

Senate Armed Services Committee
Advance Policy Questions for Lieutenant General Alexis G. Grynkewich, USAF
Nominee for Appointment to the Grade of General and to be Commander,
United States European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Duties and Qualifications

1. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR)?

The commander of U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) is tasked with defending the homeland forward and achieving U.S. strategic objectives in Europe. Beyond directing military operations within its area of responsibility, USEUCOM prioritizes the well-being of deployed personnel and their families, recognizing that a secure and supported force is vital for effective operations.

The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), as commander of Allied Command Operations (ACO), translates NATO's political objectives into military outcomes. SACEUR oversees all NATO military operations, conducts strategic military planning, secures necessary forces from member states to execute those plans, and ensures force readiness for military operations.

Coordination between USEUCOM and SACEUR fosters a unified approach to security challenges. SACEUR also identifies and addresses NATO's capability gaps through strategic analysis and joint training.

2. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualify you to perform these duties?

My career as a general officer has included time leading on the Joint Staff, at Combined Joint Task Force - Operation INHERENT RESOLVE, and at the combatant command level. I have extensive warfighting and combat experience leading Joint operations. While much of this experience was gained in the Middle East, the fundamental principles of command, Joint operations, and strategic planning are universally applicable. I bring extensive experience in leading large organizations, coordinating complex operations with diverse military forces in Coalition environments, and collaborating with Allies and partners to achieve shared objectives. As director for operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I have gained firsthand insight into the complexities of Europe's operational environment and have served as a principal briefer to Congressional defense oversight committees on Ukraine. Through my prior service in EUCOM and my current role on the Joint Staff, I have developed a deep understanding of our plans, security posture in the

EUCOM area of responsibility, the geopolitical dynamics of Europe, and the specific threats facing the region.

My interest in Europe extends beyond professional duties. Since we left our last assignment at USEUCOM, my family and I have frequently visited Europe, spending significant time on personal travel spanning the entire continent. These frequent immersions into European culture have deepened our appreciation for its complex history, dynamic geopolitics, and resilient people.

3. Do you believe there are actions you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of Commander, EUCOM/SACEUR?

While I am confident my experiences have thoroughly prepared me to assume command, if confirmed, I will continue to exercise my commitment to lifelong learning. I will continually strive to deepen my understanding of the issues, history, culture, and languages that shape Europe's strategic environment.

If confirmed, I plan to immediately launch a comprehensive review of the European theater, addressing both immediate operational needs and long-term strategic challenges. My approach will be highly collaborative, engaging not only with USEUCOM Headquarters, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, but also actively seeking input from interagency partners, Allies, and other key stakeholders across the region. This will ensure a comprehensive understanding of the complex dynamics within the area of responsibility.

Additionally, I will work closely with USEUCOM's component commanders and Service Chiefs to gain a detailed understanding of their ongoing efforts to organize, train, and equip our forces, ensuring our capabilities align with the evolving threat landscape and support broader U.S. strategic objectives in Europe. This inclusive approach supports the development and implementation for a clear, actionable strategic vision for USEUCOM.

Major Challenges and Priorities

4. In your view, what are the major challenges you would confront if confirmed as the next Commander, EUCOM/SACEUR?

USEUCOM, alongside our NATO Allies, delivers essential capabilities to support homeland defense and global power projection in order to safeguard U.S. national interests. We must ensure our NATO Allies are equipped to deter aggression against the Alliance, which requires sustained investment in critical warfighting capabilities. If confirmed, I will conduct a 90-day assessment to evaluate these priorities.

5. What plans do you have for addressing each of these challenges, if confirmed?

If confirmed, I will conduct a 90-day assessment to address key challenges, including homeland defense and supporting our NATO Allies in strengthening Europe's defense.

6. Recognizing that challenges, anticipated and unforeseen, will drive your priorities to a substantial degree, if confirmed, what other priorities, beyond those associated with the major challenges you identified above, would you set for your tenure as Commander, EUCOM/SACEUR?

If confirmed, our warfighters will be a top priority for me. I will ensure our men and women have the necessary weapons, tactics, and training to maintain superiority over any future adversary. I also see an urgent need to modernize our infrastructure and digitize our command and control tools. Our forces require tools that are flat, fast, survivable, and interoperable to succeed regionally and globally.

7. If confirmed, what actions would you take to focus the Command's efforts on each of these priorities?

As previously stated, the men and women of USEUCOM will always be a top priority. If confirmed, I will conduct a 90-day assessment and develop a plan of action to align resources and focus the team on key and critical areas to strengthen our warfighting advantage.

8. If confirmed, how would you work to ensure that Department of Defense (DOD) efforts in your area of responsibility complement the efforts of civilian agencies?

I firmly believe we are in an era where advancing our national security priorities requires the Department to collaborate closely with U.S. interagency partners. Only through such collaboration can we develop a comprehensive approach to deterring aggression across the spectrum of conflict. USEUCOM's dedicated Interagency Partnering Directorate facilitates early and ongoing interagency coordination, connecting U.S. Government agency representatives with USEUCOM Headquarters and Service component staffs. If confirmed, I am committed to prioritizing efforts to ensure the capabilities, roles, and missions of hosted agency partners are effectively coordinated.

9. What are your major observations about how the security architecture of Europe has changed since Russia's full invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022? What implications has this had on posture requirements for the U.S. and NATO?

Since February 2022, NATO has significantly bolstered its defenses, particularly in Eastern Europe, with increased troop presence, enhanced equipment, and the addition of new Alliance members through the accession of Finland and Sweden. The Alliance is making substantial investments in areas such as air and missile defense, armored

vehicles, logistics, and modern aircraft like the F-35. It is also working to develop new capabilities, including drones and advanced cyber technologies. New NATO battle plans and capability targets are driving these changes, ensuring Allies are equipped to deter and, if necessary, prevail in conflict.

Conversely, the security architecture of our adversaries is now marked by accelerated alignment, with Russia benefiting from Chinese economic support, North Korean personnel support, and Iranian materiel support. This evolving security landscape underscores the need to adopt a global perspective on our current challenges and recognize that none can or should be considered in isolation.

U.S. Commitment under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty

A cornerstone of the NATO Alliance is the principle of collective self-defense as codified in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

10. In your view, how important to U.S. strategic interests is the U.S. commitment to its obligations under Article 5?

Article 5 is the cornerstone of NATO, and U.S. commitment to Article 5 encourages our Allies and partners to uphold their own commitments to collective defense. This mutual commitment is foundational to burden-sharing amongst Alliance members, enabling the U.S. to leverage Allied capabilities in pursuit of our shared interests in Europe. This commitment also resonates globally, showcasing the strength of our resolve of the U.S. to friend and foe alike.

11. How important to being able to meet Article 5 obligations is follow through on Article 3 which commits Allies to develop their “individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack”?

It is essential. Article 3 obligations for Allies to develop individual and collective capacity are prerequisites to building the forces, capabilities, and capacities needed to maintain deterrence in peacetime and to prevail in collective defense under Article 5.

12. Do you believe the position of Supreme Allied Commander Europe should be held by an American flag officer?

While ultimately a policy question, from a purely military perspective, having a U.S. officer as SACEUR provides significant operational benefits, particularly with respect to nuclear operations. The United States has consistently offered nuclear forces to NATO for employment by SACEUR. In a conflict, with the agreement of the United States and

other Alliance nations, these weapons could be transferred to SACEUR for delivery by NATO Allies participating in the Alliance's nuclear program.

This process occurs under SACEUR's command and control. If confirmed, as the Commander of USEUCOM, I would hold these weapons and, when directed, transfer them to myself as SACEUR to employ in accordance with the North Atlantic Council's strategic direction. This structure ensures a seamless transition from deployment to employment.

NATO Burden Sharing

13. Where have you seen the greatest progress on increasing defense investments and building capabilities in the NATO Alliance?

NATO is significantly strengthening its defenses with increased troop presence and enhanced response capabilities. At the upcoming Hague Summit, leaders are expected to commit to allocating 5% of their GDP to defense—3.5% for military requirements and 1.5% for related investments, such as infrastructure. Member nations are prioritizing investments in areas like long-range weaponry, armored vehicles, and air defense systems. These enhancements will improve NATO's readiness and capacity to address a broad spectrum of security challenges.

14. What is your assessment of current plans of NATO allies for fulfilling the Alliance pledge to spend 2% of Gross Domestic Product on defense?

Currently, a record 24 NATO Allies are expected to meet the 2% of GDP defense spending goal. However, this level of spending remains insufficient to fully address critical capability shortfalls, particularly in areas such as munitions, air defense, and logistical support. Meeting NATO's requirements demand rapid and sustained investment beyond the 2% target to address the challenges of today's security environment.

15. Do you share the views articulated by former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in 2022 that the 2% defense spending goal "is no longer some kind of ceiling, but 2% is now the floor for our defense spending."

Yes. Increasing defense spending to 5% of GDP will ensure the Alliance can deter aggression and defend Europe without overreliance on the United States.

16. If confirmed, what steps would you take to encourage NATO allies to increase their defense spending and enhance their military capabilities so as to enable effective contributions to NATO's collective security?

If confirmed, I would prioritize aligning NATO's defense investments with the actual threats facing the Alliance and the plans NATO has to counter them. This would involve thoroughly assessing risks and directing spending towards essential capabilities required to protect the Alliance, rather than merely targeting a specific spending percentage. I would strongly support President Trump's and the NATO Secretary General's efforts to urge member nations to fulfill their commitment to allocate at least 5% of their GDP to defense and to achieve the agreed-upon military capability goals for 2025.

17. In your view, should the United States broaden the conversation to encourage allies to focus more on the attainment and refinement of critical capabilities vice meeting a dollar threshold?

We must encourage our Allies to do both. Nations must both increase and focus their investments in order to meet the capability requirements outlined in NATO's defense plans. Delivering these critical capabilities will also require substantial investment in the U.S. and European defense industrial bases to ensure systems and munitions are produced at the necessary scale and speed.

Support to Ukrainian Forces

18. Do you believe it is in the U.S. interest to continue to maintain a strong security cooperation relationship with the Ukrainian Armed Forces?

Security cooperation with Ukraine strengthens its defenses, supports the U.S. objective of ending the war, and reduces the risk of a broader European conflict that could threaten U.S. interests. This cooperation can be provided by either U.S. or European partners. Increased contributions from our Allies in key areas enhance Ukrainian capabilities, decreasing the need for U.S. assistance. The U.S. also gains significant benefits from security cooperation with Ukraine, including valuable technology transfers to our warfighters and industrial base, insights into the evolving nature of warfare, and access to emerging technologies being tested in real time on Ukraine's battlefields.

19. In your opinion, can Ukraine effectively defend itself against Russia's continued onslaught without substantial U.S. security assistance?

While Ukraine has enhanced its domestically produced capabilities to adapt to changes to U.S. assistance, ongoing U.S. security support remains important, particularly with respect to sustaining previously provided U.S. equipment. Without U.S. support, equipment readiness and capability are likely to decline over time. In particular, diminished air defense capabilities heighten risks to critical infrastructure and civilian areas from air and missile threats. Key enablers such as secure communications and

intelligence sharing also remain vital for Ukraine by providing early warning of upcoming attacks.

20. How would you characterize the effectiveness of the U.S. support to Ukraine to date?

While Ukrainian tenacity and innovation have been key, U.S. support has been effective in bolstering Ukraine's defenses across all domains.

21. In your opinion, have the changes in the European security environment, including increased defense investments, forward presence of U.S Armed Forces, battlefield observations, and industrial base revitalization as a result of the war in Ukraine better positioned NATO to deter Russian aggression?

The Russia-Ukraine war galvanized our European Allies to prioritize the collective defense of Europe for the first time in decades. Sustained investments by the Europeans will be crucial to preserving Alliance unity and deterring future Russian aggression. We must also continue efforts to expand both the U.S. and European defense industrial bases to create the capacity to develop, produce, and deliver at speed and scale.

22. What lessons has the U.S. learned about the future of warfare from the Ukrainian military?

Since the conflict in Ukraine began on February 24, 2022, warfare has evolved at a pace unseen since the Cold War's end. Ukraine and Russia have developed and deployed new technologies and tactics on an innovation cycle of months rather than years. As a result, the U.S. Joint Force has established multiple cells to consistently analyze advancements and integrate lessons learned from the battlefield into U.S. and NATO exercises. For example, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) have rapidly innovated their use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and uncrewed surface vessels (USV). UAS and USV operations are now conducted at scale, with significant impact and continuous technological updates. This attribute of the modern battlefield is fostering a shift to a culture of innovation, agility, and lethality across all elements of the U.S. and NATO Joint Force, from industry to operators.

Russia

23. What is your understanding of the policy and strategic objectives that determine Russian force posture and capability development?

Russian policy and strategic objectives focus on (1) countering perceived threats from the U.S. and its Allies, (2) promoting Russia as a global power, (3) reasserting control over its "Near Abroad," and (4) preserving the regime. These objectives – all of which the

Russians see as supported by their operations in Ukraine -- drive Russia's high military spending and continued capability development. Russian military expenditures were 7.1 percent of GDP in 2024, and Russia is likely to sustain this elevated military spending after the war in Ukraine in order to rebuild its military and maintain macroeconomic stability. Russia's capability priorities include maintaining and modernizing its nuclear triad and developing advanced weapon systems that will pose a continuing threat to the U.S. and our Allies.

24. Is the Russian military capable of achieving these objectives today? If not, under what circumstances might it be able to achieve these objectives?

Russia likely can partially achieve its objectives by increasing security and military resources along its western border. However, Russia probably will face challenges in fully staffing and equipping its conventional ground units for at least five years following the end of the Ukraine war. Moscow is likely to deploy a significant number of forces along its border with Ukraine and in any remaining occupied territories. This prioritization will compel Russia to accept risks in other regions, such as the Far East and Central Asia, due to resource limitations.

25. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, stated recently that Russia is succeeding in reconstituting its military despite its war in Ukraine. He noted that Russia's "industrial base is expected to roll out 1,500 tanks, 3,000 armored vehicles, and 200 Iskander missiles this year alone...Russia could be ready to use military force against NATO within five years." Do you agree that Russia is reconstituting at a rapid pace and will continue to pose a significant threat to U.S. interests, particularly in the near- and medium-term?

Russia maintains substantial defense industrial capacity and is likely to reconstitute its ground forces within approximately five years after the end of hostilities in Ukraine. However, Russia will likely face increased financial constraints due to the costs of the Ukraine war and any ongoing sanctions, which may limit its ability to sustain current levels of production and recruitment post-war. Nevertheless, by prioritizing investments and leveraging its war economy, Russia will remain a significant and persistent threat for the foreseeable future.

26. Given advances in Russian attack submarine capability, such as the deployment of the highly capable Russian submarine *Severodvinsk*, what additional capabilities or capacity are most important to maintaining the U.S. advantage in undersea warfare in the EUCOM AOR?

Forward-deployed destroyers (DDGs), SSNs, and Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft (MPRA) track and deter adversary movements in critical zones such as the Greenland/Iceland/United Kingdom (GIUK) gap and the High North. Expanded

operations with Allies are a vital component of homeland defense, with Joint and NATO-led contributions in these areas demonstrating a strong and visible commitment to collective defense across the North Atlantic.

27. In your assessment, does EUCOM currently have a mature joint concept of operations and the necessary capabilities and sufficient capacity to mitigate the military challenge of Russian A2/AD capabilities?

I am not currently positioned to fully evaluate the maturity of EUCOM concepts or the sufficiency of its capabilities. If confirmed, I will conduct a 90-day assessment and look forward to briefing the committee on my findings in a classified setting.

28. If not, what additional capabilities or capacity are required in the EUCOM AOR to ensure U.S. forces are able to achieve operational freedom of maneuver at decisive points?

I am not currently in a position to fully judge the maturity of EUCOM concepts or sufficiency of capabilities. If confirmed, I will conduct a 90-day assessment and look forward to briefing the committee on my findings in a classified setting.

29. In your view, what are Russia's strategic goals in the Black Sea and in the Mediterranean?

In the Black Sea region, Moscow remains focused on prosecuting its war against Ukraine and conducting influence operations against Kyiv's European supporters. Russia also seeks to reassert its influence in the South Caucasus, where its ability to exert leverage over Azerbaijan and Armenia is diminishing. Russia will likely attempt to influence Moldova's September parliamentary elections to hinder the country's Western trajectory.

In the Mediterranean, Russia is working to demonstrate its relevance as a key actor following the loss of its foothold in Syria with the fall of the Assad regime. Russia hopes to preserve its access to ports in the Mediterranean, including in Tartus, Syria, and along the northern coast of Africa, in order to support ongoing operations on NATO's southern flank. Russia also seeks to gain or maintain its access to key air bases in the Mediterranean region. Russia covets these maritime and air access points not only because they present an off-axis threat to Europe, but also because they are power projection platforms that enable a Russian foothold in the Middle East and support ongoing Africa Corps operations on the African continent.

30. How is Russia employing hybrid warfare tactics to undermine stability in Europe? What role should EUCOM play in defending against these tactics?

Since 2022, Russia has actively employed hybrid warfare tactics across Europe, capitalizing on disruptions caused by its invasion of Ukraine. These tactics include diplomatic confrontations, economic pressure, and targeted sabotage incidents, notably in Poland and the Baltic states during 2024. Such activities declined later in the year due to heightened public scrutiny and robust law enforcement efforts by European authorities.

If confirmed, I would direct EUCOM to counter Russia's hybrid threats by expanding defend-forward cyber operations, enhancing intelligence sharing with Allies, and strengthening coordination through interagency information initiatives and integrated exercises. I would also plan to direct targeted support to particularly vulnerable partners to bolster their resilience and help maintain regional stability.

31. What role should NATO play in defending against these tactics?

Given these tactics are an enduring and essential element of modern warfare, NATO (in coordination with our European Allies) should take the lead in countering hybrid warfare tactics within Europe. If confirmed, this is an area I will investigate further as part of my 90-day assessment.

U.S. European Command (EUCOM)

32. How has EUCOM's operational planning and requirements changed as a result of the war in Ukraine?

The war in Ukraine shifted EUCOM's focus to collective defense within the NATO framework. Planning efforts strongly emphasize enhancing deterrence while fostering European leadership and readiness along NATO's eastern flank. EUCOM has expanded and enhanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) coverage using unique U.S. capabilities. This year also marked the first time in nearly three decades that USEUCOM participated in a strategic exercise with NATO. This exercise focused on operationalizing NATO's Concept for Deterrence and Defense, positioning NATO as the lead for European defense and certifying SHAPE as NATO's Strategic Warfighting Headquarters.

33. In your assessment, what role have the rotational Army brigade combat teams played in bolstering deterrence against potential Russian aggression within NATO?

As a defensive Alliance, NATO does not select the time or place of conflict. Forward-deployed forces serve as credible signals of U.S. and Allied resolve, offering policymakers options during crises to de-escalate and demonstrate commitment to territorial defense. These forces also integrate and train with European counterparts, enhancing their ability to provide for their own defense and increasing theater-wide collective defense capacity.

34. How would a reduction of Army brigade combat teams in the AOR impact the ability to effectively carry out that deterrent role?

I am unable to provide a definitive answer at this time. If confirmed, within my first 90 days, I will thoroughly assess EUCOM's force posture, including the contributions of Army brigade combat teams and the impact of any reductions on deterrence. This assessment will incorporate U.S. and Allied capabilities, readiness, response timelines, and interoperability against hybrid and near-peer threats across all domains. I look forward to sharing my assessment with the committee upon completion.

35. What impact would the withdrawal of these units have on NATO allies' ability to enhance their capabilities via planned training and exercise activities?

Broadly speaking, because our Army is the best on the planet, the presence of U.S. units in collaborative, multi-domain NATO training and exercises helps Allies prepare for combat operations, enhances interoperability, and furthers NATO integration across warfighting functions and domains. If confirmed, I intend to fully evaluate USEUCOM force posture as part of my 90-day assessment and look forward to sharing the findings with the committee upon completion.

36. How will our allies react if we rapidly pull back from longstanding U.S. commitments before they have built up the capability to fill such roles?

I have not yet consulted with NATO Allies on this matter. If confirmed, I would engage our Allies, assess their capabilities, and develop an understanding of their view on U.S. posture in Europe as part of my 90-day assessment. As part of this effort, I would evaluate Allied readiness and develop options for a phased, coordinated approach to any U.S. posture changes. I look forward to sharing these findings with the committee upon completion.

37. Are there particular military missions in Europe that, even the long run, it is in the U.S. interest to maintain?

Yes, USEUCOM is responsible for missions that provide defense in depth for the homeland, and as a Combatant Command, USEUCOM has designated responsibilities under U.S. Code Title 10.

U.S. Capabilities and Force Posture in Europe

38. What is your assessment of the current U.S. force posture in Europe?

From my experience as Director for Operations (J3) on the Joint Staff, I understand that the Joint Force faces numerous global, competing priorities. If confirmed, I would advocate for a force posture in Europe that is both sufficient to meeting mission

requirements and sustainable over time. I would also encourage NATO Allies to increase their contributions in order to lead the conventional defense of Europe. If confirmed, I intend to conduct a 90 day assessment which will include a strategic review of U.S posture in Europe, including consideration of the continent's unique geographic position and on the approaches to the Atlantic, Middle East, Asia, and Africa.

39. Do you agree with General Cavoli's posture testimony that deterrence of Russia is most challenging in the land domain and that Russia retains advantages in certain domains, geography, and readiness?

Russia is likely most capable in the land domain but remains at a quantitative and qualitative disadvantage compared to the United States and NATO.

In the air domain, Russia holds an advantage through its expertise in the mass production, deployment, and daily combat use of One-Way Attack and multi-role Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Russia has leveraged the Ukraine conflict to assess and refine UAV capabilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

The Russian Federation Navy (RFN) has experienced less attrition during Russia's war against Ukraine compared to its air and ground forces and continues to incorporate new modern submarines and surface vessels into its fleet. The RFN holds geographical advantages in the Arctic, enabling increased control over the Northern Sea Route, supported by the addition of new nuclear-powered Severodvinsk II-class cruise missile attack submarines (SSGNs) and two new ice-class surface combatants. Despite losing 26 vessels of various classes to Ukrainian strikes in the Black Sea, the RFN remains the most capable naval force in the Black and Caspian Seas. Furthermore, Russia's Main Directorate for Deep-Sea Research is developing advanced asymmetric subsurface warfare capabilities to target critical undersea infrastructure.

40. Do you agree with General Cavoli's testimony that the outcome of a conventional conflict with Russia would be determined in the land domain?

In a conventional conflict with the United States and NATO, Russia would likely concentrate its conventional capabilities in the ground domain, where it has traditionally focused its combat strength. Despite qualitative and quantitative disadvantages, Russia would likely seek to exploit its geographically derived advantages in time and space. The United States and NATO's strategic and operational approaches to any conflict would also influence the relative importance of each warfighting domain.

41. In your opinion, what implications does Russia's invasion of Ukraine have on U.S. force posture requirements in Europe? How would your assessment change if Russia were to prevail in Ukraine?

Russia's war in Ukraine has demonstrated Moscow's readiness to incur significant political, economic, military, and social costs to achieve its strategic objectives, consistent with its historical strategic culture and approach to warfare. Regardless of the outcome of the war in Ukraine, Russia will likely remain antagonistic toward the West for the foreseeable future and prioritize the reconstitution of its ground forces.

Russia's emphasis on ground forces necessitates an increased NATO forward presence on the Eastern Flank. An assertive Russia will pose a persistent threat to Euro-Atlantic security, and a larger, more capable, and experienced Russian military will require a sustained forward posture.

42. In your opinion, what would be the greatest threat to U.S. security interests in the EUCOM AOR if Russia were to achieve their desired goals in Ukraine?

Should Russia achieve its desired objectives in Ukraine, Moscow may feel emboldened to continue using or threatening military power to exert pressure in the European Theater, including against NATO, while simultaneously strengthening its defensive posture on its periphery.

43. How should such considerations be calibrated and coordinated with NATO force posture decisions?

Alliance collective defense and the commitment to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty start with individual Allied obligations for self-defense under Article 3. Over the past five years, each NATO Ally has committed to modernizing their forces and infrastructure to fulfill their collective defense responsibilities while maintaining deterrence and warfighting readiness.

44. In your assessment, are there capability and/or capacity shortfalls in the current Joint Force that present a significant challenge to addressing current or future threats in the EUCOM AOR?

USEUCOM is tasked with supporting homeland defense, projecting U.S. combat power globally, and deterring, and if necessary, defeating Russian aggression. Key challenges include countering Russian anti-access/area denial capabilities, executing integrated air and missile defense, and rapidly confronting massed ground forces. These efforts require robust logistics, sustainment, and command, control, communications, computers, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance at scale across competition, crisis, and conflict.

Each of these areas presents distinct capability and capacity gaps, with the Joint Force facing challenges at both ends of the spectrum. At the high end, Russian advancements in missiles, strategic programs, and advanced undersea warfare platforms test existing U.S.

capabilities. At the other end, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the risks of over-reliance on exquisite capabilities, particularly against adversaries willing to endure significant costs in a protracted conflict.

If confirmed, I will fully assess USEUCOM requirements and develop options to mitigate shortfalls, ensuring mission success.

45. In your assessment, does the United States have sufficient air and missile defense capability and capacity to defend critical infrastructure, such as command and control locations and air bases, against cruise missile attack? If not, what do you perceive as the areas of highest risk?

The U.S. possesses capable systems but in limited capacity due to the growing variety of threats. Cruise missile threats remain a challenge, and while systems like Patriot are effective, they are not optimized for low-flying missiles. Additionally, USEUCOM lacks sufficient capacity to unilaterally protect all U.S. critical infrastructure in Europe, relying significantly on Host Nation and NATO contributions. If confirmed, I will review USEUCOM's critical asset lists and conduct a comprehensive risk assessment. I look forward to sharing the results with the committee in a classified setting.

46. How do you view the relative value of permanent versus rotational forces in the EUCOM AOR? How does that relative value change for different kinds of units/formations?

Permanent forces in any AOR enhance responsiveness, interoperability, and regional familiarity; strengthen Host Nation and Ally/partner relationships; and support integrated planning, enabling rapid crisis response.

Rotational forces offer flexibility to address global demands and bolster deterrence through a visible, scalable presence, and demonstrate the U.S.'s unique ability to rapidly project combat power around the world. Rotational forces also allow tailored deployments while managing force availability across theaters. However, using rotational forces for enduring requirements often strains readiness cycles and reduces long-term force readiness.

The relative value of these two models for force deployment depends on the unit and mission. Permanent enablers and headquarters ensure sustained integration, while well-structured rotations with prepositioned stocks can meet operational needs while maintaining strategic flexibility.

47. If confirmed, are there specific enhancements you would recommend to U.S. capabilities and force posture in Europe to support the Interim National Defense Strategy Guidance more effectively?

The current global security environment makes it essential for us to transfer a greater share of the responsibility for the conventional defense in Europe to our Allies. To achieve this, we must identify the U.S. capabilities essential for defending both our homeland and U.S. interests globally, while continuing to encourage increased Allied contributions to collective security. If confirmed, this will be a primary focus of my 90-day assessment.

48. Some have suggested that NATO should adopt a strategy of “deterrence by denial,” by positioning credible forces capable of threatening Russia if it seeks to act along NATO’s eastern flank. What are your views on the concept of deterrence by denial?

NATO's commitment to collective defense requires Allies to maintain credible combat forces to deter, and if necessary, defeat aggression. As such, it is important that all of our NATO Allies continue making the necessary investments to field these capabilities consistent with NATO's planning requirements.

49. What is your understanding of the operational value of the *Arleigh Burke* class destroyers homeported in Rota, Spain?

Forward basing the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers provides a flexible and responsive offensive and ballistic missile defense capability closer to the point of operational need. This geographical proximity allows these destroyers to be used in either the European, African or Central Command theaters. The ongoing conflict between Israel and Iran illustrates the utility of these forward based capabilities to protect U.S. interests and personnel in both in Europe and the Middle East.

50. What are the benefits and challenges of returning to a permanent station model in Europe?

Permanently stationed forces increase deterrence, accelerate NATO capability development through training and exercises, and build a deeper understanding of the operational environment. Over the longer term, permanently stationed forces are less expensive than enduring rotational forces, given the same theater presence.

The greatest impediment to increased permanently stationed units in Europe is the time and resources required to build the infrastructure necessary to support permanent stationing. Poland offers a model for how to offset some of the financial and logistical

burden, as was done through the 2020 U.S.-Poland Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement.

51. What are the benefits and challenges to the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with Poland?

The U.S.-Poland Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), signed in August 2020, establishes a detailed framework for U.S. military presence in Poland, and a mechanism for the burden-sharing support. Under its two key programs, Poland Provided Infrastructure (PPI) and Poland Provided Logistics Support (PPLS), the EDCA provides joint use and unimpeded access by U.S. forces at 19 Agreed Facilities and Areas (AFA) throughout the country. PPI includes Poland construction contributions of approximately \$3.6B over the next 10-20 years. The cost avoidance realized through PPLS is currently estimated at \$270M annually and is anticipated to grow in future years.

52. If confirmed, would you advocate for making the current U.S. rotational presence in Poland permanent?

The U.S. presence in Poland provide access to key terrain for rapid employment throughout the EUCOM area of responsibility. Poland is a model ally, providing approximately \$270M in logistics support for nearly 10,000 U.S. rotational service members. To date, Poland has committed over \$5B in infrastructure projects to specifically support U.S. current and future force presence. If confirmed, I would evaluate any potential changes to the current rotational model in my 90-day assessment.

EUCOM Logistics

53. How is DOD addressing logistical challenges involving the movement of supplies, equipment, and fuel?

In general, prepositioning stocks of critical ammunition, fuel, and equipment in strategic locations across the theater is a key risk mitigation for logistical challenges in any theater. If confirmed, I intend to work with Allies on this, including developing support agreements to improve and further develop military mobility corridors. I also intend to leverage co-production/co-development and NATO's Security Investment Program funding to drive Alliance strategic investments in physical infrastructure like roads, railways, ammunition storage, fuel storage, and ports. Finally, I will work with Allies and the European Union to digitize customs forms and processes to streamline procedures that routinely risk delaying force flows and support across Europe's distribution networks.

54. What military capabilities do you consider most critical for operations in a contested logistical environment and do you consider current Department of Defense investment in these capabilities sufficient?

Combat operations in a contested logistics environment require a coordinated response across the Joint Force and U.S. and Allied governments to create resilient, redundant and responsive distribution network. Prepositioned stocks, rapid mobility, and investments in new sustainment technologies and capabilities provide critical advantages in a contested logistics environment. If confirmed, I will be a strong advocate for continued investment and prioritization of funding for the fielding and protection of innovative logistics capabilities, such as AI-enabled tools with predictive analytics and autonomous distribution systems.

55. How much reliance does DOD have on commercial companies or partners to move military supplies and equipment? How much can we rely on these commercial companies or partners during wartime?

Overreliance on commercial companies and partners is a particular concern during combat operations when commercial companies likely cannot or will not operate. In addition, the cyber vulnerabilities of commercial companies present risk to military data and systems. During wartime, I expect the nationalization of commercial assets would mean many are no longer available for U.S. movement of materiel. If confirmed, I would assess USEUCOM and NATO logistics concepts to identify and mitigate military risks inherent in reliance on commercial vendors for logistical support.

As lead for intra-theater logistics, the Army has employed its Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) extensively in support of its rotational presence in Europe. However, the U.S. Government Accountability Office has noted many deficiencies in the Army's management of the program, and the Army has recently issued stop work notices due to lack of funding for them.

56. What value do you place in APS and what recommendations would you make to the Army for management of the program, if confirmed?

Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) are critical to operational plans worldwide, including in Europe. I understand APS-2 provides essential capabilities, particularly for Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs), which are vital for certain contingency plans. If confirmed, I would collaborate with the Army to prioritize the readiness of existing APS-2 sets and regularly assess their status as a key component of warfighting readiness.

Space and Cyber

57. What is your assessment of Russia's space and counter-space capabilities? How big of a threat is it to the command?

Russia possesses a wide array of space and counter-space capabilities, including ground-based anti-satellite systems, electronic warfare systems, high-power ASAT lasers, and direct-ascent missiles. These systems threaten critical warfighting capabilities, such as GPS, radar, communications, satellites, and surveillance. These and other emerging capabilities pose a significant threat to operational plans. If confirmed, I would work with the U.S. Space Force, U.S. Space Command, and our allies to ensure we can counter or mitigate these risks effectively.

58. To what extent are EUCOM's ISR capabilities resilient, and what is EUCOM's plan for ISR in contested environments?

As the Joint Staff J3, I am aware of EUCOM's diverse array of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, ranging from strategic platforms like the U-2 to tactical drones and robust satellite networks. This layered network mitigates the vulnerabilities of standalone systems and counters adversaries' intent and ability to exploit such systems. In my view, a multilayered network of terrestrial, airborne, and space-based systems provides the necessary redundancy and diversification to conduct ISR in contested environments. If confirmed, I will include and evaluations of EUCOM's ability to conduct contested ISR in my 90-day assessment.

59. What is your assessment of NATO's readiness to detect, deter, and respond to attacks from adversaries in the cyber domain?

If confirmed, I will conduct an assessment of NATO's readiness in the cyber domain. The cyber threat landscape is dynamic, characterized by persistent and increasingly sophisticated attacks from both state and non-state actors. Countering these threats requires sustained investment in advanced technologies, resilient infrastructure, and a highly skilled cyber workforce. In my experience, a laser-like focus on proactive threat hunting and incident response planning is critical to staying ahead of evolving adversary tactics. If confirmed, I would demand this focus.

60. Do you have any recommendations for how we might enhance or expand collaboration in cyber with NATO partners, including for cyber tool development or intelligence sharing?

If confirmed, I would ensure USEUCOM continues to support and coordinate with allies and partners across the cyber domain. Operationalizing NATO's cyberspace capability targets, particularly those focused on cyberspace effects, is essential to enhancing the Alliance's posture in this critical domain. I would also explore joint cyber tool development with Allies, partnering in areas such as vulnerability research and malware analysis to maximize resource efficiency and strengthen collective defense.

61. How is the command structured to task CYBERCOM for direct operational support in order to execute cyber operations in its area of responsibility?

Similar to other Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC), USEUCOM maintains a dedicated liaison element within USCYBERCOM and its USEUCOM-aligned component, staffed by Air Force Cyber personnel, ensuring a clear and established communication channel for requesting operational support. Tasking follows established USCYBERCOM procedures outlined in EXORDs and other guidance, utilizing a tiered request process that begins with informal consultations and escalates to formal taskings. USEUCOM leverages this process to request offensive cyberspace support by nominating targets and entities of interest aligned with CDRUSEUCOM's campaign objectives. When cyber effect executions are conducted, the desired timing and tempo is controlled by the supported GCC.

62. How are forces in your area of responsibility organized to execute tactical cyber operations that directly support your operational or contingency plans?

Forces within the USEUCOM area of responsibility represent USCYBERCOM and Joint Force HQ-Cyber (Air Force), serving as the primary conduit for national cyber elements supporting USEUCOM campaign planning. When required, these elements are able to integrate into Joint Task Force structures, providing dedicated support for operational planning and execution. If confirmed, I would continue efforts to embed cyberspace planners in key strategic and operational units in order to facilitate rapid identification of emerging threats and operational priorities.

Nuclear Posture

63. In your view, what role does the U.S. strategic nuclear triad play in the security of the EUCOM AOR?

Strategic U.S. nuclear forces are foundational to global security, including in Europe. Forward-deployed U.S. weapons and Allied capabilities strengthen deterrence and serve as a critical backstop for the NATO Alliance.

64. Do you agree, in full, to article 9 of the July 10, 2024, NATO Washington Summit Communiqué and in particular “The fundamental purpose of NATO’s nuclear capability is to preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.”

Yes. NATO's nuclear capabilities are essential to the Alliance's security. NATO's status as a nuclear Alliance deters aggression, prevents coercion, and preserves peace across the Euro-Atlantic.

65. Do you support the forward deployment in Europe of United States' nuclear weapon with capabilities and infrastructure by allies?

Yes. Forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons are an essential military element of NATO's deterrence and collective defense missions.

In 2024 Russia modified its nuclear doctrine to put greater emphasis on the circumstances in which it would consider nuclear weapons employment.

66. In your view, does the NATO Alliance need to make any adjustments in response to Russia's nuclear rhetoric?

Russia's recent modifications to its nuclear doctrine suggest a potentially lower threshold for nuclear weapons use. This change, combined with a broader pattern of nuclear development and rhetoric from Russia, warrants a re-evaluation of our own posture. If confirmed, I intend to conduct a comprehensive assessment of these implications and would work to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent as part of my 90-day assessment.

China

67. In your view, what are the EUCOM and NATO activities most important to mitigating the potential strategic implications of Chinese influence and investments across the AOR?

Maintaining Alliance unity is essential for countering Chinese influence, especially given the growing strategic convergence and cooperation between Russia and China. Exposing and countering Russian and Chinese information campaigns and coercive activities aimed at undermining this unity is a critical first step. If confirmed, I would prioritize intelligence efforts to fully understand the implications and military vulnerabilities stemming from Russia and China's collaboration.

68. Are you engaged with the Office of Strategic Capital or other economic competition organizations within the Department to sense, assess, and act on malign economic actions or adversarial capital by China in your AOR? Do you leverage any dedicated liaison with any of these organizations to support you?

If confirmed, I would coordinate closely within DoD and across the U.S. interagency to identify, track, and challenge capital investments and efforts by China and China-based corporations to acquire U.S. and other western nation sensitive controlled commodities.

Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) in the EUCOM AOR

69. What is your understanding of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy as it relates to the EUCOM AOR?

The U.S. counterterrorism strategy in USEUCOM's AOR focuses on building partner capacity, intelligence sharing, and deterring threats. With drug cartels now designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, EUCOM is expanding cooperation with European allies to track financial networks, disrupt cartel-linked operations, and confront the overlap of terrorism, organized crime, and hybrid threats.

70. How would you assess the effectiveness of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy and associated activities in addressing the threat posed by violent extremist organizations? What changes, if any, would you recommend?

The U.S. counterterrorism strategy has been effective in addressing threats from Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs). However, with drug cartels now designated as VEOs, additional efforts are needed to counter this specific threat. If confirmed, I would expand cooperation with European allies to track financial networks, disrupt cartel-linked operations, and address the convergence of terrorism, organized crime, and hybrid threats.

71. Within the EUCOM AOR, what do you consider the highest counterterrorism priorities?

If confirmed, I would initially focus on disrupting Balkan-based drug trafficking organizations with connections to cartels in the Western Hemisphere that are moving drugs across the southwest border of the U.S.

72. What is your assessment of the threat posed by Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other violent extremist organizations to the EUCOM AOR?

Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other violent extremist organizations will almost certainly pose a continuing threat to the USEUCOM AOR over the next three to five years. Over the past 12 months, events in the Middle East have fueled extremist sentiment, leading to increased terrorist propaganda and attack plots targeting the West. The ability of inspired or lone-actor terrorists to conduct small-scale attacks using rudimentary methods with little to no warning remains an enduring challenge for our security forces.

73. What is your assessment of Russia's role in supporting violent extremist groups in the EUCOM AOR? If confirmed, how would you work with partners and allies to counter this support?

I have seen no evidence of Russia directly supporting violent extremist groups in the EUCOM AOR. However, in 2024, Russian intelligence orchestrated a campaign of arson and sabotage in Europe, targeting commercial and cultural sites as well as Western military support for Ukraine.

If confirmed, I would focus on enhancing intelligence fusion, strengthening intelligence sharing, and building capacity with allies and partners. I would develop a comprehensive approach, integrating NATO intelligence, EU security mechanisms, and bilateral relationships to leverage partner strengths and address vulnerabilities.

NATO—European Union Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS)

74. How would you characterize the NATO-European Union (EU) relationship today?

I see a healthy NATO-EU relationship as a vital partnership for European security, and one requires ongoing coordination to ensure alignment and avoid redundancy. If confirmed, I would work to ensure both organizations work together towards common goals to ensure the most credible basis for deterrence in Europe. My goal would be to sustain a complementary relationship where NATO continues to increase defense spending to bolster collective security, while the EU leverages economic and political tools to support stability and resilience.

75. What role does the EU play in ensuring that the United States and our NATO allies are able to deter and, if necessary, defeat Russian aggression?

The EU strengthens deterrence by complementing NATO's military efforts, specifically through increasing capabilities to counter hybrid threats and bolster European resilience. Importantly, the EU also supports the development of a stronger European defense industrial base, a critical component of Europe's ability to defend against Russian aggression.

76. Does the 2024 EU Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and the new Security Action For Europe (SAFE) program compliment or compete with NATO's Defense Production Action Plan?

In my opinion, any investment in the European defense industrial base is a positive development. The transatlantic industrial base is already substantially integrated, as evidenced by the reliance of U.S. defense exports on EU content ranging from imported components to high-end European machining tools. Thus, to maximize effectiveness, European investments should prioritize transatlantic cooperation, avoid duplication, and remain aligned with NATO's strategic priorities.

77. Should the U.S. encourage the use of EDIS and SAFE to meet NATO capability targets?

I support and encourage Allied investment in NATO capabilities, provided they prioritize strengthening the transatlantic Alliance and maintain interoperability. If confirmed, I will ensure USEUCOM continues to play a vital role in fostering communication and coordination between the U.S., NATO, and the EU.

78. In your opinion, is the European Union acting in a complimentary role to NATO's security objectives, or counter to them?

The European Union can assist NATO by facilitating increased investments in the U.S. and European Defense Industrial Bases. The EU can also help by easing red tape and bureaucratic hurdles which complicate the military mission in Europe.

79. If confirmed, what lines of effort would you focus on to increase coordination between the two organizations?

If confirmed, I would suggest clarifying roles and responsibilities for NATO and EU to ensure complementary and coordinated efforts on the defense industrial base and Allied modernization. NATO should define the military requirements and identify gaps. By comparison, the EU organizes and coordinates whole-of-government systems and infrastructure across Europe to fill the requirements and gaps. Continued EU focus on coordinating and synchronizing industrial capacity; coordinating for procurement and distribution of raw materials, supplies, and energy; seeking agreements for cross-border transportation; and establishing adaptable logistics distribution networks and nodes are all in NATO's interest.

Balkans

The NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) includes approximately 600 U.S. service members. KFOR's mission is to assist in maintaining a safe and secure environment in Kosovo, consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and to support the development of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF).

80. In your view, does KFOR remain an essential deterrent to instability in the Western Balkans?

Yes. Continued U.S., Ally, and partner contributions to KFOR deter conflict and maintain stability in Kosovo and the Western Balkans region. KFOR is a model for effective Ally and partner cooperation, encouraging joint ownership of and regional responsibility for security.

81. What do you see as the major challenges in the Western Balkans? What is EUCOM's role in addressing these challenges?

The Western Balkans' regional progress faces significant challenges from a complex array of ethnic tensions, political instability, and economic hardship. If confirmed, I would ensure EUCOM continues to support Allies and partners conducting Alliance operations in the region. I would also continue EUCOM efforts to build military capacity through engagements, exercises, and visible deterrence. A stable Western Balkans allows the United States and Europe to focus on other critical strategic priorities.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

82. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer yes or no.

Yes.

83. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.

Yes.

84. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.

Yes.

85. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic

communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer yes or no.

Yes.

86. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.

Yes.

87. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer yes or no.

Yes.

88. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer yes or no.

Yes.