

**NOMINATIONS OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY,
USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE
OF GENERAL AND REAPPOINTMENT AS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF; AND ADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD,
JR., USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE
GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND REAPPOINTMENT
AS VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF**

THURSDAY, JULY 18, 2013

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Hagan, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Kaine, King, Inhofe, McCain, Sessions, Chambliss, Wicker, Ayotte, and Graham.

Committee staff members present: Peter K. Levine, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, general counsel; Mariah K. McNamara, special assistant to the staff director; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; Roy F. Phillips, professional staff member; Russell L. Shaffer, counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: John A. Bonsell, minority staff director; Daniel C. Adams, minority associate counsel; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; Steven M. Barney, minority counsel; William S. Castle, minority general counsel; Samantha L. Clark, minority associate counsel; Allen M. Edwards, professional staff member; Thomas W. Goffus, professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Anthony J. Lazarski, professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; and Robert M. Soofer, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Lauren M. Gillis and Daniel J. Harder.

Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Jeff Fatora, assistant to Senator Nelson; Jason Rauch, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Brian Nagle, assistant to Senator Hagan; Mara Boggs, assistant to Senator Manchin; Patrick Day, assistant to Senator Shaheen; Moran Banai and Brooke Jamison, assistants to Senator Gillibrand; Ethan Saxon, assistant to Senator Blumenthal; Marta McLellan Ross, assistant to Senator Donnelly; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Hirono; Karen Courington, assistant to Senator Kaine; Jim Catella and Steve Smith, assistants to Senator King; Christian Brose, assistant to Senator McCain; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Todd Harmer, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker; Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte; and Craig Abele, assistant to Senator Graham.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody.

The committee meets this morning to consider the nominations of General Martin Dempsey and Admiral James Winnefeld, both of whom have been nominated to continue in their current positions: General Dempsey as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Admiral Winnefeld as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thank you both for your service and for your willingness to continue to serve in these positions of huge responsibility.

I would also like to welcome and to thank your family members, some of whom are with us here this morning. Our military families, as you well know, are a vital part of the overall success and well-being of our Armed Forces, and we appreciate greatly their unwavering support and their many sacrifices, usually during the course of long military careers. During your opening remarks, please feel free to reintroduce your family members to our committee.

The foremost duty of the leadership positions to which General Dempsey and Admiral Winnefeld have been renominated is to ensure that our service men and women have what they need to win wars, to succeed in their missions, and to secure peace. Our nominees have carried out their duties with energy and with commitment. It is a testament to the quality of their service that the President has nominated them to continue in their positions.

I have had frequent occasions to seek the views of General Dempsey and Admiral Winnefeld over the years in both public and private settings. Even on those few occasions when I have disagreed with their assessments and recommendations, I have found their positions to be thoughtful and well reasoned.

If confirmed, our nominees will face a series of continuing challenges.

In Syria, Assad is using airstrikes, missiles, helicopters, tanks, and artillery to attack the Syrian people. He is targeting civilians in residential neighborhoods, in marketplaces, in schools, and in places of worship. He has used chemical weapons against the insurgents. He is increasingly relying on foreign fighters from Iran and Hezbollah to sustain his grip on power. To date, his actions have killed more than 100,000 Syrians, led more than a million to flee the country, forced more than 4 million more to become inter-

nally displaced, leveled entire villages and neighborhoods, and motivated the Syrian people to rise up against him.

I look forward to hearing the nominees' views on the steps that might be taken to increase the military pressure on Assad in support of the administration's goal of convincing the Assad regime and its supporters, including Russia, that the current military momentum towards the regime cannot last in the face of a major insurgency that has the support of both the Syrian people and an international coalition and that a political settlement that transitions Syria to a post-Assad regime that is inclusive of and protective of all elements of the Syrian society is the only solution.

In Afghanistan, while the campaign is on track to transition responsibility for the country's security from coalition forces to the Afghan security forces, and U.S. and coalition forces continue to draw down over the next year and a half, significant challenges remain to secure the hard-fought gains. Among those challenges is putting the U.S.-Afghanistan strategic partnership on a sound footing for the long term, including through the conclusion of a bilateral status of forces agreement to ensure that our troops have the legal protections necessary for any post-2014 U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. Recent statements by President Karzai have complicated negotiation of such an agreement, and I will be interested in what our witnesses have to say about the prospects for a successful negotiation, as well as what the status is of the efforts in Afghanistan militarily.

In mid-March of this year, Secretary Hagel responded to North Korea's provocative behavior by announcing a series of steps to improve our Homeland missile defense capability, including the planned deployment of 14 additional ground-based interceptors in Alaska by 2014.

On July 5, our ground-based midcourse defense system had a flight test failure. This test failure, along with an earlier failure, reinforces the need to pursue a "fly-before-you-buy" approach which demonstrates through realistic flight tests that the system will work as intended before deploying any additional interceptors. I would welcome our witnesses' comments on that issue as well.

The National Defense Authorization Act that we will bring to the Senate floor includes provisions that give the Secretary of Defense greater flexibility to transfer detainees from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). I will be interested in our witnesses' views on these proposed changes in our defense authorization bill.

Lastly, but far from leastly, we must confront the growing challenge of sequestration. All of the things that our military needs to do, responding to regional crises, maintaining readiness, training and equipping our forces, taking care of our servicemembers and their families, depend upon appropriate levels of funding. The damaging effect that sequestration is already having and will continue to have unless addressed, remedied, and reversed—that damaging effect on the readiness of our military must be addressed and addressed in a way that protects the vitality of our forces.

It is against the backdrop of these and many more challenges, both foreign and domestic, that we consider these two very important nominations.

Again, we welcome both of you today. We look forward to your testimony.

I now call on Senator Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I mentioned to you, we have another hearing simultaneously with this one, two floors up, so I will be going back and forth.

Over the last 4 years, our military has suffered a steep and damaging drop in capabilities and readiness. This administration has cut nearly \$600 billion already from the defense budget, reduced end strength by more than 100,000 personnel, reduced the size of the naval fleet, and cut hundreds of Air Force combat aircraft. Training and reset accounts have been gutted and modernization programs are being starved of resources. On the horizon is the addition of \$500 billion in cuts if we are unable to find a solution for the sequestration, which you know, is kind of ridiculous. When you tell normal people that we have 18 percent of our budget is the military budget, and yet we are taking 50 percent of the cuts, it is totally unreasonable. It lets you know the priorities of this administration.

The longer we allow our force to deteriorate, the harder and more expensive it will be to repair and rebuild.

Earlier this year, Chairman Levin and I sent a letter to Secretary Hagel requesting a detailed plan on how the Department would allocate the additional \$52 billion in sequester cuts slated for fiscal year 2014. The response we received was woefully light on details but made clear that further cuts in fiscal year 2014 will significantly amplify the pain our military is already enduring.

Admiral Winnefeld, you were asked earlier this year about the impact of the budget cuts on the military, and you responded. I have to say it was a very courageous response. I am quoting now. "There could be, for the first time in my career, instances where we may be asked to respond to a crisis and we will have to say that we cannot." Admiral, I feel that we are well on our way to this unthinkable reality.

Recently, the Department of Defense (DOD) has undertaken actions internally to address some critical readiness issues, including the resumption of flight operations for the Air Force after many squadrons—I believe 16—had been grounded for over 3 months. While this development is welcome news, I remain concerned over the vital training and maintenance activities, the services that remain curtailed, and nearly 700,000 DOD civilians are still being furloughed. What I find most concerning, however, is that much of this pain has been unnecessary and could have been avoided all along.

Earlier this year, I introduced a bill that would have provided for the Department with flexibility to allocate the sequester cuts in a way that minimizes risk. At that time, all the Chiefs agreed it would be still devastating, but not as devastating. When we come back and put our squadrons in flying status—again, I am going to conduct my own test on this, on how much more it costs now to retrain, get people back up in proficiency than it would have, had we just stayed with it.

Our actions at home do not occur in a vacuum. Around the world, we are seeing the effects of declining military capability and the absence of American leadership. From the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific, our adversaries are emboldened and there are growing doubts about the United States among our allies.

I raise these issues today because I am deeply concerned by the current state of our military. As our military is experiencing an unprecedented deterioration of readiness and capabilities, I ask our witnesses what advice they are giving the President on these matters.

General Dempsey, at what point will you advise the President that the defense cuts will result in the dire scenario you laid out before our committee in February? You said, "If ever the force is so degraded and so unready, and then we're asked to use it, it would be immoral."

General Dempsey, you also warned in testimony to this committee that further defense cuts will, "severely limit our ability to implement our defense strategy. It will put the Nation at greater risk of coercion, and it will break faith with the men and women in uniform." The Service Chiefs are already talking about combat forces and capabilities that are starting to hollow out. We had a discussion about this. Are we hollowing out, or are we already a hollow force?

I am afraid to remind you of the comments from the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, who stated earlier this year, "In almost 50 years in intelligence, I don't remember that we've had a more diverse array of threats and crisis situations around the world to deal with than we have today."

That is our problem, Mr. Chairman, and that is why we are having this hearing today.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.

Let me call upon you, Chairman Dempsey. Welcome.

STATEMENT OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, FOR RE-APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND RE-APPOINTMENT AS CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General DEMPSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Inhofe, distinguished Senators. I am honored to appear before you today on this 18th day of July as the 18th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I am also thankful, thankful for the confidence placed in me 2 years ago, for the continued confidence of our commander in chief and the Secretary of Defense, and for the privilege of serving alongside Admiral Sandy Winnefeld and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Of course, I am also very thankful for the unwavering love and support and tireless service in her own way of my wife, Deanie, who is seated behind me, not to mention our three children and our seven grandchildren. Yes, that is plus four since my confirmation hearing 2 years ago, with one more due any day now to make it a total of eight.

Chairman LEVIN. I am sure if it were allowed you would, for that reason alone, love to be appointed a third time. [Laughter.]

General DEMPSEY. I do not know. Actually quite the opposite. I would like to spend some time with them when the opportunity arises.

I also want to mention I notice that my nephew Michael Dempsey, who is a student at Wake Forest University and home for the summer, has joined us today. We are awful proud of him as well.

But more than anything else, I am thankful for the opportunity to defend our Nation alongside the men and women who wear its cloth. When I witness their courage and their skill, I am very much reminded of the inscription that is on the Private Soldier Monument called "Old Simon" at Antietam Battlefield that goes like this, "Not for themselves but for their country."

It is on their behalf and in that spirit that I am here today. My only purpose is to be worthy of their service every day and in every decision, to strengthen the relationship of trust that the American Armed Forces has with the American people, to meet our sacred obligation to keep our Nation immune from coercion.

We cannot take this relationship for granted. Historic transitions are testing our ability to meet our obligations. We are in the midst of a difficult fiscal correction to restore the economic foundation of power. We are also transitioning from war to an even more uncertain and dangerous security landscape.

Even as the dollars are in decline, risk is on the rise. If we do not manage these transitions well, our military power will become less credible. We will foreclose options and we will leave gaps in our security.

It does not have to be that way. We can and we must lead through these transitions. We have it within us to stay strong as a global leader and as a reliable ally. We can make our military more affordable without making our Nation less secure. To do this, we need to get at least four things right.

First, we need to get our strategy right. This means aligning our aims with our abilities. Strategy is nothing if it is not about setting priorities. Even as we rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, we still have to defend the Homeland from cyber, terrorist, and missile attack, achieve our objectives in Afghanistan, deter provocation on the Korean Peninsula, assure and assist allies across the globe, set a more responsive posture for a new normal of combustible violence. As we respond to new contingencies, we must come to terms with the risks and costs to these existing obligations. We may have to do less, but we should never do it less well.

Second, we need to get our force right. This means keeping our military ready and balanced. So far, we are getting it wrong. We have already lost readiness that will take more time and additional cost to restore. We are already out of balance due to the magnitude and the mechanism—not to mention the steep descent—of budget cuts. But it is not too late to recover. Remove the budget uncertainty. Slow down the drawdown. Help us make seemingly intractable institutional reforms. If we do this, we can build a joint force to meet the Nation's needs for a price that the Nation is able and willing to pay.

Third, we need to get our people right. This means strengthening our profession while keeping faith with the military family. Ours


is an uncommon profession, one that must value character as much as competence, that rests on a foundation of learning and leadership, that advances equal and ethical treatment for all its members, and that allows no quarter for sexual violence in all of its destructive forms. We also keep faith by making sure that our sons and daughters always go to war with the best training, the best leadership, and the best equipment. If we get this wrong, we will not get anything else right.

Finally, we need to get our relationships right. This means staying connected to our allies and, most importantly, to our fellow Americans. Now is the defining moment in our Nation's relationship with its September 11 veterans. This generation is a national asset. They are ready to contribute in their communities. They need opportunities, handshakes, not handouts.

In the end, all relationships rest on trust. Two years ago, I offered this image at my confirmation hearing to illustrate the vein of trust that must run from our men and women in uniform on the front lines back here and right back to our communities, our families, and the American people.

[The information referred to follows:]

See attached photo.



General DEMPSEY. Today, it is still all about trust. Reconfirmation is at its base a reaffirmation of trust. I am humbled by the opportunity, and I will continue to work to earn it every day. I know you expect it and I know our men and women in uniform deserve it.

I would like to say one other thing before passing it back to you, Mr. Chairman. I am very careful not to presume confirmation, and

in that spirit and not knowing when my last opportunity will be to appear before this body, I would like to thank you for your leadership of this committee and your support of America's men and women in uniform, as well as the two ranking members, Senator Inhofe, Senator McCain, with whom I have had the privilege of working for the last 2 years.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

General DEMPSEY. Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Admiral?

STATEMENT OF ADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN, FOR RE-APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND RE-APPOINTMENT AS VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Admiral WINNEFELD. Good morning, Chairman Levin and Ranking Member Inhofe and other distinguished members of the Committee on Armed Services.

I am also honored to appear before the committee this morning and to do so along with my friend and colleague and boss, General Marty Dempsey.

The military is a family business, and I am pleased to have with me today my wonderful wife, Mary, who has been such a supportive partner. She is behind me in the joint purple outfit. She has also been a tireless advocate for military families and wounded warriors and their caregivers, which has been a great comfort to know that I have such a willing partner to do this sort of work.

My sons, James and Jonathan, would have been with us also today, but they are both at athletic tournaments, one at a State baseball championship tournament and the other at a golf tournament. But they remind me every day of the importance of honorable service.

It has been my privilege to serve the Nation as Vice Chairman for the past 2 years, and I am honored to have been asked by the President to serve another term.

If reconfirmed, I will continue to provide independent and objective advice to the Chairman, the Secretary of Defense, and the President on the shape, readiness, health, and use of the military instrument of power and to keep this committee informed and to give my best effort within the three portfolios of policy, investment, and people.

In a world growing more rather than less dangerous, at the same time we face considerable financial pressure, there are plenty of challenges in the three portfolios I just listed.

In the area of policy, we have been grappling with a host of threats to our national security interests around the world, in Afghanistan, in Iran, on the Korean Peninsula, with the continuing evolution of al Qaeda and its affiliates, in the aftermath of the Arab Awakening in Libya, Syria, Egypt, and other nations, and within the increasingly complex cyber domain.

In the investment portfolio, I was first confirmed by the Senate for this job on the same day the Budget Control Act (BCA) was enacted, and we continue to cope with the financial challenges in the

wake of that act that are quietly eroding our readiness to defend our Nation and have so impacted our ability to plan for tomorrow.

To the people portfolio, we are doing our best to manage the enormous uncertainty to which our military and civilian members and their families are being exposed during this budget crisis.

We are also expending considerable effort to ensure we are properly caring for our wounded, ill, and injured members and their families, as well as finding every lever we can to eliminate the pernicious insider threat of sexual assault.

These are only a few of the challenges we face, and much remains to be done in all three of these portfolios.

If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to serve our great Nation in uniform and pledge to work with this committee on the difficult choices required to achieve a capable and strategically shaped force that can keep America safe and our interests secure.

Allow me to close by saying how deeply grateful I am for the energy all the members of this committee and your able staff bring to these issues and for your longstanding support for our men and women in uniform and our civilians.

I look forward to taking your questions.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Admiral.

Let me now ask you both the standard questions which we ask of our military nominees.

Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

General DEMPSEY. Yes, sir, I have.

Admiral WINNEFELD. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

General DEMPSEY. Yes, sir.

Admiral WINNEFELD. I do.

Chairman LEVIN. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

General DEMPSEY. No.

Admiral WINNEFELD. No, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Will you ensure that your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record and hearings?

General DEMPSEY. I will.

Admiral WINNEFELD. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?

General DEMPSEY. Yes, sir.

Admiral WINNEFELD. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

General DEMPSEY. They will.

Admiral WINNEFELD. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee?

General DEMPSEY. Yes, sir.

Admiral WINNEFELD. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

General DEMPSEY. Yes, sir.

Admiral WINNEFELD. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Okay. We are going to have a 7-minute first round of questions.

General, do you support finding additional ways to increase the military pressure on Assad?

General DEMPSEY. Senator, first, let me say that I am well aware of the human suffering and the tragedy unfolding in Syria and the effect that it is having not just inside Syria but on the region.

To your question about courses of action going forward, I support very strongly a whole-of-government approach that applies all the instruments of national power.

As for the military instrument of power, we have prepared options and articulated risks and opportunity costs to put additional pressure on the Assad regime.

Chairman LEVIN. Does the administration support additional training and equipping of the opposition?

General DEMPSEY. The administration has a governmental approach to the increased capability of the opposition.

Chairman LEVIN. Does that include training and equipping militarily?

General DEMPSEY. Not through the Department of Defense.

Chairman LEVIN. Through other means, whether it might be other countries?

General DEMPSEY. Yes.

Chairman LEVIN. On Afghanistan, are the security forces of Afghanistan on track to be fully in charge of securing Afghanistan by December 2014 when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) combat mission ends?

General DEMPSEY. They are. General Dunford assesses that he will achieve his campaign objectives in developing the Afghan security forces. Now, he does also acknowledge there are some potential gaps that he will have better clarity on after this fighting season.

Chairman LEVIN. But he is basically on track?

General DEMPSEY. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, I am not going to ask you what advice you have given to the President on the residual force which might remain, assuming there is an agreement with the Afghans, after December 2014. I am not going to ask you what the advice is because that is advice you give confidentially to the President, and he has a right to your confidential advice.

My question, however, is the following. Have you given the President your advice relative to the size of the residual force?

General DEMPSEY. I have, sir. We have provided several options. As the Joint Chiefs, we have made a recommendation on the size and we have also expressed our view on when that announcement would best meet the campaign objectives.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, would you agree that legal protections for our troops, which would be provided for if we can reach a bilateral

security agreement with Afghanistan, are essential to any long-term U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan?

General DEMPSEY. I do believe that.

Chairman LEVIN. So any presence after December 2014 is dependent upon working out a bilateral agreement with the Afghans?

General DEMPSEY. That is right, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. I hope President Karzai is listening to that answer.

General DEMPSEY. I will travel over there on Friday night, sir, and have a planned office call with him.

Chairman LEVIN. I hope that you would make that clear, and also I believe that our committee—and I will not speak for others directly. If anyone does not feel this way, they will speak for themselves. But I think it is essential that he understand that there has to be a bilateral agreement that protects our troops for there to be a residual presence. I happen to favor a residual presence, by the way.

General DEMPSEY. As do we.

Chairman LEVIN. I happen to favor giving confidence to the Afghans that there is going to be continuing relations. But I do not want to just be silent in the face of what I consider to be President Karzai's unwise—a number of his comments which are very unwise in terms of whether or not he wants a residual presence or not. He sometimes acts like he does not want a residual presence even though it is very clear to me that the Afghan people do and so does he, but he wants it on his terms, and it cannot just be on his terms. It has to be on a mutually agreed basis. Would you agree with that?

General DEMPSEY. I do, sir. I also, though, would point out that our relationship and our interests in Afghanistan run deeper than just President Karzai.

Chairman LEVIN. Of course. There is going to be an election next year, and I think you can also pass along to President Karzai that his assurances that he is not going to be a candidate in that election but that there will be an election are something that the committee members, I think probably most of whom have met with him, take seriously. Those statements of his matter to us.

Now, on the Guantanamo issue, we have in our National Defense Authorization Bill language which would give greater flexibility to the Department of Defense to transfer Guantanamo detainees to the United States for detention and trial, if it is determined to be in the U.S. national interest and if public safety concerns are addressed, to streamline the authority of the Secretary of Defense to transfer Guantanamo detainees to foreign countries. Do you support those provisions?

General DEMPSEY. Senator, what I support as the senior military leader of the Armed Forces of the United States is that we must have an option to detain prisoners. We cannot expect young men and women on the battlefield to have a single option which would be simply to kill. We must have a capture and detain option. I support anything that will assure me that those young men and women will have that option.

Chairman LEVIN. Assuming that they have that assurance that there are a place or places—

General DEMPSEY. That is correct, sir.

Chairman LEVIN.—then given that qualification, one which I share, by the way, do you then support the language of the bill?

General DEMPSEY. I would have to see the bill. But if you are asking me has Guantanamo, the facility, tarnished the image of the United States globally, I think it has. Therefore, I would welcome any other solution.

Chairman LEVIN. On missile defense, we have had an assessment from Lieutenant General Richard Formica, a letter providing the assessment that investing in additional sensor and discrimination capability for our Homeland missile defense would be a more cost effective and less expensive near-term Homeland missile defense option than deploying an east coast missile defense site, particularly since there is no current military requirement to deploy an east coast site.

Do you agree with those assessments of Vice Admiral James Syring and General Formica? Do you agree that additional analysis is needed to determine whether it would be necessary to deploy an additional missile defense site in the United States in the future?

General DEMPSEY. I would like to ask the Vice Chairman who works that to comment—but I will say I absolutely agree we should do the analysis before we make a decision on how best to meet that capability requirement.

Chairman LEVIN. I am glad you gave me an opportunity to ask Admiral Winnefeld.

General DEMPSEY. I have been looking for an opportunity, Senator. [Laughter.]

Chairman LEVIN. Well, so have I. Thank you for giving me that opportunity. Admiral?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Chairman Levin, the way I have put it is I would spend my next dollar on missile defense on the sensor discrimination that you described. There is an oft-quoted saying in the U.S. military, “quantity has a quality all its own”. In this case, quality has a quantity all its own. If you can get better discrimination, you can have a better firing doctrine that would help you there.

I also think it is wise that we are doing the environmental impact statements (EIS) for a potential east coast site. As we watch the threat develop—and we are going to have to be very cognizant of that because it could develop quickly—it may become necessary to actually put into place a second site. We will play that as we have to.

Chairman LEVIN. But when you say we should do the EIS, you mean before making a commitment to a site, that you complete those assessments?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Yes, sir. I think we are planning on doing the EISs in the relatively near term, and I think they will be done naturally probably before there is a need to actually make a decision to go with an east coast site. But I also want to state we need to be cautious and very cognizant of where the trajectory is of the threat.

Chairman LEVIN. When you say they will be done naturally, you think they should be done?

Admiral WINNEFELD. They will be done. They should be done. I agree with doing them as a hedge, as part of our hedge strategy that we have always considered having an east coast site, just as a part of the hedge strategy with putting more interceptors—

Chairman LEVIN. I am just trying to get a clear answer. Do you believe they should be done before the decision is made as to whether any site is selected?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Yes, sir, I think so.

Chairman LEVIN. I have gone over my time. I apologize to my colleagues and call upon Senator Inhofe.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In my opening statement, I quoted each one of you, and they are very strong quotes, particularly the one stating "If ever the force is so degraded and so unready, and then we're asked to use it, it would be immoral." Then General Dempsey, you add, "There could be for the first time in my career instances where we may be asked to respond to a crisis and we will have to say that we cannot." Then, of course, we saw that James Clapper said that there has never been a time in our history—and he has been around for 40 years—when the threats are so great and diverse as they are today.

Do you agree with that?

General DEMPSEY. I do, Senator. There are probably fewer existential threats to the Nation, but there are far more ways that middle-weight states, non-state actors, and violent extremist groups can reach out and touch us.

Senator INHOFE. Do you agree with that, Admiral?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Yes, sir. I would say that there are two definitions of a hollow force. One is the force is larger than the readiness money you have to keep it ready, and that is the more complex definition. The simple one is something that looks really good on the outside but it is rotten in the middle.

Senator INHOFE. Yes. I was not talking about the hollow force. I was talking about the threats that are out there.

I look back wistfully at the days of the Cold War. Things were predictable back then. Now, you have entities out there, like Iran, that our intelligence says are going to have a weapon and the capability of a delivery system. That is what he is talking about. I think it is a scary thing.

You both believe that. Have you shared this with the President?

General DEMPSEY. Yes, we have briefed the President.

Senator INHOFE. So he knows this?

General DEMPSEY. Yes, sir.

Senator INHOFE. Yet, he continues with his approach.

Let me ask you a question about GTMO. You said you would welcome any other solution. I have often looked at GTMO as one of the few good deals we have in this country that we have had since 1904. Rent is \$4,000 a year I think it is, Mr. Chairman, and they do not collect it half the time. Yet, when you say we welcome any other solution, what other solution? Is there a solution out there that would not entail bringing these people into our continental United States? Either one of you.

General DEMPSEY. I have seen the analysis done of any number of solutions, but there has not been any consensus on which one

to pursue. I simply want to align myself with those who say we have to have a detention solution.

Senator INHOFE. No, I agree. We have to have a detention. We have something there that is ready-made. I understand that a lot of the people in the Middle East do not like it. It has given us a bad reputation in some areas. But, I believe that we need to think of America first.

I can recall 4 years ago when the President came out talking about these alternatives that they had. They had sites in the United States. One was in Oklahoma. I went down there and I talked to a young lady. She was in charge of our prison down there. She had had several tours in GTMO, and she said, "What is the matter with them up there? Don't they know that we have this?" It is ready-made.

I have to say this because this is a great frustration to me. Yes, we have language that is pretty good language in the bill, but nonetheless—I will just ask one last question on that.

Can you think of anything that would not entail incarceration or movement into the United States? Right now off the top of your head.

Admiral WINNEFELD. I do not have an easy answer to that one, Senator.

One thing I would mention is just a little more flexibility I think would be useful to us. I will give you an example. We have a moral obligation to take good medical care of these detainees. Because we cannot move them outside of GTMO, we have to build very state-of-the-art medical facilities.

Senator INHOFE. I have seen it.

Admiral WINNEFELD. It would be great to be able to move them briefly back and forth to the United States if they need medical treatment and send them back. That is the kind of flexibility I mean.

Senator INHOFE. Okay, that is fine.

Admiral WINNEFELD. I know that is different from what you are talking about.

Senator INHOFE. We have that. There is not a person up here who has not been down there more than once. One of the big problems they have with the detainees down there is they are overweight, and they are eating better than they have ever eaten in their lives. They have better medical attention. They have tests run that they never even heard of before. I think we are meeting that.

On April 9, when we stop the flying—I have talked to each one of you about this, but I think we need to get something on the record. I have an aviation background, and I do not think you have to have that to know that you have to keep your proficiency up. That was 3 months ago, April 9. Now, I applaud the decision to now get back in and start retraining.

I mentioned in my opening statement that I was going to conduct a study as to how much more it costs us to go through the retraining that we are going to have to go through right now than if we had never made the decision back on April 9.

Have you already done that, or do you have any information in terms of how much more it is going to cost now than if we had not done it to start with?

Admiral WINNEFELD. I think it is a good question, and I think we can easily get that for you for the record in terms of cost.

What I can tell you is that if you take one of these squadrons that has not been flying at all, it is going to take anywhere from 1 to 3 months for them to bring their proficiency back up just in basic airmanship skills, taking off and landing and that sort of thing, and then probably another 3 months beyond that to get their combat skills back. I think of it more in terms of time, but there is a cost dimension and we can get you that.

Senator INHOFE. Yes, but time, would you not agree, equals risk at the time we need these? We had some of them who came right out of school right around April 9. They are going to go back and almost start from the beginning now. If we do not have the capability of taking care of the needs as they come up, I believe that that translates into a risk that I am not willing to take if I can do anything about it.

[The information referred to follows:]

As of today, there are 18 squadrons in the Air Force still flying at reduced levels of readiness. An additional 7,000 flying hours at a cost of \$116 million above the President's 2014 budget request and 3–6 months would be necessary to bring these remaining 18 squadrons from current (lower than Basic Mission Capable) flying rates back to pre-sequester mission status (Combat Mission Ready flying rates).

Prior to sequestration, a substantial number of Air Force squadrons were already operating at lower than optimal goals due to previous Budget Control Act (BCA) reductions and the effects of long-term high operations tempo. On 9 April, a total of 31 squadrons were stood down, including 13 combat-coded (fighter, bomber, and Airborne Warning and Control System) units and 18 institutional units (Weapons School, Aggressors, Thunderbirds, etc.). Through efficiencies and the \$208 million from the Department of Defense reprogramming request, the Air Force was able to shift funds and increase the flying rates of the 13 combat coded units back to Combat Mission Ready (CMR) rates for the remainder of fiscal year 2013. It will take 3–6 months at this CMR rate before these squadrons return to pre-sequestration mission ready rates. The efficiencies and reprogramming also allowed the remaining 18 institutional units to resume flying, albeit lower than Basic Mission Capable rates.

The Air Force will continue to have readiness challenges due to the BCA and sequestration, beyond the units that were stood down. To bring all Air Force flying squadrons back to full mission readiness goals needed to meet Defense Strategic Guidance requirements, it would take approximately 2 years, an additional \$3.2 billion per year in fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015, and a reduction in current deployment tempo (e.g. deploy-to-dwell at 1:3 or better).

General DEMPSEY. Senator, could I add?

Senator INHOFE. Sure.

General DEMPSEY. What we are seeing is that we are going to end up with two problems over time if sequestration remains in effect. The immediate problem for the next several years will be readiness because we will not be able to find the money we need to achieve the level of sequestration cuts without dramatically impacting our readiness. Then as the force becomes smaller, you can restore readiness because you are dealing with a smaller force, but I think too small. So it goes too far too fast.

Senator INHOFE. Yes, I understand that. The proficiency of a smaller number of units can be greater but you are still dealing with a smaller number of units. When we have the diverse threats that we have right now, to me that is not a very good idea, not that you can do anything about it, but right now that is a problem.

The last question, because my time is up, would be, Admiral, I appreciate the fact that you used the word "immoral". Given the

current path of readiness in the Armed Forces, in your professional judgment when will the commander in chief be at a point of making immoral decisions?

Admiral WINNEFELD. I do not think I was the one who used the term “immoral”.

But I think we are keeping the White House closely informed as to the outcome of the Strategic Choices and Management Review. That includes both capability, capacity, and readiness of the force. They are aware of those results and I am sure that they are going to factor that into their decisionmaking on the rest of the budget issues that are in play. Hopefully, we will be able to find a good resolution that will allow us to go forward with being able to plan for the future.

Senator INHOFE. I appreciate both of you. We have to let the people know that we have a real serious problem here, and I think this hearing is our opportunity to do that.

I apologize in attributing a quote to you. I guess it was General Dempsey who made that quote.

General DEMPSEY. Yes, it was, sir.

Let me assure you that if the Nation is threatened, we will go. But that is the point. We will go and we may not be ready to go. So it would depend on the nature of the conflict in which we were asked to participate. If it is an existential threat to the Nation and we send them, there is no immorality in that. But if this were some other contingency and we were asking young men and women to go not ready and we had a choice to do that—

Senator INHOFE. That is where the immorality issue comes in.

General DEMPSEY. That is right.

Senator INHOFE. I appreciate that very much and I agree with you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

Senator Blumenthal?

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I join in thanking both of you for your service over many, many years.

General Dempsey, you and I have discussed briefly the purchase of helicopters for the Afghan armed services, the purchase of Russian MI-17s from the export agency controlled by Russia that is now selling arms to Syria and a country that is still harboring, providing refuge to Edward Snowden. We discussed the reasons for that sale. Very graciously, you suggested you would look into the possibility of either ending that sale, which will result in helicopters right now, according to the Inspector General for Afghanistan, sitting on the runways of Afghanistan because they lack pilots to fly them and they lack people trained to maintain or repair them.

I wonder whether there is something we can do either to stop those sales, purchases subsidized by American taxpayers, provided by American taxpayers to a supposed ally that still does not have a status of forces agreement with us that will enable us to continue providing aid to them. I think in connection with that question, what additional kinds of resources we should consider stopping if there is no status of forces agreement?

General DEMPSEY. Senator, on the MI-17s, I support continuing on the path we are on to get the Afghans as capable as possible by the end of 2014, and that will require us to stay committed to that fleet of MI-17s. There is no way we could transition at this point and put them in anything other than that airframe.

What I suggested to you is that if we can achieve a lasting, enduring relationship with them and if they live up to their end of the deal and we live to our end of the deal, we will be investing in them through foreign military sales for some time. There is a likely point where we could transition them to U.S.-built aircraft. But in the interim period, we cannot. I should not say we cannot. It would be my recommendation that we stay the course with the existing program.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Is that interest sufficient, do you think, to justify the national security waiver under the legislation that is currently included in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)?

General DEMPSEY. I do, sir.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. What would have to change for those helicopters to be purchased from an American manufacturer such as Sikorsky or any of the others that are more than capable of providing better aircraft to the Afghans?

General DEMPSEY. We actually have experience in making that transition in Iraq where we have initially outfitted them with Soviet aircraft and are now making the transition to an American airframe. It starts with training and long lead time procurements. But that effort is unlikely to begin until we establish a bilateral security agreement.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Admiral Winnefeld, I was at a briefing recently that you gave, an excellent briefing, on threats to our Navy. I wonder if you could comment, to the extent you are able, on the importance of the *Ohio*-class replacement in terms of nuclear deterrence, the importance of continuing with that program, and any possible jeopardy that might be impacted as a result of sequester.

Admiral WINNEFELD. Senator, we of course remain committed to the triad. We believe that is the right approach for nuclear deterrence for this country, and of course, the fleet ballistic missile submarines are an absolutely essential element of that triad. It is the most survivable element that we have. It is a very reliable platform, a very reliable missile that goes with it. We are very committed to the next class coming down the line.

I think we have delayed it about as far as we can. We need to now—and we are getting into the requirements and design of this missile-carrying submarine. Again, we are just committed to the program. It is terribly important that we get this right.

We are going to try to control the costs on it. We are going to try to make this, like all the programs we are working right now, from the beginning a successful acquisition program. I know that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) and Sean Stackley with the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations himself are all committed to making this a successful program.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. You would agree, would you not, that this program really has to be spared any impact as a result of sequester? It is so vital to our national security.

Admiral WINNEFELD. I would agree with that, yes, sir.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Dempsey, I wonder if I could move to a personnel issue that I know, because of your personal commitment to the well-being of our troops, is of great interest to you, the electronic medical record system which still is incompatible—the Department of Defense medical records system with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) record system—despite questions that I and others have asked repeatedly under this Secretary of Defense and the previous one. I remain concerned, to put it mildly, with the fact that interoperability still is a goal not a reality. I wonder if you could comment on what can be done to increase the pace of making those two systems compatible. I had thought originally that they would be one system. A billion dollars has been spent on making them one system.

General DEMPSEY. Thank you, sir.

I share your concern. I can also assure you that Secretary Hagel who has a background in the Veterans Administration shares it. He has taken a decision to move the responsibility, the program management, into AT&L where it will, I think you will see, be much better managed.

We have done other things. For example, agreed to certify as complete medical records that pass from Active Duty into the Veterans Administration, which then relieves the burden of them having to do continual research to figure out if the record is complete.

That is the path we are on, but your oversight and interest in it will be an important part of achieving it.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you.

My time has expired. But I, again, want to thank you both for your extraordinary service and just to reiterate, General Dempsey, I remain unhappy, very strongly unhappy, with our current position and posture vis-a-vis those MI-17s and I am not going to let the issue go. With all due respect, I understand your position. Thank you very much for being so forthright in your answers.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal.

Senator McCain?

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I must tell both the witnesses at the onset I am very concerned about the role you have played over the last 2 years, your view of your role as the chief advisors to the President on national security, and the state of the world over the last 2 years since you have come to hold the office you hold.

General Dempsey and Admiral Winnefeld, do you believe the continued costs and risks of our inaction in Syria are now worse for our national security interests than the costs and risks associated with limited military action?

General DEMPSEY. Senator, as we have discussed—

Senator MCCAIN. I would like to know an answer rather than a filibuster. I have 6 minutes and 10 seconds.

General DEMPSEY. I assure you, Senator, I will not filibuster.

This is a regional issue. I would say that the issue in Syria is we are at greater risk because of the emergence of violent extremist organizations, as is Iraq.

Senator MCCAIN. You are not answering the question, General. Do you believe the continued costs and risks of our inaction in Syria are now worse for our national security interests than the costs and risks associated with limited military action?

General DEMPSEY. With all due respect, Senator, you are asking me to agree that we have been inactive, and we have not been inactive.

Senator MCCAIN. We have not been inactive?

General DEMPSEY. That is correct.

Senator MCCAIN. This, again, gives validity to my concern because, obviously, we may not have been inactive, but any observer knows that Bashar al-Assad is prevailing on the battlefield. Over 100,000 people have been killed. Hezbollah is there. The situation is much more dire than it was 2 years ago when you and Admiral Winnefeld came to office.

So your answer is that we have not been inactive?

General DEMPSEY. That is correct. We have not used direct military strengths, but we have not been inactive.

Senator MCCAIN. I will ask you for the third time. Do you believe that we should take military action? Which has greater risk? Our continued, limited action or significant action such as the establishment of a no-fly zone and arming the rebels with the weapons they need, which they have not been getting, General, I know. I know perhaps better than you because I have been there. Which do you think is a greater cost? The action that we are taking now, which has had no effect on the battlefield equation, or doing nothing?

General DEMPSEY. Senator, I am in favor of building a moderate opposition and supporting it. The question of whether to support it with direct kinetic strikes is a decision for our elected officials, not for the senior military leader of the Nation.

Senator MCCAIN. This goes back to my concern about your role as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

General DEMPSEY. I understand.

Senator MCCAIN. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is supposed to provide the best advice he can as far as our overall national security is concerned. That is why you are the sole military advisor.

You testified this February you had advised the President to arm vetted units of the Syrian opposition. In April, you testified you no longer supported the position. Now we read in published reports that the administration has decided to arm the Syrian opposition units.

How do we account for those pirouettes?

General DEMPSEY. I would not accept the term "pirouette," sir. I would accept the term that we have adapted our approach based on what we know of the opposition. If you recall, in the beginning of the year there was a period where it was pretty evident that the extremist groups were prevailing inside the opposition. So I have not been wavering—

Senator MCCAIN. Is your position that the extremist groups are prevailing inside the opposition?

General DEMPSEY. You asked me about February. In February, I had that concern.

Senator MCCAIN. So that is your answer to why in February you advised the President to arm them? In April, you said that we should not, and then now, obviously, we are arming the rebels. Do you support that policy?

General DEMPSEY. I support the building of a moderate opposition and including building its military capability.

Senator MCCAIN. Here is an example of my concern. You told CNN on July 8, "the war in Syria is not a simple matter of stopping the fight by the introduction of any particular U.S. capability. It seems to me that we need to understand what the peace will look like before we start the war." The war has been going on, General Dempsey, to over 100,000 people killed. We did not start the war and we would not be starting a war. We would be trying to stop a massacre that is going on. We would try to stop the Hezbollah with thousands of troops. We would try to stop the fact that the Russians continue to supply heavily Bashar al Assad's forces and what would be a great triumph for Iran in the entire region. But you say it seems to me we need to understand what the peace will look like before we start the war. Do you think we ought to see how we could stop the war by intervening and stopping the massacre?

General DEMPSEY. Senator, would you agree that we have recent experience where until we understood how the country would continue to govern and that institutions of governance would not fail, that actually situations can be made worse by the introduction of military force?

Senator MCCAIN. Actually, General Dempsey, you and I went through this in 2006 in Iraq when I said that it was not succeeding and that we had to have a surge and that only a surge could succeed in reversing the tide of battle. You disagreed with me way back then. I think history shows that those of us who supported the surge were right and people like you who did not think we needed a surge were wrong.

I guess my question to you is, is it in any way a good outcome for this situation on the battlefield to continue as it is with obviously Bashar al-Assad prevailing and a great victory for Iran and continued slaughter of thousands and thousands of people, the destabilization of Jordan, the destabilization of Lebanon, and what is clearly erupting into a regional conflict? Is that your answer?

General DEMPSEY. Senator, somehow you have me portrayed as the one who is holding back from our use of military force inside of Syria.

Senator MCCAIN. No, I am not saying that, General. I am saying what your advice and counsel is to the President of the United States, and your views are very important because that is your job.

General DEMPSEY. It is. I have given those views to the President. We have given him options. Members of this committee have been briefed on them in a classified setting. We have articulated the risks. The decision on whether to use force is the decision of our elected officials.

Senator MCCAIN. The chairman just asked you if you would give your personal opinion to the committee if asked. You said yes. I am asking for your opinion.

General DEMPSEY. About the use of kinetic strikes? That issue is under deliberation inside of our agencies of Government, and it would be inappropriate for me to try to influence the decision with me rendering an opinion in public about what kind of force we should use.

Senator MCCAIN. So your answer to the chairman's question about giving your personal view is circumscribed by decisions that are still being made?

General DEMPSEY. I will rather let this committee know what my recommendations are at the appropriate time. Yes, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. When might that be?

General DEMPSEY. Sir, if the administration and the Government decides to use military force, we have provided a variety of options, and you know that.

Senator MCCAIN. Well, if it is your position that you do not provide your personal views to the committee when asked, only under certain circumstances, then you have just contradicted what I have known this committee to operate under for the last 30 years.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Senator Donnelly?

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, General. Thank you, Admiral.

I want to get back to Syria in a second.

But, first, I want to ask you, General Dempsey. In regards to mental health services for our servicemembers, one of the things that has recently happened is that at Camp Lejeune, they were reduced by about 50 appointments per month because of the sequestration. I was wondering if you know if there has been any increase in suicide or suicide attempts since sequestration took effect.

General DEMPSEY. I do not have that data readily available, Senator. It is a good question. We are aware of some of the reduction in services. I can take that for the record.

Senator DONNELLY. Okay, great.

[The information referred to follows:]

While it is difficult for the Department to track a direct effect of sequestration on suicide events or attempts, one thing is certain, the Department has witnessed a decline in the total number of suicide events during calendar year 2013 as compared to calendar year 2011 and calendar year 2012. The latest suicide report from the Armed Forces Medical Examiner's Office (week ending July 14, 2013) stated that year-to-date 2013 there have been a total of 156 confirmed and suspected suicides. This number, while unacceptably high, indicates 45 fewer suicide events compared to 2012 and 8 fewer than in 2011. We're cautiously optimistic that our extensive efforts may be showing results, and we must continue to keep our eye on the ball following through on prevention efforts to ensure these numbers continue to decrease. The Department will continue its collaboration efforts with the Department of Veterans Affairs, other Federal agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and academia to share an understanding of key risk factors associated with suicide, collaborate on a national strategy, and develop best practices in suicide prevention.

Since the date civilian furloughs officially began (on/about July 8, 2013), there have been seven new cases of suicide events. While there has been a decrease in the number of services provided due to sequestration, the number of suicides has not increased. Suicide remains a highly complex issue with many facets contributing to a servicemember's choice to commit this act. Personal/dispositional factors, contextual factors, clinical health factors, historical factors, and even deployment fac-

tors can all contribute as stressors linked to suicide events and in some cases a lack of services may not be at issue at all. While sequestration will force the department to make tough decisions, suicide prevention is of vital importance and will remain a top priority for our leaders.

Senator DONNELLY. The follow-up on that would be, are there efforts in place right now to try to minimize the effect on mental health since it has such a dramatic effect on our servicemembers?

General DEMPSEY. There are any number of efforts, and it has the attention of not only the Department but also the Joint Chiefs. Admiral Winnefeld himself chairs a meeting with the Vice Chiefs of the Services. We meet in the tank. We are concerned because although we have prioritized care for wounded warriors, families, and mental health services in the face of declining resources, how that is implemented in the field can sometimes be missed. We are alert to it.

Senator DONNELLY. Okay.

I was in Afghanistan a few months ago and met with our commanders. At the time, we were on all of our metrics. We were right where we wanted to be as we head toward the end of 2014. Admiral and General, are we still meeting the plan that we had laid out? Are we still being able to hold the towns that we have started to hold? Are we able to turn the Taliban back? Is the plan moving along on schedule? Is it going faster or slower? Are we meeting the numbers we were hoping to meet as we head toward the end of 2014?

General DEMPSEY. I will start and see if the Vice wants to add anything.

Besides speaking with General Dunford on a weekly basis and visiting him about quarterly, I also reach out to as many other people as I can possibly reach out to who can give us other views. Yesterday we had a woman from the Congressional Research Service who had actually spent the last 5 months traveling around Afghanistan visiting with civilian and military leaders, mostly Afghans. Her report aligned with General Dunford's assessment that we can achieve our military campaign objectives on the timeline that is currently established.

Senator DONNELLY. I appreciate the update because if we are able to stay on that program, then the Afghan forces have a chance to make this work.

To get back to Syria that Senator McCain was talking about, if conditions do not change, does it look to you, as it looks to many, that in the near future Daraa could also fall to the Assad Government as well?

General DEMPSEY. Actually the chairman asked——

Senator DONNELLY. I apologize. I had to step out.

General DEMPSEY. No, no, sir. I was just reflecting on the fact that there are many people concerned about Daraa. I met on Saturday with King Abdullah from Jordan, and I will be visiting him next week and his leaders as well. We have military contingency planning ongoing both back here, but also inside Jordan. So, yes, we are concerned about Daraa.

The conflict tends to ebb and flow. That kind of conflict will always ebb and flow. We are watching and making sure that we

would have options available to the national command authority if necessary.

Senator DONNELLY. What steps, short of a limited no-fly zone, could have the kind of effect that could slow down the Assad forces?

General DEMPSEY. Let me pass that to the Vice because he just did some significant work on this in preparation for his hearing on Tuesday.

Admiral WINNEFELD. Senator, there are a whole range of options that are out there.

Senator DONNELLY. The reason I asked that is because I know there is a whole range of options, but as you look at everything, the rebel forces are being moved from almost everywhere they are located. So we have options but the ball seems to be heading the other way.

Admiral WINNEFELD. I would not want to get into any Intelligence Community judgments or anything classified in an unclassified hearing. But I think as commonly known, where the opposition is most on the run right now is in the central and western part of Syria around al-Qusayr, which they have lost, around Homs, which is a very difficult situation for them right now. That also happens to be the most important place other than Damascus itself probably for the Syrian regime to regain control of because that represents the pathway from Damascus into their traditional homeland near the coast. So they really want that back.

I believe personally—and it is only my personal judgment—that if the regime is successful in that area, they will next move north to Aleppo, which is the largest city in Syria. It is their commercial center. I do not think they are going to go down to Daraa yet, but we have to watch. We have to maintain vigilance and discern where this thing is headed.

Senator DONNELLY. Then whether it is Aleppo or Daraa, and I know there are contingencies, but to not take action is to take action and is determinative of what happens. I think there is a concern as to how long does this go on before the momentum becomes irreversible.

Admiral WINNEFELD. We are ready to act if we are called upon to act. I think the current track that is being pursued by the administration is a diplomatic track. All manner of other options have been discussed and are continually under discussion, and I would not want to get out in front of the President or anybody else on what choices he might make.

Senator DONNELLY. In effect, you are waiting to hear at this point.

Admiral WINNEFELD. As we should be. We are ready, providing every possible option we can in case we are called upon to exercise the use of force, which we believe is a political decision.

Senator DONNELLY. In regards to the rebel forces, as you look at them right now, General and Admiral, we have been concerned about al Nusra and their activities. Do you see the al Nusra piece growing stronger than the moderate piece? How do you see this moving on a day-to-day basis?

General DEMPSEY. There was a period back in April that Senator McCain referred where I was very concerned that the al Nusra

front, Ahrar al-Sham, and others—there are hundreds of different groups that shift allegiances and alliances on the opposition side, and it makes it very challenging to determine what we are really looking at there. The Intelligence Community is hard at it. I am hard at it. We are hard at it with our regional partners. There was a period of time when I was fearful that the extremist element, the jihadist Salafist side of the opposition was gaining considerable strength.

Of late, through some efforts that we have made to convince our allies to avoid creating a problem by empowering some of these groups, we have had some success at that. We have also had some success in identifying more clearly a part of the opposition that could be built and trained not only militarily. This is the point I really want to make sure resonates. This opposition has to not only be prepared militarily, but it has to be prepared if it achieves a position of governance inside of Syria. Otherwise, the situation will deteriorate even further.

Senator DONNELLY. General, Admiral, thank you for your service. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Donnelly.

Now, before I call on Senator Wicker, Senator Inhofe has a very brief comment.

Senator INHOFE. Just a brief clarification. I was told by my staff when I came back that I might have been misunderstood in my comments about GTMO. I am arguably the strongest supporter of opening it up, using it to its fullest capacity not just for incarceration but for trials. The language is in the bill. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your good faith efforts in the language that was in there, but I am against the language that is in the NDAA.

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to state that.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

Senator WICKER?

Senator WICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Dempsey, welcome back.

Let us talk about the situation in Egypt. There has been disagreement in Washington about the wisdom of continuing to provide assistance to the Egyptian military in light of recent events there. When I look at Egypt, I do not see very many Jeffersonian Democrats, but I believe the Egyptian military has acted with great professionalism and restraint throughout the 3 years of difficult transition since the 2011 ouster of Hosni Mubarak.

I believe one of the primary reasons there has not been far more bloodshed and suffering during this time of transition is the support the United States has provided to Egypt through foreign military sales and military-to-military cooperation.

In light of recent events, some have called for the end of these programs. Let me tell you how I feel about this and our commitments under the Camp David Accords and then I will let you respond.

First, we must maintain the strength of this relationship to enable us to assist and influence Egypt's military leaders.

Second, the United States would be shortsighted to overlook the return on investment we get from the Egyptian military, for example, Suez Canal transits for our carrier battle groups, intelligence

cooperation, counterterrorism cooperation. These are examples of the benefits we derive from this relationship.

Third, the Egyptian military has played a stabilizing role during Egypt's transition.

Fourth, our commitments under the Camp David Accords have yielded sustainable peace between Israel and Egypt. We must acknowledge Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's statement this weekend on Face the Nation that the Camp David Accords have been, "The cornerstone of peace between us and our neighbors, and it has also been the cornerstone of stability in the Middle East."

General Dempsey, do you agree with me regarding the importance of military-to-military relationships as enablers of U.S. foreign policy?

General DEMPSEY. I do, Senator.

Senator WICKER. Do you agree with me that we should continue to maintain and foster the strength of the U.S.-Egyptian military relationship?

General DEMPSEY. I do. If our Government decides that they have to take some action based on existing legal frameworks and restrictions, I would recommend that we find a way to restore those as quickly as possible even if it meant conditioning them some way. But I very strongly believe we have to maintain our contact with the Egyptian armed forces.

Senator WICKER. Do you have any reason to believe, as some have feared and as some fear now, that weapons and equipment that we provide to the Egyptians or that we have provided in the past have been used or will be used or would be used in ways that might eventually endanger the United States military or civilian personnel or United States interests?

General DEMPSEY. There is no indication at this point, Senator, that that would be a concern.

Senator WICKER. In your opinion, was the elected Government of Mohamed Morsi moving toward a dictatorship?

General DEMPSEY. If I could, I would like to use this opportunity to express my conversations with my counterpart. I can tell you they very strongly believe that.

Senator WICKER. Okay. Let me ask you then, before I move on to another topic. I made some pretty emphatic statements. Would you like to elaborate? I will give you an opportunity to elaborate on what you have said about the relationship that we have had and the assistance and the sales that we have had with the Egyptian military.

General DEMPSEY. Thank you. My own personal experience with it goes back to when I commanded U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in 2008, and I can tell you that they are a very strong partner of the United States, a very key nation in the region. As you put it yourself, we enjoy preferential passage in the Suez, dynamic overflight. They have committed to the Camp David Accords. The Israeli military considers the Egyptian military a strong partner. In my personal experience, which goes back now about 5 years, they are worth the investment.

Senator WICKER. Now, with regard to Syria, the chairman talked in his opening statement about a post-Assad solution, the negotiated solution. Do you agree that unless the momentum shifts—

and I think Senator Donnelly was concerned about this also—back toward the rebels, there is hardly any chance for that sort of solution that the chairman seeks and is hoping for?

General DEMPSEY. Yes, I agree. I think as the momentum ebbs and flows, each side feels itself more compelled or less compelled to seek a negotiated settlement. Sure.

Senator WICKER. If I can, I think you answered a question from the chairman about ways in which military support could be gotten to the rebels, and I think he asked about enabling other governments to support the military efforts if we are unable politically or unwilling to do so. Do you remember that question?

General DEMPSEY. I do.

Senator WICKER. Can you elaborate at all, or is that something you just do not feel comfortable talking about?

General DEMPSEY. No. I am comfortable talking about the commitment to improve the capabilities of the opposition. There are any number of ways to do it directly.

Senator WICKER. The military capability?

General DEMPSEY. That is correct.

But you have also heard me say it is not just about improving or enhancing their military capability.

Senator WICKER. I understand that, but that is what my question is about.

General DEMPSEY. Yes, sir.

Of course, other nations as well. There is a significant diplomatic effort to bundle our efforts together into something that will increase the pace at which their capability could be increased.

Senator WICKER. Could you elaborate as to who these allies might be that are a little more willing?

General DEMPSEY. I would rather do that in a classified setting, Senator.

Senator WICKER. Okay.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Wicker.

Senator Reed is going to yield momentarily to another Senator who is next in line who I believe is Senator Gillibrand. Senator Reed is going to yield just for one turn.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Okay, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you both for your public service, for your dedication, for all that you do for our military and for our Nation.

I would like to first focus and continue the conversation on Syria.

I have grave concerns over the broader regional security in the Middle East, particularly when we are seeing the continued influx of jihadi and Hezbollah fighters into Syria. I want to talk a little bit about what this means for Syria's neighbor.

Obviously, with Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran has been able to have an influence at Israel's border. Will Iran be able to do the same with regard to Syria in your estimation? What can we do to prevent both a jihadi haven, as well as a stronghold for Iran through Hezbollah in Syria?

General DEMPSEY. I will take this and then if the Vice Chairman wants to add because we have been—it will not surprise you to know—deeply involved in this issue collaboratively.

First of all, you are exactly right to think of this as a regional issue, Senator. I would add that Iran is not just a challenge to the United States in its nuclear aspirations but also through its surrogates, its proxies, its arm sales. They are trying to foment a sectarian conflict that runs from Beirut to Damascus to Baghdad. The approach to that, the strategy that would underpin our efforts should be regional, therefore, which means we need to increase our support of the Lebanese armed forces on one side, of the Iraqi armed forces on the other, and of our Jordanian and Turkish partners on the northern and southern flank.

Senator GILLIBRAND. With regard to the broader question on Iran specifically, I have heard both cautious optimism and grave concern about the election of Rohani as the new President. What is your assessment of the impact of the election? Do you expect his election to change Iran's nuclear policy or its international policies? What is your initial assessment?

Admiral WINNEFELD. First of all, I reflect back on former Secretary Gates' oft-quoted remark of he is looking for the elusive Iranian moderate. Rohani does have a reputation for being a moderate. He has made some moderate statements since he has been elected, but he is not in office yet. There are those of us who have the opinion he is going to struggle a little bit against a very conservative central government leadership led by the Supreme Leader that may prevent him from, if he wants to be a moderate, becoming one.

I think the real watchword here is prudence. It makes sense to potentially reach out to him, see where he is coming from, but not to do so naively. I do not think anybody is going to do that. I think we are in a good position here. But it is an interesting development. Nobody really expected him to be elected, at the same time again the elusive Iranian moderate. We need to maintain the pressure that we are maintaining on the regime and make it very clear to them what our objectives are, number one, that they not develop a nuclear weapon.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you.

Turning now to cyber, both of you have testified that you believe that cyber is a growing threat and a serious concern for our military and for our national security and for our economy. We have been working on a bipartisan basis on a bill called The Cyber Warrior Act—Senator Vitter and Senator Blunt are leading the charge for the Republican side—in order to create a National Guard unit that is dedicated solely to cyber defense of our Nation as a way to get some of our best and bravest from the private sector who are dedicated to the military and the defense of this country to be able to use their talents more efficiently, in a more cost efficient manner as well.

Can I have your opinions on what the impact of creating these units would be with their dual status and whether that would be in the end better for our defense and for growing this talent in house?

General DEMPSEY. I will go first. Again, this is one where the Vice has also been deeply involved.

First of all, you have our commitment to seek to figure out what are the various roles in all the components of our military and all

the branches of Service. Without making a firm commitment right now on that particular approach, I will say that each of the Service Chiefs is taking a look at it under the advice of our U.S. Cyber Command Commander and U.S. Strategic Command Commander.

By the way, you say it is a growing concern. It is here right now. There is urgency to this and I think you understand that.

We would have to understand what the cyber role would be for a guardsman. There really would be no role in a title 2 authority. There is no title 2 authority for cyber. It is really title 10.

But go ahead, Sandy.

Admiral WINNEFELD. I would say it has been an interesting idea that we have looked at and we are committed to looking at. We are growing our cyber force by a considerable number. It is probably the only part of our force that is going to grow under current budget conditions.

We need this new force to do a number of things for us, principally to help us defend our own networks inside the Department of Defense to help defend the Nation against cyber attacks. Obviously, law enforcement, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have the lead there, but we play an important role in assisting them.

Then there is the potential for offensive cyber operations in support of a combatant commander if we end up finding ourselves in a war.

Where the National Guard fits into those three niches is something we need to study and look at. We are short of money. It is going to cost a lot to develop this capability in the Guard, and it is not there all the time for us. Then again, I think you make a fair point that there is expertise out there to tap on.

Senator GILLIBRAND. That we want to have.

Admiral WINNEFELD. I just think we need to look very closely, very soberly at whether this makes sense financially.

Senator GILLIBRAND. I would like to work with you both on this issue.

We have, obviously, been spending a lot of time on sexual assault in the military. It is something everyone cares deeply about solving. One of the things I want to get your thoughts on the military has had a change of position on its view towards Article 60, that we can actually take Article 60 authority outside the chain of command and still maintain good order and discipline, still maintain command climate, command control.

Why do you think removing Article 30 would be different in any way? Because I would imagine that second legal decision would not have a differing impact than removing Article 60.

General DEMPSEY. The approach to Article 60 was because we had put in place over time in our judicial system other mechanisms, military judges and prosecutors, and an appeal process that allowed us to consider changing the authorities of a convening authority to change a ruling after the fact. But that is, it seems to us, different than taking the actual offense out of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

Do you want to add anything to that?

Admiral WINNEFELD. I think the most important thing to me is to make sure that there is an active deterrent out there that some-

body who is contemplating sexual assault knows that they are going to be caught, that they are going to be prosecuted, and if they are prosecuted, they are going to be punished. It is the same thing that has worked in the drug world for us and the like. It is our strong view that the commander is responsible for that.

Senator GILLIBRAND. But I would argue that the commander is still responsible for that because keeping in a number of the articles like Article 134, other articles that are general crimes, you are still fundamentally responsible for command climate, good order, and discipline. For any type of infraction of any part of the UCMJ, the commander is responsible for. You have to set the climate where this assault and rape is not going to happen where they can not be retaliated against and where they will report.

Admiral WINNEFELD. I could not agree more.

Senator GILLIBRAND. The only difference is the legal judgment, that weighing of evidence and facts, will now be done by a trained objective military prosecutor.

Admiral WINNEFELD. I would like to give you a couple of numbers on what the Army has discovered recently, peeling back the numbers on what a so-called objective observer might end up with.

The Army has looked back over the last 2 years and has found 35 cases where a civilian district attorney (DA) refused to take a sexual assault case—refused to take the case. The chain of command in the military insisted that the case be taken inside the military chain of command. Of those 35 cases, there are 14 out there that are not yet resolved. They are still in the court system. There are actually 49. Of the 35 complete, 25 resulted in a court martial conviction. That is a 71 percent conviction rate. The civilian rate is around 18 to 22 percent. So of those 71 percent that were convicted, 24 of the 25 got punitive discharges. They are doing prison time.

If the Army had not taken those 49 cases and the 35 where we have achieved a conviction, those people would be walking the street right now. The victims would not have had the resolution that they deserved in this case. This was done inside the chain of command, the chain of command insisting that a prosecution be pursued, and it was pursued successfully. I worry that if we turn this over to somebody else, whether it is a civilian DA or a non-entity in the military, that they are going to make the same kind of decisions that those civilian prosecutors made. I worry that we are going to have fewer prosecutions if we take it outside the chain of command.

Senator GILLIBRAND. We want prosecutions that are going to result in guilty verdicts, and weighing these kinds of evidence is very difficult. That is why being trained to know what kind of cases you can bring forward and win is so important.

But, moreover, you may have helped a handful of victims. We are still having 23,000 victims who do not feel the system is strong enough, objective enough, and transparent enough to even report. If we are going to address the 23,000 cases as opposed to the handful where a judgment of a commander might have helped, we need to change the system.

My time has expired.

General DEMPSEY. By the way, thanks, Senator. I hope you know we actually embrace this discussion.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you for your service and thoughtfulness.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.

Senator Ayotte?

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank both of you for being here and your families for your distinguished service to our country.

General Dempsey, I want to thank you for your recent visit to New Hampshire. It really meant a lot to our men and women in uniform, and they said to me after that it really said so much about your leadership to go hear from those on the ground. Also at our shipyard, our civilian workforce—they deeply appreciated it. So thank you.

Yesterday I was deeply troubled by a report that came out from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) about the Joint Prisoner of War/Missing in Action (POW/MIA) Accounting Command (JPAC), and that report actually said that unfortunately the leadership weaknesses and fragmented organizational structure is undermining the important function of JPAC. Of course, with more than 83,000 of our country's heroes remaining missing or unaccounted for from past conflicts, including 49 from New Hampshire for Vietnam and Korea, I believe we have a moral obligation to those we have left behind.

This follows up a recent Associated Press (AP) report that found that an internal study that was done at DOD found that this effort, JPAC, was so inept, mismanaged, and wasteful that it risked descending from dysfunction to total failure. There were allegations that this internal study had been suppressed by DOD.

General Dempsey, what are we going to do about this and how are we going to make sure that we fulfill our responsibility to those who have served our country and have been left behind so that they understand that they are not forgotten?

General DEMPSEY. First, Senator, thanks for the hospitality last week. I assure you I always get more than I give on those visits to soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, coast guardsmen, and all the components.

This is a new report to us as well. I can tell you, though, that the Secretary of Defense, while on travel, called me up to make sure that I had been made aware of it and to tell me that when he got back and when I complete this process of hearings and office calls, that he wants to get to the bottom of it.

I mean, it is so new, but it is so discouraging and moving rapidly toward disgraceful. I assure you we will get at it.

We have a new commander out there, and I can also tell you that he is seized with this as well.

Senator AYOTTE. I have written the chairman and I hope that we could have, with the full committee, a hearing on this because I believe it is that important to get to the bottom of some of the issues that have been raised by this GAO report and the internal report.

I would like to ask you, Chairman Dempsey, the chairman and the ranking member of this committee wrote to Secretary Hagel on May 2, 2013. We have heard testimony both in the Readiness and

Management Support Subcommittee and every subcommittee within this committee about the impacts of sequestration. In that letter, the chairman asked you to produce, or the Department of Defense to produce, a package of reductions for the fiscal year 2014 defense budget that would be the most workable approach for meeting the \$52 billion in reductions required by sequestration under the BCA.

We did receive a response recently from Secretary Hagel, but it does not really answer our question on the specifics.

Have you put together a contingency plan for the \$52 billion in reductions required by sequestration in 2014?

General DEMPSEY. The Services, having received their fiscal guidance about 2 weeks ago, are preparing that contingency right now. It will be a contingency that addresses both the President's budget submission and also the sequestration.

Senator AYOTTE. We had asked for this in July. Can you give me a commitment as to when will this be produced to us, this committee, so that we can understand the impacts of sequestration and we can also share it with our colleagues about what it really means in terms of the impact of the readiness of our forces?

Admiral WINNEFELD. I can probably help.

General DEMPSEY. Yes, go ahead.

Admiral WINNEFELD. It is a very fair question. The answer that came back was the first contours of what the fiscal year 2014 execution would look like under those conditions.

It is important for us to keep in mind that there are about five things the Service planners, budget planners, are having to go through right now. They are going through what 2014 is going to look like under the conditions that were asked for in the letter. They are finalizing what 2014 execution would look like under the President's budget. They are also having to develop two or three different scenarios for the fiscal year 2015 to 2019 budget. These people are furloughed 1 day a week. So it is a little tough to produce fine detail of that quickly. But the Services have been given the task and they will have an execution plan before the first of October and you will have it.

Senator AYOTTE. We need it sooner. Let me just say that you can do all the planning you want for the President's budget, but it is pie in the sky right now. The reality is that the law is the sequestration, and until the American people understand and everyone here understands what the real impact of that is, that is why I am hoping that you will make that the priority.

I know I do not have that much time, but I want to ask you, the Chairman and the Vice Chairman, about Russia. In particular, I saw a recent report that Russia is in violation of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Is that true?

Admiral WINNEFELD. That is something that we cannot address in an unclassified hearing, but I would be happy to get into a discussion with you in a more classified setting, the point being that we have very good verification methods in place. We watch this very closely. We believe that they are in compliance with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and I need to leave it at that in this setting.

Senator AYOTTE. Okay. I will follow up because I am not asking about the START treaty.

Admiral WINNEFELD. I understand.
[The information referred to follows:]

The administration is prepared to brief the Senator on the issues relating to the question.

Senator AYOTTE. The reason that I am asking this is because here is where we are with Russia, a postmortem conviction of Sergei Magnitsky—the human rights case—who was, of course, tortured and killed for bringing out corruption within the government. To put it in your face with the United States, they have not ruled out granting asylum to Edward Snowden. Just today there was a report that one of Putin's chief opponents, Navalny, a candidate for the mayor of Moscow, was convicted. It really reeks of using the judicial system for Putin to punish his opponents.

When I look at that context, one thing that concerns me is that our posture with Russia—if they are in violation of their treaty obligations, that is an important issue.

One final question, Admiral. The President recently announced that he would be considering further reductions to our nuclear arsenal. Do you believe that we should do that unilaterally?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Senator, the advice that we have given to the President is that we not do that unilaterally, that we do it as part of a negotiated package of reductions.

Senator AYOTTE. If there were going to be unilateral reductions, would you oppose those reductions?

Admiral WINNEFELD. I would not give that advice to the President that we do a unilateral reduction.

Senator AYOTTE. You would advise against a unilateral reduction in our nuclear deterrent?

Admiral WINNEFELD. We already have.

Senator AYOTTE. Okay. I appreciate that.

General DEMPSEY. There are three things, Senator. There is the through negotiations, preserve the triad, and modernize the stockpile.

Senator AYOTTE. My time is up, but I think given the behavior of Russia, I think it is at best naïve to think that we are going to be able to negotiate any kind of further reductions, which I would oppose. I do not think that is the right direction for the protection of this country. But in light of what I just described—and obviously, we cannot discuss it in this setting, but if we find out that they are in violation of other treaty obligations, coupled with their other behavior, I do not see how we can expect good faith negotiations from the Russians at the moment.

Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.

Senator REED?

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to the Nation and to your families' service because it is evident you cannot do this alone.

General Dempsey, one of your statutory duties is to provide your formal military advice on the strategic environment and military activities needed to address that environment through the Chairman's risk assessment. Given the current world environment, which seems to be changing minute by minute—Senator Ayotte just detailed what has happened in the last 24 hours with respect

to the Russians—what changes would you make today to your risk assessment that you submitted in April?

General DEMPSEY. Thanks, Senator.

The first thing I think you have probably noticed is we changed the one we submitted in April. Previously it had been an accumulation of combatant commander requirements.

By the way, this is to Senator Inhofe's point earlier. Since I have been Chairman over the past 2 years, the requirements that the combatant commanders have submitted have actually increased in U.S. Pacific Command, in CENTCOM, and in U.S. Africa Command notably. It is to the point about increasing risk, declining readiness.

We changed it to try to align what we are doing with national security interests unprioritized, because that is not our responsibility to prioritize them, and we made an estimate of what we are doing across the globe that is being placed at risk. We also looked inside the Services at how the health of the force is evolving.

In that document, I made mention of the fact that this document did not account for sequestration, and that once that became a reality, that I would have to revise my risk assessment. I will have to do so to align with the submission that Senator Ayotte just described.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Chairman Dempsey.

Admiral Winnefeld, my colleagues, particularly Senator Gillibrand, have done extraordinary service to the Nation and to the military by pointing out that despite years of effort, we have a significant sexual abuse problem in the military. We have to, as you both clearly indicated, not rhetorically but fundamentally respond to this.

One aspect we focused on has been the judicial system. But some of my experience suggests that there are other levers that are critical to the climate, the command structure, the performance of the military, and they include evaluation, promotion, and retention. If we do not focus on those areas also, then we will never have the kind of force that we need and the trust that we need among the men and women who serve in that force.

Can you comment on that? I know you and your colleagues have taken on a leadership role in dealing with this issue.

Admiral WINNEFELD. In terms of promotion and—

Senator REED. How do we make this so that every day someone thinks about their responsibilities? There is a judicial process out there, but this is what is expected of me to stay in the force, to succeed in the force, and to have the force succeed.

Admiral WINNEFELD. There are an enormous number of aspects of that answer, but I will touch on a few.

The most important thing—and Senator Gillibrand touched on this—is the command climate that we hold commanders responsible for establishing that makes the likelihood of a sexual assault drop down hopefully to zero. There are a number of aspects. It is about teaching people what a heinous crime this is. It is about reporting it if you see it. It is about intervening if you see it about to happen, a whole host of measures that commanders must take to establish the climate inside their commands. We need to hold commanders accountable for establishing that climate, and we in-

tend to. That is one of the reasons why the command climate surveys now are going to be seen, which we normally have not done, by the next echelon up in the chain of command. If that next echelon up detects a problem that the climate is not where it needs to be, then action can be taken and it can be even entered into somebody's evaluation as sort of a down strike, as you will.

In keeping with the prevention and the advocacy, investigation, accountability, and assessment pieces of what we are trying to do to take on this pernicious issue, it is absolutely vital that the climate piece of it come to the forefront and that we hold commanders responsible for that.

Senator REED. Thank you very much.

General Dempsey, can you comment on the current level of cooperation between the Government in Kabul and NATO International Security Assistance Force command? Every day there seems to be another example of friction rather than harmony.

General DEMPSEY. The relationship with notably the President of Afghanistan is "scratchy" I think is probably as good a word as I could describe it. He is addressing what he describes as issues of sovereignty, and we are trying to close the gap on what an enduring presence and commitment might look like.

Senator REED. Thank you.

Admiral Winnefeld, in terms of the recent discovery of contraband coming out of Cuba to North Korea, do you have a rough assessment at this juncture? Was it the Cubans trying simply to rehabilitate their equipment, or were they trying to get equipment to North Korea so the North Koreans could use it?

Admiral WINNEFELD. It is a little hard to tell at this point. The Intelligence Community is still evaluating that. It would be easy to come to the conclusion that under the guise of returning equipment to North Korea for repair, that in fact these are jet engines and missiles that would be going to North Korea to replenish their stocks or what have you.

In either case, it clearly exposes North Korea's willing defiance of the international community and United Nations (U.N.) Security Council's resolution and the like. We are very glad that the Panamanians discovered this so that we can once more expose to the world the cynical behavior of the North Korean regime.

Senator REED. Thank you. Thank you, General.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed.

Senator Graham?

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you both for your service.

Chairman Dempsey, the Russian President said I think a couple of days ago that if he thought hurting U.S.-Russian relationships would be a consequence of granting Snowden asylum, he would not do it. What would your advice be to the Russian President about granting Snowden asylum?

General DEMPSEY. I think that there would be consequences across all of our relationships, military, economic—

Senator GRAHAM. It would be damaging and not do it. Would that be your advice?

General DEMPSEY. I think it would be, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay, thank you very much.

The Prime Minister of Israel was on national television, on Face the Nation Sunday, and he said the following things about Iran. There is a new president in Iran. He believes he is criticizing his predecessor for being a wolf in wolf's clothing. His strategy is be a wolf in sheep's clothing, smile, and build a bomb.

Admiral Winnefeld, do you agree with that analysis?

Admiral WINNEFELD. As I mentioned earlier, I certainly would agree that we are for the elusive—

Senator GRAHAM. Is there any doubt in your mind that this guy is actually a moderate?

Admiral WINNEFELD. We are looking for the elusive Iranian moderate.

Senator GRAHAM. Now, my question to you—and this will determine how I vote for you. Do you believe the current President of Iran is a moderate?

Admiral WINNEFELD. He does not have a history of being a moderate, no, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. I will take that as no.

The United States should ratchet up the sanctions and make it clear to Iran that they will not get away with it, and if sanctions do not work, then they have to know that you will be prepared—us, the United States—to take military action. That is the only thing that will get their attention. Do you agree with the Israeli Prime Minister about the threat of military force against the Iranian nuclear program may be the only thing to get their attention, General Dempsey?

General DEMPSEY. That has been our approach all along, sir. So yes.

Senator GRAHAM. So great. We are all on the same sheet of paper there, that if they do not believe we are going to hit them, they are going to move.

Here is what he said about all the problems in the Mideast summed up this way. All the problems that we have, however important, will be dwarfed by this messianistic, apocalyptic, extreme regime that would have an atomic bomb. It would make a terrible, a catastrophic change for the world and for the United States.

Do you agree with his assessment of how important it is not to allow the Iranians to get a nuclear weapon?

General DEMPSEY. I do and that is what we have said.

Senator GRAHAM. Great.

All right. Now, as to Afghanistan, the current commander suggested that a 12,000-member force, two-thirds being United States, the other 4,000 being NATO, not counting American special forces troops SOF capability, would be a reasonable number to leave behind in terms of a follow-on force. Does that make sense to you? Is he in the ballpark? Does that make sense?

General DEMPSEY. He is and we have said so at NATO in various sessions.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you very much. That is encouraging.

Do you agree with me that it would be a wise investment to keep the Afghan army at 352,000 at least for a few more years rather than draw them down to 232,000?

General DEMPSEY. I do.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you.

Syria. Is Assad winning?

General DEMPSEY. Currently the tide seems to have shifted in his favor.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with that, Admiral Winnefeld?

Admiral WINNEFELD. I would say specifically the tide has shifted in his favor in the central and western part of the country. It is very fragile in the north, and they are hanging in there.

Senator GRAHAM. Is he winning overall or not?

Admiral WINNEFELD. If I were to have to pick who is winning, it would be the regime, but not by much right now.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. All right. So the regime is winning but not by much.

Could they be winning without Russia's help?

Admiral WINNEFELD. I think the most important help they are getting, sir, is Iranian and Hezbollah. I do not know whether Russia's help is vital but it is certainly helping them.

Senator GRAHAM. General Dempsey, how would you evaluate the significance of Russia's help to Assad?

General DEMPSEY. Through their foreign military sales, they are arming—

Senator GRAHAM. Let me put it this way. If the Russians said we want you gone tomorrow, would it matter to Assad?

General DEMPSEY. Absolutely.

Senator GRAHAM. It would be a gamechanger, would it not, Admiral Winnefeld?

Admiral WINNEFELD. I certainly think so, but Assad is going to fight to the death I think.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with me that if Russia said to Assad we no longer support you, it would be the ultimate gamechanger?

Admiral WINNEFELD. It would be a very important gamechanger, absolutely.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. Do you see Russia doing that?

Admiral WINNEFELD. No, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. If he stays versus him going, what is the most catastrophic outcome for us? If he wins over time and he does not leave versus having to deal with the fact that we kicked him out because we said he had to go, what is worse for us? Him staying or going?

General DEMPSEY. We have said that it is the Nation's policy that Assad must go.

Senator GRAHAM. So that means it is worse for us for him to stay and we not be able to achieve our policy. Do you agree with that?

General DEMPSEY. That is my interpretation.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with that, Admiral Winnefeld?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Yes, sir, I do.

Senator GRAHAM. Will he be in power next year if nothing changes? Your best military advice. If we keep just where we are at, Iran is helping him, do you agree they are all in in helping Assad?

General DEMPSEY. I do.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree that Hezbollah is helping Assad?

General DEMPSEY. Absolutely.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree that Russia is helping Assad?

General DEMPSEY. Yes.

Senator GRAHAM. If nothing changes, if we do not change our game, will he be in power a year from now?

General DEMPSEY. I think likely so.

Senator GRAHAM. What would that mean for the King of Jordan? Will he be in power a year from now?

General DEMPSEY. As I have said, I have met with him and he is concerned that the demographics in his nation—

Senator GRAHAM. Right. You are dead right. He told me he did not think he would be here in another year because there will be a million Syrian refugees and it is destabilizing Jordan. Do you agree with that?

General DEMPSEY. That is his concern. That is right.

Senator GRAHAM. What would that mean for the region and us if the King of Jordan is gone a year from now and Assad is in power a year from now? Would that be a good thing or a bad thing?

General DEMPSEY. He is a strong ally. It would be a bad thing.

Senator GRAHAM. It would be a horrible thing for the Mideast, would it not?

General DEMPSEY. Yes.

Senator GRAHAM. If this war in Syria keeps going on and Assad is still in power a year from now, what effect would it have on Iraq?

General DEMPSEY. It is already destabilizing western Iraq.

Senator GRAHAM. Iraq would just begin to fall apart at a faster rate—do you agree with that—because it is destabilizing the country?

General DEMPSEY. That would certainly be a possible scenario.

Senator GRAHAM. From the Israelis' point of view, the likelihood of Hezbollah getting Russian-made advanced weapons, if he is still in power a year from now—does that go up or down?

General DEMPSEY. From the Israeli standpoint, up.

Senator GRAHAM. Yes. From Israel's standpoint, one of the worst nightmares for them, short of an Iranian nuclear weapon, would be Hezbollah getting advanced weapons sold to Assad by Russia, and that likelihood would go up if he is still in power a year from now.

General DEMPSEY. Yes.

Senator GRAHAM. We will talk in the second round about sequestration. Thank you both for your answers.

Chairman LEVIN. If we can finish the first round by noon at least, there would be a very brief second round. That is my current intention, which I have shared with the ranking member.

Senator McCaskill?

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just when I think we have made real progress on wartime contracting, something happens and I realize that we have still miles to go before we really have a handle on this.

The latest incident that has come to my attention is a \$34 million military base, Leatherneck, in Afghanistan. When the marines on the ground found out this was going to be built, they sent the word up they do not need it, do not want it. That was in May 2010. In February 2011, contracts were issued, and the building was built.

Now we know it is never going to be occupied, probably going to be demolished because it was done according to U.S. wiring standards. For the Afghanistan army to take it over, for the national forces there to take it over, it would be quite an investment for them to convert the building for their use.

I understand an investigation is ongoing. I questioned Mr. Jenman about this the other day. But I need to hear from you, General Dempsey, that you are committed to getting to the bottom of this because if we do not fix accountability in this instance, whoever pulled the trigger on that expenditure really needs to be disciplined. In my opinion, they should be fired because we have to start sending a signal that when the people are saying do not build it, it is a waste of money, that it does not get built. Are you aware of this situation?

General DEMPSEY. Absolutely, Senator. You have my commitment that we will get to the bottom of it.

If I could share just a bit of good news we have—so this one was not caught, but we have de-obligated about \$1.3 billion in contracting for U.S. Forces Afghanistan and a similar amount, probably twice that amount, for the Afghan security forces.

Senator MCCASKILL. That is good. I appreciate that very much.

There has been discussion around military sexual assault that our allies have gone to a different system. The reason that this was talked about was in the context that Canada and Europe had gone to a different system in order to provide more protection for victims. We have had a chance now to take a really close look at those countries and what happened, and it is my understanding those changes in their system resulted from a concern that there was not adequate due process protections for perpetrators. Is that your understanding as well, General Dempsey?

General DEMPSEY. That is correct. Based on our last hearing on the subject, we have done a lot of research into why our allies, the five other nations, went that path, and it is not just because they wanted to protect the accused, but they were also mandated to do it by human rights courts in the European Union.

Senator MCCASKILL. The other argument that is being made about leaving this in the hand of just prosecutors, civilian and/or Judge Advocate General (JAG) prosecutors, is that this would increase reporting. I have had an opportunity to look at the numbers. In Canada, we actually have 176 in 2007, 166 in 2008, 166 in 2009, 176 in 2010. I looked at the numbers in the United Kingdom. Their numbers have actually gone down over the last several years in terms of reports from 54 to 40 to 40. In Australia, they have been stable at 82, 86, 84 over the last several years.

In Israel, there had been a fact about reporting going up when they changed part of their system when it related to lesser sexual offenses a few years ago. There was testimony about their reporting going up 80 percent. If you look back at the numbers—now, these are sex-related offenses total in the military. So everybody gets an understanding of the difference between the enormity of the challenges in our military and what they are looking at in Israel, 26 in 2009, 20 in 2010, 14 in 2011, and 27 in 2012. So yes, there is an 80 percent increase when they changed this between

2011 and 2012, but they only got back to the numbers that they had a few years previously before the change was made.

Are you all aware in the research you have done that changing the system has resulted in an increased reporting anywhere in the world?

General DEMPSEY. There is no analytical evidence nor anecdotal evidence that it has increased reporting. Furthermore, what my counterparts tell me is it has slowed the system down.

Senator MCCASKILL. You mentioned, Admiral Winnefeld, in your testimony earlier that you all have taken a look at prosecutors' decisions in isolation. I have some knowledge of this. There was discipline meted out in my office when I found out that prosecutors in our warrant desk, which was our intake desk, were getting lobbied by some of the trial prosecutors on their decisions because they did not want any losers. They did not want them to take cases that were going to reflect poorly on their won/lost record because when you are a prosecutor, there is a won/lost record. When you take a case to trial, you either win or you lose. So your status among your peers and in some instances your upward mobility in your job could depend on just your conviction rate. When you isolate them with this decision, then there certainly could be instances where you would have a prosecutor that did not want to take a close one, that did not want a "he said/she said".

Do you have additional information that you can share with this committee in terms of numbers of the number of times that civilian prosecutors have said no, military prosecutors have said no, but there are victims out there today that have had justice because the commander said yes?

Admiral WINNEFELD. I do, and I will give you a couple of examples. The Marine Corps has had 28 cases. They have looked back to 2010, 28 cases where civilian prosecutors declined to take the case. Of those, 16 of them the Marine Corps was able to obtain a conviction at court martial, 57 percent. So those are 16 perpetrators that are no longer walking the street and 16 victims who received justice who would not have received it otherwise.

The more startling numbers are from the Army, and I will repeat them. The Army has looked at 49 cases in the last 2 years. Actually 14 of them are still in process. We do not know what is going to happen with those cases. They are still in the trial system. Then 35 of them have been completed. Of those, 25 or 71 percent resulted in a conviction at a court martial. Two additional ones were plea bargained down to a punitive discharge. That takes the number up to 77 percent of these cases that civilian prosecutors would not take that resulted in some serious action taken against a perpetrator. There are some that were acquitted, understandably. Most of the ones who were found guilty have done hard time, are doing hard time, and have been given a punitive discharge from the military. These were all done inside the chain of command.

I would add, Senator McCaskill, some of these are very heinous cases that the DAs would not take. One of them was a 10-year-old autistic girl who was sexually assaulted. We took the case. The commander insisted on it, and a conviction was obtained.

Senator MCCASKILL. This is hard. We all have the same goal. But I do want to say, as I close this questioning, that anybody who

characterizes me as someone who is protecting the Pentagon, that somehow I am in cahoots with the Pentagon trying to hurt sexual assault victims, with all due respect to you guys, I think you are terrific, but there is nobody who will be further in front of the line to kick you until you are senseless if we do not get this problem under control. This is not victims versus the Pentagon. Anybody who is characterizing that is doing a disservice to victims and is doing a disservice to the military and doing a disservice to the members of this committee who have spent hours trying to find the right way to make sure that we prosecute more cases effectively within the military.

I thank you both very much.

Admiral WINNEFELD. Mr. Chairman, if I can take 10 seconds?

Senator MCCASKILL. Yes.

Admiral WINNEFELD. I would like to just reinforce what General Dempsey said a moment ago, that we actually are very grateful for the attention that the entire committee has given to this. It has been very helpful to us.

I also want to say that I look forward to our next chance to have you and other people with prosecutorial experience over to the Pentagon, as we have done before, and get your thoughts, show you what we are doing, get your expertise in there. I think that is a very productive opportunity.

Senator MCCASKILL. You do not need to worry about me being invited. As many of your JAGs will know, I call them. I am not reaching out because you guys are calling plays on this. I was just infuriated at the article that was written that this is somehow you guys pulling strings over here telling us what to do. Nothing could be further from the truth. I appreciate both of you and your commitment to this, but believe me, we are not going anywhere.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. If I may just take 30 seconds before Senator Chambliss speaks, there was an implication in an article in Politico that the amendment which was adopted by this committee was somehow or other cleared or shared with the Pentagon. That is not true. Are you aware of that?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Not that I am aware of.

General DEMPSEY. No.

Chairman LEVIN. A two-page article suggesting that somehow or other the Pentagon screened or impacted the language which we offered in a public session in this committee that led to the adoption of a bipartisan amendment, part of an article that suggested that somehow or other the Pentagon wrote something or screened something.

What they did, very properly so, was asked by the subcommittee that adopted language on this subject for its reaction. We do that all the time before the bill is marked up. The subcommittee then wrote its language under Senator Gillibrand's leadership. Wrote its language after consultation appropriately with the Pentagon. Totally appropriately. But the amendment that was adopted by this committee on a bipartisan vote was not shared with the Pentagon.

I do not know if the folks at Politico that wrote that two-page article implying to the contrary want to correct their article. But in fairness, I believe they should.

Senator NELSON. Mr. Chairman, may I just say on a point of personal privilege on behalf of Senator McCaskill, the implication that she is bought off by the Pentagon—she has been the spark plug in this whole thing from day one. I want her to know how much I appreciate that.

Chairman LEVIN. Her prosecutorial experience, I must say, is invaluable to this committee, not just on this subject but on a lot of other subjects, including this whole contracting problem that she has delved into with such tenacity and effect.

Senator Chambliss?

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for your leadership and your impassioned leadership on this issue of sexual assault. I am not going to go into questioning. I think it has been thoroughly vetted, gentlemen. We know where you are and that you are trying to rectify a very serious situation. But I think you have a thorough understanding that this committee, as a total committee, is upset with what is going on in that realm in every branch of our military. We have to fix it. The system is broken. The chairman's leadership on this and, as he said, in a bipartisan way I think addresses it fairly. We will look forward to that debate on the floor.

General Dempsey, in your answers to advance questions from the committee, you said, "We are at risk of strategy and solvency if sequestration is implemented as currently presented by law." The words "strategy and solvency" sounds like sending unprepared troops into combat and not being able to take action against threats to national security and not being able to assist allies and partners in unstable regions. Is that what you meant?

General DEMPSEY. Yes, sir. Maybe even more simply, it is the mismatch of aspirations and abilities.

Senator CHAMBLISS. I want to go back, General Dempsey, to Syria. Again, it has been thoroughly talked about here, but I am a little bit confused. I heard your response to Senator McCain's questioning. Here is the way I see where we are with respect to Syria right now and your participation in the process.

You have been in place about 2 years, as we all know. During that 2 years, the conflict in Syria has been going on the entire time. There has been virtually an uncontrolled slaughter going on inside of Syria, and I note that even the President's nominee to be Ambassador to the United Nations said yesterday in her hearing that the failure of the U.N. Security Council to respond to the slaughter in Syria is a disgrace that history will judge harshly. I agree with that. But it is also a fact that the United States has kind of sat by and watched what is happening over there and we have really had our hands behind our back.

Now, you have been in place for 2 years. You have been the principal military advisor to the President on this issue and others. Has the President followed your advice on the involvement of the United States in Syria?

General DEMPSEY. The President has asked for options, and we have provided them. On the issues, has he followed my advice, the issue is whether—there are two issues at work. Could we and should we? I have advised him on "could we". We have not gotten into a conversation about "should we" except as it relates to the

current path, which is one focused primarily on building a moderate opposition.

Senator CHAMBLISS. I am taking that to mean then that the President has listened to your options but apparently you have not picked a side or been forceful in what you think the President ought to do. Am I correct?

General DEMPSEY. Sir, let me talk about the role of the Chairman because it keeps coming back to that. It is my responsibility to provide options about the use of force and how they would contribute to a broader strategy not in isolation.

I am reluctant to—in fact, I am unwilling actually to discuss my advice to the President on whether we should use force while that deliberation is ongoing.

To the point about what is my responsibility to this committee, my responsibility to this committee is to have the same kind of conversations with you as we have on options and on what the military instrument of power could do in the context of a broader strategy.

But the decision on whether to use force is fundamentally a political decision and one that is being deliberated even frequently with regard to Syria. But for me to advocate it would absolutely put me in what I have deemed to be an inappropriate position with both the President and this committee.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Did you advocate for a no-fly zone or against a no-fly zone?

General DEMPSEY. That is the point, sir. I have not advocated nor opposed any of those options. I have explained what they would do to the situation.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Here is my dilemma, General. You are the top military advisor to the President. Syria is the most significant international military conflict going on today. It has the capability of providing future unrest to that part of the world that may be permanent. There has been no change in U.S. policy from a military standpoint in Syria during your 2 years.

Now, if we approve you for another 2 years, confirm you for another 2 years, then is there going to be a change in policy in Syria over the next 2 years, or are we just going to keep doing what we are doing, which is watching innocent people slaughtered?

General DEMPSEY. Senator, I would hate to take that burden entirely on myself to determine whether the situation in Syria will change over the next 2 years. You can be sure that as we develop options to be considered in military instrument of power, that I will articulate whether I think they will be effective, what are the risks involved to U.S. forces, what are the opportunity costs.

Let me tell you what has changed in the last 2 years. We are far more involved on the Korean Peninsula at higher states of readiness. We are far more involved in the Gulf at higher states of readiness. We continue to manage the conflict in Afghanistan. There are some significant risks we are accruing while we also are engaged in trying to determine how to match ends, ways, and means in the face of sequestration.

Senator CHAMBLISS. In closing, let me just say that Secretary Hagel in a recent announcement directed a 20 percent cut in the number of top ranking officers and senior civilians at the Pentagon

by 2019. I applaud that move. I think that is something that has to be done. We look forward to as a committee to working with you, assuming you are confirmed, to carrying out that directive by the Secretary. It is not going to be easy. It is not going to be pleasant, but everybody has to share in this pain, including our top ranking folks.

General DEMPSEY. No question. If I could just respond very briefly. There are a couple of things we should do, Senator, whether sequestration was hanging over our heads or not. One of them is to make ourselves more efficient at the institutional level. The other is compensation and health care, and we are going to need your help to do that.

Admiral WINNEFELD. If I could add just 1 second. I do not want to leave the committee with the impression that has been in the press that it is only the top brass that are being reduced by 20 percent. It is the entire staffs that are being reduced by 20 percent. This is a significant cut and we offered it. We believe that we have to become more efficient and never waste a crisis. It is the entire staff, not only the Joint Staff but the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff, but also the combatant commanders' staffs we are going to trim by 20 percent over the next 5 years.

Chairman LEVIN. Just if I heard you correctly, it is not just that you support it but that you offered it. Is that correct?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Thank you, Senator Chambliss.

Senator Hagan?

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Dempsey, Admiral Winnefeld, thank you very much for your service to our country and for being here today.

General Dempsey, on just this past Monday, I had the great pleasure to be at the Fleet Readiness Center-East at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point to welcome the arrival of the first F-35B that was scheduled for modifications. I know how important the F-35B is to the Marine Corps, to our national security, and to the local North Carolina communities that support it. This was certainly reiterated to me during my visit on Monday.

Like you and like the members of this committee, I am very worried about the damage that sequestration is already doing to the Department and to our national security. Most of the members of the civilian workforce that I met with on Monday had just had their first furlough day the Friday before, which I think is a harsh reminder of Congress' inability to find a solution here. We actually have 19,000 civilians working for DOD that are on furlough in North Carolina.

Please know that I remain dedicated to finding a balanced bipartisan solution to sequestration, and what I really worry about are those in Washington who underestimate the damage that sequestration will have if this is allowed to continue in fiscal year 2014 and beyond. I think it is important that Congress and the people hear directly from senior leaders like yourself about the impact that this is going to have if it is allowed to continue.

Can you just give a few examples of the impact that it might have on the F-35B and other modernization programs, as well as on the local communities that support them?

General DEMPSEY. Yes, let me give you a very brief, generalized answer. The Vice Chairman sits on most of the meetings where the tradeoffs are made in things like modernization.

But the point is that, as I said, it is too far and too fast. At the beginning of this period, we will suffer most prominently in readiness and in modernization. We have to take money where we can get it. Later on, as the force shrinks, we will be more ready but we will be less modernized than we think we need to be, and in my view we will have forces inadequate to achieve the strategy as currently conceived and we will have to look back at how we might change our strategy.

Admiral WINNEFELD. Specifically on the F-35, our first priority right now is to finish the development of that program, and we requested some money in the reprogramming authority to get that done in fiscal year 2013 to keep the sustainable technology development effort on track.

Because of the importance of this program, we are doing everything we can to protect the numbers as the Department finalizes the lots 6 and 7 prices, and I do not want to stray outside of my authority. This is really in the Under Secretary of Defense for AT&L lane. But we are committed to this program, and we really want to ramp up production as soon as we can to get the economies of scale that we need in order to make this a productive program. The F-35 is a very important program to us. There is no question about it.

Senator HAGAN. It is also my understanding on sequestration that the DOD civilian supervisors, they received notice just recently that if they have knowledge that the employees that report to them work more than the allotted hours during their furloughs, even when it is voluntary on their part, that those supervisors, these civilian supervisors, are subject to fines up to \$5,000 and potential jail time. When I realized that there are legal guidelines, I know, that have to be followed. We certainly do not want to have furloughed employees to have to involuntarily work without pay, but to me this seems to go too far. I am troubled that these supervisors could face these unbelievable penalties because they have motivated workers who really are dedicated to the national security of our country despite the furloughs, and we cannot fault them when they want to continue their mission, once again, because Congress has not acted.

What are your thoughts on this matter? How does one find the right balance here?

Admiral WINNEFELD. First of all, Senator, I would make a shout-out to our civilian employees in the Department who are fantastic. These are people who under ordinary conditions work extra hours because they believe so much in what they are doing, and they are just tremendous.

I am not a lawyer and I do not have the legal background in this. I believe that the restrictions you are referring to when you are furloughed are legal restrictions, and I think we are just trying to stay within the letter of the law.

But I could not agree with you more on the overall principle and the sentiment that these are American patriots who want to do the best they can for their country. We are cutting out a day's pay and they still want to do work for us. I mean, what more can you ask for from these great folks?

So the sooner we can resolve this, the better. I know the Department is working hard, if we can, to reduce the number of furlough days this year. There are no guarantees. The comptroller is working on that. But it is a real tragic situation for these great Americans.

Senator HAGAN. Even these legal ramifications, they are not supposed to even look at the BlackBerries on the days of furlough.

The previous two quadrennial defense reviews have mandated significant growth in our Special Operations Forces (SOF) and enablers that directly support their operations. Admiral Winnefeld, in response to the committee's prehearing policy questions, you said given the financial downturn that we face, we must balance the need for soft capabilities with our need to address other capability demands in light of increased budgetary pressures.

Do you believe that previously directed growth in the size of SOF should be retained despite the current budgetary pressures, and how should special operations capabilities be prioritized compared to the other capability demands that you referenced?

Admiral WINNEFELD. I have to be quite honest in telling you that if we get into the full BCA caps, the full sequester, what we call "sequester forever" in the Department, that we are probably going to have to level off SOF growth because there are so many other programs that are going to be shrinking in size. It is sort of the philosophy if you are level, then you are doing pretty well in this budget environment. If you are growing, it is really unusual. The only thing I know of that will grow will be the cyber forces, and everything else is going to be coming down in size. I think keeping it in perspective that leveling off SOF is probably about as good as we can do if we get to the full BCA cuts.

Senator HAGAN. Even with the demands that we see around the world today?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Even with the demands. Our SOFs are fantastic. They are doing very important work around the world, no question. We have a considerable amount of SOF forces in Afghanistan doing counterinsurgency. That will end at the end of 2014. We were hoping to take that capacity and bring it home and do a couple of important things with it. One is to rest the force a little bit. These folks have been going very hard for the last decade. Another would be to enhance our building partnership capacity efforts across the world. We certainly want to rest the force. We may have to trim back a little bit on the building partnership capacity just because of the budget cuts. Again, you are pretty lucky if you are only leveling off under these circumstances.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Hagan.

Senator Shaheen?

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Dempsey and Admiral Winnefeld, thank you both very much for your service to this country and for your willingness to continue to serve under what are very difficult times.

General Dempsey, I very much appreciate your coming to New Hampshire and your visiting both Pease and our National Guard and the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and meeting with a number of the businesses in New Hampshire that help make up part of the great defense industrial base we have in this country.

Many people on the committee have expressed their concerns about sequestration. I know it is something that you both care very much about. One of the things that we heard from the businesses in the meeting that you had in New Hampshire was their concern about the uncertainty and what that means in terms of their future ability to provide the support that our military needs in order to do their job.

I wonder if you could speak to whether this is something you are hearing from other parts of the country and then how concerned you are that continuing cuts from sequestration might have a very damaging impact on the defense industrial base in this country.

General DEMPSEY. Thank you, Senator.

What I found most interesting in that roundtable were two things. The big corporations—I will not name names, but the big corporations have enough flexibility that they can kind of weather the storm and are likely to still be there when we need them. It is the small businesses who do not have that kind of flexibility who I think we risk losing in two ways. One is I suspect they will look—well, they said it. They are going to look increasingly overseas. The second thing they said was that their ability to innovate is being reduced. So we are losing in several ways that I think could have a long-term negative effect.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

The other thing you have both talked about is the importance of the people who serve this country, both who serve actively in the Armed Forces, as well as those people who support your mission in the civilian capacity. One of the concerns that I have had is relative to the workers that we have who have the degrees in the science, technology, engineering, and math fields.

Looking at the statistics for the people we will need to do the work of our military and its support in the future, the statistics do not look very good because the average age of an aerospace worker in the industry is 44. Also, 26 percent of the aerospace workforce became eligible for retirement in 2008. Meanwhile, 50 percent of the Navy's science and technology professionals will be retirement eligible by 2020. Those statistics go on.

Can either of you speak to concerns that you have about how sequestration might be affecting our ability to recruit the people who have the degrees and the skills that we are going to need in the future? If we are looking at sequestration not just in 2013 but 2014, 2015, 2016, for the next 9 years, what does that do to our civilian workforce that supports your mission?

General DEMPSEY. I will ask the Vice to respond in a moment here. But reflecting back to the trip to the Portsmouth Naval Yard, one of the other things I was unaware of was the apprenticeship program where they take some of the folks with the skill set that

you described—30 of them, as I remember, some significant number—from incredible schools in the Northeast notably and they build into them this passion that I saw in the workforce there in support of the United States Navy and, in fact, in support of the Coast Guard as well. It is going to be simply a matter of mathematics. They are going to do less of that. I think we will lose some of those.

Admiral WINNEFELD. Fundamentally, the real challenge we have under the worst sequester scenario is the steepness of this cut, and what we have found over time and we understand very well this time around is that it is very hard to get force structure out quickly. Force structure meaning people. We cannot get people out fast enough. What that means is the only other levers you have are readiness and modernization. Readiness and modernization are very technical things. So we will be jettisoning basically a number of modernization programs or vastly trimming them down, and we will be reducing readiness which includes depot work and that sort of stuff which is also technical. I worry about that.

The other thing is that as we get smaller, the tendency under the rules we have is that sort of the last person in is the first person out. That is our seed corn, all these young, technically adept folks that are thinking of coming in or who are already in. If they are first to go, we are going to lose them. Then we are going to have the effects that you talked about where we have a force that stays and retires and there is nothing to backfill them. It really is something we have to watch closely. I know Frank Kendall is worried about it. I know Ash Carter is worried about it. It is something we have to be very mindful of as we move forward.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. I certainly share that concern.

Let me ask you both. One of the things that Senator McCain and I have worked on is language both in the immigration reform bill that passed the Senate, as well as in the National Defense Authorization Act that this committee has done, would deal with the number of Afghans and Iraqis who have been helpful to the United States and the international force who are concerned about their safety once we get past 2014 and the NATO force withdraws.

I wonder if you could talk about how concerned you are about that and what kind of message it would send to other people in the future who might be willing to cooperate with us in these kinds of conflicts if we are not able to help provide safety for those people who have cooperated.

General DEMPSEY. Having lived with those men and women, I strongly support the effort. But let me turn it over to the Vice who has been tracking it most closely.

Admiral WINNEFELD. Just to give you a sense, actually yesterday we had a deputies committee meeting that I was unable to attend but sent someone on this exact issue, special immigrant visas and the like to get these folks in who have really literally risked their lives to enable our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It has the attention of the National Security staff. It has our attention, and we will continue to push it in the right direction.

I would just say if you hear anything that is making you uncomfortable, do not hesitate to talk to us. We will be happy to answer any questions you might have.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. I know that Senator McCain and I stand ready to be of any help we can, and I know it has the support of this committee as well. Thank you very much.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.

Senator Sessions?

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your leadership of this committee. You lead us in a way that gets most of us to vote together every time we bring a bill out, and I think that is a testament to bipartisanship in the defense of America.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much.

Senator SESSIONS. General Dempsey, particularly I just want to ask you to reaffirm—and I know you will do so—your responsibility to share with this committee and Congress your best military judgment about matters and that you will internally—when asked by the commander in chief to give your opinion, you will give your best, unvarnished military opinion and not be influenced by politics or pressures of any kind.

General DEMPSEY. I can assure you that is what has been my intent and will remain my intent in the future.

Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Winnefeld, would you likewise?

Admiral WINNEFELD. That is what we have been doing and what we continue to do. Yes, sir.

Senator SESSIONS. I thank you. It is really important because we have a lot of significant agenda items that are occurring that will set policy for years to come whether it is the number of personnel, our involvement around the world, whether it is missile defense. In particular, we are beginning to have some hearings on our nuclear capabilities. The public proposal of the President that he would like to reduce by one-third our already substantially reduced nuclear arsenal raises a serious concern to me. We will be asking you as time goes by your best judgment on that. Of course, it goes beyond the technical issues to our role in the world and the confidence our allies have in us also.

General Dempsey, one of the more amazing things to me that I believe has caused a great deal of unnecessary problems with the sequester and the reduction in spending was the fact that this was passed in August 2011, and the President said in a national debate it was not going to happen but it was the law of the United States. He signed it. I frankly at the time wondered how it was going to be fixed. I had my doubts that we would get it fixed. The President has indicated basically he wants more taxes and more spending and he will not find any other reductions in spending anywhere else to relieve the burdens on the military.

But I would just like to get one thing straight with regard to the difficulties you have faced this year. My understanding is that you made no plans and made no cuts in the first 6 months of this year even though you were aware that this was the law in 2011, and as a result, you have had to make more dramatic cuts, more unwise reductions to try to finish this year within the budget law that you have been told you have to finish under. Has that been a problem for you and why did we not plan to reduce spending all year instead of making up all of that in the last 6 months?

General DEMPSEY. It has been a problem, Senator. We found ourselves with 80 percent spent with half the year to go. The answer as to how did we get to that position that was the budget guidance we received.

Senator SESSIONS. You got that from the executive branch?

General DEMPSEY. I get my marching orders from the Department, but I assume they got it from the Office of Management and Budget.

Senator SESSIONS. I do remain concerned about the impact on the Defense Department. It is not just that I have, as a member of this committee and personal views, a strong affinity for the men and women who serve us in uniform, but because half of the reductions in spending that were included in the BCA have fallen on one-sixth of the U.S. Government spending, the Defense Department. This is a disproportionate reduction in spending in my opinion to our Defense Department, and it is at a level that is troubling to me.

I am ranking on the Budget Committee and I have seen the numbers. We should look for other areas within our Government to find some savings too. For example, Medicaid has no cuts. Social Security has no cuts. Medicare had a little but it did not help the Defense Department. That was used to reduce spending reductions in other departments. Food stamps has gone up four-fold in the last 10 or 12 years, had zero cuts. We are just at a point that we have to figure out how to deal with this. I do believe you are being asked to take a disproportionate cut, and Congress should work with the President, the Commander in Chief, and he needs to help us work through a way to spread out some of this belt tightening so that other departments and agencies in the Government tighten their belt too.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much. Thank you for your comments as well about me, Senator Sessions.

Now, is Senator King here? If not, Senator Kaine? Senator Nelson?

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for your public service.

Let us talk first about upgrading the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) fleet. You are moving from manned platforms to a combination of unmanned and manned platforms. The law directs the Vice Chairman and the Under Secretary to certify annually that the Navy remains in compliance in supporting the needs of the combatant commanders, and the Navy has certified compliance. My interest in this is that in the President's budget, the Navy plans to gradually draw down your manned platforms before going over to the P-8 platform and then to field a fleet of MQ-4C Tritons, the unmanned aerial vehicles.

Now, it is my understanding that the Secretary of the Navy is supportive of this position. Have you all spoken to the combatant commanders to confirm if these ISR capabilities fulfill their requirements?

Admiral WINNEFELD. I have not recently covered that particular slice of the combatant commander requirements. They are going to have their integrated priority lists due to us here over this fall, and

we will scan those. We also get constant feedback from their J-8 organizations, but I would have to take it up for the record on whether specifically in that area we are answering their needs.

Senator NELSON. Okay. I would appreciate it. I think that there is some concern in the Secretary's Office about this transition, and to see that those manned platforms are utilized so that there is not a gap while we are transitioning over and getting the combined fleet between unmanned and manned.

[The information referred to follows:]

Combatant commanders' requests for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) always exceed our capacity to provide. However, regarding capability, the combatant commanders contributed to the Navy's MISR&T Transition Plan through the Battlespace Awareness Joint Capabilities Board. The combatant commanders understand and support how we are optimizing the Navy's "high-demand, low-density" ISR capability.

Yes, Dr. Vickers and I, along with Joint Staff and representatives from the combatant commands, carefully reviewed Navy's current ISR capabilities and proposed way ahead. We have certified Navy's plan each of the past 2 years. Such review is critical because, while the EP-3E ARIES and P-3 Special Projects Aircraft (SPA) have been workhorses for the Navy and Joint Force for decades, they're fast approaching end-of-service life (approximately 2020).

To mitigate short term risk, the Navy is sustaining the capabilities of both the EP-3E and P-3 SPA aircraft while fielding the baseline Triton UAV with its greatly improved persistence. They are also adding a Quick Reaction Capability, which provides certain "SPA-like" capabilities, to the P-8A aircraft. Proper phasing of manpower is critical to ensure transition of capability and capacity to follow-on platforms, without impacting combatant commanders.

The Navy's plan, as part of a joint effort, invests in the right platform/sensor mix and is in the best interests of the Joint force, particularly in our current budgetary environment. However, additional requirements, particularly those in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 draft language requiring the sustainment of five EP-3Es for allocation, that limit the Navy's ability to execute this plan may draw resources that impede fielding of the appropriate future force. Dr. Vickers and I will continue to monitor Navy's progress closely.

Senator NELSON. Now, once we are withdrawing from Afghanistan, there is going to be a lot of ISR assets that will come back and be distributed throughout the combatant commands. I sure wish that you all would take a look at what sequestration is doing to us in U.S. Southern Command and the huge success that they have had interdiction of drugs coming north. As a matter of fact, just in the last year, Colombia itself interdicted 207 metric tons. As it started to come through Central America toward the U.S. border, the Joint Interagency Task Force-South, which is the joint task force going after these drugs—that interdicted 152 additional metric tons. By the time it gets to the southern border of the United States, then they were interdicting another 10 metric tons. You can see that the big part has already been interdicted before it ever got there, thanks to a lot of U.S. Southern Command's efforts in the joint task force. I would surely appreciate it, as these ISR assets are going to be available, that you will consider Southern Command as a part to use those ISR assets. I know you will.

But would you just for the record state what are going to be the long-term effects of the sequester on the counternarcotics mission?

General DEMPSEY. In general, I will tell you that we will be able to do less in the maritime transit zones for the immediate future because of some combination of sequestration and also maintenance that has been deferred over time. I am concerned about it. In fact, I met over the past several months with both my Canadian

and my Mexican counterparts to see if we can collaboratively find a way to mitigate the risk.

Admiral WINNEFELD. We have just had to make some very difficult choices in the current environment with readiness declining and the Navy unable to support as many ship deployments as they would like to, as you well know. We have had some considerable success, as you point out, with interdicting drugs coming from Central and South America in the maritime environment and other environments. We are going to have to allocate resources. As the Chairman mentioned, it is about balancing ends, ways, and means, and we will just have to keep our eye on it. Absolutely.

Senator NELSON. I will tell you where you are going to be additionally stressed is if we are fortunate to get an immigration reform bill and if it stays in the present posture that it passed the Senate where all this additional money is being used to enhance the effectiveness of the land border, what is going to happen to all those drugs and, indeed, human smuggling it is going to go right around on the maritime border.

Now, I think this was an oversight. They would not accept Senator Wicker's and my amendment to enhance by just \$1 billion, DHS, the Coast Guard, and helping DHS with unmanned platforms.

The Navy blimp is also an asset that can be used on that. I have ridden in that blimp. It can dwell for a long time. The amount of gas that it takes for a 24-hour mission is the same amount of gas that it takes for an F-16 to crank up and just run out to the runway. It is a cost-effective platform for observation of something like a maritime border.

Hopefully, if we can pass the immigration reform, we are going to be able to enhance that maritime border. But this is going to all the more bring into question the desperate need to avoid sequester in a place like Southern Command, not even to speak of all the other commands. I spent some time with Admiral McRaven, and he walked me through what is going to happen to Special Operations Command if we have this sequester continue. It is absolutely ridiculous that we would be doing this to ourselves not only shooting ourselves in the foot but starting to shoot ourselves up the torso.

I wish you would take a look at the ISR assets as they come back and allocate some of them to Southern Command. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.

We are going to have a very brief second round of about 2 minutes for those of us who are here. We have a vote. I cannot see that clock, but it is getting close to 12:15 p.m. Is it there already? Anyway, I think we have a vote at 12:15 p.m. I am going to have a 2-minute second round.

General, I want to find a way to work through the options issue on Syria not in 2 minutes but I want to work through it because I think there is a real uncertainty among some of us as to what your role is in terms of telling us your personal opinion on things, what your role is in terms of giving advice to the President, in terms of the options that you have laid out, the pluses, minuses, strengths, weaknesses of each of those options, whether they could

be effective, what are the costs, what are the opportunity costs, and so forth.

What I am going to ask you to do for the record is to give us an unclassified list of options and your personal assessment of the pros and cons of those options. Now, in some of those pros and cons and your personal assessment, it will be pretty obvious that you are not going to recommend something. But I am not going to ask you point blank which of these options you recommend. You have said you are not going to tell us. You cannot tell us or you have not decided. For whatever reason, you are not going to tell us what your preferred option is, but what you are willing to do is go through with us the pluses and minuses of each of the various options. That is what I am going to ask you to do in a fairly thorough way for the record.

If you need to give us a classified annex, that is fine. But I want to work very hard to try to work through this issue of the options in Syria.

Now, you are aware of the fact that I personally have favored arming and training the opposition. I personally, indeed, want to consider and I have even gone beyond that talking about stand-off airstrikes against certain facilities. That is just my own personal opinion so you know where I am coming from. You and I have talked about it. I am not trying to persuade you that that is the right position or should be your position, but that is my public position.

My question to you is whether or not you are willing to give to us an unclassified list of options and the strengths and weaknesses, the costs and effectiveness and so forth of each of those options.

General DEMPSEY. Absolutely, Senator, as well as the framework of a strategy in which they might make sense, which I am happy to do.

Chairman LEVIN. Anything else you want to add to it. I do not want to limit you in any way. As long as it includes that, it may help us work through this issue.

General DEMPSEY. Yes, but I would ask you take my point even now that the decision whether to use force is one that I must communicate personally to the President. As you have seen me do in the past, if the President takes my advice and you ask me, I will tell you that he took my advice. If he does not, I am more than willing to tell you no. My recommendation was something else. He is certainly under no obligation to take my advice.

Chairman LEVIN. You have indicated that you are not going to share with us your opinion, if you have one, on whether or not to use force.

General DEMPSEY. While it is being deliberated.

Chairman LEVIN. While it is being deliberated. I am not asking you to do that. I think if you just are able to do what I have asked you to do, it may be clear that at least some of those options you think are not wise options just from your pros and cons assessment.

General DEMPSEY. Right. I thought we got at it at some level in the classified briefing.

Chairman LEVIN. But we need an unclassified answer. You said you are willing to lay out options and to show pros and cons of op-

tions and whether they can be effective, what are the costs, various costs, and so forth. If you will do that, it may be a step that would be a constructive, positive step. If you can do that within the next 4 or 5 days, we would appreciate it.

General DEMPSEY. Sure.

[The information referred to follows:]

See attached letter.



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

JUL 19 2013

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On 18 July 2013, you asked me to provide an unclassified assessment of options for the potential use of U.S. military force in the Syrian conflict. It offers my independent judgment with as much openness as this classification allows. I am mindful that deliberations are ongoing within our government over the further role of the United States in this complex sectarian war. The decision over whether to introduce military force is a political one that our Nation entrusts to its civilian leaders. I also understand that you deserve my best military advice on how military force could be used in order to decide whether it should be used.

At this time, the military's role is limited to helping deliver humanitarian assistance, providing security assistance to Syria's neighbors, and providing nonlethal assistance to the opposition. Patriot batteries are deployed to Turkey and Jordan for their defense against missile attack. An operational headquarters and additional capabilities, including F-16s, are positioned to defend Jordan. We are also prepared for the options described below:

Train, Advise, and Assist the Opposition. This option uses nonlethal forces to train and advise the opposition on tasks ranging from weapons employment to tactical planning. We could also offer assistance in the form of intelligence and logistics. The scale could range from several hundred to several thousand troops with the costs varying accordingly, but estimated at \$500 million per year initially. The option requires safe areas outside Syria as well as support from our regional partners. Over time, the impact would be the improvement in opposition capabilities. Risks include extremists gaining access to additional capabilities, retaliatory cross-border attacks, and insider attacks or inadvertent association with war crimes due to vetting difficulties.

Conduct Limited Stand-off Strikes. This option uses lethal force to strike targets that enable the regime to conduct military operations, proliferate advanced weapons, and defend itself. Potential targets include high-value regime air defense, air, ground, missile, and naval forces as well as the supporting military facilities and command nodes. Stand-off air and missile systems could be used to strike hundreds of targets at a tempo of our choosing. Force requirements would include hundreds of aircraft, ships, submarines, and other enablers. Depending on duration, the costs would be in the billions. Over time, the impact would be the significant degradation of regime capabilities and an increase in regime desertions. There is a risk that the regime could withstand limited strikes by dispersing its assets. Retaliatory attacks

are also possible, and there is a probability for collateral damage impacting civilians and foreigners inside the country.

Establish a No-Fly Zone. This option uses lethal force to prevent the regime from using its military aircraft to bomb and resupply. It would extend air superiority over Syria by neutralizing the regime's advanced, defense integrated air defense system. It would also shoot down adversary aircraft and strike airfields, aircraft on the ground, and supporting infrastructure. We would require hundreds of ground and sea-based aircraft, intelligence and electronic warfare support, and enablers for refueling and communications. Estimated costs are \$500 million initially, averaging as much as a billion dollars per month over the course of a year. Impacts would likely include the near total elimination of the regime's ability to bomb opposition strongholds and sustain its forces by air. Risks include the loss of U.S. aircraft, which would require us to insert personnel recovery forces. It may also fail to reduce the violence or shift the momentum because the regime relies overwhelmingly on surface fires—mortars, artillery, and missiles.

Establish Buffer Zones. This option uses lethal and nonlethal force to protect specific geographic areas, most likely across the borders with Turkey or Jordan. The opposition could use these zones to organize and train. They could also serve as safe areas for the distribution of humanitarian assistance. Lethal force would be required to defend the zones against air, missile, and ground attacks. This would necessitate the establishment of a limited no-fly zone, with its associated resource requirements. Thousands of U.S. ground forces would be needed, even if positioned outside Syria, to support those physically defending the zones. A limited no-fly zone coupled with U.S. ground forces would push the costs over one billion dollars per month. Over time, the impact would be an improvement in opposition capabilities. Human suffering could also be reduced, and some pressure could be lifted off Jordan and Turkey. Risks are similar to the no-fly zone with the added problem of regime surface fires into the zones, killing more refugees due to their concentration. The zones could also become operational bases for extremists.

Control Chemical Weapons. This option uses lethal force to prevent the use or proliferation of chemical weapons. We do this by destroying portions of Syria's massive stockpile, interdicting its movement and delivery, or by seizing and securing program components. At a minimum, this option would call for a no-fly zone as well as air and missile strikes involving hundreds of aircraft, ships, submarines, and other enablers. Thousands of special operations forces and other ground forces would be needed to assault and secure critical sites. Costs could also average well over one billion dollars per month. The impact would be the control of some, but not all chemical weapons. It would also help prevent their further proliferation into the hands of extremist groups. Our inability to fully control Syria's storage and delivery systems could allow extremists to gain better access. Risks are similar to the no-fly zone with the added risk of U.S. boots on the ground.

Too often, these options are considered in isolation. It would be better if they were assessed and discussed in the context of an overall whole-of-government strategy for achieving our policy objectives in coordination with our allies and partners. To this end, I have supported a regional approach that would isolate the conflict to prevent regional destabilization and weapons


proliferation. At the same time, we should help develop a moderate opposition—including their military capabilities—while maintaining pressure on the Assad regime.

All of these options would likely further the narrow military objective of helping the opposition and placing more pressure on the regime. We have learned from the past 10 years; however, that it is not enough to simply alter the balance of military power without careful consideration of what is necessary in order to preserve a functioning state. We must anticipate and be prepared for the unintended consequences of our action. Should the regime's institutions collapse in the absence of a viable opposition, we could inadvertently empower extremists or unleash the very chemical weapons we seek to control.

I know that the decision to use force is not one that any of us takes lightly. It is no less than an act of war. As we weigh our options, we should be able to conclude with some confidence that the use of force will move us toward the intended outcome. We must also understand risk—not just to our forces, but to our other global responsibilities. This is especially critical as we lose readiness due to budget cuts and fiscal uncertainty. Some options may not be feasible in time or cost without compromising our security elsewhere. Once we take action, we should be prepared for what comes next. Deeper involvement is hard to avoid. We should also act in accordance with the law, and to the extent possible, in concert with our allies and partners to share the burden and solidify the outcome.

Thank you for this opportunity to share my assessment. The classified versions of all the options described here have been presented to the National Security Staff for consideration by the Principals and the President. They have also been presented to the Congress in several briefs, including one recently provided by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Sincerely,



MARTIN E. DEMPSEY
General, U.S. Army

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Ayotte, I believe. No. I may be wrong.
Senator AYOTTE. I am next but I am going to defer first to Senator Graham and then go.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. Senator Graham?

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you.

Chairman Dempsey, back to Afghanistan. If no troops were left behind for whatever reason in 2015, we just pulled out and there

were no American forces left behind, the zero option, very quickly what is the likely outcome in Afghanistan?

General DEMPSEY. Although I have told you that the progress of the security forces has been significant, they would not have the level of confidence to sustain themselves over time if it happens that precipitously.

Senator GRAHAM. It would lead to what I believe would be a fractured state, a larger safe haven for al Qaeda types, and over time would be a disaster. Do you agree with that?

General DEMPSEY. Those are all high risks.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay, thank you.

Admiral Winnefeld, sequestration. In terms of the Air Force, if sequestration—let us start with the Navy. Over a 10-year period, how many ships will we have in the Navy after 10 years of sequestration?

Admiral WINNEFELD. I do not have the exact number for you.

Senator GRAHAM. Somebody says 232 ships.

Admiral WINNEFELD. It could be that low.

Senator GRAHAM. Would that be just like crazy?

Admiral WINNEFELD. It would certainly impact our ability to respond to contingencies and to have forward presence and deter—

Senator GRAHAM. Well, I think it is crazy.

One-third of the fighter force is grounded today. They are beginning to fly again because you have robbed Peter to pay Paul. But has the effect of sequestration grounded one-third of our fighter force?

Admiral WINNEFELD. It has grounded nine fighter squadrons, which is not one-third of the fighter force, but there are other squadrons that are flying at a rate lower.

Senator GRAHAM. What would it take for the enemy to knock out nine Air Force squadrons?

Admiral WINNEFELD. I know where you are coming from and it would be a heck of a lot.

Senator GRAHAM. If I were the Iranians, I would send a thank you note to Congress for grounding more Air Force planes than they could on their own. To say I am upset about this is an understatement.

Finally, what if, General Dempsey, Congress could not find a way to reach a deal on funding the Government? Come October 1, we just cannot fund the Government and the politicians in Washington cannot come up with a budget and we had no money for our military. What signal would that be sending to our troops and to our enemies? What kind of national security impact would it be in the times in which we live if there was no agreement to fund the Government? What would it mean to our national security?

General DEMPSEY. You remember, Senator, I held up this slide showing that these kids that we send into harm's way trust us. I would have to assess that bond of trust would be broken.

Senator GRAHAM. As to our enemies, how would they take this?

General DEMPSEY. I think they would be certainly happy at our demise.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham.

Senator Ayotte?

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Winnefeld, when you look at the security of this country, what would you prioritize first?

Admiral WINNEFELD. I would prioritize first the survival of the Nation.

Senator AYOTTE. Would that mean protecting the Homeland?

Admiral WINNEFELD. It would definitely.

Senator AYOTTE. I know that earlier you were asked about our missile defense system, and you said that the first dollar we should spend is on the sensor to add discrimination power. Correct?

Admiral WINNEFELD. That is correct.

Senator AYOTTE. I guess I am kind of dumbfounded by it because, as I understand it, that was not in the budget proposal put forth by the Department. Why was that if it was the number one?

Admiral WINNEFELD. I would have to review the budget documents to validate that. But one thing to remember is we have a new commander of the Missile Defense Agency, a new director there. He is doing an exceptionally good job. Vice Admiral Syring. He, along with his technical experts, have studied this and they have come to the conclusion that you can get better shot doctrine if you get better discrimination. He would hasten to add that if the threat gets worse, we are going to need more missiles as well, which is one of the reasons why—

Senator AYOTTE. Okay. Let me follow that, you had said in your testimony that you have to watch the threat develop from Iran. In fact, in the recent interview that Prime Minister Netanyahu gave, he said that Iran is building intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) to reach the American mainland within a few years. Of course, that is consistent with what we have heard if 2015 is a potential date when Iran will have ICBM capability or could have to reach the mainland of the United States. Is that right?

Admiral WINNEFELD. It is an intelligence assessment. It shifts all the time, but 2015 is the current number when they could potentially have a capability.

Senator AYOTTE. 2015 is the number. I guess I am a little dumbfounded why we keep saying that there is no current military requirement for an east coast missile defense site when the priority of our Nation is to protect the Homeland. As I understand it, if we went, in terms of an EIS, to production of an east coast missile defense site, it would take about 6 years, would it not?

Admiral WINNEFELD. I do not know that it would take that long. I would have to get the exact numbers for you. But I think that when the EISs are done, closely on the heels of that we would have another threat assessment that is continually going on. We would have to come to a decision fairly soon, I think, after that as to whether we would do an east coast missile field to start with.

[The information referred to follows:]

After the completion of the Environmental Impact Statement and selection of a site, it will take approximately 5 years—2 years for planning and design, and 3 years for construction. Location (e.g. construction seasons, geology, et cetera) and budget programming (i.e. military construction) will affect the schedule.

Senator AYOTTE. When I look at the possibility of 2015 ICBM capability, I think the tail is wagging the dog in terms of how long it would take to put that up. I know you said first dollar. What if

you had the second dollar of missile defense? What would you do with it?

Admiral WINNEFELD. The first thing we want to do is get the CE-2 missiles working and get them into the silos in Alaska to get the additional missiles we have talked about. That is going to take some time in and of itself to get that done.

The first dollar, as I mentioned, is the sensors so that we have this "quality has a quantity all its own" phenomenon where we have to shoot fewer missiles at the inbound threats. If we can accomplish that, that will really help us.

Then assuming if the threat continues on a trajectory where Iran develops an ICBM, we may well need an east coast missile field in order to defend this country.

Senator AYOTTE. I think what you are saying today is the second dollar.

By the way, we could do both at once if we wanted to in terms of protecting the Homeland, could we not?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Physically we could, but in terms of—

Senator AYOTTE. If we allocated the resources for you to do it.

Admiral WINNEFELD. Right. The question is is that the wisest use of the resources. It competes with everything else, but as you pointed out at the very beginning of this discussion, the highest priority is the defense of the Nation.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you both for being here. I appreciate your service to the country.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.

Thank you both. We are hopeful that we will have a speedy markup and confirmation, but that will be up to the whole committee. That would be my hope. Thank you. We thank your spouses, your wives who are here, your families again for their great support over the years.

We will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. On previous occasions you have answered the committee's policy questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the last time being in connection with your first nomination to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of these reforms changed since you testified before the committee at your last confirmation hearing?

Answer. No. I continue to believe that the Goldwater-Nichols Act as passed is effective, and I credit this legislation for making us the Joint Force we are today. However, if confirmed, I will continue to examine the lessons of the past 10 years of war to determine if there are opportunities to make us an even more effective Joint Force.

Question. In light of your experience as Chairman, do you see any need for modifications to Goldwater-Nichols? If so, what modifications do you believe would be appropriate?

Answer. I do not believe modifications to the Goldwater-Nichols Act are required at this time. Today's Joint Force reflects the commitment to integration and jointness across the Military Services established by Goldwater-Nichols in 1986. If confirmed, I will continue to examine the lessons of the past 10 years of war to de-

termine if there are needed legislative modifications or other opportunities to improve jointness.

DUTIES

Question. Based on your experience as Chairman, what recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties and functions set forth in section 152 through section 155 of title 10, U.S.C., and in regulations of the Department of Defense (DOD), that pertain to the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the organization and operation of the Joint Staff in general?

Answer. If confirmed, I do not presently foresee recommending any changes to the law. I will, however, be attuned to potential issues and opportunities for improvement that might suggest consideration for eventual changes in the law.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Other sections of law and traditional practice establish important relationships between the Chairman and other officials. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the following officials:

The Secretary of Defense.

Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff must have a close working relationship with the Secretary of Defense. Under title 10, the Chairman is assigned several duties that guide the relationship to include serving as the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman also performs other duties assigned by the Secretary of Defense.

Question. The National Security Advisor.

Answer. The National Security Advisor is a special assistant and direct advisor to the President. As the role of the Chairman is to serve as the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, and Secretary of Defense, if reconfirmed, I will continue to work closely with the National Security Advisor to ensure our efforts are synchronized across the interagency and for the purpose of implementing Presidential decisions.

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Answer. Under existing directives, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has been delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense on any matters upon which the Secretary is authorized to act. As such, the relationship of the Chairman with the Deputy Secretary is similar to that with the Secretary.

Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.

Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., and current DOD directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisers to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional areas. Within their areas, Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions. These instructions and directives are applicable to all DOD components. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to commanders of the unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Question. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense.

Answer. Under title 10, U.S.C., section 140, the DOD General Counsel serves as the chief legal officer of DOD. In general, the DOD General Counsel is responsible for overseeing legal services, establishing policy, and overseeing the DOD Standards of Conduct Program, establishing policy and positions on specific legal issues and advising on significant international law issues raised in major military operations, the DOD Law of War Program, and legality of weapons reviews. The office of the DOD General Counsel works closely with the Office of Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and communications with the combatant commanders by the DOD General Counsel are normally transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Question. The Department of Defense Inspector General.

Answer. The DOD Inspector General performs the duties, has the responsibilities, and exercises the powers specified in the Inspector General Act of 1978. If confirmed, I will continue to cooperate with and provide support to the DOD Inspector General as required.

Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Answer. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff performs the duties prescribed for him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such other duties as may be prescribed by the Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. When there is a vacancy in the Office of the Chairman or in the absence or dis-

ability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases.

Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.

Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., section 165 provides that, subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority of the combatant commanders, the Secretaries of Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of forces that are assigned to unified and specified commands. The Chairman advises the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which program recommendations and budget proposals of the Military Departments conform to priorities in strategic plans and with the priorities established for requirements of the combatant commands.

Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.

Answer. Because of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Service Chiefs are no longer involved in the operational chain of command. However, this does not diminish their importance with respect to title 10 responsibilities. Among other things, they serve two significant roles. First, they are responsible for the organization, training, and equipping of their respective Services. Without the full support and cooperation of the Service Chiefs, no combatant commander can assure the preparedness of his assigned forces for missions directed by the Secretary of Defense and the President. Second, as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs are advisers to the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense as the senior uniformed leaders of their respective Services. In this function, they play a critically important role in shaping military advice and developing our joint capabilities. If reconfirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Service Chiefs to fulfill warfighting and operational requirements.

Question. The combatant commanders.

Answer. The combatant commanders fight our wars and conduct military operations around the world. By law, and to the extent directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman serves as spokesman for the combatant commanders and is charged with overseeing their activities. He provides a vital link between the combatant commanders and other elements of DOD, and as directed by the President, may serve as the means of communication between the combatant commanders and the President or Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the combatant commanders to enable their warfighting capability and to provide support.

Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.

Answer. The Chief of the National Guard heads a joint activity of DOD and is the senior uniformed National Guard officer responsible for formulating, developing and coordinating all policies, programs, and plans affecting more than half a million Army and Air National Guard personnel. Appointed by the President, he serves as principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on National Guard matters. He is also the principal adviser to the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army and the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force on all National Guard issues. As National Guard Bureau Chief, he serves as the department's official channel of communication with the Governors and Adjutants General. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau has the specific responsibility of addressing matters involving non-Federalized National Guard forces in support of homeland defense and civil support missions.

Question. The Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan.

Answer. Although the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council, he is not in the chain of command of the Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A). The Commander, USFOR-A reports to the Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), who, in turn, reports directly to the Secretary of Defense. This reporting relationship is prescribed in title 10, U.S.C., section 164(d)(1). The Commander, USFOR-A does not have a formal command relationship with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but he coordinates with him through the Commander, CENTCOM on a regular basis. The Commander, USFOR-A sends his advice and opinions on military operations to the Commander, CENTCOM, who, in turn, presents them to the Chairman.

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. What do you consider to be the most significant challenges you have faced in your first term as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Answer. We are experiencing a period of unprecedented uncertainty and multiple transitions that daily test our ability to meet our obligations, both in the security environment and across the Joint Force. We face a difficult fiscal correction to restore the economic foundation of our power. At the same time, we are transitioning from a decade of war to a contingency footing in response to an uncertain and dangerous security landscape. Importantly, we are transitioning a generation of veterans, as many in the Joint Force return to the homefront and their communities. Across the force, the issues of sexual assault, veteran suicide, traumatic brain injury/mental health are among our most challenging. In the security environment, continued operations and transition in Afghanistan, the crisis in Syria, and deterring global provocation are among the most complex national security priorities we have faced. The Nation is far from being immune from coercion in cyberspace. This said, I continue to believe that we have it within us to lead through this critical and defining period, and remain a strong global leader and reliable ally.

Question. What new challenges do you expect to face if you are confirmed for a second term?

Answer. We face a series of tough choices moving forward, given our fiscal reality and the increasingly unpredictable security environment. These will include, but are certainly not limited to, conducting a responsible transition in Afghanistan, responding to the dynamic and persistent threat from violent extremist organizations, deterring increasingly bold provocation from North Korea and Iran, and detecting and defeating cyber and other asymmetric attacks against the homeland. We are less ready today than we were 1 year ago, and our readiness continues to degrade. If current trends continue, our military power will become less sustainable, and therefore less credible. In this context, my challenge is to continue to provide our civilian leadership with realistic options and risk assessments that balance current obligations, future contingencies, and the reality of declining resources. Internally, I will face the challenge of restoring the versatility of the Joint Force at an affordable cost. I will need to lead the effort to renew commitment to our profession by making sure we value character as much as competence.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer. We can only address these challenges together—jointly, across the inter-agency, and in partnership with Congress. If confirmed, I will work to strengthen the relationships—and specifically the bonds of trust—that have allowed us to make important progress in my first term. This trust permeates all levels. Our men and women on the front lines must trust that they will be the best trained, led, and equipped force on the battlefield. Our military families must trust that we will keep faith at home. The Services and combatant commands must trust their views will be fairly and accurately represented within internal JCS deliberations and at all levels of policy debate. Our allies and partners must trust in our sustained global leadership. The President, this Congress, and the American people must trust that their military will meet its sacred obligation to keep our Nation immune from coercion.

PRIORITIES

Question. Recognizing that challenges, anticipated and unforeseen, will drive your priorities to a substantial degree, if confirmed, what other priorities, beyond those associated with the major challenges you identified in the section above, would you set for your second term as Chairman?

Answer. If reconfirmed, I will continue to emphasize the focus areas I established in my 2012 Strategic Direction to the Joint Force to achieve our national security objectives today, build the Joint Force for 2020, renew commitment in our profession of arms, and keep faith with our military family. To do this, we will need to get four things right. The first is to achieve strategic solvency—this means establishing security priorities, aligning our aims and abilities, and balancing current and long-term requirements. Second, I will remain focused on keeping the Joint Force ready and balanced. To do so, we must restore readiness lost due to sequester, and ensure that future cuts do not undermine our ability to send our troops to war with the best training, leadership, and equipment. Third, we must prioritize investment in our people. This means valuing and strengthening character as much as competence, reinvesting in learning and leadership, advancing equal and ethical treatment for all of our servicemembers, and allowing no quarter for sexual violence in our ranks. Lastly, I will focus on maintaining the bond of trust between our men and women in uniform and the public they serve.

CHAIN OF COMMAND

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Section 163(a) of title 10 further provides that the President may direct communications to combatant commanders be transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and may assign duties to the Chairman to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in performing their command function.

Do you believe that these provisions facilitate a clear and effective chain of command?

Answer. I believe that the current chain of command provides a clear and effective means for employing our Nation's military.

Question. Are there circumstances in which you believe it is appropriate for U.S. military forces to be under the operational command or control of an authority outside the chain of command established under title 10, U.S.C.?

Answer. Military forces should normally operate under the chain of command established under section 162 of title 10, U.S.C. However, an exception to that chain of command may be appropriate for certain sensitive operations. The military units supporting such an operation are still governed by the laws of armed conflict and, as an administrative matter, the military personnel remain accountable to the military chain of command, including for matters of discipline under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Only the President may approve such an exception, as also recognized in section 162. If confirmed, I will provide the President with my best advice regarding any operation where an exception to the established chain of command may be appropriate.

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the authorities and agreements which are in place to allow U.S. military personnel to carry out missions under the authorities contained in title 50, U.S.C.? Do you believe any modifications to these authorities are necessary?

Answer. As noted above, consistent with title 50 of the U.S.C., the President may authorize departments, agencies, or entities of the U.S. Government to participate in or support intelligence activities. While I believe that all military forces should normally operate under a military chain of command, there are authorities and agreements that allow exceptions to this chain of command for title 50 operations. In some cases, the Secretary of Defense may approve this exception and in other cases only the President has approval authority. I believe the current authorities are sufficient to facilitate DOD's providing appropriate support under title 50 while ensuring necessary oversight.

ADVICE OF THE SERVICE CHIEFS, COMBATANT COMMANDERS, AND CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

Question. Section 163 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the spokesman for the combatant commanders, especially on the operational requirements of their commands. Section 151 of title 10 provides for the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit their advice or opinion, in disagreement with or in addition to the advice or opinion of the Chairman, and requires the Chairman to provide that advice at the same time that he presents his own advice to the President, National Security Council, or Secretary of Defense.

Having served as Chairman, what changes to section 151 or section 163, if any, do you think may be necessary to ensure that the views of the individual Service Chiefs, combatant commanders, Chief of the National Guard Bureau are presented and considered?

Answer. I see no benefit in changing section 151 or section 163. Section 151 and section 163 embody the spirit and letter of Goldwater-Nichols, a foundation of our Joint Force. I have made it a priority to hear from and be representative of the views of the combatant commanders and the JCS. I use their insights and collective experience to inform my best military advice. I recognize my responsibility and the value in my representing the views of the JCS and our senior commanders, even when they may vary.

SECURITY STRATEGIES AND GUIDANCE

Question. How would you characterize current trends in the range and diversity of threats we face today to national security?

Answer. The security environment is more uncertain and dangerous. It can be characterized as complex due to an increasing number of strategically significant actors, dynamic due to rapid rates of change, and uncertain due to shifting nodes of

power and influence and an unclear U.S. fiscal and budget environment. Further, the proliferation of advanced technologies is resulting in middleweight militaries and non-state actors with unprecedented destructive and disruptive capabilities, particularly in the areas of cyber, terrorism, and missiles.

Question. In your view, is the Nation's defense strategy appropriate for the threats we face today and could face in the coming decades?

Answer. The strategy as articulated in the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, is necessary and appropriate to safeguard the Nation against threats to its interests. However I am increasingly concerned about our ability to properly resource the strategy and maintain the readiness of the Joint Force due to continued fiscal uncertainty and constraints. I have documented the specific concerns in my classified Chairman's Risk Assessment submitted in February, 2013.

Question. The Defense Strategic Guidance issued January 2012 took into account a \$487 billion reduction in defense resources.

With the additional \$500 billion in cuts to DOD as a result of sequestration is the Defense Strategic Guidance still valid?

Answer. The Department is still in the process of determining what revisions might be necessary to align ends, ways, and means given the additional \$500 billion in cuts. The sequester was not expected or desired. The answer will depend a great deal on how the cuts are taken year by year (slope), the flexibility granted to the Department by Congress, and Congress' willingness to give the Department more scope for politically unpopular changes to infrastructure, benefits, and compensation.

Question. At the issuance of the Defense Strategic Guidance you said, "We will always provide a range of options for our Nation . . ."

What options do you lose or what options are significantly altered and in what way if the \$500 billion in cuts is enacted?

Answer. We will continue to provide a range of options. But, they may not be as robust or timely as they might have been, and they will entail a higher level of risk to the Nation and to the forces committed. In essence, we will be able to do fewer things simultaneously, and new contingencies may force us to take risk in other regions or for other security threats. The full implications of reduced option are unlikely to be appreciated until an unexpected contingency or strategic surprise occurs.

Question. What changes, if any, should be considered?

Answer. The recent Strategic Choices and Management Review affirmed the fundamental soundness of the Defense Strategic Guidance. However, it makes clear that we need to further prioritize missions within the context of a continued rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. It also indicated that we are at risk of strategy insolvency if sequestration is implemented as currently prescribed by law. That is, there is a point at which a steep drawdown makes it difficult for us to meet the current and expected demands being placed on our military.

Question. In your view, is our broad defense strategy and current establishment optimally structured, with the roles and missions of the military departments appropriately distributed, and U.S. forces properly armed, trained, and equipped to meet security challenges the Nation faces today and into the next decade?

Answer. These are broad, overarching issues that the Department traditionally examines through its Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The recent Strategic Choices Management Review did, however, provide insight to changes that will need to be made in terms of capability and capacity to meet future security challenges. As a consequence of fiscal constraints, we are already losing readiness that will cost us more to restore. Therefore, I am concerned that our Joint Force will be increasingly less ready for future challenges unless we get budget certainty and flexibility.

Question. In March you said, "Recognizing longer-term uncertainty, I've also begun to reassess what our military strategy should be, as well as institutional reforms necessary to remain an effective fighting force." On the topic of Strategic Choices and Management Review, Secretary Hagel said, "There will be no rollout of any grand plan on this."

Will there be any changes in strategy to account for sequestration?

Answer. The Department is still in the process of determining what revisions might be necessary to align ends, ways, and means given the additional \$500 billion in cuts. I concur with what the Secretary has stated. We still have considerable work ahead of us to determine the extent to which we have to change the Defense Strategic Guidance. That said, the Strategic Choices and Management Review indicated that the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific remains sound, but that we may need to further prioritize missions.

Question. Do you feel that we have passed or are approaching the line where military strategy is driven by resources rather than being based on objectives and threats?

Answer. Strategy is always informed by the resources available. To best protect the Nation, we must achieve the best possible balance of ends, ways, and means while assessing and mitigating risk. I am concerned that sequester in its current form prevents us from being able to achieve proper balance, pushing us closer to the line where our military strategy is out of balance with the resources needed to achieve it. If so, our military strategy will take some additional risk in achieving objectives, in the ways we achieve results, and in the way we apply resources. It is too early to determine if we will achieve the right balance or if we have crossed the line—but we will watch this carefully.

Question. What will the indicators be if we cross that line?

Answer. Unready forces, misaligned global posture, inability to keep pace with emerging threats, reduced security cooperation, and failure to maintain a high quality All-Volunteer Force are all becoming increasingly likely the longer sequestration in its current form persists. I am especially concerned about the All-Volunteer Force. We presently have the most seasoned, professional force in history. Budget reductions, inflexibility, and uncertainty will increasingly subject them to lower readiness, less education and fewer training events.

Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to the structure, roles, and missions of the defense establishment?

Answer. The upcoming QDR will enable us to look at these issues in a deliberate way. I will provide my best advice to the Secretary during the review and inform Congress as to my recommendations at the earliest opportunity. The lack of certainty in the budget environment makes it more difficult to make hard decisions about structures, roles, and missions, and more difficult to understand the impacts of those decisions.

STRATEGIC RISK

Question. Do you believe that the current and planned pace and scope of operations in Afghanistan in conjunction with current and planned end-strength and force structure reductions create increased levels of strategic risk for the United States based on the current or potential future lack of available trained and ready forces for other contingencies?

Answer. The answer depends somewhat on the President's decision on post-2014 presence in Afghanistan and on whether sequestration takes effect as current prescribed by law. Generally, end-strength and force structure reductions could entail greater military risk to any mission, during execution of future contingencies, as force reductions occur.

Question. If so, how would you characterize the increase in strategic risk in terms of the military's ability to mobilize, prepare, deploy, and employ a force for a new contingency? In your view, is this level of risk acceptable?

Answer. In an unclassified forum, I am reluctant to get into specifics on military risk. In general, a smaller Joint Force would become more reliant on rapid Reserve mobilization and on maintaining high readiness levels for its Active Forces. Implementing sequestration as currently prescribed by law will make it impossible to maintain the levels of readiness we have today for current contingencies, much less to make the investments needed to employ the force for more difficult future contingencies. The concerns expressed in the 32-star letter to the committee last year about the impacts of sequestration on readiness still stand. If anything, I am more worried today.

Question. What is the impact of the decision to decrease U.S. forces committed to Afghanistan on our ability to meet our security obligations in other parts of the world?

Answer. As we draw down the forces in Afghanistan, we intend to reset the force as well as provide for a greater range of options for contingencies in other parts of the world. This approach will become increasingly untenable if sequestration as currently prescribed by law persists.

Question. How and over what periods of time, if at all, will reductions to Army and Marine Corps end strength increase or aggravate this risk?

Answer. Reductions to land force end strength will increase risk based on our decreased ability to deter conflicts and to shape conditions overseas through Army and Marine security cooperation activities. Reduced end strength means that we will be able to "turn" the force less frequently, and under certain circumstances we may have to extend forces beyond the optimum and sustainable boots-on-the-ground dwell ratio.

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's recent announcement to inactivate 13 of its 45 brigade combat teams by the end of 2017?

Answer. First, it's important to note that these inactivations have nothing to do with sequestration. The inactivation of the 13 brigade combat teams will reduce that part of the force that the Army actually increased over the last 10 years to fight our wars. With the planned drawdown of these forces, and the conclusion of two long-term stability operations, we can manage our strategy with the reductions the Army has planned.

Question. If confirmed, what additional actions would you take, if any, to reduce or mitigate this strategic risk?

Answer. Military strategies consist of ends, ways, means, and risk. "Ends" are goals or objectives, "ways" describe how we intend to meet those objectives, and "means" are the resources available. If we cannot accept more risk, and the "means" are reduced, then we can only reduce our "ends", or change the "ways". Possible examples of changes to "ways" include adjusting our operational plans or global posture, modifying our operational concepts, reducing the scope and nature of the missions we take on, requesting new authorities, shifting the burden onto current alliances or undertaking new security cooperation mechanisms with current or new partners. Possible examples of changes to "ends" include lengthening the time it takes to resolve various contingencies and changing expectations about the speed with which we commit forces or the number of casualties we are prepared to accept. We could also reduce the scope of objectives in a particular region or contingency, or change the priorities of objectives and contingencies worldwide. The depth, breadth, inflexibility, and uncertainty of the budget reductions currently associated with sequestration will make any of these changes both more necessary and more difficult.

Question. Upon issuance of the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, you said "We do accept some risks in this strategy as all strategies must."

With the benefit of hindsight, what is your assessment of the areas where we assume the greatest strategic risk under the current Defense Strategic Guidance due to cuts of \$487 billion?

Answer. The recently completed Strategic Choices Management Review outlined the magnitude of the challenges we could face and the difficulty of the decisions involved. But we have yet to make those choices or complete the staff level assessments for a fulsome answer. It did, however, indicate that the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific remains fundamentally sound. More directly, my sense is that the Nation will have a military that is increasingly unready, steadily losing technology overmatch to possible challengers, that is smaller but similar in terms of platforms and capabilities, and that will have an eroded global presence and posture. It is a military that will be viewed with increasing concern by our longtime allies and with increasing satisfaction by our potential adversaries. It is a military that will offer our civilian leaders fewer options and higher opportunity costs when they decide to employ military force. I will provide additional specifics in my next classified Chairman's Risk Assessment related to impacts of sequestration. But the present year-to-year magnitude of the \$487 billion cut cannot be found within our existing budget without taking unprecedented action. Many of these actions that are simultaneously prevented by other laws, particularly with respect to excess infrastructure, compensation and pay, and procurement, as well as changing the balance between Guard/Reserve/Active Forces, adjusting the scope and scale of ground force reduction and allowing the retirement of unnecessary platforms. This is only a partial list.

Question. What are the additional risks associated with cutting an additional \$500 billion under sequestration?

Answer. Please see previous answers, which outline the additional risks of fewer options and gaps in or security due to a force that will be out of balance and less ready than it should be.

CHAIRMAN'S RISK ASSESSMENT

Question. In your 2013 risk assessment, you identified for the first time six National Security Interests that were derived from four enduring interests contained in the 2010 National Security Strategy.

Please describe your rationale for assessing risk against these new interests that have not been incorporated into an updated national security strategy?

Answer. The four enduring interests in the National Security Strategy provided guidance for the entire U.S. Government, including the diplomatic, information, and economic instruments of power. The six national security interests derive from these and are focused explicitly on the military contribution to the four enduring interests. I have found this construct to be useful tool when articulating specific risks and

prioritizing our military missions. They help us think through the options for using force and when/where to take risk and expend resources.

Question. Your April 2013 assessment identified several areas of broad and significant risk to national security as a result of current budget issues.

How would you characterize the trends of risk in these areas (whether they are increasing or decreasing)?

Answer. In an unclassified forum I am reluctant to go into much detail. Generally, those strategic risk trends have not changed since March.

As I have mentioned elsewhere, I see increasing strategic risk associated with sequestration as currently prescribed by law.

I will make note of any changes in my next risk assessment.

Question. What is your current assessment of the risk to combatant commanders in their ability to successfully execute their operational plans?

Answer. In my latest Chairman's Risk Assessment (CRA), I identified and characterized the ability of combatant commanders to successfully execute their operational plans and their ongoing missions. The CRA also included the combatant commanders' assessments of their most pressing challenges. In an unclassified forum I am reluctant to go into detail, however, I will say that all military operations entail risk, but we are committed to providing the President a range of options given any threat to U.S. interests.

TRANSFORMATION

Question. Military "transformation" has been a broad objective of the Armed Forces since the end of the Cold War.

In your view, what does military "transformation" mean?

Answer. Military transformation is really about adapting the Joint Force to meet future security needs. We must be able to adapt to rapid changes in technology, the global security environment, and our adversaries' capabilities. Uncertainty is the only thing certain today. We must be flexible in order to deter and defeat threats at every point along the spectrum of conflict, from asymmetric threats to a near-peer competitor. If confirmed, I will maintain the development of Joint Force 2020 as a focus area of my chairmanship, in order to ensure that our Nation's security is never uncertain.

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the progress made by the Department, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, toward transforming the Armed Forces?

Answer. My 2012 Strategic Direction to the Joint Force identifies the development of Joint Force 2020 as one of the four focus areas of my chairmanship, and we've made progress in the past 2 years. We're working to advance interdependence, integrate new and specialized capabilities, promote versatility, and preserve readiness by valuing quality over quantity. For example, we've introduced the Joint Operational Access Concept to synchronize our efforts across all five domains—land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace. This concept provides a framework to ensure the Joint Force remains survivable and successful despite growth of anti-access and area-denial threats. We're also moving forward with the Joint Information Environment, implementing innovative industry-supported efficiencies across the Department to further enhance mission effectiveness and cyber security. Ultimately, my aim is a versatile, responsive, decisive, and affordable Joint Force. If reconfirmed, I look forward to working with you to achieve this.

Question. If confirmed, what goals, if any, would you establish during your next term as Chairman regarding military transformation in the future?

Answer. If confirmed, I will maintain as a priority the development of a superior Joint Force in 2020. Transformation during this period of fiscal constraint poses challenges for us, but also opportunities. We will be selective in the capabilities we reconstitute as we draw down in Afghanistan, and ensure that lessons learned over a decade of war are retained. We may get smaller, but we can be increasingly versatile and interdependent. We will be regionally postured, but globally networked. We will integrate new capabilities and leverage cutting-edge technologies that will provide a decisive advantage as we adapt to new ways of war. The economic situation demands that the future force be affordable, but keeping our military the best led, trained, and equipped force in the world is a non-negotiable imperative.

Question. Do you believe the Joint Staff should play a larger role in transformation? If so, in what ways?

Answer. The Joint Staff is contributing significantly to the transformation of the Joint Force in a closely coordinated effort with the Services and combatant commands. The Joint Staff's current focus is on concept, strategy, and doctrine develop-

ment, and establishing joint requirements to address gaps in capability. I believe this is the correct role.

MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY

Question. The 2010 report of the QDR provided that military forces shall be sized to prevail in ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the war against al Qaeda as well as for conducting foundational activities that prevent and deter attacks or the emergence of other threats. The QDR report particularly emphasizes the requirement for improved capabilities in key mission areas such as counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations, as well as building the security capacity of partner states. In contrast, the Defense Strategic Guidance of January 2012 asserts that the United States will no longer size its forces for long duration stability operations.

Understanding that the Department is currently embarked on a Strategic Choices and Management Review that is intended to inform the 2014 QDR, what is your understanding and assessment of the current ability of each Service to provide capabilities to support these mission requirements and, if confirmed, what changes, if any, would you pursue to improve these capabilities?

Answer. The Services are currently able to provide forces to support the missions identified within the Defense Strategic Guidance. Resource constraints, however, are eroding readiness and extending the timeline by which forces can be made available to fulfill combatant commanders' requests and respond to emerging requirements. We are reexamining the plans and scenarios that drive the size and capabilities of our force to ensure they are informed by the realities of our fiscal and operating environment. We will continue to closely manage the way we use our forces as they conduct day-to-day operations. Further, new fiscal guidance will ensure that the Department invests in those capabilities most needed to defend the Nation against likely future mission requirements.

Question. In your opinion, can the 2014 QDR be conducted without an updated National Security Strategy, which is required by law to be submitted annually?

Answer. Existing guidance is sufficient to inform my statutory requirement to contribute to the QDR. The enduring interests articulated in the 2010 National Security Strategy as well as the six national security interests outlined in the Chairman's Risk Assessment provide a consistent framework within which to conduct the next QDR. If national priorities shift in any future NSS, we will adapt our strategic documents and processes such as the QDR.

Question. Are you committed to meet the statutory date for delivery of a 2014 QDR to Congress?

Answer. Yes, in accordance with title 10, U.S.C., section 118, we plan to meet the statutory date to deliver a 2014 QDR to Congress.

FUTURE ARMY

Question. The Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) of January 2012 articulated the need to shift strategic emphasis toward the Asia-Pacific region while continuing to engage in the Middle East.

Do you agree that future high-end military operations, as envisioned by the DSG, will primarily be naval and air engagements such that the Army will have difficulty justifying the size, structure, and cost of the number and equipment its combat formations?

Answer. America needs a capable and decisive Army. The size and structure of the Army will continue to adapt to the evolving security environment. Our most recent experience with war suggests that we cannot predict where or when we will be asked to fight. A global superpower needs to retain sufficient capability, capability, and readiness to win across all domains. As Chairman, my focus is on ensuring that the Joint Force as a whole is capable of executing decisive operations in support of our national interests, regardless of geography or the theater of operations.

Question. In your view, what are the most important considerations or criteria for aligning the Army's size, structure, and cost with strategy and resources?

Answer. Our Nation needs an Army that can conduct full spectrum operations as part of the Joint Force. It must be appropriately sized, structured, and equipped to in order to defend the Nation and defeat our adversaries. The Defense Strategic Guidance deemphasized long duration stability operations and reinforced the importance of defeating and denying the objectives of an adversary. The Army is realigning and resizing consistent with this guidance.

Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to properly align the Army's size and structure with the requirements of security strategies and the likely availability of resources?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support the ongoing realignment and restructuring of BCTs. These measures enhance the ability of the Joint Force to provide a full range of options to the President that meets diverse threats in an uncertain environment.

SEQUESTRATION

Question. Sequestration requires defense cuts totaling \$37 billion over the last half of the current fiscal year.

What is your assessment of how the Department is managing these cuts in the current fiscal year?

Answer. The cuts required by sequestration in fiscal year 2013 are a self-inflicted wound to our national security. We have lost readiness that will take time and money to restore. We are out of balance due to the magnitude, mechanism, and pace of budget cuts. While the Department is shifting funds where possible to minimize the impact on warfighting capabilities and critical military readiness, sequestration to date has resulted in cuts to training, exercises, and deployments, civilian furloughs and hiring freeze, reduced base maintenance, disruption to modernization, and morale challenges. We are leading through these cuts by doing all we can to protect funding to our deployed forces, our nuclear enterprise, and our warrior and family support programs.

Question. What are your views on the impact these cuts are having on readiness?

Answer. We have lost readiness that will take time and money to restore. The impact of sequestration and other budget constraints are beginning to emerge in unit level readiness reports. The effects caused by the cancellation of large force exercises and deferred maintenance are harder to measure, but will also impose significant strain on long-term institutional readiness. The combined effect of reduced training cycles, deferred maintenance, and the pace of current operations is damaging to both readiness and morale. If current trends continue, recovery from several months of sequestration will take years. Eventually, our readiness problem will become a recruitment and retention problem.

Question. The fiscal year 2014 budget request and the fiscal year 2014 budget resolutions passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives all assume that sequestration will be avoided in fiscal year 2014. It appears possible that sequestration will not be avoided in fiscal year 2014 and DOD will have to cut \$52 billion from its budget request. You have been involved in developing the most workable approach to meeting the \$52 billion savings requirement established by the Budget Control Act.

What is your assessment of the Department's proposals for managing the additional \$52 billion in cuts in fiscal year 2014?

Answer. The abrupt, deep cuts caused by the Budget Control Act caps in fiscal year 2014 will force DOD to make non-strategic choices. If sequester continues, the Department will have to make sharp cuts with far reaching consequences, including limiting combat power, reducing readiness, and undermining the national security interests of the United States. To limit adverse consequences, we need the certainty of a predictable funding stream, time to balance force structure, modernization, compensation, and readiness, and the flexibility to make trade-offs. The Secretary directed a Strategic Choices and Management Review to develop options that would accommodate these large cuts, but none of these options fully avoid an increase in risk to our national security.

Question. What are your views on the impact these cuts will have on readiness?

Answer. While DOD would attempt to protect the operation and maintenance funding most closely related to training and readiness, full protection will be impossible. Therefore, military training and readiness would remain at the currently degraded levels or, in some cases, would continue to decline in a sequester-level cut of \$52 billion in fiscal year 2014. Ultimately, ongoing cuts will threaten our obligation to send only the best trained, led and equipped forces into harm's way.

Question. What are your views on the impact these cuts will have to military capabilities?

Answer. Given the difficulty of cutting fiscal year 2014 military personnel funding, DOD would be forced to disproportionately reduce funding for operations and maintenance; procurement; research, development, test, and evaluation; and military construction. Funding for hundreds of program line items, large and small, will be significantly reduced. We will buy fewer ships, planes, ground vehicles, satellites, and other weapons systems. Cuts in funding for research and development will ulti-

mately slow discovery and advancement, eroding the technological superiority enjoyed by U.S. forces and translating into less desirable military outcomes in future conflicts.

READINESS FUNDING

Question. Given the reductions in readiness funding, what is your assessment of the current readiness of the Armed Forces to meet national security requirements across the full spectrum of military operations?

Answer. Despite a decade of strenuous demands on the force, we remain sufficiently ready to conduct current operations. The Joint Force faced the simultaneous challenge of reconstituting the force and focusing on a broad spectrum of operations prior to sequestration. Now, we must prioritize the readiness of our deployed and next to deploy forces at the expense of reconstituting the majority of the non-deployed force. This approach is unsustainable and cannibalizes longer-term reconstitution. Simply put, sequester hinders our ability to generate forces for contingency operations. If nothing changes, most operational units will have readiness deficiencies by fiscal year 2014. This lost readiness will cost more and take longer to recover.

Question. What is your assessment of the near term trend in the readiness of the Armed Forces?

Answer. We have curtailed operations, maintenance, and training across the force because of sequestration cuts. Specific actions by Service include:

- Army—80 percent of ground forces training will be curtailed for the remainder of fiscal year 2013. Units will train to just squad-level proficiency. Half of all third- and fourth-quarter depot maintenance has been cancelled.
- Air Force—12 Active Duty combat aviation squadrons stood down.
- Navy—Ship deployments have been reduced. Steaming days and training opportunities for nondeployed ships as well as flying hours for nondeployed air wings have also been reduced, resulting in at least one air wing being at minimum safety levels by the end of fiscal year 2013.
- Marine Corps—Efforts remain focused on meeting near-term commitments for deployed and next-to-deploy forces. We are concerned about the availability of amphibious ships.

We are beginning to see the effect of these actions in unit level readiness reports and expect that trend to continue as time reveals the full impacts of sequestration. We are prioritizing the readiness of our deployed and next to deploy forces, but the decreased readiness of the nondeployed force and damage to production and training pipelines make this unsustainable.

Question. Given the impact of sequestration, do you support the additional sourcing of base defense funds to pay for unforeseen requirements in support of overseas contingency operations?

Answer. While under sequestration, I would support a source of funding in the base budget to pay for emergent contingency operations. We will inevitably face new contingencies as operations wind down in Afghanistan and associated funding for overseas contingency operations decreases. Without such relief in this or in the form of a supplemental, the Services will mortgage readiness to absorb the costs of these operations.

Question. How critical is it to find a solution to sequestration given the impacts we have already seen to DOD readiness in fiscal year 2013?

Answer. It is critical. I am deeply concerned about the loss of readiness across the Department. Lost readiness take longer and costs more to recover. It foreclosed options and compounds risk. We are repeating the mistakes of past drawdowns. The impact of sequestration and other budget constraints are beginning to emerge in unit level readiness reports. The longer term effects caused by the cancellation of large force exercises and deferred maintenance are harder to measure, but will impose significant strain on long-term institutional readiness.

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the methods currently used for estimating the funding needed for the maintenance of military equipment?

Answer. Requirements drive equipment maintenance based on factors that include force structure, operations tempo, schedule, nature and use of the equipment, and safety. The Services' detailed maintenance plans balance operational availability with maintenance requirements. Perturbations in the budget process and funding uncertainties have effects across the maintenance plan for months and even years.

Question. Given the backlog in equipment maintenance over the last several years, do you believe that we need an increased investment to reduce this backlog?

Answer. The Services have successfully managed their equipment maintenance backlogs in recent years. But funding shortfalls from successive continuing resolutions and sequestration in fiscal year 2013 have culminated in more depot maintenance deferrals across all Services. If sequestration continues, this backlog will grow, causing reduced availability rates, less reliable systems, and platforms not reaching their intended service life. We need budget certainty and flexibility to best equip the Services to achieve force readiness over time.

Question. How important is it to reduce the materiel maintenance backlog in order to improve readiness?

Answer. Very. Force readiness includes materiel. The remedy for the accumulating maintenance backlog is the same as the remedy for force readiness—time and money.

Question. How important is it to receive Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding 2 or 3 years after the end of combat operations in order to ensure all equipment is reset?

Answer. Very important. OCO has been a necessary funding source to conduct ongoing operations and reset equipment to prepare for future operations. Equipment consumed in Iraq and Afghanistan remains relevant to unit readiness. OCO beyond the end of combat operations will help restore the readiness required to support the National Security Strategy. Lack of OCO for reset will delay the Services' ability to meet readiness requirements in the out years.

Question. In years past, we have based additional readiness funding decisions on the Service Chief unfunded priorities lists. However, in recent years those lists have either been nonexistent or have arrived too late in our markup process.

Do you agree to provide unfunded priorities lists to Congress in a timely manner beginning with the fiscal year 2015 budget request?

Answer. The provision of unfunded requirements lists to Congress is a long-standing practice. Given the budget uncertainty, it is difficult to project whether and when we might submit requirements for 2015. Should the Services have such requirements, the existing statutory framework provides the opportunity for the Joint Chiefs to make recommendations that are responsive to Congress after first informing the Secretary of Defense.

DEFENSE ACQUISITION REFORM

Question. Congress enacted the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA), without a dissenting vote in either House. WSARA is designed to ensure that new defense acquisition programs start on a sound footing, to avoid the high cost of fixing problems late in the acquisition process.

Having now served as the Chairman, what are your views regarding WSARA and the need for improvements in the Defense acquisition process?

Answer. The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 has been instrumental in ensuring new defense programs start on a sound footing to avoid the high cost of fixing problems late in the acquisition process. It also jump-started a culture within the Department focused on the continuous improvement of our acquisition processes and their associated outcomes, which I strongly endorse.

Question. If confirmed, how would you improve all three aspects of the acquisition process (requirements, acquisition, and budgeting)?

Answer. There is an ongoing effort within the Department to continuously improve all aspects of the acquisition process. As recently as January of 2012 a new revision of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) was published, and we are currently working with the Office of Secretary of Defense to revise DOD 5000.02, "Operation of the Defense Acquisition System." DOD 5000.02 will incorporate the initiatives outlined in Dr. Carter's 2010 "Better Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending (BPP 1.0)" memo and Mr. Frank Kendall's 2012 initiative entitled "Better Buying Power 2.0: Continuing the Pursuit for Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending", all of which I strongly support, along with the improvements instituted in the new JCIDS instruction and manual.

Question. Do you believe that the current investment budget for major systems is affordable given increasing historic cost growth in major systems, costs of current operations, and asset recapitalization?

Answer. I am concerned that costs in acquisition and procurement will continue their historic growth profiles, further exacerbating shortfalls under a sequestered budget. We will continue to scrub our processes, including our warfighter requirements, to ensure they are aligned with strategy and available resources. But, it will likely be necessary to reduce some investments for major systems under full sequestration.

Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to address this issue and guard against the potential impact of weapon systems cost growth?

Answer. I will continue to partner with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to improve our inter-related processes, and work closely with our combatant commanders and our title 10 Service providers to mitigate cost growth impacts of and on our highest priority capability investments. I will be an advocate for major systems that provide versatility at an affordable and sustainable cost.

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you propose, if any, to ensure that requirements are realistic and prioritized?

Answer. The improvements put into place in the latest revision of the JCIDS process have been very effective. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) is now more focused on weapon system cost, schedule, and performance, and uses greater analytical rigor to reach recommendations. The JCIDS process and the associated responsibilities of the JROC, Services, and the JROC advisors in support of the JCIDS process will continue to be refined throughout my tenure as Chairman.

CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD

Question. According to widely published reports, the number of U.S. contractor employees in Afghanistan often exceeds the number of U.S. military deployed in there. This was also the case during the operations in Iraq.

Do you believe that DOD has become too dependent on contractor support for military operations?

Answer. They have been part of our military force since the Revolutionary War. Contractors function in various roles and are a force multiplier. They provide rapid expansion of manpower when needed to fill critical gaps. The use of local contractors can be an important element of military objectives. With that in mind, I think we need to continuously evaluate the costs and necessity of contractors to make sure contractor support is properly structured for a period of fiscal correction.

Question. What risks do you see in the Department's reliance on such contractor support? What steps do you believe the Department should take to mitigate such risk?

Answer. We are in the process of analyzing lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan and updating doctrine to ensure that we can properly target capabilities that are optimum for contracting support. Contracting provides capabilities the military may not have readily available, but it is critical that we maintain effective oversight and introduce better cost controls.

Question. Do you believe the Department is appropriately organized and staffed to effectively manage contractors on the battlefield?

Answer. Yes. However, oversight is critical to ensure contracts are properly executed. We are in much better shape today than we were when the wars began over 10 years ago. We will continue to apply the lessons learned to improve our processes. We have expanded personnel two-fold and have a roadmap to move us to an appropriately staffed and organized contracting capability. I will remain focused on this challenge as we make resource tradeoffs in the sequestration process.

Question. What steps if any do you believe the Department should take to improve its management of contractors on the battlefield?

Answer. The Department will continue to mature the contingency capabilities of our contracting agencies and to provide dedicated unit contracting specialists for oversight. We will continue to adjust doctrine based on lessons learned and maintain our focus on training and education for this critical military capability.

TACTICAL FIGHTER PROGRAMS

Question. Perhaps the largest modernization effort that we will face over the next several years is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program to modernize our tactical aviation forces with fifth generation tactical aircraft equipped with stealth technology.

Based on current and projected threats, what are your current views on the requirements for and timing of these programs?

Answer. Dominance in the air is essential to the success of our Joint Force. Since 1953, our ground forces have not been attacked from the air by our adversaries. We cannot let any other nation achieve parity with the United States in the ability to control the air. The projected threats from our adversaries include programs to build advanced aircraft that will challenge our current capabilities in the coming years. The F-35, which will replace several older generation aircraft across the Joint Force, will continue to ensure our air dominance well into the future.

Question. What is your current assessment of whether the restructuring of the JSF program that we have seen over the past 2 years will be sufficient to avoid having to make major adjustments in either cost or schedule in the future?

Answer. The Department is committed to the JSF program and the acquisition adjustments we have made over the past 2 years. But, budget constraints and uncertainty may impact the program. To date, the F-35 has flown more than 3,000 flights totaling more than 5,000 flight hours and is largely tracking to our re-baselined plan. The program's estimate for major milestone events remains aligned to the 2012 acquisition baseline. Flight tests are also progressing close to plan.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. Do you agree that the current Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, with interceptors deployed in Alaska and California, provides defense of the entire United States—including the east coast—against missile threats from both North Korea and Iran, and do you have confidence in that system?

Answer. Yes, I am confident that the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, supported by other deployed and available ballistic missile defense capabilities, can protect the United States from both a limited North Korean and Iranian long-range ballistic missile attack.

Question. On March 15, 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced a series of initiatives to improve our homeland ballistic missile defense capabilities, including the planned deployment of 14 additional Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) in Alaska, to help stay ahead of the long-range missile threat from North Korea and Iran.

Do you support the initiatives announced by Secretary Hagel, and do you believe they will help us stay ahead of the threat from North Korea and Iran?

Answer. Yes, I support the initiatives announced by Secretary Hagel. The collective results of the initiatives will further improve our ability to counter future missile threats being developed by Iran and North Korea.

Question. As indicated in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, the administration is pursuing a “fly-before-you-buy” approach to missile defense, and will test systems in an operationally realistic manner to demonstrate they will work as intended before we deploy them. Since a GBI flight test failure with the Capability Enhancement-II kill vehicle in 2010, the Missile Defense Agency has been working to fix the problem and plans to conduct an intercept flight test in the spring of 2014 to demonstrate the fix.

Do you agree with the “fly-before-you-buy” policy, and do you agree with Secretary Hagel that, before we deploy the additional GBIs, we need to test and demonstrate the fix so we demonstrate its capability and have confidence that it will work as intended?

Answer. Yes. I agree with the administration's approach to test systems in an operationally realistic manner. I also agree with the importance of achieving confidence in a capability before it is deployed.

Question. Section 227 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 requires an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for possible future homeland missile defense sites in the United States, in case the President determines to proceed with such a deployment in the future. That EIS process is expected to be complete in early 2016.

Do you agree that the EIS process should be completed prior to making any decision relative to possible deployment of an additional homeland missile defense site in the United States, including possibly on the east coast?

Answer. I agree that EISs should be completed to ensure compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act prior to the actual deployment of an additional missile defense site in the United States.

Question. Do you agree with the Director of the Missile Defense Agency and the Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense that there is currently “no validated military requirement to deploy an east coast missile defense site”?

Answer. Yes. At this time, there is no validated military requirement to deploy an East Coast Missile Defense Site. However, analysis is underway to determine if such a site will be necessary to defend the Homeland.

Question. Do you agree with their assessment that “investment in Ballistic Missile Defense System discrimination and sensor capabilities would result in more cost-effective near-term improvements to homeland missile defense” than deploying an east coast missile defense site?

Answer. Given current fiscal constraints, investment in Ballistic Missile Defense Systems discrimination and sensor capabilities has the potential to be a cost-effective

tive near-term approach to improving homeland missile defense. Deploying an East Coast missile defense site would likely be a lengthier process.

Question. Do you agree with the following statements regarding a potential East Coast missile defense site:

General Jacoby (Commander, U.S. Northern Command): “A third site, wherever the decision is to build a third site, would give me better weapons access, increased GBI inventory and allow us the battle space to more optimize our defense against future threats from Iran and North Korea.”

General Formica (Commander Space and Missile Defense Command): “Certainly, it brings increased capacity and increased capability than we have at Fort Greely.”

National Research Council: “A GBI site located in northeastern United States would be much more effective and reliable and would allow considerably more battle space and firing doctrine options.

Answer. Generally yes, but there is no guarantee of an increased GBI inventory or that it would be the most cost-effective option.

Question. Do you agree that Presidents Bush and Obama put in place policies that called for additional missile defense sites in Europe to better defend against threats to the United States from Iran?

Answer. Yes. The intention of additional missile defense sites in Europe is to better defend the United States as well as our treaty allies.

Question. Is this presidentially directed requirement still valid and, if not, what has changed to permit the elimination of this requirement for a third interceptor site?

Answer. Additional analysis remains to determine whether a third site is the optimum and most effective way of fulfilling that requirement.

SPACE

Question. China’s test of an anti-satellite weapon in 2007 was a turning point for the United States in its policies and procedure to ensure access to space. As a nation heavily dependent on space assets for both military and economic advantage, protection of space assets became a national priority.

Do you agree that space situational awareness and protection of space assets should be a national security priority?

Answer. Yes. Space situational awareness underpins our ability to operate safely in an increasingly congested space environment. It is vital that the United States protect national space assets to maintain the benefits and advantages that are dependent on our access to space.

Question. In your view should China’s continued development of space systems inform U.S. space policy and programs?

Answer. Yes. The U.S. Government ensures its space policy and programs address China’s continued development of space systems as well as systems of other space-faring nations. Our National Security Space Strategy reflects this domain’s role in U.S. national security. Access to space underpins our ability to understand emerging threats and challenges, project power globally, conduct operations, support diplomatic efforts, and enable the global economy. The Department engages in cooperative opportunities and leads in the formation of rules and behaviors that benefit all nations. I support the development of U.S. space capabilities which preserve the use of space for the United States and our allies, while promoting the principles of the 2010 National Space Policy.

Question. If confirmed, would you propose any changes to National Security space policy and programs?

Answer. I do not recommend any proposed changes at this time. If confirmed, I would continue implementation of the President’s 2010 National Space Policy, the supporting 2011 National Security Space Strategy, and the Department’s newly updated Space Policy.

Question. What actions would you take to ensure that the Department continues to have access to radiofrequency spectrum that is necessary to train and to conduct its operations?

Answer. It is important that DOD preserve access to the 1755–1850 MHz band and open access to the 2025–2110 MHz bands. The Joint Force is dependent on tactical systems that operate in the 1755–1850 MHz band to operate and train its forces. DOD equities in this band include Satellite Operations, Air Combat Training Systems, Aeronautical Mobile Telemetry, Small Unmanned Aerial Systems, Electronic Warfare, Joint Tactical Radios System, and Tactical Radio Relay systems. Other agencies are seeking DOD to relinquish operations in this band, particularly the lower 25 MHz (1755–1780 MHz). These agencies also seek to have DOD Compress into the upper 70 MHz of this band (1780–1850 MHz). DOD analysis has de-

terminated that previously mentioned tactical systems cannot effectively operate in the compressed band. If compression of this band occurs, DOD would require access in the 2025–2110 MHz band and resources to modify systems to operate within this band. Some of the tactical systems could share spectrum with the commercial wireless industry within the lower 25 MHz without adversely effecting commercial systems, e.g. satellite operations.

STRATEGIC SYSTEMS

Question. Over the next 5 years DOD will begin to replace or begin studies to replace all of the strategic delivery systems. For the next 15 plus years, DOD will also have to sustain the current strategic nuclear enterprise. This will be a very expensive undertaking.

Do you have any concerns about the ability of the Department to afford the costs of nuclear systems modernization while meeting the rest of the DOD commitments?

Answer. The modernization of the strategic delivery systems and sustainment of the strategic nuclear enterprise is important to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. I support the continued investment in sustainment and modernization as a priority for defense spending. I am, of course, concerned about the impact of sequestration on our ability to meet these requirements. Therefore, I continue to request budget certainty, flexibility, and time to make sure we can modernize and sustain our strategic systems.

Question. If confirmed will you review the modernization and replacement programs to ensure that they are cost effective?

Answer. Yes, I will review both to ensure they are cost effective.

Question. The Department will begin to issue guidance from the recent decision to revise the Nuclear Employment Strategy.

Do you support this change in Strategy?

Answer. Yes, I do support the change in Strategy. Admiral Winnefeld and I participated in senior leader meetings, where we provided our best military advice to both the Secretary of Defense and the President on our nuclear capabilities.

Question. Will you keep Congress fully informed of additional guidance issued in response to this changed strategy?

Answer. I will work closely with the Secretary and the President to keep Congress fully informed as additional guidance is developed and issued with respect to the changes in our strategy.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT STRATEGY

Question. President Obama recently issued new guidance on nuclear weapons employment strategy, consistent with the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).

Do you support the President's new nuclear weapons employment guidance, and did you have an opportunity to provide input to the formulation of the new guidance?

Answer. Yes, I support the President's new guidance. Both Admiral Winnefeld and I participated in senior leader meetings, where we provided our best military advice to both the Secretary of Defense and the President.

Question. Do you agree with the President's assessment that the United States can ensure its security, and the security of our allies and partners, and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a one-third reduction in deployed strategic nuclear weapons below the level established in the New START treaty? Please explain your views.

Answer. We can ensure our security and that of our allies and partners and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent while pursuing further reductions beyond the New START treaty central limits. However, to be very clear on this point, in order to maintain a credible and effective deterrent we must continue to adequately invest in the modernization of our nuclear infrastructure as long as nuclear weapons exist. Also, further reductions in strategic nuclear weapons, beyond the New START Treaty Central Limits, should occur as part of a negotiated position with Russia. Both Admiral Winnefeld and I have made this recommendation to the President and the Secretary of Defense.

Question. Is the current strategic balance between Russia and the United States stable?

Answer. I believe we currently have a stable and strategic balance with Russia, but we must be thoughtful to maintain that balance in such a manner that we never sacrifice our ability to credibly provide extended deterrence and assurance to our allies.

Question. What is the military rationale to pursue an additional one-third reduction in deployed U.S. strategic nuclear weapons?

Answer. Based on the results of the Post-NPR analysis, the Department concluded that we could further reduce the number of deployed U.S. strategic nuclear weapons, while still meeting the objectives of the revised policy guidance and strategy. From the military perspective, further reductions should occur as part of a negotiated position with Russia, and to ensure the credibility of a smaller deterrent force, our nuclear infrastructure modernization plans must be fully funded and supported. In following this approach, I am confident we can maintain a strategic and stable balance with Russia, while maintaining a viable extended deterrent for our allies and partners.

Question. What are the potential risks and benefits of pursuing additional nuclear force reductions?

Answer. I am confident that we can ensure our security and that of our allies and partners, and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent while pursuing further reductions beyond the New START treaty central limits. In order to maintain an effective and credible deterrent, we must continue to adequately invest in the modernization of our nuclear infrastructure as long as nuclear weapons exist. Also, further reductions in strategic nuclear weapons, beyond the New START Treaty Central Limits, should occur as part of a negotiated position with Russia to ensure stability. As we negotiate further reductions with Russia, to include their larger number of non-strategic nuclear weapons, I am encouraged by the initiative to expand the scope of those reductions to include both strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons that are both deployed and nondeployed. I believe this is a prudent approach that will maintain strategic stability with Russia.

Question. Do you agree it is necessary to address the disparity between Russia and the United States in tactical nuclear weapons, in a verifiable manner?

Answer. It is important for us to work with Russia to establish cooperative measures that will improve mutual confidence regarding the accurate accounting and security of tactical nuclear weapons. I support efforts to engage Russia in accordance with the Senate's Resolution to Ratification of the New START treaty.

Question. Do you agree that any further nuclear reductions should be done in concert with Russia and that such reductions be part of a formal agreement requiring the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate?

Answer. The Senate's Resolution to Ratification of the New START treaty sets forth principles I agree with. This includes the principle that further arms reduction agreements obligating the United States to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in any militarily significant manner may be made only pursuant to the treaty-making power of the President. This power is set forth in Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States.

Question. Do you agree it is important to address any potential Russian non-compliance with existing nuclear arms control agreements?

Answer. Yes, we should address treaty compliance concerns. Treaty compliance determinations are provided to Congress in the report by the President on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments which is submitted pursuant to section 403 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended (title 22, U.S.C., section 2593a).

DOD'S COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM

Question. The CTR program, which is focused historically on accounting for, securing or eliminating Cold War era weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and materials in the states of the former Soviet Union, has started to expand its focus to other countries. With this expansion the CTR program is widening its focus to biological weapons and capabilities including biological surveillance and early warning; and encouraging development of capabilities to reduce proliferation threats.

Do you think the CTR program is well coordinated among the U.S. Government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts, e.g., DOD, the Department of Energy, and the State Department?

Answer. Yes. In the past year DOD, the Department of Energy, and the State Department have jointly decided how to use funds from the proliferation prevention program. Cooperation is "built in" because drawing from each Department's fund requires concurrence by the other Department's Secretary. Additionally, many agencies are now working closely together to reduce threats in particular regions. This cooperation extends across the Defense and State Departments Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, State's Nonproliferation Disarmament Fund, and the DOE Proliferation Prevention Program.

Question. The new umbrella agreement with Russia does not include work with the Russian ministry of Defense and recent efforts in the program have moved towards preventing proliferation in the Middle East and North Africa.

Do you support this transition to the Middle East and North?

Answer. I think transition to the Middle East and North Africa makes good sense. It builds the capacity for regional partners to improve WMD threat reduction through proliferation prevention. It increases safety and security of materials of concern, and it helps with border security and consequence management. The transition to these regions complements National Strategic objectives and geographic combatant commander priorities to meet those goals.

Question. What actions will you take to continue a proliferation prevention relationship with Russia?

Answer. If the agreements with Russia are extended, the project to transport and dismantle nuclear weapons would continue for some additional years. This program securely ships strategic and tactical nuclear warheads to dismantlement locations or to more secure storage sites until they can be dismantled. DOD plans to support approximately four secure shipments of legacy nuclear weapons per month and the associated maintenance for railcars and railcar security systems. While DOE projects to secure nuclear materials continue, direct DOD support to our partnership with Russia is critical to U.S. nonproliferation efforts.

Question. About 60 percent of CTR resources are proposed for biological programs.

With the very real threat of chemical weapons use and/or proliferation as we saw in Libya and are seeing in Syria, why is there such a large percentage of resources directed toward biological issues?

Answer. Dedication of 60 percent of CTR to biological programs is a necessary balance in order to deal with a pandemic, accidental release of a pathogen of security concern, or deliberate attack using a biological agent. All of these would have consequences in the United States and well beyond our borders and the obvious health impacts. There is an increasing availability of biological materials, and many countries are developing laboratory capacity to detect highly dangerous pathogens. This rapid expansion of poorly controlled infrastructure could lead to accidental exposure or release of highly contagious pathogens. An additional vulnerability at these laboratories is the inherently dual-use nature of biological activity. Legitimate infrastructure, materials, and expertise, therefore, can easily be manipulated or used for nefarious purposes if the appropriate safety and security measures are not in place. As a major hub of international travel, immigration, and commerce, the United States is directly threatened by this global danger.

PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE

Question. The 2010 QDR concluded that the United States will continue to experiment with prompt global strike prototypes. There has been no decision to field a prompt global strike capability as the effort is early in the technology and testing phase.

In your view, what is the role for a conventional prompt global strike capability in addressing the key threats to U.S. national security in the near future?

Answer. We are exploring a range of ways to counter the threat posed as our adversaries increase the range and lethality of their weapon systems. There are potential future circumstances that may require a capability to address high value, time sensitive and defended targets from ranges outside the current conventional technology. We will continue to capture these evolving capability needs in our joint requirements process. We will also continue to evaluate ongoing analysis of a Conventional Prompt Global Strike capability in order to provide recommendations on its future development.

Question. What approach (e.g. land-based or sea-based or both) to implementation of this capability would you expect to pursue if confirmed?

Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to pursue a sea-based approach as directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in February 2012. I would, of course, remain open to additional analysis or factors that would suggest another approach.

Question. In your view what, if any, improvements in intelligence capabilities would be needed to support a prompt global strike capability?

Answer. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) is an enabling capability for a wide range of important Joint Force capabilities to include global strike. A Conventional Prompt Global Strike weapon would likely require an advance persistent surveillance sensor constellation to enable and enhance its operational performance.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP

Question. Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program with the aim of creating the computational capabilities and experimental tools needed to allow for the continued certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reli-

able without the need for nuclear weapons testing. The Secretaries of Defense and Energy are statutorily required to certify annually to Congress the continued safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.

As the stockpile continues to age, what do you view as the greatest challenges, if any, with respect to assuring the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile?

Answer. To sustain a safe, secure, and effective stockpile today, we must prudently manage our nuclear stockpile and related Life Extension Programs (LEPs). We must also cultivate the nuclear infrastructure, expert workforce, and leadership required to sustain it in the future. If confirmed, I will consider the full range of LEP approaches to include refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads, and replacement of nuclear components.

Question. If the technical conclusions and data from the Stockpile Stewardship Program could no longer confidently support the annual certification of the stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable, would you recommend the resumption of underground nuclear testing? What considerations would guide your recommendation in this regard?

Answer. Our current nuclear stockpile is assessed as effective. It is certified and does not require further nuclear testing. However, the stockpile is aging. I understand there are, and will always be, challenges in identifying and remedying the effects of aging on the stockpile. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the Department of Energy to maintain the critical skills, capabilities, and infrastructure needed to ensure the safety, reliability, and security of the stockpile within a constrained budget environment.

Question. Do you agree that the full funding of the President's plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, commonly referred to as the 1251 report, is a critical national security priority?

Answer. I agree that the full funding of the 1043 report, which has replaced the 1251 report, is a critical national security priority. The President's fiscal year 2014 budget request again includes a significant commitment to support the long-term plan for extending the life of the weapons in our enduring stockpile and modernizing the nuclear weapon complex. I am committed to continuing the modernization and sustainment of our nuclear weapons delivery systems, stockpile, and infrastructure.

Question. Prior to completing this modernization effort, do you believe it would be prudent to consider reductions below New START treaty limits in the deployed stockpile of nuclear weapons?

Answer. Modernization efforts must be considered in any deliberations over the size of our deployed stockpile. Further analysis will be necessary to determine the extent to which it would be advisable to make further reductions prior to completing modernization efforts. Factors to be considered in such analysis include U.S. policy objectives as well as the need to maintain strategic stability with Russia and China while assuring our allies and partners.

Question. If confirmed, would you recommend any changes to the nondeployed hedge stockpile of nuclear weapons?

Answer. There may be opportunities to change the nondeployed hedge of nuclear weapons while still effectively managing stockpile risk. This would be considered as we complete life-extension programs that improve safety, security and reliability of the stockpile and as we modernize the infrastructure. I am committed to reducing the size of the stockpile consistent with deterrence objectives and warfighter requirements.

IRAQ

Question. With the withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces from Iraq at the end of 2011, the United States and Iraq began what the President called a new chapter in the bilateral relationship between the two countries. At the same time, the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement continues to set forth a number of principles of cooperation governing the U.S.-Iraqi relationship. In December 2012, DOD and the Iraqi Ministry of Defense concluded a Memorandum of Understanding for Defense Cooperation.

In your view, what are the main areas of mutual strategic interest in the U.S.-Iraqi relationship?

Answer. We see areas of mutual strategic interest in partnership with a sovereign, stable and democratic Iraq in several areas to include: countering Iran's aggression and pursuit of nuclear weapons capability; mitigating destabilizing effects on the region from violence in Syria; counterterrorism cooperation to reduce al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) capacity; stable production of petroleum exports; active partici-

pation in regional multilateral exercises; and involvement in the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Question. What are the main areas of bilateral defense cooperation between the United States and Iraq?

Answer. The main areas of defense cooperation are through Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Funding (FMF) programs, and International Military Education and Training (IMET). Iraq has begun to participate in regional exercises, highlighted by their recent activity in the International Mine Countermeasure Exercise and Eager Lion Counterterrorism Exercise. Under the U.S.-Iraq Security Framework Agreement—and given the lack of a Status of Forces Agreement—DOD is limited to non-operational training with Iraq. However, our Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq has helped facilitate bilateral training between Iraqi Security Forces and other regional militaries. All other defense training is conducted by contractor personnel through FMS cases.

Question. What is your assessment of the current threat posed by al Qaeda in Iraq?

Answer. AQI continues to pose a significant threat to internal stability in Iraq. Extremist elements responding to the crisis in Syria have bolstered AQI capability and motivation. Sectarian divisions, coupled with a lack of security in the Disputed Internal Boundaries, have allowed AQI to act as a destabilizing influence. The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service (CTS)—one of the most professional and disciplined units in Iraq—nevertheless lacks the ability to develop actionable intelligence to effectively suppress the threat.

Question. What is your assessment of the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces to respond to the threat posed by al Qaeda and other security challenges?

Answer. Due to current sectarian violence and political discord among the ethnic groups in Iraq, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are reaching their operational limits. Additionally, the lack of a coherent border security strategy allows the flow of weapons and personnel to and from Syria. The Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq (OSC-I) is limited to non-operational training. However, Iraq's recent acquisition of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance equipment will improve the ISF's ability to counter the AQI threat. Meanwhile, Iraq's external defense capabilities are extremely limited based on the focus on internal stability.

Question. What do you see as the principle role or roles of the Office of Security Cooperation within the U.S. Embassy in Iraq?

Answer. The principle role of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I), under Chief of Mission authority, is to conduct security assistance and security cooperation activities advancing the U.S. strategic goal of a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq. OSC-I trains the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to meet Iraq's internal security requirements while leveraging Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs, and other security assistance authorities to complement Iraq's robust Iraqi-funded Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.

Question. What do you see as the greatest challenges for the U.S.-Iraqi strategic relationship over the coming years?

Answer. The greatest challenge facing the U.S.-Iraq strategic relationship is the successful transition to a more traditional security cooperation relationship—with a robust bilateral and multilateral training and exercise program—despite persistent sectarian violence throughout the country and rising tensions over Iranian support to Syria.

Question. What are the lessons learned from the drawdown and post-combat operations in Iraq that should be applied to the drawdown and post-combat operations in Afghanistan?

Answer. First, we must improve communication and coordination between DOD and Department of State as we shift from a military-led program to a diplomatic-led program. In Iraq, the lack of a fully integrated civilian-military drawdown significantly complicated an already difficult transition. Second, we must clearly define the missions and support for U.S. and coalition forces remaining in Afghanistan, with all authorities and agreements in place prior to completion of full transition. These authorities and agreements—a primary aim of U.S.-Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement negotiations—will provide assurance of the U.S. commitment and help preserve hard-fought gains as Afghanistan begins the critical post-2014 period. Finally, we must maintain an equilibrium among our campaign objectives, retrograde, and the protection of our forces.

STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Question. The U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has underscored the importance of planning and training to prepare for the conduct and support of stability and support operations in post-conflict situations. In contrast, however, the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance asserts that the Department will avoid becoming involved in long duration stability and support operations.

What steps, if any, would you recommend to ensure that the lessons learned from stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are captured and appropriately institutionalized?

Answer. We've captured the lessons we have learned regarding stability operations in our Joint Doctrine. Specifically, we have a complete publication (JP 3-07) dedicated to the topic—the current version is dated September 2011. Later this year, we will formally assess this publication with the intent to update it as part of our routine doctrine process. Further, we will ensure the lessons and concepts are retained in our training and education.

AFGHANISTAN CAMPAIGN

Question. What is your assessment of the progress of the military campaign in Afghanistan?

Answer. The military campaign in Afghanistan continues to progress as illustrated by the recent Milestone 13/TRANCHE V announcement. In fact, the campaign has now shifted into a fundamentally new phase. For the past 11 years, the United States and our Coalition allies have been leading combat operations. Now, the Afghans are taking over, and ISAF is stepping back into a supporting role. The progress made by the ISAF-led surge over the past 3 years has put the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) in control of all Afghanistan's major cities and 34 provincial capitals and driven the insurgency away from the population. ISAF's primary focus is now shifting from directly fighting the insurgency to supporting the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in their efforts to hold and expand these gains.

Question. What is your assessment and prioritization of enablers that need to be built and sustained within the ANSF given the cessation of U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) combat operations by the end of 2014?

Answer. We have invested considerably in developing the ability of the ANSF to sustain itself in the field with logistics and mobility. We will continue to accelerate the development of additional enabling capabilities to include route clearance and casualty evacuation.

TRANSITION OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY IN AFGHANISTAN AND U.S. TROOP REDUCTIONS

Question. In February of this year, President Obama announced that by February 2014 U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan will be reduced to 34,000. In June, the ANSF achieved Transition Milestone 2013, and assuming the lead responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan.

Do you support the President's decision to reduce U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan to 34,000 by February 2014? Why or why not?

Answer. Yes. Transition Milestone 2013 represents a significant shift for our mission in Afghanistan. Over the past 11 years, the United States and our partners have led combat operations. Now the Afghans are taking the lead for their own security. ISAF's primary focus has shifted from directly fighting the insurgency to supporting the ANSF. We match troop levels to the mission and our new mission requires fewer troops on the ground. The decision to drawdown U.S. forces was made based on the real and tangible progress of the ISAF military campaign and an assessment of an increasingly capable ANSF.

Question. What is your understanding regarding the pace of those reductions in U.S. forces?

Answer. We are on path to meet our objective of 34,000 troops by February 2014. This objective is based on a transition in our mission to support increasingly capable ANSF. The Commander ISAF will have the flexibility to meet his mission and sustain the right forces through this fighting season. He will also manage the glideslope as we settle into a supporting role.

Question. Do you support the June transition of lead responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan to the Afghan security forces?

Answer. I support the transition of responsibility for security to the ANSF. Security progress and the development of the ANSF into a capable and confident fighting force have enabled the security transition process to move forward. The ANSF con-

tinues to demonstrate its ability to defeat the Taliban and provide security to the Afghan people.

Question. Do you support the transition to the ANSF of full responsibility for security in Afghanistan by December 2014?

Answer. Yes. The ANSF continues to demonstrate significant improvement. We are seeing many encouraging examples where ANSF are gaining capability, confidence, leadership, and will to engage with the enemy. The ANSF is on a path to be capable of assuming full responsibility for security by December 2014.

Question. What is your assessment of the potential impact of withdrawing faster than the announced drawdown and of leaving zero troops in Afghanistan post-2014?

Answer. Withdrawing faster and leaving zero troops in Afghanistan would likely compromise the sustainability of the ANSF. It would also impact on our ability to retrograde all our personnel and equipment while ensuring the protection of the force. Therefore, I continue to support an enduring presence post-2014 to support ANSF development and meet our security interests.

AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

Question. What is your assessment of the progress in developing a professional and effective ANSF?

Answer. The ANSF continues to grow into a confident and capable force. We are focusing on leadership development as fundamental to the professionalization of the ANSF. Leadership ratings continue to improve and the National Military Academy of Afghanistan and the ANA Officer Academy will play a pivotal role in professionalizing the ANA. Additionally, the Minister of Defense (MoD) formed an Evaluation Commission that is responsible for identifying poorly performing commanders and removes them when required. This allows the MoD the opportunity to fix the poor/lacking command climate within and address leadership concerns. Further, the Afghan National Police Training Command focuses on delineating strategic level roles, literacy of the force and rule of law knowledge.

Question. Do you support maintaining the ANSF at the level of 352,000 beyond 2014 based on the security conditions on the ground in Afghanistan?

Answer. I recommended to the Secretary of Defense and the President that the 352,000 ANSF force level should continue beyond 2014. The extension of the ANSF "surge" force is crucial to put Afghans at the fore to provide their own security. At this time, it is premature to assess the duration of this surge, but at a minimum, this extension would likely be necessary for at least 2 years following the end of the ISAF mission to counter the possibility of a Taliban resurgence after the departure of coalition forces.

Question. What do you see as the main challenges to building the capacity of the ANSF and what recommendations, if any, would you make for addressing those challenges?

Answer. The main challenges we face in building the capacity of the ANSF are attrition, leadership, and limited literacy. Unfortunately, these issues continue to undermine positive recruiting, training, and professionalization goals. These are not problems that can be solved in the short term, but ISAF is continuing to work with the MoI and the MoD to address them. We must also continue to work on the support functions that will sustain the ANSF in the field such as logistics.

Question. A recent audit report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) raised concerns about DOD plans to purchase PC-12 aircraft and Mi-17 helicopters for the Afghan Special Mission Wing and recommended suspending the contracts for these purchases. DOD and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan did not concur with the SIGAR's recommendation on contract suspension.

What is your assessment of current plans to equip the Afghan Special Mission Wing (SMW) with PC-12 aircraft and Mi-17 helicopters?

Answer. Our strategy in Afghanistan includes reducing the number of and reliance on U.S. enablers by building capability in the ANSF. In part, this will rely on developing the Afghan Air Force and the SMW, and thus reducing our requirements for aviation assets.

Question. What is your assessment of the impact to Afghanistan counterterrorism efforts if Mi-17 helicopters are not acquired?

Answer. We need to support development of a helicopter capability for the ANSF. This capability allows for transporting combat-ready Afghan troops throughout the remote regions of Afghanistan. The Mi-17 is a proven, familiar, compatible, and is well suited for operating from remote locations with minimal ground support. It possesses superior vertical lift capabilities and is capable of operation in the high-alti-

tude, mountainous terrain of Afghanistan. Previous analysis showed that the Mi-17 stands apart as an all-around helicopter capable of medium and heavy lift.

Question. Do you support the SIGAR recommendation to suspend the contracts to acquire these aircraft and helicopters for the Special Mission Wing? Why or why not?

Answer. No. It is important for the Afghans to operate and sustain a familiar platform to support the current war effort. The ANSF has over 30 years of extensive experience with this platform, with the vast majority of the seasoned Afghan helicopters pilots having flown and maintained this platform since the 1980s. The ANSF currently has over 150 trained Mi-17 pilots; to retrain the ANSF workforce (aircrew/maintainers) on an unfamiliar platform would take a minimum of 3 years and additional funds. Requiring the ANSF to retrain on any other platform than the Mi-17 would significantly impact the long-term success of the ANSF.

OPERATION RESOLUTE SUPPORT

Question. In early June, NATO defense ministers endorsed a concept of operations for the training and advisory mission, known as Operation Resolute Support, which the Alliance will maintain in Afghanistan after the ISAF combat mission ends in December 2014. The size of the mission is yet to be determined, but previously U.S. officials have said that a force of 8,000–12,000 troops was under consideration.

What do you consider to be the primary role or roles of the NATO Operation Resolute Support force in Afghanistan after 2014?

Answer. The primary role of the post-2014 NATO mission is to train, advise, and assist the ANSF at the national and institutional level, down to the Corps level. Resolute Support Mission may also contain limited enabler support as we continue to build ANSF capability.

Question. In your view, what factors should be considered in determining the size of the post-2014 NATO mission in Afghanistan?

Answer. A number of factors will be considered in determining the size of the post-2014 NATO mission. First, the continued progress of the ANSF and the level of training, advise, and assistance required to further that progress. Second, the number of bases required to support a regional approach and to assist other agencies of the United States Government will drive the size of the post-2014 force level. Lastly, any post-2014 mission will depend on completion of the BSA and the sustainment of international commitments.

Question. What is the impact on NATO ally commitments to Operation Resolute Support of the U.S. not announcing a post-2014 force commitment?

Answer. Our NATO allies are aware that the President is considering a range of options based on a number of factors to include the performance of the ANSF during this fighting season. At the NATO Defense Ministers meeting in June, allies and partners endorsed a concept of operations for the new mission for Afghanistan after 2014. This will guide NATO's operational planning over the coming months. A decision on our force commitment will be necessary soon in order for NATO members to source the plan in sufficient time to enable the deployment of forces.

PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE TALIBAN

Question. In your view, what "redlines" should the United States and Afghanistan establish for any outcome from peace negotiations with the Taliban?

Answer. Historically, insurgencies end with some form of a political settlement. We continue to support an Afghan-led reconciliation effort with the goal of a negotiated a political settlement that also protects U.S. security interests. This will likely require elements of the Taliban that wish to reconcile to: (1) lay down their weapons and stop violence; (2) denounce al Qaeda; and (3) accept the Afghan constitution including the rights afforded women and children.

Question. How effective has the current program for reintegrating insurgent fighters been in removing fighters from the battlefield? What additional steps, if any, should be taken to improve the reintegration program?

Answer. The program has had some success in weakening the insurgency in some areas. Fighters that are not ideologically committed to the Taliban can sometime be persuaded to reintegrate. The program, however, is only successful if there is credible and effective governance. Any program can be improved, and this is no exception. We need to maintain oversight of the process of delivering projects and utilizing the allocated funds.

ENDURING STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH AFGHANISTAN

Question. Do you support maintaining an enduring strategic partnership between the United States and Afghanistan beyond 2014?

Answer. Yes. I remain committed to a long-term strategic partnership with Afghanistan. An enduring strategic partnership is needed to sustain Afghan forces and to counter transnational terrorist threats.

Question. How would you describe the main U.S. strategic interests regarding an enduring relationship with Afghanistan and in that region?

Answer. We remain committed to a long-term strategic partnership with the Afghan Government and the Afghan people. We have a strategic interest in making sure that Afghanistan never again becomes a safe haven for al Qaeda and its affiliates that pose a threat to the homeland. An enduring partnership with a stable Afghanistan also promotes regional stability.

Question. Do you support the conclusion of the Bilateral Security Agreement between the United States and Afghanistan?

Answer. I support the conclusion of the Bilateral Security Agreement. We are currently negotiating an agreement that will provide the basis for a continued American military presence post 2014. Such an agreement is necessary for us to maintain a mutually beneficial partnership.

Question. In your view, what redlines, if any, must the United States establish for the negotiation and conclusion of the Bilateral Security Agreement?

Answer. In my judgment, the United States must have Exclusive Criminal and Civil Jurisdiction over our personnel stationed in Afghanistan. This is fundamental protection we provide our servicemembers overseas. We must also ensure that we have necessary operational authorities to accomplish our mission.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

Question. Special Operations Forces depend on general purpose forces for many enabling capabilities, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); logistics; and medical evacuation. Admiral McRaven, Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, has said “I have no doubt that special operations will be the last to leave Afghanistan” and has predicted that the requirement for Special Operations Forces may increase as general purpose forces continue to be drawn down.

If confirmed, how would you ensure adequate enabling capabilities for Special Operations Forces as general purpose forces continue to draw down in Afghanistan?

Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure adequate enabling capabilities needed to support the SOF mission set by working collaboratively with ISAF, CENTCOM, and the NATO Special Operations Command-Afghanistan to determine requirements. These enabling capabilities would be tailored to support our post-2014 mission based on force levels that have yet to be decided.

Question. In April 2012, the United States and Afghanistan signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the “Afghanization” of direct action counterterrorism missions in Afghanistan—reflecting the shared intention of having Afghan security forces in the lead in the conduct of such operations with U.S. forces in a support role.

What is the status of efforts to put Afghan Special Operations Forces in the lead for such operations and why do you believe such a transition is important?

Answer. We continue to see ANSF SOF make significant progress in operational effectiveness, and their independence, capacity, and competence continues to grow. One hundred percent of ANA Special Operation Forces missions are Afghan led, and approximately 60 percent of Provincial Response Company police missions are Afghan led. This transition is important to demonstrate that GIRoA is capable of leading security operations needed to further the growth in governance and Development.

Question. The Village Stability Operations (VSO) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) programs—both U.S. Special Operations missions—have been consistently praised by U.S. military leaders as critical elements of the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

What are your views on the value of these programs and do you believe they should be part of the long-term strategy in Afghanistan (i.e. post-2014)?

Answer. VSO and ALP represent a very visible expression of local security to many Afghans, particularly those in remote and isolated communities. GIRoA has identified VSO/ALP as a necessary pillar of their own long-term strategy. In November 2012, the MOI proposed that the ALP be designated a component of the Afghan Uniformed Police. Then in March 2013, the ALP was included in the MOI 10-Year Vision for the Afghan National Police.

U.S. STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN

Question. What in your view are the key U.S. strategic interests with regard to Pakistan?

Answer. Our strategic interests and national security goals remain to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and to prevent the return of safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This would not be possible without Pakistani support. We also have an interest in a stable Pakistan and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology. On the security front, we have a more limited relationship than in the past, but I believe it is a pragmatic and constructive approach.

Question. Does the United States have a strategic interest in enhancing military-to-military relations with Pakistan? Why or why not?

Answer. Yes. Military-to-military ties with Pakistan are an important aspect of the broader bilateral relationship. Our engagements, and especially our security assistance programs, are essential for effective military cooperation between our two countries. I have engaged productively with General Kayani many times in the past, and the Office of the Defense Representative in Pakistan plays an important role in building and sustaining military-military ties at lower levels. These relationships allow us to engage Pakistan in clearly defined areas of shared concern such as maintaining regional stability, curbing violent extremism, and countering the threat of improvised explosive devices.

Question. If so, what steps would you recommend, if confirmed, for enhancing the military-to-military relationship between the United States and Pakistan?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue my close engagement with the Pakistan Military. As Pakistan democratic consolidation progresses, we must ensure that we maintain our military-to-military ties. I will continue a frank and respectful dialogue about our shared interests in countering extremist and promoting regional stability. Security cooperation cannot succeed without the buy-in of Pakistani leadership and continued support of the U.S. Congress.

Question. For several years, the United States has provided significant funds to reimburse Pakistan for the costs associated with military support and operations by Pakistan in connection with Operation Enduring Freedom.

What is your assessment of Pakistan's cooperation with the United States in counterterrorism operations against militant extremist groups located in Pakistan?

Answer. Pakistan's cooperation on counterterrorism has not always met our expectations. Since 2009, Pakistan has undertaken counterinsurgency operations against extremist organizations in the northwest, including Swat, North and South Waziristan, Mohmand, and Bajaur with mixed results. Security assistance, Coalition Support Fund reimbursements, and cross-border coordination with ISAF and Afghan forces have helped enable these operations. It is in our interest that Pakistan continues this campaign as effectively and comprehensively as possible.

Question. What is your assessment of Pakistan's efforts to maintain transit and provide security along the ground lines of communication (GLOCs) through Pakistan?

Answer. The key route to sustain forces has been movement via sealift to Pakistan and then ground movement through Pakistan to Afghanistan. This is the cheapest, fastest, most direct surface route. Since the reopening, the Government of Pakistan has provided security to U.S. and NATO cargo shipments through the PAK GLOC. Pakistan is maintaining security along the GLOCs through Pakistan to Afghanistan for the trans-shipment of equipment and supplies in support of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and the retrograde of U.S. equipment out of Afghanistan.

Question. What is your assessment of Pakistan's efforts to counter the threat of improvised explosive devices, including efforts to attack the network, go after known precursors and explosive materials?

Answer. Pakistan recognizes the IED problem is a shared problem. They also suffer significant casualties within Pakistan as a result of extremist attacks using IEDs. We are making progress in the area of C-IED cooperation. Pakistan is taking demonstrable steps to disrupt the IEDs, to include placing new restrictions on the distribution of precursor materials and hosting regional discussions to discuss the IED problem with international partners, including Afghanistan.

IRAN

Question. Iran continues to expand its nuclear program and has failed to provide full and open access to all aspects of its current and historic nuclear program to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

What is your assessment of the military and political threat posed by Iran?

Answer. Iran poses a significant threat to the United States, our allies and partners, and our regional and global interests. Countering Iran's destabilizing and malign behavior requires a comprehensive approach. Iran is actively investing in the development of a range of conventional capabilities, including air, missile, and naval

assets. Iran continues to publicly threaten to use its naval and missile forces to close the Strait of Hormuz or target U.S. interests and regional partners. Iran is also one of the main state-sponsors of terrorism, proxy and surrogate groups. Iran continues to provide arms, funding, and paramilitary training to extremist groups. On the nuclear front, Iran continues to pursue an illicit nuclear program that threatens to provoke a regional arms race and undermine the global non-proliferation regime. Iran also continues to develop ballistic missiles that could be adapted to deliver nuclear weapons. Iran will seek to use its threat capabilities to enable greater influence in the region and threaten our allies.

Question. What is your assessment of U.S. policy with respect to Iran?

Answer. I support the U.S. policy of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. To this end, we are prepared with military options to include associated costs and risks. Moreover, we are pursuing a comprehensive strategy to confront Iran's malign behavior that includes diplomatic isolation, economic pressure through sanctions, diplomatic engagement through the P5+1, and military pressure through contingency preparations and exercises. In addition, we are reassuring our partners in the region by deepening our security commitments and building their capabilities.

Question. What more do you believe the United States and the international community can and should do to dissuade Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons?

Answer. This policy question is best answered by the State Department. That said, it is clear that continued international unity on sanctions is crucial to bringing Iran to the negotiating table with a serious proposal. Further, we need to sustain a comprehensive strategy that includes diplomatic pressure through UN Security Council Resolutions, economic pressure through sanctions, diplomatic engagement through the P5+1, and military pressure through contingency preparations and exercises.

Question. In your view, what are the risks associated with reducing U.S. presence in the Middle East with respect to the threat posed by Iran?

Answer. The reduction of U.S. force presence in the Middle East—due to withdrawal from Iraq (and Afghanistan), rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, and in part from fiscal constraints—could impact our ability to deter aggression and assure our allies. That said, we retain a significant and ready presence in the region with high-end capabilities that should serve to mitigate against such concerns. Furthermore, our global reach and strike capabilities contribute to our ability to deter and assure.

Question. In your view, what has been the effect of sanctions against Iran—how effective have they been and should additional unilateral or multilateral sanctions be levied against Iran?

Answer. The United States has put in place against Iran tough, smart, and crippling sanctions. As a result of these sanctions, Iran's financial, trade, and economic outlook has deteriorated significantly. International financial institutions estimate that Iran's economy contracted in 2012 for the first time in more than 2 decades. International sanctions have hindered Iran's weapons procurement efforts and driven up the costs of obtaining necessary components for its military. Sanctions also appear to have slowed Iran's progress on its nuclear program, making it increasingly difficult for Iran to import needed materials or skills. The question of additional sanctions is best answered by the State Department.

Question. In your view, what role should DOD play in countering Iran's support of international terrorism?

Answer. Iranian support for proxy groups and terrorist activities constitutes a serious threat to our partners and allies as well as U.S. interests. In short, Iran's activities are malevolent and intentionally destabilizing. DOD continues to help counter Iranian malign activities in at least three ways. First, we support diplomatic and intelligence efforts to inhibit the activities of Iranian proxy and terrorist groups. Second, we leverage our military presence in the region to deter and, when directed by the President, disrupt Iranian malign activities. Third, we leverage our extensive security cooperation relationships with countries in the Middle East and around the world to build partner capacity and trust to counter Iranian destabilizing activities.

Question. Do you agree with President Obama that all options, including military options, should remain on the table with respect to Iran?

Answer. I do agree that all options must be kept on the table in order to achieve our policy objectives toward Iran. It is our responsibility to conduct prudent planning for all contingencies, and we will ensure that military plans are kept up-to-date. This preparedness will have the effect of reinforcing our overall policy.

Question. Do you assess that sanctions will prevent or dissuade Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons?

Answer. Continued international unity on sanctions is crucial to bringing Iran to the negotiating table with a serious proposal. Departments of State and Treasury

have put in place the strongest and most comprehensive international sanctions in history, and we believe the sanctions are having a dramatic effect on the Iranian economy. I support continuing sanctions pressure on Iran; however, it is not yet clear if sanctions will ultimately prevent or dissuade Iran.

SYRIA

Question. What is your assessment of the situation in Syria and its impact on the region?

Answer. The crisis in Syria continues to be tragic, dynamic, and complex. The conflict reflects a sectarian fault line that extends across and is destabilizing the region. We are planning and engaging with Syria's neighbors—Israel, Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq—to contain the spillover effects that would render our allies and partners less secure. The competition among states with regional interests continues to fuel the violence with negative implications for deepening Sunni-Shia tensions within Syria and beyond.

Question. In your view, what is the most appropriate role for the United States in assisting regional friends and allies respond to the situation in Syria?

Answer. The United States provides leadership and support to the surrounding countries through multilateral planning efforts and humanitarian assistance. We are continuously engaged with key regional partners such as Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq to provide assistance, technical knowledge and military contingency planning.

Question. In your view, what—if any—role should the U.S. military play with respect to the situation in Syria?

Answer. We should and are pursuing a regional strategy along four lines of effort. First, we are working with our partners in the region. Second, we are supporting the moderate opposition. We are currently providing non-lethal assistance to increase the capability of the opposition. Third, we are providing humanitarian assistance to help with a massive refugee problem. Fourth, we are planning and posturing our forces for a wide range of military options.

Question. In your view, what role—if any—are Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah playing in the current conflict in Syria?

Answer. Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah continue to support the Assad regime. Russia continues to supply arms, and Hezbollah supports the regime operationally with personnel and weapons—as does Iran. Their continued support of the Assad regime has led to recent regime momentum and gains on the ground.

Question. In your view, what are the prospects of a negotiated solution in Syria?

Answer. A negotiated settlement is a preferred path to achieving our policy objectives. However, its prospects are diminished by the sectarian character of the conflict. Assad is further emboldened by Russia's continued support. The reality of disparate opposition groups, many at odds with U.S. values, also make it difficult to achieve a negotiated settlement.

Question. In your view, is the momentum currently on the side of the Assad regime or the forces fighting to overthrow Syria?

Answer. Momentum shifts are characteristic of this form of protracted conflict. The fragmentation of the opposition undermines their momentum. The Assad regime is supported by Hezbollah, Iran, and Russia, which has helped the regime regain some areas that they once ceded.

Question. Are there asymmetric options that bypass Syria's integrated air defense system rather than kinetically neutralize it, such as standoff weapons and/or stealth, and what is your assessment of those options from a military perspective?

Answer. We have a wide range of options. These details of these options are better discussed in a classified setting.

Question. What are the risks associated with doing nothing to alter the balance of military power in Syria between Assad and the armed opposition?

Answer. We have learned from the past 10 years that it's not enough to simply alter the balance of military power without careful consideration of what's necessary in order to preserve a functioning state. That said, we are taking actions to support the moderate opposition so that they can alter the balance of military power. If we were to end all our support to our allies and to the opposition, we might expect the suffering to worsen and the region to further destabilize.

THE 2001 AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE

Question. What is your understanding of the scope and duration of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)?

Answer. The United States is in an armed conflict against al Qaeda and its associated forces. An associated force is defined as a group that (1) is an organized, armed

group that has entered the fight alongside al Qaeda and, (2) is a co-belligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. These are the same terrorist threats that perpetrated the horrendous acts on U.S. soil on September 11, 2001, and the AUMF still serves as the legal basis under U.S. domestic law to employ military force against these threats.

Question. What factors govern DOD determinations as to where the use of force is authorized, and against whom, pursuant to the AUMF?

Answer. In May 2013, the President promulgated Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) governing direct action against terrorist targets located outside the United States and areas of active hostilities. This document codifies and harmonizes the procedures necessary for DOD to conduct these types of military operations. The PPG and its derivative operational plans clarify, formalize and strengthen the standards, policies, and determinations of DOD concerning where, how, and against whom military force may be utilized outside the United States and areas of active hostilities. DOD meticulously follows the formalized procedures of the PPG to ensure we make well-informed decisions based on the most up-to-date intelligence and the expertise of our national security professionals. Senior commanders and their legal advisors carefully review all operations for compliance with U.S. and international law before a decision is rendered by the Secretary of Defense or the President.

Question. Are you satisfied that current legal authorities, including the AUMF, enable the Department to carry out counterterrorism operations and activities at the level that you believe to be necessary and appropriate?

Answer. The AUMF in its current form provides the necessary and sufficient authorities to counter al Qaeda and its associated forces. If a terrorist threat emerges that does not fit within the AUMF, DOD would consult with Congress and facets of the executive branch on the question of authorities.

AL QAEDA

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda affiliates to the U.S. Homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and western interests more broadly? Which affiliates are of most concern?

Answer. Years of sustained counterterrorism (CT) pressure have degraded the ability of al Qaeda's Pakistan-based leadership to operate freely. Our efforts have made it difficult for al Qaeda to replenish its senior ranks with the type of experienced leaders, trainers, and attack planners it promoted in previous years. We have also limited the group's ability to mount sophisticated, complex attacks in the West. Despite these setbacks, al Qaeda retains its intent, though not the robust capability, to plan and conduct terrorist attacks against the West. Al Qaeda core continues to inspire and guide its regional nodes, allies, and like-minded extremists to engage in terrorism. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula remains committed to attacking our interests in the region and is the most likely group to attempt an attack in the United States in the near-term.

YEMEN AND AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

Question. What is your assessment of the current U.S. strategy in Yemen and what is your understanding of the role of DOD within that strategy?

Answer. Our overall engagement strategy with Yemen combines diplomatic, economic, and security initiatives to improve stability and security. DOD fills a critical role in this strategy primarily by supporting the development of the Yemeni armed forces. We are fostering a strong partnership with the Yemeni military to better address critical security threats, including the campaign against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The security situation in Yemen remains fragile and we must continue our partnership in the fight against AQAP.

Question. Given the continuing political instability and slow progress of reforms to the military in Yemen, what are your views on the United States continuing to provide security assistance—most significantly DOD section 1206 funding—to Yemeni counterterrorism forces?

Answer. A stable, unified, and economically viable Yemen, free of violent extremists, remains in our best interest. We have just passed the first anniversary of a 2-year plan to complete the government and military transition from the Saleh regime to a new representative system. While progress has been slow, President Hadi and the military are taking steps to reform and restructure the military as part of the overall political transition process. President Hadi and senior Yemeni military figures actively engage the United States for support and advice on the military reorganization process. The 1206 funds are, and will remain, critical to building the capacity of the Yemeni counter terrorism forces to disrupt and degrade the AQAP

operational space, securing their boarders, and disrupting maritime and land smuggling routes.

SOMALIA AND AL SHABAAB

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Shabaab?

Answer. Al Shabaab remains on the defensive. The coalition among Somali Government, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and Ethiopian National Defense Forces maintain pressure on the group. Despite its loss of territory in 2012, al Shabaab has demonstrated a continued ability to conduct complex attacks against Western interests and Somali Government targets in Mogadishu. The group also conducted small and medium scale attacks in Kenya. This trend will likely continue throughout the rest of 2013, despite increasingly public disputes amongst al Shabaab senior officials.

Question. In your view, does al Shabaab pose a threat to the United States and/or western interests outside of its immediate operational area?

Answer. Al Shabaab does not pose a direct threat to the Homeland or Europe at present. Nevertheless, the group poses an ongoing threat to U.S., Western, and other allied interests in East Africa. In February 2012, al Shabaab and al Qaeda leader Ayman Zawahiri announced al Shabaab's merger with al Qaeda. Although the group is aligned with al Qaeda's global jihadist objectives, al Shabaab focuses on defending territory in Somalia against the coalition of Somali Government, the AMISOM, and Ethiopian military forces—as well as conducting attacks in East Africa.

Question. What is your understanding of the current U.S. strategy in Somalia and the role of DOD in that strategy?

Answer. The current U.S. strategy in Somalia consists of three elements: (1) supporting the AMISOM to combat al Shabaab, increase stability and promote the institutional building of the Somali Federal Government; (2) strengthening the new Somali Federal Government with stabilization and economic recovery assistance in parallel with humanitarian assistance; and (3) building a durable and responsive central Somali Government while engaging with other Somali regional actors such as Somaliland and Puntland (the “dual track policy”). The DOD role in support of the State Department is to increase AMISOM capacity to combat al-Shabaab, engage with the new Somali National Army, and develop ways to increase security. These efforts enable Somali Government institutions and organizations to mature.

Question. Should the United States establish military-to-military relations and consider providing assistance to the Somali national military forces?

Answer. We are prepared to establish military-to-military relations with the new Somali National Army. This supports the State Department in recognizing and strengthening the Somalia Federal Government. We plan to continue assistance to our partner nations in the AMISOM while exploring ways to assist the Somali National Army. Short-term Somali stability depends on AMISOM, and long-term security requires a professional and accountable Somali National Army based on the rule of law.

AL QAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)?

Answer. AQIM and its allies have proven resilient despite the French-led military intervention in Mali. Although these groups no longer control key strategic towns, they retain the capability to launch sporadic attacks within Mali and neighboring countries, expand their safe haven, and attract recruits in pursuit of a hard-line Islamic state based on al Qaeda ideology. Further, AQIM will likely continue to bolster its ties to al Qaeda-associated terrorist groups throughout the region, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, to influence and support attack planning. AQIM will continue to pose a local and regional threat into 2014, as North African Governments struggle to disrupt AQIM movement across expansive, porous borders.

Question. In your view, does AQIM pose a threat to the United States and/or western interests outside of its immediate operational area? What capacity has AQIM demonstrated to plan and carry out actions threatening U.S. interests?

Answer. AQIM does not presently pose a significant threat to the U.S. Homeland. We see no indications the group views conducting attacks outside North Africa and the Sahel as a priority in the near term. However, the group remains a credible threat to U.S. and western interests within North and West Africa, where it has conducted or attempted attacks in several countries (i.e. Mali, Niger, Algeria, Mauritania). AQIM will likely continue to bolster its ties to al Qaeda-associated terrorist

groups throughout the region, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, to influence and support attack planning.

Question. In your view, what has been the impact of the recent expansion of AQIM's area of operations in northern Mali on the group's capacities and aims?

Answer. The expansion of AQIM in Mali between early 2012 and January 2013 increased the group's capacity as it collaborated with splinter groups al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad in West Africa, al-Mulathamun battalion, and Tuareg rebel group Ansar al-Din (AAD). This expansion reflects an increase in the group's membership. This growth has not changed the group's regionally-focused aim of establishing shari'a throughout North Africa. We continue to work with allies and partners to provide a more permanent security solution to AQIM expansion into the Sahel by supporting several regional efforts, including: The French Operation Serval; the Economic Community of West African States African-led Intervention Force in Mali; and the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.

Question. What is your assessment of the importance of security assistance to address the growing AQIM presence in southern Libya?

Answer. North African countries struggle to cooperate and coordinate CT operations, creating exploitable security seams across expansive, porous borders. Preserving security assistance is critical to enabling Libya to build the internal capacity to address these challenges. Security assistance is just one piece of a larger effort that includes law enforcement, justice system reform, and border control. However, our ability to provide assistance will require patience. Tripoli currently lacks the institutions to integrate security assistance or the mechanisms to allocate aid. Tripoli primarily relies on armed militias for security, many operating outside of central government control and some which are complicit in AQIM-linked activities including weapons smuggling.

Question. What authorities will most quickly help address the threat in southern Libya?

Answer. For counterterrorism and border security efforts we are using 1206 and 1208 authorities, along with the Global Security Contingency Fund. No further authorities are needed at this time in order to address the situation in southern Libya.

Question. Does DOD require any new authorities for this situation?

Answer. No, our 1206, 1207, and 1208 authorities give us the appropriate means to provide targeted security assistance to address emerging threats. However, these authorities have not functioned as efficiently as they should. They have been constrained by the bureaucratic sluggishness that has often limited U.S. responsiveness to our partners, and has on occasion prevented us from taking full advantage of opportunities for stronger partnerships against common threats in North Africa and throughout the Middle East since the "Arab Spring" began. For example, the equipment from a 2009 1206 case for Tunisia was just delivered this past spring—though 1206 cases are meant to address near-term CT threats. Most of these delays are caused by the bureaucratic inefficiencies between DOD and the Department of State (DOS). We continue to pursue changes that will lead to greater responsiveness and bolster our efforts in Libya, and the region in general.

NATO

Question. At the NATO Summit in Chicago in 2012, President Obama called the Alliance the "bedrock of our common security" for over 65 years. At the same time, concerns have been raised about the decline in defense spending by a number of NATO member countries, resulting in the United States accounting for approximately 75 percent of defense spending among NATO member countries.

In your view, how important is the NATO alliance to U.S. national security interests?

Answer. The NATO alliance is of critical importance to the national security interests of the United States. The combined military capabilities of the 28 NATO members are second to none. NATO and its allies possess the capability to deploy and sustain highly trained, interoperable forces that are able to conduct full spectrum military operations anywhere in the world.

Question. In your view, what impact have national defense budget cuts had on the capabilities of the NATO alliance, and what do you believe needs to be done to address any capability shortfalls?

Answer. Cuts our allies are making to their defense budgets are reducing the alliance's ability to confront security challenges and placing at risk NATO's ability to sustain concurrent operations. NATO has mitigated this underinvestment by a heavy and growing reliance on U.S. capabilities, but this trend poses risks to the future strength of the alliance. Our allies need to focus their resources on alliance

required capabilities. As their economies improve, they need to increase their defense spending.

Question. What are the greatest opportunities and challenges that you foresee for NATO in meeting its strategic objectives over the next 5 years?

Answer. The greatest opportunity for NATO to meet its strategic objectives over the next 5 years is to maintain the unprecedented level of readiness and interoperability achieved over the last 10 years of combat operations in Afghanistan. The Alliance is working to attain that goal through expanded education and training, increased number of exercises, and better use of technology. The greatest challenge of course lies within the ability of the 28 nations to provide the funding and resources required to implement those initiatives and to continue to develop the capabilities needed to meet future challenges.

Question. In your view, is there a continuing requirement for U.S. nuclear weapons to be deployed in NATO countries?

Answer. Yes. NATO's Strategic Concept states NATO's commitment to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons. However, it also made clear that as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance. NATO's 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review confirmed that nuclear weapons are a core component of NATO's overall capabilities for deterrence and defense alongside conventional and missile defense forces. The review showed that the Alliance's nuclear force posture currently meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defense posture.

Question. What strategy, if any, do you feel should be used to address declining defense budgets, as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), in Europe?

Answer. The longstanding and agreed NATO guideline for each ally is to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense. This provides a basis for comparing defense spending, but what really matters is how each nation allocates its defense resources. It is important to assess whether alliance members are procuring the appropriate quantity and quality of capabilities to meet identified NATO requirements. During this period of fiscal constraint, allies need to rigorously prioritize their defense investment with a focus on Alliance capability requirements. When economies improve, they should increase their investment.

U.S. FORCE POSTURE IN EUROPE

Question. DOD continues to review its force posture in Europe to determine what additional consolidations and reductions are necessary and consistent with U.S. strategic interests.

How would you define the U.S. strategic interests in the European area of responsibility (AOR)?

Answer. NATO will remain our Nation's preeminent multilateral alliance and continue to drive our defense relations with Europe. Through the new Strategic Concept, we defined a clear role for NATO in the years ahead, including space and cyberspace security, Ballistic Missile Defense, counter-trafficking and nonproliferation.

Question. Do you believe that additional consolidation and reductions of U.S. forces in Europe can be achieved consistent with U.S. strategic interests in that AOR?

Answer. I fully support the U.S. Army Europe plans to reduce its footprint from 16 garrisons to 7 garrisons by 2017. Regarding any additional reductions, we must ensure that our posture adapts to changes in the international security environment. Currently, there are several studies reviewing U.S. posture in Europe to include an internal DOD European Infrastructure Consolidation study and a congressionally-directed independent assessment of the overseas basing presence (NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012, section 347).

U.S. FORCE POSTURE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

Question. The Department continues the effort to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific as announced in the January 2012 Strategic Defense Guidance.

Are you satisfied with the rebalance efforts to date?

Answer. Yes. Despite the impact of sequestration, we continue to make progress on our key priorities in the Asia-Pacific. We are modernizing and strengthening our alliances and partnerships through multi-lateral and bilateral exercises while enhancing our engagement with region-wide institutions. We are enhancing our presence in the region by maintaining a defense posture that is more geographically distributed, politically sustainable, and operationally resilient. We are strengthening our military capabilities by sustaining investments critical to our ability to project power in support of security commitments.

Question. What do you see as the U.S. security priorities in the Asia-Pacific region over the next couple of years and what specific capabilities or enhancements are needed in to meet those priorities?

Answer. Our security priorities are those inherent in the rebalance: modernizing and strengthening our alliances, enhancing our presence, and pushing more quality forward in terms of capabilities. These efforts will enable us to shape partnerships and deter and respond as necessary to the threats in the region. We will continue to deter North Korea's continued provocative behavior. We will leverage our presence to mitigate tensions and encourage responsible behavior in the land and maritime territorial disputes such as exist in the East and South China Seas. We will need to deter disruptive activities in space and cyber space that have and will continue to become more sophisticated and damaging. Our forward presence and engagements are our overarching ways to address these challenges. Our people are our most valuable asset for building relationships. Special Operations Forces, cyber, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance are key capabilities I see for the near future.

Question. Do the budget cuts and resource constraints associated with sequestration threaten your ability to execute the rebalance to the Pacific?

Answer. To this point, budget reductions have not threatened our ability to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. However, full sequestration may limit or delay the strategic alignment of our engagement and capabilities. Some key relationships may take longer to develop due to constraints on education and exercises. At the same time, fiscal realities afford an opportunity to ensure we are putting the right resources in the right places, at the right times. We will continue our steady, thoughtful, and measured rebalance to the region.

Question. What is your assessment of the strategic consequences, including impact on relationships with partners and allies, if sequestration results in a "rebalance", that is, a net reduction in military assets in the U.S. PACOM AOR?

Answer. Rebalance is intended as a net increase in military capability to the Asia-Pacific region. That said, the essence of rebalance is about more than hardware. It is about more engagement and attention. With the looming impact of sequestration on readiness and engagement, our ability to expand military to military partnerships and build partner capacity will be reduced, limiting our ability to develop and expand the scope and quality of critical relationships.

SECURITY SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula and of the threat posed to the United States and its allies by the current state of North Korea's ballistic missile and nuclear weapons capabilities?

Answer. The security situation on the Peninsula is stable at the moment. However, I am concerned that we are in a period of prolonged provocation. North Korea military activity is at seasonal normal levels. North Korea has toned down rhetoric since the height of tensions in April of this year and appears to be engaged in diplomatic overtures, perhaps to win concessions. I remain concerned with North Korea's development of ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons and bellicose rhetoric threatening to use these weapons; however, we do not have any indications of imminent use of ballistic missile or nuclear capabilities at this time.

Question. In your view, are there additional steps that DOD could take to ensure that North Korea does not proliferate missile and weapons technology to Syria, Iran and others?

Answer. Currently, DOD is taking the appropriate steps to prevent proliferation. We support interagency efforts to prevent North Korea proliferation through WMD nonproliferation regimes including the Australia Group (CW/BW), Missile Technology Control Regime, Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Nuclear Suppliers Group. These regimes use customs and law enforcement practices such as export control lists to interrupt proliferation of WMD materials to Syria, Iran, and others from North Korea. Additionally, DOD supports interagency counter-proliferation efforts through involvement with the Proliferation Security Initiative and geographic combatant commander support for potential interdictions. I remain open to additional options for improving our contribution to countering proliferation.

Question. Are you satisfied that the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) combined counter-provocation plan, which was finalized a couple of months ago, strikes the right balance between enabling the South Koreans to respond to and defend against a provocation from North Korea while ensuring that the United States is involved in any decisions that might widen the military action to include U.S. forces?

Answer. Yes. The plan allows for the sovereign right of self-defense by the Republic of Korea in a timely and proportional manner without undue escalation and without violating the terms of the Armistice Agreement. Should the circumstances require or justify additional response, a bilateral U.S.-ROK consultative mechanism is in place to reach a suitable decision together. However, the situation on the Peninsula is always rife for miscalculation on all sides. U.S. deterrent forces, and the close relationship USFK enjoys with the ROK Government, are our strongest mitigation against escalation.

Question. What is your view regarding the timing of transfer of wartime operational control from the United States to the ROK, currently scheduled for December 2015, and do you support the transfer as scheduled?

Answer. I support the transfer as scheduled. From a military perspective, the timing of the transfer of wartime operational control is appropriate. The conditions for the transfer are based on meeting capability-based milestones, including acquisition of weapon systems, command and control systems, ISR platforms, appropriate and adequate supply of munitions, along with the right certification process to validate the readiness for the transfer. The ROK military is a very capable force, but it has had some setbacks in funding to achieve these milestones. General Thurman and his team at U.S. Forces-Korea are working hard with the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet the certification and capability requirements.

CHINA

Question. In the past several months, the United States and China have had several high level engagements, including President Obama's meetings with President Xi last month and your visit to China in April.

In view of these engagements, what is your assessment of the current state of the U.S.-China military relationship and your views regarding China's interest in and commitment to improving military relations with the United States?

Answer. Healthy, stable, reliable, and continuous military-to-military relations are in both nations' interest and are an essential part of the overall relationship. There are recent examples where we have improved practical cooperation, such as counter-piracy, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and military medicine exchanges. However, a deeper U.S.-China military-to-military dialogue is needed to address many of the sources of insecurity and potential competition that may arise as our two forces come into closer and more frequent contact.

Question. How has China's aggressive assertion of territorial and maritime claims, particularly in the South China Sea and East China Sea, effected security and stability in the region?

Answer. The United States has a national interest in the maintenance of peace, stability, respect for international law, freedom of navigation, and unimpeded lawful commerce. While the United States does not take sides in any territorial disputes, any such disputes must be resolved without coercion or the use of force. We strongly support dispute resolution on the basis of existing international mechanisms and in accordance with established international norms and institutions. At the same time, beginning serious negotiation on a Code of Conduct for interaction in disputed maritime territories will significantly reduce tension and potential for conflict across the region. We have made it clear to China that we have commitments to allies and partners and will continue our engagement while maintaining our posture across the Asia Pacific.

Question. If reconfirmed, what will be your priorities vis-a-vis China?

Answer. Positive and constructive engagement with China is a key part of our strategy in the Asia Pacific. In support of this, my priorities include a healthy, stable, reliable, and continuous military-to-military relationship. I will also work towards a model of relations where communications are not cut off when difficulties arise, which is precisely the time that communication and dialogue are the most important. Finally, we need increased cooperation, channels of communication, and interactions between the two militaries to improve our partnership and reduce the risk of miscalculation, miscommunication or accidents. I will give particular emphasis to improving the quality of our strategic dialogue and supporting the establishment of norms for behaviors in cyberspace.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR) CAPABILITIES

Question. Despite the ongoing drawdown in Afghanistan, demand for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities of every kind remains very high due to the enhanced situational awareness and targeting capabilities they bring to our commanders. Almost all of the geographic combatant commands still have validated ISR requirements that are not being met.

What is your assessment of the Department's current disposition of ISR assets across the various combatant commands?

Answer. I think we have maximized and optimized our ISR capability. We remain focused on our #1 priority, supporting the warfighters in Afghanistan. At the same time, we are supporting the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region while providing necessary capabilities to counter emerging extremist threats in AFRICOM's AOR. Prioritization is key to providing flexible and responsive forces.

Question. As our forces are withdrawn from Afghanistan, will existing ISR assets be re-postured to support combatant command needs in other regions, or will the ISR capacity be reduced?

Answer. In short, both. The fiscal year 2015 Global Force Management Allocation Plan is the first in which we begin to "reposture" ISR forces. Full Motion Video, Signals Intelligence, and Imagery Intelligence, among others, are valuable in any AOR. But many of the assets are very niche, and it will be difficult to translate their applicability in Afghanistan to other parts of the world. Budgetary pressures further constrain meeting combatant command requirements. Because of this, our total ISR force, quantitatively, will be diminished in fiscal year 2015 and beyond. But the technologies developed and lessons learned in Afghanistan will build a decidedly more capable, if smaller, global ISR force.

Question. Most of the highest-value ISR assets acquired after September 11 are aircraft that were not designed to be survivable in high-threat air defense environments, although in some cases unmanned aerial vehicles were designed to be deployed in large numbers in the expectation of substantial combat attrition.

Do you believe that the Department needs a major shift towards ISR platforms that are survivable in high-threat situations, or merely an augmentation of the capabilities we now have, with the assumption that air superiority can be gained rapidly enough to operate today's assets effectively?

Answer. The ISR assets we have in the Joint Force today are ready to perform missions across a range of warfighting scenarios. As we move toward the Joint Force of 2020, we will increasingly need ISR platforms that are survivable and can counter sophisticated adversaries defenses.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Question. The previous two QDRs have mandated significant growth in our Special Operations Forces (SOF) and enablers that directly support their operations.

Do you believe that QDR directed growth in the size of SOF should be retained despite current budgetary pressures?

Answer. Growth in Special Operations Forces capability has been necessary to meet the demands of the global conflicts in which we have been engaged over the past decade. We will judiciously balance the need for further growth in SOF with our need to address other capability demands in light of increased budgetary pressures. As a consequence, I do not expect additional, significant growth beyond what has already been programmed.

Question. In recent years, Special Operations Forces have taken on an expanded role in a number of areas important to countering violent extremist organizations, including those related to information and military intelligence operations. Some have advocated significant changes to U.S. Special Operations Command's (SOCOM) title 10 missions to make them better reflect the activities Special Operations Forces are carrying out around the world.

What current missions, if any, do you believe can and should be divested by SOCOM, and why?

Answer. At this time, I do not advocate for significant changes to SOCOM's title 10 missions. I use a range of processes—such as the Unified Command Plan, Guidance for the Employment of the Force, and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan—to review the mission sets and responsibilities assigned to SOCOM on a continuing basis. Additionally, the language in section 167 of title 10, U.S.C., includes "such other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense," which provides the President and the Secretary of Defense the flexibility needed to meet rapidly changing circumstances.

Question. Are there any additional missions that you believe SOCOM should assume, and, if so, what are they and why do you advocate adding them?

Answer. Pending a review of strategic planning documents, I do not advocate for SOCOM to assume any additional missions at this time. Special Operations Forces already provide a broad but uniquely specialized range of support to Joint Force Commanders. They are trained to conduct operations including counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, and counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in areas under

enemy control or in politically sensitive environments. In such environments, SOF provides unique and essential capabilities, and we will continue to leverage lessons learned in our Decade of War studies to enhance SOF and General Purpose Force integration.

Question. What can be done to ensure that indirect special operations missions with medium- and long-term impact, such as unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, receive as much emphasis as direct action, and that they receive appropriate funding?

Answer. In addition to developing specific Joint Doctrine on Unconventional Warfare, I have placed considerable emphasis on many aspects of foreign internal defense in my Capstone Concept for Joint Operations. I appreciate the significant legislative support for the many security force assistance and training and equipping missions that SOF undertakes. One area that may require enhanced legislative authorities is for greater opportunities to leverage non-SOF units to undertake partner capacity building tasks.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS AUTHORITIES

Question. Reportedly, the Commander of SOCOM has sought more control over the deployment and utilization of Special Operations Forces. For example, the Secretary of Defense recently modified policy guidance for the combatant commands that gave SOCOM, for the first time, responsibility for resourcing, organizing, and providing guidance to the Theater Special Operations Commands of the geographic combatant commanders and Special Operations Forces assigned to them. It has been reported that the Commander of SOCOM is also seeking new authorities that would allow him to more rapidly move Special Operations Forces between geographic combatant commands.

Please provide your assessment of whether such changes are appropriate and can be made without conflicting with civilian control of the military, infringing upon authorities provided to the geographic combatant commanders, or raising concerns with the State Department.

Answer. Special Operations Forces do not undertake operations without the approval of the President, the Secretary of Defense, the geographic combatant commanders, and the Chiefs of Mission. The proposed changes enhance the ability of our global Special Operations Forces to network with our U.S. interagency counterparts as well as our foreign allies and partners. I fully support a more efficient and effective ability of our Special Operations Forces to more dynamically respond to global demands in the future.

COMBATING TERRORISM

Question. The administration recently released its National Strategy for Counterterrorism. This strategy highlights the need to maintain pressure on al Qaeda's core while building the capacity of partners to confront mutual threats. The strategy also underscores the need to augment efforts to counter threats from al Qaeda-linked threats "that continue to emerge from beyond its core safe haven in South Asia."

How do you view the DOD's role under the new National Strategy for Counterterrorism?

Answer. The United States pursues a comprehensive approach to counter terrorist networks that threaten our Nation. The military is one element of this effort. DOD works closely with interagency stakeholders and key partners and allies to combat those threats beyond South Asia in support of the strategy. Training, advising, and assisting partnered forces allows us to leverage our unique Defense capabilities outside of the Afghanistan theater of operations. The Department implements rigorous guidelines, standards and accountability for lethal action against terrorist networks who threaten our Nation.

Question. What is your understanding of the impact of the Presidential Policy Guidance on Counterterrorism on DOD's role within the U.S. Government's counterterrorism strategy?

Answer. The recently signed Presidential Policy Guidance on Counterterrorism is a codification of policies and procedures that have been applied for some time. The guidance clarifies, formalizes, and strengthens the standards and processes we use. Military capabilities are one part of our comprehensive counterterrorism effort. We will continue to enable our allies to develop the capability to counter terrorists within their borders. When necessary and after a robust and accountable review process, we can take direct action against those specific terrorist networks that threaten U.S. persons. Our current authorities are sufficient to defend the Nation against existing terrorist threats. The Department implements a rigorous, transparent and account-

able review process. We will scrupulously adhere to the rule of law and the highest ethical standards in implementing the strategy and guidance.

Question. Will DOD see its role increase or decrease?

Answer. The best way to defeat terrorism is with a comprehensive approach. DOD will continue to play a significant role in counterterrorism. The presidential policy framework codifies rigorous guidelines, oversight and accountability for targeted, lethal action against specific terrorist networks that threaten our Nation. The military also conducts a range of activities to build partner capacity and support other government agency efforts.

Question. If the role increases, what, if any, are the commensurate increases in capabilities or capacities that are required?

Answer. DOD will continue to develop new capabilities, technologies, and tactics as well as streamlined processes and procedures to ensure we stay ahead of our enemies as they also adapt. Joint Force 2020 must include and integrate innovative capabilities such as cyber, Special Operations Forces and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms.

Question. Will DOD require any new authorities?

Answer. I believe that existing authorities are adequate. Should a new group threaten the United States, we can respond as necessary under U.S. domestic and international law. I have not encountered a situation during my tenure as Chairman in which we did not have the necessary and sufficient authorities. If confirmed and this occurred during my tenure, I would consult within the executive and with Congress to determine whether additional authorities or tools have become necessary or appropriate.

Question. Are there steps DOD should take to better coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other Federal departments and agencies?

Answer. Improving interagency coordination was a key finding in our Decade of War study. The Joint Staff regularly and actively participates in both the National Security Staff's Counterterrorism Security Group and the President's Counterterrorism Board of Directors. Our combatant commands support our efforts and work closely with U.S. Embassies, interagency partners, and local actors. Institutionally, the Department is deliberately and carefully integrating lessons learned in our doctrine, training, planning and operations. We seek to support similar efforts where and when they exist in other organizations.

Question. What do you view as the role of DOD in countering al Qaeda and affiliated groups in cyberspace?

Answer. Defense of cyberspace requires a public-private effort to provide the best protection possible for our Nation. We are making significant progress. Cyber is an essential capability for Joint Force 2020. DOD works with interagency and commercial partners in order to counter threats from non-state actors in cyberspace and other domains. We will continue to employ a robust defensive posture on our military networks. In the event of a cyber attack, DOD has processes in place to identify it with interagency partners, defend against the attack, and share information with industry to mitigate effects.

INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING CONTRIBUTIONS

Question. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (July 29, 2009), Ambassador Susan Rice, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, stated that the United States "is willing to consider directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers, civilian police, and other civilian personnel—including more women I should note—to U.N. peacekeeping operations."

What is your view on whether the United States should contribute more military personnel to both staff positions and military observers in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations?

Answer. In Afghanistan, our military commitment is shifting from combat operations to maintaining a long-term relationship with the people of Afghanistan in concert with our NATO allies. This mission shift allows us to consider other opportunities for U.S. forces and personnel to contribute to U.N. peacekeeping missions around the world on a very selective basis and under the right conditions. Our experience shows that even a small number of U.S. personnel can play an out-sized role in improving the effectiveness of U.N. operations.

Question. If confirmed, would you support identifying methods through which the DOD personnel system could be more responsive to requests for personnel support from multilateral institutions like the United Nations?

Answer. We have been responsive to requests from the U.N. for personnel support. This year, for the first time in nearly 2 decades, a U.S. general officer is helping to lead peacekeepers in a U.N. field mission. By all accounts, this officer has

done a terrific job in Liberia. He is even supervising members of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Additionally, when the U.N. requested U.S. officers for the new mission in South Sudan, U.S. Africa Command provided three of its own staff officers to deploy immediately until the Services could provide long-term fills. We are currently working with Africa Command on a similar solution for the mission in Mali. As I told Secretary General Ban Ki-moon during his visit this spring, we look forward to exploring even more opportunities to offer our leaders in support of the U.N. and other multilateral institutions.

INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION

Question. The collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces, general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and agencies has played a significant role in the success of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in recent years. However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature.

What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere?

Answer. Among other lessons, it seems clear to me that we have learned that countering insurgent and terrorist threats demands the integration of all instruments of national power toward a common purpose. Over the past decade, our interagency coordination has been occasionally uneven due to policy gaps, inconsistent resources, and differences in organizational culture. While we struggled early on to harness the full extent of our whole-of-government effort, over time, our military and civilian organizations have learned to better leverage each other's strengths. If confirmed, I am committed to institutionalizing these lessons learned even as we reset and prepare for the future.

Question. How do you believe these efforts can be improved?

Answer. It begins with leadership. We've learned that we need to stress the value of interagency coordination at all levels. For DOD, this means exposing our military personnel to a range of interagency organizations to facilitate understanding of different agency cultures, equities, capabilities, and limitations. We also incorporate interagency partners into our training and education programs, building the kinds of relationships that increase our overall effectiveness. More can be done, and if confirmed, I will work with this Congress to enhance these programs.

Question. How can the lessons learned in recent years be captured in military doctrine and adopted as "best practices" for future contingency operations?

Answer. As Chairman, I led a "Decade of War" effort to examine this question and to ensure that we do not lose the lessons of 10 years of war. Codifying our work is key. Critical doctrinal publications such as Joint Pub 3-08, "Inter-organizational Coordination during Joint Operations," capture the best practices of our recent experience. The current version was published in June 2011, and importantly, our interagency partners contributed to writing it. If confirmed, I plan to begin a formal update of this publication in the coming year.

Question. Interagency collaboration on an operational or tactical level tends to address issues on a country-by-country basis rather than on a regional basis (e.g. international terrorists departing Mali for safe havens in Libya).

How do you believe regional strategies that link efforts in individual countries can best be coordinated in the interagency arena?

Answer. Our performance in crisis situations rests on how well we collaborate on a routine basis. Therefore, I support a whole-of-government planning, operations and resourcing framework to ensure our country plans are mutually-reinforcing. The military develops Theater Campaign Plans and Functional Campaign Plans that address regional and trans-regional issues. We seek input from interagency partners in the development of these plans to de-conflict, if not complement efforts. State is beginning to develop Joint Regional Strategies to address regional foreign policy priorities and drive country strategies. This new regional perspective will improve our ability to coordinate DOD plans with State plans.

RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

Question. The U.S. Government has recognized the "responsibility to protect" (R2P)—that is, the responsibility of the international community to use appropriate means to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, by encouraging states to protect their own populations, by helping states build the capacity to do so, and by acting directly should national authorities fail to provide such protection. In its 2010 QDR, DOD names "preventing human suffering due to mass atrocities" as one of a long list of potential contingencies that DOD might be called on to address. DOD has begun to explore some

of the implications of R2P, by considering “mass atrocity prevention and response operations”.

In your view, how high a priority should the “responsibility to protect” be for the U.S. Government as a whole?

Answer. Preserving the capacity of the United States and its partners to prevent human suffering is a means of promoting our values and strengthening our influence around the world. Although neither the United States nor any other country recognizes the “responsibility to protect” as a legal basis for the use of military force, the U.S. Armed Forces can carry out these types of missions if called upon to do so. Prioritization is not a decision for the military to make.

Question. In your view, what should be the role of DOD, if any, in fulfilling the responsibility to protect?

Answer. The role of DOD will be to support our government’s policy decision. The whole-of-government approach should involve an appropriate mix of diplomatic, economic, and/or military measures. The role of DOD will be to provide options and assess the risk associated with those options. We will also make a recommendation on the strategy for any specific situation to include those involving atrocities.

Question. In your view, what is the proper application of R2P doctrine with respect to the situation in Syria?

Answer. The conflict in Syria is as complex as any I have seen. We have an obligation to think through the efficacy and consequences of any direct U.S. military action in Syria, especially if it could create conditions that would cause more civilian casualties, unleash chemical weapons, or bring the United States into a broader regional conflict. Even as we consider the use of force, we must continue to work with our allies and partners in the region to prevent their destabilization, provide humanitarian aid, and support the Syrian opposition. The United States is providing nearly \$815 million in aid to help the victims of this conflict, including emergency medical care and supplies, food, and shelter.

OPERATION OBSERVANT COMPASS & THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY

Question. Despite pressure by the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) and efforts by U.S. Special Operations personnel to support them, elements of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)—including Joseph Kony—continue to operate and commit atrocities against civilian populations in the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and South Sudan. Some observers have identified operational concerns with this mission, including that: (1) supported forces are trying to find an elusive foe in an area roughly the size of California, much of which is covered in thick jungle; (2) technical support to U.S. forces and their UPDF partners from the defense and intelligence community continues to be inadequate; and (3) limitations continue to be placed on the ability of U.S. Special Operations personnel to accompany UPDF partners outside of main basing locations, thereby limiting the level of direct support they can provide.

In your view, what is the objective of Operation Observant Compass?

Answer. The strategy is comprised of four elements: (1) protect civilians; (2) promote DD/RRR (disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation, and resettlement); (3) increase humanitarian access/support; and (4) remove Joseph Kony and senior LRA leaders from the region. DOD plays a role in all four pillars but is the primary agent for implementing the fourth element.

Question. Do you support the continuation of DOD’s current level of support to this mission?

Answer. In the near-term, the current level of military support is appropriate. DOD is currently weighing options to determine the future level of support. DOD must prioritize limited resources among numerous competing priorities, requirements and risks to other missions. Cost is another factor being considered given the current budget constraints.

HUMAN TERRAIN IN CONFLICT

Question. In 2009, then-Secretary Gates helped launch the Minerva Initiative and the Human Social Culture Behavior Modeling Program to develop deeper social, cultural, and behavioral expertise for policy, strategy and operational purposes in the Middle East and Far East.

How have these programs contributed to our understanding the complex human terrain of these parts of the world?

Answer. Yes. The Minerva Initiative examines the social and political dynamics of present and future conflict. Research conducted under its auspices validated the COMISAF policy of “courageous restraint” (e.g. exercise patience before using force); enriched our understanding of the radicalization processes, and produced a method

for empirically characterizing tribal cohesiveness, a predictor of the susceptibility to al Qaeda influence. The Human Social Culture Behavior Modeling (HSCB) Program, which forecasts instability globally, has been fielded at PACOM, SOUTHCOM, STRATCOM, and SOCOM.

Question. Are we adequately resourcing these programs and how can we improve our capabilities to understand the perceptions, attitudes, ethnic identities, religious beliefs and predispositions of the audiences we seek to reach and interact with in these regions?

Answer. Although the HSCB Modeling program concludes its 4 year program in fiscal year 2013, we continue to fund many other social science research efforts. As we learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, cultural and regional skills are key to succeeding in Irregular Warfare. Accordingly, I have mandated that they be covered in at all levels of Joint Professional Military Education curricula and in Joint Doctrine publications on Stability Operations, Counterinsurgency Operations, and Special Operations.

NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

Question. Criminal networks are not only expanding their operations, but they are also diversifying their activities, resulting in a convergence of transnational threats that has evolved to become more complex, volatile, and destabilizing. The Director of National Intelligence recently described transnational organized crime as “an abiding threat to U.S. economic and national security interests,” and stated that “rising drug violence and corruption are undermining stability and the rule of law in some countries” in the Western Hemisphere. In July 2011, the President released his Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security. One of the priority action areas designated in the strategy is “enhancing DOD support to U.S. law enforcement.”

What is your understanding of the President’s strategy to combat transnational criminal organizations?

Answer. The President’s Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime integrates all elements of national power to combat transnational organized crime and related threats to national security. Ultimately, the strategy seeks to reduce transnational organized crime to a manageable public safety concern.

Question. What is your understanding of the Department’s role within the President’s strategy?

Answer. DOD is not the lead agency responsible for combatting transnational organized crime. DOD instead plays an appropriate and critically important role supporting law enforcement to counter threats to national security.

Question. In your view, should DOD play a role in providing support to the U.S. law enforcement and the Intelligence Community on matters related to transnational organized crime?

Answer. DOD provides unique supporting capabilities to address the full range of transnational criminal threats, including military intelligence support to law enforcement, military-to-military capability development, and military operational activities against threats to the U.S. DOD supports U.S. law enforcement and the Intelligence Community as part of a whole-of-government approach, consistent with current authorities.

MASS ATROCITIES PREVENTION

Question. President Obama identified the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide as a core U.S. national security interest, as well as a core moral interest, in August 2011 under Presidential Study Directive 10.

Among interagency partners, what is DOD’s role in addressing atrocity threats, and what tools does DOD have for preventing or responding to atrocities?

Answer. DOD has developed Joint Doctrine for conducting Mass Atrocity Response Operations. Based on this doctrine, atrocity prevention and response is now incorporated into DOD plans and planning guidance. In addition, DOD has conducted a comprehensive review of training in this area and is working to strengthen the capacity of UN peacekeeping operations to respond to atrocity events.

Question. Has DOD developed planning processes toward this effort so that it will be able to respond quickly in emergency situations?

Answer. Yes, DOD has developed planning processes toward this effort. All DOD components have been directed to integrate atrocity prevention and response into their policies and plans. Specific plans are further developed and implemented at the geographic combatant command level, in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff.

Question. In your view, is the situation in Syria a mass atrocity?

Answer. In my view, the situation in Syria is tragic and an atrocity. By some estimates as many as 100,000 combatant and non-combatants have been killed, with over 5 million displaced.

COUNTER THREAT FINANCE

Question. Identifying and disrupting key individuals, entities, and facilitation routes enabling the flow of money that supports terrorism, production of IEDs, narco-trafficking, proliferation, and other significant national security threats could have an outsized impact on confronting these threats. In August 2010, the Department issued a Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Policy Directive which recognized the CTF discipline as an essential tool in combating criminal networks and terrorist organizations and called for the integration of CTF capabilities into future force planning and the continued support to interagency partners conducting CTF operations.

What is your assessment of the Department's efforts to date to institutionalize and support these capabilities?

Answer. Upsetting the financial supply lines of our adversaries is a proven way to disrupt threats to U.S. national security. DOD Threat Finance Cells already have a track record of success in Iraq and Afghanistan. We need this capability in the Department. DOD Directive 5205.14 (CTF), updated in November 2012, institutionalizes counter threat finance within DOD. Ultimately, our success in counter threat finance will depend on our ability to integrate efforts with other U.S. Government agencies, multinational organizations, and host nations.

Question. What is your assessment of the current ability of the Department to provide support to other U.S. Government departments and agencies conducting counter threat finance activities?

Answer. DOD currently supports the efforts of other government agencies with its unique capabilities, including long-term planning, network analysis, intelligence analysis and tools, and the integration of intelligence into operations. The result is a well-coordinated, capable, and robust counter threat finance posture. If confirmed, I will continue to remain fully engaged in the interagency process to counter threat finance activities.

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to DOD's current counter threat finance efforts?

Answer. The Department is examining its current counter threat finance efforts. We are focused on incorporating lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan and further strengthening and institutionalizing our counter threat finance capability. We may recommend additional training and education for the force.

SECTION 1208 OPERATIONS

Question. Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375), as amended by subsequent bills, authorizes the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism.

What is your current assessment of this authority?

Answer. Combatant commanders continue to view section 1208 as a key tool in the ongoing fight against terrorism. The ability for Special Operations Forces to leverage willing partners who possess access to areas, people, and information denied to our forces is critical to tactical and strategic success. This authority has allowed us to respond quickly to global challenges while maintaining appropriate civilian oversight, including Secretary of Defense approval and congressional notification. The Department is appreciative of Congress' continued support for this authority. If confirmed, I will continue to keep you informed through our annual report and briefings.

ACTIVE-DUTY AND RESERVE COMPONENT END STRENGTH

Question. Last year, DOD announced its 5-year plan to reduce Active-Duty end strengths by over 100,000 servicemembers by 2017, and the Reserve components by another 21,000 over the same period. These cuts do not include any additional personnel reductions that could result from sequestration or any agreement to avoid sequestration.

What is your view of the role of the Reserve components as the Active components draw down?

Answer. Twelve years of combat operations has transformed our Reserve component from a strategic reserve to a full-spectrum force critical to our overall military readiness. Recent combat deployments, as well as peacekeeping, humanitarian relief and homeland defense missions, have resulted in our Reserve component being far

more operationally capable and experienced than before. We have yet to determine the final steady-state balance between the Active and Reserve component, in part because of continuing budget uncertainty. But going forward, the Reserve component will be an essential part of the total force.

Question. What additional military personnel reductions do you envision if the sequester continues into 2014 and beyond?

Answer. Because military personnel cannot be reduced quickly, a continuation of sequester funding levels would require DOD to take disproportionate cuts from the modernization and readiness portions of the fiscal year 2014 budget. To ensure these accounts do not bear an excessive portion of budget reductions, DOD would seek to significantly draw down the size of the military after fiscal year 2014.

Question. In your view, what tools do DOD and the Services need to get down to authorized strengths in the future, and which of these require congressional authorization?

Answer. In my view, DOD's existing force management tools provide the necessary flexibility to enable the Services to get down to authorized end strength. At this time, the Services are not requesting additional force management tools.

RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

Question. In your view, do policies concerning religious accommodation in the military appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs, including individual expressions of belief, without impinging on those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief?

Answer. Yes. Our official policy states, "DOD places a high value on the rights of members of the Military Services to observe the tenets of their respective religions or to observe no religion at all." (DODI 1300.17, "Accommodation of Religious Practices Within the Military Services"). By both policy and practice, commanders are committed to ensuring members of the Joint Force of deep religious faith, as well as those of no religious faith, can serve in a climate of mutual respect and trust.

Question. Under current law and policy, are individual expressions of belief accommodated so long as they do not impact unit cohesion and good order and discipline?

Answer. Yes. Commanders consider requests for accommodation of individual expressions of belief, to include apparel, grooming and worship practices. Requests are given equal consideration as long as they do not negatively impact mission accomplishment, military readiness, unit cohesion, good order, discipline, or any other military requirement.

PREVENTION OF AND RESPONSE TO SEXUAL ASSAULTS

Question. In 2012, for the fourth year in a row, there were more than 3,000 reported cases of sexual assault in the military, including 2558 unrestricted reports, and an additional 816 restricted reports (restricted, meaning that, in accordance with the victim's request, they were handled in a confidential manner and not investigated). Moreover, a recent survey conducted by DOD indicates that the actual number of sexual offenses could be considerably higher, as 6.1 percent of active duty women and 1.2 percent of active duty men surveyed reported having experienced an incident of unwanted sexual contact in the previous 12 months.

What is your assessment of the current DOD sexual assault prevention and response program?

Answer. We have taken swift, deliberate action to change a military culture that had become too complacent of discrimination, harassment, and assault. The Secretary and I, along with the Joint Chiefs, remain personally committed to eradicating sexual assault within our ranks and to improving processes and programs as part of our comprehensive approach. The Services have achieved significant progress in many areas. They have added specialized training for investigation and litigation, provided broader access to victim's advocates and Special Victim's Counsel, and hired Highly Qualified Experts to evaluate our progress. We are focused on taking care of victims, preventing the conditions that make assault possible, and enforcing respectful unit environments.

Question. What is your view of the provision for restricted and unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults?

Answer. Our primary concern remains the safety and well-being of the victim. We are taking swift and deliberate action to reinforce a professional work environment, prevent and respond to predatory and precursor behaviors, and better protect victims. Should a sexual assault occur, we prefer the victim come forward with an unrestricted report, to allow for thorough investigation and litigation. However, con-

fidential reporting, or restricted reporting, allows a victim to access services to meet their personal needs without the additional anxiety of a criminal investigation. Moving initial disposition authority to O-6 commanders or higher has increased unrestricted reporting, and access to Special Victim's Counsel has increased victims' willingness to change a restricted report to an unrestricted report. However, both restricted and unrestricted reporting options remain essential to our response to sexual assault.

Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of DOD oversight of military service implementation of DOD and Service policies for the prevention of and response to sexual assaults?

Answer. The Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) oversees the Department's sexual assault policy and works with the Services' offices to execute the Services' sexual assault prevention and response plans. SAPRO also works with the civilian community to develop and implement innovative prevention and response approaches to the programs. They continue to lead on this issue by informing and advising commanders at all levels. Despite their best efforts, we have not yet turned the tide on this crime in our ranks. Therefore, I will continue to support initiatives for strengthening oversight and accountability.

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults have occurred?

Answer. The commander is central to our ability to effect institutional change. We must hold commanders accountable at every level for reinforcing the highest standards of respect and trust that all of our men and women in uniform—and the American people—deserve. The sexual assault crisis in the military is a result, in large part, of a climate that had become too complacent. We have already refined our assessments of command climate by updating the surveys that specifically enable servicemembers to evaluate their commanders on unit climate and sexual assault response. Additionally, we have moved initial disposition authority for incidents of sexual assault to the O-6 commanders or higher. We will not let up in our efforts to drive the crime of sexual violence from our ranks.

Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a judge advocate outside the chain of command to determine whether allegations of sexual assault should be prosecuted?

Answer. The commander's role in the military justice process is long-standing and essential to the effectiveness of our Joint Force. Our commanders are responsible for the efficiency of their units first, but more broadly, it is in their hands that the defense of the Nation rests. Because of the tremendous responsibility placed in commanders, they must also have broad authority to enforce discipline and execute their duties. This is a foundational element of the military justice system. The central imperative in commanders' responsibility to accomplish their assigned missions, in peacetime and in war, is the good order and discipline of the men and women they lead. Commanders regularly consult with their judge advocates, including when deciding whether to prosecute alleged offenses. Removing commanders from the military justice process in this way would send the message that there is a lack of faith in the officer corps and that commanders cannot be trusted to mete out discipline. Such a message would surely undermine good order and discipline. Absolving commanders of their role in the military justice system would potentially undermine the military's ability to adequately address this issue. Commanders must be held accountable for maintaining a climate that does not tolerate sexual assault. Responsibility and accountability go hand-in-hand: in order to hold commanders accountable for the good order and discipline of their units, they must hold that responsibility and be empowered by the system. Disempowering commanders will not help the military tackle this problem.

Question. Article 60 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) requires the convening authority to take action on the sentence issued by a court-martial and authorizes a convening authority, in his sole discretion, to take action of the findings of a court-martial, including setting aside a finding of guilty or changing a finding of guilty to a finding of guilty of a lesser included offense.

What is your view about the authority of a convening authority to set aside or modify findings of guilt and authority to reduce a sentence imposed by court-martial?

Answer. Article 60 of the UCMJ currently grants broad authority and discretion to convening authorities to dismiss findings of guilt after trial. That authority, which dates back well over 200 years, was necessary when the military justice system lacked many of the procedural safeguards inherent in the system today. In the past, the military justice system lacked attorneys serving as trial and defense counsel, independent trial judges, and an appellate process. Article 60 was necessary so that commanders, with the advice of their staff judge advocates, could ensure the

proceedings, and in particular the findings, were fair and just. Many changes to the military justice system, which began with the Military Justice Improvement Act of 1968, now provide the necessary due process and safeguards. Licensed military attorneys now serve as prosecutors and defense counsel, independent military judges preside over courts-martial, and convicted servicemembers are entitled to a robust appellate process. Due to these changes, there is little or no need for a convening authority to dismiss the findings after a panel (jury) has found the accused guilty. A convening authority should have the discretion, however, to dismiss minor offenses under appropriate circumstances, such as to prevent an accused from the burden of a felony conviction when found guilty of minor misconduct but acquitted of major offenses. Examples of such minor misconduct include underage drinking and brief absences without leave, which on their own would not normally be adjudicated by courts-martial. Rather, a convening authority should have the flexibility to adjudicate such offenses in an alternate fashion. Convening authorities should also retain the ability to modify sentences, which is an essential component of our plea bargain process.

ASSIGNMENT POLICIES FOR WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

Question. The Department, in January, rescinded the policy restricting the assignment of women to certain units which have the primary mission of engaging in direct ground combat operations, and has given the Military Services until January 1, 2016, to open all positions currently closed to women, or to request an exception to policy to keep a position closed beyond that date, an exception that must be approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. The Services are working now to develop gender-free physical and mental standards for all military occupations, presumably with the goal of allowing individuals, regardless of gender, to serve in those positions if they can meet those standards.

If confirmed, what role will you play in the development of these standards?

Answer. Women continue to serve with distinction throughout the Armed Forces, and the successful integration of women into currently closed positions requires thoughtful planning and deliberate action as we proceed. I am working with the Services to provide quarterly reports to the Secretary of Defense on the progress of requirements review and validation, the timeline for opening closed occupations, limiting factors to executing implementation, positions being considered for an exception to policy, and an assessment of newly integrated positions. All our standards should be reviewed to make sure they are essential to the occupation and task. Full implementation should occur by January 1, 2014. Ultimately, we're acting to strengthen the Joint Force.

Question. Will you ensure that the standards will be realistic and will preserve, or enhance, military readiness and mission capability?

Answer. The Service Chiefs and I identified guiding principles to better align our policies with the experiences we have had over the past decade of war. This means setting clear, essential, gender-neutral standards of performance for all occupations based on what it actually takes to do the job. With the Joint Chiefs, I am closely monitoring each of the Services as they develop their implementation plans and providing quarterly reports to the Secretary of Defense. Effective planning and implementation requires that we appropriately integrate women into the organizational culture of certain military occupations.

Question. Do you believe that decisions to open positions should be based on bona fide military requirements?

Answer. Yes. Performance standards exist to ensure individuals can accomplish the tasks required of the mission. Eligibility for training and development should consist of qualitative and quantifiable standards reflecting the knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary for each occupation as required by Public Law 103-160, section 543 (1993).

Question. If so, what steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that such decisions are made on this basis?

Answer. I will continue to work with the Joint Chiefs to ensure changes are carefully reviewed and implemented so our service women are set up for long-term success with viable career paths. This deliberate process will anticipate second- and third-order effects while guarding against unintended consequences. Our force deserves our full faith and commitment that we get this right.

Question. Some family members have expressed concerns about assigning women to what are currently male-only combat units.

To what extent do you believe that this will be a problem in the implementation of this policy?

Answer. I think families recognize the bravery and sacrifice of women in combat, especially over the past decade of war. The successful integration of women into currently closed positions requires we be thoughtful and deliberate in planning. One of my guiding principles is to also ensure a sufficient cadre of midgrade and senior female enlisted and officers are assigned to commands, to become established members of the command and to act as mentors to younger women as they integrate into the unit. These mentors will help establish a climate of trust and support.

Question. If it is a problem, what steps would you take if confirmed to address it?

Answer. I will continue to hold the Services accountable to open all specialties, as the Secretary of Defense and I must personally approve any request for exceptions to policy. If members of our military can meet the qualifications for a job, then they should have the right to serve, regardless of creed, color, gender or sexual orientation.

RISING COSTS OF MEDICAL CARE

Question. In testimony presented to Congress in February 2009, the Assistant Director of the Congressional Budget Office asserted that "medical funding accounts for more than one-third of the growth projected for operations and support funding between 2009 and 2026." In April 2009, then Secretary of Defense Gates told an audience at Maxwell Air Force Base that "health care is eating the Department alive." In recent years, the Department has attempted to address the growth in overall health care costs by identifying efficiencies as well as by proposing increased cost shares for military retirees.

What reforms in infrastructure, benefits, or benefit management, if any, do you think should be examined in order to control the costs of military health care?

Answer. Quality health care is a critical component to having a fit and ready force. We are examining fiscal year 2014 options to slow the growth of health care costs while preserving the quality and enhancing the range of health care services available to the Military Family. Reform to control costs is essential to making healthcare more sustainable. If confirmed, I will continue to assist the Secretary of Defense in this comprehensive review of benefit payment structures, organizational structure, systems, and policies to improve affordability.

Question. What is your assessment of the long-term impact of rising medical costs on future DOD plans?

Answer. Health care costs consume 10 percent of the department's budget. In real terms, costs have tripled since 2001 and are forecasted to nearly double again by 2030. Increasing health care costs will inhibit future force readiness as competing requirements confront a decreasing top line. Health care is key to retaining high quality servicemembers and to keeping faith with our entire military family. I will continue to work closely with DOD leadership and Congress to find reasonable and responsible ways to slow this growth.

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you initiate or recommend to mitigate the effect of such costs on the DOD top-line?

Answer. Over the last several budget cycles, Congress has permitted small, necessary increases in the TRICARE Prime enrollment fees. These adjustments were an important step to managing costs, but they are not enough to sustain the benefit in the long term. Given today's budget environment, we must find a mutually acceptable compromise to reduce health costs while still maintaining the quality of care our force and our veterans deserve. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Secretary of Defense and this Congress to do so.

SYSTEMS AND SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED WARRIORS

Question. Servicemembers who are or have been wounded and injured in combat operations deserve the highest priority from their Service for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from active duty when appropriate, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Yet, as the revelations at Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) in 2007 illustrated, the Services were not prepared to meet the needs of significant numbers of returning wounded servicemembers. Despite the enactment of legislation and continuing emphasis, many challenges remain, including a growing population of servicemembers awaiting disability evaluation.

What is your assessment of the progress made to date by DOD, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Services to improve the care, management, and transition of seriously ill and injured servicemembers and their families?

Answer. We have made substantial progress in medical care over the last 12 years of war. From first responder care to joint battlefield surgical care, from the Air

Force's enroute care to advanced rehabilitation provided by the Department of Veterans Affairs, the medical advances we've made are, quite literally, lifesaving and world changing. In other arenas, particularly those surrounding family and transition, we have been slower to make progress. We are structured to fight and win wars, but are not as well prepared to manage a large population of transitioning servicemembers. We are making progress within the boundaries of law, but I am committed to improving our efforts and results.

Question. What are the strengths upon which continued progress should be based?

Answer. We can make further progress by leveraging the collaboration on research and treatment between the private medical research and healthcare sectors and our Centers of Excellence. These partnerships have made significant strides in the care of our Wounded Warriors and on the health of our Total Force. We have successfully returned many of our Wounded Warriors to service. We have also established robust, day-to-day collaboration with the Department of Veterans Affairs. It is not uncommon for VA providers to speak directly to battlefield providers, and such end-to-end feedback directly benefits veterans' care. We also have uniformed servicemembers working in VA facilities and VA benefits personnel working in our medical facilities, to better serve the large population of servicemembers transitioning to civilian life.

Question. What are the weaknesses that need to be corrected?

Answer. Individual case management needs further improvement. This involves a servicemember transitioning from the Active Force to DOD retiree or eligible veteran status. The key components of this process remain the implementation of a single electronic health record, which follows the servicemember through transition, and a single tracking tool for case management. Our ability to communicate across our individual bureaucracies continues to be an area requiring our full attention and effort.

Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you would pursue to increase support for wounded servicemembers and their families, and to monitor their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life?

Answer. As the conflict in Afghanistan winds down, I recognize the importance of preserving the knowledge, skills, and advances made in caring for our wounded servicemembers over the past decade. Last month, I asked the Defense Health Board to make a high priority the ability to sustain current practices and continuing advancements in treatment and rehabilitation for our seriously wounded servicemembers and their families.

Question. Studies conducted as a result of the revelations at WRAMC pointed to the need to reform the disability evaluation system (DES). The Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES) was established to integrate DOD and Department of Veterans Affairs disability systems to improve and expedite processing of servicemembers through the disability evaluation system.

What is your assessment of the need to further streamline and improve the DES?

Answer. In addition to the changes we have already made, Senator Dole's and Secretary Shalala's commission recommended further statutory changes to limit DOD to the "ability" business and of the VA to the "disability" business in keeping with each department's core competencies. I support their commission's recommendations. Barring legislative change to establish a single system, we have gone about as far and as fast as we can with separate processes and systems.

Question. If confirmed, how will you address any need for change?

Answer. I will continue to do my very best to expedite transition and disability processing within the bounds of law and my authorities. I will advocate for governance process improvements and other system upgrade to streamline and simplify the process.

SUICIDE PREVENTION AND MENTAL HEALTH RESOURCES

Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the Services continues to concern the Committee.

In your view, what role should the Joint Chiefs of Staff play in shaping policies to help prevent suicides both in garrison and in theater and to increase the resiliency of all servicemembers and their families, including members of the Reserve components?

Answer. The Joint Chiefs have a shared responsibility to address military suicides with the same devotion we have shown to protecting the lives of our forces in combat. I am working closely with the chiefs, our interagency partners, and the White House to increase our understanding of the factors leading to suicide and how to best leverage care networks to keep our servicemembers and veterans alive.

Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that sufficient mental health resources are available to servicemembers in theater, and to the servicemembers and their families upon return to home station?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to champion the fielding of effective treatments for mental health issues, traumatic brain injury, and combat stress. This includes the robust system of behavioral health care resources that are already available in the Afghanistan Theater of Operations. I will also continue my support of the Services to reduce the stigma and remove barriers to seeking mental health services for both servicemembers and their family members. This effort must include steps to ensure subordinate commands praise help-seeking behavior and promote reaching out by providing examples of servicemembers who have benefitted from mental health assistance or counseling.

MILITARY QUALITY OF LIFE

Question. The committee is concerned about the sustainment of key quality of life programs for military families, such as family support, child care, education, employment support, health care, and morale, welfare and recreation services, especially as DOD faces budget challenges.

If confirmed, what further enhancements, if any, to military quality of life programs would you consider a priority in an era of intense downward pressure on budgets, and how do you envision working with the Services, combatant commanders, family advocacy groups, and Congress to achieve them?

Answer. The entire enterprise is under scrutiny, and we are seeking a way to balance the needs of providing security to the Nation and ensure the long-term viability of the All-Volunteer Force. Part of our evaluation has focused on providing a quality of life for servicemembers and their families that fosters successful recruitment, retention, and career progression. We are also looking to modernize and achieve fiscal sustainability for the compensation and retirement systems. The mental health of our servicemembers is also a priority. We will work to ensure that the downward pressure of budgets does not adversely impact this vital area. I have my Joint Staff positioned on working groups, task forces and other venues to work together with the Services and other concerned parties to ensure we keep faith with our military family in these areas.

FAMILY READINESS AND SUPPORT

Question. Military members and their families in both the Active and Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military leaders have warned of growing concerns among military families as a result of the stress of frequent deployments and the long separations that go with them.

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for servicemembers and their families?

Answer. According to recent Family Readiness surveys, military families are most concerned about pay and benefits and retirement. DOD is fully engaged through the Pay and Retirement Working Group, which feeds recommendations to the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Executive Committee to address these concerns. In my judgment, families are also attuned to the need for our compensation system to be sustainable.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support the Services as they assess military family needs and program effectiveness. Unsustainable costs and smaller budgets mean we must examine every warrior and family support program to make sure we are getting the best return on our investment. We must promote the most effective programs across the force and carefully reduce duplicative efforts. This ongoing effort includes current studies—via DODEA, DECA, and a number of university partnerships—to identify best practices and evaluate the value of existing programs. This effort also includes: the restructuring of medical facilities [included in the fiscal year 2014 budget] to make them more efficient, without sacrificing quality or continuity of care as well as fee adjustments that exempt disabled retirees, survivors of servicemembers who died on active duty, and their family members.

Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global rebasing, deployments, and future reductions in end strength?

Answer. As stated above, if confirmed I will continue to work with the Services to meet the changing needs of our military families. Part of this effort involves working with the White House and the Services to support community-based partnerships to improve education, employment, and wellness support for current and

transitioning members. The Services have also adjusted force size and rotation, redoubled transition support, and invested in world-class health care for our wounded. This includes the fielding of effective treatments for mental health issues, traumatic brain injury, and combat stress. It also entails the push to reduce the stigma and remove barriers to seeking mental health services for both servicemembers and their family members.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support is provided to Reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment and family readiness, as well as to active duty families who do not reside near a military installation?

Answer. We have a duty to ensure every family has access to quality resources, regardless of component or location. If confirmed, I will continue to support the Services' effort to leverage public-private partnerships within the communities. We will also continue to leverage the State Joint Force Headquarters of the National Guard to help members access child care, mental health services, employment opportunities and many other services that bolster family readiness.

Question. If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to enhance family support?

Answer. In my 2012 Strategic Direction to the Joint Force, I identified "Keeping Faith with our Military Family" as one of my four focus areas during my tenure as Chairman. Keeping faith with our military family recognizes the military family's extraordinary contributions, preserves trust, and supports them in the ways they need most. If confirmed, I will continue this focus with the Services. Today, we are actively involved in Family Support Working Groups, Resource Management Decision Working Groups and other venues to ensure program effectiveness, share best practices, and reduce duplication of efforts. America's citizens have also stepped forward. From the local to the national level, thousands of organizations, higher learning institutions, and businesses have partnered to support our Military Family.

OPERATIONAL ENERGY BUDGETING

Question. Since Congress created the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Programs, much progress has been made in a few short years in these programs.

In what specific areas, if any, do you believe the Department needs to improve the incorporation of energy considerations into the strategic planning and force development processes?

Answer. We have a comprehensive Department strategy which addresses energy challenges and leverages opportunities for the current and future force. For all new weapon systems, there is now an Energy Key Performance Parameter that must be considered during the system requirements process. Operationally, we are making strides to improve electrical generation efficiency in Afghanistan through the use of micro-grids, reducing the individual soldier battery requirements through solar power technology, and testing advanced renewable energy technologies in the battlefield environments. We have made much progress and will continue to focus on incorporating energy considerations in wargames and joint exercises in order to improve our strategic planning and force development.

Question. In what specific areas, if any, do you believe the Department should increase funding for operational energy requirements, energy efficiency, alternative energy, and renewable energy opportunities?

Answer. Each Service has invested significant resources to address operational energy requirements. My primary emphasis remains on reducing operational energy dependence to provide increased operational flexibility, combat effectiveness, force protection, and mobility options for Joint Commanders. I am focused on fully understanding the energy requirements of our Joint Force and will continue to support the Service initiatives to reduce our energy demands across the force.

LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION

Question. You have previously expressed your support for U.S. accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Do you still believe that the United States should join the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC), and, if so, why?

Answer. Yes, I testified in support of the United States becoming a party to the LOSC before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in May 2012. Being a party to LOSC enhances the United States' security posture by reinforcing freedom of navigation and over flight rights vital to ensuring our global force posture and demonstrating our commitment to the rule of law. It strengthens our credibility and brings the full force of our influence in challenging excessive maritime claims.

DETAINEE TREATMENT POLICY

Question. Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Answer. Yes.

Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field Manual on Interrogations?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you share the view that standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?

Answer. I continue to share the view that the way in which we treat detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. forces are treated should they be captured in future conflicts.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KAY R. HAGAN

ARMY CAMOUFLAGE PROGRAM

1. Senator HAGAN. General Dempsey, I understand the Army has conducted an extensive development program for the next-generation of camouflage patterns for combat uniforms. I commend the Army for working to ensure our warfighters have the best possible signature management and concealment in their combat ensembles. My understanding is that a decision has been made on the family of patterns that will be issued to Army soldiers but that the announcement has been delayed.

As we remain deployed in Afghanistan, I am concerned that this delay is preventing our soldiers from having the best camouflage possible. I am further concerned as this delay is having a severe impact on what is left of the industrial base in the United States that manufactures the textiles and uniforms that support the

armed services. Orders for the current Army camouflage pattern have slowed dramatically, as procurement officers have slowed purchasing so as to not have inventory of a soon-to-be obsolete pattern. This is causing layoffs and possible plant closings across the United States. What is the status of the Army camouflage program and when do they plan on making the announcement?

General DEMPSEY. Soldiers in Afghanistan are not at risk of harm associated with the current camouflage pattern. Deployed forces are provided the Operation Enduring Freedom Camouflage Pattern (OCP) uniform, with matching individual equipment. The OCP is the optimal camouflage solution for that operating environment and has proven effective in providing our soldiers with the necessary concealment capability.

The Army is nearing completion for the scientifically-based camouflage study, which constituted the most extensive uniform camouflage study ever undertaken with extensive soldier involvement. No final decision has been made regarding any camouflage pattern or the Army's timeline for introducing a future pattern uniform.

We recognize and are sensitive to the issues facing industry while this decision is pending. In anticipation of a potential pattern change, the Army has taken fiscally prudent steps to avoid building large inventories of uniforms and Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment in the current Universal Camouflage Pattern (UCP) that would otherwise be rendered obsolete and require disposal. The Army's objective is to spend wisely, and thereby avoid having a large stockpile of items in UCP that may not be used.

AFGHAN WOMEN

2. Senator HAGAN. General Dempsey, Afghan women have made remarkable hard-fought strides since 2001. During my recent trip to Afghanistan and through other discussions here in Washington, I recently learned that we are beginning to terminate or descope many programs that are intended to build Afghan society, specifically programs involving women and domestic issues. The targets established by the Afghan Government for female recruitment to the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) are 5,000 women in the Afghan National Police (ANP) by the end of 2014 and 10 percent of the overall Afghan National Army (ANA) force size. While cultural factors have made recruiting and retaining Afghan female police officers and army personnel more challenging, the effort to expand female participation in the ANSF is under-resourced and under-prioritized. Recent hearings have identified that there are numerous examples of descopeing and cancellation of programs to support, recruit, professionalize, and train women in the ANSF.

Please provide your views on how best we can sustain and enhance our earlier efforts to recruit, train, and mentor women into the ANSF so that these hard-won gains will continue to benefit Afghanistan after our drawdown.

General DEMPSEY. There is no simple solution to an issue directly related to the cultural and social realities of Afghanistan. Current measures to ensure the continued recruitment of women for all elements of the ANSF must remain in place. Financial incentives and international encouragement will be the primary tools to promote the recruitment, support, and training of women in the ANSF. I see two elements that must be addressed to maintain progress. The first is maintaining the standards within the ANSF to ensure it remains a positive and respected organization with critical roles for women in the Army and Police. The second is sustainment and enhancement of ANSF public messaging and efforts to recruit and train women. Eventually, this could help to change the cultural acceptance of women serving in these roles within Afghan society. In any case, our continued involvement in the development of the ANSF is our best chance to encourage positive change in this issue over time.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

SEQUESTRATION AND A HOLLOW FORCE

3. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, in your professional judgment, are defense budget cuts currently hollowing out the readiness and training of our Armed Forces?

General DEMPSEY. Prior to sequestration, the Joint Force faced the simultaneous challenge of reconstituting the force and restoring its ability to conduct the full spectrum of operations—much broader operations than the limited mission conducted in Afghanistan. Now, with sequestration, we are prioritizing the readiness of our deployed and next to deploy forces at the expense of reconstituting the majority of the nondeployed force. While this approach provides ready forces to meet current and

near-term force requirements, it comes at the expense of modernization and future readiness. In broad terms, current defense budget constraints are creating a gap between our strategy and the means required to accomplish it. The cuts are deep. More challenging, they are historically steep. We are in fact hollowing out the readiness of the force.

4. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, has the President been made aware of this assessment?

General DEMPSEY. Yes.

5. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, if sequestration continues into 2014, will the hollowing out of the armed forces accelerate?

General DEMPSEY. I am very concerned about the loss of readiness across the Department. This challenge may not accelerate, but it is sure to persist.

The fiscal year 2013 sequestration cuts were not strategy based or strategy informed. The impact of sequestration and other budget constraints are beginning to emerge in unit level readiness reports. The longer-term effects caused by the cancellation of large force exercises and deferred maintenance are difficult to measure at this time but will certainly impose significant strain on long-term institutional readiness. The continuation of sequestration into 2014 will compound these effects since readiness and modernization are essentially the only levers available to achieve the magnitude of cuts required by the sequestration mechanism. By definition, continuation of sequestration will result in a less ready, less modern force. Due to the reality that it takes longer to restore readiness than it does to lose it, continued sequestration will pose institutional challenges far beyond 2014.

6. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, do you currently have a plan to reverse this deteriorating trend?

General DEMPSEY. One of the overarching priorities of the Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR) was to look first at savings gained from reducing overhead and structural costs (“tail”) in order to minimize the impact on the capability and readiness of the force (“tooth”). As stated by the Secretary, a top priority in future year budget plans is to build a ready force. We have a responsibility to defend the country, no matter the size of our budget. The Services and defense agencies are now in the midst of determining the shape, size, and readiness of a military operating with severely reduced long-term funding.

A plan to “reverse” deterioration would depend on how long the sequestration mechanism remains in effect, how small we make the force, and how much savings we can harvest from institutional reform.

7. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, what has the Secretary’s Strategic Choices review found with respect to risk for our military under sequestration? In other words, under sequestration, what can’t we do that we must do?

General DEMPSEY. The SCMR showed that we will not be able to implement immediate significant cuts strategically. If significant and abrupt cuts are directed, we will risk fielding an unprepared force.

We are looking for ways to make these immediate cuts in the least damaging way, but because up to half of the Department’s budget is placed off limits from savings—for example, we cannot generate quick savings from cutting personnel and infrastructure—the only way to implement an abrupt 10 percent reduction is to impose disproportionate reductions in training, maintenance, and investment. Readiness, in some cases, would continue to decline beyond current degraded levels. We would also be forced to make disproportionately large cuts in funding for modernization programs, eroding our technological superiority and damaging our Better Buying Power initiatives.

8. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, in addition to devastating readiness, how will the sequester in fiscal year 2014 impact the Department of Defense (DOD) plans in the Pacific? Army and Marine Corps end strength? The Joint Strike Fighter? Shipbuilding? Missile Defense? Military space programs?

General DEMPSEY. Over a longer term, sequester in fiscal year 2014 through fiscal year 2021 would seriously disrupt our forces and programs, requiring that we substantially modify and scale back the new defense strategy.

Continued sequestration would inevitably disrupt DOD’s investment programs, including the Joint Strike Fighter, Shipbuilding, Missile Defense, and Military space programs. Under current mechanical rules that govern the sequester process, every one of our more than 2,500 procurement programs, research projects, and military construction projects would be indiscriminately reduced. Some military managers

would be forced to buy fewer weapons. Reductions in quantities will likely cause unit costs of weapons to rise, which will in turn demand further cuts in quantities.

9. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, in your advance policy question response you said: “The recent Strategic Choices and Management Review affirmed the fundamental soundness of the [January 2012] Defense Strategic Guidance,” but you also said, “The Department is still in the process of determining what revisions might be necessary to align ends, ways, and means given the additional \$500 billion in cuts,” and “... we are at risk of strategy insolvency if sequestration is implemented as currently prescribed by law.” You seem to be saying simultaneously that in the context of sequestration, our current strategic guidance works fine, is under revision, and doesn’t work. Will sequestration require a new defense strategy? Please answer yes or no and explain why.

General DEMPSEY. Yes. Full sequestration will cause us to relook the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) in terms of changing objectives and timelines. The missions that the military is called to do were re-affirmed in the SCMR. However, to complete these missions successfully, with further reduced means resulting from sequestration, we will need to rebalance our ends, ways, and means. For example, there may be things that can no longer be done simultaneously due to readiness or availability of units at a given time. If we fail to adjust the ends and ways with the sequestration cuts that require \$50 billion every year, the resulting decrease in readiness and modernization could render the existing strategy insolvent.

10. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, in your professional opinion, should defense strategies continue to be adjusted to meet diminishing budgets or should defense budgets be guided by a sound defense strategy that meets our national security objectives?

General DEMPSEY. We need to have a budget informed strategy, not a budget driven strategy. Our budget should be guided by an agreed upon strategy that meets our national security objectives. Adjusting our ends, ways, and means in order to maintain an acceptable balance is a part of any strategy; however, the strategy should not be derived solely from the budget.

11. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, in your view, do we have adequate and ready forces today to be able to simultaneously carry out operational plans for two major contingency operations? If not, how does this impact your assessment to commit forces to a major regional contingency?

General DEMPSEY. It would depend on which two major contingency operations, and the nature, size, and scope of the simultaneity and desired end states. We regularly conduct “bundled” plan assessments to determine our ability to meet simultaneous requirements of specific operational plans. In certain high priority, resource demanding and high consequence scenarios, we are challenged to meet the demands of our operational plans with adequate and ready forces. In these instances, we review the mitigation options and residual risk resulting from delayed timelines and modified objectives to assess the risk to forces and successful plan execution.

My assessment on the feasibility of committing force to contingencies is always informed by other global commitments and the degree to which our most important national security interests are effected.

DEFENSE STRATEGY

12. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, you talk about strategy in terms of balancing ends, ways, and means, and the need to balance ambition and means. This sounds eerily similar to the rationalization used by European nations to reduce defense spending to the extent that defense spending at 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is a distant memory and we are looking at an average of our allies that will approach 1 percent of GDP. Our defense strategy must address threats to national security. Do you agree that sequestration will result in unacceptable risk to the military’s ability to address national security threats creating a situation of strategic insolvency?

General DEMPSEY. Sequestration’s mechanism and magnitude, unmitigated, will increase risk to the military’s responsibilities as they are currently defined and create unacceptable risk to our national security. My sense is that if sequestration continues the Nation will have a military that is increasingly unready, steadily losing technology overmatch to challengers and unable to maintain global presence and posture. It is a military that will be viewed with increasing concern by our longtime allies and with increasing satisfaction by our potential adversaries. It is a military

that will offer our civilian leaders fewer options and higher opportunity costs when they decide to employ military force. I will provide additional specifics related to impacts of sequestration in my next classified Chairman's Risk Assessment submitted with PB15.

13. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, if we continually rebalance ends, ways, and means due to resource constraints, our military strategy becomes resource-driven and not threat-driven, eventually resulting in a strategy that only works at the level of unacceptable risk. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is supposed to be threat driven by design. Are you committed to a QDR that provides recommendations that are not resource-constrained?

General DEMPSEY. I am committed to conducting the QDR in a manner that focuses on the threats in our current and predicted environment during the time horizon covered by the QDR.

14. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, how will you know when the risk to our national interests assumed by a reduction in defense budgets and a subsequent revised defense strategy becomes unacceptable?

General DEMPSEY. Risk to the strategy becomes unacceptable when we no longer have trained and ready troops to respond to contingencies that threaten our national security interests.

LEGACY

15. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, in your professional judgment, at full sequestration will the elimination of brigades, ships, and squadrons incur unacceptable risk to our national security by not having enough forces to carry out even one major contingency operation with enough reserves to deter a second adversary? For example, does a potential looming crisis or conflict with Iran constrain your options to take or propose other military actions due to resource limitations?

General DEMPSEY. I am concerned that full sequestration is significantly impacting military readiness, increasing risks especially in the event of multiple contingencies.

16. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, given the current path of the readiness of the armed forces, in your professional judgment, when will the Commander in Chief be at that point of making immoral decisions?

General DEMPSEY. Risk rises significantly when we no longer have trained and ready troops to respond to contingencies that threaten our national security interests. I am evaluating the impact of full sequester on readiness and plan to provide my assessment to Congress once complete.

17. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, while I understand that no military leader wants to shy away from a battle, whether it be with an adversary or otherwise, what would be your course of action if given an order to deploy troops into harm's way that are of insufficient numbers, degraded capability, or not ready?

General DEMPSEY. My military advice would depend on the nature of the threat. But let me assure you that if the Nation is threatened, we will deploy in its defense. That said, I am very concerned that we will have fewer options, that our deterrent effect will be diminished, and that military action will result in more casualties if we fail to maintain our high state of readiness because of budget uncertainty.

18. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, how will you know when this point has come?

General DEMPSEY. We are watching for several indicators. Sequester increases unready forces, misaligned global posture, reduced security cooperation, and decline of the All-Volunteer Force. I am especially concerned about the All-Volunteer Force. Today we have the most seasoned, professional military force in history. Budget reductions, inflexibility, and uncertainty increasingly threaten training, readiness, recruiting, and retention.

19. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, each American who is graced with the privilege to serve and sacrifice for this great Nation at some point becomes keenly aware of the history and legacy that they will leave to those that follow. What do you hope will be your legacy as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and how do we avoid the legacy of being in charge during the age of a hollow force?

General DEMPSEY. Every military leader—myself included—works tirelessly to preserve the culture of service you describe in defense of our Nation. During this period of historic transition, I want to set the conditions for the force of tomorrow. The fiscal pressures we face increasingly challenge our ability to field a future force that is balanced and has sufficiently levels of readiness. To achieve this, we need the certainty of an approved budget, the flexibility to make tradeoffs, and time to absorb budget cuts. The responsibility for tomorrow's force rests on the efforts of us all—those in uniform and our elected officials.

READINESS AND FLYING HOUR CUTS

20. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, due to a recently approved reprogramming, the Air Force was able to move \$208 million into flying hour funds. Why couldn't DOD do this before April 9, 2013? Was it due to a lack of flexibility in moving funds within the DOD budget?

General DEMPSEY. Yes, both the NDAA and fiscal year 2013 enacted budgets were 3 and 6 months late respectively, which resulted in a 6 month Continuing Resolution that limited our flexibility (transfer authority) to move money between major budget categories and into flying hour funds. The Air Force's limited Operations and Maintenance transfer authority of \$15 million was insufficient to restore any reasonable portion of the \$591 million flying hour reduction resulting from sequestration in fiscal year 2013. Consequently, the lack of flexibility and reduction in Operations & Maintenance funds resulted in the Air Force grounding some flying squadrons on April 9, 2013. The reprogramming action completed in July gave the Air Force the authority to shift \$1.6 billion from other appropriations into critical Operations & Maintenance funds to minimize the impact on readiness, \$208 million of which was applied towards the Air Force flying hour program.

21. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, I believe DOD was short approximately \$11 billion in overseas contingency operations (OCO) funding and has requested that \$9.6 billion be reprogrammed from the base budget. If DOD received full funding for overseas contingency operations, what impact would that have had on DOD operations and readiness as a whole, to include Air Force flying hours?

General DEMPSEY. The President's fiscal year 2013 OCO budget fully funded wartime operations based on our best estimates 2 years ago. However, during execution of the fiscal year 2013 budget in the spring of 2013, the Department identified a shortfall of between \$7–\$10 billion, conservatively, in OCO funds due to a combination of sequestration reductions against both the Base and OCO O&M budgets and higher than forecasted wartime operating costs, including fuel, retrograde transportation, etc.

To ensure we could properly conduct wartime operations and to help minimize some of the devastating impacts to base budget readiness, the Department requested \$9.6 billion in reprogramming authority from Congress. Because it was unclear how much of the reprogramming action would be approved, the Services continued scrutinizing their budget activities to find additional resources to address the funding shortfall. Ultimately, Congress approved the majority of the requested fiscal year 2013 reprogramming actions, allowing the Department to appropriately fund wartime operations and mitigate a portion of the impacts to readiness in the Air Force Flying Hour Program. Ultimately, the curtailed readiness activities will have a cumulative effect in fiscal year 2014, which will be amplified with further sequestration.

22. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, how many additional hours will have to be dedicated to bring all these units and its aircrews back up to mission-ready status?

General DEMPSEY. As of today, there are 18 squadrons in the Air Force still flying at reduced levels of readiness. An additional 7,000 flying hours at a cost of \$116 million above the PB14 request and 3–6 months would be necessary to bring these remaining 18 squadrons from current (lower than Basic Mission Capable) flying rates back to pre-sequester mission status (Combat Mission Ready flying rates).

Prior to sequestration, a substantial number of Air Force squadrons were already operating at lower than optimal goals due to previous Budget Control Act (BCA) reductions and the effects of long-term high operations tempo. On 9 April, a total of 31 squadrons were stood down, including 13 combat-coded (fighter, bomber, and AWACS) units and 18 institutional units (Weapons School, Aggressors, Thunderbirds, etc.). Through efficiencies and the \$208 million from the DOD reprogramming request, the Air Force was able to shift funds and increase the flying rates of the

13 combat coded units back to Combat Mission Ready (CMR) rates for the remainder of fiscal year 2013. It will take 3–6 months at this CMR rate before these squadrons return to pre-sequestration mission ready rates. The efficiencies and reprogramming also allowed the remaining 18 institutional units to resume flying, albeit lower than Basic Mission Capable (BMC) rates.

The Air Force will continue to have readiness challenges due to the BCA and sequestration, beyond the units that were stood down. To bring all Air Force flying squadrons back to full mission readiness goals needed to meet Defense Strategic Guidance requirements, it would take approximately 2 years, an additional \$3.2 billion per year in fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015, and a reduction in current deployment tempo (e.g. deploy-to-dwell at 1:3 or better).

23. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, how much will that cost?

General DEMPSEY. As of today, there are 18 squadrons in the Air Force still flying at reduced levels of readiness. An additional 7,000 flying hours at a cost of \$116 million above the PB14 request and 3–6 months would be necessary to bring these remaining 18 squadrons from current (lower than Basic Mission Capable) flying rates back to pre-sequester mission status (Combat Mission Ready flying rates).

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24. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, what happens to these units on October 1, 2013, when sequestration hits again?

General DEMPSEY. Given the nature of the cuts in fiscal year 2013, we had no flexibility in managing squadron readiness. If sequester hits in fiscal year 2014, we will be able to rotationally stand-down units, or fly them at reduced rates, similar to actions we took in fiscal year 2013. The net effect of cuts spread over the full fiscal year versus just 7 months will lead to readiness levels slightly higher than under sequester in fiscal year 2013, but still well below pre-sequester—and already sub-optimal—readiness levels. This will significantly erode our training and force development efforts, and increase risk in our ability to fill OPLAN and the Secretary of Defense ordered missions.

IRAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

25. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, in your professional military opinion, do you think sanctions will prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons capability?

General DEMPSEY. The United States and its allies have put in place against Iran tough, smart, and crippling sanctions. However, sanctions alone were not designed to, nor will they, prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear capability. The purpose of these sanctions is to bring Iran back to the negotiating table with the P5+1.

26. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, what timeline do you think Israel is on for taking kinetic action after Prime Minister Netanyahu's remarks this weekend?

General DEMPSEY. We do not think Israel has made a decision to strike Iran. We fully support Israel's right to self-defense.

27. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, does a potential looming crisis or conflict with Iran constrain your options to take military action in other parts of the world due to resource limitations? Specifically, are you concerned that taking action in Syria, combined with readiness and resource impacts due to budget cuts and seques-

tration, invites too much strategic risk if friction with Iran results in a conflict in the Gulf as well?

General DEMPSEY. The Department maintains a robust military presence in the region to deter or counter destabilizing activities, reassure allies and partners, and safeguard the region's vital links to the international community. We are currently postured to respond to contingencies in the Gulf and are watching Syria very closely. Military involvement in Syria may impact contingency plans for Iran. The impacts depend on the level of military intervention. A small-scale intervention along the lines of training and equipping an opposition force would likely have little effect on our readiness vis-a-vis Iran. However, a larger scale intervention that entails implementing a no fly zone, suppressing enemy air defenses, and/or executing punitive strikes against regime forces will likely draw from resources that could be used in an Iran contingency. So, depending on the nature of the Iranian contingency, heavy involvement in Syria could strain our ability to sustain our forces simultaneously in the Gulf. Moreover, the risk could increase when readiness and resource constraints from the budget cuts are entered into the equation.

In terms of sequestration, a reduction of U.S. force presence in the Middle East (due to sequestration) will degrade military options to respond to contingencies, place U.S. interests, citizens, and military forces at higher risk, and strain relationships with regional partners. This in turn, will reinforce Iranian beliefs that U.S. threats of military action lack credibility and may strengthen Iranian resolve in P5+1 negotiations and embolden Iran to increase activities that destabilize the region. These effects go well beyond Iran and will decrease DOD options to shape and react to future events as well as weaken mil-mil relationships with regional partners, which U.S. foreign policy has often leveraged for broader diplomatic gains.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT

28. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, the Egyptian military seems to be the primary stabilizing institution in Egypt. What is your position on whether or not we should cut off aid to the Egyptian military?

General DEMPSEY. The situation in Egypt is rapidly evolving. Ultimately, the decision to extend military aid to Egypt rests with the President. I believe we must remain engaged with the Egyptian military at some level.

29. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, if aid is cut off, should we restore it as soon as possible?

General DEMPSEY. If the decision is made to terminate or suspend aid to the Egyptian military, we should make it clear from the start under which it will be restored.

MILITARY OPTIONS IN SYRIA

30. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, has the President given you specific objectives in Syria that your military options should support—or has he only asked you for military options?

General DEMPSEY. The President has articulated his priorities and what he views as our core national interests in Syria. Likewise, the NSS has described a set of objectives which were derived from these core national interests. In support of these objectives, we have developed a range of military options.

31. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, if no U.S. military action is taken to alter the balance of military power between Assad and the armed opposition, what does the military think the most likely outcomes are?

General DEMPSEY. The crisis in Syria is tragic, dynamic, and complex. It is a deeply-rooted, long-term conflict among multiple factions that will continue to fight after Assad's rule ends. The Syrian people face a long and difficult struggle. Potential outcomes could include the status quo, increased spillover in the Levant that compels a regional actor to attempt to alter the balance between the Regime and the opposition, or the fracturing of the country into sectarian based provinces.

32. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, in your professional military opinion, what are the military options that could best accomplish changing the balance of military power between the Assad regime and the armed opposition without boots-on-the-ground, assuming: (1) vetted rebels are provided with light arms and anti-tank weapons and training; (2) no kinetic action against Syrian integrated air defense system; (3) limited strikes in Syria would be allowed as would flight into Syrian air-

space; (4) airstrikes would last no more than 2 weeks; (5) collateral damage to civilians is to be minimized. Under those parameters, assuming legal justifications were in place: (1) what could you accomplish in terms of altering the balance of military power; (2) what lines of military effort would you recommend; (3) what are the risks associated with those lines of effort; and (4) what is the cost of your recommended course(s) of action? Please provide an assessment of the impact on your ability to handle an Iranian conflict following such an action.

General DEMPSEY. Within the framework and the constraints and objectives articulated above, there are military options available, which we have fully briefed to the national security staff.

At the unclassified level, these options would include strikes with standoff weapons on key Syrian Regime infrastructure, logistics nodes, and combat forces command and control nodes that could degrade regime forces. Striking attack helicopters on their ramps with standoff weapons would have an important impact on regime close air support capability, though the locations of those helicopters varies. Contrary to what some have suggested, although fixed wing tactical aircraft are being used by the regime against the opposition, they are not the principal firepower element being used to target the opposition. For this reason, striking runways, again as some have suggested, is not an optimal use of expensive standoff weapons, to say nothing of the fact that the regime would rapidly repair runway damage and resume operations. While the above strikes would have an effect on the balance of military power, they are not likely to be decisive.

Rather, the regime is primarily targeting the opposition through artillery and rocket attacks and ground forces operations. We believe that suppressing these attacks would require a campaign that would roll-back certain (though not necessarily all) elements of the integrated air defense system and subsequently enable a campaign against Assad's ground forces. Details of such a campaign would be classified, but such a campaign is feasible. Contrary to depictions of our prior responses as involving a massive campaign, this would not require enormous resources, but would require a moderate number of ISR, tactical aviation, and traditional support aircraft such as tankers, AWACS and personnel recovery resources, as well as regional bases and defenses for those bases. Principal risks to this approach would be: (a) the risk of retaliation from Syria against regional partners and U.S. bases within those countries; and (b) the risk to U.S. aircraft from mobile surface-to-air missile systems.

To effect a positive and longstanding result, U.S. support should contribute to enabling a substantial number of moderate opposition fighters over an extended period of time. Such an endeavor to build a moderate opposition force capable of defeating regime forces and consolidating and holding territory would require at least 2 years. This extended large-scale train and equip effort is probably the wisest course of action; however, it is not without substantial obstacles. Preferably, strikes would be deferred until an opposition force is capable of maintaining and exploiting at least some of the gains provided by the strikes.

The two options outlined above could complement one another and cause the balance of military power to shift. However, we believe it is unrealistic to expect this shift to occur rapidly. Both sides are in an existential struggle for survival, and have demonstrated considerable resiliency. We are concerned that some consider such a campaign to be easy. Once the first 2 weeks pass without a clear solution to the conflict, there would most certainly be an appetite for more action. Thus, we need to understand that the United States would likely be drawn into a protracted conflict, and would need to be prepared for the expense and follow-on actions in a post-Assad Syria that would likely be demanded.

Finally, we need to be prepared to fund either or both options. Our initial estimate for a train and equip mission is in the hundreds of millions dollars per year. The cost of the strikes depends on the number of munitions expended, but costs would start in the tens of millions and could easily increase to hundreds of millions.

Regarding Iran, we are currently postured to respond to contingencies in the Gulf and we monitor Iranian actions very closely. If action against Iran were sequential to action in Syria, we would use forces already anticipated for such a conflict. If such action were to occur in parallel, some of the forces we would deploy would not be at optimal levels of readiness.

AFGHANISTAN POST-2014 TROOP PRESENCE AND BILATERAL SECURITY AGREEMENT

33. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, is the zero option of no U.S. troops in Afghanistan after 2014 a real option given the results we have seen in Iraq with a similar precipitous withdrawal?

General DEMPSEY. We have presented the President with a range of options to consider. I have not been asked to prepare a zero option, nor do I recommend one. Our post-2014 presence will be predicated on a number of things, including the ongoing Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) negotiations, performance of the ANSF, and an invitation from the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. We also developed a complementary drawdown plan that would support a range of options, with mitigating factors included.

34. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, what mission sets and commensurate levels of troops do you recommend for Afghanistan post-2014?

General DEMPSEY. Our post-2014 mission will be to train, advise, assist, and counter terrorism. Several factors determine the size of the post-2014 mission, including the continued progress of the ANSF and the level of train, advice, and assist required to further that progress, the outcome of the BSA negotiations, and threat assessments. In addition, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is currently in the planning stages for post-2014 Resolute Support Mission, of which the United States will be the leading troop contributing nation. We assess that a range of 8–12K will be required.

35. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, General Dunford says that above all, the Afghans need to know the United States is committed to an enduring partnership. It would seem that announcing a desired number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan post-2014, pending successful BSA negotiations, would send a strong message—when will the administration announce the desired troop levels for post-2014?

General DEMPSEY. The United States has been extremely clear in our commitment to the people of Afghanistan post-2014. I have recommended that the administration announce U.S. troop levels for post-2014 after the conclusion of the BSA and formal invitation by the President of Afghanistan to remain.

36. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, after letting the Taliban raise the flag and the country name they used when they governed Afghanistan on the political office the United States helped arrange in Doha, Qatar, the Afghan people and President Karzai were understandably upset. Are the chances for a U.S.-led peace process, or reconciliation process, dead?

General DEMPSEY. While the reconciliation process in Afghanistan has thus far been exceedingly complex and challenging, it has not stopped moving forward. It remains an important element of fostering stability in Afghanistan. We will continue to support our Afghan partners in their efforts to meet with the Taliban and reach a political settlement that provides peace and security for the people of Afghanistan.

37. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, are we forcing this issue and doing more harm than good?

General DEMPSEY. A reconciliation process inevitably introduces additional complexity into internal conflict in any nation, as well as uncertainty among the elements making up both sides of the conflict. There will be both progress and setbacks along the way in any such negotiation process. Afghanistan is no exception. Nonetheless, a political solution has been required to end most insurgencies (witness the ongoing process in Colombia), and we support reconciliation as a part of the end game solution in Afghanistan. The Department of State is taking the necessary measured steps to support the peace process. A reconciled Afghanistan is in the best interest of all parties involved. President Karzai acknowledges this, and continues to encourage the peace process, albeit on his terms.

U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

38. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, what is your threat assessment of U.S. Africa Command's (AFRICOM) area of responsibility (AOR)—is the threat growing, stabilized, or receding?

General DEMPSEY. [Deleted.]

39. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, do you believe we have the forces in place in U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and AFRICOM to be able to both remain engaged in Africa and respond, if necessary, to threats as they evolve?

General DEMPSEY. DOD is prepared to respond to threats and crises as they arise while remaining engaged in AFRICOM and EUCOM.

AFRICOM forces remain engaged in priority missions such as countering violent extremist organizations and partnership building within Africa, in accordance with

the President's priorities for the continent. Meanwhile, we have taken a number of steps to be better prepared for crisis operations, particularly in Northern Africa. For example, the Marine Corps has resourced additional Marine Security Guard (MSG) Detachments to meet regional threats and address Department of State security concerns. While relieving an embassy under attack is highly complex, we also maintain Marine FAST platoons and other forces in the region to be able to rapidly reinforce an embassy in advance of a problem. Among these forces is a dedicated Special Marine Air Ground Task Force-Crisis Response (SPMAGTF-CR) in Spain capable of quickly responding to a variety of threats in Africa or Europe.

DOD has also developed and adopted rules that will allow force sharing between combatant commands (COCOMs) for brief durations to ensure rapid response in the event of a crisis. DOD and the Department of State work together to ensure that high risk facilities are properly secured with DOD support, as required. Finally, DOD monitors specified crisis response forces throughout the world and makes adjustments to position and posture forces based on threat requirements.

40. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, do you believe we have dedicated enough intelligence assets to the continent of Africa?
General DEMPSEY. [Deleted.]

41. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, what is your assessment of combining AFRICOM with EUCOM?

General DEMPSEY. Assigning combatant commands under the current structure has led to productive engagement, planning, and operations in the respective areas of responsibility. However, depending on the magnitude of budget cuts to DOD, we may need to consider combatant command consolidations among a number of other difficult staff consolidation and reduction decisions. Combining AFRICOM and EUCOM would be one of several options we would consider.

CIVILIAN FURLONGHS

42. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, what can DOD do to end civilian furloughs now?

General DEMPSEY. The Secretary of Defense instructed all components to monitor funding closely for the remainder of fiscal year 2013. On 6 August, the Secretary announced that this goal was accomplished, and reduced the total furlough days for most civilians from 11 to 6 days. None of us want to see this occur again in 2014, but the sequestration reductions will be more severe next year than this year.

43. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, will DOD use civilian furloughs next year to cut personnel costs?

General DEMPSEY. The \$37 billion in fiscal year 2013 budget cuts mandated by sequestration, combined with short timelines that limited our options, were a major cause of these furloughs. We would hope to avoid furloughs in the future because of their deleterious effects on morale and their potential to cause our best civilians to seek employment elsewhere. However, a \$52 billion sequestration top line cut in fiscal year 2014 would perpetuate our readiness shortfalls, likely requiring additional civilian personnel actions. These actions could include furloughs, but we believe under a longer-term view would more likely be weighted towards reductions in civilian billets leading to a reduction-in-force action.

44. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, how long will it take before you realize this is a penny-wise pound-foolish approach to cost savings?

General DEMPSEY. We already realize the drawbacks of civilian furloughs—they are as distasteful to us as any other budget reduction mechanism. However, in fiscal year 2013, sequestration was applied by congress on a short timeline, limiting our options and resulting in drastic measures like readiness stand-downs and furloughs that were not strategically or managerially sound. To avoid even more far reaching effects on training, we furloughed most of our civilian employees for up to 6 days. This impacted morale and productivity in most of our support operations, but we were left with no other alternative in finding \$37 billion in savings in such a short period of time.

Going forward, the SCMR has defined the decision-space faced by the Department's senior leadership. This, in turn, will inform the Services and defense agencies in developing their fiscal year 2015–2019 budgets later this year, as well as ultimately inform the Department's next QDR early next year.

SEXUAL ASSAULT

45. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, at the hearing on June 4, 2013, concerning sexual assault, you committed to review what our allies have done to structure their military justice systems. Have you had an opportunity to review the military justice systems of our allies?

General DEMPSEY. My legal counsel has personally met with representatives from the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Germany, and the Netherlands to discuss their military justice systems. He has briefed me and issued a written assessment of his review to Congress. In addition, I have spoken to several of my counterparts.

46. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, what have you learned about those systems and why they were changed?

General DEMPSEY. In most or all of their systems, commanders retain the ability to deal with minor military infractions through summary proceedings, analogous to our nonjudicial punishment system or adverse administrative actions.

- None of our allies mentioned above retain the commander in the role of the convening authority; however, this was not done in response to sexual assault. Most or all of their systems were changed in order to better protect the rights of the accused, often in response to judicial challenges.
- There is no analytic evidence to suggest that the changes they made improved reporting, investigation, or prosecution.
- Our allies' militaries are much smaller, and thus do not handle the volume of military justice cases that the U.S. Armed Forces do. Many of their systems do not allow for expeditionary justice (in combat or deployed environments) or are incapable of doing so.

IMPACT OF SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE FUNDING REDUCTION FOR B-61 BOMB

47. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, what are the military and geo-political implications of the Senate Appropriations Committee's recommendation to reduce funding for the B-61 Life Extension Program (LEP) by \$168 million?

General DEMPSEY. A \$168 million reduction to the B-61 LEP would slip the delivery of the first production unit past fiscal year 2019 and impact our commitment to our NATO and Asian allies. Additionally, the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command stated that the program is important to the long-term viability of the B-2A strategic mission and is needed regardless of changes to NATO commitments.

This reduction would also limit the DOD and Department of Energy from leveraging interoperable technology for other strategic weapons. We would need to adjust the budget and scope for those programs, resulting in delays to the overall Nuclear Weapons Council Baseline Plan.

RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION

48. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, have the Armed Forces gone too far in suppressing religious expression?

General DEMPSEY. No. DOD continues to place a high value on the rights of all military servicemembers to practice their faith and observe the tenets of their respective religions, to include the right to hold no religious beliefs. Whenever possible, commanders approve requests for accommodation of servicemembers' religious practices. This is both our policy and our practice.

49. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, if a soldier's religious faith is an important part of their resilience in dealing with the stresses of military service, is there any reason why they should be prohibited from fully exercising that faith and sharing it with others in the Services?

General DEMPSEY. We recognize that the spiritual dimension and religious faith do indeed play an important role in building and enhancing resilience for a number of our servicemembers. Commanders are conscientious about allowing them to practice their faith. We also know that some of our servicemembers do not hold to any particular religious belief, and we respect their rights as well. The only reason why a servicemember may be unable to fully exercise his or her faith or to share that faith with others is if doing so would have an adverse impact on mission accomplishment, military readiness, unit cohesion, standards, or good order and discipline. Servicemembers are free to share their faith with others, but must not force unwanted, intrusive attempts to convert others of any faith or no faith to one's beliefs.

50. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, since the Services still respect the rights of Americans to not bear arms in national defense because of sincerely held religious beliefs, is it not just as important to respect the rights of those to serve to express their religious beliefs?

General DEMPSEY. Yes. DOD does respect the rights of all servicemembers to hold and express sincere religious beliefs. Granting conscientious objector status, to which your question appears to refer, is but one example of how seriously U.S. military leadership takes the rights of its members to hold and express sincere religious, moral, and ethical beliefs. By both policy and practice, commanders are committed to ensuring members of the U.S. military of deep religious faith, as well as those of no religious faith, can serve in a climate of mutual respect and trust.

51. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, should a military chaplain be allowed to express the views of their faith in performing their official duties, even if those views are not shared by all?

General DEMPSEY. Yes. U.S. military chaplains are not restricted in expressing the views of their faith. They enter the military as fully qualified religious ministry professionals who represent specific religious organizations. Chaplains perform all the offices, functions, sacraments, ordinances, and ceremonies required of a ministry professional for that religious organization. Chaplains are also trained to offer religious ministry to, and be respectful of, those of all faiths and those of no faith. Chaplains volunteer for Military Service with the understanding that they will be required to function in a pluralistic environment. They willingly support the free exercise of religion by all members of the Military Services, their family members, and other persons whom they are authorized to serve.

WOMEN IN COMBAT

52. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, assuming a person meets the necessary high physical standards that the Services are developing for troops in frontline combat units, is it your professional military opinion that both men and women must be allowed to be assigned to those units?

General DEMPSEY. The elimination of the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule which provides greater flexibility assigning the best qualified individuals where they are needed most regardless of gender. Greater flexibility and wider pool of skilled personnel creates a more agile and responsive force generation model for greater readiness.

53. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, is it your professional military opinion that our Nation should put women, based solely on meeting objective physical standards, in frontline combat positions against a potential enemy that will seek to exploit captured American women soldiers in an unspeakably cruel fashion with the goal of undermining our national will to engage in combat?

General DEMPSEY. As the Services review their standards for each military specialty, they are considering several criterion. Physical capability is just one of those. Our women in uniform are vital to mission readiness. The Department is committed to removing any barriers that prevent servicemembers from rising to their highest potential, based on their ability and not constrained by gender-restrictive policies. This is also in part due to the realization that the character of warfare has changed. Combat is far more fluid and asymmetrical where the distinctions between frontline, direct combat areas and rear, support areas no longer exists. Any decision regarding the assignment of women to combat-related duties or to combat units should be based on our obligation to maintain a high state of mission readiness and should be approached carefully and deliberately.

54. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, is there any place in your analysis of the potential role of women in combat, to objectively consider women's health, privacy, and cultural issues in the ultimate decision whether to assign women to frontline combat units?

General DEMPSEY. Yes. The health, privacy and culture of women in combat are not new factors in determining how we employ women in the military and will be considered during our assessment. Ultimately the guiding principles we established at the onset will determine how we employ women in the future.

- Preserve unit readiness, cohesion, and morale.
- Ensure the opportunity to succeed with viable career paths.
- Retain the trust and confidence of the American people by promoting policies that maintain the best quality and most qualified people.

- Validate occupational performance standards, both physical and mental, for all military occupational specialties.
- Ensure a cadre of midgrade/senior women enlisted and officers are assigned to commands at the point of introduction to ensure success in the long run.

TRICARE FEES

55. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, prior to sending fee increase proposals to Congress, why doesn't DOD sit down with beneficiary associations and Congress to design fee increases that are reasonable and acceptable to everyone?

General DEMPSEY. Military health benefit reform has been shaped over the last 8 years by program and policy experts, Members of Congress, constituencies, and subject matter experts from within and outside of the Department. The Department's proposals have been and will continue to be based on sound principles, as well as feedback from these stakeholders.

56. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, it seems to me that DOD should wait on the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission to report its recommendations before asking Congress to make piecemeal changes to personnel benefits. Do you agree or disagree, and why or why not?

General DEMPSEY. The Commission has a unique opportunity to make real and substantive change. We also recognize that comprehensively reviewing all areas of military pay and benefits, developing recommendations for change, and vetting them within DOD and with other Departments takes time. We would like to take that time, but sequestration has radically changed the budget reality and demands more rapid action from the Department and Congress if we are to sustain long-term readiness and modernization.

57. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, wouldn't development of a comprehensive package of compensation and retirement benefit changes, to include health benefit changes, make more sense rather than a piece-meal approach that wouldn't get us to an optimal solution for controlling DOD's sky-rocketing personnel costs?

General DEMPSEY. If we had the luxury of time to allow development of a comprehensive package before making any changes, we would support it. However, given the enormous pressure the DOD budget is under, we need to act with urgency on both efficiencies and compensation reform if we are to maintain an acceptable level of military capability, capacity, and readiness to be able to conduct our military missions. I am not convinced that there is excessive risk in getting compensation and benefits under control through carefully, but quickly, considered individual actions.

ADEQUATE FORCES

58. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, in your professional judgment, how far can we go with the elimination of brigades, ships, and squadrons before we incur unacceptable risks to our national security?

General DEMPSEY. The SCMR's purpose was to look at these numbers. We are taking the SCMR results and continuing to analyze impacts and assess options. The QDR will use the foundations that the SCMR provided to best determine how far we can go without reaching unacceptable risk.

59. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, aside from the issue of the hollowness of our forces, will sequestration require the elimination of more brigades, ships, and squadrons to the point where we will not have enough forces to carry out even one major contingency operation with enough Reserves to deter a second adversary?

General DEMPSEY. No, I do not believe that we will reach that point. As long as we have access to the Reserves, we will have enough forces to deter a second adversary; however it will take time to ensure they are fully trained and ready for the contingency along with the time to get them from the homeland to the fight. In essence, we will be able to do fewer things simultaneously, and new contingencies may force us to take risk in other regions. We will be less flexible. That much is clear.

60. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, does a potential looming crisis or conflict with Iran constrain your options to take military action in other parts of the world due to resource limitations? Specifically, are you concerned that taking action in Syria, combined with readiness and resource impacts due to budget cuts and seques-

tration, invites too much strategic risk if friction with Iran results in a conflict in the Gulf as well?

General DEMPSEY. We are currently postured to respond to contingencies in the Gulf and are watching Iran very closely. Any use of additional forces than those that are deployed right now or those that are next to deploy will require time to train and equip to ensure they are ready to respond as replacements and this will cause increased stress on the force in regards to dwell time. However, our global reach and strike capabilities contribute to our ability to deter and assure, helping to mitigate this concern.

ARMY END STRENGTH AND MISSION EXECUTION

61. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, can you provide us an assessment of the impact of the reduction of 10 Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) on DOD's ability to meet the requirements of the National Military Strategy (NMS)?

General DEMPSEY. These BCT reductions will reduce the part of the force that the Army actually increased over the last 10 years to fight our wars. With the planned drawdown of these forces, and the conclusion of two long-term stability operations, we can manage our strategy with the reductions the Army has planned. Also, the Defense Strategic Guidance deemphasized long duration stability operations and reinforced the importance of defeating and denying the objectives of an adversary. The Army is realigning and resizing consistent with this guidance.

62. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, what are your concerns with regards to the reduction of 10 Army BCTs?

General DEMPSEY. As these reductions are driven by the Army's drawdown of its temporary endstrength and are consistent with the Defense Strategic Guidance, I am not overly concerned with this reduction in forces. I am concerned that sequestration will force further reduction of ground forces end strength that decreases military options available to respond to contingencies and increase risk to the force.

63. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, what is your position regarding a reduction of 100,000 soldiers should the full effects of sequestration go into effect?

General DEMPSEY. Our Nation needs an Army that can conduct full spectrum operations as part of the Joint Force to meet the NMS objectives. It must be appropriately sized, structured, and equipped in order to defend the Nation and defeat our adversaries. We grew ground forces to meet the large requirements of OIF and OEF. As this war period comes to a close, we are assessing what is needed for the future in the context of constrained resources. My instincts are that a reduction of ground forces to levels required by full sequestration would pose significant risk to our national security.

64. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, please provide an assessment of the impact of the reduction of 100,000 soldiers on DOD's ability to meet the requirements of the national military strategy.

General DEMPSEY. At full sequestration, our national military strategy will need to change.

65. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, what are your views regarding the mix of Active and Reserve Force structure should the Army be forced into reduction of another 100,000 soldiers?

General DEMPSEY. The Army uses an established, comprehensive, and transparent process to determine the optimal number and mix of Active and Reserve component forces. We will need to work together to emerge with the right mix of capabilities and capacity to accomplish core missions with acceptable risk in accordance with the Defense Strategic Planning Guidance (DSG).

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

UH-1N REPLACEMENT OPPORTUNITIES

66. Senator WICKER. General Dempsey, as evidenced by the recent relief of 17 officers at Minot Air Force Base and the reports of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Standing Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety, there is still a serious neglect of priority and budget for the sustainment of the Air Force's Priority One Nuclear Enterprise. This lack of prioritization and resourcing manifests in a nuclear enterprise that continues to conduct critical mission activities with outdated and insufficiently

supported aircraft and ground vehicles, to include the woefully inadequate 40-plus-year-old UH-1N helicopter.

The Air Force has acknowledged the need to replace the UH-1N for over a decade. The aircraft's inadequate speed, range and payload, and obsolescent sensors and monitoring equipment are well-documented. The use of an antiquated airframe such as the UH-1N to provide security for Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) sites reflects a lack of proper resource prioritization by DOD.

As Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, you are required to provide cross-Service oversight and recommendations that lead to the most effective and efficient use of the greater defense industrial capabilities. There are inexpensive and cost-effective solutions available to replace the Vietnam-era Huey being fielded by other Services that are far more reliable, capable, and safe.

As demonstrated in the Senate Armed Services Committee markup of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014, I would like to understand the current plan for replacing the existing UH-1N fleet. In addition, I would like your commitment that this issue will be addressed in the upcoming fiscal year 2015 budget submittal. Despite being an Air Force priority for over 10 years, why has the replacement of the UH-1N fleet not been realized?

General DEMPSEY. The requirement for a more responsive capability to meet ICBM security needs remains valid, but budget constraints in both the near-term and the foreseeable future make committing to new acquisition programs challenging. A formal replacement strategy for the UH-1N is due to the SASC on February 1, 2014. As potential solutions, the Air Force is pursuing a variety of replacement options to include Excess Defense Articles at low or no cost. We remain committed to remaining involved and attentive to this requirement.

67. Senator WICKER. General Dempsey, the leadership of Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) recently commented that: "I have had an urgent and compelling need since 1996 in terms of speed, range, and payload . . . the UH-1 does not meet the need. How much longer are we willing to wait and take this risk?" Has there been any change to the ICBM security force posture that you believe makes the replacement of the UH-1 less compelling or a more acceptable security risk?

General DEMPSEY. No, the ICBM security force posture has not changed. The requirement to replace the UH-1s remains valid. However, based on budget constraints, the Air Force currently plans to sustain the UH-1 for another 6-10 years vice replacing them. The Air Force will mitigate risk by upgrading UH-1 cockpits and making them night-vision-compatible combined with other critical safety improvements. The Air Force also recently received three UH-1s from the Marine Corps, which will increase capacity and availability. In addition, the Air Force and Army are examining options for the Army to transfer additional UH-1s to the Air Force.

68. Senator WICKER. General Dempsey, there are aircraft being fielded by DOD today that are significantly more capable and less costly to own and operate than the UH-1N. In your leadership role on the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), have you, or will you, direct the Air Force to prioritize consideration of in-production DOD aircraft as a replacement for the UH-1 rather than continue to assume the associated security risks?

General DEMPSEY. The JROC does not direct service acquisition decisions. Rather, it defines and validates Joint force requirements that are then submitted to both budget and acquisition processes. The JROC does validate the results of analyses of alternatives, and will be alert to consideration of all possible alternatives, including in-production aircraft. When the decision is made to replace the UH-1N, a full and open competition will be conducted to find the helicopter that meets the mission requirements and provides DOD the most capable replacement at the most economically feasible cost. This may ultimately be an aircraft that is already in production, but those efficiencies will be evident through the proper source selection process.

69. Senator WICKER. General Dempsey, the Combat Rescue Helicopter (CRH) mission requirements were determined to be overly robust and expensive to justify the CRH's use for the domestic support missions currently conducted by the UH-1N. There is concern that the lack of urgency regarding fielding of a UH-1 replacement may indicate an attempt to merge CRH and UH-1N missions in the future. Did the JROC review of the CRH program validate any requirement to provide site and convoy security for the Nation's ICBM force or for supporting the Air Force District of Washington VIP airlift/evacuation missions currently supported by the UH-1N?

General DEMPSEY. The CRH's primary mission is to recover isolated personnel from hostile or denied territory. It will also execute humanitarian missions, civil

search and rescue, disaster relief, casualty/medical evacuation, and non-combatant evacuation operations. CRH is not being produced to replace the UH-1N; rather it will replace the Air Force's aging HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopter fleet. Thus, JROC review and validation of the CRH requirements did not include missions currently supported by the UH-1N, such as providing site and convoy security for the Nation's ICBM force or supporting the Air Force District of Washington VIP airlift/evacuation missions. However, this would not preclude the CRH from being called upon to execute missions currently being performed by other vertical lift platforms.

[The nomination reference of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
June 24, 2013.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

The following named officer for appointment as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and appointment to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., sections 152 and 601:

To be General

GEN Martin E. Dempsey, 8511

[The biographical sketch of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA

Source of commissioned service: USMA

Educational degrees:

U.S. Military Academy - BS - No Major

Duke University - MA - English

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College - MMAS - Military Arts and Sciences

National Defense University - MS - National Security and Strategic Studies

Military schools attended:

Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

National War College

Foreign language(s): French

Promotions:

Promotions	Date of Appointment
2LT	5 Jun 74
1LT	5 Jun 76
CPT	8 Aug 78
MAJ	1 Sep 85
LTC	1 Apr 91
COL	1 Sep 95
BG	1 Aug 01
MG	1 Sep 04
LTG	8 Sep 05
GEN	8 Dec 08

Major duty assignments:

From	To	Assignment
Jan 75	May 76	Platoon Leader, B Troop, 1st Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
May 76 ...	Sep 77	Support Platoon Leader, 1st Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Sep 77	Jun 78	S-1 (Personnel), 1st Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Jul 78	Jan 79	Student, Armor Officer Advanced Course, U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Knox, KY
Apr 79	Jan 80	Motor Officer, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, CO
Jan 80	Oct 80	Commander, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, CO
Oct 80	Jun 81	S-3 (Operations), 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, CO
Jun 81	Jul 82	Commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, CO
Aug 82 ...	May 84	Student, Duke University, Durham, NC
Jun 84	Jul 87	Instructor, later Assistant Professor, Department of English, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY
Aug 87 ...	Jun 88	Student, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS
Jul 88	Sep 89	Executive Officer, 4th Battalion, 67th Armor, 3d Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Sep 89	May 91	S-3 (Operations), later Executive Officer, 3d Brigade, 3d Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany and Operations Desert Shield/Storm, Saudi Arabia
Jul 91	Jun 93	Commander, 4th Battalion, 67th Armor, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Jul 93	Jun 95	Chief, Armor Branch, Combat Arms Division, Officer Personnel Management Directorate, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, Alexandria, VA
Aug 95 ...	Jun 96	Student, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC
Jul 96	Jul 98	Commander, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Carson, CO
Jul 98	Oct 99	Assistant Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs, Europe and Africa, J-5, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC
Oct 99	Aug 01	Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC
Sep 01	Jun 03	Program Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization Program, Saudi Arabia
Jun 03	Oct 04	Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq
Oct 04	Jul 05	Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Aug 05 ...	May 07	Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq/Commander, NATO Training Mission-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq
Aug 07 ...	Mar 08	Deputy Commander, U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL
Mar 08 ...	Oct 08	Acting Commander, U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL
Dec 08	Mar 11	Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, VA
Apr 11	Sep 11	Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Washington, DC
Sep 11	Present	Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC

Summary of joint assignments:

Assignments	Date	Grade
Assistant Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs, Europe and Africa, J-5, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC	Jul 98–Oct 99	Colonel
Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC	Oct 99–Aug 01	Colonel
Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq/Commander, NATO Training Mission-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq	Aug 05–May 07	Lieutenant General
Deputy Commander, U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL	Aug 07–Mar 08	Lieutenant General
Acting Commander, U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL	Mar 08–Oct 08	Lieutenant General
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC	Sep 11–Present	General

Summary of operational assignments:

Assignments	Date	Grade
Executive Officer, 3d Brigade, 3d Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Operations Desert Shield/Storm, Saudi Arabia	Jan 91–Feb 91	Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq	Jun 03–Oct 04	Brigadier General/ Major General
Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq/Commander, NATO Training Mission-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq	Aug 05–May 07	Lieutenant General

U.S. decorations and badges:

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
 Distinguished Service Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
 Defense Superior Service Medal
 Legion of Merit (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
 Bronze Star Medal with "V" Device
 Bronze Star Medal
 Meritorious Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
 Joint Service Commendation Medal
 Army Commendation Medal
 Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
 Combat Action Badge
 Parachutist Badge
 Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
 Army Staff Identification Badge

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Room SR-228

Washington, DC 20510-6050

(202) 224-3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF
NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. **Name:** (Include any former names used.)
Martin E. Dempsey.
2. **Position to which nominated:**
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
3. **Date of nomination:**
June 24, 2013.
4. **Address:** (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee's executive files.]
5. **Date and place of birth:**
March 14, 1952; Jersey City, NJ.
6. **Marital Status:** (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Diane Sullivan Dempsey.
7. **Names and ages of children:**
Christopher, 34.
Megan, 33.

Caitlin, 30.

8. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.

None.

9. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.

None.

10. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.

Member, Veteran of Foreign Wars.

Member, Association of the U.S. Army.

11. **Honors and awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.

None.

12. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

I, Martin E. Dempsey, agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.

13. **Personal views:** Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

I, Martin E. Dempsey, agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give my personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

MARTIN E. DEMPSEY.

This 23rd day of May, 2013.

[The nomination of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on July 30, 2013, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 1, 2013.]

[Prepared questions submitted to ADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr., USN, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. On previous occasions you have answered the committee’s policy questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the last time being in connection with your first nomination to be Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of these reforms changed since you testified before the committee at your last confirmation hearing?

Answer. My views have not changed. I have served in various joint capacities throughout my naval career and I've now had the privilege to serve 2 years as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. My recent experience confirms the tremendous advancements created by this landmark legislation. I do not see a need to change the provisions of this legislation at this time.

Question. In light of your experience as Chairman, do you see any need for modifications to Goldwater-Nichols? If so, what modifications do you believe would be appropriate?

Answer. Reflecting on my recent experience, I do not believe changes to Goldwater-Nichols are necessary at this time. However, if confirmed, I will remain alert to opportunities or shortcomings that might indicate that changes to the legislation are warranted.

DUTIES

Question. Based on your experience as Vice Chairman, what recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties and functions set forth in section 154 of title 10, U.S.C., and in regulations of the Department of Defense (DOD), that pertain to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the organization and operation of the Joint Staff in general?

Answer. If confirmed, I do not foresee recommending any changes to the law. I will, however, remain attuned to potential issues and opportunities for improvement.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the following officials:

The Secretary of Defense.

Answer. The Vice Chairman performs the duties assigned to him and other such duties as may be assigned by the Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as the Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or until the absence or disability ceases. These duties would include providing military advice to the Secretary of Defense. The Vice Chairman may also provide the Secretary of Defense advice upon the Secretary's request in his capacity as a military adviser.

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has been delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense on any matters upon which the Secretary is authorized to act. As such, the relationship of the Vice Chairman with the Deputy Secretary is similar to that with the Secretary.

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Answer. The Vice Chairman performs the duties assigned to him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such other duties as assigned by the Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. When there is a vacancy in the office of the Chairman, or during the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing my close working relationship with the Chairman.

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)).

Answer. Title 10, U.S.C. and current DOD directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisers to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional areas. With particular regard to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), the Vice Chairman serves on many deliberative panels focused on resource decisions, including the Deputies Advisory Working Group as its Vice Chair and as Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to work very closely with the USD(AT&L) on continuing improvements to the requirements process and providing senior-level focus on key acquisition programs.

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (USD(C)).

Answer. I recognize the importance of the Vice Chairman working closely with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) in appropriately managing and providing oversight of the budgetary and fiscal processes of the Joint Staff required to achieve

the budgetary goals prescribed by the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)).

Answer. The Vice Chairman and USD(P) work together to represent defense and military interests in interagency affairs. They often co-lead or serve together on various ad hoc committees or projects as directed by Congress or as assigned from time to time by Secretary of Defense or by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, such as the Nuclear Weapons Committee or the Deputy's Management Action Group. The Vice Chairman and USD(P) also serve together on the Deputies Committee, monitoring the work of various interagency policy committees as well as supporting the Principals Committee and the National Security Council. If confirmed, I plan to continue my frequent interaction with the USD(P).

Question. The other Under Secretaries of Defense.

Answer. Within their assigned areas, Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions and interact frequently with the Joint Staff. They may issue instructions and directive-type memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. These instructions and directives are applicable to all DOD components. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to commanders of the unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Under Secretaries of Defense.

Question. The Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation.

Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., and current DOD directives establish the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation as a principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and other senior officials of DOD on cost assessment and program evaluation. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to work closely with the Director under the auspices of the Vice Chairman's resourcing and requirements functions, as well as benefitting from the extensive and independent analysis provided by the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office towards making informed resourcing decisions.

Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.

Answer. With the exception of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Public Affairs, Legislative Affairs, and for Networks and Information Integration, all Assistant Secretaries of Defense are subordinate to one of the Under Secretaries of Defense. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to commanders of unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Assistant Secretaries in a manner similar to that of working with the Under Secretaries.

Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.

Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., section 165 provides that, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority of the combatant commanders, the Secretaries of Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of forces assigned to unified and specified commands.

The Chairman, or Vice Chairman when directed or when acting as the Chairman, advises the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which program recommendations and budget proposals of the military departments conform with priorities in strategic plans and with the requirements of the combatant commanders. The Vice Chairman has numerous interactions with the Service Secretaries in the various management forums within the Department. Finally, in his role as the Chairman of the JROC, the Vice Chairman has considerable interaction with the Service Secretaries' acquisition staffs. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing my close and productive working relationship with the Service Secretaries and their staffs.

Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force and the Chief of Naval Operations.

Answer. The Service Chiefs serve two significant roles. First, they are responsible for the organization, manning, training, and equipping of their respective Services. Without the full support and cooperation of the Service Chiefs, no combatant commander can be ensured of the readiness of his assigned forces for missions directed by the President and Secretary of Defense. Second, as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they are advisors to the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense as the senior uniformed leaders of their respective Services. The Service Vice Chiefs play a key role on the JROC, chaired by the Vice Chairman. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Service Chiefs and their Vice Chiefs to fulfill the combatant commanders' warfighting and operational requirements, and on other relevant policy matters.

Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.

Answer. The Chief of the National Guard heads a joint activity of DOD and is the senior uniformed National Guard officer responsible for formulating, developing and coordinating all policies, programs and plans affecting more than half a million Army and Air National Guard personnel. Appointed by the President, he serves as principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on National Guard matters. He is also the principal adviser to the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army and the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force on all National Guard issues. As National Guard Bureau Chief, he serves as the department's official channel of communication with the Governors and Adjutants General. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau has the specific responsibility of addressing matters involving non-Federalized National Guard forces in support of homeland defense and civil support missions. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to provide support as required.

Question. The Combatant Commanders.

Answer. The combatant commanders fight our wars and conduct military operations around the world. The Chairman provides a vital link between the combatant commanders and other elements of DOD and, as directed by the President, may serve as the means of communication between the combatant commanders and the President or Secretary of Defense. When there is a vacancy in the office of Chairman or in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman when interacting with the combatant commanders. Having served as a combatant commander, I have clear insight into the capabilities and limitations of combatant command staffs. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the combatant commanders to enable their warfighting capabilities and provide other support as required.

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. What do you consider to be the most significant challenges you have faced in your first term as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Answer. In a world of accelerating change that is growing more rather than less dangerous, I have faced a number of challenges in what I have labeled the three portfolios of policy, investment, and people.

In the policy portfolio, we have been grappling with a host of threats to our national security interests . . . in Afghanistan, Iran, and the Korean Peninsula; with the continuing evolution of al Qaeda and its affiliates; in the aftermath of the Arab Awakening in Libya, Syria and Egypt; and within the increasingly complex cyber domain. Maintaining a balanced approach to securing our interests in these areas in a declining budget environment requires constant effort.

In the investment portfolio, we continue to struggle with budget challenges that are quietly eroding our readiness to defend this nation today and have impacted our ability to prepare for tomorrow. I was confirmed on the day the Budget Control Act was passed, and have discovered that the Vice Chairman has a unique role in encouraging the various elements of the Department in coming to grips with the reality of decreasing budgets.

In the people portfolio we are trying to manage the enormous uncertainty to which our military and civilian members and their families are exposed as Congress struggles to come to agreement on a budget. We have also expended considerable effort to ensure proper care for our wounded, ill, and injured members, as well as finding every lever we can to eliminate the pernicious insider threat of sexual assault.

Much remains to be done in all three of these portfolios. If reconfirmed, I look forward to continuing to serve this great Nation in uniform, and pledge to work with this committee to strike the right balance among ends, ways, and means of protecting our country and its interests.

Question. What new challenges do you expect to face if you are confirmed for a second term?

Answer. If confirmed, my foremost challenge will be to continue supporting the Secretary and Chairman in guiding the force through fiscal contraction while sustaining readiness and protecting our Nation and its security interests. The challenges I listed above will persist—indeed, they may become worse as the Department's fiscal uncertainty deepens—and require constant attention and visionary leadership. As always, new problems will emerge: new crises and contingencies; new hurdles in tending to the capability, capacity, and readiness of the force; and new challenges faced by our most important resource, namely our people.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer. If confirmed, I will renew my efforts to support the Chairman and Secretary. There is much to be done. There is more progress to be made balancing the ends, ways and means of strategy—particularly in preserving as many of our “ends” as possible by refining our “ways” as the “means” continue to decline—this means new ways of applying force and refreshing our plans on how and where we do it. We need to continue our press for a more efficient Department, leveraging congressional assistance where possible in doing so. We must ensure our people navigate the shoals of a changing financial and operational environment—and we need to remain persistent in our determination that they perform to the highest possible standards in terms of integrity, conduct, and respect for taxpayer dollars. Finally, I will use my leadership of the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC) and the budgeting and acquisition sides of the investment triangle to find the right balance among the capability, capacity, and readiness of our force. In these and other ways I will lend my best efforts to ensuring our Nation is safe.

PRIORITIES

Question. Recognizing that challenges, anticipated and unforeseen, will drive your priorities to a substantial degree, if confirmed, what other priorities, beyond those associated with the major challenges you identified in the section above, would you set for your second term as Vice Chairman?

Answer. There are a number of specific areas I will maintain high on a list of priorities. Among these are:

- Working closely with interagency stakeholders, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to ensure the trajectory of our efforts in Afghanistan remain on track.
- Ensuring the Department is fully prepared to support the President regarding any decision he may make regarding use of force in any of several areas where it may become necessary.
- Maintaining unrelenting emphasis on every possible aspect of conquering the insider threat of sexual assault in our ranks.
- Continuing to ensure the Department’s budget decisions are based on strategy and that they emphasize improved efficiency before reducing military capability, capacity, or readiness.
- Highlighting the importance of readiness in an environment where it will be tempting to preserve politically-attractive capacity and capability at its expense.
- Maintaining emphasis on wounded warrior programs even as the number of new wounded members declines due to the transition in Afghanistan—these heroes require care long after they return home.
- Building on a good trajectory of requirements and acquisition reform and remaining vigilant regarding current and future programs—there is much to be done in this area.
- Ensuring the Department maintains a collegial and influential relationship with the National Nuclear Security Administration to ensure the needs of our nuclear infrastructure are met.
- Pressing for high-leverage technical innovation that is relevant to the current and future warfighting environment.
- Working closely with my fellow senior military leaders to ensure we all serve with distinction and integrity.

JOINT REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL

Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the Chairman of the JROC, which has the responsibility to review and validate Service requirements.

Are there any recommendations that you would make to modify the JROC or its authority or the requirements process?

Answer. I do not believe additional formal changes or modifications to the JROC, its authority, or the requirements process are needed at this time. The JROC’s authority as detailed in title 10, U.S.C., section 181, is sufficient to allow the JROC to carry out its responsibilities for overseeing the joint military requirements process. We continue to make every effort within existing authorities to improve JROC processes and products.

Question. Has the ‘trip-wire’ process, to bring troubled programs back to the JROC for a review and to consider performance trade-offs to mitigate further cost growth and/or schedule delays before the program faced a Nunn-McCurdy review, been regularly employed on large programs that have experienced significant cost growth and schedule delays?

Answer. The trip wire process continues to function well. We have expanded the trip-wire process to include both schedule delays and quantity changes, in addition to cost growth, when validating capability documents. Only a few programs have recently exceeded trip-wire values. The most recent case was a review of the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 2 for an IOC schedule delay of greater than 12 months.

However, rather than waiting for trip-wires to be breached, we try to proactively engage programs and their requirements. I recently signed out a Key Performance Parameter (KPP) Relief JROCM (015-13) which was intended to encourage acquisition managers, in coordination with the appropriate requirements sponsors, to officially request requirements relief where KPPs appear out of line with a cost-benefit analysis. This has resulted in KPP changes for the Three Dimensional Expeditionary Long-Range Radar, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, and Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle.

Question. Has the JROC altered requirements, either for performance or procurement quantities, as a result of such reviews?

Answer. As previously stated, only a few program reviews have been required as a result of their exceeding trip-wire values. In the case of Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Increment 2, the JROC acknowledged that the schedule delay was driven primarily by the extension of fielding schedules and funding alignment and no change was made to performance or procurement quantities.

On the other hand, there have been performance parameter changes due to cost-benefit analysis resulting from the KPP Relief JROCM, which encourages requirements reviews when appropriate. Whether for a trip-wire breach or a proactive scrub of the requirements, we have recently made KPP changes to the following programs: Long Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B), Joint Strike Fighter, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike, Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle, WIN-T, Three Dimensional Expeditionary Long-Range Radar, Common Point Ground System, Air and Missile Defense Radar, and Global Positioning System Modernization.

Question. Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA) required the Secretary of Defense to ensure that trade-off analyses are conducted on cost, schedule, and performance as part of the requirements development and approval process. Such analyses enhance DOD's understanding of what performance factors are the critical ones driving costs and schedules.

What is your view of the modifications to the JROC process made by WSARA?

Answer. I fully support the major revisions to the joint warfighting requirements process that were made in early 2012. This includes updates to governing documents and the means by which supporting bodies carry out their responsibilities in accordance with title 10, U.S.C., section 181, and applicable portions of the WSARA (primarily sections 105 and 201). We critically assess the impact of requirements on the cost, schedule and performance of programs as a matter of routine when those programs are in front of the JROC.

Question. What additional steps do you believe that Congress or DOD should take to ensure that trade-offs between cost, schedule, and performance objectives for major weapon systems are made at an appropriately early point in the acquisition process?

Answer. DOD is striving to push capability gap information out to industry earlier in the acquisition process. By partnering early with industry and providing timely insight into our vision for future capabilities, DOD is better able to leverage industry science and technology (S&T) efforts and, informed by early S&T development, provide feasible and affordable options for acquisition decisions. A recent example of this approach is the Army's Future Vertical Lift Initial Capabilities Document which defined capability gaps in the 2030 and beyond Joint Operational Environment. There is no doubt more we can do in this area.

The JROC also considers cost, schedule, and performance tradeoffs as early as the analysis of alternatives (AoA) review.

Question. Are there any other recommendations that you would make to modify the JROC or its authority or the requirements process?

Answer. I do not believe additional changes or modifications to the JROC, its authority, or the requirements process are needed at this time. The JROC's authority as detailed in title 10, U.S.C., section 181, is sufficient to allow the JROC to carry out its responsibilities for overseeing the joint military requirements process. That said, we continue to make every effort within existing authorities to improve internal JROC processes and products.

Question. How would you assess the effectiveness of the JROC in the DOD acquisition process?

Answer. The changes to the JROC process have enabled a much closer relationship with USD(AT&L) by ensuring that requirements and their associated costs are continually evaluated through the acquisition life-cycle. We currently have an excellent relationship with USD(AT&L), to include their participation as one of the statutory experts invited to JROC meetings. Their insights are most valuable as we consider requirements alternatives, while at the same time we work closely with them to ensure requirements are kept under control and, in some cases, prudently trimmed as informed by a cost, schedule, performance and warfighter needs.

Question. What is your vision for the role and priorities of the JROC in the future?

Answer. The JROC is our key body shaping the future Joint Force (title 10, U.S.C., section 181). The priorities for the JROC and the JCIDS process are to: (1) debate strategic and operational requirements and make difficult choices earlier; (2) strive for better upfront fidelity on cost/schedule/performance tradeoffs; (3) require greater analytic rigor and risk/portfolio analysis; and (4) ensure a more dynamic/iterative process throughout a program's lifecycle. Additionally, the JROC could play an important role in retuning system requirements in the face of the dramatic resource reductions stipulated by the full BCA caps.

Question. Do you believe the JROC process is sufficient to understand and identify where there are opportunities for multi-service collaboration or where programs could or should be modified to take advantage of related acquisition programs?

Answer. Yes. We developed and expanded opportunities for multi-service collaboration for several programs during the past couple of years, including ground and amphibious combat vehicles and long range air search radars. This is always a difficult issue for the individual Services, but we have managed to make progress in this area thanks to a group of open-minded Service Vice Chiefs.

Question. What principles guide your approach to inviting, and helping ensure the sufficient participation of other stakeholders in the JROC?

Answer. Over the past several years, the JROC has been refined into a more lean executive body where key leaders and advisors have frank and open discussions. In addition to the statutory members and advisors, combatant commanders participate when appropriate. I strongly believe in the importance of including these stakeholders, and I turn to them with an offer to speak on every issue, and they have been forthcoming. In short, we have created a smaller more intimate forum that still includes the major stakeholders, which has led to a more fulsome discussion of requirements issues.

JOINT CAPABILITIES INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT SYSTEMS

Question. What is your perspective on the responsiveness of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development Systems (JCIDS) process in addressing joint capabilities needs?

Answer. We work requirements based on urgency: life/death requirements for current conflicts are worked in days; requirements to address conflicts that appear to be imminent are worked in weeks to ensure that systems can be fielded in time; enduring warfighting requirements are worked as quickly as possible using our streamlined JCIDS. While we still look for ways to continuously improve the JCIDS process, it has been dramatically enhanced and addresses requirements through a more efficient and interactive process. Combatant commander input is better incorporated to ensure joint capabilities produced are more timely, precise and needs-based. The most recent changes to the process consolidate guidance documents, streamline procedures, mandate shorter document lengths, and reduce timelines to increase effectiveness and responsiveness.

Question. What level of involvement in the joint requirements process and the JROC do you believe is appropriate for the COCOMs?

Answer. As the primary customers for the capabilities delivered by acquisition, the combatant commanders play a critical role in the joint requirements process at all levels, to include the JROC. Combatant command input during the requirements-generation process helps ensure that joint-capability outcomes more accurately match the current and future needs of the dynamic security environment. As such, we closely review Combatant Commander Integrated Priority Lists and they are invited to participate in every meeting. It is the norm for these commanders to have a representative in a meeting that covers a topic of importance to them.

Question. Do you think that JCIDS needs to be changed? If so, what are your views on how it could be improved to make the process more responsive to users' needs while efficiently investing resources in a fiscally constrained budget environment?

Answer. Revisions made in early 2012 were a big step forward in improving JCIDS, and the next scheduled review and revision of key documents is ongoing. These documents include: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5123.01 (JROC Charter), CJCSI 3170.01 (JCIDS Instruction), and the JCIDS Manual. Recent changes to JCIDS emphasize flexibility and speed in requirements generation, review, and validation. The changes also enable, when necessary, reassessment and adjustments to previously validated documents when poorly crafted requirements and timelines are identified. Preserving, and building upon, these JCIDS revisions will promote greater efficiencies and future success. In addition, we are working closely with USD(AT&L) to ensure that the Defense Acquisition System and the Joint Requirements processes are tightly synchronized and integrated to ensure that requirements are valid, feasible and affordable.

Question. The requirements development process is not a stand-alone process, but instead is required to work collaboratively with the acquisition and budgeting processes.

What steps are needed to better align the requirements development process with the acquisition and budgeting processes to make for a more efficient and effective process for delivering capabilities?

Answer. The pending update to the Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.02 and the revisions to JCIDS guidance documents will improve coordination between our requirements and acquisition processes. Additionally, I initiated and attend a quarterly leadership forum with USD(AT&L) and Director-CAPE to help align requirements, acquisition, and resourcing. These meetings have included macro discussions on the process as well as a few individual programs, and I look forward to expanding the concept. Developing a more synchronous and flexible relationship between military requirements, acquisition, and budgets will enable DOD to deliver its warfighter capabilities at more reasonable costs.

ACQUISITION REFORM AND ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT

Question. What is your view of the changes made by the WSARA?

Answer. The WSARA has been important in making sure new defense programs start on a sound footing to avoid the high cost of fixing problems late in the acquisition process. It also helped foster a culture within DOD focused on the continuous improvement of our acquisition processes and their associated outcomes. I am very encouraged by the cooperation we have built with USD(AT&L), which was encouraged by the tenets of the WSARA.

Question. What role, if any, do you believe the JROC should play in the oversight and management of acquisition programs after requirements have been established?

Answer. The JROC has an enduring title 10 oversight responsibility to ensure that an acquisition program's requirements are realistic and relevant throughout the life of the acquisition. The WSARA also required the Secretary of Defense—via the Chairman and the JROC—to ensure that trade-off analyses are conducted on cost, schedule, and performance as part of the requirements development and approval process. We are seeing this play out, as the JROC has made several mid-stride adjustments to requirements to reflect emerging realities during acquisition, always ensuring warfighter needs are fully considered.

Question. What role, if any, do you believe the JROC should play in reviewing the progress of major defense acquisition programs or other acquisition programs?

Answer. The progress of major defense acquisition programs is monitored by the JROC often through Milestone C. JROC oversight is required to ensure that an acquisition program's requirements throughout its life are realistic and relevant. The WSARA also requires the Secretary of Defense—via the Chairman and the JROC—to ensure that trade-off analyses are conducted on cost, schedule, and performance as part of the requirements development and approval process. A good example of this is the JROC's continuing interest in the F-35, to include the helmet associated with the aircraft. The JROC requires periodic and detailed updates on JSF performance, cost and schedule to ensure KPPs are appropriate in light of cost.

Question. Do you see a need for any change in the role of the Chairman or the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the requirements determination, resource allocation, or acquisition management processes?

Answer. No, I do not see a need for any change at this time.

Question. What is your view of the role played by Configuration Steering Boards (CSB) in preventing cost growth due to requirements creep?

Answer. CSBs provide an important senior level forum for acquisition and requirements officials to review and assess requirements to achieve balance between weapon system performance and affordability over a program's lifecycle. They institutionalize Military Service, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and Joint

Staff review of potential requirements trade-offs. While the CSBs are gathering momentum, my understanding is that USD(AT&L) is very supportive of using this process to help identify areas where requirements may need refinement.

Question. What do you see as the proper relationship between CSBs and the JROC in managing requirements for acquisition programs?

Answer. CSBs provide an important senior level forum for acquisition and requirements officials to review and assess requirements to achieve balance between weapon system performance and affordability over a program's lifecycle. A key output of a CSB could be a recommendation to the appropriate validation authority—the JROC in the case of KPPs—to review or relax a requirement in order to achieve a better balance between performance and affordability.

Question. What is your view of the Nunn-McCurdy requirements for Major Defense Acquisition Programs that fail to meet cost, schedule, and performance objectives?

Answer. The Nunn-McCurdy requirements have introduced rigor into our processes and better scrutiny of Major Defense Acquisition Programs regarding cost, schedule, and performance objectives. I particularly appreciate the flexibility within the process to account in particular for price increases solely due to quantity decreases.

Question. What do you see as the proper relationship between the JROC and those DOD officials charged with implementing the Nunn-McCurdy requirements?

Answer. I do not recommend any changes at this time. The current relationship between the JROC and DOD officials charged with implementing the Nunn-McCurdy requirements is appropriate. The JROC's role is to validate the criticality to national security of the systems based on the estimated increase in cost.

URGENT NEEDS PROCESSES

Question. In your view, what specific steps should the Department take to better manage the joint urgent needs process?

Answer. The Department exercises sound management of the Joint Urgent Needs process. DOD Directive 5000.71 (Rapid Fulfillment of Combatant Commander Urgent Operational Needs) was recently approved. It established the Warfighter Senior Integration Group to lead and facilitate agile and rapid responses to validated combatant commander urgent operational needs. In addition, we recently added the ability for combatant commanders to request rapid capability fielding if conflict is imminent (rather than ongoing) through a Joint Emergent Operational Needs (JEON) document. I believe we have struck the right discipline and balance between addressing truly urgent and emergent warfighter needs and merely using the system to circumvent the rigor of the deliberate process (while at the same time we are streamlining the latter process).

Question. What is your sense of where DOD might consolidate urgent needs entities and/or processes and how cost savings could be achieved through such consolidation?

Answer. This is an area where we have taken many steps, and seen important results, over the past several years. To further improve upon our efforts, the Department is reviewing the entities and processes that we use to fill urgent capability gaps in light of our drawdown from Afghanistan. Without pre-judging any results, it is possible we could consolidate these entities, and we will remain vigilant for such opportunities. The goal will be to ensure the Department is still poised to quickly address evolving threats as we draw down from our wartime footing, while ensuring the efforts are properly-scaled for anticipated future requirements.

Question. Do you believe that the Joint Staff should take steps to integrate the Joint Urgent Needs process with the individual services' processes? If so, please explain?

Answer. We are currently reviewing our urgent needs processes, to include seeking efficiencies and deconfliction between the Services' processes and joint processes. Despite the success of our joint processes, I believe we will find that each Service will still need a way to address critical needs that are specific to their component.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS COUNCIL

Question. If confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you will continue to serve as a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council.

What would your priorities be for the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC)?

Answer. Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal is a key priority in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), central to the responsibilities of the NWC. I have worked closely with the other NWC members to develop a plan for the Nuclear Enterprise that is responsible and affordable to ensure a safe, secure,

and effective nuclear arsenal for the long term. The refinement and execution of this plan continues to be my priority. We will need to remain vigilant, as the effects of potential full sequestration levels of funding on the Enterprise are not yet fully understood.

Additionally, I will continue to work with other NWC members to ensure modernization of our aging nuclear facilities and investment in nuclear enterprise-related human capital, to accelerate dismantlement of retired warheads, and to improve our understanding of foreign nuclear weapons activities.

Question. What changes if any would you recommend to the organization, structure, or function of the NWC?

Answer. I have served as a member of the NWC for the past 2 years and have no firm change recommendations at this time. However, if confirmed, I will continue work with the NWC chairman and members to assess the organization, structure and function of the NWC, and where warranted, provide recommendations for changes to increase effectiveness and value in support of the nuclear mission for national security. I will also remain alert for any need to adjust governance of the Nuclear Enterprise's activities.

INTEGRATION OF SPACE PROGRAMS

Question. What is your view on the need to institute a more integrated approach to both the military and intelligence sides of the space community?

Answer. I believe we are making progress in this area. The military and intelligence space communities participate in a number of joint forums and joint program development. We expect senior leaders to be innovative in identifying and implementing integrated programs. This is necessary for efficacy and efficiency in a much more constrained budget environment. However, when the needs of either community diverge to the extent that joint solutions impose impractical cost and risk, careful consideration should be given to viable independent, yet complementary solutions.

SPACE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

Question. In many instances the military and intelligence space programs have experienced technical, budget, and schedule difficulties. In some instances these difficulties can be traced to problems with establishing realistic, clear, requirements and then maintaining control over the integrity of the requirements once established. If confirmed as chairman of the JROC you will be involved in determining these requirements.

How in your view can or should the space systems requirements process be improved?

Answer. All weapon systems requirements are closely scrutinized to best meet the needs of the Joint Force in terms of cost, schedule, and performance. If confirmed, I will continue to work with senior leaders to improve early and continuous coordination between OSD, the military, and intelligence communities throughout the space acquisition requirements process. The active participation of the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Commander has been most helpful in this regard.

Question. In general, space programs take many years to move from conception to launch. The result is that the technology in the satellites is significantly outdated by the time the satellites are launched and operational, which in turn, can lead to a decision to terminate a program early, and look to a newer technology. This vicious cycle results in significantly increased costs for space systems as sunk costs are never fully amortized.

How in your view can this cycle be addressed?

Answer. The WSARA is designed to help ensure that new defense acquisition programs start on a sound footing, to avoid the high cost and schedule impacts of fixing problems later in the acquisition process.

Some aspects of this phenomenon will be very difficult to fix, as satellites by nature of their complexity and rigorous requirement for reliability take considerable time to design, build, and launch. However, I believe we can make improvements in our space programs by ensuring early, ongoing and rigorous reviews of costs, requirements, and performance, and their alignment. Again, bringing the expertise available from the STRATCOM Commander will be a key element in placing this cycle on a tighter rotation.

SPACE COOPERATION

Question. Do you support arms control limitations on space capabilities?

I continue to support the principles outlined in the 2010 National Space Policy, which states that the United States will pursue bilateral and multilateral trans-

parency and confidence-building measures to encourage responsible actions in, and the peaceful use of, space. The Department should only consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures that are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the national security of the United States and its allies.

Question. Would you support the United States signing the so-called European Union Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities?

Answer. The Department is currently supporting the State Department in negotiations on the European Union's proposed International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. This is an effort to develop a pragmatic first set of guidelines for safe activities in space. If confirmed, I remain committed to continuing our support to evaluating proposed drafts of the Code and considering appropriate steps to establish rules of the road for space operations that are consistent with our national security interests and access to space.

OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE

Question. Do you support the concept of operationally responsive small satellites and what do you see as the most promising opportunities for small satellites?

Answer. I support resilience in space programs and we are continuing to review and support programs that best meet the needs of the Joint Force in future conflicts and given fiscal constraints. Given unlimited funding I would want to push further and faster on this program. Under the current environment we will need to be very selective in pursuing operationally responsive space, and should select only those that provide best value. The most promising concepts would be for rapid reinsertion of communications and surveillance capability in the wake of the initial stages of a conflict with a space-capable adversary.

Question. Do you believe that smaller less complicated less expensive satellites can play a role in providing resiliency or redundancy for space systems?

Answer. I support resilience in space programs and we are continuing to review and support programs that best meet the needs of the Joint Force in future conflicts, within fiscal constraints. Such programs could include smaller less complicated less expensive satellites, and it could also include adding payloads to other satellites.

PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE

Question. DOD is currently working on technologies that if successful could lead to the decision to develop and deploy conventional, non-nuclear, prompt global strike capability.

Do you believe that a prompt global strike capability should be developed and deployed?

Answer. Although a decision has not been made to deploy such a capability, I believe it would have potential utility in a variety of time-sensitive scenarios and would thus provide greater flexibility to the President for taking kinetic action if required. There are potential future circumstances that may require a capability to address high value, time sensitive and defended targets from ranges outside the current conventional technology. Therefore, we continue to look for affordable technology risk reduction and maturation of engineering concepts.

Question. If your answer to the previous question is yes, what is your vision of the capability that should be developed for prompt global strike and the types of targets that would underpin the need to develop the capability?

Answer. If a decision is made to develop and deploy a capability, it should have specific attributes. The capability should influence, dissuade, or defeat an adversary using conventional weapons to rapidly penetrate or circumvent access-denied areas. It could be useful in situations ranging from a rapid strike against a known terrorist leader, to hitting a rogue regime's mobile missile that is positioned for launch, to quickly interfering with the ability of an adversary to target one of our space assets. This is an example of how we are actually trying to constrain requirements so we don't end up with gold plated systems we can't afford. So while it should be both prompt and accurate, not requiring the capability to hit any target on the globe or hit hard and deeply buried targets should allow us to hold an adequate set of targets at risk at lower cost.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Question. If confirmed, you will continue to be a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council, and work closely with the National Nuclear Security Administration and its Stockpile Stewardship Program.

What, in your view, are the longer-term Stockpile Stewardship Program goals and what are the key elements that should be addressed from a DOD perspective?

Answer. Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program with the aim of creating the computational capabilities and experimental tools needed to allow for the continued certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable without the need for nuclear weapons explosive testing. The Secretaries of Defense and Energy are statutorily required to certify annually to Congress the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.

I believe these goals are appropriate and the program is effective; today's stockpile has been certified without a need for further nuclear testing. But the stockpile is aging. The Nuclear Weapons Council has developed a long-term plan that includes life extension programs to address aging concerns and enhance safety and security in a responsible manner. I believe the plan is executable and affordable. If confirmed, I will work across the interagency to ensure this plan is continuously updated and implemented.

Question. In your view is the Stockpile Stewardship Program providing the tools to ensure the safety, reliability, and security of the nuclear weapons stockpile without testing and if not what tools are needed?

Answer. I believe that the Stockpile Stewardship Program provides the requisite tools, as attested to by the national security lab directors in their annual assessment letters. These tools are critical as we life-extend our aging nuclear weapons. As we sustain the program, it is important these tools allow us to assess the full range of life extension programs to include: refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads, and replacement of nuclear components.

Question. Do you believe the administration's 1251 report sets forth an appropriate road map for the modernization of the nuclear weapons complex and the strategic delivery systems?

Answer. The administration's section 1043 report, which has replaced the 1251 report, describes an appropriate roadmap for ensuring the future safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear stockpile and associated delivery platforms as well as for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex. The plan described in the 1043 report represents a strong commitment to the nuclear mission and is an important element of assurance that the U.S. deterrent remains strong. Additionally, this plan reflects the work of the Nuclear Weapons Council in developing an executable and affordable long-term plan for the Nuclear Enterprise.

Question. Do you agree that the full funding of the President's plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, commonly referred to as the 1251 report, is a critical national security priority?

Answer. Funding of the 1043 report, which has replaced the 1251 report, is a critical national security priority. The President's fiscal year 2014 budget request again includes a significant commitment from DOD to modernizing the nuclear weapon complex and supporting the long-term plan for extending the life of the weapons in our enduring stockpile. If confirmed, I will support the continued modernization and sustainment of our nuclear weapons delivery systems, stockpile, and infrastructure.

Question. Prior to completing this modernization effort do you believe it would be prudent to consider reductions below New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) limits for either the deployed or nondeployed stockpile of nuclear weapons?

Answer. U.S. objectives in future negotiations with Russia must consider multiple factors. It is my view that any reductions in the numbers of deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons, either strategic or non-strategic, would need to be negotiated in a manner that strengthens deterrence of potential adversaries, maintains strategic stability with Russia and China, and assures our allies and partners. The timing and size of reductions, if any, would have to be closely coupled to the status of the modernization effort. If confirmed, I will support the Department's continuing assessment of the proper force size and capabilities required for an effective nuclear deterrent.

NEW START TREATY AND FUTURE REDUCTIONS

Question. The New START treaty has now entered into force. Under the terms of the treaty both sides have 7 years to come into compliance with the treaty.

Do you believe that there is any opportunity to come into compliance in less than 7 years and what would be the conditions under which such compliance could be achieved?

Answer. I believe the United States will be compliant by the February 2018 deadline although we have not made a final decision on the compliant force structure. Continued funding support from Congress is required to ensure the required activities of the department and the Services can be executed in a timely fashion for compliance. While achieving the limits on delivery vehicles will take nearly the entire

compliance period, it may be possible to accelerate other elements of compliance, such as achieving the total deployed warhead limit of 1550 up to a year early.

Question. Do you believe that reductions in the total number of warheads, both Reserve and operationally deployed, is feasible prior to the expiration of the New START treaty and, if so, under what conditions?

Answer. The treaty requires the Parties to ensure their strategic offensive forces are at or below the treaty's three central limits 7 years after entry into force, which will occur on February 5, 2018. DOD is on schedule to comply with this obligation. The treaty expires in 2021 and may be extended one time for 5 years if both the United States and Russia agree. Once we are in compliance with the central limits, it is technically feasible to further reduce the total number of warheads; however I would only recommend such reductions through negotiations with Russia.

NUCLEAR TRIAD MODERNIZATION

Question. Under the NPR, the administration has committed to begin modernization of each leg of the nuclear triad including development of new nuclear cruise missiles and extending the life of nuclear weapons. This process will continue over the next 30 years and longer, and will be very expensive.

If confirmed, would you agree to review the requirements and cost of these initiatives, identify any opportunities for cost savings, and report back to the committee on a periodic basis if you identify such opportunities?

Answer. Yes. This falls under my responsibilities as Vice Chairman, and I would be pleased, if confirmed, to report any opportunities for cost savings to the committee. I am currently paying close attention within the bounds of my authority to development of the Long Range Strike Bomber, and intend to do the same for the new SSBN. I serve as a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council and have contributed over the past 2 years at developing an affordable and executable strategy for the Nuclear Enterprise that includes life extension programs of nuclear weapons.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT STRATEGY

Question. President Obama recently issued new guidance on nuclear weapons employment strategy, consistent with the 2010 NPR.

Do you support the President's new nuclear weapons employment guidance, and did you have an opportunity to provide input to the formulation of the new guidance?

Answer. Yes. I support the President's new guidance. The Commander of STRATCOM and I and our staffs both participated in the analysis process. The two of us and General Dempsey participated in senior leader meetings during development of the guidance, where, based on the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander of STRATCOM we provided our military advice to both the Secretary of Defense and the President.

Question. Do you agree with the President's assessment that the United States can ensure its security, and the security of our allies and partners, and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a one-third reduction in deployed strategic nuclear weapons below the level established in the New START treaty? Please explain your views.

Answer. Yes. I agree with this assessment. We can ensure our security and that of our allies and partners, and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent while pursuing further reductions beyond the New START treaty central limits. However, to be clear on this point, we must continue to adequately invest in the modernization of our nuclear infrastructure as long as nuclear weapons exist. Further, my advice is that further reductions in strategic nuclear weapons, beyond the New START treaty central limits, should occur as part of a negotiated position with Russia. Both General Dempsey and I have made this recommendation to the Secretary of Defense and to the President.

Question. Please explain the risks and benefits of pursuing up to a one-third reduction in deployed nuclear weapons, including the implications of the vast disparity in tactical nuclear weapons between Russia and the United States.

Answer. From our post-NPR analysis and close work with STRATCOM, the Navy, and the Air Force, I am confident we can ensure our security and that of our allies and partners, and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent while pursuing further reductions beyond the New START treaty central limits. However, to be very clear on this point, we must continue to adequately invest in the modernization of our nuclear infrastructure as long as nuclear weapons exist. Also, further reductions in strategic nuclear weapons, beyond the New START treaty central limits, should occur as part of a negotiated position with Russia in order to preserve strategic stability.

As we negotiate further reductions with Russia, to include their larger number of non-strategic nuclear weapons, I'm encouraged by the administration's efforts to expand the scope of those reductions to include both strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons that are both deployed and non-deployed. I believe this is a prudent approach that will maintain strategic stability with Russia and adequately meet the President's goals of reducing the role and number of nuclear weapons.

STRATEGIC SYSTEMS

Question. Over the next 5 years, DOD will begin to replace or begin studies to replace all of the strategic delivery systems. For the next 15 plus years, DOD will also have to sustain the current strategic nuclear enterprise. This will be a very expensive undertaking.

Do you have any concerns about the ability of the Department to afford the costs of nuclear systems modernization while meeting the rest of the DOD commitments?

Answer. Yes. I am concerned that in the current budget environment will we be challenged to complete these modernization programs; thus, if confirmed, I will be paying very close attention to these programs as they develop and mature. The modernization of the strategic delivery systems and sustainment of the strategic nuclear enterprise is important to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent and is essential to deterring potential adversaries and assuring our allies. As with any funding choices in a fiscally constrained environment we will make decisions that will provide the best possible systems that are fiscally prudent while managing appropriate risk.

Question. If confirmed will you review the modernization and replacement programs to ensure that they are cost effective?

Answer. Yes. This falls under the responsibilities of Vice Chairman and I will continue to review the modernization and replacement programs to ensure that they are cost effective. I am already closely monitoring the Long Range Strike Bomber program and am satisfied that it is currently on track.

Question. The Department will begin to issue guidance from the recent decision to revise the Nuclear Employment Strategy.

Do you support this change in strategy?

Answer. Yes. As Vice Chairman I had the opportunity to participate, along with the Commander, STRATCOM, in the discussion of the new strategy and to provide the inputs from the Joint Chiefs.

Question. Will you keep Congress fully informed of additional guidance issued in response to this changed strategy?

Answer. Yes. I have and will continue to fully inform Congress of additional guidance issued as a result of the change in the Nuclear Employment Strategy.

FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES

Question. During the Cold War, DOD pursued three key technologies to offset the numerical superiority of Soviet conventional forces: precision guided munitions, stealth technology, and satellite-based navigation. These three technologies have given U.S. forces unparalleled superiority until now. Our technology edge, however, in these areas is beginning to erode. Last year, DOD published seven strategic science and technology priorities.

Do you believe these priorities are still relevant today?

Answer. Yes. The Joint Staff participated in a DOD process in 2011 to publish seven strategic science and technology priorities: electronic warfare/protection, data to decisions, engineered resilient systems, cyber science and technology, counter WMD, autonomy and human systems. These seven priorities are still relevant today in assuring our leadership and superiority in future conflicts.

Question. If not, what additional technology priority areas should DOD be pursuing?

Answer. These seven strategic areas remain fully relevant. We need to ensure that several key capabilities remain included within research and development in these areas, including greater cyber capability (with emphasis on network protection), fully protected precision navigation and timing that is semi-independent of the global positioning system constellation, high speed standoff weapons, and improved ability for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance through adverse weather and foliage.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. Do you agree that the current Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, with interceptors deployed in Alaska and California, provides defense of the entire

United States—including the east coast—against missile threats from both North Korea and Iran, and do you have confidence in that system?

Answer. Yes. I agree that the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, supported by other elements of the ballistic missile defense architecture, provides defense of the United States from both a limited North Korean and Iranian long-range ballistic missile attack. I am confident in the system and say this even in light of the recent failure of a CE I missile test, of which we have now had three of four tests execute successfully. We still believe in this program and are determined that it succeed.

Question. On March 15, 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced a series of initiatives to improve our homeland ballistic missile defense capabilities, including the planned deployment of 14 additional Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) in Alaska, to help stay ahead of the long-range missile threat from North Korea and Iran.

Do you support the initiatives announced by Secretary Hagel, and do you believe they will help us stay ahead of the threat from North Korea and Iran?

Answer. Yes. I support Secretary Hagel's initiatives and believe they will improve DOD's ability to counter future missile threats from Iran and North Korea, while maximizing the benefit from increasingly scarce taxpayer resources.

Question. As indicated in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, the administration is pursuing a "fly-before-you-buy" approach to missile defense, and will test systems in an operationally realistic manner to demonstrate they will work as intended before we deploy them. Since a GBI flight test failure with the Capability Enhancement-II kill vehicle in 2010, the Missile Defense Agency has been working to fix the problem and plans to conduct an intercept flight test in the spring of 2014 to demonstrate the fix.

Do you agree with the "fly-before-you-buy" policy, and do you agree with Secretary Hagel that, before we deploy the additional GBIs, we need to test and demonstrate the fix so we demonstrate its capability and have confidence that it will work as intended?

Answer. Yes. I agree with the "fly-before-you-buy" approach to test systems in an operationally realistic manner. It is essential to correct system issues before they affect the deployed forces.

Question. Section 227 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 requires an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for possible future homeland missile defense sites in the United States, in case the President determines to proceed with such a deployment in the future. That EIS process is expected to be complete in early 2016.

Do you agree that the EIS process should be completed prior to making any decision relative to possible deployment of an additional homeland missile defense site in the United States, including possibly on the east coast?

Answer. I agree the Department must comply with the National Environmental Policy Act and conduct an EIS prior to the actual deployment of an additional missile defense site in the United States. It follows that it would be wise to obtain the results of the EIS before making any decisions.

Question. Do you agree with the Director of the Missile Defense Agency and the Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense that there is currently "no validated military requirement to deploy an East Coast missile defense site"?

Answer. Yes. Technically there is currently no validated military requirement to deploy an East Coast Missile Defense Site. However, that could change based on the trajectory of the threat from Iran, so we continuously analyze this assessment and will update it as required if we conclude differently.

Question. Do you agree with their assessment that "investment in Ballistic Missile Defense System discrimination and sensor capabilities would result in more cost-effective near-term improvements to homeland missile defense" than deploying an east coast missile defense site?

Answer. Yes. The MDA Director has made a compelling case that, along with reliability improvements to the interceptor, better sensor and discrimination capability would reduce the number of interceptors required to engage a given target. Thus, I believe this is the more cost effective approach and so agree with their assessment, which is consistent with the Department's analysis. However, if the threat achieves a trajectory that would indicate greatly increased capacity for producing ballistic missiles, it could be necessary to deploy an East Coast missile defense site, so we continue to assess the requirement.

Question. Do you agree with the following statements regarding a potential East Coast missile defense site:

General Jacoby (Commander, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)):
"A third site, wherever the decision is to build a third site, would give me

better weapons access, increased GBI inventory and allow us the battle space to more optimize our defense against future threats from Iran and North Korea.”

General Formica (Commander Space and Missile Defense Command): “Certainly, it brings increased capacity and increased capability than we have at Fort Greely.”

National Research Council: “A GBI site located in northeastern United States would be much more effective and reliable and would allow considerably more battle space and firing doctrine options.

I fully agree with the first two statements. The question is whether or not a third site will be required given the trajectory of Iran’s ability to produce quantities of ballistic missiles that can threaten the United States. I generally agree with the third statement, except a GBI site in the United States will not increase reliability—only improved interceptors and sensors and other technical improvements will accomplish that objective.

Question. Do you agree that Presidents Bush and Obama put in place policies that called for additional missile defense sites in Europe to better defend against threats to the United States from Iran?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Is this presidentially directed requirement still valid and if not, what has changed to permit the elimination of this requirement for a third interceptor site?

Answer. We have subsequently determined that, while maintaining our commitment to the defense of our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in Europe, it would be wiser and more fiscally prudent to invest in ballistic missile defense capability in terms of improved sensors and increased capacity at existing sites, while we evaluate the need for a third site in the United States. Engagement geometry and cost both favor this approach.

Question. You have focused on improving the cost effectiveness and affordability of our major weapon systems, including missile defenses. Missile defense systems are limited in quantity primarily by their very high cost, which is exacerbated in the current financial environment that includes sequestration.

What are your views on whether and how we can make missile defenses more cost-effective and affordable, and how we can manage our missile defense capabilities in a manner that best meets the needs of our combatant commanders?

Answer. We remain mindful of the fact that we are on a negative economic glideslope regarding regional ballistic missile defense, in which the offense is able to use relatively cheap missiles that are countered by relatively expensive defensive systems. In this regard, we should apply greater emphasis on more economic passive defense measures such as dispersal and hardening in order to make the most of our more complex defensive assets. We should also emphasize interoperability on a joint and coalition basis in order to use the full spectrum of offensive and defensive capabilities in a comprehensive joint manner so as to provide the best defense with the most economical use of resources. Candidly, we have more work to do in this regard, but are making progress. I have favored encouraging our coalition partners, including those in the Arabian Gulf region and the Western Pacific, to invest in ballistic missile defense capability in order to free resources for our own ballistic missile defense needs. Finally, I also favored moving a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery to Guam, which not only provides defense for Guam but also yields an asset that is globally deployable operating day-to-day in an actual operational environment in which it defends U.S. territory.

U.S.-IRAQ STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

Question. What is your assessment of the development of the U.S.-Iraq strategic relationship since the withdrawal of U.S. military forces at the end of 2011 consistent with the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement?

Answer. The development of the U.S.-Iraq strategic relationship since 2011 has been a slow and deliberate process. The conflict in Syria, the Arab awakening, internal sectarian divisions, and Iran’s ambitions for influence have dominated Iraq’s focus. Sectarian violence and authoritarian moves by Prime Minister Maliki have also hindered some efforts. In many areas, U.S. and Iraqi strategic goals align, but in areas with less common ground such as Syria we continue to engage the Iraqis in order to transform them into true regional partners. Iraq’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program offers a strong foundation to develop this strategic relationship, and the \$14.3 billion in committed Iraqi national funds to FMS cases is a clear indication of the desire to continue to nurture our strategic relationship.

Question. What areas, if any, do you see for the enhancement of the military-to-military relationship between Iraq and the United States?

Answer. The main areas to enhance the U.S.-Iraq military-to-military relationship are the FMS program, the International Military Education and Training (IMET), and bilateral or multilateral exercises. The FMS program provides an avenue for Iraqi Security Forces to train on U.S. equipment and, in part, inside the United States. The IMET program helps develop Iraqi leaders through intermediate and senior level development education and long-term relationships with counterparts in the U.S. military. Both programs offer the opportunity to continue and enhance our military-to-military relationship. The U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement and Joint Military Cooperation Agreement help ensure our military-to-military relationship remains on track.

Question. In your view, does the Office of Security Cooperation within the U.S. Embassy in Iraq have the right staffing levels and personnel to carry out its mission?

Answer. Based on assessments from the Chief of the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq (OSC-I) and the U.S. Ambassador, I believe we have sufficient personnel to execute a coherent strategy between the Department of State and DOD. With the transition of Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq training sites during calendar year 2013 and the continued transition to FMS funded training, the previous need for 250(+) personnel in OSC-I has dissipated. I think we are on track to have the right number of personnel at the end of September 2013, using the glide path plan agreed upon by DOD, the U.S. Mission Iraq, and Main State. The Chief of OSC-I and the Ambassador will reassess the manning requirements once the last four sites transition later this year.

Question. What safeguards can be used to ensure Iraq does not employ F-16s in a way that increases sectarian strife within Iraq?

Answer. In addition to political influence based on our bilateral relationship, we would also retain the option of withholding F-16 training, support equipment, spare parts, or munitions. Iraqi misuse of F-16 aircraft would also complicate and potentially jeopardize FMS, Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and Individual Military Education and Training—which provides a credible deterrent. However, this issue offers no easy solution, and it is a challenge we face to some degree when we sell weapons systems to any partner.

SECURITY SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation in Afghanistan?

Answer. The security situation in Afghanistan continues to improve, and the ANSF is proving they are willing and capable of assuming the lead in security operations. U.S. and coalition forces, working side by side with our Afghan partners, have reversed the Taliban's momentum and pushed insurgents out of population centers. The ANSF and ISAF continue to deprive the insurgents of key safe havens, command and control nodes, and support zones. They are now less capable, less popular, and less of a threat to the Afghan Government than a year ago. Despite this degradation, safe havens in Afghanistan and sanctuaries in Pakistan continue to provide Taliban senior leadership some freedom of movement and freedom of action. Additionally, Afghan Taliban and all its subgroups, including the Haqqani Network, remain capable of conducting isolated high profile attacks that, as intended, capture disproportionate attention. However, sustained counterterrorism pressure continues to degrade this ability.

TRANSITION OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY IN AFGHANISTAN

Question. In February of this year, President Obama announced that by February 2014 U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan will be reduced to 34,000. In June, the Afghan National Security Forces achieved Transition Milestone 2013, assuming the lead responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan.

Do you support the President's decision to reduce U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan to 34,000 by February 2014? Why or why not?

Answer. Yes. Transition Milestone 2013 represents a significant shift for our mission in Afghanistan. Over the past 11 years, the United States and our partners have led combat operations. Now the Afghans are taking the lead for their own security. ISAF's primary focus has shifted from directly fighting the insurgency to supporting the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). We match troop levels to the mission and our new mission requires fewer troops on the ground. The President's decision to drawdown U.S. forces was made based on the ISAF Commander's input, the real and tangible progress of the ISAF military campaign, and a com-

prehensive assessment of conditions on the ground, including an increasingly capable and confident ANSF.

Question. What is your understanding regarding the pace of those reductions in U.S. forces?

Answer. Troop reductions are based on our mission, ANSF capability and conditions on the ground. We are on path to meet our objective of 34,000 troops by February 2014, to include troops, bases, and equipment. It is important for the ISAF Commander to have the flexibility to meet his mission and sustain the right forces through this fighting season and he has the latitude to manage the glideslope from now to the end of the year as we settle into a supporting role.

Question. Do you support the June transition to the Afghan security forces of lead responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan?

Answer. I support the transition of responsibility for security to a capable and confident ANSF. ANSF improvement has enabled us to achieve transition Milestone 2013. There are occasional setbacks and deficiencies, but the ANSF continues to demonstrate its ability to defeat the Taliban and provide security to the Afghan people.

Question. In your view, is the campaign on track for the completion of the ISAF mission and the assumption by Afghan security forces of full responsibility for the country's security by December 2014?

Answer. Yes. The ANSF are at the forefront of the fight and are now responsible for maintaining and expanding security in the face of the insurgency. In late 2009, a concerted effort to grow the ANSF was initiated with the goal of generating and fielding trained and equipped Afghan combat elements and getting them into the fight. Unit partnering between Afghan and ISAF forces—enabled by the U.S. troop surge ordered by President Obama—provided the ANSF the space to develop combat capabilities and leadership skills from the tactical level on up. Moving into the 2013 fighting season, the insurgency now confronts a combined ANSF and Afghanistan Local Police (ALP) force of nearly 350,000 personnel who have secured over 87 percent of Afghanistan's population, and are leading 93 percent of all conventional operations. The only conventional operations they are not leading are a small number of unilateral conventional operations including security patrols around ISAF bases, route clearance patrols, and retrograde operations. These forces are operating with growing confidence, improved leadership, warfighting capability, and a vision for the future. They are a source of security, confidence, and pride for the Afghan people—factors the insurgents must consider as their influence and effectiveness in Afghanistan wanes.

BUILDING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

Question. In your view, is the current end strength level of 352,000 for the ANSF the appropriate level to provide security and stability in Afghanistan beyond 2014?

Answer. In my view, the 352,000 ANSF force level should continue beyond 2014. The extension of the ANSF "surge" force has been instrumental in breaking Taliban momentum. This force structure also enables our own troop reductions and retrograde operations. It is too early to assess the duration of this surge, but at a minimum, this extension would likely be necessary for at least 2 years following the end of the ISAF mission.

Question. What in your view are the greatest challenges to completing efforts to build the capacity of the ANSF to assume responsibility for Afghanistan's security?

Answer. Although not insurmountable, the main challenges we face in building the capacity of the ANSF are attrition, leadership, limited literacy and low technical competence. Low literacy rates, in particular, hamper the ANSF ability to meet goals in more technical areas. This is of greatest concern in the Afghan Air Force. Under current conditions, the creation of a fully functional Afghan Air Force is still 4 to 5 years off. ANSF has made great strides and is showing significant improvement, but these issues continue to undermine positive recruiting, training, professionalization, and competency goals. These are not problems that can be solved in the short term, but ISAF is continuing to work with the MoI and the MoD to address training the force in areas of professionalism, leadership, literacy, and technical competency. Over time, and with our assistance, we are confident that the ANSF address these challenges.

Question. A recent audit report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) raised concerns about DOD plans to purchase PC-12 aircraft and Mi-17 helicopters for the Afghan Special Mission Wing and recommended suspending the contracts for these purchases. The Department of Defense and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Secu-

rity Transition Command-Afghanistan did not concur with the SIGAR's recommendation on contract suspension.

What is your assessment of current plans to equip the Afghan Special Mission Wing with PC-12 aircraft and Mi-17 helicopters?

Answer. Our strategy in Afghanistan includes reducing the reliance on U.S. enablers by building the capability of the ANSF. Developing the Afghan Air Force and the SMW is a key element in reducing our requirement to provide aviation support to the ANSF. The fact is that Afghans are better able to fly and maintain these systems, which will be a necessary capability for the ANSF to prevail over the Taliban.

Question. What is your assessment of the impact to Afghanistan counterterrorism efforts if Mi-17 helicopters are not acquired?

Answer. It is critical for us to support a robust helicopter capability within the ANSF. Analysis shows that the Mi-17 is the best all-around helicopter for them. The ANSF is familiar with the Mi-17, which is well suited for transporting combat-ready Afghan troops throughout remote, high, hot, and rugged terrain with minimal ground support. It is easier for the ANSF to maintain this helicopter than more sophisticated aircraft. While it is unfortunate that the Mi-17 is the optimal vertical lift solution for the ANSF, we view it as critical for successful transition of security to the ANSF.

Question. Do you support the SIGAR recommendation to suspend the contracts to acquire these aircraft and helicopters for the Special Mission Wing? Why or why not?

Answer. We support the SIGAR audit in general but not the specific recommendation to suspend contracts for the Special Mission Wing. We, to include COMISAF, believe that we can overcome the difficulties of maintenance, training and personnel that were identified in the audit. It is in both Afghan and U.S. interest that the Afghans develop their own counterterrorism and counternarcotics capability on a timeline that supports our transition. These aircraft are essential for these tasks. That said, we acknowledge the maintenance and operational challenges that SIGAR identifies. We will work through these in concert with COMISAF. We cannot afford, however, the sequential approach that SIGAR recommends. Training, maintenance, personnel and aircraft procurement will continue apace with governing management to ensure coordinated fielding of ready capability. Notably in this context, the Mi-17 is the best aircraft to meet the SIGAR identified challenges. The Afghans have over 30 years of experience with the Mi-17 to include current operations. Any other aircraft would substantially worsen the challenges reported in the audit and set back fielded capability by years.

ENDURING STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH AFGHANISTAN

Question. Do you support maintaining an enduring strategic partnership between the United States and Afghanistan beyond 2014?

Answer. Yes. We remain committed to an enduring strategic partnership with Afghanistan. Such a partnership is in our national interest, and critical to our objectives of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda and preventing its return to Afghanistan, and denying the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan Government.

Question. How would you describe the main U.S. strategic interests regarding an enduring relationship with Afghanistan and in that region?

Answer. We are committed to a long-term partnership with Afghanistan. It is in our national interest to ensure that Afghanistan never again becomes a safe haven for al Qaeda or its affiliates that pose a threat to our Homeland.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

Question. Special Operations Forces depend on general purpose forces for many enabling capabilities, including intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); logistics; and medical evacuation. Admiral McRaven, Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, has said "I have no doubt that special operations will be the last to leave Afghanistan" and has predicted that the requirement for Special Operations Forces may increase as general purpose forces continue to be drawn down.

If confirmed, how would you ensure adequate enabling capabilities for Special Operations Forces as general purpose forces continue to draw down in Afghanistan?

Answer. If confirmed, I would work to ensure adequate enabling capabilities to support the SOF mission by working collaboratively with CENTCOM and NATO to determine requirements and fill them to the maximum extent possible. These enabling capabilities would be tailored to support our post-2014 mission and would be based on force levels that have yet to be decided.

Question. In April 2012, the U.S. and Afghanistan signed a memorandum of understanding on the “Afghanization” of direct action counterterrorism missions in Afghanistan—reflecting the shared intention of having Afghan security forces in the lead in the conduct of such operations with U.S. forces in a support role.

What is the status of efforts to put Afghan Special Operations Forces in the lead for such operations and why do you believe such a transition is important?

Answer. The ANSF SOF continue to make significant progress in operational effectiveness, and their independence, capacity, and competence. One hundred percent of ANA Special Operation Forces missions are Afghan led, and approximately 60 percent of Provincial Response Company police missions are Afghan led. With our mentorship, their ability to execute these types of missions continues to grow in sophistication. This capability is critical for GIRoA to demonstrate its ability to lead security operations.

Question. The Village Stability Operations (VSO) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) programs—both U.S. Special Operations missions—have been consistently praised by U.S. military leaders as critical elements of the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

What are your views on the value of these programs and do you believe they should be part of the long-term strategy in Afghanistan (i.e. post-2014)?

Answer. These programs represent a visible expression of local security to many Afghans, particularly those in remote and isolated communities. GIRoA has identified VSO/ALP as a necessary pillar of its own long-term strategy. These programs provide a vehicle for GIRoA to extend governance to the local level.

PAKISTAN

Question. What is your assessment of the military-to-military relationship between the United States and Pakistan?

Answer. Our military-to-military relationship has improved in the past year, emerging from the crisis that occurred subsequent to the cross-border incident in late 2011 and subsequent closure of the ground lines of communication through Pakistan used for our logistics in Afghanistan. While Pakistan defines its interests in ways that overlap but are not identical to ours, our military-to-military ties allow us to engage Pakistan in areas of shared concern such as maintaining regional stability, curbing violent extremism, and countering the threat of improvised explosive devices. The Chairman, the Central Command Commander, and the ISAF Commander have frequent interaction with General Kayani, and the Office of the Defense Representative in Pakistan has close ties with counterparts. Pakistani counterinsurgency operations against extremist organizations have been helpful to our efforts in the region. Security assistance, Coalition Support Fund reimbursements, and cross-border coordination with ISAF and Afghan forces have helped enable these operations. The Pakistani military has also hosted several U.S. delegations this year to discuss the IED problem and other issues.

Question. Should that military-to-military relationship be enhanced, and if so, what steps would you recommend for doing so, if confirmed?

Answer. Military-to-military ties with Pakistan are an important aspect of the broader bilateral relationship. A key moment in this relationship will occur when General Kayani transitions out of his job this fall. The Office of the Defense Representative in Pakistan plays an important role in building and sustaining military-military ties with security assistance programs. As Pakistan’s democratic consolidation progresses, we must ensure we maintain our military-to-military ties. Security cooperation cannot succeed without the buy-in of Pakistani military leadership and continued support of the U.S. Congress. I meet with Pakistani representatives when they are in Washington, but normally leave the central personal interactions to the Chairman, the Central Command Commander, and the ISAF Commander in order to keep under control the number of different voices the Pakistani leadership hears. However, if confirmed, I will focus on ensuring our relations remain smooth and stable during the transition to General Kayani’s successor, along with ways in which we can work productively with Pakistan to enhance security along the shared border with Afghanistan and stability in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

IRAN

Question. Iran continues to expand its nuclear program and has failed to provide full and open access to all aspects of its current and historic nuclear program to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

What is your assessment of the military and political threat posed by Iran?

Answer. Iran’s persistent, though often clumsy, efforts to undermine our partners and spread its influence pose a significant potential threat to the United States, our

allies and partners, and our regional and global interests. Countering Iran's destabilizing hostile behavior requires addressing multiple threat vectors, including conventional military, unconventional state-sponsored terrorism, and nuclear challenges.

- **Conventional Military Challenges.** Iran is actively investing in the development of a range of conventional capabilities, including air, missile, and naval assets that have generated regional anxieties and could threaten our interests and personnel in the region. Iran continues to publicly threaten to use naval and missile forces to close the Strait of Hormuz or target U.S. interests and regional partners in response to increasing sanctions or an attack on the country.
- **Unconventional Challenges.** Iran is also one of the main State-sponsors of terrorism, proxy and surrogate groups, and unconventional attacks, including against U.S. personnel and interests. Over the past 3 decades, Iran has methodically cultivated a network of terrorist and militant groups capable of targeting regional and global targets. Iran also continues to provide arms, funding, and paramilitary training to extremist groups.
- **Nuclear Challenges.** Iran continues to pursue an illicit nuclear program that threatens to provoke a regional arms race, and undermine the global non-proliferation regime. Iran is proceeding with uranium enrichment and heavy-water nuclear reactor activities in violation of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions, and Iran continues to develop ballistic missiles that could be adapted to deliver nuclear weapons.

Iran's security threats toward Israel will persist, and there remains a high potential that Iran will make a serious miscalculation of U.S. resolve leading to rapid escalation of conflict. Politically, Iran will seek to use its capabilities to enable greater influence in the region, particularly with our Gulf Cooperation Council partners and in the border nations of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan—where U.S. presence has decreased in recent years.

Question. What is your assessment of U.S. policy with respect to Iran?

Answer. I fully support the U.S. policy of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The United States is also pursuing a multi-vector strategy that I have labeled a strategic progression. This strategy initially began with outreach which, while unsuccessful, established the foundation required for pressuring Iran under the most intrusive sanctions regime in history. This pressure also includes diplomatic isolation through U.N. Security Council Resolutions, diplomatic engagement through the P5+1, and military pressure through contingency preparations and exercises. Should Iran fail to meet its obligations regarding cessation of nuclear weapons development, we have additional options to coerce Iran into doing so using military force that are available to the President. Meanwhile, we continue to sustain pressure on Iran's other nefarious activity, and we are reassuring partners through our presence in the Arabian Gulf region and through various security commitments.

Question. What more do you believe the United States and the international community can and should do to dissuade Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons?

Answer. We should maintain the current strategic progression, which is currently in what I would describe as the "pressure" stage. Should pressure not work and Iran continue to progress, it may become necessary to further increase pressure or transition to a more coercive stage. That is a policy question best addressed by President's national security team, in which the Chairman and I participate. If confirmed, I will work to ensure we are well prepared to pursue all military options necessary to achieve this end.

Question. In your view, what are the risks associated with reducing U.S. presence in the Middle East with respect to the threat posed by Iran?

Answer. A precipitous reduction of U.S. force presence in the Middle East would negatively impact our ability to deter aggression and assure our partners. We still maintain a large number of forces deployed to the region, and have managed minor reductions—such as a recent restoral of aircraft carrier presence to more traditional levels—by messaging our continued resolve, through our known ability to restore presence, and through our global strike capability. I would add that our ability to respond to an Iranian provocation is impacted more by the decline in readiness associated with budget reductions under the sequester mechanism than by a reduction in presence.

Question. In your view, what has been the effect of sanctions against Iran—how effective have they been and should additional unilateral or multilateral sanctions be levied against Iran?

Answer. Because of these sanctions, Iran's financial, trade, and economic outlook has deteriorated significantly. Inflation and unemployment are also growing. Inter-

national sanctions have hindered Iran's weapons procurement efforts and driven up the costs of obtaining necessary components for its military. Sanctions also appear to have slowed Iran's progress on its nuclear program, making it increasingly difficult for Iran to import needed materials or skills. That said, should Iran maintain its defiance of the international community and continue to develop a nuclear weapon, it may be necessary to step up sanctions even further.

Question. In your view, what role should DOD play in countering Iran's support of international terrorism?

Answer. Iranian support for proxy terrorist activities around the world constitutes a serious threat not only for the stability of our partners and allies who are directly impacted by these activities, but also for U.S. interests. DOD counters Iran's destabilizing activities in multiple ways. The Department supports diplomatic and intelligence efforts that inhibit activities of Iranian proxy and terrorist groups. Additionally, we use DOD presence in the region to deter and, when directed by the President, disrupt Iranian aggression. Further, we use our strong security cooperation relationships with regional and global partners to counter Iran's destabilizing activities. We will continue to work with the intelligence community and our many regional partners to maintain awareness of—and where feasible disrupt—Iran's asymmetric efforts.

Question. Do you agree with President Obama that all options, including military options, should remain on the table with respect to Iran?

Answer. Yes. We keep all options credibly on the table to inhibit Iranian aggression and nuclear ambitions by maintaining a robust regional presence, conducting prudent planning for all contingencies, and exercising independently and with our many partners.

Question. What is your assessment of whether sanctions as currently enacted will stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability?

Answer. The Departments of State and Treasury have put in place wide-ranging and unprecedented international sanctions. I believe they are having a dramatic effect on the Iranian economy and should continue. They appear to have made some difference, though not yet a decisive difference, in the Supreme Leader's calculations. Thus, it remains to be seen whether these sanctions will alter Iran's course. We have plans in place to take additional action if required.

SYRIA

Question. What is your assessment of the situation in Syria and its impact on the region?

Answer. The crisis in Syria is a dynamic, complex and unlimited sectarian struggle between two sides who believe that to lose means the most severe end state. It is manifesting deep ethno-sectarian divisions across the region. The conflict risks the spread of chemical weapons and the emergence of a terrorist group that could threaten U.S. interests, and it has already cost the lives of over 100,000 Syrian people and the displacement of many more. Its regional impacts extend in varying degrees to Israel, Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq. Competition between and among states with regional interests continues to fuel the violence from afar, deepening Sunni-Shia and Sunni-Sunni tensions within Syria and beyond.

We continue to provide military options to the President and to work with our interagency and regional partners to address the destabilizing effects of this crisis.

Question. In your view, what is the most appropriate role for the United States in assisting regional friends and allies respond to the situation in Syria?

Answer. The United States is pursuing a diplomatic solution in Syria with the goal of a transitional government with full executive power by mutual consent, and is providing considerable humanitarian and non-lethal support to the forces opposing the Syrian Government. The U.S. military is providing support to the surrounding countries through multilateral planning efforts, exercises, and some humanitarian assistance. We are continuously engaged with key regional partners such as Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq to provide assistance, technical knowledge, and military contingency planning. We have placed a number of F-16s and a Patriot battery in Jordan to demonstrate our commitment to that nation's security.

Question. In your view, what—if any—role should the U.S. military play with respect to the situation in Syria?

Answer. There is a broad spectrum of potential roles the U.S. military could play in Syria. These include helping provide humanitarian assistance, providing security assistance to Syria's neighbors, and providing non-lethal assistance to the opposition, including essential provisions such as food and medical supplies—all of which we are currently doing. The military could support an international effort to dis-

mantle Syria's chemical weapons program in a permissive post-Assad environment. Although there are legal hurdles involved, additional U.S. military involvement could include training, advising and assisting opposition forces from outside Syria—forces carefully selected to minimize the chances that they would abuse the power we would provide. At an unclassified level, the U.S. military could also conduct a broad spectrum of kinetic options in Syria, ranging from different types of limited kinetic strikes designed to achieve a variety of objectives, to different varieties of no-fly zone or humanitarian safe zones. All of these options have been presented to the National Security Staff for consideration by the Principals and the President. Each comes with costs, risks, legal hurdles, and opportunity costs. Notably, given the degradation of U.S. Air Force readiness due to the effects of the fiscal year 2013 sequester, the higher levels of kinetic response would impose severe opportunity costs for potential contingencies elsewhere in the world.

Question. In your view, what role—if any—are Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah playing in the current conflict in Syria?

Answer. Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah continue to provide support to the Assad regime.

Russia continues to provide arms, diplomatic and financial support to the Syrian regime. I defer to the intelligence community for specifics. Though it has recently held off on providing the S-300 surface to air missile system, it could reverse this decision at any time. Russia's continued support for the regime has cost it considerable credibility in the region.

Meanwhile, in order to support its client Hezbollah and sustain a hostile state on Israel's border, Iran provides the Assad regime with financial support, weapons, training, and advice regarding how to conduct the fight against the opposition forces.

Hezbollah has provided advice and has injected a considerable number of forces directly into the fight, providing a decisive capability in some cases, though sustaining serious losses. Again, I would defer to the intelligence community for specifics.

Question. In your view, what are the prospects of a negotiated solution in Syria?

Answer. Clearly, a negotiated settlement is the preferred path to achieving our policy objectives. However, its prospects are diminished by the sectarian and "total war" character of the conflict. The intelligence community has indicated that this type of conflict only is resolved through negotiation when both sides are exhausted or the dominant side is forced to the table by a major patron state. The former will likely take many years, and the likelihood of latter occurring is questionable. Greatly complicating the likelihood of a negotiated settlement is the factious nature of the opposition forces—despite intense pressure by its international patrons to coalesce politically, the opposition is still not united.

Question. In your view, is the momentum currently on the side of the Assad regime or the forces fighting to overthrow Syria?

Answer. The Assad regime—with direct support from Hezbollah, and weapons provided by Iran and Russia—has recently regained control of several areas previously in dispute or under the control of opposition forces. Momentum can ebb back and forth in these types of conflict, and it would appear to have shifted towards the regime in that part of the country.

Question. Are there asymmetric options that bypass Syria's integrated air defense system rather than kinetically neutralize it, such as standoff weapons and/or stealth, and what is your assessment of those options from a military perspective?

Answer. We have a range of military options. These are best discussed in a classified setting.

AL QAEDA

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda affiliates to the U.S. Homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and western interests more broadly? Which affiliates are of most concern?

Answer. A decade of relentless counterterrorism pressure has degraded al Qaeda's ability to operate. They are less capable of staging sophisticated, complex attacks against the west. Despite these setbacks, al Qaeda retains its intent to plan and conduct terrorist attacks against the west. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) remains the AQ associated group most likely and capable of attempting an attack on the United States in the near-term. Other groups, such as al Qaeda in Iraq, al Shabaab, al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, and others are more preoccupied with struggles internal to the areas in which they operate. However, to varying degrees they still have the intent and capability of conducting an attack on the United States or its people.

THE 2001 AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE

Question. What is your understanding of the scope and duration of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)?

Answer. The United States is in an armed conflict against al Qaeda and its associated forces. An associated force is defined as a group that: (1) is an organized, armed group that has entered the fight alongside al Qaeda, and (2) is a co-belligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. These are the same terrorist threats that perpetrated the attacks on U.S. soil on September 11, 2001, and the AUMF still serves as the legal basis under U.S. domestic law to employ military force against these threats.

Question. What factors govern DOD determinations as to where the use of force is authorized, and against whom, pursuant to the AUMF?

Answer. In May 2013, the President promulgated Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) governing direct action against terrorist targets located outside the United States and areas of active hostilities. This establishes procedures for DOD to conduct these types of military operations. The PPG and its derivative operational plans formalize DOD standards, policies, and determinations concerning where, how, and against whom military force may be utilized outside the United States and areas of active hostilities. DOD meticulously follows the procedures of the PPG to ensure we make well-informed and ethical/legal decisions based on the most up-to-date intelligence and the expertise of our national security professionals. Senior commanders and their legal advisors carefully review all operations for compliance with U.S. and international law before a decision is rendered by the Secretary of Defense or the President.

Question. Are you satisfied that current legal authorities, including the AUMF, enable the Department to carry out counterterrorism operations and activities at the level that you believe to be necessary and appropriate?

Answer. The AUMF in its current form provides necessary and sufficient authorities to counter al Qaeda and its associated forces. If a terrorist threat emerges that does not fit within the AUMF, the DOD would consult with Congress and the executive branch on the question of authorities.

YEMEN AND AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

Question. What is your assessment of the current U.S. strategy in Yemen and what is your understanding of the role of DOD within that strategy?

Answer. Our overall engagement strategy with Yemen is solid. It combines diplomatic, economic, and security initiatives to improve stability and security and assist president Hadi during this period of transition. Building an enduring partnership with the Yemeni military is key to addressing critical security threats, including the campaign against AQAP. The security situation in Yemen remains fragile and we must continue our partnership and support.

Question. Given the continuing political instability and slow progress of reforms to the military in Yemen, what are your views on the United States continuing to provide security assistance—most significantly DOD section 1206 funding—to Yemeni counterterrorism forces?

Answer. A stable Yemen that is free of violent extremist remains in our best interest. AQAP elements seek to exploit instability and pose a legitimate threat to the United States, our assets in the region, and the transitional Yemeni Government. While progress has been slow, President Hadi and the military are taking steady steps to reform and restructure the military as part of the overall political transition process. They continue to engage the United States for support and advice on the military reorganization. The 1206 funds remain critical to building the capacity of Yemeni counter terrorism forces to disrupt and degrade the AQAP operational space.

SOMALIA AND AL SHABAAB

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Shabaab?

Answer. While al Shabaab remains on the defensive, it has demonstrated a continued willingness and ability to conduct complex attacks against western interests and Somali Government targets in Mogadishu. This trend will likely continue throughout the rest of 2013, despite increasingly public disputes amongst al Shabaab senior officials and the efforts by the Somali Government, the African Union Mission in Somalia, and Ethiopian National Defense Forces to maintain pressure on the group.

Question. In your view, does al Shabaab pose a threat to the United States and/or western interests outside of its immediate operational area?

Answer. Al Shabaab does pose a threat to allied interests in East Africa, but it does not pose a direct threat to the Homeland or Europe at present. Al Shabaab merged with al Qaeda in February 2012 and shares al Qaeda's global jihadist objectives. However, the group continues to focus its efforts on defending territory in Somalia against the coalition of the Somali Government, the African Union Mission in Somalia, and Ethiopian military forces—as well as conducting attacks in East Africa.

Question. Should the United States establish military-to-military relations and consider providing assistance to the Somali national military forces?

Answer. If I am confirmed, I will work to ensure we are prepared to establish military-to-military relations with the new Somali National Army in support of the State Department efforts to recognize and strengthen the Somalia Federal Government. Meanwhile, we plan to continue assistance to our partner nations in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and explore ways to assist the Somali National Army. Somali stability in the near-term depends on AMISOM. Long-term, their security would be strengthened by a professional and accountable Somali National Army.

AL QAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)?

Answer. Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its allies have proven resilient despite the French-led military intervention in Mali. They are exploiting the Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali for safety. Although these groups no longer control key strategic towns, they retain the capability to launch sporadic attacks within Mali and neighboring countries, expand their safehaven, and attract recruits in pursuit of a hardline Islamic state based on al Qaeda ideology. AQIM will likely continue to bolster its ties to al Qaeda-associated terrorist groups throughout the region, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, in order to influence and support attack planning. AQIM will continue to pose a local and regional threat into 2014, as North African Governments struggle to disrupt AQIM movement across expansive, porous borders.

Question. In your view, does AQIM pose a threat to the United States and/or western interests outside of its immediate operational area? What capacity has AQIM demonstrated to plan and carry out actions threatening U.S. interests?

Answer. In my view, the U.S. Homeland is not significantly threatened by AQIM. We see no indications the group places a priority on attacks outside North Africa and the Sahel, at least in the near term. However, the group remains a credible threat to U.S. and Western interests within North and West Africa, where it has conducted or attempted attacks in several countries (i.e. Mali, Niger, Algeria, Mauritania), and possibly in Europe. AQIM will likely continue to bolster its ties to al Qaeda-associated terrorist groups throughout the region, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, in order to influence and support attack planning.

Question. In your view, what has been the impact of the recent expansion of AQIM's area of operations in northern Mali on the group's capacities and aims?

Answer. The expansion of al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali between early 2012 and January 2013 increased the group's capacity as it collaborated with splinter groups al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad in West Africa, al-Mulathamun battalion, and Tuareg rebel group Ansar al-Din to enlarge its area of operations to several cities in northern Mali and enforce Sharia law. Although the group expanded in size, this growth has not changed the group's regionally-focused aim of establishing Sharia throughout North Africa. Following heavy losses in the subsequent French-led intervention, AQIM largely retreated to its traditional safehaven in the Tigharghar mountains, where it continues to regroup and remains capable of conducting attacks in the region.

COMBATING TERRORISM

Question. The administration recently released its National Strategy for Counterterrorism. This strategy highlights the need to maintain pressure on al Qaeda's core while building the capacity of partners to confront mutual threats. The strategy also underscores the need to augment efforts to counter threats from al Qaeda-linked threats "that continue to emerge from beyond its core safe haven in South Asia."

How do you view the DOD's role under the new National Strategy for Counterterrorism?

Answer. DOD's role is one element of a comprehensive government approach that integrates our unique capabilities with those of our interagency partners and allies. In support of our strategic goals to combat al Qaeda-linked threats in South Asia

and beyond, DOD is building partner capacity by training, advising, and assisting partnered forces to confront mutual threats. DOD will also continue to conduct lethal action against terrorist networks within rigorous guidelines, accountability methods, and standards.

Question. What is your understanding of the impact of the Presidential Policy Guidance on Counterterrorism on DOD's role within the U.S. Government's counterterrorism strategy? Will DOD see its role increase or decrease? Will DOD require any new authorities or any increased capabilities or capacities?

Answer. I feel our current authorities are sufficient to play our part in defending the Nation against existing terrorist threats. Counterterrorism is a deeply interagency effort that includes intelligence, law enforcement and defense capabilities, and our success stems in large part from the exceptional cooperation in this regard that has developed over the years. It remains to be seen, but it is possible the DOD role could increase under the PPD. The recently signed Presidential Policy Guidance on Counterterrorism is a codification of policies and procedures that have been applied for some time. The PPG and its derivative operational plans formalize the standards, policies, and determinations of DOD concerning where, how, and against whom military force may be utilized outside the United States and areas of active hostilities.

U.S. military capabilities are but one part of our comprehensive counterterrorism effort. We will continue to enable our allies to develop the capability to counter terrorists within their borders. When direct action is necessary, DOD meticulously follows the PPG procedures to ensure we make well-informed decisions based on the most up-to-date intelligence and the expertise of our national security professionals. The Department implements a rigorous, transparent and accountable review process. We will scrupulously adhere to the rule of law and the highest ethical standards in implementing the strategy and guidance.

Question. Are there steps DOD should take to better coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other Federal departments and agencies?

Answer. I believe that improved interagency cooperation is one of the signature accomplishments of the struggle against terrorism over the last decade. Nonetheless, improving interagency coordination was a key finding in our Decade of War study, and it is essential that we continue to raise the bar. At the national level, the Joint Staff participates in both the National Security Staff's Counterterrorism Security Group and the President's Counterterrorism Board of Directors. At the regional level, our geographic combatant commands advance our efforts by working closely with U.S. embassies, interagency partners and local actors. The Department continues to work with our interagency partners to assess and integrate lessons learned into our doctrine, training, planning, and operations.

Question. What do you view as the role of DOD in countering al Qaeda and affiliated groups in cyberspace?

Answer. We view cyber as an essential capability for Joint Force 2020. Similar to our other counterterrorism efforts, we recognize that defense of cyberspace requires an integrated approach to providing the best protection possible for our Nation. Working with intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement partners, we will remain alert to the potential for cyber attacks on our Homeland conducted by terrorist groups. Meanwhile, opportunities exist for DOD to assist in the exploitation of cyberspace to counter extremist messaging through military information support operations. We have processes in place to identify and defend against cyber attacks, and share information with industry to mitigate effects.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Question. The previous two Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs) have mandated significant growth in our Special Operations Forces (SOF) and enablers that directly support their operations.

Do you believe that QDR directed growth in the size of SOF should be retained despite current budgetary pressures?

Answer. Growth in our Special Operations Forces capability was necessary to meet the demands of the conflicts in which we have been engaged over the past decade. While some of the growth has supported countering terrorism, the principle share of increased capacity has been used to support counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have planned to use the SOF capacity released by the reduction in COIN demand in Iraq and Afghanistan in two ways: (1) to rest and reset the force; and (2) to grow our building partner capacity efforts worldwide. However, given the financial downturn we face, we must balance the need for SOF capabilities with our need to address other capability demands in light of increased budgetary pressures. Accordingly, I support maintenance of only pro-

grammed SOF resourcing, shifting priorities inside the community in order to best establish the capabilities, capacities and readiness required to meet our most pressing needs—most notably continuing to counterterrorism—while doing the best we can to service other missions.

Question. In recent years, Special Operations Forces have taken on an expanded role in a number of areas important to countering violent extremist organizations, including those related to information and military intelligence operations. Some have advocated significant changes to U.S. Special Operations Command's (SOCOM) title 10 missions to make them better reflect the activities special operations forces are carrying out around the world.

What current missions, if any, do you believe can and should be divested by SOCOM, and why?

Answer. At this time, I do not recommend changes to SOCOM's title 10 missions. In coordination with DOD, the Joint Staff uses a range of processes—such as the Unified Command Plan, Guidance for the Employment of the Force, and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan—to assess missions and responsibilities assigned to SOCOM on a continuing basis. SOF remain uniquely suited to conducting certain information and intelligence operations. The language in section 167 of title 10, U.S.C., provides the President and the Secretary of Defense flexibility to meet changing circumstances.

Question. Are there any additional missions that you believe SOCOM should assume, and, if so, what are they and why do you advocate adding them?

Answer. I do not recommend SOCOM gain any additional missions at this time, pending a review of strategic planning documents. SOF are well-positioned to provide an appropriate range of capability to Joint Force Commanders. We will continue to use lessons from our Decade of War studies to better integrate SOF and the general purpose force.

Question. What can be done to ensure that indirect special operations missions with medium- and long-term impact, such as unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, receive as much emphasis as direct action, and that they receive appropriate funding?

Answer. The Chairman has placed emphasis on many aspects of foreign internal defense in his Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, and has developed specific Joint Doctrine on Unconventional Warfare. If I am confirmed, one area that I may examine for enhanced legislative authorities is greater opportunities for non-SOF units to undertake building partner capacity tasks, which will relieve some of this burden from SOF forces in a severely restricted budget climate.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS AUTHORITIES

Question. Reportedly, the Commander of SOCOM has sought more control over the deployment and utilization of Special Operations Forces. For example, the Secretary of Defense recently modified policy guidance for the combatant commands that gave SOCOM, for the first time, responsibility for resourcing, organizing, and providing guidance to the Theater Special Operations Commands of the geographic combatant commanders and Special Operations Forces assigned to them. It has been reported that the Commander of SOCOM is also seeking new authorities that would allow him to more rapidly move Special Operations Forces between geographic combatant commands.

Please provide your assessment of whether such changes are appropriate and can be made without conflicting with civilian control of the military, infringing upon authorities provided to the geographic combatant commanders, or raising concerns with the State Department.

Answer. Special Operations Forces undertake operations only with the approval of the requisite authorities, including the President, the Secretary of Defense, the geographic combatant commanders, and, where appropriate, the Chiefs of Mission. The SOCOM commander has made it clear that the changes he is recommending are not intended to infringe upon the authority of the Combatant Commanders—and as a former commander, I remain sensitive to this. Rather, he is trying to provide better capability to the combatant commanders such that they may use SOF forces more efficiently and effectively. I believe the proposed changes enhance the global force by networking with our U.S. interagency counterparts as well as our foreign allies and partners. If I am confirmed, I would support a more efficient and effective ability of our Special Operations Forces to respond to global demands in the future.

U.S. CYBER COMMAND MANNING AND TRAINING

Question. U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), as a combatant command, executes offensive and defensive military operations in cyberspace under title 10. CYBERCOM, in conjunction with the Military Services, is defining its personnel requirements, which will result in a requirement for the Services to provide thousands of personnel with high levels of training and skill in a technically demanding area. This force requirement could grow substantially in future years as DOD learns more about the cyber capabilities of potential adversaries and as more countries gain sophisticated cyber warfare expertise and capacity.

What are your views about programming the majority of these personnel under the Military Intelligence Program (MIP)?

Answer. U.S. Cyber Command is a subunified command. The significant amount of the work to provide planning and options in cyberspace is going to require intelligence personnel, not unlike the work conducted by our airborne Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. We are taking a very close look at the mix of personnel, both military and intelligence, required to execute missions in cyberspace and intend to strike the right balance. The Services are in the process of building our initial target of 133 cyber teams from existing force structure. Based on how the Services are currently manned, trained, and equipped, MIP personnel in two Services, the Army and the Navy, will be in the majority, while in the Air Force and Marine Corps, MIP personnel will be in the minority. As we normalize cyber operations, we believe those differences between Services will decrease over time, and across the entire force we would expect MIP personnel to be in the minority overall, just like the other domains. However, we also expect MIP personnel to be a larger percentage of the cyber force due to the significant requirement for ISR support in the cyber domain.

Question. Are cyber offensive and defensive operations intelligence missions?

Answer. No, cyberspace operations are not inherently intelligence missions, though they can require intelligence if they are to succeed. DOD cyberspace operations are designed to operate and defend DOD information systems, support the defense of non-DOD systems, and to project power in and through cyberspace in order to satisfy national security objectives. Like all operational military missions, cyberspace operations, both offensive and defensive, are supported by mission-tailored-all source intelligence. As such, cyberspace operations include the conduct of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and operational preparation of the environment in support of mission objectives. However, a substantial portion of the offensive and defensive work is not an intelligence mission.

Question. Will programming of CYBERCOM personnel under the MIP budget also lead to policy and resource oversight by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence?

Answer. Like any domain, there are both military operations and intelligence aspects of cyber operations that demand policy and oversight from both the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. Both are active in this area. I would defer to OSD for further guidance on oversight requirements.

Question. Do you have any concerns about the ability of the Services to generate and retain the required numbers of skilled and highly trained personnel to support CYBERCOM?

Answer. Because manning, training and equipping the force, and then retaining highly skilled personnel, is always a core concern, the Services are closely managing their provision of critical cyber personnel. The Services recognize this as a key priority and seem to be on track to provide the required personnel. As the Department gradually transitions to a Joint Information Environment, we should be able to transition more billets that are involved in simply managing networks into support more advanced CYBERCOM missions. We will continue to look to CYBERCOM to define a joint training standard. Cyberspace personnel managed by each Service to meet the Service's unique requirements must also meet DOD's established common standards and qualifications. It is imperative that these personnel exhibit exceptional knowledge of technical fundamentals and tactical tradecraft, and be able to employ that expertise as part of an integrated warfighting team. We have advanced our ability to generate skilled cyberspace professionals in a short amount of time, but must continue to provide the right incentives to retain these personnel in the current budget environment as we attempt to compete against industry for highly trained and skilled personnel.

Question. Should training for the CYBERCOM mission teams be conducted by the National Security Agency, by the Military Services, or in joint training facilities?

Answer. There is some training associated with specialized cyber operations tasks that is common to both an intelligence and an operational function, and that is best conducted in close coordination with the National Security Agency. There are also service training venues established that have the ability to produce some of the necessary skills required for CYBERCOM Mission Teams. Going forward, it will be important for the Joint Staff, the Services, and CYBERCOM to work together to build joint training standards and determine the best way to train to those standards.

Question. Have you considered whether the Commander of CYBERCOM should have authorities over Service personnel decisions affecting the cyber mission that are similar to those enjoyed by statute and by DOD regulation by the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command?

Answer. The Department is examining this option as one of many possible ways to enhance the effectiveness of cyber forces. For now the current way in which personnel authorities are structured is working satisfactorily. However as CYBERCOM evolves there may be merit in mirroring some of the approaches we have taken with SOCOM, including personnel decisions.

Question. Are there adequate cyber test facilities to support CYBERCOM's offensive missions, taking into account that such missions may involve permanent damage to targets?

Answer. There are currently a number of test ranges and facilities available to conduct such testing. The quantity is currently adequate, but the need could grow—clearly, financial limitations and uncertainty could constrain additional of additional facilities should they be required. The real issue is the joint alignment and management of those resources to facilitate testing and training on an annual basis. The need for cyber facilities for testing and mission rehearsal of advanced offensive capabilities remains a critical enabler for CYBERCOM mission effectiveness. We continue to review the offensive testing and evaluation requirements, especially in light of the approved cyber mission force build out. These requirements are often blended with training, exercise, and certification requirements to drive cyber range solution sets across DOD.

DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD REPORT

Question. The Defense Science Board (DSB) in January 2013 released a Task Force report on “Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat.” This report concluded that the effects of cyber warfare on civilian infrastructure could be as severe as some forms of nuclear attack, and suggested that nuclear forces should play a role in deterring devastating cyber attacks.

What are your views on whether nuclear weapons could and should be used as an element to deter severe attacks on critical infrastructure?

Answer. As stated in the NPR, the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners. We have other means to credibly deter cyber attacks against the United States, to include both non-kinetic and kinetic means.

Question. The DSB report also recommended that DOD segregate a portion of its long-range advanced conventional strike capability and greatly enhance its resistance to cyber attack to ensure that the President retains options below the use of nuclear weapons in the event of a cyber attack that compromised our conventional forces or the means of controlling them.

What are your views on the reasoning of the DSB Task Force regarding the severity of the potential threat to our conventional forces and the means of controlling them, and whether prudence dictates extraordinary protections for portions of our military forces?

Answer. I do not believe we need to segregate any quantity of conventional forces strictly in anticipation of a cyber attack. Anticipated budget restrictions will stress our conventional operations capacity enough, and segregating more of these forces will hinder our ability to use them for other contingencies. Rather, we should ensure we continuously assess the security and robustness of the networks we use to exercise command and control over these strike capabilities. The networks supporting our long-range advanced conventional strike capability already employ robust protection measures, particularly those platforms that are nuclear-capable. Additionally, we maintain redundant forms of communication, to include analog systems, and routinely train and exercise to minimize the extent to which cyber or electronic warfare attacks degrade our capabilities. Again, however, we should not rest on our current capability, and improved security and survivability of our command and control systems is a matter I take very seriously.

Question. The DSB report also concluded that DOD has an inadequate understanding of how conflict in cyberspace would or could develop, what actions and re-

actions might ensue, and how conflict could escalate. To help address this deficiency, the Task Force urged the Department to develop the capability to conduct large-scale modeling and simulation of cyberwarfare.

What are your views on this issue?

Answer. Conflict in cyberspace will indeed be complex. As we have seen over history, it would be hubris for anyone to claim a complete understanding of how a new technology will perform in combat or will influence a conflict. We can only do the best we can to understand it in advance. As such, developing and conducting large-scale modeling and simulation exercises would expand our understanding of cyberspace conflict, decision thresholds, escalation concepts, and decision uncertainty. We are taking steps to improve our cyber test and training range capacity and capabilities to ensure we can train our cyber forces in exercises like Cyber Flag and Cyber Knight. The major cyber ranges are receiving an increase in funding in fiscal year 2014 to meet an expected demand in training and testing. The Services and combatant commands continue to aggressively incorporate cyber into exercises at the direction of the Secretary. We are also incorporating cyber into our large scale modeling and simulation capabilities to better understand the domain. The Joint Staff tested for the first time in a recent NORTHCOM exercise a simulation capability that presented to the training audience degraded network effects from cyber activity. The Department of Defense has also taken steps by issuing orders, policy, and doctrinal guidance to the Joint Force as seen in new joint doctrine, updates to the Standing and Supplemental Rules of Engagement, and guidance about exercising cyberspace operations with the other operating domains. These actions, combined with the lessons garnered through future large-scale modeling and simulation, should improve our understanding of the dynamics of conflict in cyberspace.

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

Question. After September 11, intelligence collection and analysis focused on discovering, identifying, locating, and defeating terrorists and insurgents. These missions involve “finding needles in haystacks,” and were addressed in part by human intelligence operations and by applying advanced information technology to collect and combine and sift through vast amounts of information from many unconventional sources. These intelligence capabilities are applicable to a range of transnational security challenges, but are less useful for supporting more traditional forms of military operations against nation-states.

Do you think it is necessary to evaluate the current posture and plans of DOD’s intelligence components to ensure that capabilities and capacities for supporting military operations against elusive, networked adversaries and against conventional military establishments are appropriately balanced?

Answer. Balancing intelligence collection between threat networks and nation-states is continually evaluated at the theater level by combatant commanders and reflected in both their collection management process and their inputs into SecDef’s management of the force guided by the Force Allocation Decision Model.

This balance is also scrutinized at the national level by the intelligence community as guided by the President’s National Intelligence Priorities Framework in concert with experts in Congress and the NSS.

Since 2001, we have presided over a growing enterprise of ISR systems and operations. Some of these systems, while extremely effective in relatively permissive environments, will likely be unsuitable for operations against a modern military force. Therefore, as we build ISR in Joint Force 2020, sensor and platform diversity will be critical to successfully operate against a wide variety of target sets and in a variety of threat environments—permissive, contested, and denied.

That said, there are a few key similarities between countering elusive, networked adversaries and conventional military establishments, particularly when trying to find, fix, and finish critical elements of that conventional force, such as asymmetric capabilities (including weapons of mass destruction) and command and control nodes. In such cases, we will benefit from the advances we have made over the past decade.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Question. The Government Accountability Office reports that DOD has “spent hundreds of millions of dollars each year” to support its information operations outreach activities. Many of these programs are in support of operations in Afghanistan, but Military Information Support Teams from U.S. Special Operations Command also deploy to U.S. embassies in countries of particular interest around the globe to bolster the efforts of the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for Inter-

national Development (USAID). Further, the geographic combatant commands are increasingly moving into this operational space.

What are your views on DOD's military information support operations and influence programs and their integration into overall U.S. foreign policy objectives?

Answer. We continue to assess and improve our information operations activities because winning the narrative remains a critical element of advancing our national security. I view Military Information Support Operations as traditional military activities that a global combatant commander uses to support theater security cooperation and underpin theater campaign plan objectives. Influence programs and activities are also a means to support broader U.S. foreign policy objectives.

DOD's military information support operations and influence programs are integrated into geographic combatant command (GCC) and country team objectives and programs. Synchronization across government is critical, and GCCs continue to improve coordination with the State Department, USAID and Country Teams by conducting monthly and quarterly working groups/VTCs and reports to share information.

Question. What is the role of DOD versus the Intelligence Community and the State Department?

Answer. DOD continues to work alongside the Department of State and USAID in support of foreign policy objectives. DOD information operations can complement and reinforce the Department of State and other government agency efforts by focusing on military audiences and ensuring information operations themes and messages are derived from and synchronized with the State Department public diplomacy.

DOD conducts periodic working groups with the Intelligence Community and the State Department to deconflict and synchronize information operations and military information support operations (MISO) activities at the GCC, Joint Staff and OSD levels.

Question. How do you believe the success of these programs should be measured, especially in light of the constrained budget environment?

Answer. Measuring success of these programs remains a challenge. The information space is inherently complex, but should not be yielded to an adversary. It is not always easy to discern whether a change is due to an information program or some other activity more closely associated with actions on the ground. However, DOD continues to develop and monitor measures of performance and measures of effectiveness for these programs. We are incorporating these lessons in our doctrine, training, planning, and reporting.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERNARCOTICS ACTIVITIES

Question. On an annual basis, DOD's counternarcotics (CN) program expends approximately \$1.5 billion to support the Department's CN operations, building the capacity of certain foreign governments around the globe, and analyzing intelligence on CN-related matters. In a recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, GAO found that DOD "does not have an effective performance measurement system to track the progress of its counternarcotics activities." This is the second such finding relating by GAO to DOD CN in the last decade.

What is your assessment of the DOD CN program?

Answer. DOD's counternarcotics activities operate in an inherently complex environment in which it can be difficult to determine with precision whether generated effects are due to DOD efforts, other U.S. interagency efforts, host nation efforts, or factors beyond the control of these entities. I believe it would be hubris for anyone to claim the ability to create a system that would accurately track the progress of any effort in the complex arena. We do believe that DOD's CN program is critically important to enabling the broader U.S. interagency and foreign partner counternarcotics efforts. Our foreign and interagency partners with counterdrug responsibilities continually ask for DOD training, equipment, exchanges of information, planning, infrastructure, transportation, analytical, aerial reconnaissance, communications, and related support to build the capacity of foreign security services with counterdrug responsibilities. These roles and activities are appropriate and effective in strengthening law enforcement, governance, and rule of law institutions.

Question. In your personal view, should DOD continue to play a role in stemming the flow of illegal narcotics?

Answer. Yes, though current budget limitations will present an enormous challenge to our ability to do this while addressing our many other security responsibilities. With the potential for the convergence of violent extremist organizations with drug trafficking organizations, I see DOD's continued support to law enforcement as a necessary component of our national security.

Question. In your position as the Commander of U.S. Northern Command, what was your assessment of the DOD CN program as it related to Mexico and the Caribbean?

Answer. The CN efforts of the United States, Mexico, and Caribbean nations have achieved major and sustained progress against cocaine use and distribution throughout the Western Hemisphere. U.S. Northern Command furthers this effort by achieving unprecedented cooperation with the Governments of Mexico and Caribbean nations in our efforts against the threat, and I expect continued cooperation in future years. I believe these roles/relationships are essential to our policies and strategies in the region. However, this progress is deeply threatened by current budget decreases and uncertainties, as resources will likely be diverted from this area to address our many other security needs.

Question. In your position as the Commander of U.S. Northern Command, were there any activities that you had hoped to be able to conduct using DOD CN funding, but were not able to do and that you, if confirmed, would recommend DOD seek the authority to conduct?

Answer. I found that I had sufficient authorities to serve an effective supporting role to other U.S. Government agencies and foreign partners with counternarcotics responsibilities. Should I be confirmed, I will remain supportive of leveraging our current authorities and longstanding relationships within the region to support our partner nations and defend the Nation from transnational criminal organizations.

RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

Question. The U.S. Government has recognized the “responsibility to protect” (R2P)—that is, the responsibility of the international community to use appropriate means to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, by encouraging states to protect their own populations, by helping states build the capacity to do so, and by acting directly should national authorities fail to provide such protection. In its 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, DOD names “preventing human suffering due to mass atrocities” as one of a long list of potential contingencies that DOD might be called on to address. DOD has begun to explore some of the implications of R2P, by considering “mass atrocity prevention and response operations”.

In your view, how high a priority should the “responsibility to protect” be for the U.S. Government as a whole?

Answer. The “responsibility to protect” is not currently viewed by the United States as a legal basis for the use of military force. Our nation may call on us to prevent human suffering, initially using means other than force, and could use military force as a last resort if other instruments of national power fail. We work closely with our international military partners, where needed, to emphasize professionalism, commitment to the rule of law, and strengthen their capacity to protect their citizens. Without legal standing, it is not a practice we would rank order by priority, though we would be prepared to act if called upon by the President to do so.

Question. In your view, what should be the role of DOD, if any, in fulfilling the responsibility to protect?

Answer. The use of military force is only one of many instruments of national power. We should always view use of force as a last resort, to be considered only when all other instruments of national power have failed and used under appropriate legal authority. We should ensure we are doctrinally prepared to execute a mission if called upon to do so. The role of DOD in fulfilling the responsibility to protect, should it be cited as a *casus belli*, would be to provide the President with a full range of options and be prepared to act if called upon to do so.

Question. In your view, what is the proper application of R2P doctrine with respect to the situation in Syria?

Answer. R2P has been mentioned as a potential legal basis for the use of force in Syria, but to my knowledge a decision has not been taken to activate this basis. Using R2P as a basis would be a political vice military decision. Meanwhile, the U.S. Government is working with allies and partners and with the Syrian opposition to provide humanitarian assistance within Syria and across the region. The United States is providing nearly \$815 million in aid to help the victims of this conflict, including emergency medical care and supplies, food, and shelter. The recent addition of more than \$300 million in humanitarian aid will increase food aid, medical care, clean water, and provide shelter and other relief supplies for families suffering in Syria and neighboring countries.

OPERATION OBSERVANT COMPASS & THE LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY

Question. Despite pressure by the Ugandan People's Defense Forces (UPDF) and efforts by U.S. Special Operations personnel to support them, elements of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)—including Joseph Kony—continue to operate and commit atrocities against civilian populations in the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and South Sudan. Some observers have identified operational concerns with this mission, including that: (1) supported forces are trying to find an elusive foe in an area roughly the size of California, much of which is covered in thick jungle; (2) technical support to U.S. forces and their UPDF partners from the defense and intelligence community continues to be inadequate; and (3) limitations continue to be placed on the ability of U.S. Special Operations personnel to accompany UPDF partners outside of main basing locations, thereby limiting the level of direct support they can provide.

In your view, what is the objective of Operation Observant Compass?

Answer. Operation Observant Compass aims to: (1) protect civilians, (2) promote DD/RRR (disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation, and resettlement), (3) increase humanitarian access/support, and (4). This is a whole-of-government effort across a range of U.S. Government agencies and partners. DOD is the primary agent for assisting the UPDF in removing Kony and other senior LRA leaders from the region.

I acknowledge the operational challenges of this mission in the context of competing demands and higher priorities. U.S. Special Operations forces do accompany UPDF partners on missions in the Central African Republic, remaining clear of combat action with LRA elements, but they are not doing so in Sudan or the disputed region due to diplomatic concerns.

Question. Do you support the continuation of DOD's current level of support to this mission?

Answer. The current level of support is appropriate. DOD is currently weighing future options, as we prioritize limited resources among numerous competing priorities.

INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING CONTRIBUTIONS

Question. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on July 29, 2009, Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, stated that the United States "is willing to consider directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers, civilian police, and other civilian personnel—including more women I should note—to U.N. peacekeeping operations."

What is your view on whether the United States should contribute more military personnel to both staff positions and military observers in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations?

Answer. If confirmed, I would be willing to consider opportunities to support peacekeeping missions, including key staff officers and military observers, if such a course of action aligned with our national security interests. However, this mission must of necessity compete within the spectrum of other national security interests, including counterterrorism, that are often a higher priority.

Question. If confirmed, would you support identifying methods through which the DOD personnel system could be more responsive to requests for personnel support from multilateral institutions like the United Nations?

Answer. We have made additional contributions in this area over the past 2 years, as the appointment of Army Brigadier General Hugh Van Roosen to force chief of staff for the United Nations Mission in Liberia has demonstrated. We have also worked closely with the U.S. Mission to the United Nations to overcome administrative obstacles to the assignment of U.S. servicemembers within the U.N. Secretariat. I am confident we will continue to improve upon our processes and support of multilateral institutions. We may be able to bring more capacity to bear as we draw down from Afghanistan, keeping in mind that the force will be shrinking with budget cuts and we need to allow the force to rest. Our U.S. servicemembers bring battle-tested experience and expertise that enhance these types of organizations in the execution of their vital global missions.

GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS INITIATIVE

Question. The Global Peace Operations Initiative was established after the 2004 G8 Sea Island Summit to address growing gaps in international peace operations. In most cases, DOD plays a supporting role in the implementation of this train and equip program.

What is your understanding and assessment of this program?

Answer. The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) is a key component of our Government's strategy to build the capacity of U.S. partners to carry out peacekeeping operations. Through small investments in training and equipment, we can prepare motivated partners for successful participation in peacekeeping. GPOI has directly trained over 175,000 peacekeepers from 38 countries and enabled the training of another 52,000 instructors since 2005. Over two dozen peace operations have benefited from the program. GPOI is a strong example of the results we obtain when the Departments of State and Defense work together to promote our Nation's security.

Question. Would you support additional DOD contributions—in the form of U.S. military trainers—to support this program?

Answer. The GPOI has been successful in building partnership capacity in large part because of its flexibility. Our combatant commanders have made excellent use of this program to tailor assistance to the specific needs of individual partners. While GPOI underwrites training delivered by both contractors and military personnel, our experience has shown that servicemembers produce more effective and longer-lasting results than contract instructors. If confirmed, I would consider this factor, subject to the demands of our other operations overseas and against the backdrop of the severe budget restrictions we face under the Budget Control Act.

NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

Question. Criminal networks are not only expanding their operations, but they are also diversifying their activities, resulting in a convergence of transnational threats that has evolved to become more complex, volatile, and destabilizing. The Director of National Intelligence recently described transnational organized crime as “an abiding threat to U.S. economic and national security interests,” and stated that “rising drug violence and corruption are undermining stability and the rule of law in some countries” in the Western Hemisphere. In July 2011, the President released his Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security. One of the priority action areas designated in the strategy is “enhancing DOD support to U.S. law enforcement.”

What is your understanding of the President's strategy to combat transnational criminal organizations?

Answer. The President's Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime integrates all elements of national power, including the military, to combat transnational organized crime and related threats to national security. Ultimately, within our capacity to do so, the strategy seeks to reduce transnational organized crime to a manageable public safety concern.

Question. What is your understanding of the Department's role within the President's strategy?

Answer. DOD is not the lead agency responsible for combatting transnational organized crime. DOD instead plays an appropriate and important role in supporting law enforcement to counter threats to national security.

Question. In your view, should DOD play a role in providing support to the U.S. law enforcement and the Intelligence Community on matters related to transnational organized crime?

Answer. DOD is often able to provide unique supporting capabilities to address the full range of transnational criminal threats, including: military intelligence support to law enforcement, counter-threat finance, military-to-military capability development, and military operational activities against threats to the United States. Some of the capabilities DOD has developed over the last decade of war are applicable to countering transnational organized crime. DOD should provide support to U.S. law enforcement and the Intelligence Community as part of a whole-of-government approach, consistent with current authorities.

MASS ATROCITIES PREVENTION

Question. President Obama identified the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide as a core U.S. national security interest, as well as a core moral interest, in August 2011 under Presidential Study Directive 10.

Among interagency partners, what is DOD's role in addressing atrocity threats, and what tools does DOD have for preventing or responding to atrocities?

Answer. DOD has developed Joint Doctrine for conducting Mass Atrocity Response Operations and conducted a comprehensive review of DOD training. Atrocity prevention and response is now part of DOD plans and planning guidance. In addition, DOD is working with the U.N. to strengthen that organization's ability to respond to atrocity events.

Question. Has DOD developed planning processes toward this effort so that it will be able to respond quickly in emergency situations?

Answer. Yes. DOD has developed planning processes toward this effort.

Question. In your view, is the situation in Syria a mass atrocity?

Answer. My view is consistent with the White House Fact Sheet of May 1, 2013.

FUTURE OF NATO

Question. As a result of coalition operations in Afghanistan, Libya, and elsewhere the NATO alliance has achieved unprecedented levels of integration and interoperability.

If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you have for capturing the lessons learned from recent coalition operations and maintaining the capabilities developed as a result of those operations?

Answer. Both the United States and NATO have been capturing incorporating lessons learned into education, training and preparations for future operations and missions. Within the Joint Staff, our J-7 Directorate for Joint Development has the DOD lead on lessons learned. Our J-7 works with NATO, Allied Command Transformation, headquartered in Norfolk, VA, which has the lead on lessons learned from Alliance operations (with most of NATO's work performed by the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center located in Monsanto, Portugal).

I am keenly aware of the potential for diminishing interoperability and readiness as operations in Afghanistan draw down. If confirmed, I intend to continue our efforts through the Connected Forces Initiative to ensure all NATO forces and those of capable partners remain ready and interoperable. Subject to funding, this will include expanded education; increased training and exercises; and better use of technology. Additionally, the increased support for the NATO Response Force to which we have committed in the wake of our drawdown in Europe will provide excellent opportunities for maintaining our coalition warfighting capability. Finally, a broad array of exercises will help inhibit the atrophy of this important capability.

Question. In your view, what existing or new missions should be the focus of NATO's strategic efforts over the next 5 years?

Answer. In my view, NATO operations in Afghanistan will remain a key focus of NATO's strategic effort over the next 5 years. This includes successfully concluding the ISAF combat operation by the end of 2014 and ensuring that NATO is ready to commence its new train, advise, and assist mission, known as Resolute Support, on 1 January 2015. The task of that mission will be to ensure that Afghan National Security Forces are sustainable, credible, and capable of maintaining security in Afghanistan under responsible and efficient Afghan Security Institutions, operating within appropriate civilian and political controls.

That said, NATO must also anticipate future threats or enhance its preparedness for threats we already understand. These include continued emphasis on ballistic missile defense, an understanding of the transformation of terrorist groups, and cyber defense to the extent it is collectively feasible. Given the evolution of terrorist threats, it may be wise to consider an alliance capability to respond quickly to terrorist events that threaten member citizens overseas.

Question. What steps, if any, could or should NATO take, in your view, to reduce tensions with Russia?

Answer. NATO has made significant progress in reducing historical Cold War animosities and suspicions by focusing on cooperation in addressing common security threats in the areas such as Afghanistan stabilization, counter-piracy, counter-terrorism, and counterproliferation. Such cooperative efforts are spearheaded through the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). The NRC should continue to explore new forms of transparency and confidence building to augment the level of trust and goodwill between NATO and Russia. Enhancing military-to-military contacts at all levels is always beneficial, as we discovered during the conflict in Georgia; while Russia can be grudging in developing these contacts, NATO should play a role in fostering this aspect of the relationship.

But long-term improvement in relations has as much to do with changed perceptions within Russia as with any NRC project or initiative that can be accomplished. A shift in Russia's own strategic calculus will take time and firm, consistent NATO engagement.

Question. In your view, how should NATO proceed on the issue of further enlargement of the alliance over the next 5 years?

Answer. The further enlargement of the alliance is a political decision that can be made only by the NATO Heads of State and Government. I continue to believe, however, that nations able to meaningfully contribute to the security of the alliance

should be given favorable consideration, consistent with Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

PREVENTION OF AND RESPONSE TO SEXUAL ASSAULTS

Question. In 2012, for the fourth year in a row, there were more than 3,000 reported cases of sexual assault in the military, including 2,558 unrestricted reports, and an additional 816 restricted reports (restricted, meaning that, in accordance with the victim's request, they were handled in a confidential manner and not investigated). Moreover, a recent survey conducted by the DOD indicates that the actual number of sexual offenses could be considerably higher, as 6.1 percent of active duty women and 1.2 percent of Active Duty men surveyed reported having experienced an incident of unwanted sexual contact in the previous 12 months.

What is your assessment of the current DOD sexual assault prevention and response program?

Answer. In short, while we have established a strong sense of urgency and put a host of important initiatives in place, I would be the first to acknowledge that we have a long way to go to achieve our goal of a culture in which such assaults simply cannot occur. We are aggressively pushing forward under the five pillars of Prevention, Advocacy, Investigation, Accountability, and Assessment, and we will not rest until we have solved this problem.

We have taken strong action to bring perpetrators to justice, address a military culture that became too complacent of corrosive climate, and hold commanders accountable for both. The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs are personally committed to eradicating sexual assault within our ranks. We will continue to improve processes and programs as part of our comprehensive approach.

The Services have achieved progress, to include specialized training for investigation and litigation, access to victim's advocates and counsel through special victim's programs, and highly qualified experts to advise on program progress.

Question. What is your view of the provision for restricted and unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults?

Answer. Our foremost concern remains the safety and well-being of the victim. If a sexual assault occurs, we would rather the victim provide an unrestricted report, which allows for thorough investigation and delivery of justice as appropriate.

However restricted reporting must remain an option for victims, permitting access to services to meet their personal needs without the additional stress of a criminal investigation. I am personally committed to developing a climate across our Joint Force that makes victims comfortable and confident in unrestricted reporting.

We are starting to see what we believe are higher rates of unrestricted reporting. Our initiative to move initial disposition authority to O-6 commanders or higher has increased unrestricted reporting. Access to Special Victim's Counsel and advocates has increased those victims willing to change a restricted report to an unrestricted report. We will continue to pursue these and other measures with the victim's interest always in mind.

Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of DOD oversight of military service implementation of the DOD and Service policies for the prevention of and response to sexual assaults?

Answer. I believe DOD oversight of policy implementation is adequate and improving, but I recognize we still have gaps to close in collecting timely data and changing behavior in the force from top to bottom.

The Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) oversees the Department's sexual assault policy. I have developed significant confidence in this office and its leadership, and I personally rely on them for advice and information. SAPRO works with the Services' offices to execute the Services' sexual assault prevention and response plans. SAPRO also works with the civilian community to develop and implement aggressive prevention and response approaches to the programs. They continue to lead on this issue by informing and advising commanders at all levels and closing the gaps as we detect them.

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults have occurred?

Answer. My experience has always been that commander accountability is the cornerstone of unit mission success and discipline, with commanders at every level upholding the standards of trust and respect that all of our men and women in uniform deserve. This is a consistent and important element of our military culture: the commander is held responsible for the climate in his or her unit. Sexual assault in the military found root in a climate that had become complacent. We are changing that, swiftly. We have already amended our command climate assessments by updating the surveys to include servicemembers' evaluation of their commanders on

climate and sexual assault response. We will ensure that senior leadership has access to the results of those surveys. We have moved initial disposition authority for incidents of sexual assault to O-6 commanders or higher. But to make all of these efforts take hold and change the unit culture, the role—and accountability—of the commander remains essential.

Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a judge advocate outside the chain of command to determine whether allegations of sexual assault should be prosecuted?

Answer. We hold a unit commander responsible for everything the unit does or fails to do, on or off duty, whether CONUS or deployed in remote expeditionary circumstances. That kind of responsibility is best served by authority that aligns with it. Commanders receive extensive training in their unique legal responsibilities and continue to regularly consult with their judge advocates on all issues, including whether (or not) to prosecute alleged sexual assault offenses. If a commander and his or her judge advocate disagree, the decision will be reviewed at the next higher level. Removing commanders from the military justice process would send a harmful message that commanders cannot hold their people accountable and are not themselves accountable for everything in their unit. We could have removed this authority from commanders when we were struggling with equal opportunity and drug issues, but we didn't—and we got it right because commanders are the ones who fix problems in their units. I've had women commanders come up to me and insist we not take this out of the chain because they don't believe they can demand higher standards if they cannot enforce them.

Question. Article 60 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice requires the convening authority to take action on the sentence issued by a court-martial and authorizes a convening authority, in his sole discretion, to take action of the findings of a court-martial, including setting aside a finding of guilty or changing a finding of guilty to a finding of guilty of a lesser included offense.

What is your view about the authority of a convening authority to set aside or modify findings of guilt and authority to reduce a sentence imposed by court-martial?

Answer. Article 60 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice currently grants broad authority and discretion to convening authorities to dismiss findings of guilt after trial. I have already endorsed Secretary Hagel's proposed amendments to Article 60 that remove a convening authority's ability to modify Court Martial findings or sentences for qualified offenses. A convening authority should continue to have the discretion to dismiss minor offenses under appropriate circumstances, such as to prevent an accused from the burden of a felony conviction when found guilty of minor misconduct but acquitted of major offenses. A convening authority should have the flexibility to adjudicate such offenses in an alternate fashion, and should retain the ability to modify sentences, which is an essential component of our plea bargain process.

Question. During the recent full committee hearing on sexual assault, it was suggested that the terminology used in the Workplace and Gender Relations Surveys have resulted in difficulty in providing an accurate picture of the prevalence of sexual assault within the military. Specifically, use of the term "unwanted sexual contact" comprises such a broad spectrum of behavior that some have questioned the value of the survey.

What is your view concerning the methodology and terminology used in the Workplace and Gender Relations Surveys and what changes would you recommend to improve the survey as a basis for better understanding the prevalence of sexual assault in the military?

Answer. I feel we need to improve our methodology to provide more detailed—and more frequent—information about the prevalence of sexual assault and the conditions under which it occurs. Many of the survey terms we have used for years are too broad in scope and cover a broad spectrum of behavior—a choice that was made for understandable reasons at the time. However, we have learned from our efforts over the past decade and see the need for both aggregate and discrete data to inform our programs. Common terminology throughout the government and private sector will also help both communities talk about the same thing and better share effective practices.

RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

Question. In your view, do policies concerning religious accommodation in the military appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs, including individual expressions of belief, without impinging on those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief?

Answer. Yes. We value the service and sacrifices of those members of the Joint Force who hold deep religious faith, and those of no religious faith, equally—and commit to provide each with a climate that promotes mutual respect and trust. DODI 1300.17, “Accommodation of Religious Practices Within the Military Services” states that “The Department of Defense places a high value on the rights of members of the Military Services to observe the tenets of their respective religions or to observe no religion at all.” We take the words “high value” seriously. As a result, policies ensure that each of the Services allows individuals to request accommodation of religious practices. Each request is considered on a case by case basis. The commander values the servicemember’s free exercise of religion, while ensuring that approval of requests does not adversely affect mission accomplishment, military readiness, unit cohesion, good order, discipline or any other military requirement.

Question. Under current law and policy, are individual expressions of belief accommodated so long as they do not impact unit cohesion and good order and discipline?

Answer. Yes. Standing policies ensure commanders consider requests for accommodation of individual expressions of belief, to include apparel, grooming and worship practices. Requests are given equal consideration as long as they do not negatively impact mission accomplishment, military readiness, unit cohesion, good order, discipline or any other military requirement.

Question. There have been reports of incidents in which individuals in the armed services have not been accommodated in the free exercise of religion.

What actions, if any, have you directed to address these reports?

Answer. While I’m not personally aware of any servicemember who has been denied accommodation of his or her free exercise of religion, I do know that in each of the Services, commanders carefully consider each individual request for accommodation and take these matters seriously. If an individual’s request for accommodation is denied, then policies are in place that allow the member to appeal that denial all the way up to Service Headquarters level. Our policy is actually to approve these requests whenever possible. The bottom line is that military leaders place a high value on each servicemember’s individual religious freedoms and we do our best to accommodate those freedoms.

RESERVE COMPONENTS AS AN OPERATIONAL RESERVE

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Reserve components as an operational Reserve, as opposed to its longstanding traditional role as a strategic reserve?

Answer. As budget pressures tighten, the Reserve component role will evolve along with that of the Active component, which could alter the current shape of both components in ways yet to be determined. However, we know that sustained engagement in combat operations has transformed the Reserve components of our Armed Forces. Repeated combat deployments, as well as peacekeeping, humanitarian relief and homeland defense missions, have produced a force more operationally capable and experienced than any time in our Nation’s history.

I remain confident that given sufficient predictability of the next deployment, the vast majority of Reserve component forces and capabilities can be accessed systematically long into the future. National Guard and Reserve members expect to deploy periodically to meet the Nation’s security needs, and many have volunteered with this understanding. This operational force is a direct result of the substantial investment in resourcing commitments and the personal sacrifice of members, their families, and their civilian employers.

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges to maintaining and enhancing the National Guard and Reserves as a relevant and capable operational reserve?

Answer. Our current budgetary challenges and the steady decline of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding will challenge our ability to maintain current levels of readiness in the National Guard and Reserves. With respect to the National Guard, we must be sensitive to responsibilities for State missions when considering the use of these units for operational employment overseas. While remaining a strong supporter of our Nation’s Reserve component, I am concerned that a singular focus on maintaining the Reserve component at high readiness will degrade Active Duty readiness—our most responsive force. We are already seeing this with the requirement now in law for Air Guard units to be maintained at full combat readiness, which in a difficult budget environment has accelerated a decline in Active component squadron readiness.

Question. What are your views about the optimal employment in generating forces for combat missions of the National Guard and Reserve?

Answer. We have seen a significant change in Reserve component use over the past 20 years and have developed a Total Force—Active, National Guard, and Reserve—to meet sustained combatant commander requirements around the globe. This evolution and the broad range of security and financial challenges on the horizon require us to make smart decisions about Total Force roles and missions to ensure we have the forces needed to defend and advance our national interests.

The recently published report to Congress on Unit Cost and Readiness for Active and Reserve components of the Armed Forces examined this issue in depth. The report concluded that the factors used to determine the proper mix and employment of Active and Reserve component units differ greatly not only among the Services but also for individual missions and unit types. These findings will inform the next Quadrennial Defense Review which will ultimately determine the optimum mix and employment models for our Total Force.

Question. In your view, should homeland defense or other global or domestic civil support missions be assigned exclusively to the National Guard?

Answer. No, this should be a full-spectrum effort, and it would be a disservice to our citizens if any one element capable of providing a response were to be excluded for political or other reasons. I believe each component of the Total Force—Active, Guard, and Reserve—has an important, layered, and interdependent role in the successful execution of homeland defense and civil support missions. We have taken steps to enhance this system through, for example, the Dual Status Commander concept. The Council of Governors has been most helpful in bringing perspective to and gaining understanding of the complexities of this process. I believe we should bring the most appropriate force to respond to any challenge the Nation faces, whether the issue is foreign or domestic.

For domestic response, the National Guard is deeply embedded in our communities. In many cases, these soldiers and airmen possess unique skills, qualifications and experiences that enable rapid responses to natural and manmade disasters and provide invaluable contributions to homeland defense missions. In other cases, an Active component or Federal Reserve unit may be able to provide the right response more quickly due to their unique capabilities and/or proximity to an incident area.

NATIONAL GUARD

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of changes in the global and domestic roles and mission of the Army National Guard, the Air National Guard, and the National Guard Bureau?

Answer. In military operations since September 11, the Nation drew extensively upon the Reserve components to meet operational requirements, and they have integrated seamlessly with the Active component on the battlefield for over a decade. The placement of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau on the Joint Chiefs of Staff formalized this operational relationship. Though the tempo of operations for the Reserve component will reduce as operations in Afghanistan draw to a close, some operational use of the Reserve component will persist. The National Guard Bureau has tremendous experience in domestic operations, so it will be an important voice for ensuring a seamless response across military components and inter-agency partners.

Question. In your view, should there be a requirement that the position of Commander, U.S. Northern Command or Commander, U.S. Army North, the Army component commander, be filled only by a National Guard officer? Please explain.

Answer. While I would welcome assignment of a National Guard officer to one of these commands, I believe senior leadership positions should be filled with the best, most fully qualified officer available at the time for that position. National Guard officers who possess the required qualifications for these positions should be considered equally with their Active component and Federal Reserve counterparts. I believe that restricting the selection pool to only National Guard officers could arbitrarily eliminate a more qualified officer for the position, which is contrary to our goal of finding the absolute best candidate for the job.

Question. What steps need to be taken, in your view, to ensure that a “deep bench” of National Guard general officers is continually being developed?

Answer. Building a deep and capable bench of general officers is extremely important for all components of the Total Joint Force, including the National Guard and Reserves. Key factors in developing a deep bench of general officers include education, deliberate officer development, and experience. We currently make education opportunities available to all our Reserve component officers, allowing them to attain the same qualifications as their active counterparts. The Services, National Guard Bureau, and the Federal Reserves maintain effective officer development and management programs to ensure the right people are receiving the right education

and experience at the right time. The “Chairman’s 18 Reserve Positions”—18 general and flag officer billets throughout the Joint Force designated for Reserve component officers—is having a powerful and positive impact providing Reserve component officers the requisite experience required to be effective leaders at senior levels in the Total Joint Force. Inclusion of a three-star National Guard officer as the Deputy Commander at NORTHCOM and as the Deputy Director of the National Guard Bureau have enhanced our ability to provide senior positions for Guard officers.

RISING COSTS OF MEDICAL CARE

Question. In testimony presented to Congress in February 2009, the Assistant Director of the Congressional Budget Office asserted that “medical funding accounts for more than one-third of the growth projected for operations and support funding between 2009 and 2026.” In April 2009, then Secretary of Defense Gates told an audience at Maxwell Air Force Base that “health care is eating the Department alive”. In recent years, the Department has attempted to address the growth in overall health care costs by identifying efficiencies as well as by proposing increased cost shares for military retirees.

What is your assessment of the long-term impact of rising medical costs on future DOD plans?

Answer. Health care consumes nearly 10 percent of the department’s budget and could grow considerably over the next decade, taking an ever larger bite of our ability to invest in enhanced war fighting capability. The healthcare benefit is an important component of retention for our men and women. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with Service and Department leaders and with this Congress to find reasonable and responsible ways to stem this growth while still fairly providing for the needs of our men and women. This will require finding efficiencies and encouraging healthier lifestyles, and may require increased cost shares from the constituents of the system.

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you initiate or recommend to mitigate the effect of such costs on the DOD top-line?

Answer. Through the last two budget cycles, Congress has permitted small increases in the TRICARE Prime enrollment fees. These adjustments were an important step to managing costs, but they are not enough to sustain the benefit in the long term. If confirmed, I will continue to seek to better manage costs by building a shared Joint Force commitment to behaviors that promote health and continuing to look for savings where practical. We may also need to increase constituent participation in paying for this system. Given today’s budget environment, it is critical that we find an acceptable compromise to reduce costs while maintaining the quality of care our personnel and veterans expect.

Question. What reforms in infrastructure, benefits, or benefit management, if any, do you think should be examined in order to control the costs of military health care?

Answer. We are continuing to look at fiscal year 2014 options that would slow the growth of health care costs while preserving its quality and range. We’re looking at options such as facility consolidations and civilian-military personnel mix changes, as well as initiatives that increase cost-sharing with beneficiaries, such as increased co-pays and other fee adjustments. If confirmed, I will continue to review initiatives for controlling the costs of military health care while always keeping in mind the importance of providing quality service to our people.

SYSTEMS AND SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED WARRIORS

Question. Servicemembers who are or have been wounded and injured in combat operations deserve the highest priority from their Service for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from active duty when appropriate, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Yet, as the revelations at Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) in 2007 illustrated, the Services were not prepared to meet the needs of significant numbers of returning wounded servicemembers. Despite the enactment of legislation and continuing emphasis, many challenges remain, including a growing population of servicemembers awaiting disability evaluation.

What is your assessment of the progress made to date by DOD, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Services to improve the care, management, and transition of seriously ill and injured servicemembers and their families?

Answer. I feel we’ve made amazing progress in medical care over the last 12 years of war. We’ve achieved revolutionary medical advances, including joint battlefield surgical care, and advanced rehabilitation provided by the Department of Veterans Affairs. But we’ve been advancing more slowly in other areas, particularly those

surrounding family and transition. We're making progress, but I recognize we have work to do. If I am confirmed, I will keep my focus on this critical area. My wife Mary has played a key role both by being active in finding ways to enhance care for our wounded warriors and their caregivers and in enhancing my own understanding of the problems we face.

Question. What are the strengths upon which continued progress should be based?

Answer. We will look to expand research and treatment through collaboration between the private medical research and healthcare sectors and our Centers of Excellence. Many of our Wounded Warriors have successfully returned to service through such programs. We must also continue to grow our day-to-day collaboration with the Department of Veterans Affairs. We are close to achieving our goal of 100 percent certified medical records accompanying a servicemember transitioning to the VA.

Question. What are the weaknesses that need to be corrected?

Answer. One key area for improvement is individual case management when a servicemember transitions from the Active Force to DOD retiree or eligible veteran status. Streamlining this process relies on a single electronic health record, to follow the servicemember through transition, and a single tracking tool for case management. Our communication across our bureaucracies continues to be an area of frustration. We also have more work to do in ensuring the best possible opportunities exist for our wounded warriors, to include jobs and continued care for their mental and physical disabilities.

Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you would pursue to increase support for wounded servicemembers and their families, and to monitor their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life?

Answer. We need to continue our progress in tracking and assisting our wounded warriors and their caregivers, and in finding opportunities for meaningful employment, physical rehabilitation, and mental health. If confirmed, I will remain vigilant for new opportunities to help these American heroes, especially when and where they are frustrated by bureaucratic issues.

Question. Studies conducted as a result of the revelations at WRAMC pointed to the need to reform the disability evaluation system (DES). The Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES) was established to integrate the DOD and Department of Veterans Affairs disability systems to improve and expedite processing of servicemembers through the disability evaluation system.

What is your assessment of the need to further streamline and improve the DES?

Answer. I support the recommendations of Senator Dole's and Secretary Shalala's commission, to regain patient focus within each department's core competencies. Otherwise, IDES has developed to its limit to have the separate processes operate as if unified. We have recently made progress in this area by setting—and nearly achieving—a goal of having 100 percent certified complete medical records for transitioning servicemembers.

Question. If confirmed, how will you address any need for change?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work to accelerate transition and disability processing within the bounds of the law, principally by working to ensure no bottlenecks exist on the DOD side of the equation. Our governance process improvements with the VA are integral to streamlining the process.

SUICIDE PREVENTION AND MENTAL HEALTH RESOURCES

Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the Services continues to concern the Committee.

In your view, what role should the Joint Chiefs of Staff play in shaping policies to help prevent suicides both in garrison and in theater and to increase the resiliency of all servicemembers and their families, including members of the Reserve components?

Answer. In general, preventing suicides falls under the Service Secretaries' and Service Chiefs' title 10 responsibilities. However, the Joint Chiefs must collectively approach the critical issue of military suicides with the same urgency we have given to protecting the lives of our men and women in combat. One way to do this is through shared understanding among the Services—which the Joint Chiefs can and will promote, similar to sharing best practices regarding prevention of sexual assault. The Department continues to work across the interagency and the White House to better understand the factors leading to suicide, and to ultimately enable all our Veterans and their families to enjoy the future they have sacrificed so much to secure.

Each of the Services has a comprehensive suicide prevention program dedicated to evaluating the impact on force readiness, informing senior leaders, and providing guidance and oversight for program implementation. The Department currently has

a number of programs in place designed to build resilience, provide adequate mental health resources, increase help-seeking behaviors, and offer a variety of additional services aimed at helping servicemembers deal effectively with stressors.

Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that sufficient mental health resources are available to servicemembers in theater, and to the servicemembers and their families upon return to home station?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work in concert with the Service Chiefs to maintain, and increase where needed, effective treatments for mental health issues, traumatic brain injury, and combat stress. The extensive behavioral health resources already available to our forces in Afghanistan represent an important foundation upon which we will continue to build. I will also continue to support service efforts to remove lingering stigmas or barriers to treatment for servicemembers and their families. We will ensure commanders encourage seeking help by highlighting examples of servicemembers who have benefitted from mental health assistance or counseling.

MILITARY QUALITY OF LIFE

Question. The committee is concerned about the sustainment of key quality of life programs for military families, such as family support, child care, education, employment support, health care, and morale, welfare and recreation services, especially as DOD faces budget challenges.

If confirmed, what further enhancements, if any, to military quality of life programs would you consider a priority in an era of intense downward pressure on budgets, and how do you envision working with the Services, combatant commanders, family advocacy groups, and Congress to achieve them?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support essential areas, such as mental health counseling, fitness, child care, and spouse employment. I believe we can sustain a reasonable level of essential services only if we continue to reduce overlaps and seek other efficiencies in the way we apply our declining resources. However, we also need to provide security to the Nation and sustain the quality of the All-Volunteer Force. The entire military enterprise is under scrutiny. We can only achieve balance and priority through honest discussion and tough choices regarding which Services foster successful recruitment, retention, and career progression while achieving fiscal sustainability for the military of the 21st century.

FAMILY READINESS AND SUPPORT

Question. Military members and their families in both the Active and Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military leaders have warned of growing concerns among military families as a result of the stress of frequent deployments and the long separations that go with them.

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for servicemembers and their families?

Answer. According to recent surveys, military families are most concerned about pay and benefits and retirement. DOD engages military families on this issue via the Pay and Retirement Working Group. The working group's input is addressed through the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Executive Committee.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to place military family needs among my highest priorities. We must examine every warrior and family support program to ensure that we target funding at the most impactful programs and reduce duplicative efforts. To do so, we will continue current studies with DODEA, DECA, and a number of university partnerships that are focused on best practices and the return on investment of existing programs.

Among these efforts, we must also include the restructuring of medical facilities to make them more efficient, without sacrificing quality or continuity of care.

Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global rebasing, deployments, and future reductions in end strength?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Services to meet the changing needs of our military families. The Joint Staff is building—with the White House and the Services—sustainable community-based partnerships and initiatives that improve education, employment, and wellness support for current and transitioning members.

DOD has also adjusted force size and rotation, redoubled transition support, and invested in world-class health care for our families. This includes: (1) fielding effective treatments for mental health issues, traumatic brain injury, and combat stress;

and (2) continuing the effort to reduce the stigma of service and family members seeking mental health services.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support is provided to Reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment and family readiness, as well as to active duty families who do not reside near a military installation?

Answer. We must ensure that every family has access to quality resources, regardless of component or location. Current efforts include the Services' effort to leverage: (1) public/private partnerships within the communities; and (2) the State Joint Force Headquarters of the National Guard to help members access child care, mental health services, and employment opportunities. If confirmed, I will continue my support of these critical efforts.

Question. If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to enhance family support?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to advocate for the Services caring for our families. Today, Family Support Working Groups, Resource Management Decision Working Groups, and other venues are actively attempting to ensure program effectiveness, share best practices, and reduce duplication of efforts. America's citizens have also stepped forward—from the local to the national level, thousands of organizations, higher learning institutions, and businesses have partnered to support our Military Family. However, there will always be new ideas and initiatives to enhance family support. I will be most interested in those with high leverage that provide dramatically enhanced support without further deepening our fiscal crisis.

COUNTER THREAT FINANCE

Question. Identifying and disrupting key individuals, entities, and facilitation routes enabling the flow of money that supports terrorism, production of IEDs, narco-trafficking, proliferation, and other significant national security threats could have an outsized impact on confronting these threats. In August 2010, the Department issued a Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Policy Directive which recognized the CTF discipline as an essential tool in combating criminal networks and terrorist organizations and called for the integration of CTF capabilities into future force planning and the continued support to interagency partners conducting CTF operations.

What is your assessment of the Department's efforts to date to institutionalize and support these capabilities?

Answer. We learned the importance of CTF through our success in Iraq and Afghanistan with the Threat Finance Cells. Identifying and upsetting financial supply lines are a proven means of disrupting threats to U.S. national security. DOD Directive 5205.14 (CTF), which was updated in November 2012, drives the institutionalization of CTF within DOD.

Threat Finance Cells—which are comprised of intelligence, law enforcement, and defense personnel—play a supporting role in identifying insurgent, criminal, and terrorist finances; disrupting front companies; developing actionable financial intelligence; freezing/seizing illicit funds; and building criminal cases. Ultimately, success in CTF will depend on DOD's continued ability to integrate with, support, and complement other U.S. Government, multinational, and host nation activities.

Question. What is your assessment of the current ability of the Department to provide support to other U.S. Government departments and agencies conducting counter threat finance activities?

Answer. DOD currently supports the interagency with its unique capabilities, including long-term planning, network analysis, intelligence analysis and tools, and the integration of intelligence into operations. The result is a well-coordinated, capable and robust CTF posture. If confirmed, I do not anticipate an immediate need to expand the support that DOD is providing, but we will continue to remain fully engaged in the interagency process to counter threat finance activities.

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to DOD's current counter threat finance efforts?

Answer. The Department is examining its current counter threat finance efforts and identifying ways to strengthen it, incorporate lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan, and further institutionalize DOD's capability. Possible recommendations may include further training and education for the force. However, budget reductions will likely make it difficult to significantly expand this program.

LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION

Question. You have previously expressed your support for U.S. accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Do you still believe that the United States should join the Law of the Sea Convention, and, if so, why?

Answer. Yes. I support the United States acceding to the Law of the Sea Convention. My career as a Naval Officer intermixed with joint tours drives home the importance of this orderly set of laws governing activity on the sea—a set of rules that benefit our maritime nation greatly. Our accession would increase our credibility and influence in defending the Convention's existing norms that enable the access, mobility, and sustainment of our military forces and commercial fleet. Our non-party status detracts from our ability to lead developments in the maritime domain, and enables emerging powers to advance their contrary interpretations of the Convention. As the global security environment changes, it will become increasingly important for the United States, as the world's foremost maritime power, to use all elements of national power and lead from inside the framework of the Convention rather than observe from the outside.

TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

Question. The Constitution, laws, and treaty obligations of the United States prohibit the torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of persons held in U.S. custody.

If confirmed, will you take steps to ensure that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures applicable to U.S. forces fully comply with the requirements of section 1403 of the Detainee Treatment Act and with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would continue to take steps to ensure that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures applicable to U.S. forces fully comply with the requirements of section 1403 of the Detainee Treatment Act and with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the DOD Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Answer. Yes. I support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the Army Field Manual on Interrogations and in DOD Directive 2310.01E.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

NAVY INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE TRANSITION PLAN

1. Senator NELSON. Admiral Winnefeld, section 112 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2011 directs the Navy to sustain and continue to upgrade its manned airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) fleet until it commences fielding a platform or mix of platforms that provide

equal or greater capability. The law directs the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) to certify annually that the Navy remains in compliance and is supporting the needs of the combatant commanders. The Navy has certified compliance. In the President's budget request, the Navy plans to gradually draw down its aging EP-3E and P-3 Special Projects Aircraft over the period of fiscal years 2016–2018 as part of a maritime ISR transition plan that will field a fleet of MQ-4C Triton unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). I understand the Secretary of the Navy is supportive of this transition. Have you spoken to the combatant commanders to confirm if these ISR capabilities fulfill their requirements?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Combatant commanders requests for ISR always exceed our capacity to provide. However, regarding capability, the combatant commanders contributed to the Navy's MISR&T Transition Plan through the Battlespace Awareness Joint Capabilities Board. The combatant commanders understand and support how we are optimizing the Navy's "high-demand, low-density" ISR capability.

2. Senator NELSON. Admiral Winnefeld, is the Navy effectively managing the ISR platform transition?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Yes. Dr. Vickers and I, along with Joint Staff and representatives from the combatant commands, carefully reviewed Navy's current ISR capabilities and proposed way ahead. We have certified Navy's plan each of the past 2 years. Such review is critical because, while the EP-3E ARIES and P-3 Special Projects Aircraft (SPA) have been workhorses for the Navy and Joint Force for decades, they're fast approaching end-of-service life (approximately 2020).

To mitigate short term risk, the Navy is sustaining the capabilities of both the EP-3E and P-3 SPA aircraft while fielding the baseline Triton UAV with its greatly improved persistence. They are also adding a Quick Reaction Capability, which provides certain "SPA-like" capabilities, to the P-8A aircraft. Proper phasing of manpower is critical to ensure transition of capability and capacity to follow-on platforms, without impacting combatant commanders.

The Navy's plan, as part of a joint effort, invests in the right platform/sensor mix and is in the best interests of the Joint Force, particularly in our current budgetary environment. However, additional requirements, particularly those in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014 draft language requiring the sustainment of five EP-3Es for allocation, that limit the Navy's ability to execute this plan may draw resources that impede fielding of the appropriate future force. Dr. Vickers and I will continue to monitor Navy's progress closely.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

READINESS AND FLYING HOUR CUTS

3. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, due to a recently approved reprogramming, the Air Force was able to move \$208 million into flying hour funds. Why couldn't DOD do this before April 9, 2013? Was it due to a lack of flexibility in moving funds within the DOD budget?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Yes, both the NDAA and fiscal year 2013 enacted budgets were 3 and 6 months late respectively, which resulted in a 6 month Continuing Resolution that limited our flexibility (transfer authority) to move money between major budget categories and into flying hour funds. The Air Force's limited Operations and Maintenance transfer authority of \$15 million was insufficient to restore any reasonable portion of the \$591 million flying hour reduction resulting from sequestration in fiscal year 2013. Consequently, the lack of flexibility and reduction in Operations and Maintenance funds resulted in the Air Force grounding some flying squadrons on April 9, 2013. The reprogramming action completed in July gave the Air Force the authority to shift \$1.6 billion from other appropriations into critical Operations and Maintenance funds to minimize the impact on readiness, \$208 million of which was applied towards the Air Force flying hour program.

4. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, I believe DOD was short approximately \$11 billion in overseas contingency operations (OCO) funding and has requested that \$9.6 billion be reprogrammed from the base budget. If DOD received full funding for overseas contingency operations, what impact would that have had on DOD operations and readiness as a whole, to include Air Force flying hours?

Admiral WINNEFELD. The President's fiscal year 2013 OCO budget fully funded wartime operations based on our best estimates 2 years ago. However, during execution of the fiscal year 2013 budget in the spring of 2013, the Department identified

a shortfall of between \$7–\$10 billion, conservatively, in OCO funds due to a combination of sequestration reductions against both the Base and OCO operation and maintenance budgets and higher than forecasted wartime operating costs, including fuel, retrograde transportation, etc.

To ensure we could properly conduct wartime operations and to help minimize some of the devastating impacts to base budget readiness, the Department requested \$9.6 billion in reprogramming authority from Congress. Because it was unclear how much of the reprogramming action would be approved, the Services continued scrutinizing their budget activities to find additional resources to address the funding shortfall. Ultimately, Congress approved the majority of the requested fiscal year 2013 reprogramming actions, allowing the Department to appropriately fund wartime operations and mitigate a portion of the impacts to readiness in the Air Force Flying Hour Program. Ultimately, the curtailed readiness activities will have a cumulative effect in fiscal year 2014, which will be amplified with further sequestration.

5. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, how many additional hours will have to be dedicated to bring all these units and its aircrews back up to mission-ready status?

Admiral WINNEFELD. As of today, there are 18 squadrons in the Air Force still flying at reduced levels of readiness. An additional 7,000 flying hours at a cost of \$116 million above the PB14 request and 3–6 months would be necessary to bring these remaining 18 squadrons from current (lower than Basic Mission Capable) flying rates back to pre-sequester mission status (Combat Mission Ready flying rates).

Prior to sequestration, a substantial number of Air Force squadrons were already operating at lower than optimal goals due to previous Budget Control Act (BCA) reductions and the effects of long-term high operations tempo. On 9 April, a total of 31 squadrons were stood down, including 13 combat-coded (fighter, bomber, and Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)) units and 18 institutional units (Weapons School, Aggressors, Thunderbirds, etc.). Through efficiencies and the \$208 million from the DOD reprogramming request, the Air Force was able to shift funds and increase the flying rates of the 13 combat coded units back to Combat Mission Ready (CMR) rates for the remainder of fiscal year 2013. It will take 3–6 months at this CMR rate before these squadrons return to pre-sequestration mission ready rates. The efficiencies and reprogramming also allowed the remaining 18 institutional units to resume flying, albeit lower than Basic Mission Capable (BMC) rates.

The Air Force will continue to have readiness challenges due to the BCA and sequestration, beyond the units that were stood down. To bring all Air Force flying squadrons back to full mission readiness goals needed to meet Defense Strategic Guidance requirements, it would take approximately 2 years, an additional \$3.2 billion per year in fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015, and a reduction in current deployment tempo (e.g. deploy-to-dwell at 1:3 or better).

6. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, how much will that cost?

Admiral WINNEFELD. As of today, there are 18 squadrons in the Air Force still flying at reduced levels of readiness. An additional 7,000 flying hours at a cost of \$116 million above the PB14 request and 3–6 months would be necessary to bring these remaining 18 squadrons from current (lower than Basic Mission Capable) flying rates back to pre-sequester mission status (Combat Mission Ready flying rates).

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The Air Force will continue to have readiness challenges due to the BCA and sequestration, beyond the units that were stood down. To bring all Air Force flying squadrons back to full mission readiness goals needed to meet Defense Strategic Guidance requirements, it would take approximately 2 years, an additional \$3.2 billion per year in fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015, and a reduction in current deployment tempo (e.g. deploy-to-dwell at 1:3 or better).

7. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, what happens to these units on October 1, 2013, when sequestration hits again?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Given the nature of the cuts in fiscal year 2013, we had no flexibility in managing squadron readiness. If sequester hits in fiscal year 2014, we will be able to rotationally stand-down units, or fly them at reduced rates, similar to actions we took in fiscal year 2013. The net effect of cuts spread over the full fiscal year versus just 7 months will lead to readiness levels slightly higher than under sequester in fiscal year 2013, but still well below pre-sequester—and already sub-optimal—readiness levels. This will significantly erode our training and force development efforts, and increase risk in our ability to fill OPLAN and the Secretary of Defense ordered missions.

8. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, in your professional military opinion, what are the military options that could best accomplish changing the balance of military power between the Assad regime and the armed opposition without boots-on-the-ground, assuming: (1) vetted rebels are provided with light arms and anti-tank weapons and training; (2) no kinetic action against Syrian integrated air defense system; (3) limited strikes in Syria would be allowed as would flight into Syrian airspace; (4) airstrikes would last no more than 2 weeks; (5) collateral damage to civilians is to be minimized. Under those parameters, assuming legal justifications were in place: (1) what could you accomplish in terms of altering the balance of military power; (2) what lines of military effort would you recommend; (3) what are the risks associated with those lines of effort; and (4) what is the cost of your recommended course(s) of action? Please provide an assessment of the impact on your ability to handle an Iranian conflict following such an action.

Admiral WINNEFELD. Within the framework and the constraints and objectives articulated above, there are military options available, which we have fully briefed to the national security staff.

At the unclassified level, these options would include strikes with standoff weapons on key Syrian Regime infrastructure, logistics nodes, and combat forces command and control nodes that could degrade regime forces. Striking attack helicopters on their ramps with standoff weapons would have an important impact on regime close air support capability, though the locations of those helicopters varies. Contrary to what some have suggested, although fixed wing tactical aircraft are being used by the regime against the opposition, they are not the principal firepower element being used to target the opposition. For this reason, striking runways, again as some have suggested, is not an optimal use of expensive standoff weapons, to say nothing of the fact that the regime would rapidly repair runway damage and resume operations. While the above strikes would have an effect on the balance of military power, they are not likely to be decisive.

Rather, the regime is primarily targeting the opposition through artillery and rocket attacks and ground forces operations. We believe that suppressing these attacks would require a campaign that would roll-back certain (though not necessarily all) elements of the integrated air defense system and subsequently enable a campaign against Assad's ground forces. Details of such a campaign would be classified, but such a campaign is feasible. Contrary to depictions of our prior responses as involving a massive campaign, this would not require enormous resources, but would require a moderate number of ISR, tactical aviation and traditional support aircraft such as tankers, AWACS and personnel recovery resources, as well as regional bases and defenses for those bases. Principal risks to this approach would be: (a) the risk of retaliation from Syria against regional partners and U.S. bases within those countries; and (b) the risk to U.S. aircraft from mobile surface-to-air missile systems.

To effect a positive and longstanding result, U.S. support should contribute to enabling a substantial number of moderate opposition fighters over an extended period of time. Such an endeavor to build a moderate opposition force capable of defeating regime forces and consolidating and holding territory would require at least 2 years. This extended large-scale train and equip effort is probably the wisest course of action; however, it is not without substantial obstacles. Preferably, strikes would be deferred until an opposition force is capable of maintaining and exploiting at least some of the gains provided by the strikes.

The two options outlined above could complement one another and cause the balance of military power to shift. However, we believe it is unrealistic to expect this shift to occur rapidly. Both sides are in an existential struggle for survival, and have demonstrated considerable resiliency. We are concerned that some consider such a campaign to be easy. Once the first 2 weeks pass without a clear solution to the conflict, there would most certainly be an appetite for more action. Thus, we need to understand that the United States would likely be drawn into a protracted con-

flict, and would need to be prepared for the expense and follow-on actions in a post-Assad Syria that would likely be demanded.

Finally, we need to be prepared to fund either or both options. Our initial estimate for a train and equip mission is in the hundreds of millions dollars per year. The cost of the strikes depends on the number of munitions expended, but costs would start in the tens of millions and could easily increase to hundreds of millions.

Regarding Iran, we are currently postured to respond to contingencies in the Gulf and we monitor Iranian actions very closely. If action against Iran were sequential to action in Syria, we would use forces already anticipated for such a conflict. If such action were to occur in parallel, some of the forces we would deploy would not be at optimal levels of readiness.

9. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, assuming you were given the constraint of no U.S. boots-on-the-ground and to minimize collateral damage, without kinetically taking out the Syrian integrated air defense system, what limited U.S. military options could change the balance of military power between Assad and the armed opposition? I am looking for an option that falls between doing nothing and doing a no-fly-zone over Syria. In your professional military opinion, do you think we should do any of these options?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Two contributions to the contest in Syria could most effectively change the balance of power between President Assad and the armed opposition.

The first is to train and equip an opposition force that can competently fight in this war. This can and should be conducted outside Syria in a neighboring state. I am in favor of expanding this effort.

The second is to conduct operations to begin a campaign to attrite the forces that are causing the most damage to the opposition; namely artillery and rockets launched by Syrian regime forces, followed closely by attack helicopters. To be sure, attacking command and control nodes and fixed wing aircraft would have an impact, but not a decisive impact. Thus, I do not believe that merely cutting runways, as some have suggested, or hitting fixed wing tactical or transport aircraft on the ground will turn the tide. We have learned this before in places like Libya and Serbia, where a considerable level of effort was required to shift events on the ground in favor of an opposition force. This is serious business, and merely launching a few Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles into Syria hoping to turn the tide of this war will not accomplish that objective.

Rather, it would make more sense to execute a campaign that would take out the above-mentioned most effective regime forces (artillery, rockets, and attack helicopters). The details of such a campaign would be classified, but it would generally involve removing the most important elements of the IADS and gradually eliminating the forces that most threaten opposition elements.

My role is to provide advice on how, not whether, to use force. However, I believe such an operation would only be advisable under a satisfactory combination of the following factors: the level of U.S. interest at stake justifies the use of force; the contemplated action is deemed legal under domestic and international law; such a legal basis would not invite unwelcome similar action from parties elsewhere; the outcome of such action would result in decisive effects for a force that clearly shares our interests; an executable and affordable plan exists for what would follow such action; financial support is obtainable from Congress, if required; and no other contingencies of greater importance than instability in Syria are imminent.

10. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, Assad uses airfields to receive weapons and troops from Iran, move Syrian army troops around the country, resupply those troops, and conduct airstrikes against the opposition. Do these airfields represent a strategic vulnerability?

Admiral WINNEFELD. The airfields do represent one of several strategic vulnerabilities, but these airfields are not the regime's center of gravity. Degrading Assad's airfields would hinder the regime but probably not shift the balance of power decisively in favor of the opposition. Moreover, degrading airfields is an expensive and frustrating business, in which cratered runways are repaired quickly and damaged fuel farms are replaced by trucks carrying fuel.

Artillery, rockets, and, to a lesser degree, attack helicopters are principal forces hindering opposition progress in threatening the regime. Thus, I would view those forces as a more important strategic vulnerability than airfields.

11. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, could a limited strike, using standoff weapons and stealth aircraft, crater major runways, making them unusable for the Assad regime?

Admiral WINNEFELD. The U.S. military has the capability to crater Syrian runways, but only at great expense. Cratering all the runways at a representative airfield in Syria would require 50–70 TLAM missiles. However, these runways would only be unusable for several days before they are repaired. Moreover, Russian-built aircraft are especially adept at operating off rough airfields, including those that have been cratered and rapidly repaired. Finally, cratering runways does little or nothing to impact attack or logistics helicopter operations.

12. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, would we have to bomb the Syrian integrated air defense to do a limited stealth and standoff weapons attack?

Admiral WINNEFELD. The U.S. military can conduct a limited stealth and standoff weapons attack without bombing Syrian integrated air defenses. The question is whether such an attack would be decisive in turning the tide in favor of the opposition. Such an attack could achieve a limited objective, such as deterring future use of chemical weapons, but it would not alone shift the tide of the war, as we have seen in several other cases (such as Serbia and Libya).

13. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, how would the movement of Russian S-300 surface-to-air missile systems into Syria affect military options?

Admiral WINNEFELD. The S-300 is a modern surface-to-air missile system that, if procured by Syria, would be their most advanced surface-to-air weapon. The S-300 would significantly increase the risk to any U.S. aircraft or cruise missiles flying within its engagement zone.

14. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, after letting the Taliban raise the flag and the country name they used when they governed Afghanistan on the political office the United States helped arrange in Doha, Qatar, the Afghan people and President Karzai were understandably upset. Are the chances for a U.S.-led peace process, or reconciliation process, dead?

Admiral WINNEFELD. While the reconciliation process in Afghanistan has thus far been exceedingly complex and challenging, it has not stopped moving forward. It remains an important element of fostering stability in Afghanistan. We will continue to support our Afghan partners in their efforts to meet with the Taliban and reach a political settlement that provides peace and security for the people of Afghanistan.

15. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, are we forcing this issue and doing more harm than good?

Admiral WINNEFELD. A reconciliation process inevitably introduces additional complexity into internal conflict in any nation, as well as uncertainty among the elements making up both sides of the conflict. There will be both progress and setbacks along the way in any such negotiation process. Afghanistan is no exception. Nonetheless, a political solution has been required to end most insurgencies (witness the ongoing process in Colombia), and we support reconciliation as a part of the end game solution in Afghanistan. The Department of State is taking the necessary measured steps to support the peace process. A reconciled Afghanistan is in the best interest of all parties involved. President Karzai acknowledges this, and continues to encourage the peace process, albeit on his terms.

16. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, in your military opinion, what is the troop level at which the United States and international troops can only do force protection and no other mission? In other words, at what troop level is the military only able to protect itself?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Troop numbers in combat are not only based on troop-to-task but also the threat environment. Current plans call for a NATO train, advise and assist mission and a separate U.S. counterterrorism mission. Our force protection posture will be designed to protect the force conducting these missions, as well as any supporting U.S. forces. Based on our current threat assessment, our planning consideration allocates approximately 40 percent of the deployed servicemembers to force protection.

KEY PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS

17. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, please list examples of where changes you have helped institute in the military's requirements process through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has been successful.

Admiral WINNEFELD. Examples of successes from changes made to the JROC and JCIDS process include:

- F-35: Addressed service concerns with Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) for all variants and reduced performance threshold values associated with combat radius and short takeoff distance, saving money without compromising required performance for the warfighter.
- Ground Combat Vehicle/Amphibious Combat Vehicle (GCV/ACV): Directed an assessment of commonalities, which confirmed the requirement for different base vehicles and identified a number of technical areas where commonality could potentially provide measurable cost savings.
- Long-Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B): From the initiation of the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) and Capabilities Development Document (CDD), the JROC reviewed and approved both in less than 30-days—typically would have run 6-months minimum.
- Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike System (UCLASS): Re-examined the operational concept of deploying UCLASS which resulted in requirements trades from the previously approved ICD and eventual CDD.
- 3 Dimensional Expeditionary Long Range Radar-Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (3DELRR-G/ATOR): Reviewed potential overlapping requirements for service-specific radar capabilities. Analysis enabled 3DELRR to proceed with reduced performance threshold values and to meet cost and schedule targets.
- Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS): Reassessed CPGS ICD which resulted in substantial cost savings by making acceptable technology development and performance tradeoffs.
- Global Positioning Satellite Modernization AoA: Reviewed and confirmed that the existing program of record satisfies combatant command requirements. Avoided substantial expenditure aimed at achieving unnecessary performance improvements.
- Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR): Reduced performance threshold values to ensure the system would not require new hosting platform development while still providing improvements to current capabilities.
- Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): After validation of the CDD, industry engagement resulted in KPP change proposals that adequately addressed the identified capability requirements while meeting or exceeding affordability targets.
- Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T): Reviewed the CDD and approved revisions to both the Initial Operational Capability definition and several KPPs.
- Apache Block III: Reviewed and approved revisions to Capability Production Document KPPs to include Net Ready-related specified solutions and engine performance to account for engine wear over the duration of the program.

18. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, in addition, what other reform initiatives such as this are you working on?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Other recent and future JROC and JCIDS initiatives include:

- Key Performance Parameter Relief (JROCM 015-13): Intended to encourage acquisition managers, in coordination with the appropriate requirements sponsors, to officially request requirements relief where KPPs appear out of line with an appropriate cost-benefit analysis. This has resulted in increased descoping actions such as in AMPV above, JMS, and Apache Block III.
- I initiated Quarterly Leadership Forums between myself, USD(AT&L), and D/CAPE to ensure continued coordination and alignment between requirements, acquisition, and resourcing.
- We are reviewing and updating JROC and JCIDS guidance documents based on lessons learned and opportunities to further improve the process. Additionally, we are working closely with AT&L as they update the DODI 5000.02 (Operation of the Defense Acquisition System).

U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

19. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, what is your threat assessment of U.S. Africa Command's (AFRICOM) area of responsibility—is the threat growing, stabilized, or receding?

Admiral WINNEFELD. [Deleted.]

20. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, do you believe we have the forces in place in U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and AFRICOM to be able to both remain engaged in Africa and respond, if necessary, to threats as they evolve?

Admiral WINNEFELD. DOD is prepared to respond to threats and crises as they arise while remaining engaged in AFRICOM and EUCOM.

AFRICOM forces remain engaged in priority missions such as countering violent extremist organizations and partnership building within Africa, in accordance with the President's priorities for the continent. Meanwhile, we have taken a number of steps to be better prepared for crisis operations, particularly in Northern Africa. For example, the Marine Corps has resourced additional Marine Security Guard (MSG) Detachments to meet regional threats and address Department of State security concerns. While relieving an embassy under attack is highly complex, we also maintain Marine FAST platoons and other forces in the region to be able to rapidly reinforce an embassy in advance of a problem. Among these forces is a dedicated Special Marine Air Ground Task Force-Crisis Response in Spain capable of quickly responding to a variety of threats in Africa or Europe.

DOD has also developed and adopted rules that will allow force sharing between combatant commands for brief durations to ensure rapid response in the event of a crisis. DOD and the State Department work together to ensure that high risk facilities are properly secured with DOD support, as required. Finally, DOD monitors specified crisis response forces throughout the world and makes adjustments to position and posture forces based on threat requirements.

21. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, do you believe we have dedicated enough intelligence assets to the continent of Africa?

Admiral WINNEFELD. [Deleted.]

22. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, what is your assessment of combining AFRICOM with EUCOM?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Assigning combatant commands under the current structure has led to productive engagement, planning, and operations in the respective areas of responsibility. However, depending on the magnitude of budget cuts to DOD, we may need to consider combatant command consolidations among a number of other difficult staff consolidation and reduction decisions. Combining AFRICOM and EUCOM would be one of several options we would consider.

F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER PROGRAM

23. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, what is your assessment of the F-35 program?

Admiral WINNEFELD. One of the Department's top priorities is to ensure the success of the F-35 development program and achieve a stable design that will permit increased and more economical production rates. The President's fiscal year 2014 budget request includes a total of \$8.3 billion for continued system development (\$1.8 billion) and procurement (\$6.5 billion) of an additional 29 F-35 aircraft. To ensure the F-35 maintains its effectiveness against continually evolving threats, this request also includes resources to deliver advanced weapons and sensors to the F-35 fleet in the years following Initial Operational Capability (IOC).

To date, the Department has accepted close to 70 aircraft from the production line which are undergoing test activities at NAS Patuxent River and Edwards Air Force Base (AFB) while the Air Force and Marine Corps are training pilots and maintainers at Eglin AFB. In addition, the Marine Corps activated the first operational F-35 squadron last fall at MCAS Yuma, AZ and is currently accepting deliveries of F-35B STOVL aircraft as part of a 16-aircraft squadron by September 2013. Moreover, the Services documented their IOC plans in a report to Congress in June, and the government recently reached agreement with the contractor for Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) lots 6 and 7.

While we have over 50 percent of the flight test program remaining and have a good deal of development to complete, including software and weapons integration, both the F-35 A and B completed the first lifetime (8,000 hours) of fatigue testing and will begin the second lifetime testing soon. Likewise, the F-35C is projected to complete the first lifetime this fall. While we remain fully committed to the program, our focus is on completing development, which will permit ramping up to increased economies of scale in production, and on getting support costs down.

24. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, why do we need the F-35?

Admiral WINNEFELD. The F-35, as our primary air dominance platform, meets the National Security Strategy challenge of preparing for increasingly sophisticated adversaries and deterring and defeating aggression in anti-access environments. The F-35 will execute a broad range of missions against the most capable threats across the full spectrum of military operations. It will defeat increasingly sophisticated threat aircraft and air defenses to provide Joint Forces the freedom of action to conduct land, maritime and air operations. The F-35 capabilities will preserve our ability to precisely project power into distant, highly contested environments.

The F-35 will form the backbone of U.S. combat airpower for decades to come. It will replace aging, legacy fighters from across the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps with a multi-role, fifth generation aircraft. It will achieve air dominance across multiple missions to include: offensive and defensive counter-air, suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses, and precision strike (e.g., air interdiction, strategic attack, and close-air support). It provides advanced capability in the following areas:

- Survivability: detects, denies, and defeats sophisticated threats.
- Lethality: locates, identifies, intercepts, and destructs enemy aircraft, missiles, land and sea forces.
- Interoperability and Networking: enhances linked and synchronized interoperability among the Services and our international partners.
- Computer Network Operations: protects own networks from enemy attack and disrupts enemy networks.
- Affordability: the program's tight focus on reducing cost has realized significant and encouraging success. International participation further reduces cost.
- Logistics Supportability and Commonality.

The F-35 is central to the National Military Strategy and our ability to deter and defeat an increasing anti-access threat.

25. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, what is the threat that is driving procurement of this aircraft—air and ground?

Admiral WINNEFELD. The multi-role F-35 is the centerpiece of the Department's future air dominance and precision attack capabilities. The F-35's fifth generation attributes, including integrated advanced technology sensors, networking, and signature controls, are critical for maintaining U.S. air supremacy and ensuring our ability to operate against modern and emerging threats. The emergence of competitor fifth generation aircraft within the next decade—coupled with the proliferation of sophisticated electronic warfare capabilities and modern integrated air defense systems—increasingly threaten our current fourth generation aircraft. The F-35 is designed to control the air and to penetrate heavily defended environments in order to deliver a wide-range of precision munitions.

26. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, why can't we just purchase more F-16s and F/A-18 Super Hornets?

Admiral WINNEFELD. The Department's priority in TACAIR is to acquire fifth-generation fighter/attack aircraft as quickly and efficiently as practical while maintaining sufficient inventory of legacy aircraft to meet current and near-term commitments. F-16s and F/A-18E/Fs remain highly capable strike and fighter aircraft and will be operated for many additional years. However, the limitations of these fourth generation aircraft against adversaries employing sophisticated surface-to-air and air-to-air threats will make them much less survivable in the future. The F-35 will represent a generational leap in effectiveness over these superb, but legacy, platforms.

27. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, does DOD still plan to procure 2,443 F-35s?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Yes, the Department's current plan is to procure 2,443 F-35 aircraft. The President's fiscal year 2014 Defense budget request includes a total of \$8.3 billion for the program—\$1.8 billion for continued system development and \$6.5 billion for procurement of 29 aircraft. The Department endeavored to protect the development of the F-35 program this year as it adjusted its budget to meet the mandates of sequestration.

28. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, what impact does slowing down or delaying F-35 production?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Slowing down or delaying F-35 production has two major impacts. First we need to begin to ramp up production to take advantage of more

economic orders of quantity. The Department has maintained a flat production ramp for the last few years to mitigate the costs associated with concurrency. As the potential risks of finding major design flaws through ground and flight test subside, we need to ramp up the production profile at a measured rate to reduce the cost of the aircraft. Slowing or delaying this will cost us more money.

Second, delaying or slowing F-35 production impacts our operational forces. The F-35 will replace most of the legacy tactical aircraft force structure for the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. Delaying the transition to the F-35 will force the Services to extend the life of their current fleets through costly life cycle extensions, additional inspection and modification schedules, and in some cases changes to operational plans. The F-35 represents the future of our joint tactical aircraft fleet. Any delays to that end state impact our ability to meet current and future operational commitments.

29. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, what would be the impact of decreasing procurement of any of the F-35 variants?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Unit cost is extremely sensitive to the total quantity procured. Savings in the cost of the aircraft can be realized through bulk purchases and other economies of scale. The actual cost of an individual aircraft in any given LRIP lot is largely influenced by how many aircraft are being purchased, and how much production line learning has been achieved to that point. Loss of purchases will limit the ability of the program to take advantage of economies of scale, as well as reducing learning opportunities, which would drive the cost up significantly.

30. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, what is your operational assessment of the importance of the international partnership in this program?

Admiral WINNEFELD. The F-35 program is the Department's largest cooperative program with eight partner nations participating including the United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Australia, Denmark, and Norway. The F-35 enhances the strength of our security alliances by closing a crucial capability gap which enables us to operate together more effectively. Likewise, operating a common fifth generation strike fighter aircraft not only helps minimize communications and interoperability issues among partner nations but also becomes another element that binds us together. In addition, partner nation procurement and Foreign Military Sales of the F-35 mitigate costs through increased production quantities. Notably, partner nations recently have met and expressed their continued commitment and support for the program; however, they are also monitoring how DOD budget cuts will impact the cost of the program.

CIVILIAN FURLONGHS

31. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, what can DOD do to end civilian furloughs now?

Admiral WINNEFELD. The Secretary of Defense instructed all components to monitor funding closely for the remainder of fiscal year 2013. On 6 August, the Secretary announced that this goal was accomplished, and reduced the total furlough days for most civilians from 11 to 6 days. None of us want to see this occur again in 2014, but the sequestration reductions will be more severe next year than this year.

32. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, will DOD use civilian furloughs next year to cut personnel costs?

Admiral WINNEFELD. The \$37 billion in fiscal year 2013 budget cuts mandated by sequestration, combined with short timelines that limited our options, were a major cause of these furloughs. We would hope to avoid furloughs in the future because of their deleterious effects on morale and their potential to cause our best civilians to seek employment elsewhere. However, a \$52 billion sequestration top line cut in fiscal year 2014 would perpetuate our readiness shortfalls, likely requiring additional civilian personnel actions. These actions could include furloughs, but we believe under a longer-term view would more likely be weighted towards reductions in civilian billets leading to a reduction-in-force action.

33. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, how long will it take before you realize this is a penny wise-pound foolish approach to cost savings?

Admiral WINNEFELD. We already realize the drawbacks of civilian furloughs—they are as distasteful to us as any other budget reduction mechanism. However, in fiscal year 2013, sequestration was applied by Congress on a short timeline, lim-

iting our options and resulting in drastic measures like readiness stand-downs and furloughs that were not strategically or managerially sound. To avoid even more far reaching effects on training, we furloughed most of our civilian employees for up to 6 days. This impacted morale and productivity in most of our support operations, but we were left with no other alternative in finding \$37 billion in savings in such a short period of time.

Going forward, the Strategic Choices and Management Review has defined the decision-space faced by the Department's senior leadership. This, in turn, will inform the Services and defense agencies in developing their fiscal year 2015–2019 budgets later this year, as well as ultimately inform the Department's next Quadrennial Defense Review early next year.

34. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, early this year you hosted a meeting with Members of Congress and the Vice Chiefs of the Services. One of the major themes from that meeting was the commitment to address cultural change in the Services to combat sexual assault. What steps have you taken since then to effect that cultural change and what will you do, if confirmed, to continue progress?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Cultural change begins at the top of any organization. The senior leaders within the Department of Defense are committed to aggressively addressing this issue. The Joint Chiefs have reviewed and made changes to service policies, have shared best practices, have recommended a number of important initiatives to the Secretary that have been implemented across the department, have conducted a stand-down to focus exclusively on sexual assault, have updated our training programs, and are currently engaged in developing specific metrics to ensure we maintain a persistent focus on this issue. Our initiatives are designed to cover the full spectrum of attacking this problem, including but not limited to: continuing our efforts to create an environment where this crime is much less likely to occur; taking the best possible care of the victims of this crime when it occurs; continuing progress in creating an atmosphere more conducive to reporting; and continuing to tighten our prosecution efforts. Measuring progress is exceptionally difficult, but we feel we are making progress—for instance, the Services believe they are already seeing increased rates of reporting. The personal engagement by senior leaders created action down the chain of command and the priority to change our culture is recognized throughout our Services. We will continue to focus on combatting sexual assault within our ranks to drive a culture of respect and dignity for all our servicemembers—and I personally welcome and look forward to our continued interaction with Congress on this vital issue.

IMPACT OF SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE FUNDING REDUCTION FOR B-61 BOMB

35. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, what are the military and geo-political implications of the Senate Appropriations Committee's recommendation to reduce funding for the B-61 Life Extension Program (LEP) by \$168 million?

Admiral WINNEFELD. A \$168 million reduction to the B-61 LEP would slip the delivery of the first production unit past fiscal year 2019 and impact our commitment to our NATO and Asian allies. Additionally, the Commander of STRATCOM stated that the program is important to the long-term viability of the B-2A strategic mission and is needed regardless of changes to NATO commitments.

This reduction would also limit the DOD and the Department of Energy from leveraging interoperable technology for other strategic weapons. We would need to adjust the budget and scope for those programs, resulting in delays to the overall Nuclear Weapons Council Baseline Plan.

TRICARE FEES

36. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, prior to sending fee increase proposals to Congress, why doesn't DOD sit down with beneficiary associations and Congress to design fee increases that are reasonable and acceptable to everyone?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Military health benefit reform has been shaped over the last 8 years by program and policy experts, Members of Congress, constituencies, and subject matter experts from within and outside of the Department. The Department's proposals have been and will continue to be based on sound principles, as well as feedback from these stakeholders.

37. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, it seems to me that DOD should wait on the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission to report its

recommendations before asking Congress to make piecemeal changes to personnel benefits. Do you agree or disagree, and why or why not?

Admiral WINNEFELD. The Commission has a unique opportunity to make real and substantive change. We also recognize that comprehensively reviewing all areas of military pay and benefits, developing recommendations for change, and vetting them within DOD and with other Departments takes time. We would like to take that time, but sequestration has radically changed the budget reality and demands more rapid action from the Department and Congress if we are to sustain long-term readiness and modernization.

38. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, wouldn't development of a comprehensive package of compensation and retirement benefit changes, to include health benefit changes, make more sense rather than a piece-meal approach that wouldn't get us to an optimal solution for controlling DOD's sky-rocketing personnel costs?

Admiral WINNEFELD. If we had the luxury of time to allow development of a comprehensive package before making any changes, we would support it. However, given the enormous pressure the DOD budget is under, we need to act with urgency on both efficiencies and compensation reform if we are to maintain an acceptable level of military capability, capacity, and readiness to be able to conduct our military missions. I am not convinced that there is excessive risk in getting compensation and benefits under control through carefully, but quickly, considered individual actions.

NUCLEAR FORCE REDUCTIONS AND MODERNIZATION

39. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Winnefeld, you state in your advance policy questions that "the timing and size of reductions, if any, would have to be closely coupled to the status of the modernization effort." The status today of that effort is as follows: (1) 2-year delay for the follow-on SSBN; (2) 2-year delay to the follow-on ALCM; (3) 2- to 3-year delay to LEP for the B-61 nuclear bomb; (4) 2-year delay for the W-78/88 LEP; and (5) an indefinite delay for the construction of a facility to replace the Chemistry and Metallurgy Facility in Los Alamos. At what point are you prepared to say that delays in the nuclear modernization effort, as promised by the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), should caution against further nuclear force reductions? Put another way, if these delays get worse, are you prepared to recommend against further nuclear force reductions below New START levels?

Admiral WINNEFELD. The Nuclear Weapons Council has recently approved a baseline strategy that provides an executable 25-year plan that sustains a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile. This strategy is aligned with plans for platforms and delivery systems, and has adjusted the start dates and delivery targets for LEPs and some portions of the infrastructure improvements. This plan is executable with respect to throughput considerations and given fiscal constraints. It also moves us towards a responsive infrastructure, as stated in the Nuclear Posture Review and considered as part of the follow-on nuclear force reductions. I consider execution of this baseline strategy to be necessary for any negotiation of further nuclear force reductions below New START levels.

However, this plan is vulnerable to additional budget cuts—it is very fragile. While my recommendations on additional nuclear weapons cuts are primarily tied to the direct linkage they should have with negotiations with Russia, I would have to also take into consideration any further delays to modernization programs. Because I believe below New START cuts would be well in the future, we will have a much better understanding of the status of the programs when and if they are in play.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

UH-1N REPLACEMENT OPPORTUNITIES

40. Senator WICKER. Admiral Winnefeld, as evidenced by the recent relief of 17 officers at Minot AFB and the reports of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Standing Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety, there is still a serious neglect of priority and budget for the sustainment of the Air Force's Priority One Nuclear Enterprise. This lack of prioritization and resourcing manifests in a nuclear enterprise that continues to conduct critical mission activities with outdated and insufficiently supported aircraft and ground vehicles, to include the woefully inadequate 40-plus-year-old UH-1N helicopter.

The Air Force has acknowledged the need to replace the UH-1N for over a decade. The aircraft's inadequate speed, range and payload, and obsolescent sensors and monitoring equipment are well-documented. The use of an antiquated airframe such as the UH-1N to provide security for Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) sites reflects a lack of proper resource prioritization by DOD.

As Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, you are required to provide cross-Service oversight and recommendations that lead to the most effective and efficient use of the greater defense industrial capabilities. There are inexpensive and cost-effective solutions available to replace the Vietnam-era Huey being fielded by other Services that are far more reliable, capable, and safe.

As demonstrated in the Senate Armed Services Committee markup of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014, I would like to understand the current plan for replacing the existing UH-1N fleet. In addition, I would like your commitment that this issue will be addressed in the upcoming fiscal year 2015 budget submittal. Despite being an Air Force priority for over 10 years, why has the replacement of the UH-1N fleet not been realized?

Admiral WINNEFELD. The requirement for a more responsive capability to meet ICBM security needs remains valid, but budget constraints in both the near-term and the foreseeable future make committing to new acquisition programs challenging. A formal replacement strategy for the UH-1N is due to the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 1, 2014. As potential solutions, the Air Force is pursuing a variety of replacement options to include Excess Defense Articles at low or no cost. We remain committed to remaining involved and attentive to this requirement.

41. Senator WICKER. Admiral Winnefeld, the leadership of Air Force Global Strike Command recently commented that: "I have had an urgent and compelling need since 1996 in terms of speed, range, and payload ... the UH-1 does not meet the need. How much longer are we willing to wait and take this risk?" Has there been any change to the ICBM security force posture that you believe makes the replacement of the UH-1 less compelling or a more acceptable security risk?

Admiral WINNEFELD. No, the ICBM security force posture has not changed. The requirement to replace the UH-1s remains valid. However, based on budget constraints, the Air Force currently plans to sustain the UH-1 for another 6-10 years vice replacing them. The Air Force will mitigate risk by upgrading UH-1 cockpits and making them night-vision-compatible combined with other critical safety improvements. The Air Force also recently received three UH-1s from the Marine Corps, which will increase capacity and availability. In addition, the Air Force and Army are examining options for the Army to transfer additional UH-1s to the Air Force.

42. Senator WICKER. Admiral Winnefeld, there are aircraft being fielded by DOD today that are significantly more capable and less costly to own and operate than the UH-1N. In your leadership role on the JROC, have you, or will you, direct the Air Force to prioritize consideration of in-production DOD aircraft as a replacement for the UH-1 rather than continue to assume the associated security risks?

Admiral WINNEFELD. The JROC does not direct service acquisition decisions. Rather, it defines and validates Joint force requirements that are then submitted to both budget and acquisition processes. The JROC does validate the results of analyses of alternatives, and will be alert to consideration of all possible alternatives, including in-production aircraft. When the decision is made to replace the UH-1N, a full and open competition will be conducted to find the helicopter that meets the mission requirements and provides DOD the most capable replacement at the most economically feasible cost. This may ultimately be an aircraft that is already in production, but those efficiencies will be evident through the proper source selection process.

43. Senator WICKER. Admiral Winnefeld, the Combat Rescue Helicopter (CRH) mission requirements were determined to be overly robust and expensive to justify the CRH's use for the domestic support missions currently conducted by the UH-1N. There is concern that the lack of urgency regarding fielding of a UH-1 replacement may indicate an attempt to merge CRH and UH-1N missions in the future. Did the JROC review of the CRH program validate any requirement to provide site and convoy security for the Nation's ICBM force or for supporting the Air Force District of Washington VIP airlift/evacuation missions currently supported by the UH-1N?

Admiral WINNEFELD. The CRH's primary mission is to recover isolated personnel from hostile or denied territory. It will also execute humanitarian missions, civil

search and rescue, disaster relief, casualty/medical evacuation, and non-combatant evacuation operations. CRH is not being produced to replace the UH-1N; rather it will replace the Air Force's aging HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopter fleet. Thus, JROC review and validation of the CRH requirements did not include missions currently supported by the UH-1N, such as providing site and convoy security for the Nation's ICBM force or supporting the Air Force District of Washington VIP airlift/evacuation missions. However, this would not preclude the CRH from being called upon to execute missions currently being performed by other vertical lift platforms.

[The nomination reference of ADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr., USN, follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
June 24, 2013.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

The following named officer for reappointment as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and appointment to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., sections 601 and 154:

To be Admiral.

ADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr., 5212.

[The biographical sketch of ADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr., USN, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

TRANSCRIPT OF NAVAL SERVICE FOR ADM JAMES ALEXANDER WINNEFELD, JR., USN

07 June 1978 Ensign
 07 June 1980 Lieutenant (junior grade)
 01 July 1982 Lieutenant
 01 September 1988 Lieutenant Commander
 01 September 1992 Commander
 01 September 1997 Captain
 01 October 2003 Rear Admiral (lower half)
 06 May 2006 Designated Rear Admiral while serving in billets commensurate with that grade
 01 August 2006 Rear Admiral
 14 September 2007 Vice Admiral
 19 May 2010 Admiral, Service continuous to date

Assignments and duties:

	From	To
Naval Station, Annapolis, MD (Division Officer)	June 1978	Nov. 1978
Naval Aviation Schools Command, Pensacola, FL (DUINS)	Nov. 1978	Apr. 1979
Training Squadron SIX (Student)	Apr. 1979	June 1979
Naval Aviation Schools Command, Pensacola, FL (DUINS)	June 1979	Dec. 1979
Training Squadron TWO THREE (Student)	June 1979	Dec. 1979
Training Squadron TWO TWO (Student)	Dec. 1979	May 1980
Fighter Squadron ONE TWO FOUR (Replacement Pilot)	Jun. 1980	Apr. 1981
Fighter Squadron TWO FOUR (Power Plants Branch Officer)	Apr. 1981	Nov. 1983
Naval Fighter Weapons School, San Diego, CA (Quality Assurance Officer)	Nov. 1983	Jan. 1987
Fighter Squadron ONE TWO FOUR (Replacement Naval Aviator)	Jan. 1987	Apr. 1987
Fighter Squadron ONE (Operations Officer)	Apr. 1987	Jan. 1990
Joint Staff (Action Officer, EUCOM/CENTCOM Branch, J3)	Feb. 1990	July 1991
Joint Staff (Senior Aide-De-Camp to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)	July 1991	Aug. 1992
Fighter Squadron ONE TWO FOUR (Student)	Aug. 1992	Jan. 1993
XO, Fighter Squadron TWO ONE ONE	Jan. 1993	Apr. 1994
CO, Fighter Squadron TWO ONE ONE	Apr. 1994	Mar. 1995
Naval Nuclear Power Training Command, Orlando, FL (Student)	Mar. 1995	Feb. 1996
Prospective Executive Officer, USS <i>John C. Stennis</i> (CVN 74)	Feb. 1996	Mar. 1996

	From	To
Naval Reactors, Department of Energy, Washington, DC (Student)	Mar. 1996	Aug. 1996
XO, USS <i>John C Stennis</i> (CVN 74)	Aug. 1996	May 1998
CO, USS <i>Cleveland</i> (LPD 7)	May 1998	Feb. 2000
CO, USS <i>Enterprise</i> (CVN 65)	Feb. 2000	Mar. 2002
Office of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (Executive Assistant)	Mar. 2002	July 2003
Commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (Director, Warfare Programs and Readiness) (N8)	July 2003	Dec. 2004
Commander, Carrier Strike Group TWO	Dec. 2004	June 2006
Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (Director of Joint Innovation and Experimentation, J9) ...	June 2006	Aug. 2007
Commander, SIXTH Fleet/Commander, Striking and Support Forces NATO/Deputy Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe/Commander, Joint Headquarters Lisbon	Sep. 2007	Aug. 2008
Joint Staff (Director, Strategic Plans and Policy) (J5)/Senior Member, U.S. Delegation to the United Nations Military Staff Committee	Aug. 2008	May 2010
Commander, Northern Command/Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command	May 2010	Aug. 2011
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff	Aug. 2011	to date

Medals and awards:

- Defense Distinguished Service Medal
- Distinguished Service Medal
- Defense Superior Service Medal
- Legion of Merit with one Silver Star
- Bronze Star Medal
- Defense Meritorious Service Medal
- Meritorious Service Medal
- Air Medal with First Strike/Flight Award
- Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with one Gold Star
- Joint Service Achievement Medal
- Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal
- Joint Meritorious Unit Award
- Navy Unit Commendation with one Bronze Star
- Meritorious Unit Commendation with two Bronze Stars
- Navy "E" Ribbon with "E" Device
- National Defense Service Medal with one Bronze Star
- Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with four Bronze Stars
- Southwest Asia Service Medal with one Bronze Star
- Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal
- Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
- Sea Service Deployment Ribbon with two Bronze Stars
- Expert Pistol Shot Medal

Special qualifications:

- BS (Aerospace Engineering) Georgia Institute of Technology, 1978
- Designated Naval Aviator, 1980
- Capstone, 2004–3
- Designated Level IV Joint Qualified Officer, 2009

Summary of joint duty assignments:

Assignment	Dates	Rank
Joint Staff (Action Officer, EUCOM/CENTCOM Branch, J3)	Feb. 1990–July 1991	LCDR
Joint Staff (Senior Aide-De-Camp to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).	July 1991–Aug. 1992	CDR
Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (Director of Joint Innovation and Experimentation, J9).	June 2006–Aug. 2007	RADM
Commander, SIXTH Fleet/Commander, Striking and Support Forces NATO/ Deputy Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe/Commander, Joint Headquarters Lisbon.	Sep. 2007–Aug. 2008	VADM
Joint Staff (Director, Strategic Plans and Policy) (J5)/Senior Member, U.S. Delegation to the United Nations Military Staff Committee.	Aug. 2008–May 2010	VADM
Commander, Northern Command/Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command.	May 2010–Aug. 2011	ADM
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	Aug. 2011–to date	ADM

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by ADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr., USN, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Room SR-228

Washington, DC 20510-6050

(202) 224-3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF
NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. **Name:** (Include any former names used.)
James A. Winnefeld, Jr.; Nickname: Sandy.

2. **Position to which nominated:**
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. **Date of nomination:**
June 24, 2013.

4. **Address:** (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee's executive files.]

5. **Date and place of birth:**
April 24, 1956; Coronado, CA.

6. **Marital Status:** (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Mary Alice Winnefeld.
Maiden name: Mary Alice Werner.

7. **Names and ages of children:**
James, age 17.
Jonathan, age 15.

8. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.
None, other than military service.

9. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.

I serve as a trustee of the Naval Academy Foundation Athletics and Scholarships program, as reported on my SF 278. Trustee means "member" in this case. I have no advisory or supervisory role in the organization.

10. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
None.

11. **Honors and awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
None.

12. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

Yes.

13. **Personal views:** Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR.

This 14th day of June, 2013.

[The nomination of ADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr., USN, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on July 30, 2013, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 1, 2013.]