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Department of Defense
OFFICE OF PREPUBLICATION AND SECURITY REVIEW

Senate Armed Services Committee
Advance Policy Questions for Dr. Mara Karlin
Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities

Duties and Qualifications

1. What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities (ASD(SPC))?

My understanding is that the ASD/SPC is primarily responsible for advising and supporting the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Defense on the formulation, coordination, implementation, and assessment of national security and national defense strategy; the forces and contingency plans necessary to implement national defense strategy; U.S. nuclear weapons and missile defense policy; and security cooperation plans and policies.

2. If confirmed, what additional duties and responsibilities do you expect that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) would prescribe for you, particularly in light of the lines of effort comprising the National Defense Strategy (NDS)?

If confirmed, I would focus on the actions and relationships necessary to perform the duties of the ASD/SPC effectively. Formulating, implementing, and assessing the National Defense Strategy will need particular attention and I will focus on this critical area while also ensuring the Department is appropriately focused on it as well.

3. What background, experience, and expertise do you possess that qualify you to serve as the ASD(SPC), including in the following areas:

- **Defense Strategy, Force Planning, Force Development;**

I have substantial expertise working on defense strategy, force planning, and force development both in and outside of the U.S. government. Having worked for six secretaries of defense across three administrations, I have a deep understanding of and experience with the shifting security environment over the past two decades and how the Department of Defense can best address changing threats and opportunities for both today and in the future. I previously served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development and Principal Director for Strategy. In these roles, I was deeply involved in numerous national, defense, and regional strategy efforts in addition to overseeing a wide range of Secretary-level planning guidance. This included the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the President's 2015 National Security Strategy, the counter-ISIS strategy, two classified and ground-breaking secretary of defense-signed strategies, and three Defense Planning Guidance, including the earliest one in Defense Department history. I oversaw the first formal efforts to actively assess the national defense strategy with key offices from across the Defense Department and with close U.S. allies. Moreover, I represented the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the 3* programmers for

years, which required leading strategy implementation and resourcing to build the future military on behalf of OSD Policy. In earlier government service, I was responsible for U.S. policy toward the Levant and toward South Asia-- key regions that required deep expertise in challenges like terrorism, governability, and security sector reform. Outside of government, I served as a staff member of the National Defense Strategy Commission. I taught Strategic Studies for years at the graduate level, have a PhD in Strategic Studies, and wrote two books on military history and defense policy.

- **Development and review of campaign and contingency plans, major force deployments, and military operational plans;**

I have substantial experience in the development and review of plans, and deployments. In my current role as the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, I am deeply involved in formulating and assessing the Department's political-military approach to Europe (including NATO), Russia, Eurasia, the Middle East, the Western Hemisphere, and Africa. Given the threats, alliances, and partnerships in these key regions, I am regularly advising the senior Departmental leadership in these areas. My previous experience in the Department of Defense, including as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development, also required regular engagement with and assessment of plans and deployments.

- **Joint capabilities requirements and Joint Warfighting Concept Development**

I have substantial experience with the development of joint capabilities requirements and concept development. As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development, I worked closely with colleagues from the Joint Staff J8 and CAPE to oversee the analytic agenda on the size and shape of the future U.S. military. In this role, we worked to revise the criteria for building and evaluating the military in alignment with the changing character of war. In this vein, I led a number of strategic portfolio reviews on power projection, which guided tens of billions in investments. More broadly, I represented the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the 3* programmers for years, which required regular efforts to assess how and in what ways the Department was building the future force for a shifting security environment.

4. What leadership and management experience do you possess that you would apply to your service as ASD(SPC), if confirmed?

As a leader and manager, I prioritize being an inclusive decision-maker who listens, over-communicates, collaborates, and demonstrates action and integrity at all times to build a shared vision of success. I have led and managed organizations both in and outside of government. Currently, I am serving as the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, which includes leading and managing a broad portfolio that covers more than 145 countries with approximately as many staff. Previously, I served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development, which required leading and managing a key office inside Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities. Outside of government, I most recently was the Director of Strategic Studies at the Johns Hopkins University-School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). In this role, I led and managed the largest department in the graduate school, which included approximately 165 students and nearly 20 faculty and staff.

Major Challenges and Priorities

5. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next ASD(SPC)?

The major challenges that will confront the next ASD(SPC) will be ensuring the Department appropriately prioritizes the challenges posed by strategic competition while addressing persistent threats in an effective manner that accounts for both strategic and fiscal uncertainty. Modernizing U.S. nuclear forces to meet policy and strategy requirements in a cost-effective manner will be a particular challenge.

6. If confirmed, what plans would you implement to address each of these challenges?

If confirmed, I would prioritize issuing clear guidance that appropriately outlines priorities and risk tradeoffs in line with the strategy. I would regularly monitor the implementation of the strategy and assess when, how, and under what circumstances it needs to be re-looked. I would also prioritize ensuring our nuclear forces remain safe, secure, and effective.

7. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish?

If confirmed, my priorities for ASD(SPC) would be to ensure the ASD component integrates across its key areas to ensure the strategy is appropriately formulated, implemented, and assessed and to enable rigorous support to the USD(P), the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Defense.

Civilian Control of the Military

8. In its 2018 report, *Providing for the Common Defense*, the National Defense Strategy Commission observed, “there is an imbalance in civil-military relations on critical issues . . . Civilian voices appear relatively muted on issues at the center of U.S. defense and national security policy.” Do you agree with this assessment?

A: Civilian control of the military is a foundational principle to our democracy. I am aware of the serious concerns regarding this imbalance at that time, and its impact on the Department and our Nation. If confirmed, it will be one of my priorities to ensure an appropriate balance.

9. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure that your tenure as ASD(SPC) epitomizes the fundamental requirement for civilian control of the Armed Forces embedded in the U.S. Constitution and other laws?

A: If confirmed, I would provide proper and adequate direction and meaningful civilian oversight in the course of my duties. Trust in the military’s strong nonpartisan ethic enables our civilian leaders to exhibit appropriate civilian control in collaboration with the President and Congress.

10. If confirmed, what concrete steps would you take to correct this imbalance in civil-military relations?

A: Correcting imbalances in civil-military relations requires leadership, a healthy and capable workforce, and strong initiative in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will fully carry out the responsibilities of the ASD(SPC). I will also work hard to build effective, collaborative, and meaningful relationships with my military counterparts, and to advocate for the appropriate staffing levels for the office of the ASD(SPC) to perform the required civilian oversight of the military.

11. If confirmed, how, would you use your position to contribute to the discussion, debate, and resolution of core U.S. defense and national security issues?

A: If confirmed, I will fully carry out the responsibilities of the ASD(SPC), including advising the Secretary of Defense and other senior defense leaders on: national security and defense strategy; the forces, contingency plans, and associated posture necessary to implement the defense strategy; nuclear deterrence and missile defense policy; and security cooperation plans and policies. I will also represent the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and the Secretary of Defense in interagency policy discussions and participate in planning, budgeting, and execution activities. I will also play an active role in major Department of Defense reviews and in working with interagency partners to develop whole of government solutions to national security challenges.

12. If confirmed, what relationship would you establish with the Joint Staff, and how would you allocate the execution of functions for the development of strategy, plans, and capabilities between your office and the Joint Staff?

A: If confirmed, I intend to work hand-in-hand across the Joint Staff, particularly with the Director for Strategy, Plans, and Policy; the Director for Operations; the Director for Joint Force Development; and the Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment. With these counterparts, I would seek to foster an effective and collaborative relationship to address both emergent issues and policy challenges that require the integration of civilian and military expertise and perspective. My team and I benefited from strong, productive relations with the Joint Staff during my experience as the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Strategy and Force Development.

13. The National Defense Strategy Commission report notes, “allocating priority—and allocating forces—across theaters of warfare is not solely a military matter. It is an inherently political-military task, decision authority for which is the proper competency and responsibility of America’s civilian leaders.” What is your view of the role of DOD civilian leadership, as compared to the role of the military, in the formulation of strategy and contingency planning?

A: The ASD(SPC) is charged with developing, coordinating, and overseeing the implementation of national and regional security and defense strategies and policies. This includes providing policy guidance, objectives, and end states for strategy and contingency plans. The Department’s military leadership also plays a critical role in strategy development and contingency planning,

providing military operational expertise and advice. With these together, a balanced civil-military relationship enables complete and robust analysis and the consideration of meaningful options for the Secretary of Defense.

14. In your view, how important is it to have robust civilian oversight of the development and implementation of defense strategy as well as reviewing campaign and contingency plans? Please explain your answer.

A: I believe that civilian control of the military is a foundational principle to our democracy, and as such, it is key to have robust and meaningful civilian oversight of the development and implementation of defense strategies and the review of campaign and contingency plans. My views are consistent with those of the President, the Secretary, and other senior leaders of the Department. If confirmed, I would remain committed to this view and to fulfill the critical role of providing civilian policymaking responsibilities.

15. In your view, would an increase in the number of personnel assigned to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)) enhance civilian control of the military? Please explain your answer.

A: I understand that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy's (OUSD(P)) civilian workforce has decreased over time as a result of mandatory cuts over the past decade, although I have not had the opportunity to assess the personnel requirements in the Office of the ASD(SPC). If confirmed, I will make it a priority to review the current staffing levels and, if necessary, seek additional personnel in order to ensure the Office of the ASD(SPC) can perform its civilian policymaking and oversight responsibilities effectively to ensure meaningful civilian control.

National Defense Strategy

The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) outlines that the United States faces a rising China, an aggressive Russia, and the continued threat from rogue regimes and global terrorism. If confirmed, you will lead the Department's effort in developing an updated NDS.

16. Do you believe that the 2018 NDS accurately assesses the current strategic environment, including the most critical and enduring threats to the national security of the United States and its allies?

A: The 2018 National Defense Strategy helped generate bipartisan consensus around the troubling issues associated with the Russia threat and the growth of China's military capabilities and implications for the United States, and the Joint Force specifically. If confirmed, I would expect to help the Department's senior leaders update the strategy in accordance with the Biden Administration's priorities and in line with Congressional direction to submit a 2022 National Defense Strategy.

17. What revisions or adjustments, if any, would you recommend that the Secretary of Defense make to the 2018 NDS? Please explain your answer.

A: If confirmed, I would work with senior leaders throughout the Department to follow Congress's established direction on the necessary elements of the NDS review and to ensure it reflects the Administration's priorities. This includes evaluating changes in the security environment; identifying priority defense objectives and missions; and identifying priorities for designing, modernizing, employing, and ensuring readiness of the Joint Force. Areas for further exploration during the strategy review process might include identifying innovative approaches and concepts for future warfighting and modernizing our global network of alliances and partnerships. An examination of these and other issues would be nested in the broader context of national security priorities. Insights from this review would inform how I would counsel DoD leaders to update the defense strategy and its implementation.

18. In accordance with section 113(g)(1)(E) the Secretary of Defense is required to present the national defense strategy "as soon as possible after appointment". In your opinion, what timeframe would be reasonable for presenting the NDS to the congressional defense committees?

A: I am familiar with section 113, which details the requirements for the National Defense Strategy, including the direction to present the strategy as soon as possible following the appointment of the Secretary of Defense. I understand that the Department is actively conducting a thorough National Defense Strategy review process, and plans to finish work in January or February of 2022 – which is consistent with past practice.

19. If confirmed, what revisions or adjustments would you make to the Department's implementation of the 2018 NDS?

A: Given the direction contained within the President's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, I would recommend identifying how DoD efforts can be better integrated with those of other elements of national power and with our allies and partners. I understand that the last annual, statutorily-required NDS assessment, conducted by the prior Administration, identified that strategy implementation efforts warrant greater planning, organization, and prioritization. If confirmed, I would also want the Department to consider lessons learned from implementing prior strategies and to account for the importance of implementation in the 2022 National Defense Strategy review process.

20. If confirmed, what specific indicators would you use to holistically evaluate how well implementation of the NDS is progressing?

A: I believe that a robust assessment of the strategy needs to consider a range of factors, including the strategy's continued validity in light of changes in the global security environment, our effectiveness in advancing priority defense objectives, and the Department's overall performance in implementation. If confirmed, I will continue our transparent reporting to Congress on the findings of DoD's annual assessment.

21. What is your understanding of the Department of Defense’s processes for strategic assessment, analysis, decision making, and reporting for the development and implementation of the NDS?

A: National defense strategies and the assessment of their validity and implementation provide valuable opportunities to assess alignment of DoD planning and investment against the security environment, including evolving threats, gaps and deficiencies, generating imperatives for reprioritization. Past strategies, and their associated methodologies, sought to balance Joint Force preparedness against a broad range of threats. The 2018 NDS’s focus on the threats from China and Russia has stimulated necessary Departmental attention to the unique challenges, associated analyses, and specific implementation efforts particular to those threat actors. Secretary Austin’s call for China to be the Department’s pacing challenge has given additional, necessary impetus to this relative shift in DoD’s focus across a broad variety of assessment and decision processes.

22. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, if any, to improve the Department’s processes for strategic assessment, analysis, policy formulation, and decision making?

A: If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to ensure that DoD strategic assessment and analytic support processes, tools, and methodologies are appropriate to provide civilian leadership with the variety of decision support they need to address the scope and scale of the challenges now confronting the Department.

23. In your opinion, should the NDS be budget-driven or budget-informed and what key indicators reflect that one or the other of those approaches is being pursued?

A: In my view, the National Defense Strategy should be strategy-driven and budget-informed. A strategy that is budget-informed is based upon a comprehensive assessment of the security environment across multiple timeframes. It should delineate priority defense objectives and missions, and then seek to align the Department’s tools and resources accordingly. If confirmed, I would advocate for this approach within the Department.

24. What is your understanding of the role of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) in the implementation of the NDS?

A: The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) is the Secretary’s primary force development mechanism for shaping the future capability, capacity, and readiness of the Joint Force in accordance with National Defense Strategy (NDS) priorities, as well as guiding key strategy implementation activities of the Department (e.g., Departmental reforms and guidance to the force planning and analysis community). The DPG provides the Secretary’s planning priorities at the start of the DoD budget cycle, giving guidance to the Military Services and other DoD components as they build their Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) for the next fiscal year (FY) (e.g., the 2021 DPG informs the FY 2023-2027 POMs and Program Review). The

GEF provides direction regarding how limited, existing forces and resources shall be prioritized to achieve NDS priorities.

25. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, if any, to update, improve, or make the DPG and GEF more transparent and useful to the Department and to Congress, including this Committee?

A: The DPG is an annual, internal, and pre-decisional DoD planning document, and, if confirmed, I will strive to ensure it has the most impact by preparing it for the Secretary's issuance as early as possible each calendar year. This would allow the leadership of the Military Services' and DoD Components' to integrate the DPG's direction before their POMs have been finalized. Regarding transparency with Congress, if confirmed, I will ensure the Department offers detailed briefings to committee staff on the priorities of the DPG that informed the President's Budget submission. I will ensure that the GEF provides updated military planning guidance that prioritizes attention and resources on the most serious and urgent national security threats in support of National Defense Strategy implementation. I am fully committed to examining ways to make appropriate portions of the GEF more transparent within the Department of Defense and to brief committee staff on the GEF's content.

26. Will you commit that, if confirmed, you would undertake all necessary action to ensure that each of these strategic guidance documents is timely generated and issued, and updated, as necessary to reflect changes in assumptions, policy, or other factors?

A: Yes, if confirmed, I will ensure that these and other key strategic guidance documents are issued in a timely manner (e.g., in time to inform the budget process or other processes) and reflect the latest information in terms of the defense strategy, the Secretary's priorities, Departmental analysis, and policy guidance.

27. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to effectuate this commitment, and on what timeline?

A: In the case of the DPG, if confirmed, I will direct that development of the guidance begin as soon as possible in the fall timeframe each year, as the major Program Review and budget decisions of the current cycle are solidified. I would also strive to ensure the DPG helps link one budget year to the next, including by gaining senior leader direction on the desired focus areas to inform the next budget cycle. This approach should support a tight linkage with the Secretary's priorities, as well as an early issuance in the next calendar year. Regarding the GEF, under the direction of the Secretary of Defense, I would intend to oversee drafting of the Guidance for Employment of the Force in parallel with the NDS and complete it within months of the NDS.

The NDS states that a Global Operating Model concept of "combat-credible, flexible theater postures will enhance our ability to compete and provide freedom of maneuver during conflict, providing national decision-makers with better military options."

28. In your assessment, has this concept been effective?

A: The Global Operating Model and Dynamic Force Employment have been useful concepts for increasing the flexibility and capabilities of our systems and personnel while demonstrating our ability to operate with allies and partners. Managing the benefits and costs of forward presence is critical to ensuring the military presents a combat-credible deterrent against China and Russia while also maintaining DoD's ability to respond flexibly to emergent threats or crises.

29. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend be made to this concept and the manner in which it has been implemented to date?

A: The Department is in the early stages of the National Defense Strategy review, which will be followed by the development of the Guidance for Employment of the Force. If confirmed, I will work across DoD components throughout the development of these strategic documents to identify opportunities for improving guidance and concepts for how DoD uses our forces globally.

Contingency Planning

One of the purposes of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was to increase military and civilian attention on the formulation of strategy and contingency planning. The ASD(SPC) supports the USD(P), who is required to assist the Secretary of Defense in preparing written policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans and in reviewing such plans.

30. What is your view of the civilian role, as compared to the military role, in the formulation of strategy and contingency planning?

A: Civilian control of the military is a vital cornerstone of our democracy. DoD civilian leadership lead the Department in formulating national security and defense strategy. The Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense have a statutory role in overseeing military plans formulation through timely policy guidance, clearly defined objectives, and requirements and guidelines for contingency planning. The result is a balanced civil-military relationship and national defense activities that are in concert with American values.

31. In your opinion, does the civilian leadership currently have an appropriate level of oversight of strategy formulation and contingency planning? Please explain your answer.

A: Civilian leadership currently has an appropriate level of oversight over strategy and contingency planning. U.S. law clearly assigns the responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for formulating strategy and for reviewing contingency plans. If confirmed, I intend to fully support the Secretary and the Under Secretary in executing those responsibilities. Doing so effectively will require working closely with military leaders to produce effective and implementable strategies. It will also require providing guidance to shape the development of contingency plans to advance U.S. policy priorities and

ensure the national defense. Each strategy and contingency plan goes through a rigorous civilian review before approval by the Secretary.

32. What specific steps, if any, do you believe are necessary to ensure effective civilian control and oversight of strategy, contingency, and force planning?

A: If confirmed, I will fully carry out the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities to prepare guidance for and review of strategy, contingency plans, and force planning. A professional civilian staff and active dialogue between civilian and military leadership ensures effective and meaningful civilian oversight of these key areas. To that end, I will deepen and expand the interactions between military and civilian leadership through an extensive contingency plans review process to invigorate the civilian oversight role, integrate new capabilities more effectively, and ensure robust civil-military dialogue. This is clearly outlined in DoD Instruction 3000.15 on the Plan Review and Approval Process.

33. What is your understanding of the capability and capacity of both the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff to provide comprehensive, objective, and realistic joint analysis in support of formulating and evaluating strategy and operational plans and related force planning?

A: The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff have the ability to sufficiently support the development and evaluation of strategies, contingency plans, and force planning. However, there is always room for improvement, particularly given the critical role played by analysis. If confirmed, I will review the process to identify ways to improve the joint analytic enterprise and planning tools.

34. If confirmed, how would you determine whether modifications of a combatant commander's contingency or operational plan are warranted, considering geo-strategic change, risk assessments, potential adversary and our own capability enhancements, and fiscal realities?

A: The Secretary of Defense is the civilian official responsible for determining whether modification of a Combatant Commander's contingency or operation plans is required. If confirmed, I will advise senior Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) leadership on whether modifications to military plans are warranted based upon whether military plans conform to policy guidance, account for changes in the security environment, and represent an acceptable level of risk.

Joint Operational Concept Development

35. The Department is working to finalize a Joint Warfighting Concept. In your view, what is the role of the Joint Warfighting Concept as it relates to the NDS?

A: I understand that the Joint Staff is iteratively developing a Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC), with a focus on providing joint solutions to key warfighting functions such as command and control, fires, logistics, and information advantage. The Department is also developing a new

National Defense Strategy that will set its strategic direction and defense priorities for the coming years. If confirmed, I will review the JWC to ensure the Department has a strategy-driven approach to future joint warfighting and that it is appropriately nested in the ongoing work of NDS development.

36. In your opinion, can a single Joint Warfighting Concept adequately address adversaries as diverse as China and Russia, or should DOD have separate Joint Operational Concepts, including separate theories of victory, for China and Russia?

A: Joint concepts should be aligned with our strategy and theories of victory (hypotheses about how to use military instruments most effectively to achieve strategic objectives in war), while highlighting future opportunities for improvement. Our most capable adversaries present similar operational problems, but in very different theaters and with a different range of capabilities, potentially requiring different emphasis in force development and design. In my opinion, joint concept development, which could include different levels of concepts for distinct purposes, should help link the Departments' strategic theories of victory for potential armed conflict with key adversaries to future operational and force structure tradeoffs the Department must face in how we resolve the nation's most stressing military challenges.

37. If confirmed, what would be your role in reviewing the Joint Warfighting Concept?

A: Operational concepts constitute an essential link between strategic objectives, policy, and the capability and budgetary priorities needed to advance them. As such, if confirmed, I would first and foremost ensure that the JWC is aligned with the Secretary's strategy and guidance. Additionally, I would focus on ensuring that the analytic foundation for the concept is robust and able to usefully inform future Joint and Military Department capability investments to maintain the nation's military edge and to provide a strategy-driven and joint approach to future warfighting.

38. In your view, what are the respective roles and functions of the ASD(SPC) and the Joint Staff in the development of a Joint Warfighting Concept?

A: The role of civilian leadership in the development of a Joint Warfighting Concept is to ensure appropriate civilian oversight of its development and the requirements within it. This includes providing strategic guidance on how to employ the force and how military success may be judged from a policy perspective. The role of military leadership is to provide sound military advice and informed options to employ the force to meet the stated strategic objectives. If confirmed, I will ensure the appropriate balance between civilian oversight and military options are provided within joint concept development.

39. How are these roles and functions integrated?

A: It is my understanding that the Joint Staff and OSD meet regularly, through various fora at all levels, to ensure that joint concept development is strategically aligned and provides appropriate options to senior leaders.

40. Where do these roles differ and where do they overlap?

A: Joint concept development is an iterative process that requires tight linkages between civilian and military leadership. OSD and the Joint Staff should work together to ensure future warfighting concepts are aligned with strategy and policy objectives, providing sound military options to senior leaders, underpinned by analysis, and detailed at a level that is sufficient to inform capability development.

41. Do you believe it is also important for the Department to develop a Joint Concept for Competition? If so, why?

A: The Department should continue to frame military competition as one of many elements of competition undertaken as part of a whole of government approach, and focus its efforts in this realm on ensuring the Joint Force is capable and ready to defeat, if necessary, major competitor aggression in a potential conflict. Any DoD concept development related to competition should be scoped appropriately for DoD's roles and responsibilities. Recognizing the need for the Department to have capabilities and concepts to counter adversary hybrid warfare and gray zone competition as part of whole of government efforts, DoD should ensure the Department preserves the ability to focus investments on key defense capabilities, such as nuclear modernization, a modernized surface and undersea fleet, space and cyber capabilities, and long-range conventional strike.

42. If confirmed, how would you work to ensure that Military Service Warfighting Concepts are properly nested under the Joint Warfighting Concept, and that the Military Departments and Services focus on generating capabilities that support the Joint Warfighting Concept?

A: Appropriate civilian oversight of the development of future warfighting concepts and the requirements they inform is critical. It is my understanding that the Military Departments are directly involved in the development of the Joint Warfighting Concept and its supporting concepts, and are included in identifying capabilities aligned with the JWC through the Joint Staff's Joint Requirements Oversight Council. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that a strategically-aligned and analytically informed JWC and supporting concepts present meaningful options to senior leaders through the exploration of alternatives in an effort to help them understand tradespace in joint capability development.

43. In your opinion, what are the biggest challenges to reorienting force development to more effectively support the 2018 NDS?

A: The Department continues to face challenges in the effectiveness and rigor of the warfighting analysis and concept development process, both of which are critical to the development and implementation of meaningful strategic guidance. Additionally, the Department will continue to require congressional support for difficult decisions to divest of increasingly costly systems that are decreasingly relevant to the demands of deterrence and warfighting in the face of evolving, advanced threats and denied environments.

44. Do you consider the Department's war gaming capabilities to be adequate to develop a new Joint Warfighting Concept and implement the 2018 NDS?

A: War gaming, among other analytic tools, is critical for concept development. If confirmed, one of my top priorities will be ensuring the Department's decisions to shape, size, and posture the force are supported by rigorous analysis, to include war gaming, as appropriate. I understand that the Department's analytic oversight forums, of which Policy is a core member, are examining the scope of analytic tools and methodologies necessary to advance the Department's capabilities in this regard.

45. If confirmed, what, if anything, needs to be done to improve the Department's war gaming capabilities, in your view?

A: War gaming is an important tool within the Department's broader analytic ecosystem. If confirmed, I will examine the Department's war gaming capability and how and in what ways war gaming results are paired with other tools of analysis, including modeling, simulations, and experiments, among others. Capable analytic tools are critical for assessing the effectiveness of proposed concepts and capabilities against Departmental needs and U.S. strategic objectives.

46. What is your understanding of the progress DOD has made in developing, modeling, and validating the joint operational concepts required to address the challenges identified by the 2018 NDS? Please explain your answer.

A: It is my understanding that the Department uses many different analytic tools, including campaign-level, mission-level, and system-level modeling and simulation, military exercises, experiments, and war games, to assess the effectiveness of operational concepts and alternative approaches to the operational challenges facing the Joint Force, as identified in the 2018 NDS. I understand that Department leadership is currently assessing the strength and capabilities of these analytic tools and processes. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure that concepts are supported by the appropriate range of analytic tools to identify gaps or shortfalls in force design and posture, a crucial step in addressing key operational challenges posed by our most capable competitors.

47. What is your understanding of the Department of Defense's current organizational structure, capability, and capacity concerning joint operational concept development?

A: It is my understanding that OSD provides appropriate guidance and oversight to ensure strategic alignment of joint operational concept development, and that the Joint Staff is leading the development of joint concepts, in collaboration with the Military Services and OSD. If confirmed, I will ensure a collaborative and iterative approach to concept development across the Department to provide a range of analytically informed options for senior leaders.

48. If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you make to improve joint concept development?

A: Given limited resources, the Department’s concept development must account for future fiscal realities and must balance among sustaining current systems capable of countering threats at lower costs, divesting systems that are not fit for purpose, and recapitalizing and modernizing forces able to contend with threats posed by increasingly advanced competitors in the long-term. To ensure the proper balance, concept development should be aligned with strategic priorities and be resource-informed, and provide options for future investments in force structure and modernization – all of which must be underpinned by rigorous analysis.

49. In your opinion, how can the Department successfully produce short- and mid-term joint operational concepts that drive change in the Joint Force in response to identified shortfalls?

A: In my opinion, the best way to mitigate near- and mid-term shortfalls is through innovative approaches to solve specific problems underpinned by analysis. It is my understanding that Department leadership is currently assessing its analytic tools and processes, including a new experimentation mechanism. If I am confirmed, I will work with the senior leadership to ensure the Department’s effort is aligned with current strategy, and solutions are obtainable in the near- and mid-term.

50. In your view, how can DOD best contribute to a “whole-of-government” effort to develop more holistic strategies and operational concepts—integrating all tools of national power—for prevailing in competitions short of war?

A: The United States is facing a range of challenges which the Department of Defense cannot, and should not, address alone. The military should seek to integrate with other instruments of national power – including diplomatic, economic, and intelligence activities – to advance priority objectives. If confirmed, I will direct the Strategy, Plans & Capabilities (SPC) team to work closely with U.S. interagency partners, and incorporate U.S. interagency considerations into the work SPC undertakes, to help ensure close cooperation.

Joint Force Requirements

51. What is your understanding of the Department of Defense’s current process for establishing a prioritized list of Joint Force requirements derived from the NDS?

A: The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, via the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), oversees the process for establishing Joint Force requirements, which are then assigned to the Military Services to fulfill. This process then informs the Military Services’ budgets, which are reviewed by the OSD-led Program and Budget Review process.

52. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you make to this process?

A: If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff to enable the appropriate level of civilian involvement in this process, particularly to ensure it aligns with broader DoD strategic priorities and ongoing concept development and innovation efforts, and that it is underpinned by robust analysis.

53. What is your understanding of the Department's current process for assessing both U.S. and adversary capabilities?

A: Regarding adversary capabilities, the Department works closely with the intelligence community, the Combatant Commands, the Military Services, and others to monitor adversary posture, capability, and other military developments to ensure both civilian and military leaders, as well as those serving in harm's way, are prepared for potential threats.

Regarding U.S. capabilities, OSD and the Joint Staff work with the Military Services to monitor the capability, capacity, and readiness of the Joint Force in relation to potential future challenges and threats, informed by scenario-based analysis and other assessment means. The insights from these assessments inform a variety of budgetary and force planning processes.

54. If confirmed, what would be your recommendations, if any, for improving these processes?

A: Given Secretary Austin's direction that China is the Department's pacing challenge, I will work, if confirmed, with my colleagues in OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Services to ensure the Department is appropriately focused in its force planning efforts. This includes exploring alternatives, providing civilian leadership on a range of meaningful options, and understanding the sensitivity of our assumptions.

55. In your opinion, is this process adequate in identifying potential solutions (through procurement and concept development), assigning responsibility for implementing those solutions to the appropriate organization, and aligning the defense program to strategic priorities?

A: My understanding is that the Department has the necessary, established force development processes, but that there is certainly room to improve how they are applied to ensure alignment between analysis, strategic priorities, and specific responsibilities with efforts to develop necessary solutions. The Department develops and promulgates strategic and planning guidance effectively, but its analytic enterprise must be reformed to be more rigorous, responsive, and transparent. If confirmed, I would explore how reforms could improve how this process informs both strategy as well as force development processes.

56. If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you make to improve the Department's processes for establishing Joint Force requirements?

A: If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff to enable the appropriate level of civilian involvement in an effort to ensure the requirements process is aligned with DoD strategic priorities and ongoing concept development and innovation efforts. I will also work with the Joint Staff to ensure that the requirements process is underpinned by robust analysis

57. In your view, are there specific capabilities the Joint Force needs to support U.S. interagency approaches to compete below the threshold of armed conflict?

A: The Department's review of its National Defense Strategy (NDS) should appropriately examine competition below the threshold of armed conflict, and where defense roles and capabilities are appropriate and relevant to addressing the unique challenges presented in this area. If confirmed, I will ensure that NDS priorities in this regard are reflected fully via the key strategy implementation tools available, including planning guidance, program decisions, posture, and security cooperation.

Joint Force Capabilities

58. The NDS emphasizes long-term strategic competition with China and Russia. In your assessment, what are the capabilities the Joint Force needs to prevail in competition with China and Russia?

A: The NDS review should result in necessary guidance to the Department regarding long-term strategic competition. In general, my view is that the foundation of competition and deterrence must be a modernized, combat-credible, and resilient Joint Force that leverages new concepts and innovative approaches. Longer-term research and development, as well as modernization efforts, must remain a priority in order to sustain this edge. This approach provides the foundations of military advantage that enable and support a broad range of U.S. Government long-term strategic competition efforts.

59. In your assessment, what are the key areas each Military Service must improve to provide the necessary capabilities and capacity to the Joint Force to prevail in long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia?

A: Each Military Service must engage in and support a robust, responsive, and transparent analytic process to ensure necessary, strategy-driven Joint Force proficiencies and capabilities for long-term strategic competition. This includes the ability of the Military Services to explore the development of new concepts and innovative capabilities tailored to these evolving challenges.

60. In your assessment, what capability and/or capacity shortfalls in the current Joint Force present the most significant challenge to addressing threats posed by China and Russia?

A: If confirmed, I will avail myself of the best analytic products available in order to make a detailed determination as to key capability and capacity shortfalls in the current and future Joint Force. If confirmed, I would oversee Policy's role in shaping the Joint Force, including through oversight of the NDS review. As such, if confirmed, my goal in addressing such critical shortfalls will be to provide thoughtful and rigorous advice to the Secretary and other DoD leadership regarding how to achieve a strong linkage among strategy, analysis, concept development, innovation, and program investments, ensuring the Joint Force is prepared to meet the challenges posed by China and Russia.

61. In your assessment, which programs are the highest priorities for mitigating current and emerging warfighting capability and/or capacity shortfalls in the Joint Force?

A: My assessment would be informed by the emerging findings of the NDS review and key analytic products. Additionally, new warfighting concepts, when fully developed, may call for new capability investments. My general understanding is that the Joint Force must develop enhanced capability in areas such as long range fires, resilient joint command and control, improved cyber capabilities, enhanced space capabilities, and the ability to operate in heavily contested electromagnetic environments.

62. In your view, are there additional capabilities that DOD requires to successfully execute operational concepts in support of the NDS? Please explain your answer.

A: As the NDS review and joint concept development work are still underway, I can share general thoughts about what I personally see as critical areas of emerging technology and capability. Artificial intelligence and advanced computing will likely serve as key enablers for a wide range of DoD capabilities, including command and control; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and autonomous systems. In order to implement the next NDS effectively in a sustainable manner for the coming years, the Department must resource and integrate areas of technology such as these to ensure critical military advantages in the face of advanced adversaries and contested environments.

63. Does DOD have the requisite decision support—analytic expertise, processes, and tools—to support the Secretary of Defense and you, if confirmed as the ASD(SPC), in evaluating warfighting return on investments?

A: I believe the Secretary and Deputy Secretary have made clear that institutional reform and change is required to out-innovate, out-compete, and, if necessary, out-fight potential threats. If confirmed, I will review whether the Secretary and other key leaders are receiving appropriate decision support to inform and shape these larger efforts, and will determine where improvements may be required.

Global Force Posture

In February, President Biden tasked Secretary Austin to conduct a global force posture review of the Department's military footprint, resources, strategy, and missions.

64. If confirmed, what would be your role in this Global Force Posture Review?

A: If confirmed as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities, I would lead the implementation of the 120-day Global Posture Review (GPR), which I understand will conclude later this summer. I would provide oversight of follow-on actions resulting from the GPR, including adjustments to rotational and permanently stationed forces overseas, and the incorporation of longer-term strategic considerations into the NDS review.

65. What changes, if any, in the strategic and operational environment do you think have consequences for how U.S. forces are postured around the world, particularly in Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and the Middle East?

A: As directed by the President and Secretary Austin, the Global Posture Review is intended to evaluate the tradeoffs required to implement our national security priorities. DoD has taken the President's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, along with analysis of the operational environment in which our forces are positioned around the globe, to assess the alignment of our overseas posture. As the Secretary has made clear publicly, and as articulated in the China Task Force's findings, China is DoD's pacing threat and DoD posture and capability development should prioritize maintaining DoD's deterrent and warfighting advantage in the Indo-Pacific region. At the same time, the Department must account for the threat from Russia and a dynamic threat environment. Any adjustments to overseas posture would occur through standing global force management processes after engagement with allies and partners and consultations with Congress.

66. In your assessment, will changes to U.S. global force posture be required to implement the Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) concept and Global Operating Model concept in the NDS?

A: Changes to global force posture are not required to implement these concepts. However, these concepts will continue to inform the posture adjustments DoD makes in the future and how DoD conducts adversary-oriented dynamic deployments.

67. In your view, does the DFE concept need to be clarified in order to implement force posture changes?

A: DoD has clarified, refined, and implemented the Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) concept over the past two years. The DFE construct and execution of numerous DFE events, both joint and with allies and partners, demonstrate the flexibility and capabilities of DoD force employment around the world. DoD is in the early stages of National Defense Strategy review, which will be followed by development of the Guidance for Employment of the Force. If confirmed, I will work across DoD Components throughout the development of these strategic

documents to identify opportunities for improving guidance and concepts for how DoD uses our forces globally.

68. If so, what sort of clarifications are required, in your opinion?

A: DoD has had success in refining and implementing the DFE concept over the past two years. If confirmed, I will work to identify opportunities for improving guidance and concepts for global force employment..

69. Both Admiral Davidson, the previous commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) and the newly confirmed INDOPACOM commander, Admiral Aquilino, indicate that the balance of military power in the Indo-Pacific has eroded in a way that is more favorable for China. Do you agree, and if so what elements of U.S. force posture must be modified to restore a more favorable balance of power for the United States and its allies and partners?

A: I agree that the rapid and ongoing growth of China's military capabilities poses a serious challenge to the United States. I believe that solutions to this challenge will require a posture aligned with credible, analytically supported operational concepts – that is, forces, capabilities, and infrastructure that effectively address key operational challenges posed by our most capable adversaries. If confirmed, I will support the development, assessment, and implementation of such concepts and posture.

70. What is your understanding and assessment of the relative cost and benefits of the permanent versus rotational forces forward stationed overseas, particularly in Europe and the Indo-Pacific?

A: The appropriate balance among forward-stationed, rotationally deployed, and surge forces, including the costs and benefits of each, varies from region to region based upon several factors such as the capabilities required to deter particular threats and the availability of access and basing in allied and partner countries. However, each of the three components is vital to our overall global defense posture. If confirmed, I will review our global force posture in light of the outcomes from the Global Posture Review and other strategic guidance to ensure we are striking the proper balance in enhancing our deterrence against our priority threats, in close partnership with allies and partners.

71. What is your understanding and assessment of the Department of Defense's methodology and assumptions used to evaluate the relative cost of overseas posture compared to stationing forces in the United States?

A: I have not had an opportunity to review the Department's methodology and assumptions to evaluate the relative costs of maintaining U.S. forces overseas, either rotationally or permanently stationed, compared to maintaining them in the United States. If confirmed, I will take a close look at the overall global force posture processes to ensure they are appropriately designed and scoped to provide recommendations consistent with both strategic and budgetary guidance.

72. If confirmed, what actions would you take, or what changes would you recommend, if any, to the Department’s methodology and assumptions in determining the cost of overseas force posture compared to forces stationed in the United States?

A: If confirmed, I will take a close look at the overall global force posture processes to ensure they are appropriately designed and scoped to provide recommendations consistent with both strategic and budgetary guidance. I will also work closely with colleagues from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer and the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation to ensure we develop resource-informed assessments of overseas posture.

73. Are there any gaps or shortfalls in force size, or deficiencies in force posture that must be remedied to implement new operational concepts, in your view?

A: I believe that joint concepts are critical to identifying gaps and shortfalls in force design and posture. Joint concepts that credibly and effectively address key operational challenges posed by our most capable adversaries should inform the range of options that we provide to senior leaders. If confirmed, I will support rigorous analysis, experimentation, and wargaming to assess our joint concepts, in order to determine where changes in the capability, capacity, readiness, and posture of the future joint force may be necessary.

74. If confirmed, what would be your role in addressing any gaps, shortfalls, and deficiencies?

A: If confirmed, I will support rigorous analysis, experimentation, and wargaming to assess the Department’s concepts for future warfighting. I will seek to ensure that our operational concepts are strategy-driven, operationally effective, and informed by joint requirements. Analytically credible concepts are crucial to identifying gaps, shortfalls, and deficiencies in our current force, and to informing combat-credible and cost-effective solutions.

75. Does DOD have the requisite modeling, simulation, experimentation, and wargaming processes and tools—to support the Secretary of Defense and you, if confirmed as ASD(SPC)—in rigorously testing and validating DOD’s force size and posture constructs? Please explain your answer.

A: I am strongly committed to ensuring that the Department’s investment decisions – including on force sizing, capabilities, and posture – are informed by rigorous analysis across a wide range of tools. If confirmed, I will take a close look at the Department’s analytical capabilities to ensure they are appropriate to support senior leaders’ decisions on these critical issues.

Approaches to Strategic Competition

The NDS references “expanding the competitive space.” Using different approaches, both China and Russia have been successful competing with the United States below the threshold of armed conflict.

76. What does “expanding the competitive space” mean for competition with China and Russia?

A: My understanding of this concept, which was introduced in the 2018 NDS, suggests that it sought to focus DoD on identifying and then leveraging favorable asymmetries that exist between the United States and our competitors. It also highlighted the need to think broadly about the approaches and tools the Department should apply as it seeks to advance defense objectives. Finally, the 2018 NDS also states that “effectively expanding the competitive space requires combined actions with the U.S. interagency to employ all dimensions of national power.”

77. What are the capabilities the Joint Force needs to compete below the threshold of armed conflict?

A: Competition with China and Russia is global in scope and has both military and non-military dimensions. Prioritization of DoD resources must be bound by DoD’s mission and authorities. DoD must focus on activities and operations, in concert with allies and partners, that meaningfully enhance military advantage (e.g., multilateral exercises, security cooperation, information operations, special operations, posture enhancements). Enhancing ally and partner capabilities, interoperability, and resilience is also critical in order to bolster their resistance to coercion and to enable increased reliance on them as additions to U.S. capabilities in the event of aggression.

The NDS also states that “effectively expanding the competitive space requires combined actions with the U.S. interagency to employ all dimensions of national power. We will assist the efforts of the Departments of State, Treasury, Justice, Energy, Homeland Security, Commerce, USAID, as well as the Intelligence Community, law enforcement, and others to identify and build partnerships to address areas of economic, technological, and informational vulnerabilities.”

78. In your view, has the interagency been effective in planning and executing whole-of-government efforts to expand the competitive space? Please explain your answer.

A: I believe that U.S. departments and agencies have made notable progress in advancing national objectives by pitting U.S. strengths against competitor weaknesses. For example, diplomatic initiatives such as work in the Quad format (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) provide a powerful example of how multilateral cooperation can be used to address common security challenges. Another example is the Russian Influence Group, co-chaired by

U.S. European Command and the Department of State, which identifies whole-of-government solutions to counter Russian threat networks.

79. If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you have to better employ all dimensions of national power in competing with and countering Chinese and Russian hybrid and malign influence operations?

A: I believe further prioritization of key challenges and opportunities, increased clarity and shared understanding of responsibilities and authorities across the U.S. interagency, and better information sharing and integration of efforts can help to further strengthen our collective ability to advance key national objectives.

Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy and Posture

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reaffirmed long-held American doctrine that includes limiting the use of nuclear weapons to “extreme circumstances” and the need to maintain the nation’s nuclear triad of land-, sea-, and air-based capabilities. The NPR also recommended the development of a low-yield nuclear weapon to deter threats from Russia, and potentially, the return of a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile to the Navy fleet.

80. Do you agree with the 2010 and 2018 NPRs that nuclear weapons should only be used under extreme circumstances to protect vital interests?

Yes.

Over the past eight years, China, Russia, and North Korea all have expanded and modernized their nuclear arsenals, and all are continuing to do so.

81. Given these actions and the increasing nuclear threat to the United States and its Allies, do you believe it is prudent to significantly alter U.S. policies that have helped deter nuclear aggression for more than 70 years?

A: If confirmed, I would be responsible for completing the National Defense Strategy and associated strategic reviews, including a nuclear posture review. This review provides an opportunity to ensure our nuclear policy and posture is appropriately aligned with the current and future security environment.

In November 2020, NATO’s Secretary General stated that, “Simply giving up our deterrent without any guarantees that others will do the same is a dangerous option because a world where Russia, China, North Korea and others have nuclear weapons, but NATO does not, is not a safer world.”

82. Do you agree with the Secretary General that the world is a safer place due to the existence of an effective U.S. nuclear deterrent and the extended deterrence assurances we provide to our allies? Please explain your answer.

A: I agree with the Secretary General's statement that the world is a safer place due to the existence of an effective U.S. nuclear deterrent and the extended deterrence assurance we provide to our Allies. The fundamental purpose of NATO's nuclear capabilities is to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression.

As Secretary Austin has repeatedly said, our Allies are a force multiplier and a strategic advantage that none of our competitors can match. With this, the United States has long committed to extending nuclear deterrence to a number of treaty Allies. U.S. nuclear weapons should remain in NATO countries and have contributed to deterrence efforts for the past 50 years.

U.S. nuclear forces are nearing the end of their useful lives. These capabilities must be updated over the next 20 years if we are to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent. This update, largely a one-for-one replacement of our existing force, stands in sharp contrast to Russia's and China's efforts to update their nuclear arsenals, which efforts the current Commander of United States Strategic Command has characterized as a "... breathtaking expansion of military capabilities." This expansion has also coincided with an increasing role for nuclear weapons in their defense strategies.

83. What is your understanding of the state of Russia's and China's nuclear forces?

A: I understand that Russia has completed a majority of its planned modernization of its strategic forces and is pursuing new strategic range nuclear systems. I am aware that Russia is poised to increase the size of its theater and tactical nuclear weapons arsenal, and that China is rapidly increasing the quality and quantity of its nuclear forces.

If confirmed, I will ensure these nuclear programs receive appropriate analysis and attention in our strategic reviews. Our policy, posture, and strategy must be informed by the strategic rationale behind Russian and Chinese programs, and must appropriately address these improved capabilities to ensure our deterrence posture remains strong and credible.

84. Do you believe that Russia's and China's ongoing nuclear modernization and expansion efforts pose an increasing threat to the United States and its Allies? Please explain your answer.

A: Yes. I believe that the United States faces an increasingly complex global security environment where both China and Russia have demonstrated their capability and intent to advance their interests at the expense of the United States and our allies and partners. Secretary Austin has described China as the pacing threat as they have rapidly become more capable and assertive. China's nuclear modernization presents an increasing challenge for the United States. Russia's conventional and nuclear modernization programs are also adding new systems that undermine strategic stability and threaten the United States and its allies and partners.

85. Do you agree with the assessment of the past four Secretaries of Defense that nuclear deterrence is DOD's highest priority mission and that modernizing our Nation's nuclear forces is a critical national security priority? Please explain your answer.

A: As both Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks testified, I believe that nuclear deterrence is DoD's highest priority mission, and that nuclear modernization of the triad is critical to U.S. national security. If confirmed, I fully support modernizing the triad.

86. Our Allies have been historically concerned that the adoption of a "no first use policy" for U.S. nuclear weapons would signal a weakening of extended deterrence assurances. What are your views on the propriety of a "no first use" policy?

A: It is my view that the United States' declaratory policy should advance our nuclear policy objectives, support our deterrence strategy, and credibly assure allies and partners as to our continued extended deterrence commitments to them. Declaratory policy plays an important part in demonstrating our commitment to our allies and providing assurances and our commitment to extended deterrence should remain strong. If confirmed, I am committed to robust consultation with our allies and ensuring that our commitment to our allies remains rock-solid, and is perceived as such.

87. What are your views on a sole purpose doctrine for nuclear weapons?

A: It is my view that the United States' declaratory policy should support our policy objectives, support our deterrence strategy, and credibly assure allies and partners as to our continued extended deterrence commitments to them.

In keeping with past practice for incoming Administrations, the Department will review U.S. nuclear posture and I expect this will include declaratory policy. This type of review will afford the Department an opportunity to consider the views of allies and to assess whether the conditions exist today for the United States to adopt an alternative declaratory policy safely.

Ultimately, I understand that any change to U.S. declaratory policy would be made by the President.

88. Do you agree with Secretary Austin that modernizing each leg of the nuclear triad and the Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons complex is a critical national security priority? Please explain your answer.

A: I agree with Secretary Austin that we must modernize each leg of the nuclear triad while doing so in a cost-effective and judicious manner. I also agree that the DOE nuclear weapons complex is at the very heart of our nuclear deterrent. Maintaining a credible, reliable, safe, and effective nuclear capability is of the utmost importance and remains vital to U.S. national

security, and the security of our allies. It is my understanding that this is why the fiscal year 2022 budget invests in nuclear modernization efforts.

89. Do you believe the current program of record is sufficient to support the full modernization of the nuclear triad, including delivery systems, warheads, and infrastructure? Please explain your answer.

A: I believe that the triad remains critical to our Nation's defense. If confirmed, I will request immediate briefings on the current program of record, including requirements and modernization plans, costs, and schedules. I am committed to ensuring we have a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent and I anticipate that the current modernization programs will be a part of the Administration's upcoming nuclear posture review.

90. Do you support the continuation of the W93 program and the parallel efforts to collaborate with the United Kingdom in the maintenance of its independent nuclear deterrent? Please explain your answer.

A: In my view, the United States has a special relationship with the United Kingdom, and the UK's sea-based deterrent contributes to NATO's collective defense. The UK's nuclear forces remain a key contributor to NATO's nuclear deterrent posture.

Although I anticipate further briefings on the topic, if confirmed, I expect to work closely with all of our allies, including the United Kingdom, to ensure both their continued security and the continued security of the United States.

91. What is your view of the assertion that if the ICBM leg of the triad is allowed to age out and fails to meet U.S. STRATCOM requirements, the United States would have a monad comprising our submarine force, but not a dyad, given that our bombers are not on alert day-to-day?

A: I personally support maintaining an effective and credible nuclear triad of land, air, and sea-based platforms; I am committed to modernizing the nuclear triad. As Secretary Austin has stated, updating and overhauling our nation's nuclear forces in a cost-effective and judicious manner is a critical national security priority.

92. ADM Richard has testified that if the ICBM leg of the triad is allowed to age out and not meet STRATCOM requirements he would recommend re-alerting our bombers to be more responsive and improve the survivability of the force. What are your views of this recommendation?

A: I am aware that Admiral Richard testified on this recommendation. It is my understanding that the fiscal year 2022 budget request invests in nuclear modernization efforts, including the inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM)-leg of the triad, and that modernization programs will be reviewed in the context of our strategic reviews. If confirmed, I will request immediate

briefings on the current program of record to understand more fully any performance and schedule risks related to the land-based leg of the triad.

Missile Defense

The United States enjoys a measure of protection against ballistic missile threats from rogue nations like North Korea and Iran, but the threat from Russian and Chinese ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles against U.S. forces, allies, and the U.S. homeland continues to grow. The 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) codified existing policy on missile defense and endorsed follow-on actions to improve U.S. capability.

93. What are your views on the relationship between missile defense and nuclear deterrence?

A: The relationship between U.S. missile defense and the U.S. nuclear arsenal is complementary --both capabilities are essential to deterring an attack against the United States. U.S. nuclear weapons present a credible threat of response to a nuclear attack, or threat of attack, against any adversary. U.S. missile defenses provide deterrence and, if necessary, damage limitation against a limited nuclear attack by a rogue country, such as North Korea, and serve as a means of strengthening extended deterrence and assurance for allies threatened by North Korea.

94. In your view, are U.S. capabilities, in both quantity and quality, adequate to ensure the protection of U.S. and allied forces deployed in the European AOR from Russian ballistic and cruise missiles?

A: Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) plays an important role in deterring and mitigating adversary anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. Russia is investing in an A2/AD strategy to impede our freedom of movement in Europe. If confirmed, I will work with our European Allies and partners to ensure we have the right capacity, capabilities, and posture needed to address Russia's capabilities and ensure our freedom of movement in theater.

95. In your view, are U.S. capabilities, in both quantity and quality, adequate to ensure the protection of U.S. and allied forces deployed in the Indo-Pacific AOR from Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles?

A: The regional missile threat posed by China is growing. The Department is actively working with allies and partners to enhance regional missile defense efforts. Our cooperation strengthens deterrence and provides assurance essential to the unity of our alliances which are threatened by missile coercion and attacks. If confirmed, I will seek to work with relevant combatant commands, as well as allies and partners, to ensure we are postured to address threats to our interest in this key region.

96. How do you view the role of missile defense in implementation of the NDS?

A: Missile defense is an important component of our national defense strategy. Homeland ballistic missile defense protects the United States from nuclear coercion or attack from rogue states, thereby strengthening our respective alliance security architecture. Regional missile defenses strengthen our deterrence and defense postures, and help ensure freedom of maneuver and effective combat operations by offering a measure of protection for deployed forces, allies and partners, and critical infrastructure abroad.

97. Do you believe missile defense policy should be limited to countering only rogue nations, such as North Korea and Iran?

A: I support longstanding U.S. policy to rely on nuclear deterrence to safeguard the United States against large-scale strategic missile threats from Russia and China, and to pursue missile defense against a more limited threat, such as from North Korea.

98. The recent FTM-44 test, in which an AEGIS system was able to destroy an ICBM in flight raises the possibility of a layered missile defense of Ground Based Interceptors, Aegis and THAAD. What are your views on a layered missile defense?

A: Any decision to bolster homeland defense with new or existing capabilities will require weighing its cost, feasibility, and potential impacts on strategic stability against the potential added benefit to security. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Department will use congressionally-directed layered homeland defense analysis to help determine the proper mix of capabilities to defend the homeland against the rogue state threat.

99. What are your views on the requirement for a missile defense system to protect Guam—a system other than, or in addition to THAAD?

A: I understand the Department is nearing completion of in-depth analysis regarding missile defense options for the defense of Guam. If confirmed, I will work with DoD components to evaluate these options in an effort to ensure the best solution is formulated given operational requirements, costs, and relevant policy considerations.

100. What are your views on the necessity and propriety of maintaining a Homeland Defense Radar for Hawaii?

A: It is my understanding that Hawaii is currently protected by our missile defense system but that the Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii (HDR-H) could improve our defense capabilities for Hawaii against advancing rogue state missile threats. The defense of Hawaii is important, and, if confirmed, I will work with the Department's civilian and military leadership to develop effective and affordable systems to enhance our capabilities against these evolving threats.

101. What are your views regarding the Next Generation Interceptor program?

A: Defense of the homeland is a DoD priority. The Department must provide reliable and cost-effective missile defenses and continue to develop more reliable defenses as early as possible, and the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) is a key element of this. If confirmed, I will monitor the NGI acquisition plan closely and ensure that it adequately addresses the threat, and aligns with the Administration's policies.

Climate Change

President Biden has declared that climate change is an essential element of national security and foreign policy. Secretary Austin has stated that DOD will include the security implications of climate change in risk analyses, strategy development and planning guidance. If confirmed, you would have a major role in implementing this guidance.

102. What is your understanding of the ways that climate change poses a risk to national security and the Department's responsibility to prepare for its impacts?

A: Climate and environmental security risks pose unique challenges to the U.S. homeland and DoD initiatives overseas. Many of our allies and partners face similar challenges. As the President directed, climate-related factors will be incorporated into our strategic planning efforts. If confirmed, I will seek to bring increased focus on the effects of climate change, including through the NDS review. The Department should work closely with the Intelligence Community, other U.S. departments and agencies, and our allies and partners to identify and address acute risks that a changing climate poses to the Department's ability to advance priority defense objectives. If confirmed, I will also support the Department's efforts to lead on climate change, including by addressing our carbon footprint and incentivizing the development of climate-friendly technologies.

103. If confirmed, what are your views on incorporating the security implications of climate change into the Department's risk analyses, strategy development, and planning guidance?

A: Addressing climate change is among the Biden Administration's top priorities. If confirmed, I would work to implement the President and Secretary Austin's direction to integrate climate change considerations into risk analyses, strategy development, and planning guidance. The Department can also be a platform for positive change, developing climate-friendly technologies at scale.

Stability Operations

104. In your view, what are the key lessons learned from the stability operations conducted in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan?

A: I believe U.S. military efforts should, in the first instance, complement a broad national approach. It is also in our interests to ensure the Department embarks upon major initiatives with clear priorities, effective planning (cognizant of underlying political, economic, and social issues), and regular built-in assessment processes.

105. What do you believe is the proper role for the Department of Defense in the planning and conduct of stability operations in future contingencies?

A: President Biden’s Interim National Security Strategy Guidance makes clear the need to make smart, disciplined choices about the responsible use of our military, and to ensure that diplomacy, development, and economic statecraft are the leading instruments of American foreign policy. From a roles and responsibilities perspective, the Department of State leads U.S. interagency stabilization efforts, with U.S. Agency for International Development being the lead implementing agent, and DoD in support.

Defense Security Cooperation

DOD’s contribution to strengthening alliances and partnerships comprises a wide range of programs and activities designed to improve security cooperation and foster interoperability and preparedness. These programs include foreign military sales, foreign military funding, exercises and training events, military-to-military exchanges, and partnering to develop key technological capabilities.

106. What is the appropriate role of the Department of Defense in the conduct of security sector assistance?

A: Aligned with whole-of-government security sector assistance efforts, Department of Defense security cooperation tools bolster ally and partner capabilities for defense, advance shared national security interests through addressing regional security challenges, and strengthen relationships with key allies and partners. DoD security cooperation, developed and executed in coordination with the State Department, serves to reinvigorate and modernize U.S. alliances and partnerships, reinforcing a critical American asymmetric advantage in strategic competition.

107. What should be the Department of Defense’s relationship with the Department of State in the conduct of these activities?

A: Effective DoD security cooperation aligns with and advances broader U.S. foreign policy objectives driven by the Department of State. Ensuring this alignment requires thorough collaboration with the Department of State through interagency processes and regular engagement between the two departments at all levels.

108. What should be the strategic objectives of the Defense Department’s efforts to build the capabilities of a partner nation’s security forces?

A: DoD building partner capacity efforts should focus on enhancing ally and partner capabilities to effectively operate alongside and in lieu of U.S. forces to address shared national security challenges. Security cooperation investments should be targeted to advance broader goals in

strategic competition.

109. What steps, if any, would you recommend for ensuring that the Defense Department’s strategy for security cooperation in each of the geographic combatant commands is fully aligned with the NDS?

A: I understand the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD Policy), as delegated by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Section 382, has made meaningful progress in advancing the strategic oversight of security cooperation activities since the reforms codified by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2017. If confirmed, I will review existing processes and assess whether additional guidance may be necessary to ensure DoD security cooperation activities are developed, executed, and assessed in alignment with the forthcoming National Defense Strategy.

110. In your view, is the Defense Department appropriately organized and resourced to effectively conduct such activities?

A: DoD security cooperation investments are essential to the national security strategic goal of reinvigorating and modernizing U.S. alliances and partnerships. If confirmed, I will support the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy’s responsibility for oversight of strategic policy, guidance, and resource allocation for security cooperation programs and assess whether organizational or resource adjustments may be necessary in support of DoD strategic priorities.

111. If not, what changes would you recommend, if confirmed?

A: If confirmed, I will assess whether there are any additional organizational, legislative, or resource adjustments that are necessary for the effective implementation and strategic oversight of Department of Defense security cooperation activities.

Command Climate Survey

112. If confirmed, would you plan to administer a command climate survey to the workforce under your leadership and management?

A: Yes. I believe conducting a survey into the command climate of the workforce will provide insight to the organization and serve as a touchpoint for how a safe, respectful, and productive environment can be sustained and improved.

Sexual Harassment

In responding to the 2018 DOD Civilian Employee Workplace and Gender Relations survey, 17.7 percent of female and 5.8 percent of male DOD employees indicated that they had experienced sexual harassment and/or gender discrimination by “someone at work” in the 12 months prior to completing the survey.

113. What is your assessment of the current climate regarding sexual harassment and gender discrimination in the OUSD(P)?

A: I have not had the opportunity to conduct an assessment of the current climate regarding sexual harassment and gender discrimination in the OUSD(P). If confirmed, as one of the senior leaders in the OUSD(P), I would view it as my responsibility to ensure a safe and respectful workplace is afforded to all employees.

114. If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to receive or become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or discrimination from an employee of the Office of the ASD(SPC)?

A: The safety and security of the employees of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities, and the Department of Defense as a whole, are of the greatest importance. If confirmed, and if I were to receive a complaint of sexual harassment or discrimination, I would first ensure that the complainant was given respect and received in a safe, private place. Additionally, I would work with all of the resources available, including legal staff, the human resources office, and the employee's supervisory chain to support the employee concerned and to resolve the complaint appropriately. Each member of the SPC workforce deserves a safe, and respectful workplace free from abuse of any kind. If confirmed, I will communicate my expectations of this standard of respect and professionalism and that any allegations be addressed properly.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

115. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

A: Yes.

116. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

A: Yes.

117. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this

committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

A: Yes.

118. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

A: Yes.

119. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

A: Yes.

120. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

A: Yes.

121. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

A: Yes.