe that their
13 role is direct action and what we see maybe in the movies.
14 The reality is irregular warfare and irregular warfare
15 options are the strength of special operations forces. So,
16 in SOUTHCOM, when we see those activities by PRC, or Russia,
17 or China, or other actors, it is always the special forces
18 that really set the conditions to determine what comes next.
19 They're very agile, mature, and we can put them in locations
20 where either in a low visibility or an overt capability
21 working with partners directly. They really are best first
22 tool to assess the situation and determine the way ahead.

23 Senator Budd: Thank you for that.

24 Let's talk for a minute about SOFA integration with
25 Ecuador, if you will. So, I saw that Ecuadorian and U.S.



1 military forces completed a successful operation against
2 terrorist organizations on March 3. So, what are some of
3 the success stories of this operation and any lessons
4 learned for the broader region?

5 General Donovan: Senator, hopefully in the closed
6 session I can provide additional details. But the success
7 is that from a phone call between President Noboa and
8 President Trump to moving forces very quickly to partner
9 with our Ecuadorian forces. It was very short timeline.
10 Now, that was based on years investment over time of
11 Ecuadorian partnership at different types of training
12 events, but the fact that the special operations forces,
13 including both ground forces and air forces, could quickly
14 plan with the Ecuadorians to ensure that any use of force
15 fell within our requirements. Very impressed on how, again,
16 the Ecuadorians operated on both those operations and in a
17 short period of time. Very professional planning, and I
18 took part in observing both and I thought very professional
19 execution.

20 Senator Budd: General, what's your assessment on their
21 willingness in Ecuador and their capability to take a
22 greater role in contributing to regional security there?
23 And then what are some other countries in SOUTHCOM that are
24 also leading the way?

25 General Donovan: I would say Ecuador is a primary



1 focus. We just recently established a center in Ecuador, a
2 fusion cell, and with the Ecuadorian Ministry of Defense,
3 because they're leading the way. Very similar to the fusion
4 cell we have in Colombia, the one that's in Mexico City
5 right now. There's different fusion cells in the region.

6 The other nation that is really -- is stepping forward
7 is Paraguay. Recently signed a SOFA agreement with the
8 United States, which is Status of Forces Agreement, which
9 allows us to operate much more closely together. And
10 there's some great opportunities there with air domain
11 awareness. We have an FMS sales of radars coming down to
12 increase the air domain awareness. So, Paraguay is another
13 recent kind of leader.

14 But I will tell you, the Americas Counter Coalition,
15 that is Counter Cartel Coalition with 18 members right now,
16 all seem to have different degrees of desire to move forward
17 very quickly. So, we have a number of partners moving
18 forward at this time.

19 Senator Budd: I appreciate that.

20 General Guillot, it's good to see you. I saw that
21 NORTHCOM and NORAD just wrapped up exercise Arctic Edge last
22 week. So, tell us about some of the key lessons learned
23 from the exercise in terms of NORTHCOM's priorities, and are
24 there areas that you need any congressional support with
25 regarding that?



1 General Guillot: Senator, Arctic Edge, this year, I
2 deliberately moved from the "warm" months in Alaska into the
3 harsher conditions to ensure that we had the ability to
4 generate forces and execute in the harshest conditions. And
5 so, we learned some lessons about that. The forces in --
6 that are stationed in Alaska are very good at that, but as
7 we brought forces in from the outside, we see that they need
8 to make sure they have the right equipment, right viscosity
9 of oil in their generators, and the right procedures to
10 operate on the flight line to generate, launch, and receive,
11 and repair aircraft.

12 The operational focus was on cruise missile defense.
13 And so, we brought out some cruise missile replicators that
14 gave us a lot of insights on how we would defend that
15 critical landscape and others from the cruise missile
16 threat. So, it's a very, very, profitable, exercise for us.
17 What did we learn? Fourth-generation fighter aircraft, such
18 as the ones that we have in Alaska are very important.

19 And with the cruise missile threat, having aircraft
20 like the F-15E or the F-15EX, which has longer range, longer
21 duration, and more missiles on board to defeat that threat
22 would be critical in the future.

23 Senator Budd. Just quickly -- thank you, General.

24 So, I saw that Arctic Edge also was trilateral with
25 Canadians and the Danes. Why is Greenland important for our



1 national security, and what was cooperation with the Danes
2 like?

3 General Guillot: Senator, very briefly, it's because
4 we spent a lot of time looking at our 10 o'clock approach
5 through Alaska and our 12 o'clock approach through Canada,
6 having full cooperation on the 2 o'clock approach, through
7 Greenland with Denmark is essential. The cooperation and
8 the participation by the Danes in special operations as well
9 as in fighters was outstanding.

10 Senator Budd. Thank you.

11 Chairman Wicker: Thank you very much. Senator Kelly.

12 Senator Kelly: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

13 General Donovan, I want to start with Operation
14 Southern Spear and the continued use of maritime strikes.
15 As of March 9, the Joint Task Force Southern Spear has
16 reportedly conducted, I think, about 45 boat strikes,
17 resulting in the deaths of approximately 156 people. That's
18 a significant number of strikes and casualties in what is
19 fundamentally a counter-trafficking mission, not a
20 traditional armed conflict. These operations raise serious
21 concerns and questions about effectiveness and a strategic
22 outcome.

23 I want to understand the strategic rationale here.
24 These repeated boat strikes suggest a tactical approach that
25 may be generating headlines, but it's far less clear that



1 they're producing durable security outcomes. To me, this
2 operation looks like a cycle of reactive strikes with
3 limited long-term impact. So, General, what evidence do you
4 have that this campaign is actually degrading cartel
5 operations rather than simply destroying some low-level
6 assets, boats, and killing some people and displacing some
7 trafficking routes?

8 General Donovan: Senator, in the last 43 days, I've
9 looked directly at that provide. I couldn't provide you,
10 say, measures of effectiveness of the current effort, but I
11 will share with you that what I've seen, the reports I've
12 read, talking to partner nations. Primarily, partner
13 nations that I've talked to had this exact same
14 conversation. We've seen changes in the narco traffickers'
15 patterns. In a closed setting, I'd like to provide some
16 more details specifically on that, but I will --

17 Looking forward, Senator, the boat strikes aren't the
18 answer. What we're moving for now is a -- might be an
19 extension of Southern Spear, but really a counter-cartel
20 campaign process that puts total systemic friction across
21 this network, the number of networks. We know there's a
22 number of cartels involved on four or five different land
23 and sea routes, but putting total systemic friction from
24 point of production to point of delivery, which would be in
25 the plazas. Putting that together, I believe, actually

1 kinetic strikes will be one of the many tools and probably
2 not the most effective tool when we actually look at it as
3 more of a campaign approach.

4 Senator Kelly: Yeah, I agree. You said it's not the
5 answer. It's not an effective tool. And it's hard to find
6 a measure of effectiveness here. I get the systemic
7 friction thing, but consider for a second, General, we moved
8 a battle group halfway across the planet to do this and then
9 had to move it back for the war in Iran. So, I am, you
10 know, concerned about a strategic goal here and having the
11 intended effect of reducing the inflow of drugs into our
12 country, especially when you consider that the thing where
13 the most significant downside for the American people is
14 fentanyl and that mostly comes through the southern borders,
15 the land borders.

16 And if we would put those kind of resources, when you
17 think about what it takes to have a battle group there on
18 station, multiple ships burning a lot of fuel crew members,
19 and if you put that kind of resource towards dealing with
20 the fentanyl problem at the ports of entry, I think that
21 would have a greater, strategic impact on the overall
22 problem. I got about a minute and 15 left.

23 General Guillot, in your written testimony, you stated
24 that Iran's military capability has been severely degraded
25 by the strikes executed during Midnight Hammer and Epic



1 Fury, but that Iran seems to retain some capacity to direct
2 reprisal attacks on the homeland through asymmetric means.

3 So, how has the war in Iran altered the overall threat
4 landscape to the homeland, specifically as a degradation of
5 Iran's conventional warfare systems, increased the
6 likelihood of harder-to-detect asymmetric attacks like cyber
7 and the potential for homegrown violent extremists?

8 General Guillot: Senator, approaching the beginning of
9 the operations, I was concerned about cyberattacks and
10 espionage. I was worried about terrorism and lethal plots,
11 and I was also very concerned about the missile capabilities
12 where they have a space launch vehicle with the capability,
13 and range, and throw weight that could be turned into an
14 ICBM and threaten us.

15 Certainly, the cyberattacks and the terrorism and
16 lethal plot concerns remain. And I'm very hopeful that the
17 strikes by CENTCOM will negate the ballistic missile threat,
18 but we'll wait for the debrief to see if that's actually
19 happened, but I'm very confident it will be.

20 Senator Kelly: All right. Let's follow-up on this in
21 the SCIF after this hearing.

22 General Guillot: Yes, sir.

23 Senator Kelly: All right. Thank you.

24 Chairman Wicker: Very good. And Senator Scott.

25 Senator Scott: Thank you, Chairman. Well, first of



1 all, thanks, both of you for being here. Thanks for all the
2 men and women that served for both of you.

3 My question today are going to be for General Donovan.
4 As you know, my State has a large Venezuelan American
5 population, many of whom came here seeking freedom after
6 witnessing the evils of Chavez, and Maduro, and his thugs
7 firsthand. It's clear to everyone that Operation Absolute
8 Resolve was a success, thanks to our warfighters and the
9 decisive leadership of the President and secretary of war.
10 Today, Maduro and his thugs are no longer wreaking havoc in
11 our hemisphere and putting American lives at risk by sending
12 deadly drugs into our country.

13 While I know you could spend a lot of time outlining
14 just how crucial every person unit's contribution was to
15 Operation Success, could you specifically talk about the
16 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, and what they did, and their
17 success?

18 General Donovan: Senator. Thank you. When I talk
19 about the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, you have to also
20 talk about the amphibious ready group that they ride on,
21 because that team is an incredible, you know, synchronized
22 joint force that is still on task today at 12 nautical miles
23 off the coast of Venezuela.

24 This was key in the visit. I think I told you,
25 Senator, I traveled to Caracas to meet with that government



1 and our amazing charge d'Affaires there. Their safety and
2 security is based on that amphibious platform, those
3 Marines, and Sailors 12 nautical miles off the coast with
4 that quick reaction force, but also with a roll two plus
5 surgical suite, four OARs, operating tables ready to
6 respond. That's the only capital we have in the entire
7 region until we get back to GITMO, where we have a naval
8 base hospital that doesn't have similar surgical
9 capabilities. So, that the Marine Expeditionary unit.

10 And then I will tell you with a bit of pride, just on
11 about 4 days ago, we got our first picture of the flag being
12 raised over the embassy. And when we recognized it as a
13 U.S. embassy again, and those Marines and SOF teammates
14 around the flag with their ambassador, with their diplomat,
15 the CDA, putting that flag up, that's what the MEU continues
16 to do today.

17 Senator Scott: Moving forward, how do you assess the
18 importance of maintaining a continuous amphibious readiness
19 group presence in SOUTHCOM?

20 General Donovan: As we look at all centered, all the
21 capabilities that were brought to SOUTHCOM for Operation
22 Absolute Resolve and other activities, the carrier strike
23 group that we mentioned before with Senator Kelly,
24 incredible capabilities. But there's a whole joint force
25 from very clandestine, low observable aircraft to a high-end



1 destroyer system, aegis class cruisers. The reality is the
2 ARG/MEU itself, sustaining that capability in SOUTHCOM is
3 important because alone by itself as it operates as a three-
4 ship group, I call it the Swiss Army knife of the joint
5 force. It can do just about everything.

6 And as far as the economy of force, it can deliver
7 relief supplies or can deliver akinetic strike if it had to.
8 It's the most effective tool we have. The reality is we
9 don't have enough. And that's just -- that's a challenge
10 that we -- in the '90s, we had what was called heel to toe
11 army deployments, when one went out, one came back. We've
12 dropped our numbers of available ships, and so we can't do
13 that. We are looking at alternatives that we want to use
14 other platforms like the littoral combat ship and maybe the
15 expeditionary support base, other combinations that would be
16 less than what an army brings to SOUTHCOM.

17 Senator Scott: What are the risks that you'll
18 encounter if you don't have the assets?

19 General Donovan: If we don't have those assets, and I
20 think about a really -- I think my most important role is to
21 obviously achieve the mission, but take care of our Joint
22 Force team members. If we don't have that surgical suite,
23 if we don't have the long-range flights for whether it's a
24 kinetic strike or a logistics transport, we just can't
25 operate. It goes back to also looking at our bases in the



1 region that hadn't received a whole lot of upkeep over the
2 last decades. And whether that's, again, reopening and
3 occupy, taking part in operations in Puerto Rico, and the
4 Puerto Rican government has been amazing. The Puerto Rican
5 National Guard has been the backbone of a lot of operations.

6 But are we going to stay if we are we going to invest
7 the same thing in Guantanamo Bay and other locations like
8 Honduras? Great relationships, great support. But are we
9 up to speed to be able to operate without those key, heavier
10 assets, and that's what we're looking at right now, Senator.

11 Senator Scott: Can you talk about the importance of
12 Homestead Air Force Base?

13 General Donovan: We believe Homestead -- I believe
14 it's key location, especially for high wing. If we have big
15 wing autonomous, ISR-type platforms specifically as we look
16 at really bringing that machine-human teaming with what we
17 could launch there and sustain over, especially the
18 Caribbean, would be key to any of our plans to really
19 develop almost an autonomous maritime domain awareness and
20 really go seabed to space. But I think Homestead plays a
21 key role in that.

22 Senator Scott: Thanks, both of you and the people you
23 work with.

24 Chairman Wicker: Thank you. Senator Gillibrand.

25 Senator Gillibrand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.



1 I still have grave concerns about how the targeting was
2 done, how the choice of the first Iran attack that hit a
3 girl's school took place, and we need to have a bipartisan
4 hearing, discussion, and legislation about the use of AI,
5 whether it's used, when it's used, how it's used. We don't
6 have any details about that strike, whether AI was used in
7 targeting. We obviously need to know that, but I'd like to
8 learn from both of you, and I know that Senator Slotkin
9 covered this and you said that currently no AI is being used
10 for domestic surveillance. And you said that AI is not
11 being used in decision-making for a kinetic attack.

12 So, I'd like to have a commitment from you that you
13 will not use AI for decision-making and making the final
14 decision about whether to attack a location, to strike a
15 location, and use lethal force. And second, I want a
16 commitment from both of you that you will not be using AI
17 for any domestic surveillance in your AORs.

18 General Guillot: Senator, to the first, I will make
19 all decisions at my authority, or it will be to someone who
20 is legally delegated the authority. It will be a human.
21 And then, we will not use -- we will not surveil U.S.
22 citizens.

23 Senator Gillibrand: General Donovan?

24 General Donovan: Senator, we will not surveil U.S.
25 citizens. And as you as you were speaking, Senator, we were

1 involved in a process last night, the targeting process.
2 There were only humans involved. The data was helping us
3 make decisions. And in a closed setting, I'd like to share
4 with you watching these young Americans make really hard
5 decisions. They made the right decisions in the end.

6 Senator Gillibrand: I'm aware that our service members
7 are trained to the highest standards for targeting in
8 warfare. I know that our service members follow the law of
9 war. I understand they follow all the Geneva Conventions,
10 and I have great faith that they will continue to do so.

11 I'm deeply concerned with General -- with Secretary
12 Hegseth's decision-making with regard to undermining the
13 personnel and department whose job is to protect civilians
14 and to assure compliance with those laws of war. I'm deeply
15 concerned about Secretary Hegseth's rhetoric, saying that we
16 need a lethal force and we don't need these types of
17 protections. I'm deeply concerned about his firing of
18 senior counsel and JAGs throughout the services. Those are
19 some of the best trained men and women.

20 We have to make sure our warfighters have the tools,
21 advice, and guidance that you need to fight wars consistent
22 with America's values. So, I'm deeply concerned how those
23 protections will be eroded, and so, I'd like your commitment
24 that those protections will not be eroded under your
25 command.



1 General Guillot: Senator, they will not be eroded.
2 And just to illustrate, the JAG in our command is integrated
3 into all of our activities, and is, in fact, sitting behind
4 me right now.

5 Senator Gillibrand: Thank you, General. General
6 Donovan?

7 General Donovan: Very similar, Senator. They will not
8 be eroded in U.S. Southern Command.

9 Senator Gillibrand: Thank you.

10 I'd like to turn to the issue of UASs. When we had Mr.
11 Ditlevson here, I asked him about the requirements the DOD
12 pushes down to DHS when it allows DHS to use DOD counter-UAS
13 systems, and whether that included requirements for
14 coordination with relevant agencies. He said that the
15 policy defers to NORTHCOM on this question.

16 So, General Guillot, I'd like you to talk to us a
17 little bit about what requirements, including for
18 interagency coordination do you pass down to DHS in order
19 for them to take possession of the systems. And I ask this
20 in the context of the recent drone incursion over one of our
21 military bases that was just reported on today.

22 General Guillot: Senator, when the counter-UAS laser
23 system was temporarily transferred from our department to
24 DHS, JTF-Southern Border, which is the organization that was
25 operating the laser, told DHS that it was -- they would do



1 the training, but any coordination must be through their
2 department because it's operating under 124N, which is code
3 that we do not have experience with or understand. We
4 operated under 130I. But bigger than that, we understand
5 that there has to be massive coordination. And I think that
6 our coordination with FAA, with DHS, and with others, was
7 strong before, but this highlighted an area that required
8 recruitment and we have addressed those since then.

9 Senator Gillibrand: Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
10 Chairman.

11 Chairman Wicker: Thank you. Senator Cramer.

12 Senator Cramer: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
13 Generals, both, for being here for your service, and
14 certainly to the men and women under your command. Thank
15 you-all.

16 I want to follow-up a little bit on the counter-UAS
17 topic, that began with Senator Shaheen and a little bit now
18 with Senator Gillibrand and talked to you, General Guillot.
19 You know, first of all, let me ask a question, I guess this
20 also came up under Senator Shaheen with regard to Canada,
21 and their involvement, and their role, and their
22 partnership.

23 And I agree with everything that she asked and
24 everything you said, but one question that I've been
25 thinking a lot about is, one of the encouraging things in



1 the new administration in Canada, I think, and I've met the
2 Prime Minister on a couple of occasions, is their commitment
3 to put more of their own resources into their own defense,
4 and he made the 2 percent pledge. But we've, you know --
5 we've gotten kind of used to pledges that aren't fulfilled
6 by certain countries. Is there evidence, pretty solid
7 evidence, that they're acting on that commitment to get to 2
8 percent or greater in their defense budget?

9 General Guillot: Senator, like in our system, you
10 know, it takes a while for the procurement and the
11 employment --

12 Senator Cramer: Yeah.

13 General Guillot: -- but everything I'm seeing at my
14 level is full commitment. To include, exchanges with our F-
15 35 based at Eielson, where we're bringing their pilots and
16 maintainers in to learn how to operate fifth-generation in
17 the Arctic air defense radar and satellite discussions. So,
18 everything I'm seeing at NORAD is full commitment and full
19 eagerness to expand.

20 Senator Cramer: I appreciate that validation. It's my
21 observation as well, but I don't see it as closely as you
22 do. So, that's very encouraging. So, thank you for that,
23 and I think it's important for us all to take note of that
24 that commitment.

25 So, with regard to the unauthorized incursions of UAS



1 into -- particularly over our bases and the use of counter-
2 UAS, one of the things to address that threat in my part of
3 the world is, of course, that the ACC has named Grand Forks
4 Air Force Base as a point defense battle lab. In fact, I
5 think I'm going out there in a couple of weeks to cut a
6 ribbon on that.

7 And the whole PDB, is a designated organization to
8 assume that, you know, the tactical, the experimental,
9 training, you know, just helping us, but to better inform
10 policy as well as decisions on the spot. But I'd also just
11 add to that, that Colonel Rosales is at that 319th, the
12 Reconnaissance Wing, at Grand Forks, really is well postured
13 and enabled to leverage industry contacts over at Grand Sky,
14 which is an enhanced use lease UAS park with big, and small,
15 and innovative industries.

16 Maybe you could just elaborate a little bit on the role
17 of all the above. It seems to me this is not just an all-
18 of-government or an all-of-joint force, but in all-of-
19 innovation challenge that needs to be dealt with. Maybe you
20 could give me, you know, your take on how you see it all
21 coming together.

22 General Guillot: Yeah. Senator, it's certainly a
23 mission that has expanded greatly over the last couple of
24 years. Our command was named the department synchronizer
25 with not only within our department, but within the



1 interagency. And then they also established JIATF 401,
2 which has been a fantastic organization commanded by,
3 General Matt Ross --

4 Senator Cramer: Yes.

5 General Guillot: -- who has done a great job of
6 getting with industry and bringing in a lot of the
7 legislative requirements that combatant command is not
8 equipped to address.

9 So, teaming with them, and installations such as Grand
10 Forks, we see -- and also, sir, with the -- with this body,
11 your committee helped us last year with four authorities
12 that we needed to ensure that we could effectively employ
13 UAS to defend installations. And one of those was to allow
14 us to exchange information with local and state
15 capabilities, with our department's capabilities on the
16 base. And that has since been addressed. And I think it's
17 just going to get stronger and stronger and more necessary
18 to tie instead of single point counter-UAS capabilities into
19 a network that extends beyond bases and into cities and
20 communities.

21 Senator Cramer: And does higher education play plays
22 some role in some of the institutions that have those kinds
23 of capabilities, research capabilities?

24 General Guillot: I'm sorry, can you say --

25 Senator Cramer: Higher education?



1 General Guillot: Absolutely. We work with the
2 University of Arizona, University of Texas, El Paso, and
3 many others that have great systems that use common, off the
4 shelf capabilities that we can spread very quickly.

5 Senator Cramer: Thank you very much.

6 General Guillot: Thank you, Senator.

7 Senator Cramer: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

8 Chairman Wicker: Thank you, Senator Cramer. Senator
9 Kaine.

10 Senator Kaine: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

11 And General Donovan, the National Defense Strategy
12 lists the Western Hemisphere as the most important region
13 for national security, and I actually am very supportive of
14 that recognition. I have some real concerns about the
15 legality of the boat strikes in international waters and the
16 legality of the Venezuela operation.

17 And as you and I have talked before, I also worry about
18 a U.S. posture that suggests that the attitude toward the
19 region should be a kind of updating of the Monroe Doctrine
20 because having lived in Latin America, that really lands
21 badly in Latin America. It suggests the U.S. will be a
22 dominator rather than a partner, and what nations want is a
23 partner, not a dominator.

24 But still, I think the escalation of the priority of
25 the Western Hemisphere makes a lot of sense in your



1 discussion of things like this counter-cartel consortium
2 that you're putting together. I mean, that's the kind of
3 thing I think we should do more of. But here's a challenge,
4 every year, the SOUTHCOM posture hearing involves the COCOM
5 saying they're under resourced to do the more modest mission
6 we've been expecting of them. And now, the NDS suggests
7 that the mission will become even more important.

8 I think Senator Cotton, when I was at another hearing,
9 asked you some resource questions. Let me ask a different
10 question, which is about sort of the structure of the
11 SOUTHCOM HQ and operation. Do you have the current
12 structure that you need to take on effectively this mission
13 of increasing importance?

14 General Donovan: Senator, thank you. No, we do not,
15 and in 43 days, it really is the strength. I knew it all
16 along the strength of SOUTHCOM is that partnership and the
17 relationships throughout the region. I found out a couple
18 of things that right now, currently, because of over the
19 years, maybe how SOUTHCOM is viewed. It's been some people
20 say economy of force. Whatever it was, we ended up with a
21 one-third military, one-third government service, one-third
22 contractor headquarters. It's not sustainable.

23 And so, I think it's almost like a two-layer cake now,
24 Senator. The base layer of security cooperation, we do some
25 great things, and that is really the strength that enables



1 everything else to be that that next level. And we call it
2 the kind of hemispheric approach to be able to partner
3 better with NORTHCOM. That that layer of the cake is not
4 even existent. And so that's what we're working on right
5 now. We want to make the base layer strong to do what it
6 needs to do, but find the right balance of people, the right
7 talent to be able to actually function as a geographic
8 command and not at the tactical level. We have elements
9 that can do this, but actually the adjacent to be that good
10 partner with the partners in the region.

11 And then, also, how do we actually, I would say,
12 compete for resources on an equal level to other geographic
13 combatant commands. What I have found, though, is that
14 right now, the budget resources comes from an executive
15 agent, which is the United States Army, because we live on
16 an Army compound. So, it's an interesting look at this, is
17 that do I expect the Army then to fund campaigning in South
18 America? They're not structured to do so. There's a
19 mismatch here, Senator.

20 Senator Kaine: Well, you're 43 days in, so you're not
21 at the end of this analysis and decision about what the
22 right structure would be. But, obviously, we want to be in
23 dialogue with you so that the committee can do the right
24 thing to elevate the importance of SOUTHCOM to where it
25 needs to be given the NDS.



1 A question about the boat strikes. I have reviewed the
2 -- all the material available to Congress on each of the
3 strikes current through last week, so there might have been
4 one or two that I haven't looked at, and I would encourage
5 my colleagues to do the same. The last time, though, that I
6 got briefed about the targeting criteria, which was a
7 classified briefing, was in December. Do you know whether
8 the targeting criteria with respect to the boat strikes in
9 international waters have changed or not since December?

10 General Donovan: Senator, I do not believe it's
11 changed. It hasn't changed since I took over, but I haven't
12 seen any changes since. We're still using the same process
13 of reasonable certainty -- reasonable certainty, near
14 certainty to make the final decision.

15 Senator Kaine: Right. Well, I don't want to get into
16 this more in open. I may ask another question in
17 classified.

18 General Guillot, you've been asked some questions. I
19 think the chair asked you about JIATF 401. You were just
20 engaging with Senator Gillibrand on UAS issues, and we had a
21 really good discussion about it. I think the JIATF 401,
22 Matt Ross, I think it's now sort of in a good place that's
23 giving the committee some confidence about it. However, the
24 confidence that I have is about the aerial concern. I'm
25 starting to get more and more worried about surface and

1 marine uncrewed weapon systems that could do damage to
2 ships, and port, and other assets that we have.

3 Talk a little bit about from the NORTHCOM space. What
4 are you doing to make sure that we're really appropriately
5 assessing and guarding against other uncrewed systems other
6 than the aerial systems?

7 General Guillot: Senator, I share your concern, and I
8 think General Ross would tell you that we look at unmanned
9 systems as opposed to aerial more and more frequently. I
10 really would like to learn from Admiral Cooper and CENTCOM
11 and some of the work that he has done in his present
12 position, but also in a previous position when he was the
13 Fifth Fleet commander there where he used unmanned detection
14 systems and defensive systems in and around ports there in
15 the Middle East. So, I think you'll see that as becoming an
16 increasing focus of ours to the point where sometimes you
17 don't see UAS anymore you just talk about unmanned systems.

18 Senator Kaine: Yeah. Thanks so much. I yield back.

19 Chairman Wicker: And thank you very much. Senator
20 Banks.

21 Senator Banks: General Guillot, Can you talk more
22 about what we want in Greenland? You know, as I understand
23 it, the agreement is that -- the unofficial agreement is
24 that we would have more troop presence, more bases, Golden
25 Dome present -- presence there, and then kick the Chinese



1 out. I mean, is that is that accurate? What more do we
2 want?

3 General Guillot: From my perspective at NORAD and
4 NORTHCOM, Senator, what I want is the resources and the
5 force projection capability along that avenue of approach to
6 North America, which, you know, through the Arctic is our
7 most the shortest route. So, therefore, in many ways, our
8 most vulnerable route. We're very well established in
9 Canada and Alaska, and having more capability along what I
10 call the 2 o'clock approach would be key.

11 Space systems to enable Golden Dome, the ability to
12 launch fighters and tankers, to be the first line of defense
13 against cruise missiles that could be launched from the
14 Arctic, and then also having SOF and ports for SOF presence
15 and then for regular activity, and then port presence for
16 our Navy, which also gives us Golden Dome and ballistic
17 missile defense capability.

18 Senator Banks: Can you give us some context, though,
19 on what we have now and what this agreement that President
20 Trump is negotiating would allow us to do that we can't do
21 currently?

22 General Guillot: Yes, Senator. What we have now is
23 access to Pituffik Air Base which is at the northern part of
24 Greenland, which gives us some of the fighter and tanker
25 capability and a lot of space capability, but we don't have



1 a permanent presence for the SOF, and then we don't have a
2 permanent presence for some of the maritime capabilities
3 that that I need, and that's what we're working with Denmark
4 to get more access to.

5 Senator Banks: It sounds like Denmark and Greenland
6 are willing to give us that.

7 General Guillot: They've been very supportive
8 partners.

9 Senator Banks: There's been a lot of noise about this,
10 a lot of politics about Greenland, but it sounds like these
11 negotiations are productive and could lead to a place that
12 would leave America better off.

13 General Guillot: Yes, sir. They're very productive,
14 and the need there is very real.

15 Senator Banks: Thank you.

16 General Donovan, can you talk more about -- Senator
17 Kaine was talking about the -- some of us would call the
18 Trump corollary -- to the Monroe Doctrine and what that
19 means in the national security strategy. And specifically,
20 I'm curious, what does that mean to Cuba? I mean, what
21 would happen if the Chinese were kicked out of Cuba? Would
22 that be -- would we be better off for that? Is that an
23 accurate way to interpret the Trump corollary.

24 General Donovan: Senator, I'm not tracking a heavy
25 presence of China in Cuba at this time. Our focus remains



1 on our core tasks of protecting the embassy and our
2 operations in GITMO. So, I'm not tracking specifically
3 about China unless you have some of the smaller, maybe Intel
4 collection-type capabilities that we believe are there. But
5 that's all I'm tracking this time.

6 Senator Banks: Have there been public reports that
7 there are Chinese intelligence facilities in Cuba?

8 General Donovan: Yes, there have been reports of that.
9 And again, the collection --

10 Senator Banks: And the Department's 2025 China
11 Military Power Report indicates that China has likely
12 considered military basing, at least considered it in Cuba.

13 General Donovan: Yes, Senator, as you mentioned, the
14 bigger concern is the collection capability that close to
15 U.S. shores. That's my biggest concern. Not very robust,
16 but still there.

17 Senator Banks: So, what does -- so unpack for us what
18 the national security strategy means then vis-a-vis Cuba.

19 General Donovan: With a focus on the Western
20 Hemisphere, the reality is, do we -- we have to ensure that
21 those maligned actors, whether it's China, or Russia, or
22 Iran, anywhere in South America, how are we countering them
23 from different degrees of capabilities you bring? I think
24 most of those would be economic and most of them would be
25 partnerships to enable our partners to identify the threat.



1 That's why maritime domain awareness becomes a big piece for
2 us so that our partners can see over the horizon, whether
3 that's seeing drug traffickers or seeing illicit PRC Chinese
4 fishing fleets so they can actually make better decisions,
5 and we're there as a better partner.

6 Senator Banks: Would you say the National Security
7 Strategy is a warning to China not to not to think about it,
8 stay away or we'll do something about it?

9 General Donovan: Absolutely.

10 Senator Banks: Good. I like that.

11 China's nuclear power-guided missile submarines
12 threaten the U.S. homeland. How important is it that we
13 detect those Chinese submarines before they enter U.S.
14 waters?

15 General Guillot: Senator, it's of the highest
16 importance, and I have asked for -- and the Navy is
17 certainly supportive of increased undersea detection
18 capability in both the Atlantic and the Pacific to ensure
19 that we detect threats to our continent further and further
20 away.

21 Senator Banks: Thank you. I yield back.

22 Chairman Wicker: Thank you. Senator Peters.

23 Senator Peters: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

24 General Guillot, the war with Iran has already led to
25 state-sponsored cyberattacks here in the United States. In



1 fact, pro-Iranian hackers attacked a Michigan-based medical
2 device company just recently, as I'm sure you're well aware
3 of. But in addition to cyberattacks, I think it's --
4 certainly, it's not unreasonable to assume that Iran is also
5 working hard to initiate attacks here in the homeland, as
6 well. Obviously, your command NORTHCOM plays a critical
7 role in deterring and preventing these kinds of kinetic and
8 cyberattacks through your defensive operations,
9 intelligence-sharing, and integration with Cyber Command.
10 But I just want to get your sense generally, given the
11 setting that we're in right now, but generally, how do you
12 assess this risk?

13 General Guillot: Senator, I think you described it
14 very well, or I share the description that you gave is that
15 there's cyber capability is real and it is significant. And
16 they have the ability to find what they think are the
17 weakest, points in our cyber defense, which unfortunately
18 are some of the critical infrastructures that we have across
19 the U.S., and I think that they're vulnerable to remain
20 vulnerable to Iranian attacks.

21 Senator Peters: So, we have CISA and other groups
22 associated with Homeland Security and others, your
23 relationship with them. I know you do cooperate on a
24 regular basis, but we've also seen that about a third of the
25 cyber professionals at CISA were basically removed from the



1 Department, kicked out, or took RIFs, and they are not able
2 to do what they were able to do in the past. Are you
3 backfilling that, or do we have actually an enhanced cyber
4 vulnerability now?

5 General Guillot: Sir, I don't think that we have an
6 enhanced vulnerability right now, but it does take strong
7 cooperation between our command, Cyber Command, the FBI, and
8 CISA, to ensure that we share information on potential
9 attacks and ensure that we're covered to the best degree
10 possible.

11 Senator Peters: But your command is on heightened
12 alert for all of these.

13 General Guillot: Absolutely. Yes, sir.

14 Senator Peters: Good.

15 There's been some discussion about Greenland by some of
16 my colleagues. I was on a recent trip up there and we were
17 at Pituffik, which is an incredible facility. Completely
18 dark when I was there, about 750 miles north of the Arctic
19 Circle, but clearly an important strategic position for us
20 there. A couple of things related to that trip. When we
21 were there, the folks in Greenland were incredibly angry,
22 that the United States, the rhetoric coming from this
23 administration was that they were either going to be
24 purchased, which they were pretty clear to tell us that they
25 cannot be bought or they were going to have a military



1 invasion.

2 In fact, when I was there, they talked about a power
3 outage that they had in Nuuk, in the capital city there, and
4 everybody was in fear that this meant the Americans were
5 invading. Children were highly distressed, they didn't go
6 to school. Which is pretty outrageous that an ally believes
7 that when power goes out, that means U.S. troops are
8 invading. It's a pretty horrible situation that we're in
9 right now. Some of the comments that I heard from people
10 were highly emotional and felt betrayed by the United
11 States.

12 So, tell me, what are you doing and your command to try
13 to work with our ally and get past what was a pretty
14 horrible situation for them? But, you know, I've often
15 found that, I think, it's true in life, if you breach
16 someone's trust, it takes a lot of work to get that trust
17 back. How are you going to get -- how are we -- are you in
18 particular with your command, because I know you care a lot
19 about Greenland. How are we going to regain this trust?

20 General Guillot: Senator, I try to maintain the trust
21 that we've established with both Greenland through our
22 military operations and with our partners in Denmark by
23 being open, and transparent, and seeking new and improved
24 ways to partner together. And we've done that even since
25 your recent visit, and with Noble Defender, an exercise that



1 had traditionally been only NORAD forces, we partnered with
2 Denmark, for the most recent Noble Defender, and then for
3 our Arctic Edge exercise, also including, Denmark, which is
4 the military presence that Greenland has.

5 So, being open, transparent, and exploring
6 opportunities where we can partner together is where I want
7 to show that we are a valued partner and can be trusted, and
8 I think that we've been very successful in that.

9 Senator Peters: Well, if I may, Mr. Chairman, just
10 briefly, certainly that is good. And what I talked to the
11 military, especially the Danish military, that relationship
12 is still there. That wasn't where the problem was. The
13 problem is with the people who are not part of the military.
14 And I would just hope that as you continue these kinds of
15 efforts, as you just described, that it's actually
16 communicated to the general populace of Greenland, because
17 that's where the -- that's where the trust has been broken
18 and where the work is really going to be necessary.

19 General Guillot: Yes, Senator.

20 Senator Peters: Thank you.

21 Chairman Wicker: Thank you, Senator Peters. Senator
22 Sullivan, thank.

23 Senator Sullivan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And
24 gentlemen, thank you for your service. And to your staff,
25 and team members, thank you as well.



1 General Guillot, I want to appreciate the meeting in my
2 office yesterday. I talk about this chart a lot. By the
3 way, this chart is actually running out of room now. These
4 are all the Russian and Chinese incursions into the Arctic,
5 into the Alaska AOR that you and the INDOPACOM commander are
6 both responsible for. The tempo, as I mentioned, is
7 increasing. We're out of room here. We've had two Russian
8 bear bomber incursions in the last 3 weeks. The last one in
9 our response, which was NORAD, we launched nine assets, two
10 F-16s, two F-35s and AWACS, and I think four or five tankers

11 Now, you know, when these make the news -- they never
12 make the news down here, by the way. In Alaska, they make
13 the news. But you know, we say, oh, the Russians came into
14 our airspace, we intercepted them. But these are highly
15 complex, high-risk missions. Dangerous. Our airmen, guard
16 reserve, active duty, they do a great job. But can you
17 explain a little bit of the danger and complexity? I'll
18 bring up a map here. You know, we're launching from J.
19 Baker or Eielson. I mean, how far are our F-16s and F-35s
20 flying just to intercept the Russians before they cross into
21 our ADIZ?

22 General Guillot: Senator, you're absolutely right.
23 It's the picture of our fighters next to their bombers. You
24 know, looks very harmless and very easy, but especially from
25 Alaska with the distances and the harsh environment, make it



1 very complex when they get the alert to scramble from either
2 Eielson or Elmendorf. They know that they're probably going
3 to have to fly 1,500, 1,600 miles from the nearest suitable
4 concrete to land if they have an emergency.

5 Senator Sullivan: Just to intercept the Russians.

6 General Guillot: Just to intercept them.

7 Senator Sullivan: Just to get -- that's only halfway
8 through the mission, right, 1,500 miles?

9 General Guillot: Yeah. Not even halfway, sir.

10 Because they'll intercept them, then they'll escort them for
11 the duration of their period. Then they have to fly back.
12 So, these missions are often 6 to 8 hours in flight gear
13 that has to accommodate if they eject and survive, and so
14 their --

15 Senator Sullivan: It's 50 below zero in Alaska.

16 General Guillot: That's right. So, their cockpits are
17 comfortable, but they have to wear the gear in case they
18 have to leave the cockpit in an ejection. These are some of
19 the most challenging and really brave missions that we can
20 do.

21 Senator Sullivan: So, I want to commend our Alaska-
22 based military. They're doing a great job. How many tank -
23 - how many tanker top offs would a mission like that entail?

24 General Guillot: If they go to the extent of the
25 Aleutians or up into on the north part of your map there, I



1 would say a minimum of six air refuelings often at night in
2 that cumbersome gear. Which gives me just a second to point
3 out that the tankers and the AWACS are also up there to make
4 sure that that we can complete the mission along with the
5 fighters.

6 Senator Sullivan: So, a couple other quick things.
7 Thank you for that. And again, I want to thank them, our
8 military. So, let's say you're doing an intercept up here,
9 Arctic Ocean, you're in an F-16, you lose an engine in
10 February in the middle of the night. How's that going to
11 play out for that pilot? F-16s have one engine, right?

12 General Guillot: They have their single engine. If
13 they have any engine indications -- hopefully, you know, I
14 know they will be heading back over land. So, if they do
15 have to eject, at least it's over land and not over the
16 water. If the engine is still working, you know, they're
17 1,500 miles or so from the nearest suitable runway at
18 Eielson.

19 Senator Sullivan: Let me ask a kind of combined
20 question. I spoke to the Secretary of the Air Force,
21 General Wilsbach, very recently. The Air Force has
22 committed to meet 10 years ago, 10 years ago, to get more
23 KC-135 up to Eielson for this exact purpose. But other
24 reasons, I think they're working it. But 10 years is long.
25 Hell of a long time to wait for a commitment from the Air



1 Force. I hope we get on it. But we also need more
2 infrastructure, right? We're reopening the Navy base today.
3 We're building out a port in Nome. Finally, we're looking
4 at Dead Horse up here. We're looking at King Salmon down
5 here.

6 Can you talk about both the need for tankers and
7 expanded infrastructure that you're working on that can help
8 make this mission more doable, more safe, and to give the
9 power projection that we need to make sure that when the
10 Russians and Chinese keep doing this, and all indications
11 are they're going to keep doing it, that we have the ability
12 to intercept them.

13 General Guillot: Yes, sir. We need the tankers. And
14 I know the Air Force is working on that. That's the
15 lifeline up there. All of the bases that you pointed out
16 are extremely important for a couple reasons. One is
17 resiliency, safety, as you mentioned, and also, it gives the
18 President and the secretary options. If we do come into
19 conflict, we have more avenues of approach that we can
20 defend or project power from, if necessary.

21 Senator Sullivan: I look forward to continuing to work
22 with you on all these. Thanks for your great service.

23 Chairman Wicker: Thank you. Senator Sullivan, is
24 there objection to putting copies of these two posters in
25 the record? So ordered.



[The information referred to follows:]

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1 Chairman Wicker: Senator Duckworth.

2 Senator Duckworth: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

3 General Guillot, I wish I could ask you about the range
4 of threats from adversaries that I know your team is
5 battling every day, but instead, President Trump has forced
6 us to again grapple with another possible unprecedented
7 domestic misuse of our military. He seems to -- his seeming
8 desire to send troops to polling places. In February,
9 President Trump said, "Republicans ought to nationalize the
10 voting." And in late February, multiple media outlets
11 reported that a draft executive order is being circulated
12 that would use a claim of foreign interference as
13 justification to declare a national emergency around our
14 elections.

15 Let me be clear, sending troops to polling places is
16 illegal unless it is necessary to repel armed enemies of the
17 United States, and we can't forget that U.S. Code also
18 outlaws troops from intimidating any voter from fully
19 exercising the right of suffrage at any general or special
20 election.

21 General, I appreciated that you previously committed
22 before this committee to establish guardrails within your
23 authorities for domestically deployed troops, including by
24 distinguishing between military and Federal agents. If
25 President Trump orders troops to American cities around the

1 midterm elections, what guardrails will you commit to within
2 your authorities to ensure that no voters feel intimidated
3 by the presence of troops?

4 General Guillot: Senator, I very clearly understand
5 the law there and the illegality of putting armed forces
6 there, unless, as you said, there is the exception for the
7 armed rebellion. And so, if given the order, I would look
8 at it very closely, and if it did not meet what I felt were,
9 you know, the legal hurdles, I would consult with my JAG and
10 then I would bring up that concern with the secretary and
11 the chairman to ensure that I could stay on the right side
12 of the law.

13 Senator Duckworth: Thank you.

14 If your order to deploy troops to provide logistical
15 support to Federal agents around the election, would you see
16 any reason for having troops in full battle dress, body
17 armor, carrying their weapons and ammunition if it's for
18 logistical support.

19 General Guillot: Senator, logistical support is not
20 one of the exceptions. So, no, I would not see any reason
21 to use armed and uniformed members around a polling place
22 for logistics.

23 Senator Duckworth: Thank you. Would you be advised
24 that they would not be allowed around a certain radius of
25 polling places?



1 General Guillot: Senator, I don't think that's
2 defined, but I don't think they should be anywhere near
3 there where we would give the perception that we're trying
4 to operate illegally.

5 Senator Duckworth: Thank you.

6 Misusing troops on the election is just another way
7 that this administration is shifting the burden of legal
8 liability onto service members. This is my concern because
9 the statutes specify that any member of the armed forces who
10 deploys to polling places or intimidates voters could be
11 imprisoned or disqualified from office. As we saw during
12 the December hearing on domestic deployments that I secured,
13 this administration is comfortable trusting our service
14 members into legally ambiguous situations and leaving them
15 to hang out to dry without legal protection.

16 We know that President Trump, who grandstands and
17 rallies that he's all about warfighters, is actually the
18 fastest to betray them. As a Guardsman, or a former
19 guardsman, it's always going to be in my heart, this is
20 serious to me. We saw the toll Trump's misadventure last
21 year, deploying troops to American cities took on my fellow
22 Guardsmen and on their communities that we call home.

23 Taxpayers had to pay \$21 million for President Trump's
24 decision to federalize 500 Guardsmen in Illinois alone.
25 Troops who, despite his claims that they reduced crime in

1 Chicago, never actually set foot in Chicago. They sat
2 around training sites for 3 months away from their families
3 and civilian careers, because the courts found the
4 deployments illegal within the first 24 hours. And yet, he
5 kept them there for another 3 months through the Christmas
6 holidays. And now, he might once again pull our military
7 away from their daily lives to police Americans, this time,
8 to intimidate voters with no basis in facts, no basis in
9 law, and at the expense of millions of taxpayer dollars.

10 I'd like to use my remaining time to turn to operations
11 in SOUTHCOM, another arena of concerning misuse of force by
12 this administration. General Donovan, in our private
13 conversations prior to your confirmation, I expressed my
14 concern about this administration's targeting decisions and
15 what you might be asked to do once you are in leadership of
16 SOUTHCOM. Now that you're in the seat, I want to follow-up
17 on our conversation. What guidance have you received or
18 issued for how to treat associates of a group differently
19 from a confirmed direct member of a group?

20 General Donovan: Senator, thank you. In the
21 affiliates, I think the term we're using now is that the
22 same term, Senator?

23 Senator Duckworth: Well, the administration and their
24 legal justification to calling these folks associates, but
25 it's different from being a confirmed direct member of a



1 group.

2 General Donovan: We have a definition of affiliates
3 tied to that classified definition. In a closed setting, I
4 would like to share word for word what that definition is,
5 Senator.

6 Senator Duckworth: Okay. But this is about the term
7 associate, which is what the administration has used. I'm
8 concerned about the looseness of the term that SOUTHCOM has
9 been using to publicly report an individual was killed,
10 specifically, affiliate or associate. Those are the two
11 words that were used, which implies an even weaker
12 association with any concerning threat.

13 To be clear, striking people in the Caribbean Sea under
14 weak justification is not only disturbing, it is illegal.
15 This campaign has not been authorized by Congress. So,
16 despite what this administration may say or want to believe,
17 this is not a global war on terror when the American people
18 authorize the use of force through their congressional
19 representative after attacks on September 11, this is a
20 different situation entirely, one in which the
21 administration is risking American troops and innocent
22 civilians at the expense of American taxpayers, with no
23 transparency or rational justification.

24 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

25 Chairman Wicker: Thank you, Senator Duckworth.



1 Senator Schmitt, you're recognized. You temporarily have
2 the gavel.

3 Senator Schmitt: [Presiding.] Wow, big promotion
4 there. Thank you, Senator. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

5 General Donovan, I wanted to ask you, the PRC is
6 dramatically sort of increase their footprint by way of
7 infrastructure, ports, including, I think, one of the
8 largest distant water fishing fleets in the world. But in
9 your view -- well, in the 2025 National Security Strategy,
10 it declares that we're going to deny non-hemispheric
11 competitors the ability to own or control significant vital
12 assets in our hemisphere. What are some of those assets
13 that are of concern.

14 General Donovan: The primary asset I'm concerned about
15 is the Panama Canal to maintain the Panama Canal open for
16 free flow of commerce, but with the true focus of ensuring
17 that we can flow forces, U.S. forces, east or west to the
18 Panama Canal. Further south in the southern cone, you have
19 other mineral assets we're concerned with. I'm concerned
20 about an undersea cable coming into Chile that the PRC are
21 tied to, and otherwise, the dual use nature of almost
22 everything they install in our region.

23 Senator Schmitt: I think it's encouraging that Panama
24 acted on this. It doesn't feel like a one and done kind of
25 thing, though. So, what's kind of on the horizon that we



1 have to be mindful of?

2 General Donovan: Senator, thank you --

3 Senator Schmitt: -- with regard to the Panama Canal.

4 General Donovan: Thank you for highlighting that.

5 President Mulino, a great partner. The fact that we are
6 holding the Panamax, our largest exercise, the first time in
7 14 years in Panama. There's 24 other nations coming. So,
8 they're becoming not only holding the Chinese at bay,
9 they've also become key partners in the region. And we
10 believe that, you know, things like the jungle training
11 operations school, those are core, not only to increase our
12 capabilities as U.S. service members, but also to bring
13 other partners together to develop those relationships.

14 And, Senator, what I've also realized in this first 43
15 days, that same environment that these cartels thrive in,
16 that they look to create those anarchic situations that they
17 can flourish in, the PRC is right there with them. The
18 Chinese are right in those same areas, you know, countering
19 local government. And the Chinese can move in very quickly
20 and build a cheap school, the cheap soccer stadium, or a
21 cheap road and gain influence. And I think the more we work
22 with these partners, exercise like Panamax, where we show
23 that we're good partners and teammates, and use some of the
24 tools we have, the Economic Defense Unit, Strategic Capital,
25 we're introducing new tools to counter the PRC influence in



1 the region.

2 Senator Schmitt: And it feels like the post-Maduro, it
3 feels like that a lot of folks are coming our way, right, in
4 that part of the world more sort of Latin American
5 governments, and friends are becoming better friends and
6 people who were maybe, not so outwardly, favorable to us
7 have sort of come our way. Is that your assessment?

8 General Donovan: Senator, maybe you've heard of the
9 Americas Counter Cartel Coalition. It started as a
10 conference in our headquarters, led by the secretary about 2
11 weeks ago. They signed a document that we now have a
12 coalition that will have a military aspect to it. And I say
13 military, it's really it's partners that are willing to join
14 with us to move forward on the against the cartels with
15 different degrees based on what they can bring. But I'm
16 pretty positive. And you can sense that folks want to get
17 at this problem set.

18 Senator Schmitt: Thank you.

19 General Guillot, I wanted to ask you, for counter-UAS
20 threats that are the threats that are out there and sort of
21 counter us. Missouri is home to Whiteman Air Force Base,
22 obviously. How are you assessing the threat level to
23 military installations that are out there right now, and how
24 far along are we in countering that?

25 General Guillot: Senator, we've seen an increase from



1 last year in the number of detections over military
2 installations over the course of the year. Some of that
3 might be due to the fact that we have more detection
4 capability now than we did in the past. And then, our
5 ability to defeat them has improved. Whereas a year ago,
6 almost everyone that was detected was not defeated.

7 Now about a quarter of the ones that we detect we're
8 able to defeat. I pay particular attention to Whiteman and
9 other strategic bases, whether submarine, silos, or
10 aircraft, and work very closely with Admiral Carrell at
11 STRATCOM to make sure that either through the services or
12 through our own capabilities at NORTHCOM, we are protecting
13 those vital locations from UAS.

14 Senator Schmitt: You could put me in the category of
15 somebody that's very supportive of our efforts to increase
16 our presence, our footprint, in Greenland. I think it's
17 vital for a bunch of different reasons. What are sort of
18 the -- what are the designs that we might have for expansion
19 given the strategic importance that it has? Where do you
20 see that right now, and why is that important?

21 General Guillot: Senator, it is extremely important
22 strategically and operationally for our command. We're very
23 supportive of expanding access to and cooperation with
24 Greenland and Denmark. I have a strong relationship with
25 the Danish CHOD, and we're working together to bring more



1 capability there. What I'd like to see added to what we
2 have now, which is, primarily space and initial fighter and
3 tanker response is -- are more locations where we can do
4 special operations and more access in the maritime domain,
5 to build up our defense -- defensive approaches from that
6 northeast approach to North America.

7 Senator Schmitt: Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr.
8 Chairman.

9 Chairman Wicker: [Presiding.] Thank you, Senator
10 Schmitt. Senator Rosen.

11 Senator Rosen: Well, thank you, Chairman and Ranking
12 Member, for holding this hearing. And I'd really like to
13 thank General Guillot and General Donovan, not just for
14 testifying today, but for your lifetime of service to the
15 Nation. Thank you.

16 I want to start with you, General Guillot, about,
17 defense of critical infrastructure, because defending
18 critical infrastructure in the homeland from cyberattacks
19 involves multiple Federal entities, as we know. Civilian
20 agencies such as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
21 Security Agency, CISA, have primary responsibility for
22 working with the infrastructure owners. While the
23 Department of Defense brings unique capabilities in cyber
24 operations and homeland defense. Countries such as China
25 and Russia have demonstrated sophisticated cyber operations

1 that could potentially disrupt power, transportation, or
2 communications networks inside the United States.

3 So, can you speak to how -- excuse me, Northern Command
4 fits into that framework? And specifically, what role does
5 NORTHCOM play in supporting the defense of critical
6 infrastructure against cyber threats? How do you coordinate
7 these responsibilities with other agencies?

8 General Guillot: Senator, the defense of critical
9 infrastructure happens to be one of the three or four main
10 goals for our headquarters this year to improve our
11 capability for all the reasons that you mentioned. Starting
12 with cyber, we have a very strong working relationship with
13 First Cyber Command, with CISA, and with the FBI to make
14 sure that it's seamless defensive of our networks, not only
15 within our own department, but as it goes out into critical
16 infrastructure and the Defense Industrial Base, because we
17 need all of those entities to be free from cyber threats for
18 us to be successful militarily in defending the homeland.
19 So, we have a very strong relationship.

20 And then, we work and exercise, and tabletop exercise,
21 with them to make sure that on the cyber front that we were
22 unified and very -- sharing of all information that we have.
23 I think the Defense Industrial -- excuse me, the critical
24 defense infrastructure faces more threats than just cyber.
25 There's certainly physical threats that they have, and in



1 that regard, working very closely with the National Guard,
2 from each state where they recently had their tag conference
3 in Colorado where we hosted that. And then we made a pact
4 this year to work with each state to see what critical
5 infrastructure they felt that they would protect, and then
6 what they might need from Title 10 forces to augment that,
7 to make sure that we had a seamless protection of defense
8 critical infrastructure in the physical domain as well as in
9 the cyber domain.

10 Senator Rosen: Thank you.

11 And in Nevada, we have lots of critical infrastructure,
12 Hoover Dam and others. So, thank you for that. General
13 Donovan, I want to move to you and talk about Guantanamo
14 Bay, because with the use of our naval base at Guantanamo
15 Bay to house undocumented individuals detained in the United
16 States, I have concerns about the delineation between the
17 responsibilities of DOD and ICE, and whether the military
18 was ever made whole after having to foot the bill for the
19 Department of Homeland Security carrying out its mission.

20 So, General Donovan, for those who are deported now
21 being held at Guantanamo, are military personnel charged
22 with guarding, caring, and feeding them. If so, who's
23 paying for it, and what is the division of responsibilities
24 between DOD and ICE there?

25 General Donovan: Senator, SOUTHCOM's job is to ensure



1 safety, care, and humane treatment of those IAs at that
2 facility at GITMO. Currently, those -- all cost associated
3 that go through the services, not directly to SOUTHCOM. So,
4 I'd have to defer that to the services of the comptroller.

5 Senator Rosen: Well, can you tell me that -- do you
6 have plans to hold people at GITMO for years if they can't
7 be returned to their country of origin? And again, what
8 about your manpower if you do that? Resources, are you
9 going to be coming to us for that? Can you speak to that at
10 all please?

11 General Donovan: Again, Senator, those are decisions
12 that would be at DHS and above the Secretary. So, we'll
13 just continue to carry out our responsibility of providing
14 security for that actual camp itself.

15 Senator Rosen: Thank you.

16 I'm going to build a little bit, General Guillot, on
17 Senator Duckworth's remarks about DOD deployment to American
18 cities. And I'm just concerned that our Guardsmen, our
19 Guardsmen are going to be placed in dangerous situations,
20 deployed to patrol American cities, or they're working in
21 close proximity to ICE and involved in sensitive community
22 interactions. So, what guidance has been provided to our
23 Guardsmen in order to avoid eroding trust in diverse
24 communities where they're patrolling, and what is the
25 division of missions' responsibility between DOD and ICE as



1 it refers to our National Guard?

2 General Guillot: Senator, at this time, there are no,
3 Guard forces under my command in any of the cities that you
4 mentioned. But in the past, as you know, we did have some
5 under Title 10 authorities. And the first thing that, they
6 are briefed when they come under Title 10 is not so much
7 what they can do, but what they cannot do. And that is they
8 cannot execute any law enforcement activities. Even if
9 there are perhaps policemen in their civilian job, or if
10 their military policemen in their Guard unit, if they're
11 under Title 10 authorities due to the Posse Comitatus Act,
12 they are not allowed to execute any law enforcement
13 activities, and that's the first level of briefing that we
14 gave in the past when we had forces assigned to us. But at
15 this time, all of the Guard forces that are operating in
16 various cities, they're not under Title 10, so therefore
17 they're not under my authority.

18 Senator Rosen: Thank you.

19 Chairman Wicker: Thank you, Senator Rosen. Senator
20 Warren.

21 Senator Warren: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

22 President Trump and Secretary Hegseth are repeatedly
23 dragging the U.S. military across both legal and moral
24 lines. Trump and Hegseth have plunged us into an illegal
25 war with Iran, where a U.S. airstrike appears to have killed



1 150 school children. And it's not just in Iran. Under
2 Trump and Hegseth, the military fired on civilians and
3 shipwreck survivors in the Caribbean, and now Secretary
4 Hegseth is threatening to give, "no quarter," to
5 adversaries.

6 This is not who we are. Our enemies might not care
7 about civilian casualties, but the U.S. military always,
8 always has. And that is why Secretary Hegseth attacks on
9 the guardrails that prevent civilian harm and civilian
10 casualties is so dangerous. So, take the JAGs, now more
11 than ever, we need strong, independent military lawyers.
12 But there are serious concerns that JAGs cannot give honest
13 legal advice right now. So, General Guillot, let me ask
14 you, have you seen any evidence of the JAG Corps being
15 sidelined, whether at NORTHCOM or elsewhere in the
16 Department?

17 General Guillot: Senator, I have not seen any evidence
18 of the JAGs being sidelined in our command. I'll point out
19 that our JAG is included in all of our battle rhythm
20 meetings, and in fact, our JAG is sitting behind me right
21 now.

22 Senator Warren: Yeah. And I just want you to know,
23 I'm glad to hear that. Glad to hear it's not happening in
24 your command, but we know that this is a problem across the
25 Department. Secretary Hegseth fired JAGs because he thought



1 they were, "roadblocks," and he installed his personal
2 lawyer to retrain military lawyers to water down
3 constraints. He reassigned hundreds of JAGs to work on
4 Trump's radical immigration agenda. And last week, the
5 secretary said he's starting a, ruthless overhaul of the JAG
6 system.

7 Look, for decades, military lawyers have worked side by
8 side with officers to make sure that strikes are lawful and
9 that they minimize civilian casualties. That doesn't make
10 us weaker. It saves innocent lives, and it prevents fueling
11 terrorism. But Secretary Hegseth has blamed JAGs for what
12 he calls, "stupid rules of engagement." So, General
13 Donovan, let me ask you, if a JAG or a civilian harm advisor
14 says to distinguish between a military base and an
15 elementary school and an airstrike, is that a stupid rule of
16 engagement?

17 General Donovan: No, Senator.

18 Senator Warren: Yeah. Look, JAGs can't give their
19 best advice if they fear losing their job just for raising
20 legal concerns with an operation. One way we protect the
21 integrity of legal advice in our military is by creating for
22 cause removal protections for our JAGs. Commanders also
23 need to be able to speak up when they're being asked to
24 break the law.

25 General Donovan, your predecessor was reportedly ousted



1 because he raised concerns about the legality of the
2 Caribbean boat strikes. Will you commit to informing this
3 committee if SOUTHCOM is directed to do something that you
4 or your JAG thinks may be illegal?

5 General Donovan: Senator, my first obligation, if I
6 face what I believe is an unlawful or illegal order, is to
7 obviously, seek legal counsel, discuss that with my higher
8 headquarters, and then move forward and not carry out an
9 illegal order.

10 Senator Warren: Yeah. Maybe you didn't hear my
11 question. My question was, will you commit to informing
12 this committee if SOUTHCOM is directed to do something that
13 you or your JAG thinks is illegal?

14 General Donovan: If I reported that to this committee,
15 Senator, would be through my chain of command.

16 Senator Warren: But you would make sure that we got
17 the information.

18 General Donovan: I would report to my chain of
19 command.

20 Senator Warren: And you would not take any
21 responsibility for making sure we got that information. You
22 do realize we have oversight responsibilities here?

23 General Donovan: Senator, I would work that
24 information through my chain of command.

25 Senator Warren: All right. That's a very concerning



1 answer here. Look, what's happening right now is very
2 dangerous. We need our nonpartisan military leaders to
3 double down on their commitment to following the law and
4 speaking up when they are asked to break it. And Congress
5 needs to be able to step in and rein in this lawless
6 commander-in-chief and his self-styled secretary of war.
7 Thank you.

8 Chairman Wicker: I think we have another series of
9 questions by Senator Reed.

10 Senator Reed: Mr. Chairman, thank you.

11 I have one question. General Donovan, you noted twice
12 that you reviewed every single execute order, EXORD, related
13 to the boat strikes. Just to confirm, it was important to
14 you, to your understanding and oversight of these strikes,
15 to review these EXORD documents. Is that correct?

16 General Donovan: Yes, Senator.

17 Senator Reed: Thank you, sir.

18 Mr. Chairman, I would just like to reiterate that there
19 is a legal requirement for the Department to provide those
20 EXORDs to the committee, which you and I have requested
21 multiple times to include letters to the Secretary of
22 Defense. Section 1744 of the fiscal year 2020 NDAA requires
23 you to provide the EXORDs at the request of the committee.
24 But, in fiscal year 2025, Section 1067, it requires you to
25 provide a copy of any new or revised EXORDs within 15 days,



1 so there's no requirement for a request.

2 The secretary has not fulfilled this legal requirement.
3 And your testimony, General Donovan, further confirms in my
4 mind that we need these documents to understand and oversee,
5 that's our role, oversee these operations. I just for the
6 record want to make that very clear.

7 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

8 Chairman Wicker: Thank you, Senator Reed. If there's
9 nothing further, let's reconvene at 12:10 in the SCIF. Will
10 that be all right, gentlemen?

11 General Guillot: Yes, sir.

12 General Donovan: Yes, Senator.

13 Chairman Wicker: And we are recessed until then.

14 [Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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