

**Senate Armed Services Committee**  
**Advance Questions for General John Hyten, USAF,**  
**Nominee for Appointment to be Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

**Duties and Responsibilities**

**Section 154 of title 10, U.S. Code, establishes the position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and provides that the Vice Chairman performs the duties prescribed for him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in addition to such other duties as may be prescribed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. Furthermore, other provisions of law and DOD issuances assign to the Vice Chairman a breadth of duties and responsibilities.**

**What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?**

The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the nation's second-highest-ranking military officer, responsible for overseeing joint military requirements, representing the military in National Security Council Deputies meetings, and performing other duties as directed by the Chairman.

**What background and experience do you possess that qualify you to perform the Vice Chairman's duties and responsibilities?**

I have been an Air Force officer for over 38 years serving at every level of command, from tactical to strategic levels. I have served in multiple capacities within the Pentagon on the Joint Staff, at the Service Secretary and Combatant Command level. My work, especially in key national security nuclear, space, missile defense, electronic warfare, and cyberspace mission areas, and across all domains, gives me a unique perspective for the challenges our nation faces.

As Commander, USSTRATCOM, I have provided my best military advice to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense and the President on multiple occasions. The breadth of my experience, gained first in engineering and acquisition, then in operations, and finally through positions of senior leadership affords me the understanding and awareness to support the Chairman and further enable the Joint Force through integration, relevance, and resiliency with a focus on future national security challenges. I consider it a privilege and an honor to serve this great nation and fully recognize the complexity our military faces given the present and projected world security situation. I do not possess all the answers, but I will remain open to a wide variety of expert opinions in order to inform and offer my best military advice.

**In light of the lines of effort set forth in the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), what other duties do you anticipate the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs would prescribe for you, if confirmed?**

The incoming Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Milley, has indicated he does not initially intend to expand the Vice Chairman's duties beyond what is stipulated in statute.

If confirmed, I expect to emphasize efforts to continue to strengthen our military readiness and reform Department business practices for greater performance and affordability.

We must focus on targeted, disciplined increases in personnel and platforms to meet key capability and capacity needs in all domains and theaters of operation.

**Do you believe that there are any steps you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?**

There is nothing specific at this time. I will continue to maintain an open mind for thoughtful insight from many sources to ensure our military forces are positioned to serve our nation.

**Are there other roles or responsibilities that should be assigned to the Vice Chairman, in your view?**

I do not believe there are any additional duties to assign to the Vice Chairman, beyond those stipulated in statute. If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman and the Director of the Joint Staff, if necessary, to ensure the Joint Staff's effectiveness.

**If confirmed, and given your experience and observations as the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, what innovative ideas would you consider providing to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense regarding the organization and operations of the Joint Staff?**

I do not have any plans at this time to change the organization and operations of the Joint Staff. If confirmed, I will review the Joint Staff processes in place to evaluate opportunities for improved effectiveness.

**If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure that your tenure as [Vice] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff epitomizes the fundamental requirement for civilian control of the Armed Forces embedded in the U.S. Constitution and other laws?**

The Constitution and applicable laws clearly articulate that we are a nation under civilian control; it is the foundation of our great nation. If confirmed as the Vice Chairman, I will make it my priority to ensure military options are aligned with a whole of government approach and in full support of our civilian leadership. Civilian control of the military is a bedrock principle of our country and I will do everything in my power to ensure it is upheld to the fullest extent.

## **Deputy Secretary of Defense**

**The Deputy Secretary of Defense and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff often partner to lead the Department in addressing emergent issues and policy challenges that require the integration of civilian and military expertise and perspective.**

**If confirmed, how would you structure your relationship with the Deputy Secretary of Defense?**

If confirmed, I will work hand-in-hand with the Deputy Secretary of Defense to foster and build a relationship. Activities will include participation in multiple meetings each week on emerging issues, co-chairing senior leader forums to provide guidance to the Department, and attending a recurring weekly one-on-one meeting.

**If confirmed, how would you expect to allocate responsibilities between the Deputy Secretary of Defense and yourself as co-chairs of the Deputy's Management Action Group?**

I view the Deputy Secretary of Defense as a close and complementary partner in managing the agenda and execution of the Deputy's Management Action Group. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Deputy Secretary of Defense on a wide variety of issues to include the full range of strategy, policy, resourcing, and management issues impacting the Department. I view the Deputy Secretary as an indispensable contributor and advisor.

**In your view, how could the Deputy's Management Action Group be more effective in ensuring that DOD issues with resource, management, and broad strategic and/or policy implications are addressed in a manner that aligns with the Secretary of Defense's priorities and the Department's planning and programming schedule? Please explain your answer.**

The Deputy's Management Action Group is a critical forum for sharing information, creating alignment across civilian and military components, exercising effective civilian control and oversight of the Department, and making decisions on major issues. One way to make this forum more effective is to identify additional lower level forums working on issues that would benefit from a higher-level review to broaden information sharing, remove obstacles, and bring decisions to closure.

## **Major Challenges and Opportunities**

**What do you consider to be the most significant challenges you will face if confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?**

Our nation faces strategic challenges in an increasingly complex global security environment. We must position forces to flexibly respond with appropriate capabilities and options at the time and place of our choosing to assure allies and deter adversaries.

We also rely heavily on our allies and partners to address various security challenges and increase our collective strength. Specifically, we are in the midst of a great power competition with Russia and China and still face challenges from Iran, North Korea, and violent extremist organizations. In order to effectively address the threats we face, we are modernizing our military and maintaining its readiness to engage anywhere at a time and place of our choosing.

**What plans do you have for addressing each of these challenges, if confirmed?**

If confirmed, I intend to work alongside the Chairman, combatant commanders-- who establish requirements, and the Services--who are required to deliver capabilities.

The Joint Staff will collaborate with interagency partners and Congress to assess the global security challenges and provide a flexible, agile deterrent with operational options for decision-makers.

**To the extent the Joint Staff performs functions that overlap with those of other DOD Components, what would be your approach, if confirmed, to consolidating and reducing those redundancies?**

If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman to ensure there is due diligence given to this matter to ensure change is legal and properly implemented.

**The Joint Chiefs of Staff**

**Section 921 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 made changes to section 151 of title 10, U. S. Code, concerning the service of members of the Joint Chiefs (other than the Chairman) as military advisors to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.**

**What is your assessment of the authorities and process by which members of the Joint Chiefs (other than the Chairman) provide military advice and opinions to the President, National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and civilian leadership of the Department of Defense?**

Existing authorities and processes facilitate the flow and exchange of advice and opinions to senior leaders. If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman to facilitate any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, either individually or collectively, in providing their advice directly to the President, National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, the Secretary of Defense, or Congress. Additionally, I will foster a collaborative environment that promotes respect for dissent and strengthens our national security in a very complex security environment.

**Will you commit that, if confirmed, you would always provide your best military advice to the President, the National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, and civilian leadership of the Department of Defense, even when your advice and opinions differ from those of the Chairman or the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?**

Yes, if confirmed

### **2018 National Defense Strategy**

**The 2018 NDS moved beyond the “two-war construct” that has guided defense strategy, capability development, and investment for the past three decades, and refocused DOD on a “2 + 3 framework”. That framework prioritizes “great power competition and conflict” with China and Russia as the primary challenges with which the United States must contend, together with the imperative of deterring and countering rogue regimes like North Korea and Iran. Finally the framework emphasizes the defeat of terrorist threats to the U.S. and the consolidation of gains in Iraq and Afghanistan, while moving to a “more resource sustainable” approach to counterterrorism.**

**In your view, does the 2018 NDS accurately assess the current strategic environment, including prioritization among the most critical and enduring threats to the national security of the United States and its allies? Please explain your answer.**

Yes, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Force provided their best military advice during the development of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). It accurately assesses the current strategic environment and articulates the position of the Joint Chiefs with appropriate focus on great power competition.

**In your view, does the 2018 NDS correctly specify the priority missions of the DOD and the capabilities by which DOD can achieve its objectives in the context of the current strategic environment? What do you perceive as the areas of greatest risk?**

Yes, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) correctly prioritizes the Department of Defense’s mission. China and Russia’s growing capabilities pose the greatest risk to our nation and strategic stability.

**In your view, are the plans and programs of the Commanders of the Combatant Commands appropriately focused, scoped, and resourced to counter the threats and achieve the national security objectives identified by the NDS?**

Combatant Command (CCMDs) Contingency Plans (CONPLANs) and Operational Plans (OPLANs) are necessary but not sufficient to capture the full scope of operations across the globe. In response, the Joint Force is developing Globally Integrated Base plans (GIBP) for each of the priority challenges. GIBPs use the capstone OPLAN to prioritize

military objectives across the globe, identify global campaigning activities, and achieve the NDS's national security objectives.

**If confirmed, what changes might you propose to the missions, responsibilities (including geographic boundaries), and force structure allocated to the Combatant Commands, best to implement the 2018 NDS? Please explain your answer.**

The Joint Force considers ways to improve the combatant commands' ability to achieve military objectives. If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman to review the relevant studies regarding combatant commands' roles and missions and offer my recommendations.

**In your view, are the Combat Support Agencies properly designated, structured, and manned to support implementation of the 2018 NDS and execution of the Combatant Commanders' operational plans? Please explain your answer.**

Yes, they are properly designated, structured, and manned to support implementation of the 2018 NDS and combatant command (CCMD) operational plans. Combat Support Agencies (CSA) operate in a supporting-to-supported command relationship. This relationship provides the agencies tasking and guidance to support combatant commanders consistent with the NDS. Each CSA Director has the responsibility to evaluate their requirements and plan, program, and budget accordingly. As required by Title 10, the CJCS submits biennial assessments of the responsiveness and readiness of each agency to support the CCMDs. While each of these assessments has highlighted areas for improvement, none have identified major shortfalls that require changes with respect to designation, structure or manning.

**If confirmed, what changes might you propose to the missions and responsibilities of the Combat Support Agencies, better to implement the 2018 NDS? Please explain your answer.**

The Joint Force considers ways to improve the combatant commands' ability to achieve military objectives. If confirmed, I will review the relevant studies regarding roles and missions and offer my recommendations to the Chairman.

**If confirmed, what changes or adjustments would you advise the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make in the Department's implementation of the 2018 NDS?**

If confirmed, I will ensure that the National Defense Strategy (NDS) is periodically reviewed and if I think changes are required then I will advise the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs at that time. I concur with the National Military Strategy (NMS), which details specific military policies required to meet the guidance contained in the NDS.

**If confirmed, what revisions or adjustments would you recommend the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff make to the 2018 NDS as a result of changes in assumptions, policy, or other factors?**

The eight Combat Support Agencies (CSA) provide unique combat support capabilities to the combatant commands, and are well established within the DoD. If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman and respective CSA to articulate any concerns I might have, or are raised through the Joint Staff's biennial assessments.

### **DOD Strategic Guidance Documents**

**What is your understanding and evaluation of DOD's processes for strategic assessment, analysis, decision making, and reporting for each of the following strategic guidance documents? If confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, specifically what would be your role in generating and shaping the content of each such document?**

#### **National Defense Strategy (NDS)**

The NDS reflects the Secretary of Defense's analysis of the security environment and provides direction for force-management and force-planning priorities over the next 7 years. If confirmed, as the Vice Chairman, I will work with the Chairman to provide military advice to the Secretary of Defense to help shape those priorities and then direct the National Military Strategy (NMS) to develop the ways and means to meet objectives.

#### **National Military Strategy (NMS)**

The NMS builds upon NDS direction for "what" to do and provides the Joint Force a strategy of "how" to achieve the objectives. The NMS directs the Joint Force in a continuum of strategic direction (ways and means) as well as a prioritization framework for force development and force design for the near and far term.

#### **Guidance for Employment of the Force**

The Presidentially-approved 2018 Contingency Planning Guidance (formerly titled the Guidance for the Employment of the Force), the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan, and the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance are not scheduled to be updated until 2020 or later and are tailored to the current security challenges. However, any significant change to the NDS would result in a re-assessment, and potentially an out-of-cycle revision of these documents.

#### **Defense Planning Guidance**

The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) establishes the Secretary of Defense's strategic resource priorities.

#### **Joint Strategic Campaign Plan**

The National Military Strategy (NMS) details the military ways and means required to meet the guidance contained in the National Defense Strategy (NDS). The Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) "operationalizes" the NMS

into actionable tasks for global military leaders. As the global integrator, the Chairman and Joint Staff ensure both of these documents reflect global integration requirements and are appropriately informed by an understanding of the global strategic environment in accordance with National Security Strategy (NSS) and NDS guidance.

### **Global Force Management Implementation Guidance**

The Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG) allows the Secretary of Defense to integrate complementary policy and guidance on directed readiness, assignment, allocation, apportionment, and assessment into a single authoritative document. If confirmed, my role is to advise the Secretary of Defense and Chairman on matters of readiness and balanced requirements of the combatant commands. Additionally, I advise the Secretary of Defense and Chairman on matters of risk related to allocation and assignment of forces to better support resource-informed planning and a dynamically employed force.

### **Chairman's Risk Assessment**

Title 10 directs the Chairman to prepare an annual assessment of strategic risk to national interests and military risks to the execution of the National Military Strategy. The Chairman's Risk Assessment (CRA) is submitted through the Secretary of Defense, and to Congress, along with the Secretary's Risk Mitigation Plan. The CRA is developed in collaboration with the services and combatant commands, and uses a common and consistent methodology to appraise and communicate risk across the Joint Force.

### **If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, to update, improve, or make these reviews more useful to the Department and to Congress?**

If confirmed, I will work to find ways to do the same for other strategic guidance documents. We currently provide high quality reviews of the previously mentioned documents, incorporating inputs from across the Joint Force. We also continuously seek to improve our efforts through similar processes like those resulting in the re-invigorated Joint Military Net Assessment.

### **DOD Readiness**

### **How would you assess the current readiness of the DOD—across the domains of materiel and equipment, personnel, and training—to execute the 2018 NDS and Combatant Commanders' associated operational plans?**

I am confident today we can protect the homeland, meet our alliance commitments, and maintain a competitive advantage over any potential adversary. With stable and adequate levels of funding we are working to improve readiness and modernization across the joint force in order to increase our lethality, flexibility and resilience.

**In what specific ways have the Combatant Commands utilized their increased budgetary authority over the past two years to foster readiness recovery?**

The Services, who are leading the charge, received increased budgetary authority to restore core readiness. The Combatants Commands' role has been to highlight, to the Services, areas of critical concern for mission execution. For example, at U.S. Strategic Command, our primary mission is deterring strategic attack against the United States and our allies. We fully support Service efforts to sustain and modernize the nuclear Triad, including Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) and infrastructure, to ensure we present a ready force able to deter adversaries and assure our allies and partners.

**What is your assessment of the risk the Combatant Commands and the Combat Support Agencies have accepted in regard to their readiness to execute operational plans in furtherance of the 2018 NDS?**

Restoring warfighting readiness, both current and future, is a key priority of the 2018 NDS. With stable and adequate levels of funding we have been able to address risk in force readiness and are restoring capability to respond to contingencies. The Joint Force continues to face challenges in rebuilding future readiness, or the ability to project power and achieve superiority in multiple domains in 2025. Our competitive advantage has eroded over time because of two decades of continuous operations and exacerbated by sequestration and fiscal uncertainty. With sustained, predictable, adequate, and timely funding we can continue to improve readiness and build the future force that maintains our competitive advantage.

**If confirmed, what role would you play in restoring joint force readiness?**

If confirmed, I will continue the current efforts to address joint readiness and further develop the warfighting capabilities needed to defend the nation in the future. Our nation faces very real and significant challenges, and we must continue to invest in the future. Sustained, sufficient and predictable funding over the course of several years will help us maintain our qualitative and quantitative competitive advantage. Additionally, we must recapture our ability to go faster than our adversaries and take informed risks to maintain our competitive advantage.

**National Security Budget Reductions/Sequestration**

**The discretionary caps imposed by the Budget Control Act (BCA) will be in effect for FYs 2020 and 2021. Absent a budget agreement, the Department will not receive adequate or on-time funding. Continuing resolutions are likely and sequestration remains a possibility.**

**How does this budget uncertainty affect the Combatant Commands and the Joint Staff, in your view?**

Budget uncertainty in the form of a continuing resolution or sequestration impacts current year execution and future year operations in support of the National Defense Strategy (NDS). The Joint Force requires sustained, predictable, adequate, and timely funding to meet NDS requirements.

**In your assessment, what would be the effects of continued application of the BCA discretionary caps through 2021 on Combatant Commanders' implementation of the 2018 NDS?**

Budget Control Act cuts will negatively impact the Joint Force's ongoing readiness recovery efforts, equipment recapitalization, and force modernization in favor of supporting deployed and next-to-deploy forces, all within a context of expanding global threats. The Joint Force requires sustained, predictable, adequate, and timely funding to meet NDS requirements.

**The President's Budget for FY 2020 requests \$576 Billion in base DOD funding, coupled with \$174 Billion in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). Together, the proposed base and OCO request reflect a total budgetary increase of less than 3% in *real growth* over the FY 2019 defense budget. In its 2018 report, the National Defense Strategy Commission recommended that Congress increase the base defense budget at an average rate of three to five percent above inflation through the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).**

**Do you believe that DOD requires 3-5% real budgetary growth through the FYDP to implement effectively the 2018 NDS? Please explain your answer.**

Yes. 3-5% real budgetary growth through the FYDP allows the Joint Force to recover readiness and invest in advanced technologies necessary to effectively implement the 2018 NDS. The Joint Force assessed a number of competitive areas with China and Russia, which supported the conclusion for 3-5% growth to maintain the nation's competitive advantage in the future.

**At proposed FY 2020 funding levels, is DOD adequately funded to fight one major power rival, while maintaining deterrence and stability in other regions of the world? Please explain your answer.**

The Department's FY 2020 budget makes notable progress in National Defense Strategy (NDS) implementation and continues progress on developing new concepts for force employment and warfighting. The Joint Staff regularly works with Congress to review and adjust budget execution. As you know, continuing resolutions (CRs) represent budget uncertainty and limit the Department's spending to last years' levels and priorities. An on-time budget is critical to our mission and programs. If confirmed, I will continue to review and recommend funding changes throughout the budget process.

**If confirmed, by what standards would you measure the adequacy of DOD funding going forward?**

If confirmed, I would measure the proposed budget against the National Defense Strategy required tasks, missions, and capabilities. PB20 supports a more lethal, ready, and partnered force by funding efforts to modernize current capabilities and expand warfighting capacity. Sustained, predictable, adequate, and timely funding is required to support the Joint Force.

### **Use of Military Force**

**In your view, what factors should be considered in making recommendations to the President for the use of military force?**

If confirmed, recommendations on the use of military force should be consistent with U.S. domestic and international law. Additionally, I would consider probability of success, cost in terms of casualties, and strategic risk.

**In your view, what is the appropriate role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in establishing policies for the use of military force and the rules of engagement?**

The President, as Commander-in-Chief, determines when to use military force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense and should actively advise on the policies for the use of military force and the rules of engagement.

**Do you agree with the interpretations and applications of the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military made by both the Obama and Trump Administrations?**

I agree that the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force provides a legal basis for operations against violent extremist organizations and is consistent with the policies of current and past administrations expressed in the report on the Legal and Policy Frameworks Guiding the United States Use of Military Force and Related National Security Operations.

**Are you satisfied that current legal authorities, including the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, enable the Department to carry out counterterrorism operations and activities at a level you believe to be necessary and appropriate?**

Yes, at present, we have the legal authorities to carry out U.S. counterterrorism operations at the necessary and appropriate level.

**In your view, is a “new” Authorization for the Use of Military Force needed at this time? Please explain your answer.**

The Authorization for the Use of Military Force provides the necessary authorities to conduct current operations.

**In your view, are extant policies and processes for determining which forces of other nations are eligible for Collective Self-Defense by U.S. forces, and under what conditions, adequate and appropriate?**

“Collective self-defense” rules of engagement (ROE) authorize U.S. forces to defend foreign forces and individuals against any attack or threat of imminent attack. If confirmed, I would consider two key factors; collective self-defense legality and whether it is in U.S. interest, before making a recommendation to the Chairman and/or Secretary of Defense.

**According to the 2018 NDS, Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) will allow for the more “flexibl[e] use [of] ready forces to shape proactively the strategic environment while maintaining readiness to respond to contingencies and ensure long-term warfighting readiness.”**

**If confirmed as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, what role would you play in the DFE process?**

As the global integrator, the Chairman must understand the global strategic environment and be mindful of potential impacts on operations and readiness in secondary areas of interest. If confirmed, the Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) First Principles --- gain or maintain initiative, demonstrate flexibility and agility, challenge adversary strategic calculus, and induce tempo --- will also serve as good guidelines, and will inform my DFE recommendations. I will also analyze NDS/NMS strategic priorities, combatant command campaign objectives, and projected strategic loss/gain as I weigh the opportunity costs associated with a particular DFE mission.

### **Chain of Command**

**Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S. Code provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commands. Section 163(a) of title 10 further provides that the President may direct that communications between the President or the Secretary of Defense and the Commanders of the Combatant Commands be transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and may assign duties to the Chairman to assist the President and the Secretary in performing their command function.**

**Do you believe that these provisions of law enact a clear and effective chain of command?**

Yes.

**In your view, do these provisions properly effectuate civilian control of the military? Please explain your answer.**

The chain of command originates at the President to the Secretary of Defense, and from the Secretary to the commanders of the combatant commands. If confirmed, I will be a dedicated advisor to enhance decision-making and execute lawful orders as given by my civilian leadership.

**Are there circumstances in which you believe it appropriate for U.S. military forces to be under the operational command or control of an authority other than the chain of command established under title 10, U.S. Code?**

Normally, our armed forces operate under the established Title 10 chain of command. There may be instances for the President to establish other temporary command relationships for certain sensitive military operations. Regardless of the command relationship, U.S. military personnel are still accountable to the Title 10 chain of command and are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Furthermore, our armed forces are governed by the law of armed conflict during any operation.

**What is your understanding and assessment of the authorities and agreements in place to permit U.S. military personnel to carry out missions under the provisions of title 50, U.S. Code? Do you believe any modifications of these agreements or authorities are necessary?**

I understand that relevant authorities and agreements provide the necessary framework for military forces to support activities of other U.S. Government departments and agencies when called upon by the President or Secretary of Defense as the situation dictates. I believe that the current authorities and agreements are sufficient. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing work within the Department, the Chairman and interagency partners to adjust existing arrangements as the need arises.

### **Alliances and Partnerships**

**Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are crucial to U.S. success in competition and conflict against a great power. To this end, the 2018 NDS stresses the importance of strengthening existing U.S. alliances and partnerships, building or enhancing new ones, and promoting “mutual respect, responsibility, priorities, and accountability” in these relationships. Interactions with the Armed Forces of other nations are often conducted at the level of the Chairman or Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.**

**If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to strengthen existing U.S. alliances and partnerships, build new partnerships, and exploit opportunities for international cooperation?**

If confirmed, I will ensure that our Global Campaign Plans include actions to strengthen alliances and partnerships, build new partnerships, and leverage new opportunities for international cooperation. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, working in

tandem with the Chairman, is uniquely suited to energize our ally and partner networks to respond to global security challenges.

**How would you characterize your familiarity with the military leaders of the Armed Forces of other nations, international consultative forums, and processes for enhancing interoperability between allies and partners?**

Allies are critical in responding to mutual threats, preserving our shared interests, shaping the strategic environment, and are the greatest asymmetric advantage the United States has over potential adversaries.

In my global deterrence mission, I have gained a great deal of familiarity with many nations' senior military and government leaders, providing an opportunity to strengthen international relationships, build trust and enhance interoperability between our allies and partners. For example:

- During my three years at USSTRATCOM, I have traveled to, or hosted, approximately 50 international engagements with senior military leaders and government officials to build trust and strengthen strategic relationships.
- USSTRATCOM hosts an annual Deterrence Symposium with senior official participation from Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Pakistan, Poland, and the Republic of Korea.
- I have the privilege of continuing annual bilateral talks with my counterpart, the Australian Vice Chief of Defence Force. Each year we meet to review specific initiatives designed to improve the interoperability of our respective forces through a variety of testing, training, and exercises with our strategic bombers, space, and electronic warfare capabilities.
- I oversee NIMBLE TITAN, our multi-national missile defense experiment with participation from 25 nations and 3 international organizations. Representatives from Europe, the Gulf States, the Indo-Pacific, and North America examine challenges, concepts, and initiatives related to allied missile defense collaboration and interoperability.
- USSTRATCOM has completed 22 government-level Space Situational Awareness (SSA) agreements and 103 Space Agreements. This includes agreements with two intergovernmental organizations and over 70 commercial satellite launchers, owners, and operators.

**Defense Security Cooperation**

**DOD's contribution to strengthening alliances and partnerships comprises a wide range of programs and activities designed to improve security cooperation and**

**foster interoperability and preparedness. These programs include foreign military sales, foreign military funding, exercises and training events, military-to-military exchanges, and partnering to develop key technological capabilities.**

**Is the Defense Security Assistance Command appropriately organized, resourced, and trained to execute security sector assistance effectively? If not, what changes would you make or direct, if confirmed?**

As Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, I do not have a significant role in Security Assistance. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff, the Services, and other agencies, including the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, to learn more on the subject and provide my best military advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President.

**What progress has DOD made in standardizing security assistance reporting so as to leverage comparisons of security cooperation spending across countries, regions, and programs to enable informed future prioritization and resourcing decisions?**

As Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, I do not have a significant role in Security Assistance. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff, the Services, and other agencies, including the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, to learn more on the subject and provide my best military advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President.

**What progress has been made in establishing the DOD Security Cooperation Workforce Development Program? What skill and competency gaps remain, in your view?**

As Commander, U.S. Strategic Command I do not have a significant role in Security Assistance. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff, the Services, and other agencies, including the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, to learn more on the subject and provide my best military advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President.

### **The Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)**

**The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a member of the DAB, the DOD acquisition system's senior advisory board. The DAB reviews and advises the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment on Major Defense Acquisition Programs—the most complex and expensive DOD acquisition projects.**

**What is your understanding of the Vice Chairman's role as a member of the DAB?**

The Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) is the senior advisory board for defense acquisitions in the Department of Defense of the United States of America. The board is chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and includes the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Secretaries, and a number of

Under Secretaries of Defense. The DAB plays an important role in the Defense Acquisition System. Members of this board are responsible for approving the Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and serve as the most important executive review of expensive acquisition projects that would have potentially large impacts on how wars are fought.

**Do you perceive that the Vice Chairman's role in the DAB, should be modified to enhance the Board's effectiveness? If so, how?**

Nothing specific at this time, but I will continue to maintain an open mind for thoughtful insight from many sources.

**Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development Systems (JCIDS)**

**The Vice Chairman serves as the chairman of the JROC in accordance with section 181 of title 10, U.S. Code. The JROC is vested with the responsibility to assess joint military capabilities; establish and approve joint performance requirements that ensure interoperability between military capabilities; and identify new joint military capabilities based on advances in technology and concepts of operation.**

**How would you assess the effectiveness of the JROC in establishing joint requirements for submission to the DOD acquisition process?**

Joint Performance Requirements (JPR) are a recent change to the JCIDS manual and it is too early to accurately determine the effects on acquisition. If confirmed, I will collaborate with the JROC to ensure it assesses the long-term effectiveness of JPRs, measures other parameters for effectiveness, and recommends changes as necessary.

**In your view, have recent acquisition reforms that shifted authorities to the Military Services affected the JROC's ability to assess joint performance requirements? If so, how? If confirmed, how would you ensure that the JROC has the authority and information it needs to execute its statutory functions?**

No. The JCIDS manual was revised to address these shifted authorities. If confirmed, I will continue to ensure joint interoperability through my oversight responsibilities which now include the Joint Performance Requirement (JPR) guidelines. The JPR enables the JROC to delegate authorities where appropriate to support a streamlined and responsive system enabled through a variety of rapid capability pathways.

**The JCIDS process was established to address overlap and duplication in Military Services' programs. JCIDS is intended to provide the information the JROC needs to identify the capabilities and associated operational performance requirements needed by the joint warfighter.**

**Is the JCIDS process effective in providing the information the JROC requires to anticipate both the current and the future needs of the joint force?**

Yes. The JCIDS process ensures concept-driven and threat-informed joint military capabilities meet requirements in the NDS. The JCIDS process enables evolutionary acquisitions that keep pace with evolving threats and advancing technologies. Using tailored staffing lanes based on operational requirements, the JCIDS process ensures the system is responsive to changing threat environments. Additionally, recent Joint Staff J7 process changes include an addition at the Joint Capabilities Board to examine alignment with Joint Concepts and provide a more robust review of current and future needs.

**How would you, if confirmed, drive the development and articulation of future joint concepts from which each Military Service's concept development, requirements generation, and acquisition processes will derive? Does DOD have the requisite modeling, simulation, and analytic capabilities to develop and assess future joint concepts, and the associated capabilities and force structure?**

If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman and Joint Chiefs to drive the development of future joint concepts, continuing the work started by General Dunford on the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO). The CCJO calls for new approaches and capabilities to ensure we maintain our competitive advantage over peer adversaries.

Yes, I believe DoD has the requisite analytic capabilities to develop and assess future joint concepts, capabilities, and force structure.

**How have recent acquisition reforms, including the implementation of rapid acquisition pathways in which requirement are not generated via JCIDS, affected the ability of the JROC and the Vice Chairman to identify and advocate for joint requirements?**

Recent acquisition reforms, including the implementation of rapid acquisition pathways have not affected the JROC's ability to identify and advocate for joint requirements. The JROC can still identify and advocate for joint requirements via Annual Joint Assessment and requirements that have joint performance parameters.

I support getting capabilities to the warfighter faster and will continue to work with the Joint Chiefs to ensure that service-controlled initiatives are not stove-piped or duplicated. The Joint Force must develop integrated solutions to maintain our competitive advantage.

**In your view, what is the appropriate role of Combatant Commanders in the JCIDS process? If confirmed, how would you improve the effectiveness of the process in identifying both the near-term and long-term needs of the Combatant Commander?**

It is a team effort. Combatant Commanders serve as advisors to the JROC when matters related to their area of responsibility or function are under consideration. Combatant Commanders serve a critical role in developing requirements and addressing capability

gaps. The Combatant Commanders specifically identify risks and evaluate their Global Campaign Plan objectives via the Annual Joint Assessment and the Capability Gap Assessment processes.

If confirmed, I will ensure the JROC continues to seek and consider input from the Combatant Commanders. I will evaluate the needs of the Combatant Commanders, the realities of Service budgets, and the priorities of DoD leadership before determining any necessary adjustments to improve effectiveness

**Do you believe that today's JROC and JCIDS processes are sufficient to identify where opportunities for multi-Service collaboration exist, or where programs could or should be modified to take advantage of a related acquisition program?**

Yes. We bring senior leadership to the table at every phase of the requirements development process ensuring Service collaboration exists. There remains enough leniency in the process for Services to develop their own unique solution - provided the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approves. The JROC's focus on Joint Performance Requirements to include timely and cost-effective development of capability solutions to the warfighter and that enhances joint interoperability while fulfilling Service's capability gaps.

**Do you have any recommendations for changes to the structure, authority, or processes of the JROC or the JCIDS?**

Not at this time.

**The streamlined middle-tier acquisition authorities enacted in Section 804 of the FY 2016 NDAA seek to speed fielding of advanced technologies and systems by waiving the JCIDS process.**

**What do you perceive as the downsides of not using the formal JCIDS process?**

The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process was created to ensure joint interoperability. Avoiding JCIDS could put the onus of joint interoperability on the proposing service. However, waivers granted by the Joint Staff are documented and published to ensure visibility and provide traceability for future staffing and validation

**What is your opinion of initial forays using 804 authorities?**

From my perspective as the Commander, US Strategic Command, I am pleased to see the depth and breadth of activities looking to accelerate the delivery of warfighting capabilities to the field. If confirmed, I will continue to work with stakeholders to evaluate the use of 804 authorities and provide feedback as necessary.

**One of the challenges facing many acquisition programs—ranging from weapons systems to business systems—is unrealistic and infeasible technical requirements.**

**What best practices can the Department employ to generate realistic and technically feasible requirements, particularly in sophisticated, rapidly-evolving technical areas such as cybersecurity, hypersonics, and artificial intelligence?**

The DoD requirements process must be informed by the results of its rapid prototyping authorities, such as Section 804, to ensure requirements are realistic and feasible. To the maximum extent possible, the DoD should require its systems to be open and modular to minimize upgrade costs as technology continues to rapidly evolve, especially in areas such as cybersecurity, hypersonics, and artificial intelligence.

**If confirmed, what actions would you take to strengthen or support the technical knowledge and capabilities of personnel responsible for requirements generation?**

If confirmed, I will continue to support efforts by OUSD (A&S) and the Defense Acquisition University to develop training programs for DoD personnel with the responsibility for developing requirements.

### **Operational Energy**

**How can DOD acquisition systems better address requirements related to a military platform's use of energy? In your view, should energy supportability be a key performance parameter in the requirements process? If confirmed, specifically what would you do to prioritize energy resilience and mission assurance for DOD, including acquiring and deploying sustainable and renewable energy assets to support mission critical functions, and address known vulnerabilities?**

Energy supportability is one of the four mandatory Key Performance Parameters (KPPs). The Joint Staff conducts an energy supportability analysis for all requirements documents when the JROC designates the energy KPP as a Joint Performance Requirement. If confirmed, I will continue to support the Joint Staff's role in prioritizing energy resilience.

### **Environmental Contaminants**

**According to GAO, DOD has identified 401 military installations affected by known or suspected releases of Perflouroctane sulfonate (PFOS) and Perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA).**

**If confirmed, what actions would you take to address PFOS/PFOA contamination on DOD installations?**

If confirmed, I will support the ongoing DoD actions to test, treat and monitor water sources around our 401 installations to address PFOS/PFOA releases from DoD

activities. These compounds are constituents of aqueous film forming foam (AFFF) widely used in fighting petroleum fires. DoD proactively responded by limiting use of AFFF on our installations to emergencies, addressing on and off-site drinking water impacted by PFOS/PFOA from DoD activities under the federal cleanup law, and by researching alternative firefighting solutions.

**If confirmed, what would be your approach to addressing the health concerns of service members and their families regarding alleged exposures to potentially harmful contaminants on U.S. military installations and in the context of performing military duties?**

If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Military Departments to monitor the 524 DoD owned drinking water systems worldwide. For the systems that test above the EPA health advisory level of 70 parts per trillion for PFOS and PFOA, we will take one of the following course of action based on EPA recommendations in the health advisory: provide bottle water, provide an alternative water source, such as using other supply wells or connecting to a municipal system, or add treatment systems to remove PFOS/PFOA. Ultimately, our service members and their families should not have to worry about their health while living in homes on U.S. military installations or when performing their military duties.

**Readiness and Resource Impacts from Extreme Weather**

**In 2017, three hurricanes resulted in over \$1.3 billion in damage to military installations across the U.S. In 2018, extreme weather events caused roughly \$9 billion in damage at Tyndall Air Force Base, Camp Lejeune, and Offutt Air Force Base. Hurricane season for 2019 already has begun.**

**How would you assess the readiness and resource impacts on DOD from recent extreme weather events?**

The impacts are significant. Over \$10 billion in two years creates a strain on our finite resources and forces us to make tough decisions if not supplemented with additional funding. Beyond cost, damage to critical infrastructure also disrupts deployment cycles and training operations which provide a ready force. It will take time to fully recover from these events.

Despite severe damage to Offutt AFB facilities, USSTRATCOM was able to continue operating and accomplish our assigned missions without interruption or degradation in our capabilities. The primary impact from flooding was to the Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) mission facilities highlighting the need to take a modern look at legacy systems. Flooding destroyed or damaged the operations and training facilities for the National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC) and Airborne National Command Post (ABNCP).

My Joint Force Air and Maritime Component Commanders have temporarily mitigated the impacts to the NC3 mission by conducting NAOC and ABNCP missions from alternate locations proving the value of mobile command and control nodes. In the long-

run, we will need to replace the facilities lost at Offutt AFB with a new NC3 Alert Force Campus.

**Based on these readiness and resource impacts, do you believe it necessary to use more resilient designs in DOD infrastructure?**

The DoD faces a long-term threat from extreme weather events, rising sea levels, and increased flooding at coastal locations. If confirmed, I will work with DoD's many stakeholders to support ongoing DoD actions and implement appropriate planning and design standards that account for projected sea level rise and extreme weather events.

### **Tactical Fighters**

**The 2018 NDS provides that the United States must be capable of striking targets inside adversary air and missile defense networks. A major component of that ability is the F-35 which, after a painstakingly slow start, is now beginning to have a major impact on current operations.**

**Based on current and future threats outlined in the NDS, what are your views on the requirements and timing of the F-35 program?**

The F-35's requirements are appropriate and necessary for National Defense Strategy (NDS) implementation and will play a pivotal role in providing air superiority over the coming decades. F-35 production timing is a complicated system of interrelated variables and must continue to be systemically advanced to find an appropriate balance among budget, subcontractor component supply, and Service components' ability to field the aircraft. If confirmed, I will work with the services and acquisition community to ensure the F-35's critical requirements are met to ensure timely delivery to the warfighter.

**Even if all of the current aircraft modernization programs execute as planned, the average age of the tactical, strategic, and tanker fleets will continue to increase. Aging aircraft require ever-increasing maintenance, which incurs ever-increasing costs. Nonetheless, readiness levels continue to decline.**

**What are your views on balancing current aircraft capacity and future capability to meet expected threats?**

Acquiring and modernizing our 5th generation platforms is vital for potential operations against near-peer competitors. In the short term, recapitalizing a portion of our 4th generation aircraft fleet provides essential capacity to improve readiness and meet NDS demands while we field new 5th generation aircraft, modernize existing 5th generation aircraft, and develop new technologies to maintain the Joint Force's competitive advantage.

Adapting the force we have today, while we design the force needed for tomorrow's challenges, requires a mix of capabilities within the Tactical Fighter portfolio.

## **Nuclear Modernization**

**If confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you will continue to serve as a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council, as you have in your current capacity as the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command. As a member of the Council, you will continue to work closely with the National Nuclear Security Administration to set policies and resources for DOD and Department of Energy nuclear programs.**

**If confirmed, what would be your priorities for the work of the Nuclear Weapons Council?**

The Nuclear Weapons Council's (NWC) enduring priority is maintaining a safe, secure, effective, and ready nuclear weapon stockpile able to deter adversaries and assure Allies and global security partners. Collaboration between the DoD and our National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) partners has proven increasingly successful in sustaining legacy weapons and moving forward with critical modernization efforts through life extension programs.

Future success is contingent on building a robust and resilient infrastructure to include plutonium processing capabilities as well as other unique weapon materials and components. Maintaining confidence in our weapons hinges on having the necessary modern facilities and trained people to sustain the deterrent force.

**What changes, if any, would you recommend to the membership and responsibilities of the Nuclear Weapons Council?**

As a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) for a number of years, I believe the current membership and responsibilities are adequate to maintain a safe, secure, and effective weapon stockpile.

**Do you believe the current program of record is sufficient to support the full modernization of the nuclear triad, including delivery systems, warheads, and infrastructure?**

Yes. The program of record, including the modest supplements prescribed by the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, is sufficient to support the nuclear force's full modernization. Then Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan and General Dunford recently testified that the nuclear mission is the top priority for the DoD, and the funding needed to perform this crucial work is a small fraction of the DoD budget. I agree with that position. The U.S. nuclear enterprise is critical to deterring our adversaries and assuring our allies and its credibility backstops all U.S. military operations and diplomacy around the globe. The cost to sustain the U.S. nuclear force is both affordable and critical to deterring strategic attack against the United States and its allies.

**What are your ideas for working across the Joint Force to mitigate the risk that all three legs of the nuclear triad will “age out” simultaneously at the end of the 2020s?**

I agree with the Department of Defense's position that nuclear modernization remains the number one modernization priority. I will work closely with OSD, the services, and U.S. Strategic Command to mitigate the concurrent risks across the three legs of the triad created by previous deferrals of nuclear modernization. We must maintain our nuclear force enterprise, while concurrently building the future triad, and when possible, accelerate modernization with calculated smart risks.

**In your view, does the Stockpile Stewardship Program provide the tools necessary to ensure the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile without testing? If not, what tools are needed?**

Yes, the Stockpile Stewardship Program has developed the computational and experimental tools needed to certify the current stockpile without the need for full-scale nuclear weapons testing. The program relies on state-of-the-art supercomputers, large-scale scientific facilities, and workforce expertise. Continued support for the National Laboratories is crucial for the viability of the Stockpile Stewardship mission.

## **Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications**

**You oversaw the standup of a new Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) Enterprise Center at U.S. Strategic Command. If confirmed, you will co-chair the Council on National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications Systems.**

**If confirmed, how would you use your new role to continue to advocate for the modernization of NC3 systems?**

If confirmed, modernization of Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) would remain a top priority. As co-chair of the Council on National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications Systems, I would work to ensure NC3 capabilities meet national objectives, are adequately resourced, and stay synchronized with senior leader and continuity of government communications efforts. Additionally, as chair of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), I would work closely with CDR USSTRATCOM and the Services to ensure efficient validation of NC3 modernization requirements and advocate for the rapid delivery of threat-based NC3 capabilities that empower our triad of nuclear capabilities.

## **Missile Defense**

**The United States enjoys a measure of protection against ballistic missile threats from rogue nations like North Korea and Iran, but the threat from Russian and Chinese ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles against U.S. forces, allies, and the U.S. homeland continues to grow. The 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) codified existing policy on missile defense and endorsed follow-on actions to improve U.S. capability.**

**What are your views on the relationship between missile defenses and nuclear deterrence?**

I believe they are both critical elements of our overall strategic deterrent. The nuclear deterrent is priority one -- deterring the use of nuclear weapons against the U.S. and our Allies. Missile defenses undermine potential adversaries' confidence in their ability to achieve political or military objectives through limited missile attacks against our nation and our allies. A robust and credible, layered missile defense system paired with our conventional and nuclear force capabilities provides the ability to deter strategic attacks and impose costs against any potential adversary.

**Is a space-based sensor layer a required "next step" in enabling a wide variety of missile defense capabilities, including improved tracking and targeting of advanced threats?**

Space based sensors can monitor, detect, and track missile launches from locations almost anywhere on the globe, unimpeded by the constraints that geographic limitations

impose on terrestrial sensors. Our missile defense approach must integrate active missile defense and advanced technologies to neutralize missile threats. We must consider space-based sensors and boost-phase defense capabilities to achieve greater efficiencies for active missile defenses. The utilization of space provides a missile defense posture that is more effective, resilient, and adaptable.

**What are your views on the efficacy of boost-phase intercept and space-based intercept programs? Has DOD developed and implemented operational concepts, plans, and policies appropriate to the governance and utilization of such programs? What would you do to address this issue, if confirmed?**

The value of boost-phase intercept and space-based intercept programs remains an open question. While the concepts of boost-phase intercept and space-based intercept have great potential, the Department is exploring how to resolve the challenges associated with them, as directed by the 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR). I understand USD R&E will provide an assessment of the cost, feasibility, practicality, and timelines on different architectures and programs. I expect there will be challenges in creating these programs on the scale to provide robust coverage of threat areas. If confirmed, I will remain involved in operational discussions to ensure a thorough examination of these concepts.

**If confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, what priorities would you recommend for U.S. missile defense capabilities for the homeland?**

As stated in the Missile Defense Review (MDR), modernization and innovation are critical to ensure the continuing effectiveness of missile defenses.

My first priority has been and will continue to be, if confirmed, modernizing sensor networks, particularly a space-based architecture that can effectively detect, provide warning, and track current and emerging threats. If you cannot see it, you cannot defeat it.

Development and fielding advanced missile defense technologies also enhances deterrence by denying an adversary any benefit they might seek by attacking the U.S. or our allies. To that end, we are exploring both kinetic and non-kinetic concepts that will out-pace the threat and achieve a more cost-effective defense posture.

### **Nuclear Enterprise Review**

**In 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel directed a comprehensive review of the DOD nuclear enterprise in response to adverse incidents involving U.S. nuclear forces and their senior leadership. The review culminated in numerous recommendations to address concerns identified. Responsibility for monitoring the implementation of corrective actions has been transferred from OSD to the Military Services.**

**Based on your recent experience as Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, are the Military Services maintaining appropriate focus on implementing the corrective actions required by the Nuclear Enterprise Review?**

Yes. The Services remain actively engaged in addressing the items identified from the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews. The Department has chartered a three-tier body comprised of members from the Services, Combatant Commands, Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary of Defense to oversee completion of the corrective actions. This construct ensures continued senior level awareness and involvement. The Service Secretaries and Chiefs personally participate in update briefings to the Deputy Secretary of Defense on at least an annual basis.

## **Arms Control**

**On February 2, 2019, after years of Russian treaty violations, Secretary of State Pompeo announced that the United States would suspend its participation in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, triggering the six-month withdrawal countdown.**

**How can DOD mitigate any negative consequences of withdrawal from the treaty, and reassure NATO allies regarding stability in Europe?**

Our NATO allies and security partners agree that unless Russia verifiably destroys all of its SSC-8 missile systems by 2 August 2019, Moscow will bear sole responsibility for the end of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). Russia's ongoing and expanding material breach of the treaty created untenable consequences for our nation and our allies' security. Our approach on INF has the full support of our NATO allies, as the North Atlantic Council demonstrated with supportive statements in December 2018 and February 2019. If confirmed, I will work closely with our NATO allies to enhance deterrence and security in a post-INF environment.

## **Space Program**

**The United States is increasingly dependent on space, both economically and militarily—from the Global Positioning System on which many industries and military capabilities rely, to the missile warning systems that underpin U.S. nuclear deterrence. Our great power competitors—China and Russia—are engaged in a concerted effort to leap ahead of U.S. technology and impact U.S. freedom of action in the space warfighting domain.**

**How would you characterize the level of risk China and Russia pose to U.S. space-based assets?**

Risk to U.S. space-based assets from China and Russia continues to increase and expand. Over the past two decades, Russia and China have continued to improve their space weapons capabilities and enacted military reforms to better integrate space, cyberspace, and electronic warfare into both offensive and defensive military operations. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency's "Challenges to Security in Space Report," both Russia and China have potential counter-space assets on the ground and in orbit today. Both nations will continue to develop, exercise, and integrate these capabilities into war plans. We must improve our space-based capabilities' resilience and protection in the face of these advancing threats.

**Can the United States win this new "space race" in your view?**

Yes.

**If confirmed, how would you assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in improving situational awareness of space and appropriately prioritizing the protection of U.S. space-based assets?**

If confirmed, I would leverage my extensive space experience to advise the Chairman on these issues.

We must expand our allied partnerships in Space Situational Awareness (SSA) while ensuring joint requirements drive adoption of common data standards and machine-to-machine interfaces/automation. Improvements in SSA will enable us to better determine intent, provide positive attribution of space events and enable the employment of defensive and, when directed, conduct offensive space control capabilities within clearly laid out authorities.

Space systems supporting strategic warning and communications must remain the top priority. In addition, many of our other space systems provide services, which have elements critical to our national civil, economic, and military interests. In recognition of this, we must pursue protection capabilities and techniques, which maximize flexibility, allowing us to respond to adversary threats against any U.S. or allied space system.

**The Senate version of the FY 2020 NDAA includes a provision directing the creation of a U.S. Space Force that is focused on warfighting in the space domain and charged to transform historically late-to-need processes for developing, procuring, and fielding space warfighting capabilities, without creating an extensive and unreasonably expensive new bureaucracy.**

**What is your assessment of the Senate’s “Space Force” legislation?**

The Department of Defense is transforming its approach to space from a combat support function to a warfighting domain; establishing a U.S. Space Force supports these efforts. Further, I support efforts to move towards a Space Force that organizes, trains, and equips our space warriors with the capabilities to maintain our advantages in space. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to ensure the Department has the appropriate resources and authorities to execute these changes.

**By memorandum of December 18, 2018, the President directed the establishment of U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM) as a Unified Combatant Command, with responsibility for Joint Force space operations. On June 27, 2019, the Senate confirmed the nomination of General John Raymond for appointment as the Commander, SPACECOM.**

**If confirmed, what would be your role in the establishment of SPACECOM? On what timeline do you expect SPACECOM to reach Initial Operating Capability? Full Operating Capability?**

I expect the Commander, U.S. Space Command, to lead his new command to full operational capability. He will continue to transform the Department of Defense's space capabilities from a support function to a warfighting domain that is critical to our nation. He will integrate with our allies and partners and be the commander for military space operational matters to the U.S. government and commercial entities. He will closely integrate with other space organizations such as the National Reconnaissance Office.

**What missions, functions, and tasks will transfer from U.S. Strategic Command to SPACECOM? If confirmed, how would you ensure that there is no diminution in strategic capability during the period in which these missions, functions, and tasks are being transferred to SPACECOM?**

On May 24, 2019, the President signed an update to the Unified Command Plan, assigning Commander, U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM), the responsibility to plan and execute global space operations and missions, with an emphasis on protecting and defending our space operational capabilities. Once the command is established, U.S. Strategic Command's (USSTRATCOM) operational space forces will be re-assigned to USSPACECOM. This is a no-fail mission, so to ensure that there is no interruption during transfer, USSTRATCOM will continue to support USSPACECOM with personnel, facilities, and infrastructure as the new command grows into its final operational capability during the next few years.

**Should there be a conflict in space or a related domain, what are your views on the importance of unity of command as compared to unity of effort between DOD and Intelligence Community assets, both in space on the ground?**

The DoD and Intelligence Community each have distinct responsibilities and authorities in space. When it comes to protecting and defending our space capabilities, however, the two organizations must be in lock step. Joint Task Force – Space Defense, a critical function within the new USSPACECOM, is an integrated DoD, NRO, and IC organization. It will serve as the mechanism to provide not only unity of effort for DoD and IC assets in defense of our on orbit assets, but to serve as a single command charged with the preservation of critical national capabilities with both military and civil objectives while taking advantage of DoD and IC unique authorities.

**As part of DOD's approach to the domain of space, the Department established the Space Development Agency. In testimony before this Committee, DOD officials reinforced that the first and most important task assigned to the Space Development Agency is to develop, in cooperation with the space industry, a highly distributed and resilient space layer to support military targeting operations.**

**In your view, will the creation of a new Space Development Agency accelerate the U.S. "leap ahead" of our great power competitors in space—or will it prove a redundant bureaucracy that slows progress? Please explain your answer.**

The Secretary of Defense should have the authority to transfer forces, missions, and organizations, such as the Space Development Agency, on the timing and tempo necessary for mission effectiveness. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to ensure the Department has the appropriate resources and authorities to execute these changes.

**Where should the Space Development Agency reside, in your view?**

On March 12, 2019, then Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan officially established the Space Development Agency (SDA) within the Department of Defense led by USD (R&E) Mike Griffin. SDA will unify and integrate efforts across the Department to define, develop, and field the necessary, innovative solutions to outpace advancing threats.

I understand, the USD (R&E) will work with the Comptroller to determine any realignment of FY19 and FY20 resources. The SDA will transfer to the U.S. Space Force if approved by Congress.

**In your view, what steps should the Space Development Agency undertake to solve—in short order—the long-standing problems associated with overly bureaucratic and late-to-need processes for developing, procuring, and fielding space warfighting capabilities?**

Long standing problems can be overcome by pursuing rapid prototyping, shortening timelines for research and development, and reforming acquisition authorities to allow the department to move at the speed of relevance. We have to learn to move fast again.

The Space Development Agency (SDA), in coordination with existing Service space acquisition organizations, will be working to counter the Department's risk averse space development culture.

The move to smaller satellites and proliferated constellations, leveraging the emerging commercial sector, is an excellent example of how we can find innovative, commercially leveraged ways to deliver capabilities faster, enabling more rapid responses to emerging threats.

**If confirmed, how would you ensure that commercial technology and mission support is incorporated into Space Development Agency products and SPACECOM mission execution at acceptable risk levels? What particular challenges do you perceive to increasing collaboration between the private sector and DOD in the acquisition of space systems and launch options?**

The Space Development Agency (SDA) is intended to energize our acquisition processes, moving us away from single-threaded complex constellations that make easy targets, toward smaller, more agile, distributed constellations. The commercial sector is moving

this way for economic reasons and, if confirmed, I will encourage and support Dr. Griffin's efforts in the SDA to take every advantage of commercial opportunities.

As the Department works to better leverage the commercial sector to speed our acquisition processes there will be resistance from, and a learning curve for, our traditional commercial acquisition partners. The Department will prioritize speed, innovation, and flexibility of acquisition.

There will be opportunities for increased competition from smaller more agile commercial partners. Our traditional partners must adapt to the Department's new sense of urgency, necessitating a cultural change away from counting on large programs with decade's long acquisition and funding streams.

While the challenges will be significant, my conversations with those within the Department and in the commercial sector lead me to believe we can adapt to a new paradigm and succeed.

### **Access to Radio Frequency Spectrum**

**If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to ensure that the Department continues to have access to the radio frequency spectrum necessary to train and conduct operations?**

Operations in the Electro-magnetic Spectrum (EMS) pervade every military domain, across all Joint Functions, and throughout the entire range of military operations. We must properly train and equip the Services and Joint Force to ensure success.

If confirmed, I would advocate a dual track to ensure continued radio frequency spectrum access – to include microwave, infrared, and ultraviolet bands – by the Department for training and operations.

First, we must consolidate efforts within the department to maintain/retain EMS superiority. This requires joint collaboration on requirements for future EMS/Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities. The Services must leverage and develop capabilities that are interoperable across the Department.

Second, there is a need to evaluate and address the impacts of spectrum competition from the private sector and resulting impacts to DoD training and operations. Developing an analytical capability to rapidly assess potential impacts to DoD programs from EMS auctions must be a priority. Additionally, DoD must engage with other federal agencies to advocate for required spectrum to ensure the Department can operate without interference. I support the regulatory work DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO) is undertaking with National Telecommunications and Information Association (NTIA), to guarantee DoD spectrum access, to meet the Department's EMS requirements-based needs.

## Cybersecurity

**In 2015, Russian hackers gained access to the Joint Staff’s unclassified email system through a spearfishing attack; the email system was taken off-line for several weeks while hardware and software were replaced. In March 2019, the Secretary of the Navy’s *Cyber Readiness Review* presented a scathing assessment of the Department of the Navy’s approach to cybersecurity and hi-lighted the urgent need for the Navy to modify its business and data hygiene processes to protect data as a resource.**

**In your view, would the Joint Staff benefit from conducting a “Cyber Readiness Review” similar to that of the Navy? Please explain your answer.**

Yes, the Joint Staff would benefit from a readiness review, to identify any potential discrepancies in existing processes and improve information security. If confirmed, I will assess the necessity and timing of a cyber-protection readiness review for the Joint Staff. This Cyber Readiness Review conducted by the Navy in March of 2019 appropriately followed the Department of Defense 2018 Cyber Posture Review (CPR) submitted to Congress in August 2018. Both these reviews were similar in intent, purpose, and findings.

The Joint Staff was an equal partner with OSD in the formulation of the CPR and was able to account for the challenges the Joint Force must contend with in the cyber domain. If confirmed, I will ensure the Joint Staff remains decisively engaged in the implementation of the 2018 DoD Cyber Strategy, formulated specifically to address the gaps highlighted in the CPR.

**What would you do to improve the cybersecurity culture across the Joint Staff workforce—military, civilian, and contractor? How would you empower and hold accountable key leaders to improve the Joint Staff’s cybersecurity culture?**

If confirmed, I would direct continued annual cybersecurity awareness training of all Joint Staff personnel (military, government, civilian, and contractor). Also, I would direct cybersecurity workforce improvement through cybersecurity professional certification and continuing education. Additionally, I would require a Commander’s Critical Information Report for any breach and direct a monthly report on cyber protection status. I will hold my key leaders accountable through the annual Federal Information System Modernization Act (FISMA) report to Congress, which includes cybersecurity role-based tracking of all military, government, civilian, and contractor personnel cybersecurity training and qualifications.

**In May 2018, the Cyber Mission Force achieved full operational capability. In September, DOD released its 2018 Cyber Strategy. The Strategy charges DOD to “defend forward, shape the day-to-day competition, and prepare for war” to compete, deter, and win in the cyber domain.**

**What is your understanding of the role of DOD and the Cyber Mission Force in defending the Nation from an attack in cyberspace? In what ways is this role distinct from those of the homeland security and law enforcement communities?**

When directed by the President or requested by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the DoD is prepared to assist DHS with any significant cyber incident that exceeds their incident response capacity. There is a distinctive difference in roles for DHS and the law enforcement community from DoD. DHS and law enforcement operate under domestic authorities, while DoD focuses on the foreign state and non-state actors that threaten the interests of the United States.

**In your view, will operationalization of the “defend forward, shape the day-to-day competition, and prepare for war” concepts deter and disrupt China and Russia’s aggressive actions in cyberspace? If so, how? If not, what changes to the Cyber Strategy would you recommend?**

Strategic competitors, such as Russia and China, are conducting persistent malicious cyber campaigns to erode U.S. military advantage, threaten our infrastructure, and reduce our economic prosperity. We are taking the initiative to deny, disrupt, degrade, and expose these malicious cyber activities which threaten the Department, U.S. interests, and the American people. This initiative includes actively collaborating with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, private industry, and international allies and partners to "defend forward" by preemptively responding to and disrupting these threats well before these activities reach their intended targets and cause harm. The operationalization of these concepts enable the Department to compete, deter, and win in the cyber domain.

**What actions would you take, if confirmed, to remediate any gap between DOD capability and capacity and goals of the 2018 Cyber Strategy?**

The Joint Staff collaborated with OSD and other DoD stakeholders in developing the 2018 Cyber Posture Review (CPR), and accounted for the challenges the Joint Force must address in the cyber domain. If confirmed, I will ensure the Joint Staff, in concert with the Department, is decisively engaged with the implementation of the 2018 DoD Cyber Strategy, to address the gaps highlighted in the CPR. This effort requires a continuous evaluation and consistent vigilance across the dynamic cybersecurity landscape.

**Is it feasible, in your view, for DOD to operate in cyberspace below the level of armed conflict?**

Operating in cyberspace below the level of armed conflict is not only feasible, but necessary. We need to compete daily by persistently engaging and defending forward to disrupt, deter, and deny malicious cyber activity. These operations range from intelligence collection and preparation, to strengthening the security and resilience of our networks. The DoD can focus these efforts on adversaries that pose strategic threats to

U.S. security and prosperity, while collaborating with our interagency, industry, and international partners.

**What role should DOD and the Cyber Mission Force occupy in combating foreign influence operations, especially those conducted via social media?**

Within the bounds of U.S. Law, DoD, and the Cyber Mission Force will take an active role combating foreign influence operations, alongside our Allies and partners. Daily challenges exist in Central America, Europe, the Pacific, and the Middle East, to name a few regions. Our ability to reinforce support to Allies and partners and demonstrate a continued commitment to ensuring their safety and security, is critical to our ability to defend forward. The DoD and the Cyber Mission Force represent key agencies for coordinating active and unified defenses of networks and our populations. Unique capabilities include: the global network of military-to-military partnerships, capacity for intelligence gathering and analysis, and the ability to plan and operate in a coalition environment.

**What role should DOD and the Cyber Mission Force occupy in anticipating or responding to attacks on commercial entities?**

Through a series of partnerships with DHS and sector-specific agencies such as the financial and energy sectors, DoD should provide expertise and experience needed to support our critical infrastructure partners' efforts to anticipate, prevent, and respond to significant cyber incidents. Examples of this support include sharing of threat information and collaborative analysis of vulnerabilities and threats. Partnerships like these are expanding to other critical sectors where the DoD and the private/commercial entities have mutual equities.

**What are your views as to whether the “dual hatting” of the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command as the Director of the National Security Agency should be maintained or terminated?**

The current “dual hat” configuration between U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency is working well and should be maintained. If confirmed, I will give this issue careful attention and work with the Chairman to provide the best military advice.

**Science, Technology, and Innovation**

**U.S. superiority in key areas of innovation is decreasing or has disappeared, while our competitors are engaging in aggressive military modernization and advanced weaponry development. DOD has identified ten key areas in which investment to develop next generation operational capabilities is imperative: hypersonics; fully networked C3; directed energy; cyber; space; quantum science; artificial intelligence (AI)/machine learning; microelectronics; autonomy; and biotechnology. Much of the innovation in these technologies that could prove suitable for national defense purposes is occurring outside of the traditional defense industry.**

**What do you see as the most significant challenges (e.g., technical, organizational, or cultural) to U.S. development of these key technologies?**

In developing next generation operational capabilities, three leading challenges often addressed are the adequate protection of our intellectual property, insufficient integration between civilian and defense industry, and cultural risk aversion that leads to a lack of agility in the development of key technologies.

**In your view, has DOD properly integrated and synchronized investments in these technologies across all Components?**

Though DoD has integrated and synchronized technology investments across all Components, there is always room for improvement in this area. If confirmed, I will work with stakeholders in congress and across the Department of Defense to better focus, integrate, and synchronize development of these key technologies.

**How is the Department balancing revolutionary capability advancements as compared to “quick win” incremental improvements that can be rapidly fielded?**

The Department balances revolutionary capability developments with rapidly fielded advancements through focused analysis and assessment. This enables DoD to make informed tradeoffs and decisions where there are uncertainties associated with increasing adversary military capabilities, changes in the strategic environment, and emerging technologies for future military operations. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the National Defense Strategy is implemented while also ensuring appropriate funding, development timely fielding of emerging technologies notably in cyber, space, artificial intelligence and missile defense.

**What efforts is the DOD making to identify new technologies developed commercially by the private sector and apply them to military and national security purposes? What are the challenges that you perceive to increasing collaboration between the private sector and DOD?**

The DoD has multiple initiatives within the defense research enterprise specifically focused on identifying commercial technologies currently in the private sector, but have potential uses for national security and warfighter purposes. Examples include Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), which accelerates technology interface, and DoD 5G initiative that is enabling collaboration with the private sector.

**Are there steps that should be taken to ensure that the Department has the research and testing infrastructure and equipment to maintain pace with, or surpass the investments being made in emerging technology by our peer adversaries?**

The developmental and operational test and evaluation communities are critical to all of the Department's warfighting capability development pathways. The Department needs to understand the performance capabilities, effectiveness, and safety limitations of new

systems, prior to delivering them to the warfighter. If confirmed, I will work with OSD and the relevant DoD stakeholders to ensure the test community collects operationally relevant data as early as possible during system development, by using a combined testing approach.

**One of the main objectives of the defense research enterprise is to develop advanced technologies that will be of benefit to the warfighter. In this regard, it is critical that advancements quickly transition from the development phase into testing and evaluation, and ultimately into a program of record for the deployment of capability to the warfighter.**

**What are the challenges you perceive to effectively transitioning technologies from research programs into programs of record?**

Transitioning technologies into programs of record must be a consideration at the beginning of any development effort. Successfully transitioning technologies requires many different collaborators (e.g., acquisition community, warfighting community, industry) and includes explicit agreements with the Services up front. If confirmed, I would work with the R&D, acquisition and warfighting communities to ensure we have a cohesive plan from concept development through transition.

**If confirmed as Vice Chairman, what specific steps will you take to ensure that all of the Military Services are benefitting more quickly and directly from research being performed across the defense research enterprise?**

If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, the Service Chiefs, and Congress to continue development of rapid prototyping and rapid fielding efforts, in order to decrease the time it takes to get innovative technologies from research labs into the hands of the warfighter.

**By memorandum of October 24, 2018, then-Secretary of Defense Mattis established the Protecting Critical Technology Task Force, reporting to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Task Force was one component of DOD's response to Intelligence Community warnings that China and Russia are engaged in campaigns to steal trade secrets, proprietary information, and other forms of intellectual property from the United States, through infiltration of the software supply chain, acquisition of knowledge by foreign students at U.S. universities, and other nefarious means—all as part of a strategic technology acquisition program.**

**If confirmed, how would you expect responsibilities for leading the Task Force to be divided between you and the Deputy Secretary of Defense?**

The Vice Chairman and Deputy Secretary of Defense (DSD) have maintained the same Task Force leadership construct and remain fully committed to implementing this critical element of the National Defense Strategy (NDS). In this role, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has responsibility to maintain alignment and to make sure it remains a priority

for the Department. The Task Force reports every other week to an Executive Committee (EXCOM), which the Vice Chairman and DSD co-chair and whose membership includes the Undersecretaries of Defense, the DoD CIO, the Joint Staff, all of the Services, and other key individuals. This EXCOM is a directive body that ensures the Task Force recommendations are appropriately considered and acted upon with sufficient authority and urgency.

If confirmed, I look forward to the expansion of current efforts to synchronize this work with our interagency partners.

**Given Secretary Mattis’s call for “concrete action”—to happen quickly, what were the outcomes of the Task Force’s 30- and 90-day sprints?**

The initial 30- and 90-day ‘sprints’, driven by the Task Force, focused on immediate, internal Department actions to improve our critical technology protection posture and to gain momentum and lay the groundwork for larger, institutional changes that required more time. Between OSD and the Services, there were 44 prioritized tasks in the 30-day sprint, and an additional 37 prioritized tasks in the 90-day sprint. These tasks included things such as updating or altering existing Department policies, establishing DoD critical program and technology priorities, identifying resource challenges, ensuring appropriate contract and grant language was in place, and some specific actions related to distinct technology areas. All of the prioritized tasks in these sprints have been completed.

The Task Force is now focused on its next set of objectives. For instance, to increase cybersecurity within the Defense Industrial Base (DIB), the Department has begun assessing and enforcing compliance with existing, contractually-obligated cybersecurity standards and is developing a Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification process that will require DIB companies to maintain a third-party certified cybersecurity readiness in order to partner with DoD. In addition, security is being integrated into the acquisition process alongside cost, schedule, and performance. Within the research and development enterprise, the Task Force is focused on preventing individuals with problematic foreign connections from conducting DoD-funded research, as well as countering the negative aspects of foreign talent recruitment programs.

**If confirmed, how would you lead the Task Force in working with partners in the National Security Innovation Base and defense research enterprise to ensure the integrity and security of DOD’s classified information, controlled unclassified information, and key data?**

If confirmed, I would work with the DSD to ensure the Task Force is effectively carrying out its mandate.

The Department maintains strong relationships with its partners throughout the National Security Innovation Base, including the Defense Industrial Base (DIB), academia, and other research and development centers. There are a number of forums through which this interaction regularly occurs. The Department is leveraging these relationships to

improve information sharing and ensure that changes and solutions to protect the Department's critical programs and technologies.

### **Joint Officer Management**

**If confirmed as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff you would have significant responsibilities with regard to joint officer management policies.**

**If confirmed, what modifications to law and policy would you suggest to provide DOD and the Military Services the force management and talent management tools necessary to recruit, develop, sustain, and retain a 21st century joint, All-Volunteer Force?**

If confirmed, I will assess talent management strategies to maintain our competitive advantage over our adversaries. The FY19 NDAA talent management strategies moved the department in the right direction through the enhancement of constructive service credit, alternative promotion authority, and reordering of a promotion list based on merit. If confirmed, I will continue to work with OSD and the Service Chiefs as we implement these authorities and assess the effects these programs have on maintaining a ready force.

**Do you believe current DOD and Military Service procedures and practices for reviewing the records of officers pending the President's nomination for promotion or assignment are sufficient to enable fully-informed decisions by the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President?**

Yes, the Services thoroughly evaluate officer qualifications, past performance, future potential, and any available adverse or reportable information, and each service has a rigorous process in place to ensure all decisions are fully informed.

**In your view, are these procedures and practices fair to the individual military officers proceeding through the promotion or assignment process?**

Yes. I believe these procedures and practices are fair and reasonable for the officers involved.

**The NDAA for FY 2017 modified the Joint Qualified Officer (JQO) system established by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in two significant ways. First, it broadened the statutory definition of "joint matters" to expand the types of positions for which an officer can receive joint duty credit. Further, it reduced from three years to two the minimum tour length required for joint duty credit.**

**What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the FY 2017 modifications to the JQO system?**

The two significant modifications from the 2017 NDAA provided the Department additional flexibility in the Joint Qualification System. The expansion of the “joint matters” definition ensures the ability to award joint duty credit to additional officers making contributions to the development and achievement of strategic objectives. The reduced statutory tour length required for joint duty credit provides the Services additional flexibility in officer assignment for tightly managed career timelines and milestones. Given the timing of the change, along with standard tour lengths, additional time is needed to have a full picture of the overall impact of the tour length reduction.

**In your view, are the requirements associated with becoming a JQO, and the link between attaining joint qualification and eligibility for promotion to General/Flag officer rank, consistent with the operational and professional demands of Service line officers?**

Yes. Although careers are tightly managed to Service specific milestones and operational demands are significant, the 24-month minimum joint tour and associated JPME completion for joint qualification enhance an officer’s perspective and knowledge to perform at the GO/FO ranks.

**In your view, what additional modifications, if any, to JQO prerequisites are necessary to ensure that military officers are able to attain both meaningful joint and Service-specific leadership experience and adequate professional development?**

The existing joint officer qualification requirements provide a tested and flexible means to ensure officers develop the skills necessary for successful service at the operational and strategic levels; therefore, no additional modification to the JQO system is necessary at this time.

**What are your ideas for improving the JQO system better to meet the needs of Reserve Component officers?**

Major changes to the JQO system were made in 2007 to incorporate Reserve Component officers. In 2018, the Reserve policy was adjusted to increase joint qualification opportunities for Reserve Component officers. I do not recommend changing the JQO system with respect to the Reserve Component.

**Should the requirement to be a JQO be eliminated as a consideration in selecting officers for promotion and assignment?**

No. Meeting the JQO requirement enhances the ability of senior officers to operate effectively in the joint environment at the operational and strategic level. Officers who meet the requirement provide benefit to the Services, joint organizations, and the Department, and should be maintained.

**Given the substantial resources invested in developing officers to lead or support joint forces, should more be done to improve the JQO system? Is there another system that would be more effective, in your view?**

If confirmed, I will assess talent management strategies to maintain our competitive advantage over our adversaries. Further, I will continue to work with OSD, the Chairman and the Service Chiefs as we implement these authorities and assess the effects these programs have on maintaining a ready force.

**Should the requirement to be a JQO be eliminated as a consideration in selecting officers for promotion and assignment?**

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**In 2008, Congress enacted section 156 of title 10, U.S. Code, inaugurating the requirement that the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be selected by a board of officers convened by the Secretary of Defense. To this day, the Chairman's Legal Counsel remains the only joint duty officer selected from among qualified officers of the Armed Forces in this manner.**

**Do you consider the board selection process required by section 156 to be an effective and efficient process for selecting an officer to serve in this critical joint position?**

Yes, the board selection process is effective and efficient and typically runs no more than two or three days. Since each Military Department has their own personnel systems, the process to convene a joint selection board can present challenges. However, in order to conduct a joint selection board, the planning and preparation begins well in advance with each Service providing qualified candidates for consideration.

**What lessons, if any, have been captured from this joint process that could improve the selection board processes used by the Military Services?**

The Department incorporated the Services' best practices into the joint selection board processes.

**Would you support expanding application of the process employed to select the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to other joint officer positions? Why or why not?**

To my knowledge, the Secretary of Defense has not considered expanding the application process to other Joint positions. However, if confirmed, I will review this specific suggestion with the Chairman.

## **Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)**

**The 2018 NDS asserts that JPME has stagnated—that it focuses on the accomplishment of mandatory credit at the expense of lethality and ingenuity.**

**Based on your assessment of the threats facing the United States, now and in the future, what knowledge, skills, and abilities will officers need to succeed in great power competition against the nation’s adversaries?**

Joint leaders will require exceptional competence in joint warfighting, and demonstrate flexibility, toughness, and ability to think through uncertainty. Future leaders will need to conceive, design, and implement strategies and campaigns that integrate global capabilities to defeat competitors in contests we have not yet even imagined, and respond to activities short of armed conflict in domains that are already being contested. Key attributes of Joint Officers will include highly developed critical thinking and problem-solving skills while operating with ambiguity and rising above disrupted communications, resiliency, and irreproachable ethical conduct.

**If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to enhance DOD’s JPME system to ensure that it fosters the education and development of a cadre of strategic thinkers and planners with the intellectual acumen, military leadership proficiency, and sound judgment to lead the joint force in a transregional, multi-functional, multi-domain “Whole of Government” environment?**

If confirmed, I will work with the Services to sustain the Joint and Services Cross Functional Team and ensure a talent management program to support continuous intellectual development, hold individual officers accountable for academic performance and match officers’ talent with appropriate PME opportunities and positions of responsibility.

**In your view, to what degree does the Secretary of Defense Strategic Thinkers Program, established by Directive-type Memorandum-19-001, address the JPME concerns documented in the 2018 NDS? What does this new program add to the current PME system?**

We need to delineate between "strategists" - those who can imagine and write strategy from a blank page, and the "strategically-minded" - those who can effectively execute strategy through campaigns and operations. The former are rare and the new Defense Strategic Thinkers Program will help develop such individuals. The NDS language refers to the latter, the development of which is a responsibility of the larger JPME system. The inaugural execution of this program has promise, and if confirmed, I look forward to ensuring its success.

## **DOD Senior Official Education and Training**

**In your view, do a sufficient number of General/Flag officers and members of the Senior Executive Services (SES) have the advanced training, academic degrees, and**

**expertise in scientific and technical disciplines needed to lead the future joint force and the scientific/technical civilian workforce?**

Yes, but I am concerned about our ability to continue to attract and retain the highest quality talent necessary to achieve the NDS. To do that, we must compete with the public and private sectors for talent, and further establish the Department as an employer of choice, by effectively describing the importance of the Nation's defense to prospective employees.

**Are the career paths for General/Flag officers and SES with technical skills sufficient to ensure that DOD and its Components can develop capability performance requirements that will counter rapidly changing technological threats, execute complex acquisition programs, and make informed investment decisions? If not, what would you do to address this deficiency, if confirmed?**

Yes, but we must continue to evolve as our industrial and technology bases evolve. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff, OSD and other DoD stakeholders to ensure our senior leaders continue to receive the training, advice, and assistance they need to continue do so.

**In your view do current General/Flag officer and SES assignment policies incentivize highly qualified senior leaders to serve in acquisition programs? Do established tour lengths enable and empower senior leaders so assigned to manage effectively the long-term acquisition programs under their purview? If not, what changes do you believe are necessary to improve the effectiveness of the senior leaders assigned to such positions and duties?**

In my judgment, the Department's biggest civilian workforce challenge is ensuring we continue to attract and retain the highest quality talent necessary to achieve the NDS. To do that, we must compete with the public and private sectors for talent, and further establish the Department as an employer of choice, by effectively describing the importance of the Nation's defense to prospective employees. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff, OSD and other DoD stakeholders to ensure our senior leaders continue to receive the training, advice, and assistance they need to continue do so.

**Are you satisfied that OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Military Services have in place sufficient training and resources to provide General/Flag officers and members of the SES the training, advice, and assistance they need to "play the ethical midfield"? Please explain your answer.**

Yes. Sufficient training and resources are in place to provide senior military and civilian leaders the training, advice, and assistance they need to "play the ethical midfield." The ability to make ethical decisions is identified as a specific Desired Leader Attribute for leaders throughout the military and is foundational to all Joint and Service developmental efforts. The ethical foundation is laid at the outset of these individuals' careers and is further developed and reinforced in formal education and training throughout their careers.

## **Joint Operations**

**Military operations are becoming increasingly joint: Marines plan to deploy in larger numbers and on a wider range of Navy ships; the U.S. Army and Air Force invest in counter-maritime capabilities; and both air and naval forces continue to develop and implement capabilities to defeat anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) networks.**

**In your view, which other Military Service doctrines and capabilities offer the greatest opportunity for synergy in joint operations?**

Joint operations conducted globally require the integration of space and cyberspace domains. Both domains are relatively new among the services and offer opportunities to build synergy and joint operations.

**What innovative ideas would you propose to increase Service interdependence and interoperability to accomplish missions and tasks in support of joint operations?**

If confirmed, I would increase emphasis on interdependence and interoperability through joint training at the tactical and operational levels of warfare to strengthen our ability to conduct joint operations. I would also consider developing joint readiness goals, objectives, and metrics to achieve statutory guidance and assess synchronization of Service goals and objectives to ensure proper alignment with DoD goals and objectives. I would also focus on communication and the network as a key functional area to rigorously ensure joint interoperability.

**In your opinion, what are the Army and Navy's most critical shortfalls in capabilities to support the joint force? Do you believe the Army and the Navy are on the correct paths to modernize and overcome those shortfalls?**

In my current role as Commander, US Strategic Command I do not have a significant role in assessing the Army and Navy's most critical shortfalls to support the joint force. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff, the Services to learn more on the subject and provide my best military advice to the Chairman, Secretary of Defense and the President.

**The Air Force Research Laboratory's "Loyal Wingman" program seeks to pair unmanned aircraft with a 5<sup>th</sup> generation fighter. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment report on Future Carrier Air Wings makes recommendations as to the use of unmanned aircraft to augment 5<sup>th</sup> generation fighters.**

**How do you envision such manned-unmanned teaming manifesting in joint operations going forward?**

In my current role as Commander, US Strategic Command I do not have a significant role in this matter. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff, the Services to learn

more on the subject and provide my best military advice to the Chairman, Secretary of Defense and the President.

**Current technologies allow “low probability of intercept/low probability of detection” datalinks to connect 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> generation aircraft. As well, there has been much discussion about the importance of networking and connecting Service capabilities across air, land, and sea platforms operating across multiple domains.**

**How does DOD intend to execute joint airborne battle management in a high-end fight?**

As Commander, U.S. Strategic Command I have not been directly involved in this matter. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff, OSD, and the Services to learn more on the subject and provide my best military advice to the Chairman, Secretary of Defense and the President.

**What is DOD doing to make machine-to-machine command and control, across multiple domains, a reality?**

In June 2019, DoD released its Digital Modernization Strategy. It is the cornerstone for advancing our digital environment to afford the Joint Force a competitive advantage in the modern battlespace. We will increase technological capabilities across the Department and strengthen overall adoption of enterprise systems to expand the competitive space in the digital arena. We will achieve this through four strategic initiatives: innovation for advantage, optimization, resilient cybersecurity, and cultivation of talent. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff, OSD, and other DoD stakeholders on this matter and provide my best military advice to the Chairman, Secretary of Defense, and the President.

**What is being done to ensure that all Services’ airborne data links are interoperable and resilient against peer competitors?**

Interoperable and resilient airborne data-link communications are critical to Joint Force warfighting. Joint Force platforms are executing upgrades to ensure communication capabilities; gateways are under development to facilitate robust communications across different data-links; and future Joint Force capability development should continue to emphasize interoperability and resiliency in the formulation of new data-link requirements

**Who is leading this effort across the joint force, and what progress is being made?**

The Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4)/Cyber Functional Capability Board (FCB) is the primary venue to work Joint Force data-link requirements and capabilities as designated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) Joint Capability Board (JCB). The C4/FCB monitors service modernization implementation plans and works closely with the office of the Department of Defense Chief Information

Officer (DoD CIO) to ensure network capacity and access for the Joint Force. The JCB receives updates on these modernization efforts and considers data-link operability and resilience essential to capability development validation. If confirmed, I will continue to monitor progress.

**Has the Joint Staff developed and refined the joint operational concepts that will govern this integrated fight?**

In my current role as Commander, U.S. Strategic Command I do not have a Joint Staff or Department-wide assessment of this matter. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff and OSD to learn more on the subject and provide my best military advice to the Chairman, Secretary of Defense and the President.

**Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Capabilities**

**Demand for ISR capabilities of every kind has grown exponentially in recent years, largely due to the enhanced situational awareness and targeting capabilities they afford commanders. Almost all of the geographic Combatant Commands have validated ISR requirements that are not being met.**

**What is your assessment of DOD's current disposition of ISR assets across the Combatant Commands?**

Demand for ISR continues to outpace available supply. To meet new demands, the Department reprioritizes assets from other combatant commander operations and plans to utilize elements of the ISR force within the Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) construct to mitigate strategic risk, respond to unforeseen crises, and provide flexibility for senior decision makers. The strategic environment drives the Department's ISR allocation strategy as prioritized by the 2018 National Defense Strategy.

**What do you perceive as the most concerning shortfalls in both the capability and availability of ISR assets? If confirmed, what steps would you take to correct these deficiencies?**

Expanding the availability of ISR assets requires a holistic approach - purchasing more platforms will not necessarily expand the Joint Force's ISR availability. We will require more mechanics, operators, analysts, and linguists - very talented and skilled service members who require lengthy, rigorous training before they can operate in the field. I plan to work with the Services to explore expanded ISR availability as well as broader investments in ISR platforms, sensors, and communications capabilities designed to penetrate and survive in high-threat and denied environments.

**Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program**

**The CTR program, which has focused historically on accounting for, securing, or eliminating Cold War era weapons of mass destruction and materials in**

**the states of the former Soviet Union, has expanded its focus to other countries. As part of this expansion, the CTR program is widening its focus to biological weapons and capabilities, including biological surveillance and early warning, and encouraging the development of capabilities to reduce proliferation threats.**

**How could coordination of the CTR program across U.S. Government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts (i.e., the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the State Department) be improved?**

The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program is a critical and effective effort that contributes to the safety and security of the United States. It is imperative that national governments have capabilities to counter WMD threats as proliferation is a global problem that cannot be resolved by the United States alone. CTR's multi-year funding structure, rapid response capabilities, and authority to work directly with our partners' civilian and military establishments make it a unique tool to meet such emerging threats.

**Notwithstanding the use and proliferation of chemical documented recently in Libya and Syria, about 60% of CTR resources are allocated to biological programs.**

**Do you believe this shift in focus to biological programs accurately reflects the current threat?**

Yes. The current focus on biological programs was a function of a surge that had been designed to address specific identified threats, to include the need for increased partner detection capabilities and security of sensitive biological facilities. The Department reviews threats on an annual basis and reprioritizes activity when required.

**If confirmed, would you recommend adjustment in the allocation of CTR resources? If so, what adjustments would you recommend?**

If confirmed, I will review CTR resource allocations and collaborate with Departmental stakeholders to ensure CTR efforts are supportive of our broader Counter WMD strategies and Combatant Commands plans. CTR efforts must be synchronized with interagency partners who have different roles, authorities, and responsibilities in countering WMD threats.

## **Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs)**

### **What is your understanding of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy and the role of DOD in supporting that strategy?**

The National Strategy for Counter Terrorism provides a holistic, whole of government approach to countering violent extremist organizations (VEOs). The DoD is involved in several lines of effort including a leading role in strengthening the counterterrorism abilities of international partners and conducting military operations overseas to disrupt terrorist networks.

### **How would you assess the effectiveness of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy in addressing the threat posed by VEOs?**

The 2018 National Strategy for Counter Terrorism will take time to realize results. Given the long-term horizon to counter violent extremism, the Department will measure effectiveness based on trends associated with the strategic objectives. For example, we continue to successfully diminish the capacity of terrorists to directly attack the homeland. However, we struggle as an interagency to effectively curtail radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization of some organizations. If confirmed, I'll work with the Chairman and interagency to routinely assess our progress of the strategy to address violent extremist threats and identify areas for adaptation.

### **What changes, if any, would you recommend to the strategy and its associated measures of effectiveness? Should efforts to prevent the underlying causes of extremism be a component of our counterterrorism strategy?**

Adjusting our approach, even in small amounts, will take time to manifest itself into tangible results, especially if we are looking to move to a greater balance between kinetic and non-kinetic means. If confirmed, I will work with the many joint stakeholders to monitor our strategy measures of effectiveness to ensure we are working towards a desired end state with the understanding that progress will require strategic patience. Efforts to prevent underlying causes of extremism are key components of our counterterrorism strategy.

### **If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to promote a “more resource sustainable” approach to counterterrorism?**

If confirmed, I would support the ongoing evaluation of DoD's counter-terrorism campaigns in USAFRICOM, USCENTCOM, USINDOPACOM, and elsewhere to optimize assets and personnel and achieve a more resource-sustainable approach. For instance, in USAFRICOM, this approach has included prioritizing U.S. national interests with a focus toward security cooperation programs, strengthening partner networks and reinforcing their operations to counter VEOs, which in turn reduces our required posture in the region. USSOCOM is in the process developing a future global counter violent extremist (C-VEO) posture and operating concept which is sustainable, interagency

integrated, partner supported, and based around globally connected information sharing. Additionally, this force optimization will enable more effective operations to defeat trans-regional threat networks. If confirmed, I will advocate for continued and improved collaboration and integration with DoD, interagency, and our multinational allies and partners to maximize resource sustainable approaches to CT.

### **Countering ISIS in Iraq and Syria**

#### **What is your assessment of the current threat posed by ISIS?**

ISIS remains the primary transnational terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests overseas. ISIS continues to encourage its networks, branches, and supporters to inspire, enable, direct, and conduct attacks worldwide. ISIS will use its media capability to preserve its global brand appeal despite territorial losses. ISIS is likely exercising patience and adapting to its restrained operational environment to pursue its goal of establishing a global caliphate. Inspired attacks are the principal method ISIS is projecting power globally as CT pressure in the region and plot disruption in Western countries have temporarily limited its ability to resource external networks.

#### **What is your current understanding of the current U.S. Strategy and Objective in Syria?**

The U.S. military mission in Syria remains the enduring defeat of ISIS and we continue to work by, with, and through our partners and allies. U.S. strategic objectives in Syria are to:

- Achieve the enduring defeat of ISIS, AQ and other affiliates in Syria
- Reduce and expel Iranian malign influence from Syria
- Resolve the Syrian civil war on terms favorable to the U.S. and U.S. allies
- Deter the production, proliferation, and use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Regime and achieve the elimination of Syria's chemical weapons program
- Compel the Syrian regime to cease its sponsorship of terrorism and defend allies and partners from threats emanating from Syria
- Mitigate human suffering

#### **In your view, should U.S. troop levels in Syria be tied to the achievement of certain conditions on the ground? If so, what conditions do you believe should factor into decisions about U.S. troop levels in Syria?**

The future operational environment in Syria remains uncertain and dynamic. U.S. forces have drawn down to a residual presence in Syria to maintain counterterrorism and security operations. Any potential future troop level or capabilities changes would have to be assessed based on numerous variables to include conditions on the ground. However, we should sustain the necessary U.S. and coalition capabilities to prevent an ISIS resurgence and secure our enemy's enduring defeat.

**What should be done to ensure that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) do not lose control of the ISIS foreign terrorist fighters they are currently holding? To what extent should the U.S. facilitate the repatriation of these foreign terrorist fighters to their countries of origin? What new legal or policy-based authorities might be useful to DOD in this regard?**

Our military efforts have hastened the territorial defeat of ISIS, and the Coalition-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have nearly destroyed the remnants of the ISIS physical caliphate. ISIS is fighting to maintain control over its last pocket of territory while it shifts in other areas to underground and insurgency attacks. Without substantial international assistance to local governance institutions, ISIS likely will further take advantage of ethno-sectarian tensions and inadequate basic services to foment instability. Other state actors competing to advance their respective agendas further complicate the security environment.

With recent successes on the battlefield, we need to be postured to counter the threat emanating from the outflow of foreign fighters and their families to their home country or potential future battlefields. While disrupting the foreign fighter flow into and out of the AOR remains a priority, it is also a challenging task as returning experienced foreign fighter numbers and motivations are difficult to accurately track.

I do not have any recommendations on new legal or policy-based authorities with regards to foreign terrorist fighters and their repatriation to their countries of origin at this time, but if confirmed, I will explore this matter with OSD and the interagency.

**What is your understanding of the current U.S. strategy and objectives in Iraq?**

The U.S. strategy seeks the enduring defeat of ISIS and rebuilding of independent Iraqi Security Forces. To achieve these ends, the coalition continues helping the Iraqi Security Forces to consolidate gains, improve their military and security capability, and evolve into a more professional and representative force that is capable of countering an ISIS insurgency.

**What steps would you recommend for normalizing security assistance to the Iraqi Security Forces in the coming years?**

To support enduring normalized security assistance to the ISF, the DoD is enacting a plan of action that will occur in three conditions-based phases:

Phase 1 calls for the appointment of a Senior Defense Official/Defense Attache which is complete.

Phase 2 will transition tasks from CJTF-OIR to OSC-I which transitions activities from CJTF-OIR to a normalized Security Cooperation Office.

Phase 3 will seek implementation of permanent OSC-I billeting/staffing. This will be conditions based and characterized by the cessation of major combat operations against ISIS and the implementation of a Joint Manpower Validation Board to source requirements for OSC-I with permanent staffing.

At the end of these phases, the SDO/DATT and Security Cooperation Construct will be fully normalized with permanent manning and stable, reliable funding streams that support long-term U.S. national security interests in Iraq.

### **Yemen and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)**

**If the United States ceased providing intelligence support and military advice to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, how might this affect Saudi and Emirati cooperation with the U.S. against Al Qaeda and other terrorist threats?**

As Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, I do not have an assessment of this matter. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff and the Services to learn more on the subject and provide my best military advice to the Chairman, the Secretary of Defense, and the President.

**How would you characterize the focus of the intelligence support and military advice that U.S. advisers provide in Yemen? Would you characterize that support as offensive or defensive in nature? Please explain your answer.**

A small number of U.S. military personnel are deployed to Yemen to conduct operations against al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS. U.S. Armed Forces continue to work closely with the Government of Yemen and regional partners to dismantle and ultimately eliminate the terrorist threat posed by those groups.

**What role do U.S. defense partnerships in the region play in facilitating the U.N.-led diplomatic process in Yemen?**

The Saudi-led Coalition (SLC) supports the internationally recognized government of Yemen. Saudi Arabia is currently hosting the Yemeni government-in-exile in Riyadh. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia and UAE have provided essential financial support to the Central Bank of Yemen to enable the government to pay civil servants and support to the Yemeni rial.

The U.S. government is working closely with the UN Special Representative (UNSR) to negotiate an end to the conflict. It is widely recognized that the SLC likely will neither defeat the Houthis nor resolve the ongoing conflict in Yemen through a military solution. Since the commencement of the conflict in 2015, the Houthis have continued to elevate threats against the coalition with attacks into Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and international shipping lanes. The prolonged conflict has contributed to a significant and worsening humanitarian crisis with approximately 80% of the population requiring

urgent humanitarian assistance. Continued military operations risk further exacerbating instability in Yemen and the region.

## **Afghanistan**

**What additional actions can DOD take to support the ongoing reconciliation negotiations? What role does Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS) play in backing the diplomatic process?**

I believe the current numbers are appropriate given the existing conditions on the ground. U.S. forces assist Afghan security institutions in providing security for the people of Afghanistan in preparation for when the Taliban realize that the path for peace is through political settlement and not continued violence.

Within Afghanistan, our interagency partners are constrained by the lack of security. Without a permissive environment, there can be no guarantee of the effectiveness of the additional support. If confirmed, I will consult with senior officials and GIRoA to assess what, if any, additional interagency resources are necessary as progress is made on the South Asia Strategy. If I can assist by requesting those resources, I will.

**Were a major reduction in U.S. troop levels announced, how do you anticipate this would affect reconciliation negotiations? How do you anticipate that other members of the coalition would respond?**

As Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, I do not have an assessment of this matter. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff and the Services to learn more on the subject and provide my best military advice to the Chairman, the Secretary of Defense, and the President.

**What role do you believe coalition members should play in the reconciliation effort? In your view, is the U.S. doing enough to ensure that the other members of the coalition are up to date on the negotiation's efforts and goals?**

For specifics on the reconciliation effort, I defer to the State Department.

**Do you believe there is a need to maintain a longer-term U.S. military presence in Afghanistan to address counterterrorism concerns?**

I believe that U.S. troop levels should be based on the level of threat present in Afghanistan, and they must provide the correct complement of capabilities to enable successful execution of the South Asia Strategy.

**If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend to the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan?**

As the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, I do not have an immediate assessment of this matter. If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman, CENTCOM Commander, and

Resolute Support Commander to ensure our strategy is in line with national interests and any directed changes.

**At the meeting of NATO defense ministers in November 2017, Resolute Support Mission troop-contributing members increased the number of troops deployed from 13,000 to 16,000.**

**What is your assessment of the progress of the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan?**

To achieve U.S. objectives and to build upon the gains of the last 17 years, USFOR-A conducts two well-defined and complementary missions. First, through OFS, U.S. forces continue the CT mission against al-Qaeda, ISIS-K, and their associates in Afghanistan to prevent their resurgence and any external attacks. Second, in partnership with NATO allies and partners in the Resolute Support (RS) mission, U.S. forces advise and assist the ANDSF. The United States supports the institutionalization of ANDSF gains by conducting functionally based security force assistance (SFA) as part of the NATO-led RS mission.

I believe the NATO train, advise and assist approach, and the South Asia Strategy, can and has created conditions for reconciliation. In 2014, the Afghans began leading the fight against the Taliban. In contrast to previous years, the Afghans now have over 330,000 members of the armed forces that are fully responsible for security throughout Afghanistan. They have been able to execute simultaneous Corps level offensive operations, characterized by integrated conventional, air, and Special Forces operations. President Ghani's Afghan Security Roadmap is improving the offensive capability of the Afghan National Army so they can expand population security by 2020.

**Do you believe that NATO has dedicated a sufficient number of troops to the Resolution Support Mission to meet Afghan force-training objectives?**

As the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, I do not have an immediate assessment of this matter. If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman, the Joint Staff, Commander U.S. Central Command, and Resolute Support Commander to assess force posture.

**What is your assessment of progress in developing a professional and effective Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and what recommendations would you make to address persistent challenges to building ANDSF capability and capacity, if confirmed?**

I understand that the Resolute Support Mission takes a conditions-based approach toward security force development. That said, the growth of Afghan Air Force and Special Forces are key to increasing Afghan offensive capability. We will double the number of the Afghan Special Security Forces by 2020, and significantly increase the capability of the Afghan Air Force. Intelligence development is an ongoing process. Sustainment and

logistic functions will take longer. Afghan Security Institutions are still developing systems, programs, and policies that reinforce ANDSF capability growth. Progress has been incremental. Our advisory efforts remain focused on leadership and training to ensure Afghan forces develop the capacity to take full advantage of their increased capabilities.

**What is your understanding of the current planning assumptions regarding the size of the ANDSF through 2019 and beyond?**

As the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, I do not have an immediate assessment of this matter. If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman, CENTCOM Commander, and Resolute Support Commander to ensure our strategy is in line with national interests and any directed changes.

**What can be done to reduce ANDSF attrition rates?**

As Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, I do not have an assessment of this matter. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff and the Services to learn more on the subject and provide my best military advice to the Chairman, the Secretary of Defense, and the President.

**Iran**

**What is your assessment of the current military threat posed by Iran?**

Iran is our nation's most formidable conventional and unconventional threat in the region. Its primary military capabilities are missiles, naval forces, and unconventional forces. Iran has the region's largest surface-to-surface missile (SSM) arsenal, including both ballistic and cruise missiles. Some of the SSMs have a range of up to 1300 miles; farther than Washington D.C to Dallas, TX (1185mi.). Iran's Navy is capable of a limited menu of operations, but it is the Arabian Gulf's preeminent naval force and features many small boats and naval mines to complicate adversary freedom of movement in a conflict. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps – Qods (IRGC-QF) maintains ties to Shia groups across the region to advance Iran's interests. Proxies give Iran unconventional options for operations in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain and globally. The IRGC-QF also has longstanding bonds with select Sunni groups, including Palestinian Islamic Jihad, HAMAS, and the Taliban. Regular Iranian ground forces continue to focus on internal security and territorial defense, while also deploying limited numbers to Iraq and Syria. Iranian military leaders probably recognize they could not defeat a modern advanced military, but they could impose significant cost.

**What is your understanding of the objectives of the “maximum pressure” strategy with respect to Iran? What is the role of the U.S. military in this strategy?**

The “maximum pressure” campaign aims to change Iranian behavior and create conditions to negotiate a better deal with Iran than the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. It involves tenants derived from Secretary Pompeo’s “12-points” (i.e., ensuring Iran will never have access to nuclear weapons, will cease terrorist operations and employment of ballistic missile launches, etc.). The campaign applies diplomatic, information, and economic instruments in conjunction with the U.S. military’s ability to respond to Iranian aggression and malign activity in support of the strategy.

**If the current situation vis-a-vis Iran continues to escalate, what off-ramps exist for “dialing down” the tension, in your view?**

The Department of State is leading the “maximum pressure” campaign and I defer to Secretary Pompeo for any realistic diplomatic off-ramps. The President has been clear that he does not want war with Iran and is willing to speak with the regime without any pre-conditions.

## **China**

**The 2018 NDS describes China as a “strategic competitor” and charges that China is pursuing a military modernization program that “seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future.”**

**From your perspective, what effect is China’s expanding economy and growing military having on the Asia-Pacific region as a whole, and how should the U.S. restructure its security posture in the region best to counter China?**

If confirmed, I plan to work in concert with the Chairman to execute the National Defense Strategy tenets to Compete, Deter, and Win alongside our allies and partners. In order to achieve these, I believe the Joint Force and INDOPACOM must:

Maintain credible combat power and work with the Services and Departments to build the right force of the future; continue to fully support the State Department-led pressure campaign against the DPRK; maintain a network of like-minded allies and partners to cultivate security networks which reinforce the free and open international order; continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows and encourage other to do the same; be ready to counter the coercive influence of regional competitors; counter transnational threats and challenges, including terrorism and illegal/illicit trafficking, and be ready to respond to natural disasters.

**What is your view of the purpose and relative importance of sustained U.S. military-to-military relations with China?**

One of the most far-reaching objectives of the National Defense Strategy is to set the military relationship between the U.S. and China on a long-term path of transparency and non-aggression. Our military-to-military relationship should focus on reducing risk and preventing/managing crises. Our sustained military-to-military engagements are

designed to continue and encourage China to maintain regional peace and stability, and support rules-based international order instead of undermining it. Bilateral military engagements with China, including high-level visits, policy dialogues, and functional exchanges reinforce the procedures necessary to reduce risk, and prevent and manage crises.

**Between 2013 and 2018, China increased its air and sea incursions into the South China Sea twelvefold. China also increased deployments of offensive and defensive weapons systems to the South China Sea by that same order of magnitude. Further, during this same period, China disregarded international norms to create more than 3200 acres in the South China Sea; where once there was ocean, land now exists—under China’s sovereign control.**

**Do you agree with Navy Admiral Philip Davidson’s assertions that “China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States”?**

Yes.

**What can the United States do, both unilaterally, and in coordination with allies and partners, to counter the increasing challenge posed by China in the South China and East China Seas?**

Our presence in the South and East China Seas demonstrates U.S. commitment to maintaining peace and stability in the region, as do the frequent U.S. and Allied air and naval patrols. These efforts show that we are dedicated to protecting the freedoms and lawful uses of the sea and airspace guaranteed to all nations, to include the ability of lawful commerce to transit unimpeded throughout the shared domains of the Indo-Pacific. The United States has said time and again that territorial disputes in the region should be resolved peacefully and without conflict or coercion. The United States continues to encourage claimants to use diplomatic means to resolve disputes. To ensure stability, U.S. operations in the South and East China Seas—to include freedom of navigation operations—must remain regular and routine. In my view, any decrease in air or maritime presence would likely reinvigorate PRC expansion.

If confirmed, I will consult with the USINDOPACOM Commander on broader efforts to counter the increasing challenges posed by China in these areas.

**China has embarked on a massive shipbuilding program. By 2030, China will have almost 100 more ships than the U.S. Navy; China will possess more major surface combatants and more attack submarines, most of which will be newer and more capable. And while all of China’s Navy will be focused on the Indo-Pacific, the United States maintains only about 60 percent of its fleet in the Pacific.**

**Will Chinese investments erode the United States’ current advantage in undersea warfare, in your view?**

The U.S. Navy is investing in robotics and unmanned systems to supplement and ultimately improve our current Anti-Submarine Warfare capabilities. In addition to a suite of asymmetric solutions, we are advancing undersea mining capabilities to counter Russian and Chinese advancements in undersea warfare.

**How should U.S. joint concepts of operations, force posture, and investments adapt to counter this shifting maritime balance in the Indo-Pacific, in your view?**

Our concepts must also incorporate asymmetric and irregular approaches that create dilemmas for adversaries on a global scale. We will prioritize the ability to exploit subsurface advantages and, when required, use standoff air and surface long range fires to hold surface combatants at risk. Working with our allies and partners, we will ensure freedom of navigation in peacetime and freedom of action in crises.

To counter the shifting maritime balance in the Indo-Pacific, the Joint Force will develop integrated, all-domain solutions that expand our advanced capabilities beyond the maritime environment.

**What capability and/or capacity shortfalls in the current joint force present the most significant challenge to addressing the threats in the Indo-Pacific region?**

The Joint Force requires sustained investment in the following critical areas: undersea warfare, critical munitions stockpiles, standoff weapons (Air-Air, Air-Surface, Surface-Surface, Anti-Ship), intermediate range cruise missiles, low cost / high capacity cruise missile defense, hypersonic weapons, air and surface lift capacity, cyber capabilities, air-air refueling capacity, and resilient communication and navigation systems.

In addition to improving the current systems stated above, we must enhance our logistics and ISR posture in the AOR.

**What are the key areas in which each Military Service must improve to prevail in a potential conflict with China?**

Each year INDOPACOM provides the Chairman with the command's concerns regarding the emerging warfighter capability and capacity shortfalls that most adversely affect INDOPACOM's ability to plan and execute its mission. These concerns include shortfalls in critical munitions capacity, undersea warfare dominance capabilities, countering A2/AD environments, and persistent ISR. Additionally, the Combatant Commanders Exercise Engagement and Training Transformation (CE2T2) program offers an invaluable way of enhancing interoperability with critical allies and partners to mitigate capacity shortfalls in the Joint Force.

**What is your current assessment of the risk of a critical logistics failure in any conflict with China?**

Conflict with China poses formidable challenges to the joint logistics enterprise. Joint Force leadership is actively working to mitigate the risk to our logistics enterprise through strategic positioning. If confirmed, I will continue our Department's efforts to ensure that logistics challenges inherent to any conflict with China are addressed in the planning, programing, budgeting, and execution processes.

**In your view, are U.S. capabilities, in both quantity and quality, adequate to ensure the protection of U.S. and allied forces deployed in the Indo-Pacific AOR from Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles?**

The threat to U.S. forces and bases is substantial and growing. The People's Liberation Army Rocket Forces have a growing inventory of medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles that threaten U.S. bases in the region, including those in South Korea, Japan, and Guam, as well as naval forces operating inside the Second Island Chain. Many are purpose-built for specific targets, such as aircraft carriers or air bases, and PLA Rocket Forces maintain a high degree of combat readiness. Moreover, China is constantly evolving its missile technology, increasing their range, survivability, accuracy, and lethality.

I believe that recent U.S. actions, particularly through the FY19 National Defense Authorization Act and the FY19 defense appropriation, have generated the focused direction and urgency to better address this threat, but we have a long way to go to deter and counter ballistic missiles and future hypersonic weapons. Technology investments such as boost phase intercept development, increased interceptor lethality, and land and space-based sensors will improve the capability and reliability of U.S. missile defense.

**What does this mean for U.S. joint force freedom of operations in the Indo-Pacific?**

The United States will employ the full-spectrum of capabilities and concepts, in concert with regional partners and allies, to protect forces deployed in the U.S. Indo-Pacific AOR from Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles. China has quickly closed the gap with respect to protection of forces from the threat ballistic and cruise missiles pose to our land and sea-based assets.

**What is your assessment of China's increasing military presence overseas, including its base in Djibouti and other infrastructure projects across the Indian Ocean?**

China's increasing military presence overseas challenges our access, influence, and freedom of action globally. While primarily a regionally-focused military, China aspires to project power worldwide. China's expanding global interests, especially its Belt and Road Initiative-associated projects, have Beijing increasingly looking beyond the region.

China is expanding its access to foreign ports to pre-position the necessary logistics support required to regularize and sustain deployments in the Indian Ocean region. This

larger overseas logistics and basing footprint will enable Beijing to project and sustain military power at greater distances from China.

### **U.S. Capabilities and Force Posture in Europe**

**In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 5, 2019, General Scaparrotti stated, “I am not comfortable yet with the deterrent posture that we have in Europe in support of the National Defense Strategy.”**

**In your assessment, what capability and/or capacity shortfalls in the current joint force present the most significant challenge to addressing threats in Europe?**

Joint Force shortfalls in the EUCOM AOR are Theater Anti-Submarine Warfare (TASW), 5th Generation fighters, and joint fires. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Chairman, the EUCOM Commander, and update my assessment with the committee.

**In your assessment, does the United States have sufficient air and missile defense capability and capacity to defend critical infrastructure in the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), such as command and control locations and air bases, against cruise missile attack? What do you perceive as the areas of highest risk?**

DoD has sufficient air and missile defense capability in the EUCOM AOR but, it is not deployed in sufficient numbers to defend EUCOM's critical infrastructure against salvo cruise missile attacks. U.S. military capabilities, including Integrated Air and Missile Defense, have improved in recent years through the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI).

The highest risk is Russia's broad military modernization efforts of long-range cruise missiles, undersea, and cyber capabilities that threaten to erode U.S. military competitive advantage.

**If confirmed, what specific enhancements would you recommend to joint force capabilities and force posture in Europe to support the NDS more effectively?**

Successful implementation of the NDS in the USEUCOM AOR requires a combat-credible U.S. and Allied posture, NATO members committed to upholding responsibilities, more resilient partners and, ultimately, a Russian government that adheres to the rules-based international order. U.S. and Allied posture is capable of deterring and denying adversary aggression against sovereign NATO territory. As our NATO Allies increase defense and modernization spending, our combined capabilities and posture will become more interoperable, ready and lethal. As we regain the

Alliance's conventional overmatch, we must be postured to proactively mitigate Russia's irregular "malign influence campaign" that seeks to undermine NATO security.

Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) complements USEUCOM's permanent, forward-stationed forces; balancing the two is an effective way to increase combat capability while minimizing costs. Permanent forces are critical to our enduring deterrence posture. They are familiar with the region, habitually train with allies and partners, and are ready to respond rapidly in the event of a crisis. DFE provides episodic presence of additional, rapidly-deployable forces that bolster USEUCOM's combat capability, operational flexibility and deterrent posture. These limited-duration deployments allow a more balanced global force posture while increasing readiness and interoperability.

### **European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)**

**Do you believe continued, dedicated funding for EDI is required to support implementation of the NDS in Europe?**

The funding for the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) (through 2024) and associated Service investments have us moving in the right direction. If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman to continue to monitor progress and encourage our Allies to make additional investments as well and work with the committee to achieve the correct posture.

**Do you believe DOD could fully perform its mission to deter and if necessary, defeat aggression in Europe, in the absence of the funding provided by EDI?**

No, a reduction to European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) funding would add operational risk and delay our ability to set the theater with a combat-credible force to deter Russia.

**How would you evaluate the importance of EDI in improving U.S. warfighting capabilities in Europe?**

If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman, Commander, U.S. European Command and other stakeholders to evaluate the importance of the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) in improving U.S. warfighting capabilities in Europe to counter threats in the region.

**In your view, what role does military construction—a significant component of EDI—play in posturing EUCOM to deter Russian aggression? Please explain your answer.**

Access to sufficient infrastructure at key locations is essential to support military activities and operations. The investment of resources to improve infrastructure throughout the European theater provides allies, partners, and potential adversaries a clear indication of our long-term commitment to Europe. The planned improvements support military readiness in the region, support various activities and events, and improve theater Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSO&I) capabilities.

## **Russia**

### **Are there any areas of common interest between the United States and Russia in the security sphere, in your view?**

Russia is a significant global power. Cooperation with Russia on areas of mutual interest is a key element of global security and stability. These areas include nuclear arms control, counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, combating transnational threats such as terrorism and narcotics, managing escalation in the space and cyber domains, partnering to end regional wars, and provide post-conflict stability.

### **In your view, does the NATO-Russia Council have any practical ability to foster appropriate security relations with Russia?**

Yes. The NATO-Russia Council is an important channel for dialogue with Russia that addresses concerns, increases predictability, and reduces risks. This channel complements and supports U.S. government dialogue with Russia. The Council captures Allied positions on disagreements with Russia, such as Ukraine and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

### **In your view, which aspects of U.S. and NATO force posture in Europe are most effective in deterring Russian aggression and mitigating threats to our NATO Allies and partners? Are there additional measures that the U.S. and NATO should consider?**

Deterring Russian aggression and supporting NATO's defense of the Euro Atlantic area remain the as challenges facing USEUCOM. These complex and interrelated challenges require coordination with other U.S. Government Agencies, the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, allies and partners in Europe. Russia's "malign influence campaign" seeks to confound our coordination efforts and weaken the Alliance's integrity. While the Russia challenge is USEUCOM's most demanding task, the command's commitment to assist in the defense of Israel requires significant attention and resources.

If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman, Commander, U.S. European Command, other combatant commanders and interagency stakeholders to establish credible deterrence to Russian aggression and ensure it's a collective NATO alliance responsibility.

Continued integration with DOD efforts to address global requirements is essential to address trans-regional threats that span the conflict spectrum. Synchronized efforts by the combatant commands, overseen by OSD and the Joint Staff, are crucial to our success. We will continue to work closely with Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (R&E) and the Joint Staff to streamline the development and fielding of warfighting capabilities and concepts. If confirmed, I will continue advocating for resourcing solutions to address emerging requirements such as:

enhanced and expanded Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR); anti-submarine and undersea warfare; Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD); hypersonics; cyber operations and a secure, resilient Information Technology theater infrastructure.

**Given recent advances in Russian attack submarine capability, as evidenced by the deployment of the new Russian submarine *Severodvinsk*, what additional capabilities or capacity are most important to maintaining the U.S. advantage in undersea warfare?**

A robust Theater Anti-Submarine Warfare (TASW) capability requires investment in the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS) that uses the Fixed Surveillance System (FSS), Fixed Distributed System (FDS), and the Advanced Deployable System (ADS). A robust presence of fast attack submarines, guided-missile cruisers and destroyers, and Maritime Reconnaissance and Patrol Aircraft are instrumental in maintaining U.S. advantages in undersea warfare.

The U.S. Navy is investing in technological solutions in robotics and unmanned systems to supplement and improve our current ASW capabilities. To counter Russian and Chinese advancements in undersea warfare capability, we require a suite of asymmetric solutions, including advanced undersea mining capabilities.

**The 2018 NDS specifically mentions Russia’s robust anti-access, area denial capabilities (A2/AD) capabilities and the challenges they pose for U.S. forces.**

**In your assessment, does DOD currently have a mature joint concept of operations and the necessary capabilities in sufficient capacity to overcome Russian A2/AD capabilities? If not, what additional capabilities or capacity are required in Europe to ensure U.S. forces are able to achieve operational freedom of maneuver?**

We have the necessary joint concepts, capabilities, and allies to defeat Russian A2/AD capabilities. We are emphasizing future joint and multi-national concepts and capabilities to retain our competitive advantage. USEUCOM’s capability and capacity will continue to increase with the addition of permanent and rotational advanced land, sea, and air capabilities, and our emphasis on interoperability of U.S. capabilities with our NATO Allies.

**In the fall of 2018, the Russian Navy conducted a large maritime exercise in the Mediterranean Sea. A November 2018 Russian attack on Ukrainian ships in the Black Sea significantly escalated Russia’s war on Ukraine.**

**In your view, what are Russia’s strategic goals in the Mediterranean and in its aggression against Ukraine in the Black Sea region?**

In broader Europe, including the Mediterranean Sea, Russia seeks to block NATO expansion in order to prevent the spread of Western political and military influence close

to its borders. Russia also seeks to degrade the influence of trans-Atlantic institutions and create a defensive buffer region to enhance the security of its territory.

In the Black Sea, Russia intends to legitimize its claim to Crimea, deter Ukraine from asserting its sovereign rights over territorial waters, and secure the Kerch Strait.

**What is your assessment of the longer-term effects of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in the Black Sea region on the security of NATO allies such as Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey?**

Russia’s aggression in the Black Sea region affects each nation’s security challenges in different ways. The worst outcome for Russia’s actions in Ukraine is a united NATO response. Putin’s actions have revitalized Allied vigilance toward Russian activities.

**Russian tactics in eastern Ukraine have been termed “hybrid”—combining hard power with soft power—including lethal security assistance to separatists, the use of special operations forces, extensive information operations and propaganda, and withholding energy supplies and imposing other economic pressures on the civilian populace.**

**If confirmed, how would you recommend that DOD and EUCOM address Ukraine’s most pressing gaps in capability to defend against Russian hybrid warfare?**

Ukraine’s most pressing capability gaps require deliberate long-term planning to ensure complex systems are delivered in a rational, coordinated, and sustainable manner. This requires significant work with our allies and partners to ensure that efforts with Ukraine are complementary and enduring. Ukraine must also address internal legislative, institutional, and structural requirements to develop enduring capabilities.

In coordination with EUCOM, we intend to use a combination of assistance conditionality, targeted capacity building, and advisory engagement to encourage Ukraine’s continued defense reform toward NATO interoperability. The U.S. government provided over \$1.3 billion in security assistance from 2014 to the present, providing significant leverage to encourage difficult reforms. We, along with our allies, partners and NATO Liaison Office in Kyiv, support a robust reform effort across several domains.

**In FY 2019, for the first time in its existence, DOD’s Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative will be used to provide lethal assistance to Ukraine.**

**In your assessment, should a greater proportion of Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative funding be dedicated to lethal assistance? What are the obstacles, if any, to providing increased lethal assistance?**

We have a good balance of lethal and non-lethal assistance for Ukraine now. Before we determine if we need to make further adjustments, we need to observe how Ukraine puts the capabilities we are providing to use and assess its ability to absorb and employ additional lethal assistance and equipment.

One of our biggest challenges is that Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) funds have a one-year life span, meaning we have to obligate them before the end of the fiscal year in which they are appropriated. Technology release processes, contracting, and procurement timelines limit DoD's ability to provide Ukraine more advanced defensive lethal capabilities through USAI. While DoD is able to address most of Ukraine's priority operational needs through USAI, the ability to execute USAI funds over a two-year period could allow DoD to support more complex capabilities such as defensive lethal systems in the maritime domain.

**If confirmed, what specifically would you do to incentivize Ukraine to expedite its progress toward defense reform?**

Ukraine has made strides on reforming their Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces, but work remains. If confirmed, I will emphasize to the Ukrainian Chief of the General Staff my belief that the adoption of NATO standards will bolster Ukraine's ability to defend its territorial integrity and advance its membership aspirations.

To incentivize Ukraine, I would encourage their military to strive towards these critical defense reform standards to ensure they remain eligible for Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative funds.

**On March 5, 2019, General Scaparrotti testified that U.S. efforts to counter Russian influence operations still lacked “effective unification across the interagency” and that the United States has yet to develop “a multi-faceted strategy to counter Russia.”**

**What is your assessment of EUCOM and NATO’s readiness to detect, deter, and respond to Russian influence operations, including attacks in the cyber domain?**

NATO has recently made gains in detecting, deterring, and responding to cyber-attacks, but more work remains. NATO maintains a Cyber Defense structure that protects over 100K users at approximately 60 locations. NATO’s Computer Incident Response Capability Centre aims to prevent, detect, respond, and recover from cyber incidents. Furthermore, NATO has established a Cyberspace Operations Center to coordinate and synchronize cyberspace operations. In short, NATO’s cyber defense capabilities and capacity are improving, but continuous efforts will be required to reduce vulnerabilities across the Alliance.

**In your view, how important is it for the United States to invest in non-military tools of national power as part of a Whole-of-Government approach to countering Russian hybrid operations against the United States?**

Yes. It is imperative that we embrace a whole-of-government approach to counter Russia. These efforts gain effectiveness when aligned with allies and partners. The Russian government demonstrated the ability to utilize its instruments of national power to achieve desired outcomes. Increased transparency and alignment will increase the speed at which the U.S. government competes in this space, allowing us to be proactive versus reactive.

**In your view, what additional military and non-military capabilities are required for the United States to counter effectively Russian hybrid operations below the level of military conflict?**

DoD has sufficient resources to counter Russian hybrid operations below the level of armed conflict. However, additional information operations capability would benefit EUCOM in countering Russian's malign influence campaign. If confirmed, I will look very closely at our capabilities and capacity.

**NATO Alliance**

**How important is the NATO Alliance to U.S. national security interests?**

Our commitment to NATO and particularly our obligations under Article 5, are crucial to U.S. strategic interests. Article 5 obligations are the linchpin of defense and deterrence against adversaries threatening the U.S. homeland and our vital interests in Europe. NATO's strength is our mutual trust, commitment, and cohesion to collectively deter threats or respond to attacks.

**What do you view as the major strategic objectives of the NATO Alliance in the coming years and what are the greatest challenges in meeting those objectives?**

The essential strategic objective of NATO is to deter great power war on the European continent. It has been the NATO objective since 1949. The recently released NATO Military Strategy, the first in decades, recognizes the need to take a '360-degree approach' to best defend the Alliance and deter adversaries. This means greater defense spending, capabilities, and contributions by all Allies to address challenges from all directions. Increased commitment to defense spending, as agreed during the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, will modernize warfighting capabilities and increase the amount of ready forces available to confront security challenges of the future. It is critical that NATO Allies invest in, and make actual warfighting capability available to the Alliance at operationally relevant speeds. If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman and our NATO counterparts to ensure the Alliance carries out its commitments.

**What do you see as the proper role, if any, for NATO in addressing the threat posed by ISIS and in addressing the problem of illegal immigration across the Mediterranean Sea?**

NATO has a role in addressing the threats and dealing with the problem of illegal immigration across the Mediterranean Sea. The terrorist threat to Europe remains high

despite a decline in attacks across Europe in the past two years. Four ISIS-enabled attacks occurred in 2018, a significant decrease from previous years. The ISIS threat is greatest in Turkey, France, Belgium, Germany, and the UK. ISIS is particularly aggressive in Turkey where it directed multiple attacks against civilian targets and tourist locations. The group intends to expand its operational networks and they continue to call on sympathizers to conduct attacks in Europe. Al-Qa'ida intends to conduct attacks in the USEUCOM AOR but lacks the capability due to diminished leadership and resources.

**It is critical that NATO Allies invest in, and make actual warfighting capability available to the Alliance at operationally relevant speeds, when required. As part of the NATO Readiness Initiative, Allies have committed to a “Four Thirties” plan—30 battalions, 30 air squadrons, and 30 naval combat vessels ready to use within 30 days.**

**Why is this initiative important, in your view?**

The NATO Readiness Initiative enhances deterrence by creating a “culture of readiness” within the Alliance. Readiness and deterrence go hand-in-hand. Readiness, combined with an “enabled theater” creates a credible deterrent which alters an adversary’s calculus.

**What are the components of a realistic plan to train, certify, and maintain the readiness and interoperability of these “Four Thirties” units?**

We have an outstanding Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) who I trust will develop plans to best train, certify, and maintain readiness. If confirmed, I fully support the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) plans to build “Four Thirties” unit readiness. I will ensure SACEUR has our full support to validate the readiness and interoperability of the “Four Thirties” units.

**If confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, what actions would you recommend to align the NATO Readiness Initiative with requirements to execute NATO Graduated Response Plans?**

In my current role as Commander U.S. Strategic Command I do not have an assessment of this matter. If confirmed, I will work with the Commander, U.S. European Command to align NATO Readiness Initiative (NRI) forces with NATO’s Graduated Response Plans force requirements. NRI forces are essential to strengthening NATO’s deterrence and defense posture.

**In your view, is there a continuing requirement for U.S. nuclear weapons to be deployed in NATO countries?**

Yes. As long as NATO is committed to a nuclear deterrence mission, it is important the U.S. maintain nuclear weapons forward deployed in NATO countries. These forward-based weapons contribute to U.S. extended deterrence, enhance assurance guarantees to

our NATO Allies, and demonstrate Alliance members' willingness to share defense burdens.

**Under what conditions, if any, would you envision further enlargement of NATO in the coming years?**

The United States' support for NATO's Open-Door policy is unwavering based on Article 10 of its founding treaty. The Alliance's size is only one of many factors that drive decisions and timelines.

**How will the new NATO Joint Force Command for the Atlantic in Norfolk, Virginia, and the Enabling Command in Ulm, Germany, enhance credible deterrence in Europe? How would you define and measure success for these new NATO commands, if confirmed?**

Both commands are a part of an adaptive NATO Command Structure to improve how the Alliance addresses challenges from a 360-degree perspective. I am encouraged by the progress in standing up Joint Forces Command (JFC) Norfolk and its ability to focus on the trans-Atlantic area. Working with our newly established U.S. Second Fleet, JFC Norfolk increased Allied maritime domain awareness. This command also leads focused exercises and operations in the Atlantic to maintain our sea lines of communications. Joint Support and Enabling Command in Ulm greatly assists the Alliance's ability to move, reinforce, and supply forces throughout the area of responsibility. Success is consistently improving our speed of response and capacity to enable.

**The Korean Peninsula**

**How would you assess the continuing value of the U.S.-South Korea alliance to U.S. national security interests?**

For nearly 70 years, the U.S.-ROK alliance has been a core pillar of the U.S. national security architecture in Northeast Asia. The alliance has successfully deterred the North Korean threat since 1953. It plays an integral role in managing potential tensions in the region between South Korea, Japan, and China. The U.S.-ROK Alliance has also strengthened our collective security, economic ties, and societal relationships.

**Do you believe it important that the United States and the Republic of Korea resolve fairly and amicably their negotiation of a new Special Measures Agreement for 2020 and beyond? If so, why?**

Yes. However, the equity of U.S.-South Korea burden-sharing is best determined by policy-makers. The South Korean contribution to the Alliance is substantial and their

investment in defense leads U.S. Allies as measured by percent of Gross Domestic Product.

In recent years, South Korea's financial contributions under various arrangements supported the successful relocation and consolidation of U.S. forces across the Korean Peninsula. Going forward, I have every expectation the Republic of Korea will provide a fair share of the burden under the new Special Measures Agreement being negotiated.

**In your assessment, what is the value of combined joint exercises for maintaining the readiness of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula?**

Exercises and training are the routine activities of militaries around the world. The U.S. military conducts exercises and training at multiple echelons, at home and in every geographic Combatant Command region of the globe. Each exercise on the Korean Peninsula is agreed upon by both the United States and South Korea as an integral part of maintaining combined forces warfighting readiness. International participation in Alliance exercises has been growing. The characterization of military training has more to do with the publicity and emphasis of reporting surrounding training activities, than with the activities themselves.

**In your view, are there additional steps that DOD could take to improve U.S. and allied defenses against North Korea's missile capabilities?**

Yes. Although I am confident we remain postured to detect and respond to a North Korean missile threat, there are areas where we could improve our capabilities. The Missile Defense Agency continues to improve regional integration and advancement of allied missile defense capabilities, such as the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force Aegis. Additionally, the Department of Defense is adapting existing and emerging capabilities, such as integrating the F-35 Lightning II sensor systems into missile defense.

**In your view, are there additional steps that DOD could take to ensure that North Korea does not proliferate missile and weapons technology?**

The Department of Defense plays a supporting role in a whole-of-government approach to preventing the proliferation of missile and nuclear technology. United States Forces Korea (USFK) works with South Korea on this and other major security interests. If confirmed, I will continue this cooperation across the entire spectrum of threats facing the Alliance and ensure it remains ironclad and effective. I will work with the USFK Commander, U.S. INDOPACOM, Joint Staff, and OSD to provide more thoughts on specific policy proposals.

**Other Areas**

**How do Chinese and Russian operations and engagement in Central and South America, Africa, and the Arctic serve to advance both nations' long-term strategic goals? How do these operations and engagements threaten U.S. interests? What can**

**and should the United States do to counter Chinese and Russian footholds in these areas, in your view?**

As Commander U.S. Strategic Command, I do not have an assessment of this matter. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff, the Services to learn more on the subject and provide my best military advice to the Chairman, Secretary of Defense and the President.

### **Active and Reserve Component End Strength**

**Active force end strength continues to grow across all Military Services. Do you believe Active end strength must continue to grow?**

In my current role, U.S. Strategic Command I do not have a full assessment of this matter. I can tell you that our services remain committed to having quality women and men serving in our ranks. "Quality is more important than quantity." Current force level may meet our current operational needs but the future operating environment will grow more complex. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff, the Services, and other combatant commanders to understand their strategic problem areas, in the great power conflict, help provide the future force our country needs, and provide my best military advice to the Chairman, Secretary of Defense and the President.

**What Active end strength do you believe necessary to meet the demands placed on the Armed Forces by the 2018 NDS and associated operational plans?**

The growth requested in the FY20 budget submission represents responsible growth across the services and supports the direction of the NDS. The services remain committed to "quality over quantity." This force level meets the current operational needs.

**If Active end strength is increased in FY 2020, what specific parameters would you use to determine what the corresponding Reserve Component end strength should be in order to support those Active forces?**

The Active and Reserve Components both play a very important role in executing the NDS. A balance is needed to achieve this end. The department is committed to finding the correct force structure. Continuous evaluation based on mission requirements and operational tempo is essential to achieving our National Defense Strategy missions.

**In your view, do the Reserve Components serve as an operational reserve, a strategic reserve, or both? In light of your answer, should the Reserve Components be supported by improved equipment, increased training, and higher levels of overall resourcing for readiness going forward?**

The Reserve Component is an integral part of the total force. The Reserve Component serves as both an operational and strategic reserve. Our Reserve Components deserves realistic,

challenging training on the best equipment possible, to successfully execute their operational and strategic roles.

### **Religious Accommodation**

**In your view, do current DOD policies and processes properly facilitate the free exercise of religion, without impinging on the rights of those who have different religious beliefs, including no religious beliefs?**

Yes. Each of the Services has demonstrated the importance of religious liberty training for Service members as well as issues of religious accommodation.

**Do you support a policy that allows a prospective recruit to request and receive an accommodation of religious practices prior to enlisting or accepting a commission in a Military Service?**

Yes.

**Do you support a policy that allows a service member's religious accommodation, once granted, to follow the member throughout his/her military career—no matter where he/she is stationed or the nature of his/her specific duties, unless it can be demonstrated that the accommodation adversely affects military mission accomplishment?**

Yes.

**In your view, do existing DOD policies and practices regarding public prayers offered by a military chaplain in both official and unofficial settings strike the proper balance between a chaplain's right to pray in accordance with the tenets of his/her religious faith and the rights of other service members who may hold with different beliefs, including no religious beliefs, who may be present in these settings?**

Yes.

### **Prevention of and Response to Sexual Assaults**

**In your view, are the policies, programs, and training that the Department has put in place to prevent sexual assault and respond to sexual assault when it does occur, adequate and effective?**

If confirmed, I will continue to support efforts to address chain of command accountability, prevent retaliatory behavior, reduce root causes, and foster a culture of dignity, respect, and one that is free from sexual assault and sexual harassment.

One sexual assault in the Joint Force is too many. While we have put forward great effort and resources to prevent and respond to sexual assault and prevention, we still have work to do.

The DoD and Joint Force Leadership are committed to the safety of our men and women and will not relax our comprehensive efforts to combat sexual assault. Any form of retaliation goes against our core values and has no place in our military. The Military Services are committed to eliminating retaliatory behavior and have implemented a number of policies and procedures to address retaliation and work on understanding what causes this problem.

**Despite significant efforts by the Military Services to enhance the response to sexual assaults, including measures to care for victims and to hold assailants accountable, the prevalence of sexual assaults across DOD remains too high. If confirmed, what will you do to increase focus on the prevention of sexual assaults?**

We must empower our commanders and hold them accountable for the command climate in their units. Additionally, we must ensure every Service member, from new recruits to our most senior officers, adhere to a culture of professionalism and respect, which starts with leadership.

**What is your view of the necessity of affording a victim both restricted and unrestricted options to report a sexual assault?**

Sexual assault victims should be afforded every available support mechanism, including the opportunity to elect to file either restricted or unrestricted reports. These options provide victims a personal choice, and a much greater voice.

**What is your assessment of the potential impact, if any, of proposals to remove from military commanders, case disposition authority over felony violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, including sexual assaults?**

Commanders are responsible for the good order and discipline of their units, and removing their authority will undermine this long-standing principle. Commanders must retain the ability to hold all Service members in their formation accountable for their actions. The authority to discipline service members, to include convening courts-martial, is an important tool that enables commanders to fulfill their responsibility to their people and to establish an appropriate culture where victims are treated with dignity and respect. Commanders are crucial to our ability to effect institutional change and disposition authority is one of the most effective instruments available to them.

**What is your view of the role of the chain of command in maintaining a command climate in which sexual harassment and sexual assault are not tolerated?**

The chain of command sets the tone in every aspect of command climate and maintenance of good order and discipline. Commanders at all levels are expected to promote an environment of dignity and respect, free from unlawful discrimination, sexual harassment, and sexual assault. Commanders are accountable for the command climate they foster.

**In your view, do military and civilian leaders in the DOD have the training, authorities, and resources needed to hold subordinate commanders and supervisors accountable for the prevention of and response to sexual harassment and sexual assault? If not, what additional training, authorities, or resources to you believe are needed, and why?**

It is my understanding that DoD investigative and prosecutorial training, authorities, and resources are adequate. Criminal investigative agencies prioritize sexual assault cases and thoroughly investigate all allegations of sexual assault. With increased training and specialization, both investigators and prosecutors are becoming increasingly skilled in dealing with these types of complex cases.

**If confirmed, what specific role and tasks would you establish for yourself in the Joint Staff's program of preventing and responding to sexual harassment and sexual assault?**

If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman and Service Chiefs to evaluate and refine prevention and response policies to improve oversight and accountability. I will also emphasize that Joint Force readiness depends on the readiness of our Service members and readiness is most prevalent in cohesive units with empowered chains of command.

### **The DOD Civilian Personnel Workforce**

**DOD is the federal government's largest employer of civilian personnel. The vast majority of DOD civilian personnel policies comport with requirements set forth in title 5 of the U.S. Code, and corresponding regulations under the purview of the Office of Personnel Management. Although this Committee does not have jurisdiction over title 5, over the years, it has provided numerous extraordinary hiring and management authorities applicable to specific segments of the DOD civilian workforce.**

**In your judgment, what is the biggest challenge facing the Department in effectively and efficiently managing its civilian workforce?**

The Department's biggest challenge is competing for talent in cutting-edge technical fields. This talent is in high demand in both the private and public sectors, and is necessary to advancing the National Defense Strategy. In many cases, private sector employers are able to offer a suite of attractive work-life benefits, such as flexible work schedules and virtual work. DoD must become an employer of choice for such high demand professionals.

**Do you advocate the creation of a new "title 10" DOD civilian workforce and a concomitant body of title 10 personnel authorities applicable only to the DOD civilian workforce? If so, what should the key components of this new body of personnel law be, and how should it improve on title 5, in your view?**

This question is best answered by the civilian leadership of the Department, such as the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff, the Services, and other agencies to learn more about the subject and provide my best military advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President.

**Under current law, the civilian pay raise to adjust for wage inflation is set at the Employment Cost Index (ECI) minus 0.5 percent, or about a 2.6 percent increase for FY 2020. Yet, the Department's budget did not provide funding for a civilian pay increase, notwithstanding submission of the largest topline defense budget request in the Nation's history.**

**If confirmed, would you personally support a pay raise for DOD civilian employees, consistent with current law?**

If confirmed, I would support a pay raise for DoD civilian employees if such a law is enacted.

**How would you assess the morale of the DOD civilian workforce? What is your assessment of the effect that past pay and hiring freezes have had on the DOD civilian workforce?**

Results from the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey indicate that employee morale is high and has been steadily increasing over the last 6 years. Pay and hiring freezes increase risk to an organization's ability to attract and/or retain the best talent. However, even with pay freezes, the DoD civilian workforce has remained resilient and staunchly committed to the Department's mission.

### **General/Flag Officer Reductions**

**The FY 2017 NDAA directed DOD to reduce the number of general and flag officer (G/FO) billets by 110 by 2022.**

**What progress has the Joint Staff made in reducing its number of G/FO in accordance with Department-wide plans?**

The Joint Staff contributed to an approximate 10% SES reduction in that time. Additionally, the Joint Staff scheduled and identified by-year reductions throughout CY22. The Joint Staff also identified 78 General Officer/Flag Officer positions for reduction in conjunction with the FY17 NDAA. To date, the force reduced from 310 positions to 289 positions and plans will reduce further to 232 by December 31, 2022. In coordination with this reduction and FY17 NDAA, there is a plan to establish an Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) account of not more than 30 billets. The Joint Force will successfully meet the requirements of the NDAs; however, emerging requirements such as the establishment of USSPACECOM may require future adjustments to the GO/FO pyramid.

**If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to ensure the Joint Staff is successful in meeting these reduction mandates on time?**

I will work with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Combatant Commanders, and leaders of Defense Activities to ensure we meet reduction and restructuring mandates. The Department has established a General Officer/Flag Officer reduction plan timeline for each position identified for deletion. The Joint Staff reviews the plan regularly and provides updates to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on a quarterly basis, or more frequently as needed. Regarding SES management, I will continue to execute the DoD SES Reduction Plan to meet the goals of the Department while ensuring the mission and integrity of the Joint Force.

### **Mental and Behavioral Health Care**

**If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that sufficient mental and behavioral health resources are available to deployed service members, as well as to service members and families at home station locations, including Reserve Component service members and their families who do not reside near a military base?**

The Department's approach must continue to be one that focuses on the Total Force – active duty, reserve component members and their families. It is imperative the Department leverages a full spectrum of support mechanisms to support our vast and geographically dispersed population. Military OneSource, the Department's 24/7/365 solution to providing Service members and their families with resources, tools and information, is one of these solutions. A coordinated network of care encompassing support and services provided by the Department and other Federal, State, local, non-profit and private entities, can be very effective reaching and serving geographically dispersed Service Members and their families.

### **Women in the Service**

**In December 2015, then-Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter changed policies applicable to women in military service, opening all occupations and units to the assignment of women.**

**In your view, what more could the Military Services do to increase the propensity of qualified women to enlist or access in the military in combat occupations?**

If confirmed, I will work with the Service Chiefs and Vice Chiefs to review and address potential shortfalls in policies and programs.

**Across the Military Services, the retention rate of female officers declines precipitously between 8-12 years of service. To what do you attribute this decline? What specifically would you do, if confirmed, to increase the retention rates of mid-grade female officers?**

All Service members strive to strike a balance between service to country and personal priorities. Many women leave service early in order to start or raise families. If confirmed, I will work with the Service Chiefs and Vice Chiefs to ensure their personnel policies, programs, and procedures can accommodate, to the greatest extent possible, the various competing demands that military service imposes on women and families with the aim of retaining higher numbers of women in uniform.

### **Service of Transgender Persons**

**In January of 2019, the Supreme Court issued an order allowing DOD to implement this Administration’s policy prohibiting some transgender persons from joining the military. The new DOD policy took effect on April 12, 2019.**

**If confirmed, what would be your role in implementing the new DOD policy on the service of transgender persons?**

Transgender individuals may serve so long as they can adhere to all military standards, including the standards associated with their biological sex.

I would refer you to the Department’s 2018 Report and Recommendations on Military Service by Transgender Persons, which states that persons who have a history of gender dysphoria, who have undergone medical treatments for gender transition, or who are unable or unwilling to meet the military’s standards associated with their biological sex, could adversely impact military readiness and effectiveness and should be evaluated for the purposes of either accession or retention.

**How will DOD determine which service members should be “grandfathered” under the 2016 policy?**

As the Department’s 2018 policy states,

- Individuals who prior to April 12, 2019, were either contracted for enlistment or selected for entrance into an officer commissioning program through a selection board or similar process and were medically qualified for military service in their preferred gender are considered exempt from the new policy.
- Similarly, contracted ROTC and military service academy cadets/midshipmen, with a diagnosis of gender dysphoria confirmed by a military medical provider prior to April 12, 2019, are exempt and may transition.

**In your experience, has the service of transgender individuals in their preferred gender had any negative impacts on unit or overall readiness in the Military Services?**

I am not aware of significant impacts to unit readiness based on transgender persons serving. The policy is not a ban of transgender individuals. There are many transgender service members serving today with honor and distinction who are meeting the military standards, but it is critical that the department formulate consistent personnel policies to ensure the United States retains the most lethal and combat effective fighting force in the world. To maintain a worldwide deployable and combat ready force high standards, across all services, must be set and met. All service members must meet these standards.

### **Military Health System Reform**

**Section 702 of the NDAA for FY 2017, as modified by Sections 711 and 712 of the NDAA for FY 2019, transferred the administration and management of military hospitals and clinics from the Military Services to the Defense Health Agency (DHA).**

**Do you support the purpose and implementation of section 702 of the FY 2017 NDAA, as clarified by sections 711 and 712 of the FY 2019 NDAA?**

As Commander U.S. Strategic Command, I do not have a significant role in this matter. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department continues to make the transfer of the administration and management of the military treatment facilities to the DHA, and work with OSD, the Chairman and Joint Staff to ensure it happens while taking care of our beneficiaries.

**In your view, are the Military Departments' medical forces properly sized to meet the joint medical requirements set forth in Combatant Commanders' operational plans implementing the 2018 NDS?**

As Commander, U.S. Strategic Command I do not have a significant role in this matter. The total medical force end strength of roughly 178,000 is sufficient to execute operational plans and meet global medical demand. As we design a future force more focused on great power competition, the size and capability of our medical forces may need to be reexamined. If confirmed, I will work across DoD and with Congress on these efforts.

**In your view, do military medical providers across the Military Departments possess today the critical wartime medical readiness skills and core competencies required to provide effective and timely health care to service members engaged in combat or contingency operations?**

Yes. The joint medical force possesses the competencies necessary to save lives in a kinetic environment, as evidenced by their performance in overseas contingency

operations over the last 18 years. As we begin to lose personnel with combat experience, it is imperative that we codify, train, measure, and report the knowledge, skills, and abilities associated with wartime medical competencies. Our two decades of sustained combat operations highlight the need for embedded medical capabilities as far forward as possible. These capabilities increase survivability and must be integrated in the complex and contested battlefield of the future.

**Do you believe the Defense Health Agency should be replaced with a new combatant command, a Unified Medical Command?**

I think it is too early to tell. Before we can assess the impact of transition and implementation, we need to allow the DHA sufficient time to complete actions from the 2017 and 2019 NDAA. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to consider and identify additional areas for reform to strengthen the Military Health System after we fully implement the present transformation plan.

**Operational Energy**

**The Department defines *operational energy* as the energy required for training, moving, and sustaining military forces and weapons platforms for military operations, including the energy used by tactical power systems, generators, and weapons platforms. As early as 2004, then-General James Mattis testified before Congress that DOD must “unleash us from the tether of fuel,” if U.S. forces are to sustain momentum and retain freedom of maneuver. Today, DOD energy requirements are projected to increase due to technological advances in weapons systems and distributed operations over longer operating distances.**

**If confirmed, what would you do to harness innovations in operational energy and link them with emerging joint operational concepts?**

Operational Energy remains one of the Department’s greatest logistical burdens and largest vulnerabilities. To make the best use of technological innovations in this area, I would fast-track them through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process in each case where they offer solutions to emerging concept-required capabilities coming from joint operational concepts.

**In what specific areas, if any, do you believe the Department needs to improve the incorporation of energy considerations into the strategic planning and force development processes?**

DoD can improve the incorporation of energy considerations in the following specific areas:

- 1) Ensure our fuel posture matches our military strategy with respect to Russia, China, DPRK, Iran, and Violent Extremist Organizations.

- 2) The Joint Staff is examining force readiness with a focus on fuel consumption in an effort to align strategic reserves with our operational plans. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff and Services to address these and other related issues to ensure we have the right fuel at the right place at the right time within a geographic area of responsibility.
- 3) To safeguard our homeland defenses from potential cyberattacks on the US power grid, we are working with OSD Policy, DOE, and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to make the grid more reliable and resilient.

### **United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea**

**Officials of the Department of Defense, including previous Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have advocated for accession to the Law of the Sea Convention.**

**Do you support United States accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea?**

Yes. Like my predecessors, I support joining the Convention. Being a party to the Convention enhances the United States' security posture by reinforcing freedom of the seas and rights vital to ensuring our global force posture. The Convention provides legal certainty in the world's largest maneuver space.

**How would you respond to critics of the Convention who assert that accession is not in the national security interests of the United States?**

As Commander, U.S. Strategic Command the question of accession to the Law of the Sea Convention has not been my responsibility. If confirmed, I will review the issue as required.

**In your view, what impact, if any, would U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention have on ongoing and emerging maritime disputes such as in the South China Sea and in the Arctic?**

Acceding to the Convention would strengthen our credibility and strategic position on issues pertaining to these regions. While we do not take sides in the various territorial disputes in the South China Sea, we do have a national security interest in ensuring disputes are resolved peacefully, that countries adhere to the rule of law, and that all nations fully respect freedom of the seas. However, we undermine our leverage by not signing up to the same rule book which we are asking other countries to accept. As for the Arctic, the other Arctic coastal nations (Russia, Canada, Norway and Denmark (Greenland)) understand the importance of the Convention and are in the process of utilizing the Convention's procedures to establish the outer limits of their extended continental shelves (ECS) in the Arctic. The United States has a significant ECS in the

Arctic Ocean, but cannot avail itself of the Convention's mechanisms to gain international recognition of its ECS. We should put our rights on a treaty footing and more fully and effectively interact with the other seven Arctic Council nations who are parties to the Convention.

**Detainee Treatment and the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station**

**Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014?**

Yes, I support the standards for detainee treatment in the Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014, and required by section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92). Individuals in the custody or control of the U.S. Government may not be subjected to any interrogation technique or approach, or any treatment related to interrogation, that is not authorized by and listed in the Army Field Manual.

**Forty detainees remain at the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station. Estimates of the current cost of maintaining an individual detainee at Guantanamo are as high as \$8 million annually.**

**What are your views on the continued use of the detention facility at Guantanamo? Should use of the facility be expanded or terminated?**

The detention facility at Guantanamo is DoD's only long-term law of war detention facility. The continued use of this facility is ultimately a policy decision; however, I believe we need a long-term facility for detainees who pose a continuing threat.

**Do you believe the U.S. Government should be keeping detainees in long term detention, without charges or prosecution? In your view, under what circumstances would such long-term detention be appropriate?**

Yes, we need a facility that provides us the capability to conduct long-term detention in order to keep our enemies off the battlefield. Long-term detention would be appropriate in those cases where an enemy cannot be prosecuted but continues to pose a continuing threat to the security of the United States.

**If confirmed, would you commit to notifying Congress if a decision is made to transfer a detainee to Guantanamo *before* that transfer occurs?**

If confirmed, I will ensure the Department will continue to notify Congress as required.

**In your view, what standard should apply to medical care provided to detainees at Guantanamo?**

The health and well-being of the detainees at Guantanamo are an important mission of JTF-GTMO. Accordingly, USSOUTHCOM, through JTF-GTMO, provides adequate and humane care for the detainees at Guantanamo that complies with the standards of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. As the detainee population ages and chronic medical conditions rise, it will remain Department policy to protect the life and health of detainees by humane and appropriate clinical means, and in accordance with all applicable law and DoD policy.

**In your view, should DOD be permitted to bring Guantanamo detainees to the United States for critical medical care that is not available on-island?**

As Commander, U.S. Strategic Command the question of critical medical care that is not available on-island has not been a responsibility of mine. If confirmed, I will review the issue as required.

**Insider Threat**

**DOD has experienced devastating attacks from insider threats—attacks that have led to the death and injury of DOD personnel, as well as to the loss of highly-classified information critical to national security. The National Insider Threat Task Force published the Insider Threat Program Maturity Framework in November 2018.**

**In your view, how will DOD’s newly-designated Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), better posture the Department to deter, detect, and mitigate insider threats before they reach a critical point and potentially harm national security.**

As Commander, U.S. Strategic Command the question of implementing the newly-designated Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) has not been my responsibility. If confirmed, I will review the issue as required.

**What can the Department do to ensure that senior leaders in each DOD Component—not only the intelligence or counterintelligence communities—are fully invested in protecting their people, facilities, information from insider threats as a core mission objective?**

First of all, we have to realize this is an active defense problem, not a passive defense problem. In other words, to defend against insider threats, all elements of the Department must be actively on the network and defending against all threats.

Component Commanders are currently best postured for success. Components have already been given a great framework for Insider Threat Programs (InTP) that include clear policies, procedures, responsibilities, training/reporting requirements and mechanisms, and joint programs created for information sharing and consolidation.

However, due to the swift timeline for InTP establishment, key challenges have been program uniformity, funding, and manpower. Most notably, each Component is creating their program without any additional funding or manpower resources to support this new mandate. This has led to uneven implementation of InTPs policies. The Department of Defense can assist senior leaders in successfully instituting the InTP standards by ensuring they have the necessary resources to execute the InTP Maturity Framework of 2018.

### **Congressional Oversight**

**In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.**

**Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress?**

Yes, if confirmed

**Do you agree, if confirmed, and when asked before this committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate committees of Congress to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the position of the Administration?**

Yes, if confirmed

**Do you agree, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner?**

Yes, if confirmed

**Do you agree, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—**

**including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you?**

Yes, if confirmed

**Do you agree, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided?**

Yes, if confirmed

**Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request?**

Yes, if confirmed

**Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee?**

Yes, if confirmed

**Do you agree, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress?**

Yes, if confirmed