

Senate Armed Services Committee
Advance Policy Questions for Roger Mason
Nominee to be Director, National Reconnaissance Office

Duties/Responsibilities

The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) was established as a Department of Defense (DOD) and Intelligence Community (IC) joint effort to develop, launch, and operate signals, imagery, and communications satellites to enable its mission partners to produce intelligence products for the military, Congress, and the Executive Branch, and it is a Department of Defense agency under section 424 of title 10 United States Code.

1. What is your understanding of the specific duties and responsibilities of the Director of the NRO?

The Director, NRO (DNRO) is responsible for executing NRO missions and activities as a Defense Agency that is a member of the Intelligence Community. In this capacity, the DNRO is responsible for the management and operations of the NRO and serves as the principal advisor on overhead reconnaissance to the Secretary of War (SecWar), Director of National Intelligence (DNI), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commanders, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Department of War (DoW) Executive Agent for Space on all overhead reconnaissance matters. The DNRO is responsible for the strategic, top-level management of NRO's core responsibilities to develop technology, acquire systems, launch space assets, and operate the overhead reconnaissance constellations in an integrated architecture that includes ground-based processing facilities, communication ground stations, and classified information technology (IT) network systems.

The DNRO is responsible for management and development of the combined NRO workforce in conjunction with military and United States Government (USG) personnel providers. The DNRO develops and executes the NRO budget within the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and Military Intelligence Program (MIP). In acquisition, the DNRO serves as the Senior Acquisition Executive for the NRO, oversees the acquisition programs and ensures quality deliverables, timely completion, and affordability within budgets. Operationally, the DNRO is responsible for monitoring the operational status of all satellites, data processing facilities, and communications nodes to ensure the capabilities are mission capable. This includes managing the physical facilities and digital assets required to execute space, ground, and cyber operations with the appropriate security and safety.

2. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualify you to perform these vitally important duties and responsibilities?

My aerospace, defense, and intelligence industry experience substantially included all phases of NRO's mission, most functions that the NRO provides, and all intelligence

domains in which the NRO executes its mission. My experience ranges from field operations to the c-suite to the boardroom at companies small and large, new, and traditional.

The sum of this experience puts me in a unique position that, if confirmed, would enable me to lead the NRO with a strong ability to understand and shape industry behavior for the benefit of the mission. If confirmed, my understanding of how industry makes key decisions and what is important to these companies will help place the NRO in a stronger position to leverage the best industry has to offer government. Industry faces decisions that include how to make investment decisions; drive performance; correct problematic programs; manage manufacturing lines; allocate personnel across program needs; position within public markets, private equity, or venture capital; respond to demand slow-downs, government shutdowns, and continuing resolutions; and apply the best contract type to achieve the desired organizational outcome. These and other decisions affect industry's relationship with the government.

Simply put, my diverse industry experience is a unique strength, that combined with prior government service, will help me best apply my leadership skills and experience to the benefit of the NRO.

3. Do you believe there are any actions that you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of the Director of the NRO? Please explain your answer.

Yes. While my past government and industry experience provides a strong foundation, the threats to our nation and the technologies available to the NRO are constantly evolving. If confirmed, my first action will be to receive in-depth briefings on the NRO's current relationships, partnerships, programs, and operational posture. Understanding the specifics of ongoing challenges and opportunities directly from the experts within the NRO is critical to ensuring my leadership is informed and effective from day one. I would also seek to quickly engage with the NRO's key partners across DoW and the IC to understand their needs and perspectives.

4. What is your understanding of the unique role of the NRO within the IC?

As a DoW agency that is a member of the IC, the NRO operates as part of an integrated community that provides collection responsive to information needs from the strategic to the tactical. The NRO mission is to develop, acquire, launch, and operate space-based overhead intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance systems and associated ground command and control, mission management, processing, and communications segments. The NRO partners across the DoW, IC, and other space organizations, such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), United States Space Force (USSF), U.S. Space Command, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Working closely with IC mission partners, the NRO provides policy makers, analysts, and

others timely access to high-value intelligence data used to produce intelligence products for the President, Congress, national policy makers, and warfighters. The NRO also takes its tasking directly from the NSA and NGA, as functional managers for signals intelligence and geospatial intelligence, respectively.

IC partners rely on NRO's expertise in acquisition management to accelerate capabilities across the national security enterprise to put more tools and information in the hands of analysts and warfighters faster than ever before.

5. What is your understanding of the unique role of the NRO within the Defense enterprise?

Within the Defense enterprise, the NRO was specifically created to develop, launch, and operate America's space-based intelligence constellations. Its unique role is to provide the overhead intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance capabilities that inform military decision-making and enable sensor-to-shooter kill-chains. The NRO functions as a force multiplier for the warfighter, providing timely access to high-value intelligence data essential for planning and operations. Furthermore, DoW partners rely on the NRO's world-class expertise in acquisition management to accelerate the development and fielding of advanced space capabilities across the entire national security enterprise.

6. In light of the lines of effort set forth in the 2026 National Defense Strategy, what other duties and responsibilities do you anticipate will be assigned to you, if confirmed?

If confirmed, I anticipate my duties will focus on directly aligning NRO capabilities with the four lines of effort in the 2026 National Defense Strategy. To support homeland defense, I will prioritize optimizing NRO's overhead architecture for persistent early warning while hardening NRO's ground and cyber systems against advanced threats. To deter China through strength, I will accelerate NRO's transition to the next generation space architecture that integrates highly resilient proliferated and exquisite capabilities, thus ensuring the availability of survivable intelligence and targeting data, all at mission speed. Additionally, to facilitate greater allied burden-sharing, I will focus on expanding partnerships with traditional and non-traditional partners. Finally, to supercharge the defense industrial base, I will champion agile acquisition and expand partnerships with commercial and non-traditional industry suppliers to foster a resilient and innovative space industrial enterprise.

Major Challenges and Opportunities

7. If confirmed, what is your vision for the NRO of today? For the NRO of the future?

If confirmed, my priorities will focus on elevating NRO's strengths and emphasizing three major areas: (1) Accelerate the next generation space architecture that combines

proliferated and exquisite capabilities to produce integrated intelligence data at mission speed; (2) Enable NRO to push the leading edge of space technology and innovate faster; and (3) Ensure enterprise-wide resilience from space vehicles to the ground and everything that connects the agency.

8. What do you consider to be the most significant challenges you will face if confirmed as the Director of the NRO?

The single, largest challenge is the transformation of space from a benign sanctuary into a highly contested warfighting domain. China and Russia are rapidly fielding a spectrum of kinetic and non-kinetic counter-space capabilities explicitly designed to deter, delay, degrade, or destroy U.S. space-based intelligence architectures. This contested environment drives a host of new requirements that NRO systems must now account for. The challenge is compounded by the fact that the NRO cannot afford to slow down. We must constantly pursue technological and strategic advantages to stay ahead of these threats.

9. What plans do you have for addressing each of these challenges, if confirmed?

My plan is to ensure the NRO continues its exceptional performance in pivoting its enterprise to address the reality of a highly contested space domain. The NRO must continue the aggressive resource allocation toward a next generation architecture of survivable, proliferated, and exquisite capabilities. NRO can make its intelligence architecture inherently more resilient, persistent, and exponentially harder for adversaries to blind or destroy by distributing NRO capabilities across a vast network of smaller systems and heavily integrating commercial partnerships. If confirmed, ensuring enterprise resilience, including all space and ground components, will be one of my highest priorities.

10. Given the major challenges you identified above, what other priorities would you set for your tenure as the Director of the NRO, if confirmed? Please explain your answer.

If confirmed, beyond addressing the contested nature of space, my priorities as DNRO would center on enterprise resiliency, workforce development, and strengthening mission partnerships. First, I would prioritize comprehensive enterprise resiliency and survivability from space to ground against all threats, including threats such as cyber-security and supply chain risks. I do not view survivability as a trade-off with other capabilities, but rather as a fundamental element of the design for every space and ground system. Second, retaining, developing, and attracting new talent to maintain NRO's technical edge will be one of my top priorities because the NRO workforce is essential to NRO's success. Finally, I will prioritize enhancing collaboration with industry and NRO's mission partners. This includes strengthening ties with private industry to better leverage rapid commercial innovation, deepening integration with IC and DoW partners, and deepening partnerships with allies to ensure a unified and highly effective national security space enterprise.

11. If confirmed, what actions would you take to focus NRO efforts on each of these priorities?

I would take immediate, targeted actions across resiliency, workforce development, and partnerships to focus NRO efforts on these priorities. For resiliency, I will pursue an acceleration of NRO's transition to a proliferated and highly resilient architecture that integrates both commercial and exquisite systems to ensure intelligence delivery remains persistent and robust in contested environments. To support workforce development, I will commit to wielding every available policy lever—such as STEM pay, robust internship programs, fair and rewarding promotion pathways, and career-broadening opportunities—to support existing NRO personnel and recruit new technical talent. Finally, to expand partnerships, I will pursue contracting mechanisms to scale NRO's commercial relationships across all phenomenologies, while personally engaging with the leadership of the NGA, NSA, USSF, and other critical partners to help identify and resolve operational gaps, ensuring NRO's efforts are fully aligned with the NGA's, NSA's, and USSF's mission requirements.

Relationships

The law and traditional practice establish important relationships between the Director, NRO, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence and other senior officials of the DOD, the IC and the U.S. Government. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Director, NRO to each of the following:

12. The Secretary of Defense

The DNRO is responsible for implementing the Secretary's priorities and requirements. As DNRO, I would keep the Secretary fully informed of the NRO's efforts to develop, acquire, launch, and operate the overhead reconnaissance systems that provide critical intelligence to our warfighters and support the Department's priorities.

13. The Director of National Intelligence

The DNRO is responsible for implementing the DNI's priorities and requirements. As DNRO, I would keep the DNI fully informed of operational status, programmatic progress, and key decisions. This can be achieved through tailored weekly activity reports, informal discussions and emails on hot topics, and immersion visits on key capabilities / topics, in addition to participation in routine DNI-led meetings.

14. The Director, Central Intelligence Agency

The CIA is a key mission partner. I would ensure the Director of the CIA is aware of how NRO's capabilities can support the CIA's mission and would seek CIA's input to ensure NRO systems meet CIA's intelligence requirements. A close, collaborative relationship is essential for mission success.

15. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security

I would work closely with the Under Secretary of War for Intelligence and Security to ensure the NRO's intelligence activities are aligned with DoW-wide policies and priorities and that NRO's overhead reconnaissance capabilities are effectively integrated into the broader defense intelligence enterprise.

16. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment

As the Senior Acquisition Executive for the NRO, I would maintain a close relationship with the Under Secretary of War for Acquisition and Sustainment. I would ensure NRO acquisition processes are robust and that we are leveraging best practices to deliver cutting-edge capabilities on time and on budget, in alignment with departmental guidance.

17. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering

The NRO's mission is to push the boundaries of technology. I would partner with the Under Secretary of War for Research and Engineering to ensure the NRO is aligned with the Department's top R&D priorities and that we are leveraging the best of the national technology base to invent, prototype, and field capabilities that do not yet exist.

18. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

I would serve as the principal advisor to the Chairman and Vice Chairman on all overhead reconnaissance matters, ensuring they both have a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of NRO systems and how they can best be employed to support the joint force.

19. The Secretary of the Air Force

I would advise the Secretary of the Air Force on all overhead reconnaissance matters, maintaining the strong, historical partnership between the NRO and the Air Force to ensure their efforts are synchronized.

20. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force

Building on the long legacy of partnership between the NRO and the Air Force, I would collaborate with the Chief of Staff to ensure these respective organizations are aligned to meet the nation's security needs.

21. The Under Secretary of the Air Force

I would work with the Under Secretary to ensure our acquisition and personnel efforts are aligned, continuing the close partnership that has been a hallmark of the NRO's success.

22. The Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force

I would engage with the Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force as needed to ensure efforts in areas like acquisition, financial management, and sustainment are fully coordinated.

23. The Chief of Space Operations

NRO's partnership with the USSF is the cornerstone of American dominance in the space domain. I would work closely with the Chief of Space Operations to strengthen this partnership, ensuring the NRO and USSF operate as a unified enterprise to maintain American dominance in space. The NRO's strength in pushing technology for intelligence collection complements the USSF's strength in domain protection and warfighting integration.

24. The other Secretaries of the Military Departments and Chiefs of the Military Services

I would ensure the leaders of the Military Services are aware of the overhead reconnaissance capabilities the NRO provides and would seek to understand their unique intelligence requirements to ensure we are effectively supporting their warfighters.

25. The Director, Space Rapid Capabilities Office

I would collaborate with the Director of the Space Rapid Capabilities Office to share best practices on agile acquisition and rapid prototyping to ensure we are both delivering capabilities at a speed that outpaces our adversaries.

26. The Commander, Space and Missile Systems Center

I would partner with the Commander of Space Systems Command to fully exploit the flexible acquisition pathways within the National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program, ensuring the NRO can leverage commercial launch to rapidly field capabilities.

27. The Commander, U.S. Strategic Command

I would ensure the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command has access to the intelligence needed to execute their strategic deterrence mission and understand the global threat environment.

28. The Commander, U.S. Space Command

The NRO's partnership with U.S. Space Command is critical. I would ensure the Commander is supported with the intelligence required for domain awareness and would collaborate to align efforts for protecting and defending vital space assets.

29. The other Combatant Commanders

I would serve as the principal advisor to the Combatant Commanders on overhead reconnaissance, working to ensure the intelligence data collected by the NRO is timely, actionable, and effectively supports their operational planning and execution.

30. The Chief, National Guard Bureau

I would work with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to ensure they are aware of the support the NRO can provide for domestic operations and homeland defense missions.

31. The Directors of the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

The NSA and NGA are foundational partners who task the NRO. As Director, I would maintain constant communication with their Directors to ensure the NRO is responsive to their collection requirements. I would also work to strengthen partnerships with all three agencies by communicating progress on shared interests, listening to their needs, and informing technical, cost, and schedule requirements to ensure the space-based ISR architecture enables them to fulfill their missions.

2026 National Defense Strategy

The 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS) supersedes the Biden Administration's 2022 NDS, and it is a sharp departure from the 2018 NDS, published during President Trump's first term, which prioritized the resumption of Great Power Competition and deterrence of rogue regimes.

32. In your view, does the 2026 NDS accurately assess the strategic environment as it pertains to space? Please explain your answer.

Yes, the 2026 NDS accurately assesses the strategic environment by recognizing that space is no longer a benign sanctuary but a highly contested warfighting domain. The strategy correctly identifies the urgent threats posed by strategic competitors, particularly China, who are rapidly fielding kinetic and non-kinetic counter-space capabilities designed to blind, degrade, or destroy U.S. intelligence architectures. This aligns directly with my assessment that the transformation of the space domain is the single largest challenge facing the national security space enterprise today.

33. Does the 2026 NDS properly focus the United States on preparing to compete, deter, and win against the range of threats in the domain of space? Please explain your answer.

Yes, the 2026 NDS properly focuses USG efforts by emphasizing peace through strength and deterrence by denial. By prioritizing homeland defense and deterring China in the

Indo-Pacific, the strategy underscores the absolute necessity of having survivable and persistent space-based intelligence. To compete and win, the NDS correctly drives the imperative to move faster, supercharge our defense industrial base, and field a resilient architecture that can withstand adversary attacks and guarantee critical intelligence delivery to the warfighter under all conditions.

34. Given your current knowledge of space programs, does the 2026 NDS specify the correct set of capabilities by which the United States can achieve its objectives in space, in the face of ongoing competition and potential conflict with China and Russia? What do you perceive as the areas of highest risk?

The 2026 NDS drives us toward the correct set of capabilities, specifically a resilient, proliferated hybrid architecture that blends exquisite government systems with commercial technology that can be rapidly fielded. The areas of highest risk remain the vulnerability of legacy, monolithic satellite systems and the speed at which we can transition to this new, distributed architecture and expanding comprehensive space domain awareness from very low Earth orbit through cislunar space. We must outpace our adversaries' rapid development of counter-space weapons, making agile acquisition and the supercharging of the defense industrial base critical to mitigating these risks.

35. Are there other nation-state or other actors operating in space that you perceive as a risk to the United States or as cause for concern? If so, why?

China and Russia remain the primary strategic competitors and pacing threats in space, but other actors also present significant risks. Nations such as Iran and North Korea are continually advancing their space and ballistic missile programs, which pose regional security challenges and potential threats to our space assets. Additionally, non-state actors and cyber criminals present a persistent, asymmetric risk to U.S. ground stations, supply chains, and data processing networks, reinforcing the need for comprehensive enterprise resiliency across all segments.

36. Given your current knowledge of space programs, are extant U.S. policies, programs, and authorities applicable to space appropriate to ensure the United States can compete, deter, and win in great power competition in space? Are there additional measures we should be considering? What do you perceive as the areas of highest risk?

As an outside observer it appears that current statutory authorities are generally sufficient, but the rapid pace of the threat environment requires us to maximize the flexibility of our policies and acquisition frameworks. We must continuously assess whether our processes allow us to capitalize on commercial innovation fast enough. The highest risk in this area is bureaucratic sluggishness. We must ensure that our policies enable rapid prototyping and the seamless integration of commercial capabilities. If confirmed, I will continuously evaluate whether additional legislative or policy measures are needed to maintain our competitive edge and will work with Congress to address them.

37. What role do you believe the NRO should play in supporting the 2026 NDS?

The NRO must play a foundational role in executing the 2026 NDS by serving as the premier provider of overhead intelligence capabilities necessary to drive all four of its lines of effort. Whether providing early warning to defend the homeland, delivering the targeting data required to deter China through strength, sharing critical insights to increase burden-sharing with allies, or leading the way in supercharging the defense industrial base through agile acquisition, the NRO's capabilities are essential. The NRO provides the persistent, resilient decision advantage that underpins the successful execution of the entire strategy.

38. In your view, is the NRO adequately sized, structured, and resourced to provide all requisite support to implementation of the 2026 NDS as regards the space domain?

From my current vantage point outside the government, I cannot definitively assess whether the NRO is perfectly sized, structured, and resourced to meet the ambitious demands of the 2026 NDS. The NRO has a strong legacy of mission success, but the shift to a highly contested domain and a proliferated architecture requires immense focus and resources. If confirmed, one of my first priorities will be to conduct a comprehensive review of NRO's resource posture, workforce structure, and programmatic alignment to ensure we are fully equipped to implement the NDS.

39. If confirmed, how will you address any gaps or shortfalls in the NRO's ability to meet the demands placed on it by implementation of the 2026 NDS and the associated operational plans?

If confirmed, I will address any identified gaps or shortfalls by fiercely advocating for the necessary resources within the DoW and the IC. I will also look to optimize NRO's existing investments by accelerating its adoption of commercial capabilities, streamlining NRO acquisition processes to eliminate inefficiencies, and leveraging technology such as artificial intelligence to maximize the productivity of NRO's workforce. If additional authorities or resources are required to close critical mission gaps, I will work closely with Congress and DoW and IC leadership to secure them.

40. If confirmed, what changes or adjustments, if any, would you advise the Secretary of Defense to make in DOD's implementation of the 2026 NDS as regards the domain of space?

If confirmed, I would advise the Secretary of War to ensure the tightest possible integration between DoW's space warfighting efforts and the IC's overhead intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance architecture. I would advocate for policies that further accelerate the fielding of commercial space technologies and streamline the sharing of releasable intelligence data with joint forces and key allies to support burden-sharing. Ensuring unity of effort between the NRO, the USSF, and U.S. Space Command will be

critical to maximizing the effectiveness of the NDS.

41. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to enhance or expedite the implementation of the 2026 NDS and U.S. strategic objectives in space?

To expedite the implementation of the 2026 NDS, I would immediately prioritize accelerating the NRO's transition to a resilient, proliferated hybrid architecture that can withstand adversary threats, while still enabling exquisite collection. I would aggressively pursue commercial relationships with non-traditional and commercial suppliers to supercharge our industrial base and bring cutting-edge capabilities to orbit faster. Additionally, I would focus heavily on workforce development by ensuring we recruit and retain the top-tier technical talent required to integrate automation, AI, and machine learning NRO operations, thereby delivering critical intelligence to the warfighter at machine speed.

NRO Missions and Functions

42. As space shifts from categorization as a domain that exclusively supports operations in other domains, to a domain that is itself contested, how will you shift NRO's approach to space, if confirmed?

If confirmed, I will continue to accelerate the NRO's efforts to address the reality of a highly contested space domain. This requires moving away from a strict reliance on a handful of exquisite, monolithic satellites and toward a proliferated architecture that distributes NRO's capabilities across a vast network of smaller systems and heavily integrates commercial partnerships. This approach makes NRO's intelligence architecture inherently more resilient, persistent, and exponentially harder for adversaries to blind or destroy.

43. If confirmed, how will you guarantee that NRO has the capability and capacity to support DOD's priority space warfighting missions, while ensuring responsiveness to the needs of other NRO mission partners?

The key is to embrace a hybrid architecture and technology-driven tasking orchestration. We must continue to invest in exquisite, government-unique systems that provide capabilities the commercial market cannot, while also leveraging commercial and small-satellite systems to augment coverage, increase revisit rates, and offload routine mission demands. The next generation architecture must incorporate automation, artificial intelligence, and machine learning to orchestrate tasking, collection, and delivery at speed. This approach provides the most robust, resilient, and complementary support for all national security users, allowing the NRO to balance the needs of warfighters and their IC partners.

44. The tasking of on-orbit assets must be conducted, and the data they collect made available in a timeframe relevant to the warfighter to ensure mission

accomplishment. How can these processes, both at NRO and as executed by our mission partners, be accelerated to increase mission impact, in your view?

To accelerate these processes, collection and processing must happen at machine speed. Manual steps must be automated, and NRO, NGA, and NSA systems must be integrated. The volume and speed of data delivered by NRO's next generation architecture will require data processing and delivery at a speed and scale that only AI/ML can deliver. Applying appropriate AI/ML models and automation will be essential to managing the complexity of the data and reducing the times between collection and delivery to the user.

DOD military operations against peer competitors and rogue nation threats require constant monitoring and tracking of critical mobile targets, close integration between space and airborne intelligence systems, and tight coupling with strike planning and execution systems.

45. If confirmed, how would you ensure that NRO satisfies these warfighting requirements?

If confirmed, I would ensure the NRO satisfies these requirements by prioritizing enterprise resiliency and embracing a proliferated architecture that delivers warfighting capability at the speed of relevance for operations. Smaller satellites, operating in proliferated constellations across multiple orbits, can provide the continuous, high-revisit tactical ISR required to maintain custody of mobile and time-sensitive targets. This distributed mesh is inherently more survivable and allows us to meet the demanding needs of the warfighter in a contested environment. I would work with IC partners who provide tasking to ensure that we are meeting warfighter requirements for tracking and targeting with a focus on warfighters' latency requirements.

46. What are the implications of these tactical military requirements for constellation planning, processing agility, speed of dissemination, and coordination with the Military Services and commanders?

These requirements demand a paradigm shift. For constellation planning, it means moving to a hybrid architecture with a larger number of smaller, more dynamic assets. For processing, it means moving capabilities to the edge and automating to achieve machine speed. For dissemination, it demands robust, resilient, and high-bandwidth communication pathways. Finally, it requires a new level of deep, continuous coordination with the Military Services and commanders to ensure NRO systems are integrated into their operational workflows.

47. Given the seismic shifts in the global threat environment and sustained vibrant growth in the commercial space sector in the U.S. and overseas, what do you see as the primary challenges to the NRO's existing space and software architectures?

The primary challenge is that space is now a contested domain. NRO architectures must account for a full spectrum of threats, from kinetic and non-kinetic attacks to

sophisticated cyberattacks, designed to deny us advantage. At the same time, the NRO cannot afford to slow down; it must constantly pursue technological and strategic advantages. This requires stronger partnerships, particularly with the USSF, and to evolve traditionally integrated systems and processes to meet these new challenges.

48. The NRO has fostered explosive growth in tasking and control between overhead satellites. How will you ensure unity of effort and deconfliction of taskings in the space warfighting domain across DOD and IC customers and equities?

Ensuring unity of effort and deconfliction across a rapidly growing architecture of interconnected satellites requires both advanced technology and tight interagency integration. Because the NRO executes collection requirements rather than setting them, unity of effort must include with the functional managers. If confirmed, I will ensure the NRO's tasking architectures are seamlessly integrated with both NGA and NSA. By aligning automated collection and tipping-and-cueing models directly with NGA and NSA priority frameworks, we can deconflict competing demands from DoW and IC customers dynamically. Furthermore, as machine-to-machine tasking expands, the NRO must utilize artificial intelligence and machine learning to orchestrate these operations at machine speed. This ensures the entire overhead architecture operates as a synchronized enterprise, adapting in real time to meet the most critical warfighting and intelligence needs without duplication of effort.

49. Given the growth of both the space enterprise and threats to space assets, what specifically will you do, if confirmed, to ensure mission resiliency and survivability of NRO on-orbit systems, communications lines, and mission processing facilities?

If confirmed, a top priority for me will be enterprise resiliency, from ground to space, and survivability against threats including kinetic, electromagnetic, and cyber threats. The NRO will need to continually adapt and evolve to maintain the ability to operate through contested space and survive the use of adversarial counter-space capabilities. I do not see resiliency and survivability as a trade-off with other priorities; they are fundamental to the design of every space and ground system.

50. If confirmed, how will you use both Artificial Intelligence (AI) and machine learning in executing the NRO mission best to support the DOD and your other primary customers?

I see AI and machine learning (AI/ML) as essential to the NRO's ability to achieve its mission. The volume and speed of data from NRO's next-generation architecture will require processing and delivery at a speed and scale that only AI/ML can provide. If confirmed, I will ensure the NRO continues to integrate AI/ML capabilities across every mission portfolio to do things better and faster. This includes capitalizing on the expertise of academia and industry to apply and adapt models and algorithms, so the NRO can focus on mission application, from current operations to R&D.

51. As the capability of collection platforms increases, the challenges associated with data transmission and storage have grown commensurately. Similarly, the importance of data in supporting AI algorithms is increasing. What do you intend to do, if confirmed, to ensure that data vital to NRO mission sets is readily available and secure?

If confirmed, I will continue to support the use of cloud computing as an IC enabler. It allows processing and compute to dynamically scale with mission needs, provides resiliency through disaggregated data centers, and supports modern software development. That said, I recognize that some systems or data types may be better suited to using on-premises, dedicated hardware. Any solution must consider the alternatives and tradeoffs, including costs, to ensure data is both available to users and secure from adversaries. Finally, cyber-security must be a priority to ensure that data vital to NRO's mission is available and secure.

52. If confirmed, what steps would you take to improve the information-sharing, integration, coordination, and collaboration between NRO and the DOD, as well as between NRO and other elements of the IC?

If confirmed, I would build partnerships with peer organizations by communicating progress on shared interests, listening to partners' needs, and informing technical, cost, and schedule requirements to ensure the space-based ISR architecture enables users to fulfill their missions. My five years serving as ADNI(SRA) taught me the importance of building strong relationships, and I would apply that experience to ensure an integrated intelligence and defense approach to major program decisions, seeking to understand issues from the perspectives of all stakeholders.

53. What is your assessment of the risks and benefits associated with building partnerships with private industry to accomplish NRO's missions? How would you mitigate any risks you identify?

The primary benefit of working with industry is leveraging the rapid innovation and new technology that private industry frequently brings to scale more quickly than government can. The NRO can observe the capabilities and performance of industry partners and combine this with its own expertise to accomplish its unique missions. The risk lies in ensuring the government's unique, high-end requirements are met and that we maintain a competitive and diverse industrial base. I would mitigate this risk by continuing to use a whole-of-industry approach with NRO contracts, identifying the best of breed for NRO's needs, and using a hybrid approach that integrates exquisite, government-unique capabilities with commercial marketplace-derived capabilities.

54. NRO is blending the use of traditional spacecraft and new flexible smallsats to provide improved mission support to users. In your view, how can NRO exploit commercial launch and other less expensive launch options to allow for more rapid replenishment and on-orbit employment of vital warfighting systems, while minimizing the risk of mission failure?

The rapid expansion of space access through commercial launch providers is a strategic advantage for the United States. If confirmed, I would plan to maximize this advantage by partnering directly with the USSF and its Space Systems Command to fully exploit flexible acquisition pathways like the NSSL program. By capitalizing on frequent, lower-cost commercial launch cadences, the government can shift its models, accept more calculated risk in individual components, use commercial off the shelf (COTS) technology, and field capabilities faster, ensuring we can rapidly replenish constellations during sustained operations.

55. The NRO has cultivated an exceedingly capable workforce of highly-technical and qualified space and intelligence professionals. Given the constant competition for talent across the technical community, specifically what would you do, if confirmed, to ensure the NRO sustains and enhances its ability to recruit, develop, and retain the cadre of qualified technical experts it needs to perform its current and future missions?

I believe that the workforce is the heart of any organization, and I hold the retention, development, and attraction of new talent as a top priority. The uniqueness of NRO's mission is what attracts talent. If confirmed, I commit to using every policy lever available to me to support them, from things like STEM pay, an exciting internship program, fair and rewarding promotion, and career broadening opportunities. I would also plan to represent the NRO at public events to build awareness of and interest in the NRO as a place doing some of the most exciting and purpose-filled work a person could hope to be part of.

NRO Acquisition Programs

NRO has long maintained a reputation for the quality of its acquisition process as compared to the existing DOD acquisition process for space. At the same time, the NRO has experienced its share of major acquisition program failures, including large cost overruns, schedule delays, and programs that were cancelled due to a lack of performance, even after the investment of billions of dollars.

56. One of NRO's core missions is to procure, build, test and deliver world-class satellites. If confirmed, how would you prioritize execution of NRO's acquisition and fielding of capabilities?

If confirmed, I would prioritize acquisition execution by balancing the urgent need for speed with rigorous cost and schedule discipline. Current and future warfighter needs require the NRO to rapidly field a resilient, proliferated architecture. To meet these demands, we cannot accept the massive cost overruns or schedule delays of the past. My priority would be to leverage agile acquisition frameworks, employ fixed-price contracts where appropriate, and ensure continuous oversight so that we deliver capabilities on time and on budget. Delivering world-class satellites only matters if they arrive in time to be operationally relevant.

57. Please explain your view of NRO space acquisition, testing, and fielding processes as compared to those of DOD.

The NRO has historically benefited from a highly streamlined, cradle-to-grave acquisition model that tightly couples the user, the acquirer, and the operator. This flat structure often allows the NRO to move fast and adapt nimbly to technical challenges. However, as the committee notes, the NRO is not immune to major program failures. The NRO model excels in pushing the boundaries of state-of-art technology and rapid prototyping, but both the NRO and the DoW writ large must continuously evolve their processes to better integrate commercial innovation and enforce stricter accountability to prevent critical resources from being wasted on underperforming programs.

58. If confirmed as Director, NRO, what changes or improvements, if any, would you make to NRO space acquisition, testing, and fielding processes, and why?

If confirmed, I would push towards more modular, open-architecture designs and away from massive, monolithic programs that are historically prone to catastrophic delays and cost overruns. I would improve capability testing and fielding process by emphasizing digital engineering and digital twin technologies with the goal of identifying and correcting integration failures before hardware built. Furthermore, I would expand the use of COTS and non-traditional vendors. These changes are necessary because we must field capabilities at the speed of the threat. Breaking large programs into smaller, more manageable, and frequently launched increments drastically reduces the risk of total program failure.

59. Are there one or more components of NRO's space acquisition, testing, and fielding process that are functioning optimally, in your view?

In my view, the NRO functions optimally when acting as a rapid research and development pathfinder for the broader DoW and IC. The NRO has a unique and highly effective culture of taking calculated technical risks to prototype cutting-edge sensors and architectures. Additionally, the NRO's recent efforts to integrate commercial startup capabilities through flexible contracting mechanisms are showing exceptional promise. This ability to quickly identify, test, and onboard commercial innovation is a core strength that I intend to protect and scale across the enterprise if confirmed.

The Air Force is seeking to disaggregate its space missions to larger constellations of less expensive satellites. Similarly, the commercial sector is rapidly developing inexpensive satellite technology that supports massive constellation sizes.

60. What do you perceive to be the impact of these shifts in approach on the design of reconnaissance satellites and constellations?

We are seeing the benefits and impacts of these shifts today. In recent years, the NRO has already been going through a fundamental transition from relying solely on a few

vulnerable, exquisite satellites to a resilient, hybrid, and proliferated architecture. Advancements in miniaturization and commercial manufacturing allow smaller, less expensive satellites to be deployed in large constellations across multiple orbits. This shift means small satellites can now handle the bulk of routine, high-frequency intelligence gathering and provide the continuous revisit rates required by tactical military users. Consequently, this frees larger, exquisite national systems to focus on the most complex and hard-to-reach targets, creating a reconnaissance architecture that is significantly more capable and survivable against modern threats.

61. Today, commercial technology often surpasses the innovative edge once held in the domain of space by the military, the IC, and the government contractors that traditionally support them. If confirmed, how will you ensure that commercial technology is appropriately incorporated into NRO acquisition and mission execution at acceptable risk levels?

Commercial technology often iterates faster than traditional DoW and IC technology, but the government still maintains an edge when it comes to many exquisite space technologies. With that, there is huge benefit to adopting industry best practices and capabilities and blending with what NRO acquisitions for maximum effectiveness. If confirmed, I will ensure that NRO incorporates commercial technology by adopting an approach that buys commercial capabilities whenever possible and builds exquisite government systems only when necessary. We must actively leverage the commercial sector's rapid innovation cycles by integrating commercial imagery, radio frequency data, and communication pathways directly into the NRO enterprise. We will rigorously assess the cybersecurity and supply chain security of NRO's commercial partners while using a hybrid architecture that prevents excessive reliance on any single provider to manage risk. We can maximize intelligence output, share insights more easily with allies, and maintain our strategic advantage at an acceptable and calculated level of risk by seamlessly fusing unclassified commercial data with highly classified exquisite collection.

China

62. What is your assessment of the strategic objectives of China in space?

My assessment is that China's strategic objective is to achieve space superiority and establish itself as the leading global space power. China views space as a critical enabler of modern military operations and economic prosperity. Its military objectives include developing a robust intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance architecture capable of monitoring and targeting U.S. and allied forces globally. Concurrently, China is fielding a comprehensive suite of counterspace weapons designed to deny adversaries the use of space during a conflict.

63. In what ways, if any, do China's strategic objectives conflict with U.S. strategic objectives?

China's strategic objectives directly conflict with the U.S. goal of maintaining freedom of operation and secure access to the space domain. While the United States seeks to ensure space remains stable and accessible for all peaceful purposes, China is seeking to constrain U.S. activities in the domain to achieve strategic dominance. Its development of kinetic and non-kinetic weapons explicitly designed to blind, degrade, or destroy U.S. satellite architectures runs directly counter to the objective of maintaining a resilient, secure, and uncontested national security space enterprise.

64. To what extent do you view China's activities in space as a threat or challenge to U.S. national security interests?

I view China's activities in space as the most significant and urgent pacing threat to U.S. national security interests in this domain. China's rapid deployment of advanced overhead reconnaissance systems greatly enhances its ability to track and target U.S. forces around the world. Furthermore, China's demonstrated willingness to develop and test counterspace capabilities, including direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles, directed energy weapons, and sophisticated cyber tools, poses a direct and existential threat to the critical intelligence and communications architectures that our military relies upon for daily operations and strategic deterrence.

65. Are U.S. policies and the associated authorities—as applicable to space—sufficient to counter China's influence, or are there additional measures we should be considering? What role should the NRO play in this regard?

As an outside observer it appears that current U.S. statutory authorities are generally sufficient, but the pace at which we implement our policies and acquisition strategies must accelerate to counter China's rapid advancements. We must continuously review our policies to ensure they enable rapid prototyping, aggressive commercial integration, and seamless allied data sharing. The NRO's role is foundational to countering this influence. The NRO must provide the overhead intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance required to monitor China's military buildup and counterspace developments, while simultaneously fielding a proliferated, survivable architecture that denies China the ability to achieve a decisive advantage through an attack on our space systems, thus maintaining a favorable balance of military power in the economically vital Indo-Pacific region.

Russia

66. What is your assessment of the strategic objectives of Russia in space?

My assessment is that Russia's strategic objective is to maintain its historical status as a premier space power while heavily leveraging the domain to support its terrestrial military operations and strategic deterrence. Russia views space as a critical arena for power projection and seeks to offset U.S. conventional military advantages. To achieve this, they are aggressively developing capabilities designed to disrupt, degrade, or destroy

the space-enabled command, control, and intelligence systems of the United States and its allies.

67. In what ways, if any, do Russia's strategic objectives conflict with U.S. strategic objectives?

Russia's strategic objectives conflict with U.S. objectives primarily through Russia's intent to contest the domain and hold U.S. and allied assets at risk. The United States prioritizes maintaining a secure, stable, and accessible space environment for national security and commercial growth, but Russia is actively developing and testing destructive counterspace weapons, including the potential development of a nuclear-armed anti-satellite weapon. This aggressive and destabilizing posture directly opposes our objective of ensuring freedom of operation and the safety of critical overhead architectures.

68. To what extent do you view Russia's activities in space as a threat or challenge to U.S. national security interests?

I view Russia's activities in space as an acute threat to U.S. national security interests. Russia's repeatedly demonstrated destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile capabilities, which create dangerous orbital debris, and Russia routinely employ electronic warfare to jam satellite communications and navigation signals. Furthermore, Russia's development of co-orbital weapons and sophisticated cyber capabilities, not to mention their potential development of a nuclear-armed anti-satellite weapon, poses a severe risk to intelligence collection, early warning systems, and the overall operational effectiveness of U.S. and allied military forces.

69. Are United States policies and the associated authorities—as applicable to space—sufficient to counter Russia's influence, or are there additional measures we should be considering? What role should the NRO play in this regard?

I believe our current policies and authorities are generally sufficient, but execution must be faster and more agile to outpace Russian counterspace developments. We must ensure our policies continually support rapid architectural diversification and robust intelligence sharing with our NATO allies. The NRO must play a critical role by delivering the persistent overhead reconnaissance required to monitor Russian military activities, weapons development, and space launches. Additionally, the NRO must urgently field a resilient, proliferated architecture that mitigates the impact of any Russian attempt to blind or degrade NRO's intelligence capabilities.

Establishment of U.S. Space Command (U.S. SPACECOM), the Space Force, and the Space Development Agency (SDA)

In Space Policy Directive (SPD)-4, the President directed DOD to stand up the United States Space Command (U.S. SPACECOM), a combatant command that will be responsible for the operational planning of DOD space missions and activities, space-related support to other combatant commands and their operational plans, and defense of

space assets.

70. Please explain your views on the “pros” and “cons” of unity of command as compared to unity of effort in space?

Space is now a contested domain, requiring operational planning for the defense of space assets, activities in space, and support to other combatant commands in the event of conflict. Unity of effort appropriately meets the complexity of supporting operations in and from space, whether that support is intelligence collection, defense of space assets, or other effects. In a conflict scenario, each organization within DoW plays a distinct and important role and succeeds when personnel trained and experienced in their missions execute them to achieve shared objectives. Unity of effort allows specialized organizations like the NRO and U.S. Space Command to focus on their unique core competencies while collaborating to achieve the broader, collective goal. Success requires robust, practiced coordination to ensure effective action during a crisis or conflict. Unity of command provides streamlined decision-making under a single authority, reducing ambiguity in the chain of command but potentially imposing costs such as decision bottlenecks that can slow response and organic cooperation during a conflict.

71. In your view, in a time of conflict in space, is unity of command, unity of effort, or some other approach the most effective in ensuring the protection and defense of U.S. Government and allied space assets? Please explain your answer.

In a time of conflict in space, I believe a tightly integrated unity of effort is the most effective approach to ensuring the protection and defense of U.S. and allied space assets and enabling effects in space to achieve strategic objectives for the USG. The space domain requires specialized domain awareness and familiarity with the assets in space. The U.S. Space Command brings warfighting expertise and a mandate to defend space assets. The NRO provides intelligence collection using space-based capabilities that it is most experienced and best positioned to operate. Joint operational hubs, like the National Space Defense Center, enable a unity of effort to achieve rapid, synchronized decision making while maintaining the distinct warfighting and intelligence gathering roles U.S. Space Command and the NRO should play during a conflict. Unity of effort ensures that U.S. Space Command can effectively execute its mission to protect, defend, and fight in the space domain, including protecting NRO space assets' ability to deliver continuous, critical intelligence to national policymakers and joint forces during conflict.

The NRO is the only defense intelligence agency that is not designated as a combat support agency (CSA) as defined in the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. Historically, the NRO has asserted that it should not be designated as a CSA because it does not make operational decisions regarding the satellites that it builds and controls. In NRO's view, others, principally its mission partners—NSA and NGA—both of which are designated as CSAs, are responsible for determining the requirements that guide NRO satellite designs and the operational tasking of deployed satellites. Now, however, there

exists a class of operational decisions for which the NRO Director *is* responsible. In situations in which U.S. satellites are under attack or threatened with same, the NRO Director has the authority to make operational decisions regarding space control.

72. In your view, what should be the relationship between the Director of the NRO and the Commander, U.S. SPACECOM during hostilities in which DOD and NRO assets are or could be threatened?

If confirmed, I believe the relationship between the DNRO and the Commander of U.S. Space Command must be a highly collaborative and integrated partnership built on mutual trust and clear divisions of responsibility. During hostilities, the Commander of U.S. Space Command is responsible for the overall defense of the space domain, while the DNRO retains operational authority over the safety, health, and tactical maneuvering of NRO's national reconnaissance assets. This relationship must be executed through pre-established operational agreements and shared facilities, ensuring that U.S. Space Command can defend the broader domain while the NRO maintains the precise control required to preserve its critical intelligence collection capabilities.

73. In your view, would the designation of NRO as a CSA with respect to space control matters prove helpful to ordering the relationship between the Director NRO and Commander, U.S. SPACECOM in these situations?

Designating the NRO as a Combat Support Agency for space control is unnecessary to effectively order this relationship. The key to successful coordination during hostilities is clear, pre-coordinated operational agreements on roles and responsibilities. During hostilities, the Commander of U.S. Space Command is responsible for the overall defense of the space domain, while the DNRO retains operational authority over the safety, health, and tactical maneuvering of NRO's national reconnaissance assets. Any potential changes to the NRO's designation must be balanced against the risk of disrupting the NRO's unique agile acquisition culture and existing lines of authority.

The satellites that the NRO builds and operates are tasked by small organizations that are subordinate to the Directors of NSA and NGA. The Director of NGA and DIA, and the national intelligence elements of the military services, report through separate chains to both the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence. Even though NSA and NGA are CSAs, as yet there exists no formal operational relationship between the Commander, U.S. SPACECOM and these NRO tasking organizations, notwithstanding the fact that battlefield commanders rely on these satellites for vital intelligence support and their operations must be tightly coordinated with other DOD intelligence systems, command and control networks, and strike systems.

74. Would it be advisable, in your view, for the Commander, U.S. SPACECOM to be in the chain of command for the tasking of NRO satellites in conflict situations, as a means of rationalizing space command and control in support of U.S. military forces?

It would not be advisable to place the Commander of U.S. Space Command in the chain of command for the tasking of NRO satellites in conflict situations. The tasking of the national reconnaissance architecture is currently executed by NSA and NGA, who act as the functional managers for their respective intelligence disciplines. As combat support agencies, NSA and NGA will prioritize operational and tactical support to the U.S. military during combat operations, including in their tasking of NRO satellites. Rather than alter the tasking chain of command, the focus should be on ensuring that U.S. Space Command's tactical requirements are seamlessly and rapidly integrated into the existing NSA and NGA tasking processes to guarantee the warfighter receives immediate support during a conflict.

75. In your view would it be feasible and advisable to apply the current model pursuant to which the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command serves also as the Director of NSA and reports to the DNI on national intelligence operations, to grant authority to the Commander, U.S. SPACECOM to control the tasking of national intelligence space assets in support of military forces in combat?

It would not be advisable to apply the dual-hat model used by U.S. Cyber Command to grant U.S. Space Command authority over the tasking of national intelligence space assets. NSA and NGA already serve as the functional managers for their respective intelligence disciplines. Furthermore, both NSA and NGA are already mandated to provide direct, prioritized support to military forces during conflict because both agencies are designated as Combat Support Agencies. Granting tasking authority directly to U.S. Space Command would duplicate existing missions and disrupt established, proven processes.

In SPD-4, the President further directed the Secretary of Defense to craft a legislative proposal to establish a Space Force within the U.S. Air Force. The legislative proposal DOD presented to Congress intentionally omitted a primary role for the NRO and other IC organizations, to the concern of many Members of Congress and their staffs.

76. In light of the critical role that space will play in the future of the United States, and given the likelihood that space could become a domain of active, existential conflict, please explain your view of the benefits that accrue to the Nation and the space mission by maintaining separation between the NRO and the Space Force? How does separation of the NRO and the Space Force provide advantage in our great power competition with China or Russia?

The primary benefit of maintaining organizational separation is that it allows both NRO and USSF to focus relentlessly on their distinct and specialized core missions. USSF is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping military personnel to conduct space operations. The NRO mission is to develop, acquire, launch, and operate the nation's space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance satellites. The NRO is optimized for agile acquisition and the development and operation of intelligence collection systems, whereas USSF is optimized for organizing, training, equipping, and executing space warfighting operations. These two organizations, working together,

provide the cornerstone of the United States' strategic advantage in space. The NRO provides intelligence collection capabilities that benefit the warfighter but also meet the information collection needs of decision-makers, intelligence analysts, and even civil government (e.g., wildfire identification). The NRO's space-based capabilities meet needs from the strategic to the tactical, depending upon the needs of the end user of the information. In a great power competition with China and Russia, NRO's ability to provide responsive intelligence collection to meet the needs of users from the strategic to the tactical provides a decision advantage. Similarly, allowing USSF to dedicate its full attention to protecting and defending the space domain provides a strategic advantage to the United States.

77. Are there any conditions or circumstances, in your view, in which NRO and the Space Force should be further integrated, going forward?

I would not recommend structurally combining the NRO with the USSF, but I do believe deep operational and tactical integration is absolutely critical given the contested nature of the domain. I understand that USSF and NRO currently train and exercise together, and this close collaboration and operational planning should continue. The NRO and USSF jointly operate out of the National Space Defense Center to ensure shared domain awareness and unified defensive responses are planned and executed. Shared threat warnings, coordinated defensive maneuvers, and collaborative capability prototyping are areas where the NRO and USSF should continue to work together.

78. Currently the Space Force sends funding to the NRO through an interagency transfer process or DoD funds the NRO through the military intelligence program (MIP). Would you support further integration of NRO Space Acquisition Authority with the Space Force if such provided speed to launch, orbit, and operations in support of the 2026 NDS?

I strongly support close alignment and coordination of acquisition efforts to achieve the speed and scale required by the 2026 NDS, but I would caution against formally integrating or merging acquisition authorities. The NRO's distinct acquisition culture is the very foundation of its ability to move rapidly, take calculated technological risks, and leverage commercial innovation effectively and is the gold standard of space acquisition. I support shared commercial contracts and collaborative prototyping where they make sense but also recognize that each organization may have unique requirements that merit separate acquisitions. The NRO also collaborates with IC partners, and one of the great efficiencies and benefits of the NRO is having an organization that exists in both the intelligence and warfighting communities.

Quality-of-Life Challenges in the NRO

79. What unique quality-of-life challenges affect NRO civilian employees, service

members assigned or detailed to NRO, and their families?

The primary challenge affecting the NRO workforce is the constant, intense competition for talent across the broader technical community, compounded by the daily real life demands present for every individual. NRO's civilian employees, service members, and their families bear the weight of executing a highly complex and technical mission in an increasingly contested space domain. The continuous pressure to maintain NRO's technological edge and outpace strategic competitors demands exceptional dedication, which naturally places significant stress on our personnel as they balance these vital national security responsibilities with the needs of their families.

80. If confirmed, how would you address these challenges to help improve the quality-of-life, retention, and productivity of these personnel and their families?

If confirmed, I will address these challenges by treating the NRO workforce as the heart of the organization, making their retention and professional development a top priority. I commit to using the specific policy levers available to me to support NRO's people. This includes fully utilizing STEM pay to remain competitive, ensuring fair and rewarding promotion processes, and providing meaningful career broadening opportunities that keep personnel engaged and growing. Furthermore, I will constantly highlight the unique and purpose-filled nature of the NRO mission, ensuring the NRO workforce knows the critical value of their contributions, which is one of the strongest factors in retaining highly qualified technical experts.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

81. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Yes

82. Do you agree, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner?

Yes

83. Do you agree, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding

your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you?

Yes

84. Do you agree, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided?

Yes

85. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request?

Yes

86. Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee?

Yes

87. Do you agree, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress?

Yes