

**Advance Policy Questions for Guy Roberts**  
**Nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for**  
**Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs**

**Department of Defense Reforms**

**The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included the most sweeping reforms since the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.**

**Do you support these reforms?**

Yes.

**What other areas for defense reform do you believe might be appropriate for this Committee to address?**

I do not have any specific recommendations at this time. If confirmed I would expect that in the process of implementing the FY 2017 NDAA reforms that we may identify additional changes that would be worth considering.

**The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 also required that the Secretary of Defense establish cross-functional teams to address critical objectives of the Department.**

**What are your views on the potential focus areas and uses for future cross-functional teams?**

I do not have any specific recommendations at this time. If confirmed I would expect that in the process of implementing the FY 2017 NDAA reforms that we may identify focus areas and potential teaming opportunities.

**Duties**

**Section 138 of title 10, United States Code, provides that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (ASD(NCB)) shall advise the Secretary of Defense on nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and chemical and biological defense.**

**What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the ASD(NCB)?**

The ASD(NCB) is the principal advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and the USD(AT&L) on nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and chemical and biological defense.

The ASD(NCB) is the principal advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and the USD(AT&L) for the nuclear matters and provides technical guidance to the Secretary of Defense regarding the nuclear stockpile. Nuclear Matters, under the (ASD(NCB) serves as the focal point for DoD activities and initiatives related to the dual missions of sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent and countering the threat from nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation.

## **Qualifications**

### **What background and experience do you possess that qualify you for this position?**

I have over thirty years of working arms control, anti-proliferation, deterrence and strategic stability issues. This includes:

Serving as a staff officer in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency working on the Conventional Forces in Europe and Open Skies Agreement;

While on active duty in the Marine Corps I served as an action officer on the Joint Staff with a portfolio that included the Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention, Certain Conventional Weapons Convention addressing landmines and incendiaries. I was on the U.S. delegations to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Review Conference, the Conference on Disarmament, and the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governor's' meetings on the North Korean nuclear weapons program.

As the Department of the Navy's Associate Counsel for arms control agreements, I reviewed all naval programs for compliance with strategic arms controls agreements and provided legal advice with regard to the Polaris Sales Agreement with the UK. While serving as the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy I was appointed Deputy Head of Delegation to the Biological Weapons Convention Review Conferences and I was a member of the Moscow Treaty negotiating team. I also participated in the creation and implementation of the Proliferation Security Initiative and the negotiation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 which requires states to ensure their territory is not used for WMD purposes.

As NATO's Deputy Assistant Secretary General for WMD Policy and the Director for Nuclear Policy I was responsible for NATO's Countering WMD policy and initiatives. I also oversaw NATO's nuclear deterrence posture and was one of the drafters of NATO Deterrence and Defense Posture Review.

Finally, as a private consultant I have provided subject matter expertise on arms control, non-proliferation, international legal issues and strategies to combat terrorism to over 30 international domestic organizations and institutions.

## **Major Challenges and Priorities**

**If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish?**

Maintaining a safe and secure nuclear deterrent capability, ensuring the destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile, decreasing the threat of proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and to keep WMD out of the hands of terrorists and other enemies by locking down, monitoring, and destroying weapons and weapons related materials.

**In your view, what are the major challenges that you would confront, if confirmed?**

Working to synchronize the NCB priorities to support our Combatant Commands, International Partners and Interagency collaborators without duplication of effort.

## **Relations with Congress**

**What are your views on the state of the relationship between the Office of the ASD(NCB) and the Senate Armed Services Committee in particular, and with Congress in general?**

Responsiveness to the SASC and to Congress writ large is essential so representatives can make informed legislative decisions on behalf of our Nation.

**If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a productive and mutually beneficial relationship between Congress and the Office of the ASD(NCB)?**

I will be available as needed to brief Congress and to discuss any Congressional concerns.

## **Reorganization of AT&L**

**The Department of Defense plans to divide the duties of the Under Secretary of Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics, under which the ASD(NCB) falls, into two separate organizations as of February 2018. As directed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, these will be the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering and the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment.**

**Will the Office of the ASD(NCB) be kept intact after the reorganization, and if so, under which Under Secretary will it fall?**

The leadership of the Department is working on organization decisions and plans and I am not yet privy to or party to these conversations.

**What opportunities do you see for this office under the reorganization?**

The NDAA presents an opportunity to further collaborate with our partners in Policy, Security Cooperation and CWMD to find efficiencies and build better synergistic relationships.

**If confirmed, how will you work to make sure that this office both takes advantage of advancements in research and innovation and keeps the modernization programs on schedule and within budget?**

I will work collaboratively with all stakeholders to ensure that advances in research and innovation are effectively leveraged for safeguarding the warfighter and U.S. national security, while simultaneously relaying the acquisition needs to ensure that such efforts are effectively targeted towards modernization programs. I look forward to additionally working with the other affected and interested agencies to ensure that cost, schedule, and performance goals pertaining to modernization programs are met.

### **Nuclear Weapons Council**

**Section 179 of title 10, United States Code, designates the ASD(NCB) as the Staff Director of the Nuclear Weapons Council.**

**What is your understanding of this role?**

The law directs that the DoD and the DOE/NNSA provide experts to serve as the NWC staff. Since the beginning of the NWC, the ASD(NCB) has performed the role of NWC executive secretary, in addition to the legally mandated staff director function. As executive secretary, the ASD(NCB) sets the agendas and facilitates the activities of the NWC. As staff director the ASD(NCB) also has oversight responsibilities for the NWC staff and the other subordinate organizations of the NWC.

**If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that the Nuclear Weapons Council duties are effectively executed?**

The Nuclear Weapons Council is the primary interface for coordinating nuclear weapons enterprise issues between the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy. Its top priority is to ensure the success of stockpile life extension and nuclear infrastructure modernization programs in the current fiscal environment; in particular, to advocate for the appropriate resource recommendations to ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

As the staff director and executive secretary of the NWC, I understand the need to decisively address the issues facing our nuclear program managers and to control the cost of the weapon system and warhead development programs included within our program of record. I will work with the Nuclear Weapons Council, its subordinate bodies, and its

individual members to oversee major nuclear acquisition programs, and ensure NWC annual reporting requirements are fulfilled in a timely manner.

**Are there any changes that you would recommend to the membership, organization, structure, or responsibilities of the Nuclear Weapons Council?**

If confirmed, in support of the USD, I will review the operations of the Nuclear Weapons Council and make recommendations for appropriate changes and/or request any legislative language to ensure the NWC has the necessary authorities and responsibilities to maintain the nation's capability to develop, field, and ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear weapons.

**What do you see as the challenges that the Nuclear Weapons Council will face over the next four years, and what would you do to address these challenges, if confirmed?**

The Departments of Defense and Energy each have ongoing efforts to modernize the nation's nuclear forces and weapons complex. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Nuclear Weapons Council, Air Force, Navy, and National Nuclear Security Administration, and other relevant OSD Components to ensure we successfully execute our planned modernization efforts and address emerging and future threats to deter adversaries and assure allies. In order to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent it is essential that we maintain the capability to conduct design and manufacturing of every element of that deterrent. Cost is always a consideration, but the foundational elements of remaining a nuclear weapons state cannot and should not be overlooked. Rebuilding infrastructure, some of which dates to the Manhattan Project Era, is an essential element of that, as is maintaining our intellectual capability.

In addition to ongoing efforts to modernize the nuclear enterprise, I am aware that the DoD is leading the on-going Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which will have a significant impact on our nation's plans for the future of the nuclear enterprise. I have not yet been briefed on the details of the NPR process or content. However, I would assume, based on Secretary Mattis' open testimonies on the FY18 budget, that the Nuclear Posture Review will address this issue. As he stated, "We're looking at each leg of the triad and we're looking at each weapon inside each leg. What I'm looking for is a deterrent that will be most compelling and make certain these weapons are never used."

## **Nuclear Modernization**

**Do you support and intend to advocate for the modernization of all legs of the triad of nuclear delivery vehicles?**

Yes. I fully support both Departments' ongoing efforts to modernize the nation's nuclear forces and weapons complex. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Nuclear Weapons Council, Air Force, Navy, National Nuclear Security Administration, and other relevant OSD components to ensure we successfully execute our planned modernization efforts and address emerging and future threats to deter adversaries and assure allies.

**Do you support and intend to advocate for the funding, development, and fielding of the Long-Range Stand-Off Weapon?**

I believe that the modernization of all elements of the triad are necessary. Our nation has maintained a nuclear cruise missile capability for decades, and I believe it continues to be an essential element of our deterrent capability and the Long Range Stand-Off is the logical successor for a timely modernization. I also believe that the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review will address this question more fully. That review will leave the ultimate determination to the Secretary of Defense and I will support the Secretary's position fully and completely.

**The Nuclear Weapons Council has laid out a schedule for modernization of the nuclear weapons stockpile over the next 20 years that involves life extension programs, major alterations, and interoperable warheads, in addition to maintenance of the existing stockpile systems.**

**Do you support and intend to advocate for all components of this program?**

Yes. I fully support both Departments' ongoing efforts to modernize the nation's nuclear forces and nuclear weapons complex. If confirmed, I will work through the Nuclear Weapons Council, Air Force, Navy, NNSA, and other relevant OSD components to ensure we successfully execute the planned modernization efforts to deter 21st-century threats and reassure our allies.

In addition, although I have not been briefed on the on-going NPR, I am aware of the significant impact that such a review may have on the future of the nuclear enterprise, and I would expect to incorporate outcomes from this effort into the program of record for the nuclear enterprise.

**Do you agree that programs to modernize and replace critical infrastructure, such as the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement at Los Alamos and the Uranium Processing Facility at Y-12, are national security priorities that should be addressed in a timely manner?**

Yes. It is my understanding that much of the Nation's critical nuclear infrastructure is at or beyond end of life, and no longer provides the reliability and flexibility that we need to sustain a modern nuclear deterrent. Congress has supported a significant, multi-year investment in the new Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 plant, and in recent NDAA's has expressed concern that the Nation needs to reestablish a plutonium pit production capability that supports the needs of the nation. If confirmed, I look forward to learning the details behind plans and programs to modernize and replace critical infrastructure, and how current and future infrastructure investments have been sequenced to address national security needs.

**Are the multiple components of the nuclear modernization plan appropriately sequenced and scoped in order to meet the operational needs of the commander of U.S. Strategic Command?**

I am not familiar with the details of current U.S. Strategic Command operational plans and needs, and so cannot judge how well the current nuclear modernization plan is sequenced and scoped from that perspective. However, from experience in the military and elsewhere I know that the Commander of USSTRATCOM has significant input to budgeting decisions in the Department of Defense and in nuclear weapons decisions made by the Nuclear Weapons Council. If confirmed, I will work closely within the Department of Defense and with the Department of Energy to ensure that we sequence and scope nuclear modernization plans to support our 21<sup>st</sup> century nuclear deterrent.

**How do you intend to ensure the health of the specialized industrial base needed to produce certain components of the delivery systems currently being modernized?**

The nuclear weapons enterprise within DoD is not unique in having concerns over the ability of the underlying industrial base to meet national needs. This is a much broader problem that affects a wide variety of acquisition programs in the Department of Defense. In my opinion, part of the answer is to provide clear demand signals and ensure that we try to appropriately sequence acquisitions over time, so that we don't ask our industrial partners to cycle between periods of high demand and inactivity. If confirmed, I will work with my colleagues in the DoD and DOE to see that we have aligned procurements of delivery platforms, warheads, and bombs in a way that can be met by the industrial base, and I will support the Undersecretary of Defense for AT&L in her efforts to address this problem in a broader sense across the acquisition community.

**Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications**

**Section 171a of title 10, United States Code, outlines the responsibilities for the Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System. The nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) system consists of more than 100 separate programs managed by the Navy, Air Force, or DISA. The system is aging and has suffered from inattention, yet is vitally important to**

**ensuring the President has direct control over nuclear weapons and their use, during peacetime and in crisis.**

**What role do you see for the ASD(NCB) in oversight of the NC3 system?**

The DoD Chief Information Officer has primary oversight of the NC3 system. If confirmed, I will work with CIO, Joint Staff, the Services, DISA, and other OSD Components to ensure that our NC3 system is assured and reliable at all phases of a crisis. In particular, I anticipate playing a role in oversight of the survivability of relevant NC3 systems in nuclear weapon environments.

**What actions will you take to ensure there is a long-term road-map and acquisition strategy to ensure the NC3 system meets requirements for the President?**

As USSTRATCOM Commander General Hyten has emphasized, the nuclear deterrent is only as effective as the command and control that enables it to function, and many of those systems are facing obsolescence. If confirmed, I will support the Undersecretary for AT&L and the successor Under Secretary in emphasizing a strategic approach to modernizing NC3 systems across all programs. I believe that is the best way to meet our stringent nuclear command and control requirements within our budgetary constraints.

## **Navy Shipbuilding**

**In the 1970s and 1980s, the United States procured the current *Ohio*-class submarines within the Navy's shipbuilding (SCN) account. In 2015, Congress created a special fund, the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund for procurement of *Columbia*-class SSBNs, the replacements for the *Ohio*-class SSBNs.**

**Do you have a view on how the cost of *Columbia*-class SSBNs should be funded—solely from Navy resources, from a combination of Navy and other-than-Navy (e.g., OMB and other Defense) sources, or with a different approach? If so, please explain.**

If confirmed, I will work with the DoD leadership and the US Navy to ensure that proper resourcing is provided for the *Columbia*-class SSBNs. This is a critical leg of our nation's nuclear deterrent. It is the nation's responsibility to provide the appropriate funds by any method deemed appropriate, regardless of the mechanism used.



## **Nuclear Enterprise**

**The nuclear enterprise functions through collaboration between the Navy, the Air Force, the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy and for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the National Nuclear Security Administration headquarters, and the national laboratories and production sites.**

**Do you believe that the current system adequately connects military requirements to acquisitions and procurement to technical expertise and production?**

The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) serves as the focal point for interagency analyses and decisions to maintain and manage the nuclear weapons stockpile. By law, the NWC is responsible for coordinating and approving activities of the Department of Energy for the study, development, and production of nuclear weapons. The NWC develops nuclear weapons stockpile options and the costs of such options and alternatives. I understand that the NWC reviews and approves requirements and ensures acquisition plans address those requirements. Through its subordinate committees, member agencies, and various annual review processes, the NWC has access to the technical expertise and insight into the production capabilities needed to support nuclear weapons procurement. If confirmed, as Staff Director to the NWC, I would endeavor to assure that the process works efficiently and effectively.

**Do you have any recommendations for improving the functions of the complex?**

If confirmed, and consistent with whatever guidance comes from the Nuclear Posture Review Process, I will review the functions of the complex with my partner agencies to evaluate its performance and develop recommendations for improvement.

## **Stockpile Stewardship Program**

**Do you support the Stockpile Stewardship Program and have you reviewed the elements of this program as conducted by the National Nuclear Security Administration?**

Yes, I support the program as I understand it. The National Nuclear Security Administration through this program ensures the Nation sustains a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent through the application of science, technology, engineering, and manufacturing. I am aware that this program enables maintaining the active stockpile, executing Life Extension Programs (LEPs) and performing Weapons Dismantlement without the need for underground nuclear testing. I am also aware that investment in a specialized science and engineering workforce with appropriate facilities and infrastructure are required for the program to be successful.

**In your view, are there any additional capabilities that the Stockpile Stewardship Program should develop?**

Since 1995, there has been a requirement to conduct an annual stockpile assessment to evaluate the safety, performance, and reliability without nuclear explosive testing. This review is based on physics and engineering analyses, experiments, and computer simulations. These reviews drive changes into the NNSA Stockpile Stewardship program and new capabilities are planned appropriately. I am not familiar with the details of the assessments to date and the recommendations for new capabilities. If confirmed, I will review the results of the annual stockpile assessment with my partners and make appropriate recommendations on new capabilities.

**As materials and designs age, what is your opinion on whether the modeling and simulation will continue to suffice indefinitely in place of underground testing in ensuring the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile?**

I am not familiar with the details of the reviews and assessment of the adequacies of the modeling and simulation capabilities. If confirmed, I will review the results of the annual stockpile assessment process with my partners and make appropriate recommendations on the adequacy of modeling and simulation capabilities to underpin the certification of the stockpile.

**If the technical conclusions and data from the Stockpile Stewardship Program could no longer confidently support the annual certification of the stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable, what would your recommendation be?**

Since 1995, there has been a requirement to conduct an annual review of the stockpile to evaluate the safety, performance, and reliability without nuclear explosive testing. This review is based on physics and engineering analyses, experiments, and computer simulations. The Directors of the three DOE nuclear weapons laboratories—Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL)—are required to complete annual assessments of the safety, reliability, and performance of each weapon type in the nuclear weapons stockpile. In addition, the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command provides an assessment of the military effectiveness of the stockpile. These assessments also include a determination as to whether it is necessary to conduct an underground nuclear test to resolve any identified issues. The Secretaries of Energy and Defense are required to submit these reports unaltered to the President, along with any conclusions the Secretaries consider appropriate. If confirmed, I would review the results of the annual stockpile assessment results with my partners and make appropriate recommendations.

## **Chemical and Biological Defense Matters**

**Section 138 of title 10, United States Code, states that the ASD(NCB) shall advise the Secretary of Defense on chemical and biological defense in addition to nuclear matters.**

### **What is your understanding of your roles and responsibilities with respect to chemical and biological defense matters?**

The ASD(NCB) is the principal advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and the USD(AT&L) for activities that combat current and emerging WMD threats, including all matters related to Research, Development and Acquisition of chemical, biological, radiological defense. In this capacity, I will provide oversight for the development of acquisition policies, provide advice, and makes recommendations for chemical, biological, radiological, medical and non-medical defense as well as the safety and security of chemical and biological agents that are used to research medical countermeasure capabilities to protect the force.

### **How do these roles and responsibilities relate to those of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction?**

The DASD(CWMD) serves as the primary point of contact within the OUSD(P) for development and implementation of policies to counter WMD and ensures coordination for homeland defense activities. The integration of DASD(CWMD) with the NBC components (NCB/NM, NCB/TRAC, NCB/CBD, and DTRA) are critical to the Department's efforts to counter WMD.

DASD(CWMD) provides DoD policy and guidance for the programs and activities of the DoD Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program in conjunction with NCB/TRAC and DTRA.

DASD(CWMD) develops, coordinates, and monitors implementation of DoD policies for arms control and nonproliferation of nuclear, radiological, chemical, biological, and advanced conventional weapons and missiles, and international technology transfers with NCB/TRAC and DTRA.

DASD(CWMD) oversees international countering WMD initiatives building U.S. and partner capacity in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense capabilities and combating transnational threats in conjunction with all NCB components.

DASD(CWMD) is the Secretary of Defense representative for non-proliferation and arms control matters, including but not limited to those involving the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, with the National Security Staff, the Department of State, and other departments, agencies, and interagency groups.

**What do you believe are the principal challenges in chemical and biological defense, and what would be your priorities for the Department of Defense’s Chemical and Biological Defense Program?**

The principal challenges are that the Threat is real and evolving, the Norms which have previously protected civilians and security forces are at risk, and technology advancements and ease of proliferation are lowering or eliminating barriers to those who wish to obtain WMD and increasing the capability of those who already have access to WMD.

To address these threats, the CBDP has three objectives; **Prepare for Surprise**, **Advanced Early Warning**, and **Protect the Force**:

**Prepare for Surprise:** Understanding of current CB threats and seize technical opportunities.

- Collaborate with the Intelligence Community to identify threats
- Characterize and forecast emerging, advanced, and non-traditional threats
- Maintain a robust, proactive technology watch

**Advance Early Warning:** Ensure early detection, information sharing and forecasts of impacts.

- Develop detection and diagnostic systems for forward/field use
- Build networked information systems that integrate CWMD and health sources
- Ensure processes are in place for effective sharing of critical information

**Protect the Force:** Develop and deploy effective materials, products, technologies, and medicines to minimize the effects of any CB agent.

- Invests in capabilities that are integrated into Warfighter CONOPs and training
- Develop flexible and broad-spectrum technologies – e.g., protective equipment, medical countermeasures, and decontamination – for diverse user communities
- Explore how capabilities can be combined to optimize outcomes

**Interaction with Other Federal Agencies on Chemical and Biological Matters**

**The Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Health and Human Services play important roles in planning and implementing U.S. policy and programs for protecting the United States against biological and chemical threats, including the development and stockpiling of vaccines and therapeutic products.**

**If confirmed, how would you work with these agencies to ensure the effective coordination and collaboration of efforts to improve U.S. security against biological and chemical threats?**

Coordination and collaboration with the other responsible agencies is not only critical to protecting the homeland, but also to protecting the Warfighter. I strongly support the need for coordination and collaboration with DHS and DHHS to prevent duplicative efforts, increase efficiencies, and introduce cost-sharing measures in the development of medical countermeasures against biological and chemical threats. These interactions are formalized through the Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise (PHEMCE).

### **Chemical Demilitarization**

**The United States is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and, under the terms of the treaty, was obligated to destroy its chemical weapons stockpile by no later than the extended deadline of April 2012.**

**Do you agree that the Department of Defense and the U.S. Government should be in full compliance with the terms and obligations of the CWC and the Biological Warfare Convention, including the deadline for destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile under the CWC?**

Yes, I agree that the Department of Defense and the U.S. Government should be in full compliance with the terms and obligations of the CWC and the Biological Warfare Convention. If confirmed, I will ensure all programs under my purview will remain in compliance with and meet the obligations of the Chemical Weapons Convention to destroy our chemical weapons stockpile in the most expeditious manner while ensuring the safety of the people and protecting the environment as well as the Biological Warfare Convention.

**If confirmed, will you work to ensure that the Department takes steps needed to minimize the time to complete destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile, without sacrificing safety or security?**

If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department continues to evaluate options to accelerate the destruction schedules and complete destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile by the congressionally mandated destruction deadline of December 31, 2023.

**If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure adequate funding is requested to permit the most expeditious destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile, consistent with the legal requirement to protect public health, safety, and the environment?**

The destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile is a priority within the Department. I will work with the Comptroller and members of Congress to obtain the fiscal resources required to complete the destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile while protecting public health, safety, and the environment.

**Recently, there have been challenges at both major chemical demilitarization plants. The Pueblo Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant began destroying mustard agent back in September 2016, however, an unanticipated roof replacement and a hazardous waste spill halted operations. Additionally, the Blue Grass Army Depot has further schedule delays due to construction complications.**

**If confirmed, what management actions would you take to address these problems?**

A new Program Executive Officer (PEO), Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA) began in June 2017. The new PEO is evaluating initiatives to improve the management and performance of the program. If confirmed, I will review these initiatives with the PEO and determine appropriate management actions.

**Do you see the need for any changes in the structure, organization, or reporting relationships within the chemical demilitarization program?**

If confirmed, I will review the program's organization and management structure as well as the reporting requirements and make changes as appropriate.

### **Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs (Nunn-Lugar Programs)**

**Do you support the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs?**

Yes, I support the Nunn-Lugar CTR program. CTR is DoD's primary program for helping other countries eliminate, secure, detect, and interdict the flow of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and related materials. This mission is critically important given the national security threats that we currently face relating to detecting WMD and WMD-related items that may fall outside state control, and securing especially dangerous pathogens, chemical precursors, and nuclear material.

If confirmed, I will support the DoD CTR Program and other relevant threat reduction programs by ensuring they are resourced and capable of fulfilling the mission to mitigate WMD-related risks.

**If confirmed, would you support joint research programs with foreign nations partnered with the United States in the areas of chemical or biological weapons defense?**

Yes. In addition to chemical and biological defense research with more developed foreign partners such as the UK, Australia, and Singapore, the CTR program works with civilian and military counterparts in partner countries across the former Soviet Union, Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia to eliminate, secure or prevent proliferation of WMD. It accomplishes this mission in collaboration with international and non-governmental partners by developing locally appropriate, sustainable programs. These joint research

opportunities provide unique opportunities to advance key U.S. partnerships abroad, to protect the warfighter, as well as to safeguard the national security of the United States and its allies.

**What is your understanding as to your responsibilities with respect to the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs?**

Acquisition oversight of the CTR program is my primary responsibility. This includes monitoring cost, schedule, and performance, as well as approving engagement plans, validating requirements, and issuing tiered guidance to the program that informs its long-term planning activities and investments.

It is my understanding that my responsibilities, if confirmed, will include exercising authority, direction, and control over the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). In this role I shall provide oversight of countering WMD efforts executed through DTRA's Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, with support from the office of the DASD(TRAC).

**Consequence Management of CBRNE Incidents**

**The Department of Defense has a mission of providing support to civil authorities for consequence management of domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) incidents, if directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Since 2002, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and the Commander of U.S. Northern Command have had responsibilities for planning and executing that mission.**

**If confirmed, how would you expect to work with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and the Commander of U.S. Northern Command on issues related to the Department's capabilities to provide support to civil authorities for CBRNE consequence management, as well their homeland defense missions related to nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or materials?**

I would expect to continue to work with my Homeland Defense and NORTHCOM counterparts to address any issues and ensure that we are delivering the CBRN capabilities required to defend the homeland.

DOD support to civil authorities is an important component of our mission, and I will continue to prioritize such support. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which is overseen by the ASD(NCB), already provides valuable assistance for CBRN events to CCMDs, including USNORTHCOM, and to civil authorities. In addition, I would direct DTRA to continue to fully participate in USNORTHCOM exercises such as VIGILANT SHIELD, ARDENT SENTRY, and VIBRANT RESPONSE. I would also instruct

DTRA to support USNORTHCOM joint task forces established during National Special Security Events.

**The Department of Homeland Security is the lead federal agency for planning, coordinating, and implementing consequence management of CBRNE incidents in the United States, in conjunction with the States and territories.**

**If confirmed, what relationship would you expect to have with the Department of Homeland Security and its component entities?**

I understand that the Department has ongoing relationships to enhance efficiencies and would seek to strengthen those relationships.

If confirmed, I will continue our excellent relationship with the DHS on efforts of mutual concern to both of our organizations. For example, DTRA collaborates with DHS to develop technologies to address threats of mutual concern. These challenges include development of technologies for threat detection, hazard prediction, event modeling, and decision support.

**What do you believe is the appropriate role for the Department of Defense in providing support to civil authorities for CBRNE consequence management?**

There are well established policies and procedures for DoD support to civilian authorities. DoD routinely exercises with civilian agencies through both NORTHCOM and National Guard exercises and deploys requested capabilities in support of high threat events, such as National Special Security Events.

I support the current laws and authorities which allow DOD to provide support to civil authorities in response to requests for assistance for domestic emergencies to include CBRNE incidents. For example, DTRA supports equipping and training the National Guard Civil Support Teams (CST). DTRA has developed a Mobile Field Kit for these CSTs which is a sensor integration and situational awareness tool to be used for nuclear and radiological detection.

**If confirmed, what role would you expect to have in regard to the oversight of Department of Defense capabilities related to consequence management of CBRNE incidents?**

The CBRN defense equipment used in a response is primarily developed and fielded under the joint Chemical and Biological Defense Program. I don't envision any change to the current oversight responsibilities.



If confirmed, I will continue to exercise oversight activities of the DTRA consequence management programs and other collaborative efforts with NORTHCOM and DHS.

### **Reporting Chain**

**Section 138 of title 10, United States Code, states that the ASD(NCB) may communicate views on issues directly to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense without obtaining the approval or concurrence of any other official within the Department.**

#### **What is your understanding of why this direct access is necessary?**

The Department of Defense Military Liaison Committee coordinated military requirements with the Atomic Energy Commission. The committee functioned as the authorized channel of communication between the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy on all atomic energy matters relating to the military applications of atomic weapons or atomic energy. The committee addressed matters of policy, programming, and commitment of funds to the military application of atomic energy.

In 1951, the Secretary of Defense moved the committee to the Pentagon and designated its chairman as the Deputy to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy Matters. In 1953, this position was re-designated as the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy.

In 1996, Congress added the responsibilities of chemical and biological defense. Since then, Congress has maintained that the position was necessary to ensure appropriate senior-level policy oversight and implementation guidance within the Department.

#### **What is your understanding of how this process has functioned in the past?**

In my understanding, the ASD(NCB) has always had the required access to the Secretary of Defense on all issues under its purview.

#### **If confirmed, would you expect to have direct and timely access to the Secretary of Defense for matters pertaining to the safety, security, and reliability of nuclear weapons?**

I am totally committed to maintaining a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent. If confirmed, I would expect to still maintain direct and timely access to the Secretary of Defense regarding safety, security, and reliability of nuclear weapons.

### **Notification of Congress**

**If confirmed, would you commit to promptly notifying Congress of any significant issues in the safety, security, or reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile?**

If confirmed, once I have the facts, I will commit to prompt notification surrounding any significant issue in the safety, security, or reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.

### **National Security Budget Reductions/Sequestration**

**The original discretionary caps imposed by the Budget Control Act (BCA) will be in effect for Fiscal Year 2018 through Fiscal Year 2021, unless there is an agreement to change the budget caps. Both Bipartisan Budget Agreements in 2013 and 2015 increased spending levels above the BCA caps and maintained parity between defense and non-defense funding.**

**In your assessment, what would be the impacts of continued implementation of the BCA discretionary caps through 2021 on the Department of Defense and national security, and specifically on nuclear modernization plans?**

Budget realities, such as the BCA discretionary caps, have forced reductions in the scope, schedule margin, and management flexibility in recapitalization plans for the nuclear enterprise. Despite these challenges, the Department remains committed to strengthening and modernizing the nuclear Triad. The DoD continues to look for creative solutions to reduce costs, such as the incremental funding of the first COLUMBIA submarine and the potential for greater commonality in Air Force and Navy ballistic missile systems. These issues continue to be addressed at each budget cycle through issue teams led by the DoD Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation.

**Do you believe that any future budget agreements must maintain parity between defense and non-defense funding?**

If confirmed, my priorities will include supporting the secretary in obtaining the top-line defense budget, the necessary resources to rebuild the military, and participating in defense strategy and reform. If I am confirmed, I will work in close partnership with this committee to provide the appropriate justifications for the resources the department requests and in particular to ensure funding for our critical nuclear modernization program--a paramount national security priority.

**If confirmed, by what standards would you measure the adequacy of funding for the missions under your supervision?**

The Department of Defense (DoD) is entering a period when multiple weapon delivery systems require significant modernization as they near end-of-life. The Department delayed several programs in previous years, thereby removing any schedule margin for recapitalizing these systems. Moreover, the internal and external reviews of the DoD

nuclear enterprise conducted in 2014 brought additional focus on needed recapitalization and resulted in increased investments to ensure the long-term health of our nuclear forces.

Modernization and replacement programs will require increased investment over current levels for much of the next 15 years and will depend on sustained Congressional funding. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) must also be funded at an adequate level to maintain and extend the lifetime of the existing stockpile, while sustaining or modernizing its aging facilities and infrastructure. As a result, substantial funding will be required in the near future.

### **Congressional Oversight**

**In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.**

**Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?**

Responsiveness to the SASC and to Congress writ large is essential so representatives can make informed legislative decisions on behalf of our Nation.

**Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the ASD(NCB)?**

Yes.

**Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate committees in a timely manner?**

Yes.

**Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with this Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?**

Yes.

**Do you agree to answer letters and requests for information from individual Senators who are members of this Committee?**

Yes.

**If confirmed, do you agree to provide to this Committee relevant information within the jurisdictional oversight of the Committee when requested by the Committee, even in the absence of the formality of a letter from the Chairman?**

Yes.