Senate Armed Services Committee
Advance Policy Questions for Mr. Justin Overbaugh
Nominee for Appointment to be
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security

Duties, Qualifications, and Relationships

Section 137a of title 10, U.S. Code, establishes the position of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (DUSD(I&S)) and provides that the DUSD "shall be appointed from among persons who have extensive experience in intelligence matters."

1. If confirmed as DUSD(I&S), what do you believe would be your most critical duties and responsibilities?

The primary responsibility of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (DUSD(I&S)) is to support the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)) as well as the Secretary of Defense by executing his intelligence and security responsibilities and authorities, including the authorities that are codified in Title 10 and Title 50 of the United States Code. Conducting this responsibility in support of the warfighter and our national defense will always be on the top of my mind. If confirmed, I will also always want to balance the USD(I&S)'s responsibilities with the protection of privacy and civil liberties, pursuant to section 137(c) of Title 10 United States Code and in accordance with Federal law and the regulations and directives of the Department of Defense.

I understand that the responsibilities of the DUSD(I&S) by statute and policy are contained in DoD Directive 5143.01. I would support the USD(I&S) as the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor regarding intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters; exercising authority, direction, and control on behalf of the Secretary of Defense over the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the National Security Agency / Central Security Service (NSA / CSS), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA); establishing policy and priorities for, and providing oversight of, the defense intelligence and security enterprises; exercising oversight of personnel policy to ensure that intelligence organizations in the Department of Defense are staffed, organized, trained, and equipped to support the missions of the Department; ensuring that the DoD intelligence components that are also elements of the intelligence community (IC) are responsive to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in the execution of the DNI's authorities; ensuring that the combatant commanders, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the civilian leadership of the Department are provided with appropriate intelligence support; ensuring that counterintelligence activities in the Department are conducted and managed efficiently and effectively; ensuring that certain sensitive activities which the Department conducts or supports are conducted and managed efficiently and effectively; overseeing

the implementation of assigned DoD security policies and programs to ensure efficiency and effectiveness; and serving as the Program Executive for the Military Intelligence Program (MIP).

2. What is your understanding of the role of the DUSD(I&S) as "first assistant" to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S))?

As the principal assistant to the Under Secretary, the DUSD(I&S) assists the USD(I&S) in carrying out the responsibilities, fulfill functions, manage relationships, and exercise authorities as provided for in law and DoD Directive 5143.01, including the exercise of authority, direction, and control on behalf of the Secretary of Defense over the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA). In addition, the DUSD(I&S) assists the USD(I&S) in planning, policy, and strategic oversight for all defense intelligence, counterintelligence and security policy, plans, and programs. Lastly, the DUSD(I&S) advises on and assists the Under Secretary with all responsibilities in providing staff advice and assistance to the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, as a leader in the Department it is an implied responsibility, when appropriate, beneficial, and lawful, to collaboratively support the intelligence-related needs for the whole-of-government mission to protect our nation's security.

3. What is your understanding of the differences between the title 10 and title 50 duties of the USD(I&S)—duties that, in regard to some matters, could be delegated to you if confirmed as the DUSD(I&S)?

My understanding is that the DUSD(I&S) supports the USD(I&S) and Secretary of Defense in fulfilling all the Secretary's statutory responsibilities in the areas of intelligence and security, whether codified in Title 10 or Title 50 of the United States Code. Although I am not aware of any specific portfolio assignments or delegations at this time, the duties of the USD(I&S) are further prescribed in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5143.01. This includes providing overall direction and supervision for policy, program planning and execution, and use of resources for DoD activities that are part of the Military Intelligence Program and for personnel security, physical security, industrial security, and the protection of classified information and controlled unclassified information-related activities. Of note, section 137(c) of Title 10 also states that it shall be a top priority of the USD(I&S) to protect privacy and civil liberties in accordance with Federal law and the regulations and directives of DoD.

I also understand that the USD(I&S) supports the Secretary of Defense in fulfilling the responsibilities in subsection 3038(a) of Title 50, United States Code, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, to ensure: (1) that the budgets of the intelligence community (IC) elements within the Department of Defense (DoD) are adequately funded to the overall DoD intelligence needs; (2) the implementation of the policies and resource decisions of the Director of National Intelligence by DoD Components within the National Intelligence Program (NIP); (3) that DoD tactical

intelligence activities complement and are compatible with intelligence activities funded by the NIP; (4) that the IC elements within DoD are responsive and timely with respect to satisfying the needs of operational military forces; (5) waste and unnecessary duplication among the DoD intelligence activities are eliminated; and (6) that DoD intelligence activities are conducted jointly where appropriate.

4. What leadership and management experience do you possess that you would apply to your service as DUSD(I&S), if confirmed?

If confirmed, it would be my privilege to put my nearly 26 years of experience in leadership and management in service as DUSD(I&S). Most recently, I've served as the Chief Operations Officer for Strategic Decision Solutions, a boutique strategy and risk consulting firm serving midsize ($200mil to $1b) property and casualty insurance companies. Prior to that, I served in the U.S. Army for over 25 years, retiring as a Colonel. I've successfully led and managed organizations specializing in Infantry, Intelligence Counterintelligence and Recruiting operations. As part of my duties, I've managed relationships with U.S. community leaders, U.S. and foreign intelligence services, and U.S. interagency and foreign military partners.

5. Please provide an example of a situation in which you led and brought to conclusion a management improvement/change initiative in a complex organization.

As Director of Intelligence for a Special Operations - Joint Task Force at U.S. Special Operations Command, I led a change initiative to establish full-spectrum intelligence support for a new strategic organization tasked with global synchronization of sensitive, national-level capabilities. As part of this effort, I successfully convened seven international partners to collaborate on 148 global operations, enhancing partner-nation interoperability and improving the efficiency and efficacy of operations and intelligence sharing. Additionally, I built a new decision support and analytical team that connected our joint task force with 25 national defense, intelligence, and academic organizations. This initiative culminated in the creation of a comprehensive, global threat picture, which significantly strengthened our ability to respond to emerging threats and made a measurable impact on global security operations.

6. What is your experience across the domain of intelligence matters? Security matters?

If confirmed, I look forward to applying my over two decades of intelligence and security related experience to the role of DUSD(I&S). Mostly recently, I served as Director of Intelligence for a Special Operations - Joint Task Force, establishing full-spectrum intelligence support to a new U.S. Special Operations Command organization charged with global synchronization of sensitive, national-level capabilities. In this capacity I worked across the Intelligence Community and Interagency along with Foreign Allies and Partners to reorient some of the U.S.'s most exceptional resources toward our most challenging threats. Prior to that role, I served in various intelligence positions of increasing responsibility including Human Intelligence Branch Chief at U.S. Special

Operations Command, the Commander of all U.S. Army Strategic Counterintelligence operations in Europe and Africa, Counterintelligence Case Officer, Executive Officer for the U.S. Army's only dedicated Counterintelligence unit charged with supporting Special Operations Forces, Military Source Operations Collector in eastern Afghanistan, the Senior Intelligence Officer for 2d Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group, and as a Reconnaissance Platoon Leader in the 101st Airborne Division. Along the way, I earned two graduate degrees (MS in Defense Analysis and MA in National Security and Strategic Studies), co-authored scholarly articles on intelligence and foreign policy, graduated from DIA's Advanced Foreign Counterintelligence Operations Course, earned the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Agent's Badge and Credentials and was recognized with the National Counterintelligence Executive's 2014 Counterintelligence Operations Award.

7. Are there are any actions you would take to enhance your ability to perform the duties and exercise the powers of the DUSD(I&S)?

If confirmed, leveraging the experience and wisdom of the career professionals within the DISE and throughout the Department will be critical to my own and the organization's success. I believe in the value of seeking knowledge in every direction and will do so if confirmed. Furthermore, I would work to ensure an organization climate that encourages the best ideas to flow freely through the organization.

From my understanding of the responsibilities of the OUSD(I&S) and requirements in support of DoD, the broader IC, and the whole of government, it is imperative to foster and facilitate a collaborative environment to achieve mission success. If confirmed, I will personally work to maintain strong relationships and seek new opportunities for collaboration with stakeholders.

8. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure that your tenure as DUSD(I&S) epitomizes the fundamental requirement for civilian control of the Armed Forces embedded in the U.S. Constitution and other laws?

As a proud Veteran, I am fully committed to upholding the fundamental requirement in the U.S. Constitution and other laws for civilian control of the Armed Forces, a key principle of American governance and enabler for our success as a nation. This includes executing my responsibilities and duties established by law and policy to the President, Secretary of Defense, and to the United States Congress, and holding those who I manage and oversee accountable for the same.

9. How do you view the relationship and division of responsibilities between the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (OUSD(I&S)) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)?

The partnership between OUSD(I&S) and Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) is essential to the success of the DISE. The OUSD(I&S) works closely with the ODNI to effectively integrate intelligence in support of U.S. national security interests.

Through the effective partnership and integration between OUSD(I&S) and ODNI, the Intelligence Community delivers coordinated intelligence to policymakers and warfighters on crucial threats to our national security. If confirmed, I will seek to continue to strengthen the partnership between OUSD(I&S) and the ODNI to maximize effects and return on investment of our combined efforts.

The USD(I&S) himself is dual-hatted as the Director of Defense Intelligence at ODNI and there is a military officer who serves as the DNI's Advisor on Military Affairs (DAMA) to ensure tight coordination between the Department of Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) and the greater IC. The staffs must coordinate to effectively and efficiently ensure quality intelligence is provided in support of our national leadership and warfighters. I believe that USD(I&S) plays a critical role and is effective in ensuring IC support to Warfighters.

Lastly, as a principal member of the Suitability and Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council (PAC), the USD(I&S) works with the DNI, who is the Security Executive Agent and a principal member of the PAC.

10. How do you view the relationship and division of responsibilities between the OUSD(I&S) and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)), particularly as regards policy and programs for information operations, including military deception and operations security (OPSEC)?

My understanding is that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) is the Principal Staff Assistant for oversight of Information Operations (IO), and that the USD(I&S) is the Program Management Lead for DoD deception activities and operations security. In coordination with the USD(P), the USD(I&S) develops and oversees implementation of DoD policy, programs, and guidance for military deception and operations security; the coordination and deconfliction of DoD IO and intelligence activities; and develops and oversees the implementation of policy for intelligence support to IO. If confirmed, I will prioritize ensuring the Department has all available tools to effectively compete along the full competition continuum. A strong partnership between OUSD(I&S) and OUSD(P) is critical in the development and effectiveness of DoD activities to counter adversary activities in the "gray zone", which will enable our ability to deter adversaries short of armed conflict and re-establish deterrence.

11. In your view, what would be the optimum relationship between the OUSD(I&S) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to providing operational intelligence, counterintelligence, and security support to the warfighter?

I understand that the USD(I&S) is responsible for supporting the Secretary of Defense in discharging his intelligence and security responsibilities and authorities under Title 10 and Title 50 of the United States Code. This includes exercising authority, direction, and control on behalf of the Secretary of Defense over certain defense intelligence components of the Department of Defense and working closely with the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, Service Components, and the ODNI to develop effective policy,

plans, programs, and priorities. The optimal relationship between OUSD(I&S) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is mutual support and consultation to ensure the defense intelligence enterprise (DIE) provides the warfighters with the best intelligence possible, to conduct their planning and operations and to provide the Secretary of Defense with the best defense intelligence and military advice.

12. What is your understanding of how the responsibilities for the oversight of the activities and programs of special operations forces are delineated between the OUSD(I&S) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SOLIC))?

I understand that USD(I&S), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)), and the DoD Senior Intelligence Oversight Official (SIOO) acting together are the primary oversight officials for all U.S. Special Operations Forces intelligence and intelligence-related activities and programs. A strong partnership between OUSD(I&S), ASD(SO/LIC), and their Deputies is critical in the development and effectiveness of many DoD activities in the "gray zone," which will enable DoD's ability to deter adversaries short of armed conflict and reestablish deterrence. If confirmed, we will work closely together with the SIOO, who I understand provides independent oversight within the Department of intelligence and intelligence-related activities. I will continue this close partnership to ensure that the United States is best postured to maximize effects. In doing so, I will ensure defense intelligence activities adhere to appropriate coordination processes within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

13. How do you view the relationship and division of responsibilities between OUSD(I&S) and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment (OUSD(A&S)) in regard to both unclassified and classified contract efforts?

I understand the relationship between OUSD(I&S) and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment (OUSD(A&S)) is one of cooperation and collaboration. I am aware of existing important efforts between both offices, to include an examination of DoD oversight of classified contracting, getting the National Background Investigation Services program back on track, and partnering to protect the National Security Innovation Base and Defense Industrial Base from adversary compromise. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about these efforts and making my own assessment of their progress.

Also, if confirmed, a priority of mine will be to better enable intelligence to inform Department investments, effectively matching capabilities with threats, along the entire acquisition life cycle. I will work closely with the USD(A&S) to best integrate intelligence efforts to effectively support decision makers amidst a rapidly evolving technological and threat environment.

14. How do you view the relationship and division of responsibilities between the OUSD(I&S) and the DOD Chief Information Officer, particularly with respect to the cybersecurity mission; developing interoperability requirements applicable to information systems architectures for processing intelligence and counterintelligence information; and the certification of intelligence information systems?

I view the relationship between the OUSD(I&S) and the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (DoD CIO) as one predicated on collaboration and partnership to align, secure, and modernize information security policies and DoD's information system architectures to support our warfighters. I understand that the DoD CIO advises the Secretary of Defense on information technology, including National Security Systems and defense business systems, cybersecurity, and develops DoD strategy and policy for all DoD information technology. Along with the newly established position for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy, the partnership between OUSD(I&S) and DoD CIO is imperative for continuing cybersecurity efforts, such as implementing Zero Trust on all three DoD network fabrics to mitigate nefarious actors including potential insider threats.

If confirmed, I will work with the DoD CIO to advance the department's mission by ensuring an integrated, intelligence, and counterintelligence informed management of IT and network security that addresses the evolving cybersecurity threat.

15. How do you view the relationship between the OUSD(I&S) and the heads of the Intelligence Components of the Military Departments? What factors would you recommend that the USD(I&S) consider and weigh in providing input to the Secretaries of the Military Departments on the duty performance of the heads of their respective Intelligence Components?

My understanding is that the OUSD(I&S) staff works closely with the heads of the intelligence and counterintelligence components of the Military Departments. The USD(I&S) then provides input to the Secretaries of the Military Departments on the performance of the senior intelligence officer within each Military Department.

The USD(I&S) is the Principal Staff Assistant to the Secretary of Defense with authority delegated from the Secretary to establish policy for DoD intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters. If confirmed as the DUSD(I&S), I will assist the Directors for Defense Intelligence within OUSD(I&S) with their specific programmatic responsibilities and support the USD(I&S) in carrying out his assigned responsibilities and exercising the authorities delegated to the USD(I&S) by the Secretary of Defense.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments exercise authority, direction, and control over all components within their respective Departments. The heads of the intelligence and counterintelligence components within the Military Departments are under the

authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Military Department, and subject to the policy oversight of the USD(I&S).

I understand that DoD Directive 5143.01 outlines the responsibilities and functions, relationships, and authorities of the USD(I&S). In accordance with this Directive, OUSD(I&S) assists the USD(I&S) to develop and provide policy guidance, resource advocacy, and oversight for the integration of Reserve Component intelligence elements, and ensures the Department effectively employs and resources Reserve Component intelligence elements to best support the National Defense Strategy. The programmatic role of OUSD(I&S) is the same with respect to the Active and Reserve Components of the Military Services. Like the Active Components, the Reserve Components' intelligence elements are under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the relevant Military Department in which they are located, and subject to the policy oversight of the OUSD(I&S).

16. What is your understanding of the DUSD(I&S)'s responsibility and authority for the management and oversight of Military Intelligence Program (MIP) and National Intelligence Program (NIP) funding? How do the processes employed by the OUSD(I&S) in the execution of these responsibilities differ from the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process applicable to all other DOD organizations and funding?

My understanding is that USD(I&S) executes the Secretary's statutory responsibilities regarding the budgets of the DoD components that comprise the Intelligence Community (IC), specifically ensuring the budgets of DoD IC elements are adequate to satisfy the overall intelligence needs of the Department. Further, as the MIP Executive Agent, the USD(I&S) is also responsible for the management and oversight of the Military Intelligence Program (MIP). The USD(I&S) executes the functions for the NIP of the Department, as delegated by the Secretary of Defense, and as the Director of Defense Intelligence for ODNI, has visibility into the NIP through participation in the ODNI PPBE decision forums. Additionally, the DNI and the USD(I&S) then jointly issue intelligence programming guidance to closely synchronize NIP and MIP-funded programs to ensure the Department's priorities are communicated to the IC. If confirmed, I will support the USD(I&S) in his partnership with the ODNI in ensuring DoD intelligence requirements are effectively supported within the NIP budget.

With respect to the DoD PPBE process, it is my understanding that the USD(I&S) is a full participant in the Department's PPBE process and that military intelligence requirements compete with the other DoD requirements.

17. If confirmed, specifically what actions would you take to develop and sustain an open, transparent, and productive relationship between the Senate Armed Services Committee and the OUSD(I&S) and the Defense Agencies under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I&S)?

I believe that collaborative congressional oversight provides an invaluable perspective on DoD activities that informs better decisions within both branches of government, ultimately making DoD more effective in achieving our common purpose of strengthening our national defense. If confirmed, I intend to maintain a routine, continuous, and transparent dialogue with the defense oversight committees to discuss the Department's activities that are subject to their oversight, including defense intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related activities. I am committed to maintaining open lines of communication with Congress to ensure accurate and consistent information is shared from the OUSD(I&S) and the defense agencies under USD(I&S) authority. Through this approach, I will seek to facilitate effective oversight and build mutual trust between DoD and Congress, enabling DoD constructive conversations and collaboration on statutory authorities, resource allocation, and oversight.

18. If confirmed, will you commit to ensure that this Committee is provided with the notifications required under law, and that any such notification is accurate, complete, and timely?

I am committed to keeping Congress fully and currently informed for all activities that fall under the USD(I&S)'s responsibility under DoD Directive 5143.01, including fulfilling the notification requirements in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 2723. If confirmed, I will examine how the OUSD(I&S) supports the USD(I&S) with respect to this responsibility and pursue improvements, as needed, to ensure such notifications are accurate, complete, and timely.

Conflicts of Interest

Federal ethics laws, to include 18 U.S.C. §208, prohibit government employees from participating in matters where they, or certain family members or organizations with which they have certain relationships, have a financial interest.

19. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to disclose any potential conflicts of interest, including investments, business ties, family relationships, or other connections that could be perceived as influencing your decision making?

I agree to comply with all conflicts of interest disclosure requirements set forth in the Ethics in Government Act and implementing regulations.

20. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, that if a conflict of interest arises, you will recuse yourself from participating in any decisions regarding that specific matter?

I agree to comply with all recusal requirements under 18 U.S.C. § 208 and implementing regulations.

21. Do you commit, without qualification, if confirmed, to decision-making on the merits and exclusively in the public interest, without regard to private gain or personal benefit?

I commit to deciding matters on the merits based on the public interest, without regard to any private gain or personal benefit

Major Challenges and Priorities

22. What do you consider to be the most significant challenges you would face if confirmed as the DUSD(I&S)?

If confirmed, the most significant challenge I anticipate as DUSD(I&S) will be how to ensure that the DISE is most effectively supporting the Secretary of Defense's priorities of restoring a warrior ethos, rebuilding our military, and reestablishing deterrence in support of our national defense in a rapidly changing environment.

Effective management of the DISE is essential, and we must align efforts to maximize effects downrange and the return on our investment. This includes ensuring we have the right technology and organizational structure to enable our personnel—some of America's best—to increase their impact in today's operational environment, and to position the Enterprise for the rapidly changing landscape of the future. If confirmed, I would ensure the Enterprise has the culture, business best practices, and processes necessary to be agile, while remaining laser focused on the mission. Adapting the DISE at the speed of relevance will be difficult, but essential. From my perspective, technology advancements in ubiquitous sensing, space control, and unmanned systems at scale are examples of the challenges to which we must adapt.

If confirmed, I will endeavor to better enable intelligence to inform Department investments, effectively matching capabilities with threats. With program costs incredibly high—and the cost of misallocation on the modern battlefield even higher—the premium on intelligence effectively informing the entire acquisition life cycle is at an all-time high. I believe the speed of the technology will require increased focus earlier in the development cycle, requiring an increased focus on scientific & technical intelligence.

We must ensure the Department has all the tools required to most effectively compete along the full continuum of conflict. Our adversaries are increasingly conducting malign activity below a threshold that has traditionally triggered a military response. Enhancing DoD Irregular Warfare capabilities will allow us to provide leaders with risk-informed options to better compete short of armed conflict and re-establish deterrence. Similarly, I believe offensive cyber capabilities and an increased focus on Defense human intelligence are areas for opportunity. Finally, offensive counterintelligence efforts are essential in disrupting our adversaries. These options may often carry additional risk; however, the DISE will strive to provide risk-informed options to the Secretary that support his and the President's national security objectives.

Expanding Roles and Responsibilities

In 2003, Congress established the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence with the intent to improve coordination of the Department of Defense's intelligence and security efforts in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The roles and responsibilities of the Under Secretary have expanded significantly since the creation of the position, particularly in the areas of security and law enforcement.

23. What is your understanding of the evolution and growth of the roles and responsibilities of the OUSD(I&S) since its establishment?

I understand that the evolution of the roles and responsibilities of the OUSD(I&S) since its establishment in 2003 have been strategic and responsive to the evolution and growth of requirements to support the Secretary of Defense in executing intelligence and security responsibilities and authorities under Title 10 and Title 50 of the United States Code. The growth is largely attributed to the evolution of important security functions and programs that enable the Department to more effectively compete across the spectrum of conflict, to include implementation and oversight of Trusted Workforce 2.0 and the designation of the Under Secretary as the Principal Staff Assistant for Law Enforcement. I see these and others as necessary to support the Secretary in the successful implementation of the Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance.

24. If confirmed, how do you intend to balance the significant and varied responsibilities of the OUSD(I&S)?

I understand that the USD(I&S) is the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense with authority delegated from the Secretary of Defense to establish policy and provide oversight for DoD intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, other intelligence-related matters, and law enforcement. If confirmed as the DUSD(I&S), I will support the USD(I&S) in fulfilling all responsibilities in a manner that supports the Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance. I will identify and leverage the extraordinary expertise and talent across OUSD(I&S) and Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise to successfully accomplish this objective.

Supervision, and Oversight of the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise

The USD(I&S) is vested with responsibility for the overall direction and supervision of the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise in the execution of intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters across DOD. Subject to USD(I&S) oversight, responsibility for executing policies and programs in these domains vests primarily in the Military Departments and Services, elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Defense Agencies.

25. What is your understanding of the role of the OUSD(I&S) in coordinating the activities of the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise?

I see intelligence and security as mutually reinforcing mission areas. The Department must understand the intentions, capabilities, and activities of strategic competitors and adversaries. Similarly, the security apparatus must safeguard our personnel, information, capabilities, and infrastructure against adversaries. I understand that OUSD(I&S) works across the Department with the Military Services and defense agencies to identify requirements and capabilities to meet DoD priorities. They work closely with the ODNI to ensure the national intelligence priorities take all Departmental requirements into account. These efforts ensure Enterprise alignment with all national and Department-level strategies, guidance, direction, and relevant priorities. The USD(I&S) also executes the Military Intelligence Program (MIP) and participates in the ODNI specified National Intelligence Program (NIP) process to ensure resources are aligned against DoD priorities.

National Defense Strategy

26. What is your assessment of the current strategic environment, including your assessment of the critical and enduring threats to the national security of the United States and its allies and partners?

The United States faces one of the most dangerous strategic environments in our Nation's history, characterized by the vulnerability of the U.S. Homeland from years of unsecured borders, increasingly capable air and missile threats, and others; China's unprecedented military buildup and its intent to seize control of the Indo-Pacific; and a range of other persistent threats to the United States and its Allies and partners, including Russia, Iran, North Korea, and terrorists. In addition, growing cooperation between Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea must be monitored to safeguard our interests.

27. If confirmed, how would you prioritize the efforts of the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise relative to the critical and enduring threats identified above?

If confirmed, I will ensure the DISE prioritizes intelligence support and effective security posture, aligned to strategic priorities and the evolving threat environment. I will work across DoD and the Intelligence Community to prioritize capabilities that address critical and enduring threats while identifying and considering capability gaps and shortfalls throughout the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process. In addition, I will partner closely with the DNI to align the MIP and NIP for greatest effect downrange and return on investment.

28. In your view, what role(s) should the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise play in the implementation of the National Defense Strategy?

The DISE plays a vital role in implementation of an NDS promulgated by the Secretary of Defense. In support of the objectives of the next NDS, the DISE must support both warfighters and decision makers; provide decision advantage; reestablish deterrence; and safeguard personnel, information, operations, resources, technologies, and facilities

against a wide range of threats and challenges. At the same time, the DISE must also maintain its ability to provide strategic warning globally.

29. How would you assess the current readiness and capabilities of the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise to execute the NDS?

I believe the DISE is well-postured to support DoD's execution of the Department's strategic priorities. If confirmed, I will conduct my own assessment of the Enterprise's readiness and seek new and innovative ways to improve its ability to execute the Interim NDS and the next NDS promulgated by the Secretary of Defense.

Strengthening Alliances and Attracting New Partners

Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are crucial to U.S. success in competition and conflict against a great power.

30. If confirmed as DUSD(I&S), what would be your priorities to strengthen and synchronize existing intelligence and counterintelligence relationships with foreign governments and international organizations as well as to foster new relationships?

My time in Army intelligence leading collection operations and supporting Special Operations Forces taught me the immense value of close partnerships with foreign partners. Strong international relationships and intelligence sharing during my military service resulting in increased mission success and decreased risk to force, while shedding light on the fidelity of strategy, formed the foundation for my appreciation of their value at the national level. U.S. intelligence sharing relationships in many cases provide outstanding return on investment as we each leverage our respective placement, access, and capabilities while economizing resources. Allies and partners can be force multipliers that enable DoD to effectively execute the Secretary's next National Defense Strategy if they approach the relationship as true partners, willing to contribute as able and appropriate, not simply be recipients of our intelligence and information. If confirmed, I commit to strengthening defense intelligence and counterintelligence relationships with Allies and partners, including ensuring we have the intelligence sharing relationships needed to execute the next National Security and National Defense Strategies. I also commit to working with the USD(P) and ODNI to ensure synchronization of existing U.S. partnerships and the appropriate prioritization of outreach to new partners.

31. If confirmed, what factors should be considered in rendering decisions on the disclosure and release of intelligence to foreign governments and international organizations, including in support of combatant commanders' expressed desire for better intelligence and intelligence sharing to counter foreign malign activities?

I understand that the National Disclosure Policy (NDP) sets forth the factors that must be considered prior to the disclosure of classified military information, including military intelligence, to appropriate foreign partners. I also understand that the USD(I&S) is

responsible for issuing policy for the sharing of military intelligence. If confirmed, I will support the release of military intelligence and coordinate with the DNI to enable the release of national intelligence to Allies and partners to support combatant command requirements in accordance with the NDP when in support of the National Security and National Defense Strategies and aligned with United States policy.

Oversight of Sensitive Activities

The Department of Defense defines sensitive activities as "operations, actions, activities, or programs that, if compromised, could have enduring adverse effects on U.S. foreign policy, DOD activities, or military operations or cause significant embarrassment to the U.S., its allies, or the DOD."

32. What is your understanding of the role of the USD(I&S) in providing oversight of DOD sensitive activities?

The USD(I&S) is the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding intelligence, counterintelligence, law enforcement, security, sensitive activities, tradecraft, and other intelligence-related matters. The USD(I&S) establishes policy and provides oversight and direction for the coordination, assessment, reporting, and conduct of DoD intelligence and intelligence-related sensitive activities, the Defense Cover Program, special communications, technical collection support to intelligence activities, defense sensitive support, and the clandestine use of technology.

If confirmed, I would work closely with relevant defense and interagency stakeholders to ensure DoD sensitive activities are conducted consistent with law and DoD policy.

33. If confirmed, what factors would you consider in assessing risks associated with proposed DOD sensitive activities?

I believe that if DoD is to provide the Secretary of Defense with all necessary options to effectively compete and deter adversaries short of armed conflict, DoD must be prepared to take greater risks in the conduct of the sensitive activities necessary to reestablish deterrence. However, I strongly believe that these risks must be informed risks. OUSD(I&S) should play a critical role in strengthening the oversight of DoD sensitive activities, providing the Secretary and other decisionmakers with a deeper understanding of the intelligence, the threat environment, potential impact assessments, and other critical information available to DoD's interagency and international partners. If confirmed, I will work with the team to look at these and other factors and determine the extent to which our current risk assessment methodologies are adequate for the current environment to provide the most valuable risk informed decisions.

34. Do you believe the USD(I&S) has a responsibility to keep the congressional defense committees fully and currently informed of DOD sensitive activities? If so, how would you seek to fulfill that responsibility?

Yes, I believe that the USD(I&S) has this responsibility under law, policy, and precedent. If confirmed as the Deputy USD(I&S), I intend to support the USD(I&S) to maintain a routine, continuous, and transparent dialogue with the congressional defense committees on all Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise activities, to include DoD sensitive activities. I believe that collaborative congressional oversight provides an invaluable perspective on DoD activities that informs better decisions within both branches of government, ultimately making DoD more effective in achieving our common purpose of strengthening national defense.

Defense Department and the Intelligence Community Collaboration

Since September 11, 2001, collaboration—both analytical and operational—between the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community has grown increasingly close. Seamless collaboration is vital to effective and rapid responses to non-traditional threats and bringing together the strengths of the full spectrum of defense and intelligence capabilities can generate more effective solutions to complex problems. However, absent effective management and oversight, such collaboration risks blurring distinct agency missions, authorities, and funding, as well as creating redundant lines of effort.

35. In your view, are there aspects of the current relationship between the Department and the Intelligence Community that should be re-examined or modified?

I am aware that the OUSD(I&S) works closely with both ODNI and the Central Intelligence Agency to ensure that the Intelligence Community (IC) is able to deliver both national and military intelligence support to policymakers and warfighters. OUSD(I&S) also enables the rest of the DoD and the IC to coordinate and deconflict to ensure the most effective execution of intelligence and sensitive activities. If confirmed, I will seek to strengthen the relationship between OUSD(I&S) and the IC so that we can continue to work together to enhance IC capabilities and enable DoD operations.

Economic Competition

Adversarial economic competition is increasingly an issue that DOD needs to factor into its planning process as it intersects with military and national security challenges. Adversaries like China are using economic competition as a gray zone tactic to out-maneuver the U.S. by operating in the interstitial spaces between traditional agencies "lanes in the road" and stove-piped authorities. Increasingly, geographic combatant commands are having to consider in their planning process and theater security cooperation plans how to combat adversarial economic competition techniques.

36. How is DOD postured from an intelligence perspective to understand and analyze the intersection of economic and national security to better prepare DOD to contribute to economic competition?

Economic security is national security—the U.S. military is only as powerful as the underlying strength of the U.S. industrial base. While the President and the Secretary have made clear the expectation that the Department aligns its resources to support the warfighter, DoD can play a significant role in coordinated operations across the economic and military domains to support national security objectives. I understand that DoD has pockets of excellence that contribute heavily to this mission space, but there is certainly room—and a requirement—for increasing depth in relevant areas of expertise to ensure DoD is optimally postured to leverage commercial, financial, economic, and military tools to reinforce the United States' military advantage. This includes an increased focus on China's efforts to gain an economic advantage against the United States and its Allies and partners as well as how their specific economic tradecraft is affecting our competition in order to inform leadership decisions.

37. What expertise and capabilities does DOD have to support the collection and analytic needs for economic competition?

While I have not been fully briefed on current capabilities, I am generally aware that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise has expertise in several relevant fields, ranging from economics and political science to engineering and biosciences. If confirmed, I will seek to identify gaps in our expertise and capabilities in order to optimize the Enterprise against the economic competition problem set.

38. How will you prioritize intelligence support for the geographic and functional combatant commands, as well as senior leadership in the Department, with regards to adversarial economic competition needs?

Given the complex and multidisciplinary nature of economic competition, I believe that it is critical that support provided to the combatant commands aligns with the vision and priorities of DoD senior leadership. The President and the Secretary have made clear the expectation that the Department aligns its resources to support the warfighter. We must ensure we have modern structures that appropriately align to the threat, using obsolete organizational structures and outmoded approaches to address new types of threats will not work. If confirmed, I will work to support the USD(I&S) and work with the Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE), the Intelligence Community, and the broader U.S. Government to ensure the DIE's support is appropriately distributed with—and aligned between—these key customers to maximize effects.

Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development Systems (JCIDS)

Per section 181 of title 10, U.S. Code, the JROC is vested with the responsibility to assess joint military capabilities; establish and approve joint performance requirements that ensure interoperability between military capabilities; and identify new joint military capabilities based on advances in technology and concepts of operation. The JCIDS process was established to address overlap and duplication in Military Services' programs

by providing the information the JROC needs to identify the capabilities and associated operational performance requirements needed by the joint warfighter.

39. What is your understanding of the role of the JROC and JCIDS in identifying and establishing joint warfighter capability requirements in the domains of military intelligence, counterintelligence, and security?

I understand that military intelligence, counterintelligence, and security requirements generated from DoD Components, including the combatant commands, are accounted for among the other Joint Capability Areas in the Joint Requirements Oversight Council's (JROC) subordinate Functional Capabilities Boards (FCB). These FCBs process "bottom up" deliberate and urgent requirements and provide "top down" portfolio reviews that evaluate specific enterprise capability areas. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development Systems (JCIDS) process is also informed by a yearly JROC-led Capability Gap Assessment that validates and prioritizes Combatant Command capability gaps expressed in their Integrated Priority Lists.

The USD(I&S), as a statutory advisor to the JROC and its subordinate boards, provides advice that supports JCIDS throughout all stages of requirements generation and validation processes and plays a central role in bridging DoD and IC requirements by directly facilitating the common gatekeeping function between the Joint JCIDS and the Intelligence Community Capability Requirements Process.

40. What is your understanding of the role of the defense intelligence enterprise to provide support and insight in the process of informing requirements for the broader acquisition system, especially related to understanding threat systems and illuminating supply chain issues? Are there sufficient people and resources to support acquisition intelligence for the Department?

I have real concerns about the ability of the existing DoD acquisition integration structure with the intelligence enterprise to effectively match the speed of the technology cycle, the increasing scope of acquisitions challenges, and the criticality of the defense supply chain resiliency in the face of adversary threats. The DISE is a vital component of the acquisition process, providing intelligence throughout the requirements development and acquisition lifecycle on current and future adversary capabilities and threats to DoD supply chains. Ensuring that intelligence is incorporated throughout the requirements development and acquisition lifecycle is necessary to deliver effective, affordable, and resilient capabilities that are matched to the threat environment and free from adversary compromise. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to improve the incorporation of accurate intelligence into the full acquisition lifecycle, to include more robust integration at the earlier stages of the process, to better inform DoD investments.

41. What is your understanding of the role of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (OUSD(I&S)) in identifying and establishing requirements for rapid or urgent operational needs, or other acquisition capabilities (like middle tier acquisitions) not tied to major acquisition programs?

17

I understand that, as part of statutory responsibilities to support JCIDS urgent and emergent operational needs processes, the USD(I&S) assists in validating requirements from an intelligence perspective, and further supports solution analysis by identifying emerging technologies and capabilities in the Defense Intelligence Enterprise or National Intelligence Community. When necessary, the USD(I&S) may also facilitate Military or National Intelligence Program funding to accelerate the fielding of a necessary and promising intelligence capability. The analysis performed by USD(I&S) for urgent needs is not limited to major acquisition programs, but may also include science, technology, research, and development capabilities that are of sufficient Technical Readiness Level to be eligible for consideration as a solution to a requirement. From my current perspective, I am concerned that intelligence inputs into the DoD acquisition process are inordinately focused on major acquisitions versus rapid acquisitions, and even then, intelligence inputs often arrive too late in the cycle to fully inform the first and most critical decisions on which programs to develop and purchase. If DoD leaders are to successfully make these hard choices, OUSD(I&S) must improve how the DISE delivers accurate and relevant intelligence to inform DoD's earliest acquisitions decisions, as well as the entire program lifecycle. If confirmed, I intend to leverage all DoD authorities available to accelerate these processes to act at the speed of operational need.

Intelligence Support to the Warfighter

42. If confirmed, how would you balance the need for the combat support Defense intelligence agencies to provide intelligence support to the warfighter with the need to provide intelligence support to policy makers?

Balancing support to the warfighter with intelligence support to policy makers is one of the OUSD(I&S)'s primary responsibilities. In today's environment of global and regional threats, most issues are relevant to both warfighting commands and policy makers. If confirmed, where there remain tactical and operational differences, I would work to ensure the DISE continues to satisfy requirements for operationally relevant intelligence that directly enable warfighter success, and I would work collaboratively across DoD and with interagency partners to inform policy and military decision-making by our national leaders.

43. In your view, what opportunities exist across the Intelligence Community to improve intelligence support to the warfighter? If confirmed, what would you do to leverage these opportunities?

My experience in uniform underpins my belief in the importance of and the continued opportunity to improve collaboration across the intelligence community to better support the warfighter.

If confirmed, I would engage early and often with the combatant commanders to improve my understanding of their needs, and I would frequently engage leaders within the national intelligence community to obtain support to meet those warfighter needs. I am

particularly interested in applying greater attention to faster, more agile, and adaptive processing, exploitation, and dissemination of intelligence data to better support the warfighter and others that engage our adversaries at the tactical edge—especially as DoD warfighters increasingly rely on resilient and survivable sensors further removed from the battlefield to inform their tactical decisions.

44. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that the geographic combatant commands are adequately assessing and prioritizing their intelligence needs?

I understand that OUSD(I&S) conducts multiple engagements with the combatant commands to include regular meetings with all combatant command J2s on a variety of issues in order to maintain a current understanding of regional risks and intelligence priorities. If confirmed, I will promptly establish my own relationships with the Combatant Commanders and ensure that they are able to prioritize and receive the intelligence support they require.

45. In your view, what are the shortfalls, if any, in providing the functional combatant commands and combat support agencies adequate intelligence support, and ensuring that their intelligence needs are prioritized?

As I am not yet in the position, I do not have a completely informed perspective on this matter. If confirmed, I commit to supporting the Secretary's priorities and evaluating intelligence needs of the Combatant Commands, Combat Support Agencies, Defense Agencies, and Services. I would also strengthen relationships with the Joint Staff to assess capability gaps, prioritize needs, and recommend strategic alignment of MIP funding against the highest intelligence needs of the warfighter in a manner that maximizes our return on our investments. Lastly, I would support the USD(I&S) to work with the DNI to closely synchronize NIP and MIP investments to ensure synergy in maximizing effects for the warfighter.

46. In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out by special operations forces different from those carried out by the Intelligence Community?

I understand that Special Operations Forces (SOF) intelligence operations are focused on DoD requirements and priorities. These priorities may differ from those of the IC in that they are sometimes more tactical, focused on support to military operations or preparation of military operations. This intelligence enables a commander to make decisions that reduces risk to force and can create opportunities for further collection and exploitation. SOF missions require accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence that only integrated, multi-disciplinary collection and analysis can provide. It is essential that SOF intelligence operations are conducted pursuant to applicable law and policy, and subject to the requisite intelligence oversight rules, consistent with all DoD intelligence activities.

Innovative Technologies

47. What role do you see for AI in supporting national and economic security?

I believe national and economic security have a reciprocal relationship. The role of AI for one will generally apply to the other. AI has the potential to enhance the speed and efficiency of how the DISE provides support to national security. In an environment of expanding data sources and a limited workforce, AI could assist in triaging and transforming the tasks requiring human attention. We must carefully consider the biases and vulnerabilities created through the introduction of AI, although it is without question that AI integration is necessary and has the potential to provide improved accuracy and precision in our support.

48. If confirmed, what priority would you assign to ensuring that the Defense intelligence enterprise invests in AI applications, as well as training and business process reengineering to ensure effective use of such applications by the workforce?

If confirmed, I will ensure that AI is considered in the modernization of capabilities, infrastructure, processes, and tradecraft within the DISE. We should default to its investment where it can improve our speed, accuracy, and efficiency.

We can learn from AI investment across the government to understand where to leverage its potential in shaping our operating environment and driving future advantages.

49. What role do you envision for AI in bringing greater efficiencies, timeliness, and accuracy to intelligence collection, analysis, dissemination, and military decision making?

I cannot speak highly enough of our intelligence professionals. Their expertise and time are invaluable. I believe that AI can assist in prioritizing the collection that receives their attention and collate that information in a manner that expedites their analysis. AI can also be used to improve the efficiency in disseminating more relevant, accurate, and actionable intelligence into the hands of the warfighter at greater speed and volume, thereby enabling better and faster military decision making. AI can also be used to create new ways of generating and responding to intelligence requirements.

50. Are there other technology areas that you view as promising as they relate to the intelligence and security functions of OUSD(I&S)?

I believe that to accomplish the Secretary's objective of rebuilding our military capabilities, we must be flexible and aggressive in our approach to innovation and adopting commercial solutions. Critical to success will be closer integration between DoD and the commercial sector in order to identify and pilot new capabilities that can be used to maintain an advantage against our adversaries at the speed of relevance.

Additionally, I believe there are a number of promising areas that, if confirmed, I will work with OUSD(I&S) components and DISE to support regaining decision advantage in today's contested environment. Among these areas are: the exploitation of, and our defense against, exquisite intelligence collection technologies, such as ubiquitous sensing and space ISR; expanding virtual domain operations that disrupt adversary intelligence; the use of advanced computing and software to improve the efficiency of intelligence collection management; and survivable cloud compute and data transport to the tactical edge.

51. In your view, does DOD have sufficient numbers and expertise in the intelligence community to monitor and analyze technological advances in industry, academia and our adversaries research establishments that will impact DOD missions and national security?

As I am not in the position, I am unable to provide a comprehensive assessment to answer this question. However, from my outside perspective, I am concerned that the DoD may lack sufficient quantity and specialization of Science and Technology Intelligence (S&TI) personnel that are necessary to remain competitive with our adversaries. The sheer volume of information in open-source research alone presents challenges for the capability and capacity of human analysts, even when paired with AI tools. Additionally, many emerging technologies require highly specialized expertise that are either in short supply or may not be currently available within the U.S. Government and might require changes to DoD authorities to fully address. Even with improvements, DoD will increasingly be reliant on outside expertise for cutting edge technology, particularly in niche fields such as quantum computing, biotechnology, and advanced materials. I do not believe that we can rely on traditional organizational structures and approaches to solve these new challenges. OUSD(I&S) creatively uses existing programs such as the Intergovernmental Personnel Act and the Applied Research Laboratory for Intelligence & Security to close talent gaps. DoD must also effectively leverage commercial sector innovation to help us close these gaps. If confirmed, I will support the USD(I&S) efforts with the USD(R&E), the ODNI, the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), the private sector, and others to develop options to ensure that the DISE has access to the expertise needed to stay ahead of adversary technological advancements.

52. In your view, what areas of emerging technology should we be prioritizing collection and analysis to better prepare DOD for future conflicts?

Although I am not yet in the position and have not had the opportunity to be fully briefed at the classified levels, if confirmed, I will conduct a full assessment on which emerging technologies we must improve collection and analysis against. Beyond traditional focuses for collection and analysis, there are emergent technologies that are advancing adversary capabilities. We must understand how adversaries seek to develop and deploy those technologies, along with identifying opportunities for how we can deny adversary employment.

Some specific areas that we should be prioritizing include quantum, space-based technologies and biotechnology.

Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement, and Security

53. What is your assessment of current and anticipated counterintelligence threats to DOD? Which threats do you assess to be the most concerning and why?

As I am not yet in the position and briefed on classified information, if confirmed, I will seek to understand the counterintelligence threat environment at the classified level in order to develop informed recommendations to counter threats to our intelligence advantage.

I am aware that the advent of ubiquitous sensing, artificial intelligence-powered exploitation of data, and analytics (also referred to as data analytics), may make it increasingly challenging for U.S. intelligence to operate with the same effectiveness and agility against our adversaries without the appropriate modernization of our efforts. Additionally, as DoD increasingly relies on space-based capabilities for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to warfighters, protecting U.S. space superiority from foreign denial and deception grows more essential.

54. What is your understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the OUSD(I&S) to provide strategic direction and oversight of implementation of counterintelligence policy, programs, guidance, and training to ensure they are responsive to validated DOD and national counterintelligence priorities? What changes, if any, in these roles and responsibilities would you recommend, if confirmed?

I understand the USD(I&S) has broad responsibility for oversight of DoD counterintelligence (CI). Further, although I do not yet have access to classified information, I understand that the Department is implementing its DoD CI Strategy, "Confronting Threats to America's Military Advantage, 2021-2031," and has recently completed a year-long, end-to-end review to identify CI capability requirements, gaps, and solutions to implement that strategy.

I also understand the USD(I&S) along with the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency is a standing member of the National CI and Security Center's National CI Policy Board. In addition, DoD participates with the FBI in the National CI Task Force and local CI Task Forces under a formal memorandum of understanding. Through this and other forums the USD(I&S) provides policy, oversight, advocacy, guidance and direction to DoD CI activities conducted, oftentimes, in cooperation or in partnership with other Departments and Agencies across the U.S. Government.

One of my major priorities, if confirmed, is to support the USD(I&S) to assist the Secretary in reestablishing deterrence by presenting him with risk informed options to impose costs on our adversaries short of armed conflict. Among these options is a greater

focus on counterintelligence, and in particular, offensive counterintelligence, to disrupt foreign intelligence services before they can act with malign intent against the United States.

Personnel Security and Insider Threat

The OUSD(I&S) is accountable for managing and overseeing DOD's insider threat, personnel security, security clearance process, and the National Industrial Security programs. DOD has experienced devastating attacks from insider threats—attacks that have led to the death and injury of DOD personnel, as well as to the loss of highly-classified information critical to national security. Recent delays have exacerbated backlogs in processing security clearances and reinvestigations for DOD personnel.

55. Most of these very challenging new and enhanced requirements have been assigned to the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA). What is your current assessment of the ability of DCSA to transform itself to meet these objectives?

I understand that after President Trump transferred the background investigation and security clearance function to DCSA in 2019, DCSA vetting services have proved essential to national-level efforts to modernize personnel vetting and uniformly execute the National Industrial Security Program. DCSA services establish the foundation for execution of various subsequent security requirements and procedures which enable the essential concept of security in-depth. Additionally, in accordance with Section 847 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, DCSA has been charged to prepare to conduct assessments of Foreign Ownership, Control, and Influence (FOCI) not only for cleared defense contractors, but also all DoD contracts over $5 million—an effort that, if confirmed, I intend to assess closely to determine how best to support the FOCI mission in an effort to protect the Defense Industrial Base from compromise. Ultimately, to effectively and efficiently serve the DoD and other Federal agencies, I believe that DCSA requires cutting-edge technology, adaptable processes, the capacity to operate at scale, and—perhaps most significantly—the best talent available with the skills needed to pursue these objectives.

Although I do not yet have enough information to make a full assessment currently, the criticality of these efforts and the state of our capabilities relative to the timing of these mandates is concerning. If confirmed, I look forward to working with DCSA to fully assess the state of play.

56. There has been a backlog in processing security clearances that has been growing since 2023, after many years of steady progress in improving the security clearance process timelines. What is your understanding of the current issues causing the backlog and the status of efforts within DCSA to reduce that backlog?

I am dismayed at the continuing challenges to delivering timely security clearances, and if confirmed, it would be a top priority to avoid further delay in meeting the requirements of Trusted Workforce 2.0. Our national security depends on recruiting and retaining highly qualified individuals serving in critical positions across the Federal Government and industry, and delays in the security clearance process hinders our ability to fill these roles at the speed of mission requirements. People are our most important asset, but an inefficient and lengthy background investigation and security clearance process prevents the DoD from attracting and competing for top-tier talent. Every day a scientist, engineer, or analyst waits on their clearance to begin Federal work is one day closer to taking a job elsewhere—or never even applying to the U.S. government at all.

If confirmed, I will fully engage with DCSA to understand the factors contributing to timeliness concerns and will hold them accountable for their performance. I commit to modernizing and accelerating the clearance process through rigorous oversight and dedication to business transformation, advanced technology, and data-driven solutions.

57. Specifically, if confirmed, how would you ensure that DCSA is highly responsive to the needs of the USD(A&S) for vetting DOD contractors in responsibility determinations?

I understand that DCSA provides vetting of contractor personnel and companies for eligibility to access classified information in accordance with regulatory requirements for the National Industrial Security Program. This vetting assesses alignment of eligibility decisions with national security interests. This is one piece of a security apparatus that must work in concert with and at the speed of the acquisitions decision-making process to enable uncompromised delivery of supplies and technologies to properly equip our warfighters

If confirmed, I will support the USD(I&S)'s efforts to prioritize collaboration with OUSD(A&S) to optimize security in acquisitions, including vetting people and companies within a certain timeframe and under conditions that allow the Department to acquire critical supplies, services, and technologies at the speed of mission requirements.

58. What is your understanding of the status of development, approval, and implementation of the Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative?

I recognize that Trusted Workforce (TW) 2.0, originally launched in 2018 under President Trump, is a national-level reform effort aimed at improving overall efficacy of vetting for clearances and suitability. While I understand that TW 2.0 may have demonstrated some relative progress at times over the last few years, there clearly remains unacceptable challenges to full implementation of its objective.

If confirmed, I will support the USD(I&S)'s efforts to collaborate with our ODNI, Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and Office of Management and Budget colleagues to evaluate and take appropriate action to ensure that DoD fulfills its TW 2.0

responsibilities. Furthermore, I commit to keeping DoD's interagency and private industry partners fully and regularly informed of DCSA's progress in implementing TW 2.0, and identifying to them—as well as the Congress—any indications of additional delays or cost overruns in meeting the performance and timeliness standards set for the vetting enterprise. Specifically, I will work to ensure Department leaders know the impact of failing to meet these standards, so efforts can be appropriately prioritized in support of Department objectives.

59. What is your understanding of the status of development, approval, and implementation of continuous vetting initiative?

It is my understanding that continuous vetting (CV), including the adjudication of CV information, is a key element of Trusted Workforce 2.0. As DoD further implements CV, I believe its implementation must prioritize advanced technology, capacity, and cost-effectiveness. Without an effective and timely CV architecture, DoD will be unable to optimize its workforce in a secure manner, jeopardizing mission success.

If confirmed, I will push OUSD(I&S) and DCSA to incorporate modern technology, maximize efficiency, and continuously improve the ability to identify and assess risk to our nation's trusted workforce. Specifically, I will work to ensure Department leaders know the impact of failing to meet these standards set for the vetting enterprise, so efforts can be appropriately prioritized in support of Department objectives.

60. What is your understanding of the remaining challenges in achieving reciprocity of clearances and access to classified information across government components and their contractors?

I am aware of concerns about reciprocity between Federal components, particularly with IC agencies. My understanding is that reciprocity between DoD components has been significantly improved, but the delays in reciprocity that remain are generally related to differences between IC agencies in their individual enhanced eligibility requirements for access to especially sensitive information, such as polygraph requirements.

If confirmed, I will ensure DoD personnel vetting policies and processes are aligned to Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiatives and tracked through a performance management system to ensure effective and efficient transfer of trust and the mobility of the Federal workforce, as well as our contractors and others in private industry who are granted clearances.

61. In your view, how should DCSA posture the Department to deter, detect, and mitigate insider threats before they harm national security?

Over the course of my military service, I learned time and again the importance of empowering leadership and accountability at all mission levels. I understand that USD(I&S) is responsible for policy and oversight of the Department's Insider Threat

program, ensuring DoD components have the necessary guidance, resources, and capabilities to empower leaders at all levels to manage insider risk to readiness, resources, and national security information. I understand that DCSA's role in the Insider Threat program is to be a data and system provider, enabling information sharing and decentralized program implementation so DoD commanders at all levels effectively manage their own risks.

If confirmed, I will work with DCSA, the Military Departments, and other DoD components to ensure component and subordinate level insider threat program interoperability with enterprise data and systems.

62. How would you characterize the threat posed by foreign nations to the integrity of the National Security Innovation Base? Which threats do you assess as most concerning, and why?

The threat posed by foreign nations to the integrity of the National Security Innovation Base is persistent and significant. While I am not currently briefed on classified information, from open-source reporting I appreciate that the National Security Innovation Base is being exploited in sustained attempts to erode U.S. technology superiority critical to maintaining a military advantage over adversaries and the economic wellbeing of U.S. industry. Threat actors increasingly seek to weaponize the open and collaborative nature of the strong partnerships and relationships DoD has cultivated with U.S. academic institutions. Additionally, foreign threats don't just include outright theft of information through espionage and other illicit means, but also rely on more subtle approaches such as foreign acquisition of critical nodes within the U.S. supply chain.

If confirmed, I look forward to further strengthening DoD efforts to protect the National Security Innovation Base—to include an emphasis on robust intelligence support to Foreign Ownership, Control, and Influence mitigation and support to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States— to thwart our adversaries while continuing to support the vital and enabling aspects of innovation. In addition to FOCI and the Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States (CFIUS) efforts, I believe a key component of this effort will be not only enhancing our defensive posture here at home but taking action to impose costs on adversaries and reestablish deterrence.

63. How would you propose to improve the support provided by the DCSA, the DOD counterintelligence organizations, and the national Intelligence Community to better protect the National Security Innovation Base, and enhance the Department's innovation strategy, especially with respect to technology companies that are non-traditional DOD contractors?

DCSA plays a vital role in safeguarding national security by conducting background investigations and granting security clearances for DoD personnel and contractors. DCSA also oversees the National Industrial Security Program (NISP), which protects classified information within the Defense Industrial Base.

Although the core security principles of the NISP remain valid for all companies and contractors, as I understand from open-source reporting, the NISP's administrative requirements may lack the agility needed to facilitate effective acquisition decisions and ensure supply chain integrity in today's landscape, especially for classified programs. Furthermore, I am concerned that these regulations do not adequately address the needs of the National Security Innovation Base, a significant portion of which operates outside of the traditional NISP framework. It is these non-traditional DoD contractors that increasingly drive national security innovation, presenting DoD with the greatest opportunities for leap-ahead technologies, but meanwhile posing unique vulnerabilities to our adversaries.

64. In your view, is DCSA postured to better leverage artificial intelligence and other automation tools to improve due diligence vetting, as well as security clearance processes and suitability determinations?

I recognize the immense potential of artificial intelligence and machine learning to revolutionize personnel vetting and due diligence. Through automating routine tasks and analyzing vast datasets, I believe we could significantly improve the speed and accuracy of these vetting processes. If confirmed, I will prioritize development and adoption of these technologies across the DoD, working closely with DCSA to ensure responsible and effective implementation and return on investment.

65. According to the "Fork in the Road" memo from the Office of Personnel Management, "Employees will be subject to enhanced standards of suitability and conduct as we move forward," but no further guidance has been issued on what that means. What is your current understanding of the current definition for "suitability" being used by DOD, the process for those suitability determinations, and how that might change?

I understand USD Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) is the Department's lead for suitability based on guidance issued by OPM. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the USD(P&R) to ensure the appropriate intelligence and security inputs are incorporated into their guidance.

Collection & Special Programs

66. In light of the rapidly evolving nature of the national security environment, to include significant advances by adversarial nations in the development and fielding of capabilities that could challenge DOD tradecraft, technologies, methodologies, and processes, what do you see as the most pressing challenges to DOD's ability to conduct technical and human intelligence collection activities?

Adversary investment in advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and encrypted communications, as well as the dispersion of sophisticated

capabilities across the globe, have complicated the information environment and reduced our national security advantage. Additionally, the emergence of ubiquitous sensing and the increasing volume of commercially available data on individuals and their activity pose novel counterintelligence challenges to DoD human intelligence collection activities, operational security, force protection, and many other areas of potential vulnerability.

Meanwhile, our own foundational vulnerabilities such as fragmented infrastructure, limited interoperability, and outdated network architectures amplify the threat from these advanced capabilities. Therefore, we must invest in innovation to stay ahead of these advanced technologies while building a secure, efficient foundation to move our information from sensors to decision-makers securely and faster than our adversaries.

If confirmed, I will work to smartly allocate and realign resources to close the seams that adversaries exploit, raising the barrier and cost of conducting intelligence against the U.S., and ensuring our intelligence enterprise can securely navigate an era defined by relentless digital exposure and ubiquitous technical surveillance. This will include DISE efforts to address the reality of global ubiquitous sensing, the proliferation of networked, correlated, and automated systems, and the algorithms that can exploit gathered information.

67. If confirmed, how do you intend to approach these challenges to ensure that the DOD intelligence enterprise is postured to operate in an increasingly contested security and intelligence environment?

DoD operates within an increasingly contested security and intelligence environment. Embracing new technology and investing in innovative solutions is vital to the Department's ability to grasp collection opportunities in the physical and digital domains.

If confirmed, I will lead the continuous review of processes and policies to support warfighters and decision makers in this changing environment. This may require changes in how DoD personnel train and use tradecraft, technologies, and methodologies, as well as process adjustments for collection analysis. Aggressive efforts to ensure DoD is leveraging the best commercial technologies will remain essential, as will our ability to rapidly field technologies where required. As we adapt our efforts, we must ensure the DoD's intelligence collection activities are lawful and conducted in accordance with the United States Constitution.

Alignment across mission and technology needs, modernization of planning doctrine in this new landscape, and reducing barrier of entry for DoD elements and personnel to access best-in-class capabilities in a resource efficient manner is essential in 2025 and beyond.

Information Operations

68. What are your views on the roles, responsibilities, and preparedness of the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise to conduct operations in the information environment, as well as deter and defense against such operations by adversaries?

I believe that for DoD to compete effectively in the information environment, the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise must inform activities that shape the perceptions of specific foreign audiences to gain or maintain a competitive advantage. Our efforts to deter and defend against adversary information operations should be prioritized with appropriate resources and must include more robust coordination and collaboration across the Department, including with the USD(P) as the Secretary of Defense's Principal Information Operations Advisor, as well as the interagency.

69. In your view, how can the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise better support the requirements of the combatant commanders for intelligence to enable their information operations?

I believe that the DISE should enhance its ability to support Combatant Commanders by focusing on three key areas: understanding adversary goals, enabling maneuver in the information environment, and identifying proxies and influence networks. First, the DISE must improve its intelligence collection and analysis to fully understand adversary goals in the information space—what they seek to achieve, how they measure success, and where vulnerabilities exist. Second, intelligence must be aligned with warfighter requirements to facilitate maneuver in the information environment, ensuring that commanders can shape narratives, counter adversary information operations, and integrate influence activities into broader operational planning to support American objectives   Finally, the DISE should increase its focus on tracking adversary use of proxies and influence mechanisms—whether state-sponsored media, cyber actors, or third-party enablers—to provide a clearer picture of the information battlespace. If confirmed, I look forward to assessing and improving the Enterprise's support to information operations in these areas.

Imperative for Independent Intelligence Analysis

70. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure that DOD intelligence analysts, including those seconded to offices that are not part of the defense intelligence structure, are independent and free of pressure from influence from their chain of command to reach a certain conclusion, including a conclusion that fits a particular policy preference?

I am deeply committed to ensuring that all defense intelligence assessments remain unbiased, objective, and free from political interference. An absolute focus on the mission and support of the warfighter demands it. The credibility of intelligence assessments—and the willingness of our leaders to accept and act on those assessments—is predicated on apolitical, non-partisan analytical judgments. We cannot support the warfighter or policymaker without the best thinking from all of our people in support of our national security.

If confirmed, I will support the USD(I&S) efforts to work with the DIE to ensure that all DoD intelligence analysts adhere to Intelligence Community analytic standards promulgated in Intelligence Community Directive 203, which mandates that all-source intelligence analysis must be objective and independent of political considerations.

The Defense Intelligence Workforce

The USD(I&S) exercises policy oversight of the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) to ensure that defense intelligence, counterintelligence, and security components are structured; manned; trained—including joint intelligence training, certification, education, and professional development; and equipped to execute their missions.

71. In your view, is the DOD civilian intelligence workforce properly sized with the appropriate capabilities, in your view? Please explain your answer.

As I am not yet in the position, I have not yet had an opportunity to comprehensively assess the size or capabilities of the DISE workforce. I am aware that the Secretary has directed reductions within the civilian defense workforce to more effectively align with the Administration's national security priorities, and I fully support this critical effort. If confirmed, I will immediately review the work that has been done to date across the DISE workforce and provide recommendations for how to most effectively meet the requirements of the DISE in support of national security.

Space

72. If confirmed, what would be your approach to enhancing the interface and synchronization of space-based capabilities resident in the Intelligence Community with military space organizations?

If confirmed, I will support the USD(I&S)'s work with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, the United States Space Force, the ODNI, and defense and intelligence agencies to ensure roles, responsibilities, and requirements amongst the various stakeholder organizations are aligned and mutually support IC and military space-based intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) needs. I would also ensure that DoD and IC ISR space architectures remain integrated to maximize ISR support to the Joint Force to achieve our national security objectives.

73. How would you recommend deconflicting tasking requirements in the space warfighting domain across DOD with tasking requirements from Intelligence Community customers?

If confirmed, I would first work to understand the gaps and concerns with existing tasking processes and procedures from the Joint Staff, Combatant Command, and Service

perspectives. I will then work alongside the Joint Staff and ODNI to support the development of new processes, tools, and concepts of employment to assure Combatant Commanders and warfighters access to the space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance necessary to support military operational requirements. New architectures must be responsive to the warfighter.

The Space Force has been assigned the mission of space-based ISR. To ensure the timely presentation of forces and effects to the combatant commander by the Space Force, Congress enacted into law section 1684 of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (P.L. 118-31), further amended by section 1654 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (P.L. 118-366) which stated that:

"The Secretary of the Air Force shall be responsible for presenting space-based ground and airborne moving target indication systems to the combatant commands to accomplish missions assigned to such commands under the Unified Command Plan that— (1) are primarily or fully funded by the Department of Defense; and (2) provide near real-time, direct support to satisfy the operational requirements of such commands."

74. If confirmed, will you adhere to this provision of law?

Yes, if confirmed, I would ensure that OUSD(I&S) and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise partner with the leads of the MTI Working Group established by the FY2024 NDAA to identify the most cost-effective delivery mechanisms to improve lethality.

Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP)

75. What is your understanding of the current congressional concerns regarding transparency and reporting on UAP issues with Congress?

I am aware of the tremendous public and congressional interest in understanding both historical and contemporary UAP observations. If confirmed, I am committed to enabling the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community, and National Archives and Records Administration to declassify and share information related to UAP with the American public to the greatest extent possible. It is imperative that we also continue to protect sensitive information regarding sources and methods, to ensure that gaps potentially revealed by declassification of information to the public—and therefore to our adversaries—is a risk-informed decision. When UAP information is unable to be safely and responsibly declassified, I am committed to providing all such information, at all levels of classification, to the appropriate congressional committees of jurisdiction.

76. What do you see as the intelligence communities' level of effort and focus on the UAP challenge?

I understand the Department enjoys strong support from the IC and the whole of the DISE for its UAP mission. In line with statute, AARO reports to both DoD and the

ODNI and regularly convenes a group of IC partners to share information and expertise. IC partners routinely support AARO in the analysis and resolution of UAP reports. If confirmed, I will ensure this strong partnership is sustained.

The All-Domain Anomalous Resolution Office, or AARO, was established to be the central clearinghouse for reporting and analysis of UAP incidents.

77. Do you believe AARO is adequately staffed and resourced to carry out its mission? What areas do you believe AARO should be focusing on?

Yes. I understand that AARO is adequately staffed and resourced to meet its mission. I believe that AARO should focus on fully leveraging partnerships and capabilities across the USG to close gaps in domain awareness and minimize technological and intelligence surprise. If confirmed, I will ensure AARO has the support it needs to succeed, and that its efforts—and that of the DISE—are complementary and synchronized with other DoD efforts to address Unmanned Vehicles in an effective manner.

78. How will you improve the integration of intelligence community technical collection assets, such as signals intelligence and measurement and signatures intelligence systems, into UAP reporting?

I understand that DoD enjoys strong support from the IC in this regard. AARO convenes multiple UAP Communities of Interest that engage IC partners to draw on their expertise, resources, and capabilities. If confirmed, I will ensure continued DoD collaboration with IC partners to expand and improve technical collection for UAP detected in air, sea, or space.

Sexual Harassment

79. If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to receive or otherwise become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or discrimination from an employee of the OUSD(I&S)?

Every member of the DISE workforce is entitled to work in an environment free of harassment or discrimination of any type. If confirmed, I will ensure that leaders across the DISE are acting to ensure that our workplace is free of harmful sexual or other harassment or discrimination and will take immediate action to correct and hold accountable those responsible for actions counter to law and policy.

Detainee Treatment

80. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, *The Department of Defense Detainee Program*, dated August 19, 2014?

Yes, I support the standards for detainee treatment specified in Army Field Manual 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations and DOD Directive 2310.01E, Department of Defense Detainee Program.

Section 2441 of title 18, U.S. Code, defines grave breaches of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, including torture and cruel and inhuman treatment.

81. In your view, does section 2441 define these terms in a way that provides U.S. detainees in the custody of other nations, as well as foreign detainees in U.S. custody appropriate protections from abusive treatment?

Yes.

Whistleblower Protection

Section 1034 of title 10, U.S. Code, prohibits taking or threatening to take an unfavorable personnel action against a member of the armed forces in retaliation for making a protected communication. Section 2302 of title 5, U.S. Code, provides similar protections to Federal civilian employees. By definition, protected communications include communications to certain individuals and organizations outside of the chain of command, including the Congress.

82. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that military and civilian members of the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise who report fraud, waste, and abuse, or gross mismanagement—including in classified programs—to appropriate authorities within or outside the chain of command—are protected from reprisal and retaliation, including from the very highest levels of DOD and the broader Intelligence Community?

If confirmed, I commit to ensuring protections are afforded to DISE employees who report fraud, waste, and abuse, or gross mismanagement, in a manner consistent with law, regulation, and policy. Additionally, I will ensure that personnel who pursue retaliatory actions upon protected personnel are addressed appropriately, as established by law, regulation, and policy.

83. If confirmed, what role would you play in ensuring consistency in the application and interpretation of whistleblower protections across the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise?

If confirmed, I commit to ensuring DoD policy implementing such protections is applied consistently and uniformly in accordance with law.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive

timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

84. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes.

85. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes.

86. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes.

87. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes.

88. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes.

89. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes.

90. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes.