

PREPARED STATEMENT OF
THE HONORABLE DAVID J. TRACHTENBERG
SENIOR SCHOLAR, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY
FORMER DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

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Chairperson Fischer, Ranking Member King, and members of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to participate in this hearing on President Trump's Golden Dome for America initiative. It is an honor to testify before you today. Madam Chairperson, I would ask that my full statement be submitted for the record.

I have been asked to comment on the strategic threat environment facing the United States and the larger policy issues relating to the Golden Dome effort. My views on this are a matter of public record and some of my testimony today will reflect what I wrote in an *Occasional Paper* published last year by the National Institute for Public Policy titled, *Next Steps in Homeland Missile Defense*.¹ I would also like to submit that paper for the record.

I would like to focus on three issues: First, does the strategic threat to the homeland justify the Golden Dome effort? Second, what impediments exist that may stifle progress on Golden Dome? And third, what should be done to overcome these impediments and how might this committee, and Congress more generally, help accomplish this?

Regarding the strategic threat to the homeland, there is no question that the United States is increasingly vulnerable to attack by a variety of missile threats, including ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles, as well as from unmanned aerial systems or drones.² Major adversaries such as China and Russia are expanding their strategic missile capabilities with ever greater numbers of sophisticated nuclear and conventional missile systems. China possesses what has been described as the largest and most sophisticated ballistic missile arsenal in Asia and is "conducting the most significant expansion of its missile systems in its history."³

Since the end of the Cold War, the missile threat to the United States has evolved in ways that complicate defense of the homeland. Ballistic missiles have been seen as the

¹ David J. Trachtenberg, *Next Steps in Homeland Missile Defense*, Occasional Paper, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, January 2025), <https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Vol.-5-No.-1.pdf>.

² Glen VanHerck, "Why the Golden Dome Is Essential for Homeland Defense," *The National Interest*, August 24, 2026, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-the-golden-dome-is-essential-for-homeland-defense>.

³ Statement by General Michael A. Guetlein before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Senate Armed Services Committee, April 27, 2026, p. 3, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/guetlein_opening_statement.pdf.

weapon of choice for states seeking to reign terror upon an adversary, as they are difficult to counter. Today, more than 30 countries possess ballistic missiles of varying ranges and capabilities.⁴ Moreover, the ballistic missile threat has been augmented by newer, more sophisticated, types of missiles that are even more difficult to counter. These include hypersonic missiles, cruise missiles, and other types of unmanned aerial systems like drones.

As the director of the Golden Dome for America initiative, General Michael Guetlein, has testified, “A new generation of advanced air and missile threats, unprecedented in their speed, numbers, and lethality, now holds the American homeland at risk.”⁵ As even the Biden Administration’s 2022 *Missile Defense Review* noted, “missile-related threats have rapidly expanded in quantity, diversity and sophistication. U.S. national security interests are increasingly at risk from wide-ranging missile arsenals that include offensive ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic weapons....”⁶ And as one former Biden Administration official put it more starkly in congressional testimony, “Offensive missiles are increasingly weapons of choice for Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, for use in conflict and to coerce and intimidate their neighbors.”⁷

The utility of ballistic, cruise, and other types of missiles in combat has been demonstrated by their effective use in recent conflicts. For example, Azerbaijan’s extensive use of unmanned aerial vehicles or drones in the second war over Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 led to an impressive victory over Armenian forces. In addition, in the first two years since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia launched more than 11,000 missiles at Ukraine, including ballistic, cruise, unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), and hypersonic missiles.⁸ By some reports, Russia has fired more than 2,000

⁴ Kelsey Davenport, “Worldwide Ballistic Missile Inventories,” *Arms Control Association Fact Sheet*, August 2023, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/worldwide-ballistic-missileinventories>.

⁵ Cited in Sana Pashankar, “Pentagon Sets Funds, Dates for Secret Golden Dome Space Program,” *Bloomberg News*, August 7, 2026, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-07/pentagon-sets-funds-dates-for-secret-golden-dome-space-program>.

⁶ Department of Defense, 2022 *Missile Defense Review*, p. 1, <https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.pdf>.

⁷ Testimony of Dr. John Plumb before the Senate Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee, May 18, 2022, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ASD%20Plumb%20SASC%20SF%20Missile%20Defense%20Written%20Statement%20-%20May,18%202022_FINAL.pdf.

⁸ Benjamin Jensen and Yasir Atalan, “Assessing Russian Firepower Strikes in Ukraine,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 23, 2024, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/assessing-russian-firepower-strikesukraine>.

cruise missiles against Ukrainian targets,⁹ including launching more than 100 cruise missiles and drones in a single attack in December 2023 and again in November 2024.¹⁰ In July of this year, Ukraine reported some 265 cruise missile attacks and more than 8,600 drone strikes.¹¹ In May, Russia targeted Ukraine with nuclear-capable “Oreshnik” intermediate-range ballistic missiles with hypersonic capabilities.¹²

The growing threat of faster, longer-range, and more deadly ballistic, cruise, hypersonic, and other unmanned missiles and systems means that the United States is increasingly at risk of more complex missile attacks, including those employing sophisticated countermeasures. Consequently, missile defense of the U.S. homeland must address these multiple types of threats, either singly or in combination, on an urgent basis.

Importantly, the growth and sophistication of adversary missile systems complicate overall U.S. force planning and may discourage U.S. military action in theaters where the risk of enemy responses against American and allied personnel, bases, and infrastructure may be considered too great. In this way, adversary offensive missile systems can dissuade U.S. leaders from taking necessary actions in support of U.S. interests abroad. This dynamic may have a chilling effect on U.S. decision making and freedom of action. As missile threats to the homeland grow, the United States may be deterred by adversary coercive nuclear or conventional threats, unwilling to risk the potential consequences of an opponent’s response to U.S. military action—even when such action is justified. In this way, missile systems need not be employed in combat to have a significant dissuasive effect on U.S. actions. An effective missile defense system

⁹ Valentyna Romanenko, “Russia has launched 2,437 cruise missiles since February 2022 – Ukraine’s Air Force spokesperson,” *Ukrainska Pravda*, June 3, 2025,

<https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/06/03/7515375/>.

¹⁰ See Victoria Butenko, Maria Kostenko, Mariya Knight, Svitlana Vlasova and Christian Edwards, “Russia unleashes biggest air attack on Ukraine since start of full-scale invasion,” *CNN*, December 30, 2023,

<https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/29/europe/ukrainerussia-airstrikes-intl-hnk/index.html>; David Brennan, “Russia launches ‘massive’ drone and missile energy blitz across Ukraine,” *ABC News*, November 28, 2024, <https://abcnews.go.com/International/russia-launches-massivedrone-missile-energy-blitz-ukraine/story?id=116299874>.

¹¹ Cited at <https://www.facebook.com/themilitarychannelusa/posts/read-ukraines-ministry-of-defense-reported-that-russian-forces-launched-265-crui/122225686334902462/>.

¹² Tetyana Oliynyk, “Putin says Oreshnik missile was fired against Ukraine to ‘conveniently observe impact’,” *Ukrainska Pravda*, June 4, 2026,

<https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/04/8037802/>; Yuliia Dysa and Max Hunder, “Russia hits Ukraine with Oreshnik missile in one of war’s biggest attacks on Kyiv,” *Reuters*, May 23, 2026, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-capital-kyiv-hit-by-massive-missile-drone-attack-2026-05-23/>.

can help to mitigate the dissuasive effect of enemy missile threats. Moreover, as long as the U.S. homeland remains vulnerable to expanding missile threats and the proclivities of opponents to threaten actual nuclear use, the United States may be increasingly reluctant to take military action in support of threatened allies and friends. This would undermine longstanding U.S. extended deterrence policy.

In 2023, the congressionally mandated, bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission noted that “to date the United States has chosen to not build homeland missile defenses against major powers” and that U.S. homeland defense capabilities “do not adequately protect the critical infrastructure necessary to project power and avoid coercion in light of growing Russian and Chinese nuclear and conventional strike threats.”¹³ Consequently, the Commission recommended that the United States “develop and field homeland IAMD [integrated air and missile defense] capabilities that can deter and defeat coercive attacks by Russia and China.”¹⁴ The Trump Administration should publicly endorse the bipartisan conclusions of the Strategic Posture Commission and accelerate efforts to enhance U.S. missile defense capabilities in light of the growing missile threat to the homeland.

Second, what are the most significant impediments to Golden Dome’s success? I believe they reflect more political, bureaucratic, and institutional biases rather than technological or fiscal challenges.

Progress in homeland missile defense has been stymied by outdated Cold War nostrums, anemic funding, lack of prioritization, organizational and bureaucratic roadblocks, and ideologically based political opposition. Political opposition to Golden Dome is rooted in the Cold War notion that defending the nation from missile attacks is unnecessary and destabilizing – unnecessary because deterrence is and will remain reliable, and destabilizing because it will spark an arms race as others seek to build even more offensive capabilities to overwhelm the defense. Both notions are seriously flawed and based on dubious assumptions or demonstrably false.

The notion that deterrence can be relied on to succeed indefinitely is a comforting but likely unrealistic proposition, especially in light of Moscow’s extensive nuclear

¹³ Madelyn R. Creedon, Jon L. Kyl, et al., *America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States*, October 2023, p. 28, <https://www.ida.org/assets/2026/06/18084611/Strategic-Posture-Commission-Report.pdf>.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. X, 72, 105.

building program, its belligerent actions—including its full-scale invasion of Ukraine—and its numerous bellicose nuclear threats against the West. In addition, China’s massive expansion of its own nuclear arsenal, its increasingly aggressive posturing over Taiwan, and its growing military collaboration with Russia as part of what has been called the “Axis of Authoritarians” suggest that the prospect of coercive nuclear threats and opportunistic aggression in a two-nuclear-peer environment is a growing and realistic concern.

Moreover, the notion that Golden Dome will spark a U.S.-driven “action-reaction” offensive arms race as adversaries seek to counter it is belied by the fact that adversaries have been developing more sophisticated nuclear-capable offensive missiles for years while the United States has not. Indeed, the oft-cited notion that U.S. actions are the primary driver of adversary reactions and the corollary notion that U.S. restraint will engender adversary restraint have been disproven by history.¹⁵

In addition, some opponents argue that Golden Dome can never be 100 percent effective against large, sophisticated missile threats. But perfection, of course, is not the objective. Heightening the uncertainty of success in an adversary’s calculation of whether to launch an attack in the first place strengthens deterrence. And providing some protection against the possible failure of deterrence is, in my view, the only morally acceptable course of action for a government whose primary constitutional duty is to protect the safety and security of Americans. In light of the growing threats to U.S. security from both peer nuclear adversaries and rogue states, the time has come to abandon the outdated thinking that American vulnerability to missile attack is a stabilizing feature of the international environment.

There is also an institutional bias within the Pentagon and the defense establishment that has worked against progress on improved missile defenses. This bias is the result of many factors, including a lack of understanding of deterrence issues, a belief that nuclear use by adversaries against the homeland is a far-fetched possibility, a focus on speculative and often inflated cost estimates, the desire to spend limited resources on what are perceived to be other more urgent priorities, a culture of risk avoidance, and concerns over technological feasibility, especially defenses in space.

Experts who understand the technical aspects of missile defense, including former directors of the Missile Defense Agency, have stated that Golden Dome is both cost-effective and technologically feasible. As one noted, “Moving to space is the only way to

¹⁵ See, for example, Hon. David J. Trachtenberg, Study Director, Dr. Michaela Dodge, and Dr. Keith B. Payne, *The “Action-Reaction” Arms Race Narrative vs. Historical Realities* (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, March 2021), <https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Action-Reaction-pub.pdf>.

defeat a growing quantity and quality of adversary threats. It is the only means to provide an effective boost/ascent phase missile defense capability essential to defeat current and future threats. There is simply no other technically feasible option....”¹⁶ And General Guetlein noted recently that two Golden Dome tests were “phenomenally successful.”¹⁷

With respect to cost issues, I would like to comment on the various cost estimates for Golden Dome that have been circulating in the media. The CBO, for example, has estimated that the cost of Golden Dome could top \$1.2 trillion over 20 years.¹⁸ Others have estimated the cost could reach as much as \$3.6 trillion over 20 years.¹⁹ There are several points that need to be made, however, to put all such cost estimates in proper context.

First, estimating the cost of any system over a 20-year period is fraught with uncertainty and likely to be wrong, perhaps wildly so. It is based on certain assumptions regarding technology development, programmatic architecture, industrial base support, and other variables that are not necessarily valid. Indeed, some may be unknown and unknowable at present.²⁰ General Guetlein has stated that the CBO estimate is an uninformed “myth” and does not accurately portray the planned Golden Dome architecture, noting that “sensational cost estimates” are “all false.”²¹ Of course, it is not unusual for the cost of any program to look exorbitant and prohibitive to the average person if extended over a period of two decades. Indeed, the cost of conventional force modernization may be in the trillions of dollars if estimated over a period of several decades, but that is not a valid argument for forgoing necessary conventional force

¹⁶ Lt. Gen. Henry “Trey” Obering, III (Ret.), Remarks at symposium on “Overcoming the Roadblocks to Homeland Missile Defense,” hosted by National Institute for Public Policy, July 20, 2022, printed in *Journal of Policy & Strategy*, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 104, <https://nipp.org/wpcontent/uploads/2023/03/Proceedings-July-2022.pdf>.

¹⁷ Thomas Novelty, “‘There is no Golden Dome’ unless Congress prioritizes funding, general warns,” *Defense One*, August 11, 2026, https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2026/08/golden-dome-congress-general/415355/?utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru.

¹⁸ David Arthur and Christopher Martin, et. al., “Potential Costs of a National Missile Defense System,” Congressional Budget Office, May 2026, <https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2026-05/62379-golden-dome.pdf>.

¹⁹ Todd Harrison, *Build Your Own Golden Dome: A Framework for Understanding Costs, Choices, and Tradeoffs*, AEI Foreign & Defense Policy Working Paper 2025-20, September 2025, <https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/WP-Estimating-the-Cost-of-Golden-Dome.pdf?x68881>.

²⁰ For a critical assessment of the CBO methodology, see Christopher Stone, “A Response to the Opponents of Space-Based Interceptors in Golden Dome,” *RealClear Defense*, June 23, 2026, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2026/06/23/a_response_to_the_opponents_of_space-based_interceptors_in_golden_dome_1190312.html.

²¹ Novelty, op. cit.; Also see Rachel S. Cohen, “Golden Dome cost estimate draws Pentagon pushback,” *Federal News Network*, August 20, 2026, <https://federalnewsnetwork.com/defense-main/2026/08/golden-dome-cost-estimate-draws-pentagon-pushback/>.

enhancements. The publicly postulated cost estimates for Golden Dome may be right or wrong, but allowing such speculative, crystal ball-like estimates to drive policy decisions, regardless of the methodology used, is shortsighted and unwise.

Second, there is an unfortunate tendency by many to confuse cost with value. The two are not synonymous. The cost of Golden Dome may indeed be high in monetary terms, but that cost may pale in significance to the value Golden Dome provides in defending the nation from the growing threat of missile attack. Indeed, Golden Dome is intended not only to protect the United States against possible missile attack but also to strengthen deterrence of such an attack in the first place by diminishing the odds that an aggressor can count on successfully achieving his military objectives. And in weighing cost, it is important to consider the cost of rebuilding a major American city should deterrence fail, for whatever reason. In this regard, Golden Dome is the nation's ultimate insurance policy, and, in my view, its value as both a deterrent to missile attack and a defense against such an attack far exceeds its cost. If we are not willing to pay the premium for the protection it promises, then we must shoulder the potentially catastrophic consequences that may flow from accepting the risk of deterrence failure.

Finally, those who assert that Golden Dome is "unaffordable" are confusing the issue of affordability with spending preferences. In other words, it is not that Golden Dome is unaffordable, but rather that critics believe the fiscal resources it requires would be better spent on other priorities.²² Let me be clear: There is a legitimate debate to be had over the proper prioritization of limited defense resources, but suggesting that speculative and extreme cost estimates make the Golden Dome effort unaffordable is misleading at best and disingenuous at worst.

Ultimately, it is a question of whether the nation is willing to accept the risk of remaining relatively defenseless in perpetuity against emerging, more sophisticated, and more capable adversary missile threats to the homeland, including those posed by major nuclear adversaries like Russia and China. I would hope the Congress' answer to this question would be a resounding no.

²² For a discussion of this issue as it relates to spending on nuclear weapons programs, see Dr. Keith B. Payne and Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., et. al., *A New Nuclear Review for a New Age* (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, April 2017), pp. 185-198, <https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/A-New-Nuclear-Review-final.pdf>.

Finally, there is the question of what should be done to overcome these impediments and how this committee, and Congress more generally, might help accomplish this. On this question, I would make several observations.

First, it is important for the Congress to reaffirm its clear and unequivocal support for Golden Dome in the NDAA and to codify as a matter of policy that the United States shall be defended against all types of missile threats, of any range, launched from any location. Over the years, congressional language has been schizophrenic on this issue, sometimes expressing support for a more robust missile defense capability, other times favoring a missile defense system that can counter only limited missile threats to the homeland and stating that it is U.S. policy to rely on strategic deterrence and the threat of nuclear retaliation rather than active defenses to protect the nation against more sophisticated long-range missile threats from peer adversaries.

I commend the Congress for modifying U.S. missile defense policy in the FY2026 NDAA by declaring that it is the policy of the United States to defend against “the threat of foreign attack by increasingly complex ballistic, hypersonic glide, and cruise missiles, and other advanced aerial threats,” without restricting this effort to limited missile threats or rogue state actors only.²³ While the language also recognizes that our nuclear deterrent remains an essential component of our deterrent posture, it should be augmented by active defensive measures to guard against the risk of deterrence failure. Golden Dome promises just that.

Second, Congress needs to exercise fully its oversight role to ensure the administration moves out swiftly and smartly to make the promise of Golden Dome a reality. This includes support for, and greater investment in, space-based sensors that can provide early warning, tracking, and discrimination capabilities, as well as kinetic and non-kinetic defensive intercept capabilities, including directed energy systems. In this regard, Israel’s experience with its “Iron Beam” system may be instructive. Directed energy technology can potentially change the offense-defense cost curve significantly in favor of the defense, nullifying one of the most frequently cited arguments against missile defense, namely, that defensive interceptors are significantly more costly than the offensive missiles they are intended to counter.

As adversary missile threats grow and become increasingly capable, the role of space-based assets takes on greater significance and should be pursued with all due urgency. The benefits of developing a space-based intercept capability are numerous. It would allow longer-range missiles to be countered in their boost-phase, when they are

²³ Section 1651 of the *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026* (Public Law 119-60), December 18, 2025, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-119publ60/pdf/PLAW-119publ60.pdf>.

most vulnerable due to highly visible signatures while their engines are burning, or in their ascent-phase prior to payload separation. A boost- or ascent-phase defense would also allow the destruction of missiles over enemy territory rather than over U.S. soil. This, in itself, could serve as a powerful deterrent to missile attack. And it would also help mitigate the technical challenges faced by terrestrial mid-course and terminal missile defense systems that face geographic, trajectory, and other limitations and are likely to encounter enemy decoys and countermeasures.²⁴ Cold War-era platitudes that space-based defenses will result in the “militarization of space” or the “weaponization of space” ignore decades of adversary efforts to develop and improve anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities, fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS), and other counter-space activities. In short, the time to debate the value of space for the missile defense mission is over.

Third, a “business-as-usual” approach to missile defense is inadequate. To its credit, the Trump Administration is seeking to accelerate the acquisition of critical military capabilities, reduce production timelines, and rebuild the necessary defense infrastructure to stay ahead of the threat curve.²⁵ But this will require greater congressional support and commensurate, long-term funding. While there are those inside the defense establishment who will object to the Golden Dome effort as syphoning off needed funds for other priority defense projects, the potentially catastrophic consequences of failing to implement Golden Dome successfully make overcoming the critics’ objections imperative. Indeed, Executive Order 14186 makes clear that this initiative is a presidential priority,²⁶ and the administration must communicate forcefully the rationale for and importance of Golden Dome at every opportunity.

²⁴ Ian Williams and Masao Dahlgren, et al, *Boost-Phase Missile Defense: Interrogating the Assumptions*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2022, p. 1, https://csis-websiteprod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/publication/220624_Karako_BoostPhase_MissileDefense.pdf?VersionId=WjJxlNM58oru1LK21LC9untewoK_UAQD.

²⁵ See, for example, Pranshu Verma, “Pentagon presses defense firms to build weapons as Iran war depletes stocks,” *The Washington Post*, August 8, 2026, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2026/08/08/pentagon-presses-defense-firms-build-weapons-iran-war-depletes-stocks/>; Filip Timotija, “Pentagon pushing defense contractors to speed up weapons production,” *The Hill*, August 10, 2026, <https://thehill.com/policy/defense/6020032-pentagon-demands-faster-weapons-production/>; Department of War, “Department of War Launches the 'Golden Dome for America Hub' To Accelerate Industry Engagement, Revolutionize Homeland Missile Defense Partnerships,” *News Release*, August 11, 2026, <https://www.war.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4568639/departments-of-war-launches-the-golden-dome-for-america-hub-to-accelerate-indust/>.

²⁶ The White House, “The Iron Dome for America,” Executive Order 14186, January 27, 2025, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-14186-the-iron-dome-for-america>.

Although Program Managers are generally risk averse given that failure is seldom rewarded, true progress is only possible through bold action. Indeed, we often learn more from our failures than our successes, and Congress should encourage boldness in this endeavor. The stakes are too high to do otherwise.

Finally, Congress must provide the necessary fiscal resources to implement Golden Dome over the long term. This means committing to a regular and steady appropriations funding stream that is not subject to the uncertain vagaries of reconciliation bills, continuing resolutions, ill-advised programmatic trade-offs, or partisan hostage-taking. The defense of the American people requires nothing less.

In the past, Congress authorized multiyear advance appropriations to protect the nation against national security threats deemed particularly dangerous.²⁷ While such an approach for Golden Dome may be considered extraordinary and may not engender the requisite bipartisan support, I cite this example to indicate that where Congress has the will, it can surely find innovative ways to ensure that Golden Dome is adequately funded over the long term.

With these initial comments, I appreciate the opportunity to offer my views to the subcommittee and look forward to your questions. Thank you.

²⁷ “Project BioShield” was one example of a 10-year advance appropriation to defend the nation against the threat of bioterrorism and is discussed in David J. Trachtenberg, *The Lawgivers’ Struggle: How Congress Wields Power in National Security Decision Making* (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2020), pp. 242-246.

David J. Trachtenberg

The Honorable David J. Trachtenberg is Senior Scholar and former Vice President of the National Institute for Public Policy, a nonprofit research center in Fairfax, Virginia. He was nominated by President Trump and confirmed by the U.S. Senate on October 17, 2017, as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and served in this capacity until his retirement from government service in July 2019. Until January 2018, he also served as the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the principal civilian adviser to the Secretary of Defense on policy matters. He was also the senior Department of Defense civilian official responsible for DoD policy on civilian casualties resulting from military operations.

Prior to his confirmation, Mr. Trachtenberg was President and CEO of Shortwaver Consulting, LLC. Earlier, he was a Vice President at CACI and Senior Vice President for Homeland Security at National Security Research, Inc. Prior to joining NSR, Mr. Trachtenberg was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy and Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy in the George W. Bush Administration.

From 1995-2001, Mr. Trachtenberg was a Professional Staff Member with the House Committee on Armed Services (HASC) in Washington, D.C, serving as head of the committee's policy staff and staff lead for the HASC Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism.

Mr. Trachtenberg is a two-time recipient of the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service. He has testified before multiple congressional committees, is widely published, and is the author of *The Lawgivers' Struggle: How Congress Wields Power in National Security Decision Making* (2020). He is also a longtime member of the U.S. Air Force Military Auxiliary Radio System (MARS), a volunteer network of civilian amateur radio operators who provide contingency communications support to the Department of Defense and the armed forces. He holds an A.B. in International Relations from the University of Southern California and a M.S. degree in Foreign Service from Georgetown University. An adjunct professor in national security at the Arlington, Virginia campus of Missouri State University's graduate School of Defense and Strategic Studies, Mr. Trachtenberg has also been a Practitioner in Residence at Georgetown University's graduate School of Foreign Service.