

Advance Questions for Mr. Brian P. McKeon
Nominee for Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

1. Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

Not at this time.

2. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

N/A

Duties of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Section 134a of Title 10, United States Code, provides that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall assist the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the performance of his duties. Department of Defense Directive 5111.3 emphasizes that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy advises and assists the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, particularly on strategy formulation, contingency planning, and the integration of Department of Defense plans and policy with overall national security objectives.

3. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under current regulations and practices?

Section 137a of Title 10, United States Code, governs the position for which I have been nominated. It provides that the Principal Deputy “shall be the first assistant to an Under Secretary of Defense and shall assist such Under Secretary in the performance of the duties of the position of such Under Secretary and shall act for, and exercise the powers of, such Under Secretary when such Under Secretary is absent or disabled.” DoD Directive 5111.03 (Jan. 8, 2009) provides a broad statement that the Principal Deputy “advise[s] and assist[s]” the Under Secretary for Policy “with all responsibilities in providing advice and assistance to the Secretary of Defense.”

4. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect that the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy would prescribe for you?

Unless and until I am confirmed, I will not know the specific set of issues that will be

assigned to me by the Secretary and the Under Secretary for Policy. If confirmed, it is likely that Ms. Wormuth and I will divide responsibilities so that each of us has a lead role on certain issues for OSD Policy.

Relationships

5. What do you see as the relationship between the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and each of the following?

The Secretary of Defense

Pursuant to the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), as the USD(P)'s principal assistant, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy serves as a staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense on all matters concerning the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy provides support to the Deputy Secretary similar to that provided to the Secretary, as described above.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

The Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy (PDUSD(P)) is the principal assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and is responsible for assisting the USD(P) in carrying out all responsibilities, fulfilling functions, managing relationships, and exercising authorities provided for in law to the USD(P). The PDUSD(P) advises and supports the USD(P) with all responsibilities in providing advice to the Secretary of Defense in interagency fora (such as National Security Council system deliberations), engagement with international interlocutors, and in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution processes inside the Department, including the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review, and annual program and budget reviews.

The other Under Secretaries of Defense

Pursuant to the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy works closely with the other Under Secretaries of Defense and their Deputies to achieve the Secretary's objectives. This includes providing policy input, as appropriate, to each of them in their respective areas of responsibility.

The Assistant Secretaries of Defense

Pursuant to the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), the Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy (PDUSD(P)) works

closely with Assistant Secretaries of Defense across the Department to achieve the Secretary's objectives. This includes providing policy input, as appropriate, to each of them in their respective areas of responsibility. As the USD(P)'s principal assistant, within the Office of the Under Secretary for Policy, the PDUSD(P) provides oversight of Assistant Secretaries on issues and at times as directed by the USD(P). The Policy team works together to provide the USD(P) and the Secretary with advice and recommendations on the full range of policy issues under consideration in the Department and provides policy oversight to ensure that the Secretary's guidance and decisions are implemented properly.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments

The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy works closely with the Secretaries of the Military Departments on a broad range of issues, including strategy development, force planning, and other areas in which the Military Departments are critical stakeholders.

The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

As the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense, the President, and the National Security Council, the Chairman has a unique and critical military role. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy works closely with the Chairman and Vice Chairman to support the efforts of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Secretary, and the Deputy Secretary, and to help ensure that military advice is taken into account in an appropriate manner across a broad range of issues relating to strategy, force development, force employment, and other matters.

The Service Chiefs

The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy works closely with the Service Chiefs in support of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on a broad range of issues, including defense strategy and policy development, force planning, and other areas in which the Military Departments and Services are critical stakeholders.

The Commanders of the Regional and Functional Combatant Commands

The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy also works closely with the Combatant Commanders to support the efforts of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Secretary, and Deputy Secretary, particularly in the areas of strategy and policy, contingency planning, and policy oversight of operations.

The Director of the National Guard Bureau

The Principal Under Secretary of Defense for Policy works closely, through the Chairman and Vice Chairman, with the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chief

of the National Guard Bureau is a member of the Joint Chiefs, and has a specific responsibility to provide information on the non-Federalized National Guard.

The General Counsel of the Department of Defense

The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy works closely with the General Counsel on all policy issues that involve a legal dimension. Doing so requires significant and regular coordination on a broad range of issues.

The Administrator and Deputy Administrators of the National Nuclear Security Administration

The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy works with the Administrator and Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, in support of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy's oversight of strategy for nuclear weapons and forces, as well as USD(P)'s role on the Nuclear Weapons Council. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy also works with the Administrator and Deputy Administrator to coordinate policies and programs to reduce nuclear threats.

The Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency

The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy supports the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in exercising authority, direction, and control over the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The Policy organization works closely with DSCA to provide the Secretary with advice and recommendations on the full range of security cooperation issues facing the Department.

Qualifications

6. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

I have worked on national security issues for the Congress and the Executive Branch for most of the past 25 years. Consequently, I have gained experience and knowledge on a very broad range of regional and functional issues. This experience has also given me a deep understanding about how policy is developed and advanced in the two political branches.

For the last 16 years, I have also been assigned management responsibilities. In my current position, I supervise a staff of approximately 370 people and have served as the *de facto* chief operating officer for two National Security Advisors, managing the budget, administration, and personnel, as well overseeing the Executive Secretariat and the White House Situation Room. I believe I have demonstrated an ability to manage people and processes.

Through my long service in the Senate and in the White House, I have developed strong personal and professional relationships with many senior officials currently serving in the Department of Defense, as well as in the White House, the Department of State, and the Intelligence Community. These relationships will help me in the performance of my duties, should I be confirmed.

My experiences as Deputy National Security Advisor to the Vice President and in my current position have given me first-hand experience in diplomacy and policy-making at the highest levels of the Executive Branch.

Finally, my long experience working in the Senate would enable me, if confirmed, to help the Department in its frequent interactions with the Congress. Having spent so much of my professional career working in the Congress, I have deep respect for its role in national security policy and am committed to ensuring a regular dialogue between the Department and the Congress.

Major Challenges and Problems

7. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?

Section 137a of Title 10, United States Code, provides only a general statement of the duties of the position for which I have been nominated. It provides that the “Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense shall be the first assistant to [the] Under Secretary of Defense and shall assist such Under Secretary in the performance of the duties of the position of such Under Secretary and shall act for, and exercise the powers of, such Under Secretary when such Under Secretary is absent or disabled.” Until and if I am confirmed, I will not know the specific set of issues that will be assigned to me by the Secretary and the Under Secretary for Policy. If I am confirmed, it is likely that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and I would divide responsibilities so that each of us has a lead role on certain issues for OSD Policy.

As a general matter, I recognize that the women and men of OSD Policy have been through a difficult period in the last year, with furloughs resulting from sequestration, followed by the government shutdown in October. Among other things, I intend to focus on our human capital to ensure that OSD Policy can continue to recruit and retain strong talent.

8. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

See response to #7, above.

- 9. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you recommend be established in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?**

See response to #7, above.

Afghanistan

- 10. What are our key strategic objectives in Afghanistan and, in your view, are we on track to achieve those objectives?**

I understand we continue to make progress in our pursuit of the remnants of core al Qaeda. Additionally, our Afghan partners are proving effective in their combat operations, which supports our security objectives in Afghanistan.

- 11. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend to the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan?**

If confirmed, I would support the current U.S. strategy to defeat of core al Qaeda, to include preventing its reconstitution in the region.

- 12. What do you see as the United States' long-term strategic interests in Afghanistan after 2014?**

The U.S. strategic interests in Afghanistan include the defeat of core al Qaeda in the region as well as the realization of a stable Afghan Government that can provide security to its people.

- 13. Do you support the retention of a limited U.S. military presence in Afghanistan after 2014?**

A post-2014 U.S. military presence can help Afghanistan by continuing a focused counterterrorism mission against core al Qaeda and by being part of a NATO-led mission to train, assist, and advise the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). As the President has stated, however, the Afghan Government must conclude the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) in order for U.S. troops to remain in Afghanistan.

- 14. If so, what in your view should be the size, mission, and duration of such a residual U.S. military force?**

The President has stated that if a BSA is signed, a small U.S. force could remain in Afghanistan with NATO Allies to carry out two narrow missions: training and assisting Afghan forces, and counterterrorism operations to pursue any remnants of core al Qaeda. If confirmed, I will support DoD's work to develop options and a recommendation on the appropriate force size.

15. If the United States and Afghanistan are unable to conclude a Bilateral Security Agreement that ensures legal protections for such a residual U.S. military force, should the United States withdraw its military forces from Afghanistan?

The President will make that decision at the appropriate time. In the meantime, I understand that the United States is prepared to sign the BSA. The longer it takes the Afghan Government to conclude the BSA, the greater the risk for higher costs and constrained options for the United States and coalition partners.

Afghanistan Transition

16. Do you support the transition of full responsibility for the security of Afghanistan to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) by 2014?

Yes. I understand that the ANSF now has the lead for virtually all operations, conducts these operations independently, and over the last year has proven itself to be up to the task. The ANSF has prevented insurgents from making any significant gains.

17. In your view, what are the main challenges to the success of such a transition?

I believe the main challenge will be ensuring that the ANSF has the necessary financial support to preserve the progress achieved so far. This will require a continued U.S. commitment as well as assistance from allies and partners.

18. What do you see as the major challenges of transitioning away from a DOD-lead for programs currently in Afghanistan to a civilian-led effort in Afghanistan?

There are many missions that DoD led during the counterinsurgency campaign (e.g., rule of law development) that will transition to civilian agencies post-2014. If confirmed, I would work with U.S. departments and agencies -- particularly the Department of State -- the international community and the Afghan Government to ensure that we are positioned to protect our strategic interests in Afghanistan with appropriate assistance, consistent with the President's decision on the post-2014 military mission.

Afghanistan National Security Forces

19. What is your assessment of the progress in developing a professional and effective ANSF?

I am informed that current ANSF officers and leaders are very competent, but more are needed. The ANSF has grown rapidly over the last few years, but developing a larger leadership cadre takes time and sustained effort.

20. What do you see as the main challenges to building the capacity of the ANSF, including after 2014?

My understanding is that capacity at the ministerial and institutional level is one of the main challenges facing the ANSF. Having advisors with the right skill sets in place will be critical in mitigating this challenge. Sustaining financial resources and ensuring the

ANSF continue to build capacity to execute funding will also be critical in maintaining security gains made over the past three years.

21. If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you make for addressing those challenges?

If confirmed, I would closely consult and coordinate with Afghan leaders, NATO Allies, and other partners to ensure we are working together on shared priorities. We must also ensure we are promoting professionalism and self-sufficiency within the Afghan forces.

22. What do you see as the main challenges to sustaining the ANSF beyond 2014, and if confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you make for addressing these challenges?

My view is that we need to ensure that the Afghan forces continue to receive the necessary international support and assistance, as well as the training and equipment, to plan and conduct missions independently. If confirmed, I would recommend that we continue to focus on improving the Afghans' ability to conduct planning, contracting, and logistics functions at the ministerial levels.

23. Do you agree that any future reductions from the current ANSF troop level should be based on the security conditions in Afghanistan at the time the reductions would occur?

It is difficult to contemplate or foresee the size or structure of the ANSF over an indefinite time period. I agree that, for the remainder of the Obama Administration, the size of the ANSF should be governed primarily by security conditions.

U.S. Relationship with Pakistan

24. What is your assessment of the current relationship between the United States and Pakistan?

The relationship has improved since 2012, and the recent visit of Prime Minister Sharif to Washington was an indicator of that improvement. I attribute the improvement to both countries' decision to refocus the relationship on areas of mutual interest. This includes promoting peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan, eliminating core al Qaeda, and aiding Pakistan in its fight against militants that target the United States, Pakistan, and other nations. The relationship still faces significant challenges, but it is in a stronger position than it was. If confirmed, I would engage my Pakistani counterparts on common interests, as well as in areas where we have disagreement.

25. Do you see opportunities for expanded U.S.-Pakistan cooperation on security issues? If so, how would you prioritize these areas of cooperation?

I believe we should continue to take a practical approach to the security relationship with Pakistan. We should focus on areas where our strategic interests overlap, while engaging in areas where they do not. In their joint statement issued last October, President Obama and Prime Minister Sharif agreed that no country's territory should be used to destabilize

its neighbors. This presents an opportunity for strengthened cooperation on counterterrorism.

26. What is your assessment of Pakistan's efforts to combat the threat of international terrorism?

Pakistan has suffered significant military and civilian casualties in the fight against terrorism and deployed large numbers of forces in counterinsurgency operations along the Afghan border. These actions attest to the extent of Pakistan's commitment to the fight against terrorism. At the same time, we have longstanding concerns that we regularly discuss with the Pakistan government about the use of its territory by terrorist or extremist organizations that threaten U.S. interests and the security of Pakistan's neighbors.

27. What conditions, if any, should the United States place on its security assistance to Pakistan?

The provisions of U.S. law and regulations governing the transfer of governing U.S. security assistance to foreign governments, including those found on the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-73), provide appropriate conditionality.

The Haqqani Network

The Haqqani network, which has been linked to a number of deadly attacks on Afghan, U.S., and other coalition forces in Afghanistan, operates from safe havens in Pakistan.

28. In your view, should additional steps be taken to track and counter the illicit financial activities of the Haqqani Network, and if so, what role – if any – should DOD play?

I understand that the U.S. Government is taking action against the Haqqani network through DoD action in Afghanistan and Treasury's decision on February 6, 2014, to freeze the assets of three suspected militants. If confirmed, I would work across the U.S. Government, and with international partners and organizations, to counter the Haqqani Network.

Iraq

29. What in your view are the key U.S. strategic interests with regard to Iraq?

The United States has a strategic interest in helping Iraq build a sovereign, stable, self-reliant country with a representative government that can be a partner in the region and not a safe haven for terrorists. We are working to develop a strong, long-term strategic partnership in accordance with the U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement. Strengthening our partnership with Iraq will help us to advance significant interests, including counterterrorism cooperation against threats to our national security and that of the region, economic growth and the stabilization of global energy markets, and the development of democracy.

30. What in your view are the major areas, if any, for security cooperation between the United States and Iraq?

We share key interests with the Iraqis in the security realm, including reducing the threat from violent extremists such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, containing the spread of extremism from Syria, and countering threats from Iran.

31. In what areas, if any, do you see U.S. and Iraqi security interests diverging?

The United States and Iraq have similar security interests. We both have an interest in fighting terrorism and ensuring that Iraq is stable and free from external influences. We also both have an interest in maintaining stability and security in the Middle East.

32. What do you see as the greatest challenges for the U.S-Iraq security relationship over the coming years?

Today's Iraq is still recovering from decades of dictatorship and years of conflict and international isolation. To continue on a path of progress, it needs an inclusive government so that all people of Iraq feel they have a voice in their government. As the President said during the visit to Washington of Prime Minister Maliki last November, the United States stands ready to deepen its security cooperation and to honor the sacrifice of the U.S. Armed Forces by ensuring a strong, prosperous, inclusive, and democratic Iraq.

33. In your view, what steps, if any, should the United States take to engage with Iraq to promote greater security and stability across the Middle East region?

The United States has encouraged Iraq and its neighbors to act to re-integrate Iraq into the region after years of isolation. Progress has been made over the last year in resolving longstanding disputes between Iraq and Kuwait, but more needs to be done. One important way to support this integration is by encouraging Iraq to take part in regional dialogues as well as military exercises as demonstrated by Iraq's participation in the EAGER LION exercise held in Jordan last summer. If confirmed, I would work with partners in the region to assist Iraq in becoming more integrated in the regional framework and to participate in additional trainings and exercises.

Iraq faces a resurgent violent extremist threat that seeks to exploit popular discontentment with the current Maliki Government, particularly within Sunni communities in western Iraq.

34. What role, if any, should the United States play in assisting the Government of Iraq in confronting the threat of violent extremism?

Although the Government of Iraq is responsible for providing its own security, we can assist in a variety of ways to help the Iraqis increase their capabilities and capacity to meet current threats. It is my understanding that the Department, in concert with interagency partners, is already using a variety of key security assistance and cooperation tools to build the capacity of Iraqi Security Forces. If confirmed, I would support information sharing, non-operational training for the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and

Ministry of Interior Counter Terrorism Services, and continued sales of key defense articles to the Government of Iraq.

35. In your view, what conditions, if any, should the United States place on the provision of equipment or assistance to the Government of Iraq in its fight against violent extremism?

The Foreign Military Sales program provides what I believe are stringent measures to monitor the Government of Iraq on the use of military equipment and assistance, consistent with U.S. laws. These are the same conditions imposed on other countries that have and receive U.S. defense articles. Prime Minister Maliki also pledged, in a recent letter to Chairman Menendez, that U.S. equipment would not be used against innocent civilians. The United States has made clear to Iraq that it will be held accountable for complying with end-use monitoring protocols, and that U.S. assistance is dependent on the Iraqis adhering to proper use of the systems we sell to them.

Transatlantic Relationship and NATO

36. In your view, how important to U.S. national security interests is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the U.S. transatlantic relationship with our Alliance partners?

NATO and our transatlantic relationships remain very important, as U.S. security and engagement in Europe are closely intertwined. Europe is home to some of the United States' most stalwart allies and partners, who have fought and continue to fight and sacrifice alongside U.S. forces. Europe is our principal partner in seeking global and economic security, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. The United States has enduring interests in supporting peace and prosperity in Europe as well as bolstering the strength and vitality of NATO.

37. What changes, if any, would you recommend to strengthen that transatlantic relationship, if confirmed?

The transatlantic relationship is as strong as ever, but we should not take Alliance cohesion and solidarity for granted. The commitment of Allies to a strong NATO must be manifested in a willingness to invest in the future of the Alliance by pooling resources and sharing risk to develop the capabilities needed to fulfill future missions. If confirmed, I would encourage Allies to make those investments.

38. As the United States pursues a pivot toward the Asia-Pacific region, do you believe there should be a reduction in the U.S. security commitment to Europe?

The rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region does not imply a shift of attention from Europe. Far from it. Europe remains our principal partner in seeking global and economic security. Moreover, we continue to have security obligations to our NATO Allies pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty. A peaceful and prosperous Asia-Pacific is in the interests of both Europe and the United States.

39. As the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan nears completion, do you foresee a need for NATO to re-evaluate its purpose, missions and objectives going forward?

Like any organization, NATO should periodically examine its purpose, missions, and objectives. The successful completion of NATO's largest and most challenging operation represents a turning point for the Alliance. As Allies sustained regular troop rotations to Afghanistan, defense investment in new capabilities and the readiness of some forces for other potential missions declined. The purpose of the Alliance continues to be deterrence and defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. However, as NATO completes the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan, some of its operational objectives will likely be replaced by objectives related to training and readiness, with more emphasis on live exercises to maintain interoperability.

Libya

40. What role do you envision the United States playing in helping Libya build capable security institutions?

The Administration has made building Libyan security a priority. It is my understanding that DoD will train a 5,000-8,000-member general purpose force (GPF) with the basic skills needed to protect government institutions and maintain order. I believe that DoD plans to complement its training efforts with defense advisor and defense institution reform programs to build the institutional capacity of the Libyan Ministry of Defense. Importantly, DoD is coordinating security-capacity-building efforts with our partners in the UK, Italy, Bulgaria, and Turkey, and ensuring that our programs complement the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) in Libya and other international activities to support Libya's security sector development efforts.

41. What is your assessment of the risks associated with the paramilitary forces that continue to have control of large swaths of Libya?

Paramilitary forces present significant risk to the Libyan government and the Libyan people. Building a government security force that is respected by Libya's people will be essential to Libya's future.

42. In your view, what role, if any, should DOD play in assisting the Libyans with addressing the threat to stability posed by paramilitary forces?

I believe that the Department of Defense's general purpose force (GPF) training and related efforts are intended to help Libya develop the security foundation necessary to protect government institutions and maintain order. DoD's border security and counterterrorism training and equipping programs are also aimed at building the Government of Libya's capacity to address its security challenges.

43. What do you view as the most significant challenges to the Libyan government in building capable and sustainable security institutions?

Qaddafi left Libya with deep deficits in government capacity. As a generation of Libyans

deprived of self-government takes on the challenges and responsibilities of renewing Libya's security sector, the United States will support their capacity- and capability-development goals through practical training and advice. If confirmed, I would support these efforts.

44. In what ways can the United States be most effective in assisting the Libyan government in building capable and sustainable security institutions?

If confirmed, I would continue to advance the U.S. effort to couple our training and equipping efforts with institution-building programs to facilitate the Libyan Ministry of Defense's ability to recruit, sustain, and retain trained general purpose force personnel.

Africa-related Security Matters

The new DoD strategic guidance, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," announced by President Obama on January 5, 2012, sets out the defense priorities for the 21st century and the key military missions for which DoD will prepare. The primary emphasis of the strategy relates to the Middle East and Asia. The strategy makes little reference to Africa and its myriad security challenges.

45. In light of the emphasis on areas outside of the African continent, if confirmed, how would you draw attention to the myriad security challenges confronting African nations?

If confirmed, I would support the Department's continued focus on disrupting and dismantling al Qaeda and its affiliates in the region while building the capacity of African security forces, defense institutions, and regional organizations to combat transnational threats and participate in peace operations. As part of these efforts, if confirmed, I would support the Department's efforts to instill within African militaries a commitment to operate under civilian authority, respect the rule of law and human rights, and support international peacekeeping operations.

U.S. Military Operations Against the Lord's Resistance Army

Despite pressure by the Ugandan People's Defense Forces (UPDF) and efforts by U.S. Special Operations personnel to support them, elements of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) – including Joseph Kony – continue to operate and commit atrocities against civilian populations. Some observers have identified operational concerns with this mission, including that: (1) supported forces are trying to find an elusive foe in an area roughly the size of California, much of which is covered in thick jungle; (2) technical support to U.S. forces and their UPDF partners from the defense and intelligence community continues to be inadequate; (3) limitations continue to be placed on the ability of U.S. Special Operations personnel to accompany UPDF partners outside of main basing locations, thereby limiting the level of direct support they can provide; and (4) logistics and operational enablers for U.S. forces.

46. In your view, what is the objective of Operation Observant Compass?

Operation Observant Compass (OOC) is one component of a wider U.S. strategy to counter the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). This strategy has four pillars: increasing the protection of civilians; apprehending or removing Joseph Kony and senior commanders from the battlefield; promoting the defection, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of remaining LRA fighters; and increasing humanitarian access and providing continued relief to affected communities. Under OOC, U.S. Special Operations Forces seek to enhance the capacity of local forces to end the threat posed by the LRA. I understand that U.S. military advisors work with African forces to strengthen information-sharing and synchronization, enhance operational planning, and increase overall operational effectiveness.

47. In your view, what is the appropriate level of priority to be accorded to efforts to counter the Lord's Resistance Army?

I understand that, as with all of the Department's efforts in Africa, OOC is a low-cost, small-footprint effort that leverages the capabilities of our African partners. This approach has yielded significant results to date. Two of the top five LRA leaders have been removed from the battlefield, and recent reports suggest that the Ugandan military also removed a third leader, Okot Odhiambo. Since OOC was launched, civilian deaths attributed to the LRA have decreased by 75%, and LRA abductions are down by 50%. Such statistics indicate that the current level of effort is making progress against the LRA while keeping our African partners appropriately in the lead.

48. If confirmed, will you work to review the four concerns outlined above and report back to the committee?

Yes.

Russia

49. What in your view are the major security issues in the U.S.-Russian relationship?

There are a number of areas where the United States and Russia cooperate, including strategic arms reductions, counter-terrorism, Afghanistan, preventing proliferation of dangerous technologies, military relations, and dissuading Iran from becoming a nuclear-armed nation. If confirmed, I would continue to engage Russian counterparts to try and find common ground and new areas of cooperation, such as the work we have done together to eliminate Syria's chemical weapons.

50. Where do you see U.S. and Russian security interests aligning and where are they diverging?

Although there are points of friction in many areas of our relationship, the United States and Russia have worked together effectively on issues such as the removal of the Syrian chemical weapons program, countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and Afghanistan. If confirmed, I would work with Russia to make progress on such areas where we share common interests and communicate effectively where we disagree.

51. In your view what policy steps should DOD take to improve relations with Russia? For instance, would you support increased military to military relations and exchanges with Russia?

My general view is that military-to-military exchanges are useful to increase channels of communication and mutual understanding. It is my understanding that DoD has a robust military-to-military work plan scheduled for this calendar year, with more than 60 events and a variety of quality activities such as military exercises, senior leader visits, and conferences. If confirmed, I would support our military-to-military cooperation agenda and support increasing our engagement for the benefit of both sides.

52. Would you support any joint development or other programs with Russia?

If confirmed, I would support joint development programs that would benefit the United States.

53. Would you support joint U.S.-Russian cooperation on missile defense as a way to send a signal to Iran against Iran's developing long-range missiles or having nuclear weapons?

If confirmed, I would support U.S.-Russian cooperation on missile defense. U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia cooperation on missile defense would signal to Iran that its development of missiles and pursuit of nuclear capabilities are reducing rather than enhancing Iranian security.

54. Do you support efforts mandated by the New START Treaty Resolution of Ratification to seek reductions in the stockpiles of Russian and U.S. tactical nuclear weapons?

Yes.

55. If so, what steps would you recommend for pursuing such reductions, if confirmed?

If confirmed, I would recommend that our focus for the next stage of arms control consist of bilateral efforts to increase transparency and pursue further reductions that would include all nuclear weapons – deployed and non-deployed, strategic and non-strategic. Consultation with Allies and partners will be essential to ensure that extended deterrence and assurance remain strong.

56. What role, if any, should the DOD play in responding to Russian attempts to exert influence over other countries on its border, including Ukraine, Georgia, and the Baltic countries?

DoD's role and potential response would depend on the particular situation and whether it involved a military dimension. For example, in the current crisis in Ukraine, DoD officials have urged their counterparts in Ukraine to stay out of the political struggle. The United States, of course, has a treaty alliance with each of the Baltic States. It seeks to maintain strong partnerships with other countries in the region, including Ukraine and Georgia.

57. In your view, does Russia want Iran to have a nuclear weapon?

No. Russia is a partner in the P5+1 process, which is working toward a long-term, comprehensive solution to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.

Iran

58. What is your assessment of the military and political threat posed by Iran?

If left uncontested, some of the policies and activities of the Iranian regime constitute a significant threat to the security of the United States and that of many U.S. friends and partners. This trend is particularly concerning with regard to Iran's advancement of its ballistic missile program. Iran's inventory of ballistic missiles, which is the largest in the region, is therefore a source of tremendous concern. Iran is the most active state-sponsor of terrorism in the world, with a proven track record of meddling in the internal affairs of countries in the region.

59. What is your assessment of U.S. policy with respect to Iran?

The Obama Administration's dual-track approach of combining smart diplomacy with economic and military pressure has resulted in a considerable sharpening of Iran's strategic choices. This policy has unified and mobilized the international community against Iran, resulting in Iran's regional and global isolation. It has imposed tremendous economic costs on Iran through robust and comprehensive sanctions. By keeping all options on the table, it has sent a powerful message to Iran that unless it changes course, its policies risk making it less, not more, secure. Ultimately, it is this comprehensive and focused policy that forced Iran to the negotiating table, where it agreed to the Joint Plan of Action. The sustained application of this policy, I believe, gives us the best chance of reaching a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. Meanwhile, I believe we should continue to hold Iran accountable for a host of destabilizing activities in the region and its deplorable human rights record.

60. In your view, what are the risks associated with reducing U.S. presence in the Middle East with respect to the threat posed by Iran?

In my view, a significant reduction in our military presence in the Middle East during negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program would negatively impact the effectiveness of our policy in relation to Iran and our credibility with regional partners. If confirmed, I would support the position of DoD to maintain a strong military posture in the Gulf region, made clear by Secretary Hagel in December at the Manama Dialogue.

61. In your view, what role should DOD play in countering Iran's support of international terrorism?

It is my view that the Department of Defense has a significant role to play in countering Iran's support for international terrorism through DoD's support to broader U.S. Government efforts. If confirmed, I would continue to work with interagency and international partners to ensure that Iran is held accountable for the full scope of its destabilizing activities in the region and beyond, as necessary.

Israel

With regard to our relationship with Israel, President Obama has stated: “Our military and intelligence cooperation has never been closer. Our joint exercises and training have never been more robust. Despite a tough budget environment, our security assistance has increased every year. We are investing in new capabilities. We’re providing Israel with more advanced technology – the type of products and systems that only go to our closest friends and allies. And make no mistake: we will do what it takes to preserve Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge – because Israel must always have the ability to defend itself, by itself, against any threat.”

62. Do you agree with President Obama’s position and views with regard to the U.S. security relationship with Israel?

Yes. Under the leadership of Secretary Hagel, the Department has worked to strengthen further this already historically strong U.S.-Israeli defense relationship. Key components include significant Foreign Military Financing and the approval to release advanced military capabilities to Israel, like the F-35 and the V-22 aircraft. If confirmed, I would ensure that DoD's already deep cooperation with Israel is continued and I would work to sustain our strong security relationship.

Post-Arab Uprising Military-to-Military Engagement

The past few years have brought great change to the Middle East and North Africa. These changes may require adjustments to our military-to-military engagement efforts throughout the region.

63. What is your understanding of U.S. military-to-military engagement in the Middle East and North Africa (e.g. Yemen, Tunisia, Egypt, and other countries in the region), and what changes – if any – would you advocate for in light of the Arab Uprising?

My understanding is that DoD cooperation with Middle East and North African partners is specifically tailored to partners' strategic interests and tactical needs while advancing U.S. strategic interests. In my view, during this time of continuing change and uncertainty in the region, DoD should sustain and improve military-to-military and defense civilian relations, while continuing to evaluate and re-calibrate the nature and substance of each of our engagements to ensure that they are consistent with U.S. values and advance U.S. national interests.

I also would stress the critical importance of reassuring partners that we will remain engaged in the region and committed to our joint strategic interests.

Syria

The civil war in Syria continues and President Assad's commitment to continuing his regime's ongoing operations appears unwavering despite international condemnation. To date, the United States has limited its support to opposition forces to non-lethal assistance to forces on the ground, as well as technical assistance to elements of the opposition working to build a cohesive political entity.

64. In your view, what is the proper role on the United States military in this conflict?

The President has been very clear that he will direct the use of military force when necessary to protect the United States and in furtherance of U.S. national security interests. In the case of Syria, the President has been clear that there is no military solution to the conflict. The Department continues to be involved in interagency discussions that examine possible military roles to support U.S. policy goals in Syria. If confirmed, I look forward to advising the Secretary and working with interagency partners on this matter.

65. In your view, should the United States provide support to opposition groups on the ground in Syria, including lethal support?

The United States should provide, and has been providing, a range of assistance to moderate elements of the Syrian opposition, both civilian and armed. This assistance is critical to building opposition capacity to meet essential needs, strengthen the effectiveness of the armed opposition on the ground, and counter the growing influence of extremist groups. We are providing nearly \$260 million in non-lethal support to the Syrian civilian opposition, including the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC), local activists, and the Supreme Military Council (SMC). This assistance includes the provision of equipment (e.g., ambulances, food, computers, communications equipment, and generators), small grants to local councils and Syrian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and associations on the ground, and support for media.

It is my understanding that since April 2013, DoD has delivered additional assistance directly to the SMC as well as the SOC. To date, DoD has provided more than 480,000 meals ready to eat (MREs) and 18 tons of medical supplies, as well as communications gear and vehicles. We seek to be responsive to the needs of the armed opposition and ensure that our assistance serves the military purposes of the SMC. We have provided this support in consultation with the SMC. And we continue to provide our support in consultation with and cooperation with other countries in the region, in an effort to build the effectiveness of the armed opposition.

We are constantly looking at what options are available to help resolve the crisis in Syria. We are focused on ways to help end the conflict, alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people, and mitigate the growing threat from extremists. If confirmed, I would continue OSD's efforts, in partnership with the Joint Staff, to examine the risks and opportunities related to the provision of lethal assistance to the moderate opposition and other military options for Syria to support the Administration's decision-making on this question.

66. In your view, would the removal of the Assad regime be a strategic defeat of Iran in the region?

Yes. Iran has an interest in the outcome of the conflict in Syria, and has invested resources in seeking to ensure that the Assad regime stays in power. Therefore, removal of the Assad regime would be a loss for Iran.

After the United States threatened the use of military force in response to Syria's use of chemical weapons against Syrian civilians in August of 2013, Syria agreed to an international plan to eliminate its chemical weapons program by the end of June 2014. Although Syria acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention and has eliminated its capacity to mix and fill chemical agents and munitions, it has failed to meet recent deadlines to transport its chemical agents and precursors to Latakia for removal and destruction.

67. Given Syria's apparent unwillingness to meet all its internationally mandated deadlines, what are your views on the prospects for eliminating Syria's chemical weapons program by June 30, 2014?

The U.S. Government and international community are concerned about Syria's lack of progress in meeting its obligations, and further delays will make meeting the June 30 deadline more challenging. We are working with key international partners to increase pressure on the Syria to fulfill its obligations in accordance with the agreed timeline.

68. What additional steps, if any, do you believe the Department of Defense could take as part of the international effort to ensure the successful elimination of Syria's chemical weapons program in 2014?

I understand that the Department is contributing capabilities critical to eliminating Syria's chemical weapons, and is postured to fulfill its role in the international effort as soon as Syria fulfills its obligations to remove the chemical materials from Syrian territory. If confirmed, I would work with my colleagues in the policy, operational, and technical communities, as well as with key international partners, to ensure the successful elimination of Syria's chemical weapons program.

Egypt

69. What is your assessment of the security situation in Egypt?

I know that the Department is concerned with the recent upswing in terrorist violence in the Sinai and around Cairo, and I understand that Secretary Hagel has personally offered assistance to help Egypt respond to and prevent future attacks. Despite the hold on delivery of some weapons systems, the Department continues to provide maintenance support for Apache helicopters used in counterterrorism operations. If confirmed, I would continue to support Egypt's counterterrorism efforts.

The Egyptian government's detainment and arrest of journalists, opposition group members, and the Muslim Brotherhood are also a significant concern. I understand that

the Department has continued to encourage the interim government to uphold the new constitution's rights and has raised U.S. concerns about this crackdown.

70. What is your assessment of the U.S.-Egypt security relationship?

The U.S. security relationship with Egypt provides us with important over-flight routes and facilitates Suez Canal transit access, helps us to ensure Israel's security, allows us to cooperate on combatting terrorist threats, and helps to maintain the security of our embassy and consulate. Egypt is an important regional actor, and our security relationship with Egypt helps us protect our interests in the region.

71. What is your assessment of the role Egypt plays with respect to regional stability?

Egypt has historically played an important role in promoting regional stability. By continuing to fulfill its obligations under its Peace Treaty with Israel, increasing its counterterrorism operations in the Sinai, providing security for both military and private vessels transiting the Suez Canal, and efforts to prevent illicit trafficking across its shared borders with Libya, Sudan, and Israel, Egypt makes significant contributions to regional security.

72. In your view, should the U.S. Government continue to provide defense articles and services purchased by the Egyptian military using U.S. Foreign Military Financing funds?

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) remains an important element of the U.S.-Egypt relationship. At the same time, we have serious concerns about the Egyptian government's actions, as described in my response to question 69, above. The delivery of some weapons systems remains on hold. In addition, the FY 2014 appropriations law restricts the use of FY 2014 FMF for Egypt unless certain certifications are made by the Secretary of State. If confirmed, I would support the Department's efforts to work with the Department of State on making the required assessments, and implementing these authorities.

Gulf Security Cooperation

The Administration has been working with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) governments to enhance regional cooperation and security against ballistic missile threats, particularly from Iran.

73. What is your view of the potential for missile defense cooperation within the GCC to enhance regional security, and how do you see this potential cooperation fitting into the United States missile defense and security efforts in the Middle East?

It is my understanding that U.S. missile defense cooperation with GCC nations, including their acquisition of advanced ballistic missile defense capabilities, is increasing. Such cooperation on defensive systems is beneficial to those countries as well to the United States and the region.

74. What role do you see for the sale to the United Arab Emirates of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot missile defense systems, and similar sales to other GCC partners, in regional security against Iranian missile threats?

It is my understanding that a number of GCC countries are considering acquiring ballistic missile defense capabilities. These systems would play an important role in countering Iranian missile threats.

Regional Ballistic Missile Threats and Response

Iran and North Korea each has hundreds of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles today that are capable of reaching forward-deployed U.S. forces, allies, and other friendly nations in the EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM AORs. The Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report of February 2010 stated that the United States intends to pursue regionally tailored phased adaptive approaches to ballistic missile defense against such missile threats in various regions.

75. Do you believe that such regionally tailored phased adaptive approaches will provide our regional combatant commanders with the missile defense capabilities needed to defend our forward deployed forces and our allies and partners in the region?

Yes, I believe that continuing to deploy U.S. and allied and partner missile defenses appropriate to each region can make a significant contribution to defending our deployed forces and our allies and partners from ballistic missiles.

76. What role do you see for the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system with Standard Missile-3 interceptors in U.S. missile defense capabilities in these AORs?

My understanding is that Aegis destroyers and cruisers with SM-3 interceptors are important capabilities that are in great demand for defending against ballistic missile threats in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

77. In addition to U.S. missile defense capabilities in these AORs, what role do you see for other nations to contribute to regional missile defense capabilities?

Given the large number of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles that can threaten NATO, the Middle East, and East Asia, the missile defense capabilities of Allies and partners in those regions are important both for their own defense and as a complement to U.S. ballistic missile defense capabilities.

China

China's defense spending has had double-digit increases annually for about the past 20 years. While a certain amount of military growth is to be expected for a country experiencing the kind of economic growth that China has had over about that same period, the types of platforms and capabilities China is developing have been interpreted by some as designed to project power, limit freedom of movement by potential adversaries, and conduct military operations at increasing distances. Such developments, coupled with

strident rhetoric and a lack of transparency, stoke growing concerns about China's intentions in the region.

78. How would you characterize the current U.S. relationship with China?

The relationship is both cooperative and competitive. Our policy is to manage the areas of competition while seeking to expand our cooperation in areas where our interests align, both in Asia and globally.

79. What do you believe are the objectives of China's steady increase in defense spending and its overall military modernization program?

As is set forth in an annual report to Congress on this subject, China is undertaking a long-term, comprehensive military modernization program designed to improving the capacity of its armed forces to fight and win high-intensity regional military operations of short duration (i.e., a Taiwan contingency). In addition, there are indications that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is developing capabilities beyond those required to address China's immediate territorial concerns.

80. How should the United States respond to this Chinese military growth and modernization?

I believe that the U.S. response to China's military modernization should be flexible and supported by the continued evolution of our force posture in the Asia-Pacific region, the maintenance of our global presence and access, the modernization of our own capabilities in such areas as countering anti-access and area denial capabilities, and the strengthening of our alliances and partnerships. The United States should continue to monitor developments in China's military modernization program while encouraging China to be more transparent about its military and security affairs. The United States has been and should remain the preeminent military power in the Asia-Pacific region.

81. What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-China military-to-military relations?

The trajectory of the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship is positive. If confirmed, I would look for ways to build on this positive momentum consistent with U.S. interests and values, always balancing increased engagement with China against increased engagement with Allies and partners across the region.

82. Do you believe that the United States should make any changes in the quality or quantity of our military relations with China? If so, what changes and why?

I believe that military exchanges with China can be valuable. These exchanges require that China be as committed as the United States is to sustained and substantive exchanges. If confirmed, I would support increasing military-to-military engagement with China while encouraging China to act responsibly, both regionally and globally.

By most accounts, China has become more assertive in its claims of sovereignty in various domains, including maritime, air, and space. There are numerous examples of this

assertiveness, but one in particular is China's increased aggressiveness in asserting its excessive maritime claims in the South China Sea.

83. What role should the United States play in the ongoing maritime disputes in the South China Sea?

Freedom of navigation and overflight, open access to Asia's maritime domain, the maintenance of peace and stability, free and open commerce, and respect for international law are key national security interests of the United States in the South China Sea. U.S. policy is that all parties should resolve their disputes through peaceful means and in accordance with international law, without resorting to the threat or use of force.

84. How does the presence of the U.S. Navy in the South China Sea influence this maritime dispute and, in your view, would an increase in U.S. activity in that region serve to stabilize or destabilize the situation?

I believe it is critical for the U.S. Navy to maintain a visible presence and assert its freedom of navigation and overflight in the East and South China Seas, in accordance with international law.

Cyber space has become a critical realm for civilian and military applications and, as a result, it represents a potentially substantial vulnerability. There are reports that China is aggressively pursuing cyber warfare capabilities, and would likely seek to take advantage of U.S. dependence on cyber space in the event of a potential conflict situation.

85. If confirmed, what would you do to help ensure our military is protected in cyber space and prepared to defend against a cyber attack

The protection of U.S. military networks from cyber attack is one of DoD's core missions, and if confirmed, I would work with DoD components and other departments and agencies throughout the U.S. Government to ensure a coordinated approach to cyber threats, not only from China, but from others as well. If confirmed, I would continue to support DoD's efforts to develop its cyber capabilities and cyber workforce, which are two of the most important enablers for defending DoD's networks. We must also work closely with the private sector and international partners to strengthen our overall cybersecurity and collective defense.

North Korea

86. What do you see as the implications for regional security and stability of North Korea's continued refusal to curb its provocative behavior?

The security situation on the Korean Peninsula is serious and requires constant vigilance. North Korea's December 2012 missile launch and February 2013 nuclear test demonstrate that it has the capabilities and the will to undermine regional stability.

North Korea's provocative behavior, large conventional military, pursuit of ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, and proliferation activities

continue to be serious concerns for the United States and our allies and partners in the region. The murky nature of the North Korean regime and the unpredictability of its leader, Kim Jong Un, add to our concerns.

If confirmed, I would ensure that our military deterrence of North Korean aggression continues to support our diplomatic efforts to end North Korea's nuclear and missile programs.

87. What is your understanding of the threats posed to the United States and our allies by North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD capabilities?

My understanding is that North Korea's missile programs are largely untested at longer ranges. However, they are a direct threat to U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific and to our Allies and partners in the region. Combined with North Korean proliferation activities, they pose a direct threat to U.S. territory. I take this threat very seriously, and if confirmed, I would ensure that DoD is prepared to defend against it.

88. What concerns you most about North Korea and, if confirmed, what would you do to address those concerns?

My top concerns regarding North Korea are the unpredictability of North Korea's leadership, its capabilities described in response to the previous question, its longstanding practice of provocations designed to draw parties to the negotiating table, and the upcoming spring military training cycle. If confirmed, I would work with our South Korean allies to ensure that we have the capabilities necessary to address the full range of possible North Korean aggression, including ballistic missile and WMD threats.

Republic of Korea

89. What is your understanding of the current status of the U. S.-South Korean security relationship?

The U.S.-Republic of Korea (RoK) alliance is very strong. Together we are making investments necessary to deter North Korean aggression and ensure security on the Korean peninsula. The President plans to visit the Republic of Korea in April, at which time he will reaffirm the strength of our partnership.

90. What is your view regarding the timing of the transfer of wartime operational control from the United States to South Korea, now planned for December 2015, and what will you do to ensure this transition takes place as planned?

If confirmed, I would support the continued assessment and review of the security situation on the Korean Peninsula in implementing Strategic Alliance 2015 (SA2015), of which the transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) is a part. OPCON transition has always been conditions-based. If confirmed, I will continue to support this approach.

91. What is your assessment of the security benefits of the force repositioning agreed to under the Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan Relocation Plan and how does repositioning U.S. forces change the way they will operate on the Korean Peninsula?

I am not familiar with the specifics of these plans and would need to be briefed on them before providing an assessment.

There have been a number of North Korean attacks against South Korea in the last few years including the sinking of the South Korea Navy ship CHEONAN, the artillery attack on the South Korean island, as well as the 2013 cyber attack against television stations and banks. South Korea has been adamant that it will respond “firmly” to the next such provocation.

92. What is your understanding of the U.S. obligations in the event of an attack on South Korea by North Korea, and under what circumstances do you believe the U.S. armed forces should be committed to engage North Korean forces in response to an attack on South Korea?

These obligations are set forth in the U.S.-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953, specifically Articles II and III.

93. Are you confident that the recent Counter-Provocation Plan provides a sufficient framework to de-escalate tensions on the peninsula if there are future attacks?

My understanding is that the Counter-Provocation Plan includes procedures for consultation and ensures a well-coordinated combined action in response to North Korean provocations and threats. It is also my understanding that U.S. Forces Korea and the RoK military closely consult to ensure the proper response and control escalation, and if confirmed, I would work to ensure those close consultations continue.

Japan

94. How would you characterize the U.S.-Japan security relationship?

The U.S.-Japan security relationship is very strong. It enables virtually all U.S. military activity in the Western Pacific, allowing peace, stability, and prosperity to flourish in the region for more than a half century. The President will visit Japan in April, at which time he will reaffirm the strength of our partnership.

95. What steps, if any, do you believe Japan ought to take to become a more active partner in security activities with the United States and in the international security arena?

I support any steps that Japan chooses to take to increase its contributions to the Alliance and to regional and global security. I believe the changes Japan is currently contemplating are a logical reflection of Japan’s role in the world.

The current plan is for the closure of the Marine Corps Air Station on Okinawa after the construction of a Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab on

Okinawa. While the Governor of Okinawa has signed the landfill permit to allow construction of the FRF to go forward, local opposition and a long construction timeline make the completion of the FRF uncertain.

96. What is your opinion of the prospects for the successful construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab on Okinawa?

I believe that Japan took a significant step towards enabling the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility last December with the signing of the landfill permit by the Governor of Okinawa. This concrete step forward will lead to the construction of airfield facilities at the current Marine Corps Camp Schwab. It is my understanding that many of the necessary relocations within Camp Schwab required for the landfill are already underway. By working closely with Japan, we have every confidence that this very significant forces realignment effort will be successfully completed.

97. Is the cost-sharing arrangement between the United States and Japan to pay for the relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam and the costs associated with the continued presence of U.S. forces in Japan equitable and appropriate? Why or why not?

Current cost sharing arrangements for relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam are both equitable and appropriate. Japan has made an unprecedented commitment to provide \$3.1B to fund U.S. military facilities on U.S. territory. This contribution helps us achieve our common goals of maintaining a strong U.S. military presence in the region while creating a U.S. military presence on Okinawa that is politically sustainable over the long term.

98. How, in your view, does building an unpopular new airfield on Okinawa, one that could take 7 to 10 years to finish at a cost of at least \$3.6 billion, serve to improve the U.S.-Japan relations in general and the U.S. military-Okinawa relations in particular?

My understanding is that since at least 1996, the United States and Japan have been in agreement on the need to relocate the existing Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma, around which a significant population had grown over the years. Since 1999, we have identified a site in the vicinity of Camp Schwab near the village of Henoko. This was confirmed most recently in the October 2013 2+2 Meeting Joint Statement. I believe that once this facility is completed and operational, the resulting benefit to the areas of Okinawa south of Kadena Air Base, where the vast majority of the Okinawa population resides, will be apparent to all.

99. Is Japan carrying a fair share of the burden of the cost of the U.S. presence in Japan under the current Special Measures Agreement?

My understanding is that Japan is meeting its obligations under the 2011 Special Measures Agreement (SMA). If confirmed, I will ensure that Japan continues to meet its obligations under the current and future SMAs.

India

100. What is your view of the current state of U.S.-India security relations?

I see the United States and India as committed to a long-term strategic partnership, based on common values, interests, and shared challenges. President Obama has referred to this relationship as one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century. The defense relationship is a vital and growing component of that relationship. My understanding is that defense cooperation has increased rapidly over the last decade since the signing of the 2005 New Framework Agreement on defense cooperation, and now includes a strong slate of high-level dialogues, personnel exchanges, exercises, and defense trade.

101. If confirmed, what specific priorities would you establish for this relationship?

If confirmed, I would continue to prioritize a number of lines of effort with India currently underway. I would work to build upon current military-to-military engagement, including exercises, which remain the most visible part of the defense relationship. I would focus on accelerating defense trade, seeking out new joint ventures, and pursuing opportunities for technology transfer, co-production, and co-development of defense systems under the aegis of the defense trade and technology initiative approved by President Obama and Prime Minister Singh in 2013. In addition, if confirmed, I would seek to further cooperation in such areas as maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) response and counterterrorism.

102. What is your assessment of the current relationship between India and Pakistan?

The relationship between India and Pakistan is marked by historic distrust. In recent years, the two governments have undertaken efforts to improve the relationship, with limited success. The U.S. Government is committed to constructive and durable relationships with both India and Pakistan. If confirmed, I would continue to encourage further confidence-building measures and senior-level engagements between India and Pakistan, and would encourage both countries to be transparent with each other on their activities in the region.

103. In your view, what impact has the ongoing tension between Pakistan and India had on the stability of Central and South Asia generally, and on the prospects for lasting security in Afghanistan?

The distrust between India and Pakistan does not promote regional stability, and that is also the case in Afghanistan. The United States believes that the bilateral relationship between India and Afghanistan is not a threat to Pakistan, nor is it directed against any other country in the region. It is vital for Afghanistan to develop constructive relationships with all countries in the region to achieve long-term regional stability. I support the Administration's view that we should continue to encourage all regional actors to be transparent with each other with respect to their bilateral relationships and cooperative activities.

104. What effect, if any, do you anticipate that India's successful test launch of the Agni V rocket on April 19, 2012, will have on India-U.S. relations?

In the two years since that test, we have not seen a major impact on U.S.-India relations.

Republic of the Philippines

105. What is the current state of U. S.-Philippine military-to-military relations, including efforts to increase the number of rotational U.S. forces operating from the Philippines?

My understanding is that DoD is in the process of modernizing the U.S.-Philippines alliance to position our two countries more effectively to address 21st century security challenges in the Asia-Pacific region. DoD supports the Armed Forces of the Philippines' (AFP) long-term modernization. I understand that DoD is also currently negotiating a new agreement to further enhance our defense cooperation and enable an increased rotational presence of U.S. forces.

106. Do you believe Operation Damayan was a successful disaster relief effort? What were the lessons learned from the operation? What are the needed areas of improvement for U.S. disaster relief operations and joint task force operations in this area?

The U.S. whole-of-government response to Super Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda was highly successful. In close cooperation with Philippine authorities, the United States was able to move responders and supplies rapidly into the affected area. I was pleased to see such close cooperation between DoD, the Department of State, USAID, Philippine authorities, and all of the other international and nongovernmental partners that came to the aid of those affected by this tragedy. I believe that the U.S. Government and international community are still discussing lessons learned, and I agree that it will be important to incorporate them into future disaster relief training, exercises, and preparedness. I would work to do so, if confirmed.

107. Do you anticipate a reduced or increased U. S. military footprint or change in mission for U. S. military forces in the Philippines in the near to mid-term?

My understanding is that there are two primary considerations that will determine future U.S. military missions and footprint in the Philippines. First, discussions between the United States and the Philippines on enhanced rotational presence of U.S. forces are ongoing. I cannot predict the outcome of those discussions. Second, I understand that DoD continues to assess requirements for the current counterterrorism mission in the southern Philippines as security in that region improves. If confirmed, I look forward to engaging on both of these issues as we chart the future of the alliance.

Indonesia

108. What is the current state of military-to-military relations with Indonesia and, specifically, Kopassus?

My understanding is that DoD considers Indonesia to be a strong defense partner and that the U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military relationship continues to improve after the years of restrictions ended in 2005. In my view, increased military-to-military engagement supports our ability to foster the continued reform and professionalization of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI). Current defense cooperation is focused on maritime security, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Bilateral defense trade is also growing.

With respect to Kopassus, I agree with the July 2010 decision by then-Secretary Gates to begin limited engagement. If confirmed, I would work with Congress to ensure that we help Indonesia continue to make progress on reform, human rights, and accountability issues.

109. Do you favor increased U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military contacts? If so, under what conditions? Why?

If confirmed, I would support increased military-to-military engagement with Indonesia. My understanding is that we have a strong bilateral defense relationship as well as many shared regional security interests, including maritime security, counter-terrorism, and cooperation within regional architectures. Indonesia is a key regional leader, including within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and will be an important partner in increasing multilateral defense cooperation in the region. I support continuing and building on our engagement consistent with required human rights vetting, and we will continue to encourage further defense reform efforts.

Colombia

Plan Colombia has enabled the Colombian government to make significant gains against the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and other paramilitary forces in Colombia, as well as enabled the government to secure many previously ungoverned areas. Since fiscal year 2000, the United States has provided more than \$7 billion to support Colombia's efforts to counter the threat of transnational criminal organizations and various terrorist groups.

110. What are your views regarding the current situation in Colombia focusing upon: (1) the current military and political situation in Colombia; (2) the ability of the Colombian military to control its territory; and (3) ongoing DoD programs?

Since the start of Plan Colombia, the Government of Colombia has made enormous strides, with substantial U.S. support, to improve its internal stability and citizen security. It has dramatically improved its capacity to secure the country against several threats, including insurgents (such as the FARC), paramilitaries, illegally armed groups, and drug trafficking organizations. Colombia's Ministry of Defense, with U.S. support, continues to apply pressure on organizations like the FARC, while also working to address citizen security and external defense issues.

Colombia has made progress in asserting better governmental control of its territory and maintaining consistent pressure on the FARC, and continues to work to consolidate those

gains. If confirmed, I would support the Department's efforts to encourage Colombia to maintain pressure on the FARC and other threats to internal stability.

I understand that DoD's security cooperation programs with Colombia have focused on training, equipping, and mentoring Colombians and also provide support to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance programs. Colombia has also partnered with the United States in Central America, an area of common security interest. I am confident that Colombia will continue to grow as a stable, interoperable partner in supporting security in the region, and if confirmed, I look forward to working with my Colombian counterparts to this end.

111. In your view, is the Colombian government capable of sustaining the last decade's gains during this economic downturn and the scheduled decline in U.S. security assistance?

Yes.

112. In light of budget conditions, do you believe continued U.S. security assistance to Colombia at the current levels is sustainable?

Given Colombia's substantial progress, described above in response to question 110, security assistance to Colombia has been on a downward glide path. Given budget realities, this trend will likely continue. I understand that the Department has made difficult decisions about where to focus our cooperation with Colombia, and has also highlighted some areas where continued U.S. support remains critical, such as institutional reform efforts.

113. In your view, what are the remaining U.S. supported programs that will need to be continued to "lock in" the progress that has been made?

It has been several years since I have been briefed on the details of our assistance programs in Colombia, so I would want to reserve judgment on this question until and if I am confirmed. Colombia's long-term stability and response to transnational interests is in our direct interest. As a general matter, well-designed and well-implemented programs that restore security, provide social services, promote justice and human rights, and encourage legitimate economic development in areas formerly under guerrilla and terrorist control are essential to helping Colombia secure the progress that has been made.

Central America and Mexico

During a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing in 2011, General Douglas Fraser – the Commander of SOUTHCOM – and Admiral Winnefeld – the former Commander of U.S. Northern Command – discussed the increasingly dangerous region between Colombia and Mexico, and the devastating impact transnational criminal organizations are having on the people and security in this region. The U.S. has increased its assistance in this region, but – to date – the Department of Defense has had only a small role.

114. What is your assessment of the threats posed by transnational criminal organizations in this region?

In the region between Colombia and Mexico, the Central American governments continue to struggle against the threat described in the question. Several Central American countries have nascent governmental institutions, making them susceptible to the corrupting influences of transnational criminal organizations.

115. What is your understanding and assessment of DoD's current activities in Mexico and Central America?

My understanding is that DoD's Mexico and Central America programs support host nation security efforts, as well as regional and hemispheric defense cooperation and coordination. DoD activities focus on professionalization, respect for human rights, and developing sustainable capabilities with regional armed forces. Within Central America, DoD's efforts are focused on building maritime capacity to curb illicit trafficking.

Additionally, DOD has the lead responsibility for the detection and monitoring of maritime and air illicit narcotic smuggling flow to Central and North America and manages those efforts through the Joint Interagency Task Force South, a component of U.S. Southern Command.

Cuba

116. What is your view of the need to review and, potentially, revise U. S. policies regarding Cuba?

The President's policy is to promote positive change in Cuba and the ability of the Cuban people freely to determine their future. The President's policy changes have allowed separated Cuban families to reunite and given Cuban citizens greater access to resources and information that allow them to establish greater independence from the state. We are open to a more constructive relationship with Cuba, consistent with our national interests, but that will be difficult to achieve while Cuba continues to hold in jail U.S. citizen Alan Gross and continues to detain, harass, and abuse its citizens for exercising their fundamental freedoms. Consistent with current policy, I support targeted bilateral engagements that advance U.S. national interests and the enactment of measures that help reduce the dependence of Cuban citizens on the state.

117. What is your opinion about the need for, and the pros and cons of, military-to-military contact with Cuba?

I understand that the U.S. military currently conducts regular military-to-military fence line talks at U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay with representatives of the Cuban Frontier Brigade in order to prevent misunderstandings on either side. The U.S. military also conducts an annual disaster-relief exercise with the Cuban military at Guantanamo Bay. I look forward to learning more about these engagements, if confirmed.

118. In your view, is Cuba currently supporting or sponsoring international terrorism?

As designated by the Secretary of State, Cuba remains on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism.

Building Partner Capacity

In the past few years, the Defense Department has requested and Congress has approved a number of temporary authorities to build the capacity of partner nations or provide security assistance. These include the “Section 1206” global train and equip authority, targeted authorities to build capacity in Yemen and East Africa, and the Global Security Contingency Fund.

119. In your view, what are the strategic objectives and priorities for the Department’s programs for building the capacity of partner nations?

In my view, the Department’s capacity building programs aim to develop partners’ defense and security institutions, and enable them to provide for their own security and contribute to regional and multilateral responses to threats and instability. Doing so reduces the burden on U.S. forces to respond to security threats outside the United States, and develops a group of partner countries that can effectively participate in coalition-based operations.

120. What improvements, if any, would you recommend, if confirmed, to the strategic direction, oversight, and management of the Department’s programs for building partner capacity to ensure that these programs are executed consistent with U.S. national security goals and objectives?

I have not yet had the opportunity to review the Department’s partner capacity building programs in detail. If confirmed, I would ensure that DoD assistance programs are appropriately managed and assessed for strategic effectiveness, are coordinated with interagency efforts, and adhere to the Defense Strategic Guidance.

121. What is your assessment of the implementation and effectiveness of the Department’s programs for building partner capacity in achieving U.S. national security goals and objectives?

I have not been involved in the implementation of the Department’s partner capacity building programs, but I understand the Department has undertaken in-depth assessments of their effectiveness. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing the Department’s close collaboration with the Department of State and the Congress on these programs.

122. In your view, what should be the role of the Department of Defense, vis-à-vis the State Department and other civilian departments and agencies, in efforts to build the capacity of foreign security forces?

The Department of Defense is an important member of the interagency group that considers, executes, and evaluates the U.S. Government approach to building partner capacity. If confirmed, I would seek to maintain strong relationships with DoD’s interagency partners, to ensure the Department’s efforts to strengthen foreign security forces fully contribute to regional foreign policy objectives.

Authority for Use of Military Force/Law of Armed Conflict

On September 18, 2001, Congress passed the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40), which provides that “the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.” This AUMF remains in effect and provides the legal authority for certain U.S. military actions.

- 123. What is your understanding of the role of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in interpreting the AUMF and in the application of the AUMF to military activities?**

My understanding is that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) is a principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on policy-related matters regarding the application of the AUMF to military activities.

- 124. In your view, does the Department of Defense have the legal authorities it needs to conduct military operations against entities responsible for 9/11 and against those who plan further attacks against the United States?**

Yes.

- 125. In your view, do existing authorities provide the U.S. military the flexibility it needs to respond to new and emerging terrorism threats?**

Yes.

- 126. Without the AUMF, would the U.S. military have the authority to use force, including deadly force against members of al Qaeda and associated forces? If so, under what circumstances?**

I believe that the President may, in certain circumstances, direct the use of military force without the express authorization of Congress, but I would defer to the General Counsel on the more detailed analysis of the circumstances under which he could do so.

- 127. What is the impact of the President’s Policy Guidance on Counterterrorism on the application of the AUMF with respect to counterterrorism operations?**

As far as I am aware, the Presidential Policy Guidance on Counterterrorism had no impact on the Department’s application of the AUMF with respect to counterterrorism operations.

- 128. In your view, would it be appropriate for the United States to use military force against terrorist groups that have not engaged in hostilities directly against the United States, but merely shown an intent to do so? If so, under what circumstances?**

My understanding is that any decision to use such force against a terrorist group showing an intent to engage in hostilities directly against the United States would be fully informed by analysis from the intelligence community; policy deliberation, and appropriate legal review.

Unmanned Systems

Over the last four years, the Administration has worked to establish a framework that governs our use of force against terrorists – insisting upon clear guidelines, oversight and accountability that is now codified in Presidential Policy Guidance the President signed on May 22, 2013. As a part of that effort, the President has indicated a preference that the U.S. military should carry out the use of force in active warzones, and beyond.

129. What are your views on whether the Department of Defense should assume greater responsibility for lethal strikes by remotely-piloted aircraft (drones)?

I support the view that the U.S. military is the part of government that should be responsible for using force against terrorist threats abroad.

130. What benefits or risks to national security would be implicated if the Department were to take the lead role in operating unmanned systems?

I believe that close cooperation between DoD and its interagency partners can address risks to our security, while providing the benefits of improved transparency with the Congress and the public and greater efficiency across our government.

Strategy Formulation and Contingency Planning

One of the purposes of Goldwater-Nichols was to increase military and civilian attention on the formulation of strategy and contingency planning. DOD Directive 5111.3 specifically assigns a major role to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for those important matters.

131. What is your view of the civilian role, as compared to the military role, in the formulation of strategy and contingency planning?

In my opinion, defense strategy and contingency plans must be anchored in national security principles established by the President. Civilian leaders play an important role in providing necessary guidance to shape military planning, and then have a role reviewing that planning. Working within the parameters outlined by the President and Secretary of Defense, military leaders provide their best military advice on how to achieve objectives.

132. In your opinion, does the civilian leadership currently have an appropriate level of oversight of strategy and contingency planning?

Having not served previously in the Department of Defense, I am not in a position to evaluate the level of civilian oversight of strategy and contingency planning. If confirmed, I intend to play an active role in supporting the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary

of Defense for Policy as they establish the strategic direction for the Defense Department and fulfill their statutory responsibilities.

133. What steps do you believe are necessary to ensure effective civilian control and oversight of strategy and contingency planning?

In my experience working with both civilian and military leaders of DoD, I believe it is important to have open discussions on both what we ask the military to achieve and the proposed military approaches to key security challenges. If confirmed, I intend to support the Secretary and Under Secretary fully in fostering such discussions.

Department of Defense Strategic Guidance

The Department of Defense (DOD) strategic guidance, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” announced by President Obama on January 5, 2012, sets out the defense priorities for the 21st century and the key military missions for which the DOD will prepare.

134. Do you agree with the defense priorities set out that guidance? What changes, if any, would you recommend to those defense priorities?

Yes. Any changes to this guidance should be reviewed in light of an evolving future security environment, as well as the realities of the changing fiscal environment.

The DOD strategic guidance includes a new emphasis on U.S. security interests and challenges in the Asia-Pacific region. Accordingly, the Department is taking steps to shape U.S. forces relative to the air and maritime demands of the Far East and deemphasizing readiness for prolonged or large-scale stability operations.

135. What is your understanding and assessment of the new strategic guidance’s shift of emphasis to the Asia-Pacific and away from large-scale stability operations, and the implications of this shift for shaping U.S. force structure?

The United States has strong and longstanding ties with countries in the Asia-Pacific region, where the United States has supported security and stability with our military presence and partnerships. The rebalance reflects an understanding of the growing importance of Asia to the world economy and our own security and prosperity. In terms of force structure changes to support the rebalance, I understand that DoD is building resiliency in its regional operating bases, enhancing capacity for long-range strike, and making investments in cyber and space capabilities. DoD also continues to invest in advanced capabilities for undersea operations and fifth-generation fighter aircraft.

I understand that U.S. ground forces will retain sufficient capacity to undertake limited counterinsurgency and stability operations, if required. DoD is also ensuring that it has the ability to mobilize and regenerate forces if a larger-scale stability operation becomes necessary in the future. Finally, the institutional elements of the ground forces are seeking to retain and refine the lessons learned and specialized capabilities that have been developed over the past ten years in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Combating Terrorism

- 136. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda and its associated forces to the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and Western interests more broadly?**

Al Qaeda and its associated forces continue to pose a persistent threat to the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and Western interests more broadly.

- 137. What do you believe is the terrorism threat from al Qaeda and affiliated groups in each of the Geographic Combatant Commands? And, of these threats, what do you consider the highest counterterrorism priorities?**

I believe the highest counterterrorism priorities remain in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. Core al Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents in Afghanistan and Pakistan remain a persistent and serious threat. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has proven its capability to initiate attacks against the United States, and is the most lethal al Qaeda affiliate. Al Qaeda's continued persistence in Iraq and Syria raises regional concerns.

In the USAFRICOM area of responsibility (AOR), al-Shabaab remains a threat to U.S. and Western interests in the Horn of Africa, and has staged high-profile attacks against Western targets in the region. My understanding is that there is no current, credible evidence that al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is a direct threat to the U.S. homeland. AQIM and its associates do, however, threaten U.S. persons and interests abroad, as well as those of our European Allies.

In the remaining Geographic Combatant Command areas of responsibility, I understand that the threat from al Qaeda is less pronounced. If confirmed, I would work with the intelligence community, the Department's interagency partners, and our foreign partners to disrupt and dismantle any emerging threats from al Qaeda in the regions.

- 138. What is your understanding of the Department's role in the U.S. strategy to combat terrorism?**

The Department of Defense supports the President's National Strategy for Counterterrorism principally by building partner capacity and, when appropriate, capturing or killing terrorists who pose a continuing, imminent threat to U.S. persons.

- 139. Are you aware of any nexus between non-state actors and criminal networks?**

Yes, it is my understanding that a strong nexus exists between illicit non-state actors and global criminal networks. In locations such as Colombia, Peru, Afghanistan, and the Sahel, there is plenty of evidence of instability fostered and funded by the convergence of criminal networks and terrorist organizations. These relationships pose threats to the national security of the United States and to our allies and partners.

- 140. Given your current knowledge of DOD's programs, do you believe resources are aligned in a manner consistent with these counterterrorism priorities?**

I understand the Department has appropriately aligned its counterterrorism resources with the priorities outlined in the National Strategy for Counterterrorism. If confirmed, I look forward to working on this issue in greater detail and ensuring we remain agile in our ability to address emerging threats.

Mass Atrocities Prevention

President Obama identified the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide as a core U.S. national security interest, as well as a core moral interest, in August 2011 under Presidential Study Directive 10.

- 141. Among interagency partners, what is DOD's role in addressing atrocity threats, and what tools does DOD have for preventing or responding to atrocities?**

As President Obama noted in April 2012, preventing and responding to atrocities is a core national security interest of the United States. I understand that the Department has played an active role in the efforts of the Atrocities Prevention Board and has worked to strengthen support to emerging atrocity situations. If confirmed, I would continue these efforts and ensure that the Department plays an active role in supporting the Atrocities Prevention Board.

Section 1208 Operations

Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375), as amended by subsequent legislation, authorizes the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism.

- 142. What is your assessment of the overall effectiveness of this authority?**

Although I understand that DoD Section 1208 programs are widely supported by both interagency partners in the field and our foreign partners, I would make it a priority – if confirmed – to ensure that the Department has objective measures for assessing the program's strategic effectiveness.

Department of Defense Counternarcotics Activities

On an annual basis, DOD's counternarcotics (CN) program expends more than \$1.0 billion to support U.S. CN operations, build the capacity of certain foreign governments around the globe, and analyze intelligence on CN-related matters.

- 143. What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD CN program?**

DoD is assigned the mission of lead U.S. agency for the detection and monitoring aerial and maritime drug traffic bound for the United States. It is my understanding that DoD provides militarily unique capabilities to support law enforcement organizations, both foreign and domestic, in their efforts to combat illicit drug trafficking. The revenues generated by illicit narcotics trafficking provide support for terrorists, insurgents, and other criminal groups that threaten U.S. national security interests. The Department's counternarcotics program serves as a cost-effective way to protect these interests.

144. What is your understanding of the Department's CN authorities?

It is my understanding that the Department's CN authorities allow DoD to provide critical enablers to law enforcement and partner nations' security forces to confront the threat posed by illicit narcotics trafficking, and terrorism. The use of these authorities often provides ancillary benefits to law enforcement efforts in other areas including addressing other forms of transnational organized crime. As the lead agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime drug traffic bound for the United States, the Department also has authority to assist our State, local, tribal, Federal, and international law enforcement partners. DoD CN authorities also support our Geographic Combatant Commanders' CN programs, covering regions in Central and South America as well as Afghanistan. CN authorities also allow for the provision of CN programs and activities through the National Guard Counterdrug Programs of 50 States and three Territories. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to preserve these authorities.

145. Should the United States reassess ongoing efforts to combat the trafficking of illegal narcotics in the Western Hemisphere given the increasing concerns of many of the nations in the Hemisphere about the lack of results from the decades old war on drugs?

In my view, DoD has played a key role in supporting U.S. and partner nation counternarcotics efforts that have made progress against cocaine use and distribution throughout the Western Hemisphere. According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy, DoD counternarcotics efforts helped reduce the amount of cocaine reaching the United States, which has contributed to declines in cocaine overdose deaths, positive workplace drug tests, retail drug purity, and cocaine seizures in the United States. Nevertheless, continued high levels of cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine trafficking, and the growing threat of synthetic drugs, continue to present a difficult challenge, and there is room for improvement. If confirmed, I would work to find better ways to disrupt the production and trafficking of illegal drugs, which in turn can contribute to reduced stability in affected countries.

Training and Equipping Foreign Security Forces

The FY 2014 defense appropriations act makes a number of changes to the prohibitions and vetting process required for training, equipping, or providing other assistance to foreign security forces that have committed gross violations of human rights.

146. What is your assessment of these changes and their possible effect on the

Department's ability to provide needed training, equipment, or other assistance, especially in countries such as Mexico, Afghanistan and Myanmar?

I strongly support the Leahy law, and I am aware that the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State strongly support it also. If confirmed, I would review the impact of FY 2014 changes to the Leahy law on DoD activities.

147. What concerns, if any, do you have regarding the changes to the law?

I do not have any concerns at this point with the changes to the Leahy law made in the FY 2014 Act.

148. Would it be beneficial to have an exception to the prohibitions on training and providing assistance to allow the Department to provide limited training on human rights, rule of law, the English language, and the law of armed conflict?

I am not aware that the Administration is recommending any changes to the Leahy law.

National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime

Transnational criminal organizations are having a debilitating impact on the ability of our foreign partners to govern their nations and provide opportunities for their people. Last July, President Obama released the first National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime. The Department of Defense is not a law enforcement agency, but it does bring unique enabling capabilities to our nation's Federal law enforcement agencies.

149. What role, if any, should the Department of Defense play in combatting transnational criminal organizations?

The President stated in his Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime that transnational organized crime is a threat to our national security. I agree with the Strategy's call for the U.S. Government to build, balance, and integrate the tools of national power to combat transnational organized crime and related threats. DoD has a supporting role to play in this effort. Although DoD does not, and should not, serve as the lead U.S. Government agency for transnational organized crime, it is my view that DoD should continue to provide unique support to U.S. law enforcement and foreign partners in our common efforts against transnational organized crime.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is currently pending in the Senate.

150. What are your views on U.S. accession to UNCLOS?

I support U.S. accession the Law of the Sea Convention. The United States has a significant interest in promoting a rules-based international order, including the international law of the sea. Dating back to the Nixon Administration, the United States

played a substantial role in drafting and negotiating the Law of the Sea Convention and its 1994 Implementing Agreement. The Convention effectively preserves our interests as both a coastal nation and a maritime nation.

151. From a national security standpoint, what do you see as the advantages and disadvantages to being a party to UNCLOS?

The Convention advances the interests of the United States as a global maritime power. Specifically, the Convention codifies the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea, including rights of innocent passage in the territorial sea, transit passage in straits used for international navigation, archipelagic sea lanes passage, and the traditional freedoms of navigation and overflight beyond the territorial seas of any coastal State. I am unaware of any disadvantages of the United States joining the Convention.

152. What is your understanding of the principal arguments against ratifying UNCLOS, and what is your response to those arguments?

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee twice approved the Convention during the last decade, in 2004 and in 2007. The arguments against the Convention, and the responses to those arguments, are fully developed in the reports of the Committee. I agree with the arguments set forth by the majority of members who twice approved the Convention, which are reflected in those reports, specifically S. Exec. Rept. 108-10 (2004) and S. Exec. Rept. 110-9 (2007).

Cyberspace

153. What is your understanding of the role of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the development of policy and strategy for military operations in cyberspace and in exercising oversight of U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency?

My understanding is that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)) plays an important role in providing senior-level civilian oversight of U.S. Cyber Command, working closely with U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Cyber Command on cyberspace strategy and policy, contingency planning, and policy oversight of cyberspace operations. In accordance with the NDAA for FY 2014, OUSD(P) will work closely with the Secretary's principal cyber advisor. Finally, OUSD(P) works closely with and supports the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence in its role overseeing NSA.

154. In the cyberspace domain, for each of the mission areas of cyber network defense, cyber network exploitation, and cyber network attack, what is your understanding of the relationship between the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and each of the following: the Chief Information Officer; the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence?

My understanding is that, to defend DoD networks, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Chief Information Officer frequently work together to support

initiatives such as the Joint Information Environment that improve the resiliency of DoD networks. OUSD(P) also works closely with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (OUSD(AT&L)), in particular through the Cyber Investment Board, which addresses resource allocation issues across the cyber mission areas. OUSD(P) has a strong relationship with the Office of the Under Secretary for Intelligence (OUSD(I)) because of the nexus between intelligence and cyber operations, which also support activities across the cyber mission areas.

155. What is your assessment of the maturity and adequacy of policy and doctrine governing defensive, offensive, and intelligence-gathering operations in cyberspace, both within the Department of Defense and the interagency? What gaps or deficiencies remain, in your view?

My understanding is that DoD continues to refine doctrine, policies, and organizational relationships to enable USCYBERCOM to execute its missions in cyberspace. In particular, USCYBERCOM continues to refine its concepts of operations and employment, command and control structure, and training and readiness standards. These efforts represent a significant maturation of the policy and doctrine that govern cyberspace operations. DoD also supports the newly released framework developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to improve the defenses of critical infrastructure upon which the Department depends.

156. What is your assessment of the appropriate roles and responsibilities of the Department of Defense, vis-à-vis other government agencies (such as the Department of Homeland Security, the Intelligence Community, and the Justice Department) and the private sector in preparing for, and the conduct of, the defense of government and critical infrastructure networks in cyberspace?

DoD is responsible for defending the Nation against attacks in all domains, including cyberspace. When directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, DoD conducts cyberspace operations to enable military operations, to operate and defend military systems, and to secure DoD critical infrastructure. If and when directed, DoD provides support to State and local governments and to the private sector. Departments and agencies across the Federal government coordinate with the private sector to develop cybersecurity solutions and to mitigate risks and vulnerabilities.

It is my understanding that DHS has the primary responsibility for coordinating domestic cyber incident prevention, protection, mitigation, and recovery. In addition, DHS is responsible for securing unclassified Federal civilian networks and systems. DoD and the Department of Justice (DoJ) provide technical support to DHS as it carries out these missions. DoJ investigates, attributes, disrupts, and prosecutes cybercrimes outside of military jurisdiction. The Intelligence Community provides cyber threat information to agencies of the U.S. Government as they carry out their missions.

Illicit Arms Trafficking

157. What is your understanding of the problem of illicit arms trafficking and the role of the United States to deal with the problem?

The trafficking of illicit arms is a serious, worldwide problem. Because of the United States' experience in this area and our strong and well-developed arms export control system, we can be a leader in engaging partner countries on ways to combat illicit arms trafficking more effectively.

158. In your view, to what extent, if at all, does the lack of national controls and enforcement on arms flows contribute to the illicit trafficking problem, and could efforts to respond to illicit trafficking be improved if other countries adopted and enforced national regulations on arms import, export, and transit similar to those of the United States?

Where illicit trafficking is pervasive, partner countries should improve their arms transfer processes. If confirmed, I would encourage other countries to improve the standards of their controls, to make them closer to those of the United States, so that the international trafficking of illicit arms would become much more difficult.

159. Do you think the arms trade treaty would enhance U.S. national security interests?

Yes. The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) would help to establish higher international standards for the transfer of arms that are based on the standards that apply in the United States, thus making it much more difficult for terrorists or other illicit actors to obtain them. It is in the interest of U.S. national security to have fewer weapons in the hands of illicit actors.

Arms Control

160. What role do you see for arms control as a means of improving U.S. national security?

Arms control can contribute to U.S. national security by providing predictability and stabilizing the strategic or military balance between the United States and other nations at lower levels of weapons, including strategic nuclear forces. I believe such agreements, and their attendant verification provisions, make the United States safer and more secure, as they provide mutual transparency and predictability regarding military forces.

161. What are your views on the possible next steps to address nuclear weapons issues between the United States and Russia?

The President determined after a review of our nuclear strategy that we can ensure the security of the United States and our allies and partners and maintain a strong and credible nuclear deterrent while safely pursuing up to a one-third reduction in deployed nuclear weapons below the limits established in the New START Treaty. The Administration is seeking to pursue such reductions through negotiations with the

Russian Federation. The United States has made clear our interest in seeking reductions in all categories of nuclear weapons, including non-strategic nuclear weapons.

162. What conditions, if any, do you believe need to be met to further reduce strategic and tactical nuclear stockpiles through arms control?

We require a willing partner, but to date, Russia has not shown interest in pursuing such discussions. The Administration will continue to engage with Russia to gauge interest in pursuing opportunities for arms control relating to both strategic and non-strategic nuclear stockpiles.

163. What might be the risks and benefits of pursuing reductions below New START force levels?

Further reductions in the nuclear forces of Russia and the United States offer a number of benefits, including reducing the number of nuclear weapons that can be targeted against the United States and promoting our nuclear non-proliferation objectives. Reducing nuclear forces also benefits the United States by permitting us to maintain strategic stability and predictability at lower force levels. Such a posture, supported by modernization programs to maintain the credibility of our deterrent force, will provide the United States sufficient forces to deter or respond to 21st century threats.

Ballistic Missile Defense

In February 2010, the Defense Department issued its report on the first-ever comprehensive review of U.S. ballistic missile defense policy and strategy, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), as required by Congress. The BMDR established a number of policy priorities, including establishing defense against near-term regional missile threats as a top priority of missile defense plans, programs and capabilities. It also stated the policy of sustaining and enhancing the ability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system to defend the homeland against attack by a small number of long-range missiles by countries such as North Korea and Iran, and of hedging against future uncertainties.

164. Do you support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review?

Yes.

165. Do you agree that our missile defense must be fiscally sustainable?

Yes, we have an obligation to invest in effective, affordable missile defense systems. If confirmed, I would continue to implement DoD's commitment to deploying capabilities that have been proven through testing and assessment and that are affordable over the long term.

In September 2009, President Obama announced that he had accepted the unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to pursue a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to missile defense in Europe. This approach is

intended to defend all of Europe against existing and emerging threats from Iranian missiles, increasing in capability with each of its four phases. Phase 4 of the European PAA is intended to provide a capability to defend against potential future long-range missiles from Iran that could reach the United States, thus augmenting the existing homeland missile defense capability.

166. Do you support the PAA to Missile Defense in Europe and, if confirmed, will you implement it?

Yes, I support the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and the plans for it that Secretary Hagel announced on March 15, 2013. If confirmed, I would continue to implement those plans.

167. Do you agree that any ballistic missile defense systems that we deploy operationally must be operationally effective, suitable, survivable, cost-effective, affordable, and should address a credible threat?

Yes.

168. Do you agree that ballistic missile defense testing needs to be operationally realistic, and should include Operational Test and Evaluation, in order to assess operational capabilities and limitations of ballistic missile defense systems, prior to deploying such systems?

Yes.

The United States and NATO are seeking options to cooperate with Russia on missile defense, including the possibility of sharing radar and early warning data. President Obama has announced that such cooperation would not limit U.S. or NATO missile defense capabilities.

169. Do you agree that such cooperation could enhance the security of the United States, NATO, and Russia against common missile threats from Iran, and could send a powerful signal to Iran that could help persuade Iran not to pursue long-range missiles or nuclear weapons?

Yes. U.S./NATO cooperation with Russia on missile defense has the potential to improve our mutual security against the threat of Iranian ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons and would send a strong signal to Iran of our common resolve.

170. Do you agree that, notwithstanding Russian concerns, the United States is committed to the continued development and deployment of U.S. missile defense systems, including qualitative and quantitative improvements to such systems, needed to meet our security needs?

Yes. I believe that the proliferation of ballistic missiles is a real and growing threat to the United States, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners. If confirmed, I would work to improve our missile defense forces to meet our national security needs.

National Security Space Policy

- 171. What role, if any, do you believe the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should play in the establishment of a national security space policy?**

The role of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is to support the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in carrying out the responsibilities of overseeing implementation of existing national security space policy in coordination with other agencies and with Congress. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary also supports the Under Secretary in carrying out responsibilities for overseeing development of new policy when circumstances warrant.

Special Operations Forces

The previous two Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) have mandated significant growth in our special operations forces and enablers that directly support their operations.

- 172. Do you believe QDR-directed growth in the size of special operations forces can and should be maintained in light of current fiscal challenges?**

I understand that Special Operations Forces (SOF) are a highly efficient and effective capability that the Department intends to preserve. If confirmed, I would work with the Service Chiefs, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)), and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to ensure the SOF community is appropriately sized to meet the full range of missions assigned globally.

Special operations forces heavily rely on enabling capabilities provided by the general purpose forces to be successful in their missions.

- 173. In light of current fiscal challenges, do you believe sufficient enabling capabilities can be maintained within the general purpose forces and that such capabilities will remain available to special operations forces when needed?**

If confirmed, I would work closely with the Service Chiefs, the ASD(SO/LIC), and the Commander, USSOCOM to ensure the Department is appropriately structured and resourced to make enablers available to both SOF and the general purpose forces.

- 174. Do you believe special operations forces should develop additional organic enabling capabilities in addition or in place of those currently provided by the general purpose forces?**

If confirmed, I would work with the ASD (SO/LIC) and the Commander, USSOCOM to examine this issue.

The Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has sought more control over the deployment and utilization of special operations forces. For example, the Secretary of Defense modified policy guidance for the combatant commands

earlier this year that gave USSOCOM, for the first time, responsibility for resourcing, organizing, and providing guidance to the Theater Special Operations Commands of the Geographic Combatant Commanders and special operations forces assigned to them. It has been reported that the Commander of USSOCOM is also seeking new authorities that would allow him to more rapidly move special operations forces between Geographic Combatant Commands.

- 175. Please provide your assessment of whether such changes are appropriate and can be made without conflicting with civilian control of the military, infringing upon authorities provided to the Geographic Combatant Commanders, or raising concerns with the State Department.**

I understand that USSOCOM resources deployments of SOF personnel to the Geographic Combatant Commands, but that the Geographic Combatant Commanders continue to exercise operational control over those deployed forces. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Department of State and other relevant interagency partners to understand the contours of this issue more fully.

- 176. Do you believe USSOCOM is appropriately resourced to adequately support the Theater Special Operations Commands and special operations forces assigned to them?**

If confirmed, I would work with ASD(SO/LIC) and the Commander, USSOCOM to understand more fully the resourcing issues associated with the Theater Special Operations Commands and their assigned forces.

Interagency Collaboration

The collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces, general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and agencies has played a significant role in the success of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in recent years. However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature.

- 177. What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere?**

The lessons learned on interagency efforts over the past decade have led to well-informed, transparent, constant communication and collaboration at multiple levels. If confirmed, I would work to ensure we continue operating under a common strategic framework and build long-lasting, multi-departmental relationships with our interagency partners.

- 178. How do you believe these efforts can be improved?**

I strongly support a whole-of-government approach to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. If confirmed, I would work to maintain and expand the capacities and institutions that have supported successful, collaborative interagency efforts over the course of the past decade.

- 179. If confirmed, what would be your role in encouraging greater interagency collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces, general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and agencies?**

I believe that interagency collaboration is the most important contributing factor to many SOF achievements. If confirmed, I would work with the ASD(SO/LIC) and the Commander, USSOCOM to help them oversee, maintain, and build upon the important relationships developed over the past decade.

Multilateral Peacekeeping Operations

In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (July 29, 2009), Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, stated that the United States “is willing to consider directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers, civilian police, and other civilian personnel—including more women I should note—to U.N. peacekeeping operations.”

- 180. What is your view on whether the United States should contribute additional military personnel to both staff positions and military observers in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations?**

If confirmed, I would support additional contributions of U.S. military personnel to staff officer positions, provided that they are positions that would add significant value to the mission, and that the mission is a strategic priority for the United States.

Support for international peacekeeping remains an important security objective for the U.S. Government, and the United States has a stake in the success of UN peacekeeping operations. I believe that, where practical, the United States should continue to provide military personnel for UN peacekeeping operations, especially for key staff positions that can help shape the direction and success of the mission. If confirmed, I would carefully evaluate any proposals to contribute military or civilian personnel to a UN peacekeeping operation, weighing the potential positive impact of U.S. participation in the mission against other military commitments we have around the globe, and the estimated cost of U.S. involvement.

- 181. What are the advantages and disadvantages of contributing additional military personnel to U.N. operations?**

Contributing additional military personnel to UN missions can provide the opportunity to shape UN missions and enhance mission success. Successful UN peacekeeping operations are in the core national security interest of the United States, as they generally are cost effective, reduce the burden on U.S. forces, and in many cases directly advance U.S. security interests. Additionally, the Department gains real-time information and insights on emerging threats and crises from places where there might not otherwise be a U.S. presence. We must be mindful, however, of the additional demands these assignments could impose on the Department.

Detainee Treatment Policy

- 182. Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?**

Yes.

- 183. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?**

Yes.

- 184. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field Manual on Interrogations?**

Yes.

- 185. Do you share the view that standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen or Marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?**

Yes.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

- 186. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?**

Yes.

- 187. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?**

Yes.

188. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.

189. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.