

**RECORD VERSION**

**STATEMENT BY**

**GENERAL RAYMOND T. ODIERNO  
CHIEF OF STAFF UNITED STATES ARMY**

**BEFORE THE**

**SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE**

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**TOTAL FORCE POLICY FOR THE U.S. ARMY**

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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe and other distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you about the total force policy for our Army.

Let me begin by thanking each member of the committee for your support and commitment to the Soldiers, Civilians, Families, Veterans, and Wounded Warriors of our Army, particularly while we remain at war and with the specter of great fiscal challenges and strategic uncertainty. The Nation's investment in your Army over the past decade has been decisive in ensuring the success of American Soldiers on the battlefield and achieving our national security objectives.

## **Introduction**

Despite declining resources, the demand for Army forces continues to increase. More than 70,000 Soldiers are deployed today and about 85,000 Soldiers are forward stationed in nearly 150 countries including nearly 20,000 on the Korean Peninsula. Our Soldiers, Civilians, and Family members continue to serve with the competence, commitment and character that our great Nation deserves. I am truly humbled to lead the extraordinary men and women of our Army who volunteer to raise their right hand and serve our country. As a division, corps and theater commander for over five years in Iraq and now as the Chief of Staff, I know full well the tremendous sacrifice the Soldiers from the Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve have made for our Nation.

## **Strategic Environment**

Throughout our Nation's history, the United States has grown the Army to fulfill the expanded demands of war and then drawn down military forces at the close of every war. Today, however, we are in the process of rapidly drawing down Army forces before the war is over. As we consider the future size and organization of our Army, it is imperative we consider the world as it exists, not as one we wish it to be. The recent headlines alone - Russia's unlawful annexation of Crimea, the intractable Syrian civil war, missile launches by North Korea – just to name a few, remind us of the complexity and uncertainty inherent in the international security environment. It demands that we make prudent decisions about the future capability and capacity that we need within our Army. Therefore, we must ensure our Army has the ability to rapidly respond to conduct the entire range of military operations, from humanitarian assistance and stability operations to general war.

## **Adapting the Army for War**

The Army over the last thirteen years has met the call to defend the Nation during two wars. In support of our war efforts, the Army's budget nearly doubled as we restructured, modularized and modernized the entire force, especially our National Guard and Reserve. To meet our Combatant Commanders' operational requirements, we grew the Active Army from 480,000 to 570,000 Soldiers and the Army National Guard from 350,000 to 358,000 Soldiers. We also significantly increased the full-time support of our National Guard from 45,555 to 59,270 personnel (30%) and our Reserve from 19,278 to 24,672 personnel (28%). We increased these full-time support personnel to facilitate building and sustaining the unit readiness required to meet the rotational demands. We needed the National Guard and Reserves to be more ready and to serve as an operational reserve. We built the structure (1<sup>st</sup> Army) that enabled the rotational mobilization, training, and deployment of our Guard and Reserve forces. We optimized the Army for the known demands of Afghanistan and Iraq. Our emphasis was on predictability and rotational readiness. We equipped and modernized the Reserve component to match their Active component counterparts. We included the National Guard combat formations in our ARFORGEN process to include Combat Training Center rotations. From 2001 to

2011, the Army budget grew from \$79B to \$138B (74%). We increased the National Guard budget from \$6.9B to \$16.1B (132%) and the Reserve budget from \$4.7B to \$8.2B (73.8%) to address shortfalls in individual and unit training, medical and dental readiness, and other areas that were inhibiting our achieving and sustaining desired readiness levels. Additionally, the overseas contingency operations funding received during this time period also facilitated the Army in meeting the increased demands of the two theaters of war.

## **Developing a Total Army Force Policy**

The war in Iraq is over and we continue to significantly reduce our forces in Afghanistan. However, we remain in a period of great strategic uncertainty and fiscal ambiguity. Over the past four years, the Army has absorbed several budget reductions while simultaneously conducting operations overseas and rebalancing the force to the wider array of missions called for in the defense strategy. From FY12 to FY 21, the DOD will take approximately \$900 billion in reductions with the Army share of those reductions being approximately \$265 billion.<sup>1</sup> Given that personnel constitute about half of the Army's budget, reductions in end strength and force structure are unavoidable. Our goal remains to properly balance end strength, readiness and modernization across our Total Army. To achieve these levels of spending reductions while still fulfilling the strategic demands for a ready and modern Army, an integrated Total Army approach was required.

### **Secretary of Defense Guidance**

In developing our plan to size and shape the Total Army, we first took guidance from our civilian leadership. The Department of Defense directed the Army to not size for large, prolonged stability operations. For the Army, this equates to taking risk in our depth and endurance characterized by later arriving forces, notably our large Guard combat formations – divisions, brigade combat teams, field artillery brigades, and aviation brigades. As we began building our FY 15 budget, the Secretary of Defense specifically directed the Services to not retain force structure at the expense of readiness to avoid a hollow force. The Secretary recognized that immediately reducing Defense budgets as a result of sequestration-level funding would adversely affect readiness and modernization in the next 4-5 years, but Services were directed to develop balanced budgets that permitted the restoration of desired levels of readiness and modernization by FY 2021.

### **Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff Guidance**

The Secretary of the Army and I provided additional guidance to first focus on fulfilling the needs of our combatant commanders to the greatest extent possible within reduced resource levels. Specifically, we directed that we disproportionately reduce our full-time forces as low as we responsibly could first and then consider modest reductions in our Guard and Reserve forces to achieve balance among and within the components in terms of end strength, readiness, and modernization.

### **Force Planning Process**

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<sup>1</sup> Consistent with the funding caps specified in the Budget Control Act of 2011, the FY 13 Budget proposed \$487 billion in DOD funding reductions over 10 years, of which the Army's share was an estimated \$170 billion. In addition, sequestration was triggered in 2013, forcing an additional \$37 billion reduction in FY 13 and threatening a further total reduction in DOD funding of approximately \$375 billion through FY 21, with the Army's portion estimated at \$95 billion.

The Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense conducted a transparent, open and highly collaborative budget formulation, force structure and aviation restructure decision process that included representation of all components at all levels and incorporated elements of their input. Additionally, the National Guard Bureau represented the views of the Adjutants General in all deliberations and at the request of the NGB, Army leadership engaged State Adjutants General on the budget, force structure and aviation restructure plans on numerous occasions beginning in August 2013.

The 2013 Strategic Choices and Management Review, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review and FY 2015 Program Budget Review gave us the opportunity to take a hard look at how best to size and organize our Army. We considered the unique attributes, characteristics and complementary nature of the three components. This Total Army plan establishes the structural conditions to ensure our National Guard forces meet state responsibilities while ensuring we have adequate Active forces to meet ongoing operational demands that require presence, forward stationing and in some cases no notice deployments. All components are necessary and this plan allows both the National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve to continue to provide relevant forces to implement the defense strategy domestically and overseas.

All proposals were examined during the process. Many were infeasible because they did not faithfully adhere to Secretary of Defense guidance, failed to meet the operational demands of our Combatant Commanders, or did not achieve the necessary funding reductions once fully burdened costs were incorporated. Our Army is made up of professionals across all components who have superbly executed their assigned missions under extraordinary circumstances. This plan reflects the continued commitment and sacrifice of Soldiers from every component of our Army. No one is fully satisfied with the final outcome, including myself. However, the reality is that the funding in the future will not allow us to have everything we may want. We must make tough but necessary choices in order to balance end strength, readiness and modernization across the Total Army so that all of our Soldiers, regardless of component, can accomplish their missions.

## **End Strength**

Our goal in executing reductions has been to maintain the proper balance between end strength, readiness and modernization across the Total Army. We cannot hollow out the Army by becoming over-manned and unprepared for future contingencies. We are reducing end strength as rapidly as possible, while still meeting our operational commitments, to concentrate remaining funds on rebuilding readiness. However, to do this we must accept greater risk in our modernization programs in the near term. Therefore, consistent with the defense guidance, we are in the process of drawing down end strength. By the end of FY 15, we will reduce the Active Army from a wartime high of 570,000 to 490,000, the Army National Guard from 358,200 to 350,200 and the Army Reserve from 205,000 to 202,000 Soldiers.

But with sequestration-level caps in FY 16 and beyond, the Army will be required to further reduce Total Army end strength to 420,000 in the Active Army, 315,000 in the Army National Guard and 185,000 in the Army Reserve by the end of FY 19. At these end strength levels, we will not be able to execute the defense strategy. It will call into question our ability to execute even one prolonged, multi-phased major contingency operation. Our Army will not have sufficient capacity to meet ongoing operational commitments and simultaneously train to sustain appropriate readiness levels.

This would be a total reduction of 213,000 Soldiers since 2011, with 150,000 coming from the Active Army, 43,000 coming from the Army National Guard and 20,000 from the Army Reserve. These end strength reductions to the Active Army represent 70% of the Total Army end strength reductions compared with 20% from the National Guard and 10% from the U.S. Army Reserve. As we are executing the reductions from the war time end strength gains from the Active Army, this plan will retain approximately 53,000 full time support positions in the National Guard in order to facilitate support for future operations. This represents approximately 8,000 FTS positions above pre-war levels. Our Total Army plan will also result in going from a 51 percent Active and 49 percent Reserve component mix in FY 12 to a 54 percent Reserve and 46 percent Active component mix by the end of FY 17. The Army will be the only service in which the Reserve component outnumbers the Active component.

The President's FY 15 Budget request provides a balanced and responsible way forward in the midst of ongoing fiscal uncertainty. It allows the Army to reduce and reorganize forces, but incurs some risk to equipment modernization programs and readiness. Under the FY 15 Budget request, the Army will decrease end strength through FY 17 to a Total Army of 440-450,000 in the Active Army, 335,000 in the Army National Guard and 195,000 in the Army Reserve. This should be the absolute floor for end strength reductions. In order to execute the defense strategy, it is important to note that as we continue to lose end strength our flexibility deteriorates as does our ability to react to a strategic surprise. Our assumptions about the duration and size of future conflicts, allied contributions and the need to conduct post-conflict stability operations are optimistic. If these assumptions are wrong, our risk grows significantly.

These cuts will be particularly felt by our generating force that mans, trains, and equips our Army. We do not scale the generating force with the operating force in order to have capability to grow the Army in a time of war. It currently comprises about 18% of the Army, far below the ratio of the other Services. At a 440-450,000 end strength in the Active force, the Army will be at risk to meet our generating force requirements by having to reduce to historically low manning levels of 83,000.

We believe that the Total Army plan balances the reductions appropriately across all components and achieves balance, even at the lowest estimated sequestration levels. This will ensure that we have the resources necessary to continue to train and maintain the Army and to have a force that we can still modernize effectively for the future.

## **Brigade Combat Teams Restructure**

We have undertaken a comprehensive reorganization of Army units to better align force structure with limited resources and increase unit capability. Reorganization of the current operational force of Active Army Infantry, Armored and Stryker BCTs from 38 to 32 reduces tooth to tail ratio and increases the operational capability of the remaining BCTs. All Active Army and Army National Guard BCTs will gain additional engineer and fires capability, capitalizing on the inherent strength in combined arms formations.

Previous budget cuts coupled with sequestration-level funding could result in a reduction of up to 46% of the Brigade Combat Teams from the Active Army and up to 22% of the Brigade Combat Teams from the National Guard. Most of our contingency plans call for our forces being ready and deployed within ninety days to meet requirements. If we are forced to reduce to the lowest BCT levels under the current law caps, the available inventory of ready units will not meet the requirements. This would cause our national leaders to have to make the decision of either not

providing needed forces to our combatant commanders or deploying unready, not fully manned BCTs with limited logistical support. Both increase the risk to mission success and our American Soldiers. Thus, our ability to maintain the appropriate number, mix and types of BCTs across the Total Army is essential.

## **Aviation Restructure Initiative**

We cannot afford to maintain our current aviation structure and still sustain modernization while providing trained and ready Aviation units across all three components. Therefore, we have conducted a comprehensive review of our strategy and developed an innovative concept to restructure our aviation fleet to address these issues. We considered operational commitments, readiness levels, future requirements and costs. Army leadership listened carefully to National Guard concerns over this plan, especially the desire of the National Guard to maintain aviation brigades. The Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI) allows us to eliminate obsolete airframes, sustain a modernized fleet, reduce sustainment costs while maintaining all aviation brigades in the reserve component. However, we will eliminate three full aviation brigades in the active component.

The ARI is a cascading transition of Aircraft across the Total Army. It begins as we divest the Army's oldest or non deployable helicopters, the fleet of OH-58A/C, Kiowa Warriors, and TH-67s. We have not been successful in developing and fielding a new armed aerial scout aircraft for over two decades. For more than two decades, our interim solution has been the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior. It has served us well but to keep it flying safely for another decade will require a significant investment of billions of dollars. Investing that sort of money in an aging platform simply does not make sense, if we have an option.

Next, we will replace the OH-58Ds in the Active component with AH-64 Apaches already in the Active force and with Apaches in the National Guard. In our analysis of alternatives, we compared the Kiowa Warrior to other available aircraft, and determined that the AH-64 "E" Apache helicopter with the Modern Target Acquisition and Designation System (MTADS) and teamed with unmanned aerial systems (UAS) is the overwhelming preferred aircraft in the armed aerial scout role. Teaming the AH-64E with UAS further expands our aerial scout capabilities. The "Echoes" can control the flight of the UAS and their sensors, and if armed, their weapons as well. Adding this new dimension to Army aviation is a significant increase in capability, but it also increases the training requirements of the "Echo" aviators as they are now controlling multiple aircraft and passing data and commands between them and with troops in contact on the ground, all while piloting their own aircraft, often at night and in dangerous terrain and weather. This teaming has already started in combat operations in Afghanistan with considerable success due to highly skilled aviators and ample unit training. Without using the Apaches to fulfill both our attack and armed aerial scout roles, we cannot generate the capacity required to fulfill combatant commander operational demand at our current AC-RC force mix. This plan allows us to facilitate the necessary collective training for this high demand, low density aircraft, especially as we reduce our Apache shooting battalions from 37 to 20 in order to facilitate them in the armed aerial scout role.

The Apaches removed from the National Guard will be replaced with our modernized UH-60L and they will continue to receive UH-60M Blackhawks as part of already scheduled modernization efforts. By retiring the Kiowas and Kiowa Warriors and consolidating the Apaches in the Active Army to increase our total operational capacity, we will displace over 150 Blackhawk medium lift helicopters. The Active Army in turn will transfer 111 Blackhawk helicopters to the Army National Guard and 48 Blackhawk helicopters to the U.S. Army Reserve. These UH-60 Blackhawks will

significantly improve National Guard capabilities to support combat missions and increase support to civil authorities, such as disaster response, while sustaining security and support capabilities to civil authorities in the states and territories.

Finally, the Army will transfer nearly all Active Army LUH-72 Lakota helicopters to the United States Army Aviation Center of Excellence at Fort Rucker, Alabama, and procure an additional 100 LUH-72 Lakotas to round out the training fleet. These airframes will replace the TH-67 Jet Ranger helicopter fleet as the next generation glass cockpit, dual engine training helicopter. Army and Department of Defense leadership listened carefully to National Guard concerns over their need to retain LUH-72s to accomplish state missions. At current funding levels, this plan will enable the Army National Guard to retain all of its LUH-72 aircraft.

Under this plan, the disproportionate reductions, as in end strength, come from the Active component. 86% of the total reduction of aircraft (687 of 798) will come out of the active component compared with 14% of aircraft (111 of 798) from the Guard and Reserve components. The Active Army's overall helicopter fleet will decline by about 23%, and the Army National Guard's fleet of helicopters will decline by approximately 8%. We have already made the decision to eliminate three entire aviation brigades from the Active component while we sustain all our aviation brigades in the reserve components. The National Guard will also retain all LUH-72s, CH-47s and gain additional UH60s to accomplish state missions while giving up their AH-64s in order for the Army to meet critical mission requirements.

The resulting Active and Reserve component aviation force mix as a result of the Aviation Restructure Initiative will result in better and more capable formations which are able to respond to contingencies at home and abroad. With this proposal, we achieve a leaner, more efficient and capable force that balances operational capability and flexibility across the Total Army. Overall, we believe this plan will generate a total savings of about \$12 billion.<sup>2</sup>

## **Readiness and Training**

Our Army must be able to rapidly deploy, fight, sustain itself and win against complex state and non-state threats in austere environments and rugged terrain. Readiness levels are determined primarily by the need to support requirements as given by our Combatant Commanders and our overall budget authorities to train, man, equip and sustain Army units. Also, various statutes and regulations proscribe our ability to access, mobilize, train, deploy, employ, off-ramp, and cycle our Guard and Reserve forces. We focus our highest readiness on those units that most likely will be the earliest deployers during a crisis response. These units are not solely Active forces. Numerous National Guard and Reserve units, especially critical enablers, are part of this mix. Additionally, in determining readiness levels we must keep in balance the need for National Guard forces to respond in a crisis and execute their State responsibilities.

Our training levels for the various components are directly related to desired readiness levels. Home Station Training (HST) along with culminating events at Combat Training Centers (CTC) are the primary tool the Army uses to reach necessary collective training levels for our units. A typical Active BCT will conduct a CTC rotation every two years and reach brigade level proficiency at the end of that training. They will have the ability to rapidly respond to crisis. A National Guard BCT will

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<sup>2</sup> See Attachment on Aviation Restructure Initiative savings estimates

conduct a CTC rotation every 7-10 years with the goal of reaching company level proficiency. However, they will require additional training and preparation prior to any deployment.

The duration of this additional training for National Guard BCTs is dependent on several factors, including pre-mobilization readiness and complexity of the assigned mission. Experience shows us that high end war fighting capabilities require greater collective training to achieve combat proficiency. Due to the geographic dispersion of most National Guard BCTs and coupled with limited opportunity for collective-level combined arms training, they require greater post-mobilization collective training time to reach necessary deployment readiness levels. This process also substantially increases their overall cost compared to an Active BCT.

For our aviation brigades, the requirement to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance and air ground integration requires sustained collective training that is much greater than just maintaining individual pilot or crew proficiency. The collective training between manned and unmanned systems along with coordination with ground forces in order to deliver accurate and effective fires is critical as we build our combined arms capabilities.

As overall end strength declines, the necessity to sustain readiness becomes a greater imperative. This will also result in increasing demand for our Guard and Reserve forces. Maintaining them as a strategic reserve is not practical in the current security environment. Combatant Commanders requirements to help shape their theaters are growing, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, so it is highly likely that operational unit readiness will be fully consumed and dwell times will be significantly reduced. We have already suffered in our overall readiness because of reduced funding under sequestration in FY 2013. In order to ensure all components have the necessary dollars to fund training and sustain readiness, it is critical to balance end strength and force structure reductions across the Total Army.

## **Modernization**

Currently, our Guard and Reserve are the most modernized in the history of our Army. Over the last decade, the Army has improved the Equipment On Hand and equipment modernization levels for both the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. Overall equipment on hand levels have improved significantly as a result of increased Congressional funding and a focused effort by the Army to increase the modernization of the reserve components. More importantly, the equipment provided to the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve has been the same modern equipment provided to the Active component, resulting in significant increases in modernization to 86% for the Army National Guard and 76% for the Army Reserve. Our modernization efforts will continue to emphasize improving operational capability, flexibility and modernization across all components to ensure a ready and capable Total Army. However, more modern equipment is more expensive to maintain. If we are unable to balance our reductions in end strength and force structure across all components, the result will be an inability to sustain that modern equipment effectively and to obtain the capabilities needed for future operations.

## **National Commission on the Structure of the Army**

There have been some calls for a National Commission to examine Army force structure. They point to a similar commission for the Air Force that looked at their structure and mix of forces between their Active, National Guard and Reserve. We do not recommend a commission and believe

it will hinder the Army's ability to balance end strength, readiness and modernization as we downsize the force and fulfill congressional direction to reduce spending.

First, as stated earlier, the Army worked our plans to downsize the force and reduce spending levels in an open, transparent, and collaborative manner. Action officers, general officers and senior civilian leadership from the National Guard Bureau, Office of the Chief of Army Reserve, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff and Combatant Commands participated in the analysis and deliberations. Numerous meetings of the Joint Chiefs addressed these issues. Opposing views and proposals were thoroughly debated in these meetings. Additionally, experts and analysts within the Department of Defense assessed all options for their viability in ensuring the Army could meet its defense strategy requirements. All of these conversations and analysis were considered before the final decision was made by the Secretary of Defense.

Second, the Army continues to be open and transparent in providing Congress with our intent, rationale, and proposed plan for the Total Army. We have and continue to explain our plan in person to Governors and Adjutant Generals. We have and continue to explain our plan in person to Governors and Adjutant Generals. While no one is excited about losing any assets, Governors especially understand that fiscal constraints require common sense solutions.

Third, our plan disproportionately reduces Active ground and aviation forces, and includes modest reductions to our National Guard and Reserve. National Guard and Reserves must be a part of the reductions and excluding them will mean increasing reductions in the Active and Reserve component, readiness, and modernization, thereby increasing the risk to the Army's ability to implement the defense strategy. We remain committed to working closely with members of Congress on this issue, but believe a commission will impede the Army's ability to carry out its mission.

## **Closing**

We have taken the overwhelming majority of reductions in this plan from the Active component. We know the importance of all three components and this plan is not about Active versus the National Guard or Reserve; this is about providing the best Total Army for our Nation. Our Army is getting smaller and we must be more ready in the Active, the National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve to respond to future threats. This proposal allows us to balance end strength, readiness and modernization for all of our components and sustain our valuable Guard and Reserve forces as a viable operational reserve.

Regardless of Component – Active, Guard or Reserve – our Soldiers have served honorably with distinction and have fought bravely and tenaciously on battlefields to defend our country. Their service and sacrifice is something we must never forget. Therefore, it is incumbent on us to ensure they are organized, trained, and equipped to answer the Nation's call at home and abroad whenever and wherever they are needed. Our recommendation delivers the best Total Army that will allow them to do just that.

## Attachment – Aviation Restructure Initiative Savings Estimate

The Aviation Restructure Initiative savings have two parts: procurement savings and annual operating cost savings

**Procurement Savings:** The Army will save the taxpayers over \$12B by not buying the following:

- \$3.3B for OH-58D Cockpit and Sensor Upgrade Program (CASUP)
- \$7B for OH-58D Service Life Extension Program (SLEP)
- \$200M for TH-67 Service Life Extension Program (SLEP)
- \$1.4B for a new training aircraft at Fort Rucker to replace the TH-67

These procurement costs are driven by two key parts of the initiative: 1) Using the AH-64E Apache to replace the Scout mission instead of extending the life of the OH-58D or procuring a new Armed Aerial Scout; and 2) Using an already existing platform, the LUH-72 as the new training aircraft at Fort Rucker instead of extending the life of the current fleet while we design and build a new trainer

**Annual Operating Cost Savings:** The Army will save the taxpayers over \$1.1B every year by reducing the number of helicopters and pilots by 23% in the Active Army and 8% in the Army National Guard

- The Active Army will move 100 LUH to Fort Rucker, saving significant funds through consolidation, while at the same time, the Army National Guard will not lose any LUH – 100% of the savings from the Active Component
- The Active Army reduce by 3 Aviation Brigades (from 13 to 10), a nearly 25% reduction in operating costs, while the Army National Guard will retain all 8 Aviation Brigades – 100% of the savings from the Active Component
- The Army will reduce operating costs by divesting nine battalions of Scout Aircraft (OH-58D), while the Army National Guard will divest one battalion; the Army National Guard battalion will receive some Blackhawks as a backfill
- Fewer aircraft in the Army and National Guard will result in fewer pilots being trained, saving money at Fort Rucker

These savings allow the Army to fund its most important priorities: modernizing our Apache, Blackhawk, and Chinook fleet across the Active, Guard, and Reserve. It also allows us to avoid creating a “hollow” force of too many aircraft and pilots, but not enough modernization and training dollars.

The consolidation of the Apache aircraft into the Active formations enables us to: divest the OH-58 fleet (which is the majority of the cost savings); reduce the number of pilots going through Fort Rucker (reducing operating costs); and allows us to collectively train attack/scout aviation battalions, teamed with UAVs, in the same location and at the same time as we train ground maneuver units, producing a better capability for reduced costs