

Advance Policy Questions for
Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr., U.S. Navy,
Nominee to be Commander, U.S. Pacific Command

Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

No. If confirmed, I will continue to assess the need for any modifications.

Duties

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U. S. Pacific Command?

The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (COMUSPACOM) is responsible for deterring attacks against the U.S. and its territories, possessions, and bases; protecting Americans and American interests; and, in the event that deterrence fails, winning our Nation's wars. The Commander is also responsible for expanding security cooperation with our allies, partners, and friends across the Asia-Pacific region.

What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

I believe my thirty-six years of military experience, culminating in command of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, have prepared me well for assuming command of PACOM.

Over my career, I have served in every geographic combatant command region, including seven tours in the Pacific. This has given me a broad understanding of our military, economic, and geopolitical challenges and opportunities around the globe. During my operational tours, I participated in numerous major operations including the S.S. Achille Lauro terrorist hijacking incident, Attain Document III (Libya, 1986), Earnest Will (Kuwaiti reflagged tanker operation, 1987-1988), Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Southern Watch, Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, Willing Spirit (Columbia hostage rescue, 2006-2007), and Odyssey Dawn (Libya, 2011). I have commanded at every level, including squadron, wing, Joint Task Force Guantanamo, the U.S. Sixth Fleet, Striking and Support Forces NATO, and my current assignment.

Between operational tours, I was assigned three times to the Navy staff and twice to the Joint Staff in the Pentagon where I gained valuable insights and experience into the resourcing, administrative, Joint, Interagency, and Title 10 processes that underpin an effective Department of Defense.

I have been truly fortunate to have been sent by the Navy to Harvard, Georgetown and Oxford Universities for post-graduate education where I studied East Asia security, political terrorism, and the ethics of war.

Prior to my current assignment as Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, I served as the assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff where I was the Chairman's direct representative to the Secretary of State. In this assignment, I travelled extensively throughout the Asia-Pacific region and met senior government leaders, including Defense and Foreign Ministers, many of whom I will work with if confirmed as COMUSPACOM.

Finally, as Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, I have had the opportunity to establish or renew personal and professional relationships with political and military leaders in the region. If confirmed, I will continue strengthening those relationships, while enhancing the rebalance to the Pacific. My assignments over my career have given me broad theoretical and practical operational experience leading to a firm understanding of the military's role in the whole of governmental approach to global and regional challenges.

Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, U. S. Pacific Command?

If confirmed, I will take every opportunity to better my knowledge of, and relationships with, our allies and partners across the Asia-Pacific. I look forward to engaging senior leaders within the Department of Defense and the Department of State, regional security experts, leading think tanks and universities, and military and civilian leaders throughout the Asia-Pacific in order to improve my understanding of the challenges and opportunities in the region. I look forward to coordinating closely with members of this Committee as we work together.

Relationships

If confirmed, what will be your relationship with:

The Secretary of Defense

COMUSPACOM performs duties under the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense. COMUSPACOM is directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the ability of the command to carry out its missions.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense performs duties as directed by the Secretary and performs the duties of the Secretary when the principal is absent. COMUSPACOM ensures the Deputy has the information necessary to perform these duties and coordinates on all major issues.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Under Secretaries are key advocates for combatant commands' requirements. COMUSPACOM coordinates and exchanges information with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on strategic and regional security issues involving the Asia-Pacific theater.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

COMUSPACOM coordinates and exchanges information with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence as needed to set and meet the Command's intelligence requirements.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Chairman functions under the authority, direction, and control of the National Command Authority. The Chairman transmits communications between the National Command Authority and COMUSPACOM and oversees the activities of COMUSPACOM as directed by the Secretary of Defense. As the principal military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman is a key conduit between the combatant commanders, Interagency, and Service Chiefs.

COMUSPACOM keeps the Chairman informed on significant issues regarding the U.S. Pacific Command Area of Responsibility (AOR). COMUSPACOM communicates directly with the Chairman on a regular basis.

Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (COMUSSOCOM)

COMUSPACOM maintains a close relationship and communicates directly with COMUSSOCOM on issues of mutual interest. PACOM coordinates requirements and operations of Special Operations Forces within the PACOM AOR through the Commander, Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) to support PACOM's Theater Security Cooperation Program, deliberate plans, and real world contingencies. SOCPAC is a subordinate component to PACOM.

The other Combatant Commanders

COMUSPACOM shares borders, and maintains close relationships, with the other combatant commanders. These relationships are critical to the execution of our National Military Strategy and are characterized by mutual support, frequent contact, and productive exchanges of information on key issues.

The Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs

The Service Secretaries are responsible for the administration and support of forces assigned to combatant commands. COMUSPACOM coordinates with the Secretaries to ensure that requirements to organize, train, and equip Pacific Command forces are met.

COMUSPACOM communicates and exchanges information with the Service Chiefs to support their responsibility for organizing, training, and equipping forces. Successful execution of Pacific Command's mission requires close coordination with the Service Chiefs. The Service Chiefs are valuable sources of judgment and advice for the Combatant Commanders.

Commander United Nations/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea

As a subordinate unified commander, the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea receives missions and functions from COMUSPACOM. I recognize his unique responsibilities in armistice and during hostilities as Commander United Nations Command /Combined Forces Command and will fully support his actions in those sensitive and demanding roles.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel

Earlier this year Secretary Hagel directed the Department to transform how it accounts for its personnel missing from past conflicts. Specifically, he directed that he be provided with a plan to organize the Department most effectively to increase to the maximum extent possible the numbers of missing Service personnel accounted for annually while ensuring timely and accurate information is provided to their families.

As a result of the plan that was presented to Secretary Hagel, the Department submitted a legislative proposal to eliminate in statute the position of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs. The DASD's duties and responsibilities will be assumed by the director of a new Defense Agency that is being formed by merging three existing organizations, and will be overseen by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I fully understand the priority our Nation places on this issue and, should I be confirmed, I will fully support the Department's efforts to account for personnel missing from past conflicts.

Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan/Commander, International Security Assistance Force

When needed, COMUSPACOM communicates and exchanges information with the Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan/Commander, International Security Assistance Force via the Commander, U.S. Central Command.

COMUSPACOM maintains a close relationship and communicates directly with the Commander, U.S. Central Command on issues of mutual interest that affect both of their AORs so that respective strategies, policies and operations are coordinated and mutually supportive. India-Pakistan issues have heightened the importance of close cross-COCOM coordination. Additionally, COMUSPACOM must be alert to the possibility of "spillover" into this region of ISIL fighters and sympathizers, especially the return of these fighters to countries in this region.

As a force provider, PACOM routinely sends forces to CENTCOM including and most notably, aircraft carrier strike groups, Marine expeditionary forces, Air Force fighter squadrons, and Army Brigade Combat Teams. These forces support CENTCOM and the fight in Afghanistan by providing land and sea based striking power, expeditionary flexibility, and Ballistic Missile Defense.

Director of the National Guard Bureau

COMUSPACOM communicates and exchanges information with the Director of the National Guard Bureau to support the Bureau's responsibilities for organizing, training, and equipping forces. Like the Service Chiefs, successful execution of PACOM's mission requires close coordination with the National Guard Bureau.

The Chief of Naval Research

The Office of Naval Research is a valuable resource for technologies that help COMUSPACOM counter developing threats in the Asia-Pacific region. If confirmed, I will maintain a close relationship with the Chief of Naval Research as well as the other Services' research organizations and national laboratories to ensure the requirements for developing technologies for U.S. Pacific Command are understood.

Challenges and Priorities

In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Commander of U.S. Pacific Command?

This region is critical to U.S. and global security and prosperity. The U.S. works with its allies and partners to ensure the region's security and set the conditions for economic prosperity. As our nation globally rebalances toward the Asia-Pacific region, and if confirmed, I will focus on three main challenges in the PACOM AOR. First, North Korea's large conventional military, relentless quest to acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, and consolidation of power by Kim Jong Un present a clear and present danger to regional security and stability. This is the region's most volatile challenge and my greatest concern. Second, China's rise as a regional military and global economic power, and in particular, its rapid military modernization and assertive behavior toward regional neighbors present opportunities and challenges that must be managed effectively. This is our most enduring challenge. Finally, the stability, security, and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific will depend on strong relationships with our treaty allies and partners to ensure that we are able to maintain access to, and use of, the global commons, including cyber. We must remain alert to the potential for ISIL fighters from Asia-Pacific nations to return to their countries of origin. With their combat experiences and extremist ideology, they could rejoin or establish new Violent Extremist Organizations in the region. Importantly, we must ensure that our relationships, especially in the security assistance arena, help instill respect for human rights and do not abet rights violations.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

I will support the Administration's whole-of-government approach to achieve a peaceful, secure, and prosperous future security environment on the Korean Peninsula. Forward-based and forward-deployed U.S. military presence in the Western Pacific will continue to reassure our treaty allies and deter aggression by North Korea. If this fails, I will ensure Pacific Command forces are prepared to fight and defeat North Korean forces.

I will work to continue modernizing and strengthening our treaty alliances and partnerships in the region as we orient them toward the challenges of the 21st century. These critical relationships are enhanced by

maintaining interoperable military capabilities that deter regional aggression and build partner security capacity. Additionally, I will work toward maturing the military-to-military relationship with China. Both China and the U.S. have a strong stake in the peace and stability of the region. Building a cooperative bilateral relationship will reduce the likelihood of a miscalculation, increase the clarity of Chinese strategic intentions, and encourage mutual engagement in areas of common concern. Finally, I will work to improve the Japanese and Korean relationship, especially in the military-to-military arena. Enhancing our trilateral cooperation with Japan and Korea will strengthen regional stability in Northeast Asia.

If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed?

My first priority will be to continue to maintain a credible deterrent posture and reassuring military presence in the Asia-Pacific. Second, I will continue to strengthen our alliances and partnerships. Third, I will work through DoD and with this Committee to collaborate with other elements of the U.S. government and our allies to maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula and bring about the verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Fourth, I will actively pursue steady and measured military-to-military engagement with China toward a cooperative and constructive relationship. Lastly, while supporting our nation's strategic focus on the Asia-Pacific and sustaining the realignment and transformation processes already underway, I will work to carefully shepherd and repeatedly assess progress toward our desired force posture.

Force Posture in the USPACOM AOR

Significant changes to the U.S. force posture in the region have already begun or are planned to begin in the next few years, including movement of Marines from Okinawa to Guam and the relocation of U.S. forces within South Korea. There are also plans to increase U.S. presence in southern parts of the Asia-Pacific, including in Australia and Singapore, and to develop comprehensive engagement strategies with a number of other countries in the region, such as the Philippines and Vietnam. These initiatives will likely compete with other global commitments for increasingly constrained funding.

What is your understanding of the national security priorities in the Asia-Pacific?

Our national security priorities in the Asia-Pacific include encouraging the peaceful resolution of disputes, including territorial disputes and those based on history; upholding the freedom of navigation; standing firm against coercion, intimidation, and aggression; building a cooperative regional architecture based on international rules and norms; enhancing the capabilities of our allies and partners to provide security for themselves and the region; and strengthening our own regional defense capabilities.

The North Korean threat is the most significant threat to stability in the region, while a tactical miscalculation arising from territorial disputes such as those that exist in the East and South China Seas is the most likely. Natural disasters such as typhoons, earthquakes and tsunamis will surely occur and some of these will overwhelm the ability of the nations involved to overcome without assistance from the U.S. PACOM must have key capabilities in theater, including robust predictive intelligence, readily available to demonstrate America's commitment to the region and to our allies, friends and partners

there. We must be prepared to address incidents and crises quickly and, if needed, to fight on short notice.

In your view, what strategic criteria, if any, should guide the posture of U.S. military forces in that region to best address those priorities at acceptable risk?

I believe the posture of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific should ensure that U.S. forces are able to operate near potential sources of conflict, safeguard critical assets and infrastructure, respond rapidly to crises, maintain a politically sustainable force laydown, meet contingency and steady state sustainment requirements, and guarantee our ability to execute contingency operations. The presence of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula, the risk associated with proximity of those forces to North Korean military capabilities, and the advanced technological capabilities resident in the Asia-Pacific require that the most technologically advanced and ready forces are forward deployed in the AOR.

How, if at all, do the methods of forward basing, rotational forces, and agreements with allies for training and logistics activities support our national security priorities throughout the region?

DoD views posture as a combination of three elements: forces, footprint, and agreements. “Forces” are U.S. military capabilities, equipment, and commands, assigned or deployed. “Footprint” describes our infrastructure, facilities, land, and prepositioned equipment. “Agreements” are treaties, as well as access, transit, support, and status of forces arrangements with allies and partners. Together, these elements enable the U.S. to maintain a forward presence to achieve our national security objectives and demonstrate our commitment to the region.

PACOM operations, activities, and actions help shape an Asia-Pacific region into one that is secure, prosperous, and underpinned by a rules-based international order. If confirmed, I will posture our forces, footprints, and agreements in a manner to effectively communicate U.S. intent and resolve to safeguard our national interests, strengthen alliances and partnerships, maintain an assured presence in the region, prevent conflict and, in the event of crisis, respond rapidly and effectively across the full range of military operations in order to resume steady state activities.

In your view, is the right mix of these forward presence methods necessary to achieve an affordable theater posture at acceptable levels of risk? If so, how would you propose broadly assessing each method relative to its cost and benefit?

Yes. However, our current force structure and presence are not optimal to counter the threats we face. The size of the Asia-Pacific region and the diversity of threats – from military provocation to illicit trafficking in all its forms to countering terrorism to responding to natural disasters – warrant a more stable forward-deployed presence and readiness posture.

Risk measures our global force structure, including the availability of forces, access, and basing against the full range of regional threats and challenges. With fewer forces, we become more reliant on access and basing. And with even less forces, the Combatant Commander is forced to accept even more risk. A more stable budget environment would allow better management of this risk. Although DoD already has processes in place to continuously evaluate these variables and make adjustments, some risks cannot always be mitigated. These risks must be managed based on the context of the moment.

How important is a forward basing strategy to the ability of USPACOM to execute its day-to-day mission? Its operational contingency plans?

I believe the U.S.'s forward-based forces are our most visible sign of our commitment to regional peace and stability and are critical to PACOM's day-to-day operations. They are essential to our ability to respond quickly and effectively to contingencies. Forward based forces are not only the first responders in any contingency, they also serve to assure allies and partners and deter aggression by potential adversaries. Additionally, forward-based forces are vital for day-to-day engagement where we train and exercise with allies and partners to enhance capabilities and capacity across the region.

How does the planned relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam and other locations in the Pacific improve U.S. security in the region? How does the planned relocation of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula improve security?

Maintaining ready forces close to potential sources of conflict is a key pillar of force posture in the Asia-Pacific region. The relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam and other locations in the Asia-Pacific will allow us to maintain a significant number of ready forces west of the international dateline, signaling and assuring our steadfast commitment to the region and our regional alliances. Our forces will be readily available for multi-regional security, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and operational contingencies. Moreover, this strategic dispersal of forward-deployed forces will increase our agility to respond to crisis and, at the same time, complicate the calculus of potential aggressors.

The U.S.'s commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea is unshakeable. The planned posture changes in Korea support a broader force posture in the Asia-Pacific that is geographically distributed on the Korean peninsula, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. These changes addresses host nation concerns and simultaneously improve our mutual defense infrastructure. The Army's rotational plan is a global model designed to rotate fully trained formations with high unit cohesion, yielding a net increase in combat capability. I support the posture changes on the Peninsula consistent with the joint vision for the alliance laid out by both Presidents and further developed by the Secretary of Defense and his Republic of Korea counterpart. If confirmed, I will continue close defense cooperation with South Korea.

In your view, are the levels of funding, manning and military-to-military engagement in the Asia-Pacific region appropriate to the management of current and future risk to U.S. strategic interests in the region? Do you foresee a requirement to increase or to decrease those funding levels in the coming years?

The January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and the March 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review place an emphasis on the importance of the Asia-Pacific. If confirmed, I will review levels of funding, manning, and military-to-military engagement in the Asia-Pacific region and, if there are shortfalls in existing resources, I will advocate for additional resources required to support the President's priorities. My preliminary assessment is that there is a great deal that must be accomplished out here and we are limited by current resources. While I do believe funding levels must be increased in the future if we are to meet all of our commitments, the ability to do so will be influenced by budgetary requirements and limitations such as sequestration and continuing resolutions, changes to the regional security environment, and the relative priority of other military commitments around the globe.

What are your views on the current number and types of ships forward-stationed in the Asia-Pacific region? Are they sufficient to support the current operational and contingency plans or would you foresee the need to increase or change that naval force structure in the AOR?

The January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and the March 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review place an emphasis on the importance of the Asia-Pacific. Admiral Locklear has gone on record asking for consideration that the 10th Amphibious Ready Group or elements of that unit be based west of the dateline, options for home-porting the hospital ship USNS MERCY west of the dateline be considered, and additional maritime intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets be kept forward in the Western Pacific. I believe recent events such as Operation Damayan (Typhoon Haiyan disaster relief effort in the Philippines in 2013) and the search for Malaysian Airlines Flight 370 validate forward basing such assets. If confirmed, I will review levels of assigned forces in the Asia-Pacific region and, if I believe there are shortfalls, I will advocate for additional resources required to support the President's and Secretary's priorities.

Specifically, what is your assessment of the number of amphibious ships required in the AOR?

In addition to the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) forward deployed in Sasebo, Japan, the Program of Record will provide 5 Amphibious Ready Groups in San Diego to meet rotational assignments in the PACOM and CENTCOM areas of responsibility. Once the Program of Record is executed, these amphibious ships are adequate to meet current demands. However, forward basing the 10th ARG west of the international dateline would increase theater security cooperation opportunities and enhance PACOM's ability to quickly respond to contingencies.

How would fully funding construction of 12 LPD-17 class ships impact AOR needs?

The current plan is to fund construction for the 11th LPD-17 to fulfill the 5-Amphibious Ready Group requirement in San Diego. Constructing an additional LPD-17 ship would provide additional flexibility to meet additional USMC requirements.

What is your assessment of the feasibility of using the LPD-17 hull to support BMD requirements?

I am not aware that adapting the LPD-17 hull to support BMD requirements is an initiative that has been vetted at senior levels within the Navy. As the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, my opinion is that we don't have enough of these ships in the inventory today to support Marine Corps requirements and that they are fully employed in their current mission sets. Adding BMD to these ships would not only be expensive, it could potentially cause either mission (BMD or amphibious) to suffer in support of the other.

What is your assessment of the force level requirements in the AOR, and potential impact of longer deployments on quality of life for following ship types: Carriers (CVN), Attack Submarines (SSN), and Auxiliaries (Fast Combat Support).

Global demands for forces and the price of 13 years of war place a heavy tax on our forces. As part of "fair sharing" as adjudicated through the global force management process, PACOM routinely falls short of formally-stated force requirements. Personnel and operations tempo limitations, planned and

unplanned maintenance, and necessary training requirements all detract from the Commander's ability to get purposeful presence from those forces permanently assigned to PACOM. Admiral Locklear's stated demand for carriers, attack submarines, and auxiliaries is not met. If confirmed, I will review the PACOM force requirements and will not hesitate to ask for the forces I believe we will need to meet our assigned missions.

While force levels in the AOR from a permanent homeport basis (i.e., "forces for") are adequate, meeting demands of COCOMs in other AORs detracts from PACOM presence. For example, when the forward deployed naval forces (FDNF) carrier in Japan is in planned maintenance we do not always have a ready replacement carrier in the Western Pacific because of other world-wide demands.

Deployments for carrier strike groups and amphibious ready groups are expected to normalize over time as the Navy fully implements its Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP) to a nominal 7 month deployment length. OFRP should help improve both quality of life and training/readiness as schedules become more predictable. Attack submarines are generally able to maintain 6-month deployments. Auxiliary ships (T-AKEs, T-AOs, T-AOEs) are Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships with rotational civilian mariner crews and not subject to deployment restrictions. JHSV's and MLPs will also be operated by MSC under similar conditions.

In view of declining ship force structure numbers, and lengthened deployments becoming the norm, what proposals would you suggest to better leverage the current force and minimize adverse quality of life manning impact?

The Navy is on track to achieve its goal of homeporting 60 percent of the fleet in the Pacific by 2019. Implementing the new Optimized Fleet Response Plan across all ships will provide greater stability in schedules, as well as time to conduct adequate maintenance and training. That said, homeporting ships in the Western Pacific increases presence without the 4:1 turnaround ratio for rotational deployments, providing for quicker response to contingencies and greater awareness of the operating areas. I fully support forward presence including the near term addition of two more BMD destroyers to Japan, a 4th SSN to Guam, and expanding Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) presence in Singapore.

How does the planned relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam improve U.S. security in the region?

The U.S.'s commitment to the security of Japan is unshakeable. Maintaining ready forces close to potential sources of conflict is a key pillar of our force posture in the Asia-Pacific. The Marine Corps Distributed Laydown is a critical enabler to PACOM's Asia-Pacific strategy. The relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam will allow PACOM to maintain a significant number of ready forces west of the international dateline, signaling and assuring our steadfast commitment to the region and our regional alliances. Forces will be readily available for multi-regional security and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief missions in addition to operational plan/contingency plan operations. At the same time, PACOM will be able to reduce the number of Marines on Okinawa, which is politically sustainable as it comports with the desires of the host government. If confirmed, I will continue the close defense cooperation with Japan.

How does the planned relocation of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula improve security?

Our commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea is unshakeable. The planned posture changes in Korea will produce a force that is geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. The changes appear to address host nation concerns and simultaneously improve our mutual defense infrastructure. I support the posture changes on the Peninsula consistent with the joint vision for the alliance laid out by both Presidents and further developed by the Secretary of Defense and his ROK counterpart. If confirmed, I will continue the close defense cooperation with South Korea.

What is your understanding of the plans for rotational deployments of U.S. Marines to Australia and how, in your view, will such a presence advance U.S. security interests?

During the August 2014 Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN), Secretary Kerry, Secretary Hagel, the Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Julie Bishop, and the Australian Minister of Defense, David Johnston signed a Force Posture Agreement that enables the investments required to reach a full rotational deployment of up to 2500 U.S. Marines and enhances U.S. Air Force cooperation and access to Northern Australian airfields. The initiatives that we implement under this agreement will continue to enhance our alliance with Australia and our engagement with other regional partners. Smaller Marine rotations to Darwin over the past several years have proven that the multilateral engagement opportunities are beneficial to both U.S. security interests and to our allies' and partners' interests in the region. Additionally, USMC presence in Darwin will help both nations better respond cooperatively to a crisis in the region, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. These initiatives – developed in cooperation with our important Australian ally – demonstrate the strength of the U.S.-Australia alliance and its ability to enhance regional stability and security. If confirmed, I will continue the close defense cooperation with Australia.

Do you have any concerns about the timing and readiness of follow-on forces arriving in PACOM to meet operational plans? If yes, what are they and how can they be resolved?

Yes. The time it will take to deploy the forces/capabilities to locations of most likely crisis and contingency within the PACOM AOR remains a concern. The tyranny of distance involved in moving forces from the West Coast to the Western Pacific, especially Korea, impacts my ability to provide a timely response.

If confirmed, I will advocate for the necessary forward deployed forces, in conjunction with a dynamic force presence and required lift -- both sealift and airlift -- to ensure we are able to meet required operational timelines.

The rebalance to the Pacific will increase the percentage of U.S. ships in the region from 50 percent to 60 percent of the Navy's entire fleet. However if the fleet size is reduced from about 300 ships to about 250 ships, the number of ships forward deployed the region will remain the same at about 150.

Does the potential of increasing the percentage of ships in the region, but the number of ships in the region remaining the same, lead to challenges regarding the expectations of allies, and if so, how would you plan to mitigate such an effect?

The Navy is on track to meet its goal of homeporting 60 percent of the fleet in the Pacific by 2019. Current projections show that the fleet size in 2019 will be 286 ships, meaning that 60 percent would total 171 ships. This represents an increase of 21 ships from today's current presence. That said, if the number of ships in the Navy inventory shrinks to 250 because of sequestration or other mandates, the Pacific Fleet would certainly field a proportionally smaller force. However, while I agree that quantity has a quality all its own, looking solely at the number of ships provides only a partial view of our capability -- our platforms and systems are dramatically more advanced and capable than their predecessors. Risk in capacity is mitigated by improvements in capability, including the leverage provided by the Joint force.

How do you plan to mitigate the effects of reduced U.S. aircraft carrier presence in the region?

The Navy does not plan to reduce carrier numbers in the Pacific Fleet. In fact, once CVNs 78 and 79 come on line, the Navy's carrier numbers will be at 11 with 6 CVNs homeported in the Pacific. While not optimal, until then, PACOM has significant deployable assets across the Joint force that can achieve meaningful deterrent and/or kinetic effects. If confirmed, I will continue to posture these forces to achieve PACOM objectives and mitigate operational risk.

The March 14, 2014 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission report said that "...there is growing concern among U.S. allies and partners that the United States will be unable to follow through on its commitment to the rebalance due to declining defense budgets and continuing security challenges elsewhere. Furthermore, some regional countries almost certainly began to question the willingness of the United States to restrain China's increasing assertiveness after China in 2012 gained de facto control of Scarborough Reef, territory also claimed by the Philippines, a U.S. treaty ally. This perception could lead some regional countries to increasingly accommodate China or pursue military capabilities that could be used offensively or preemptively."

Do agree with this assessment and what mitigation steps would you recommend?

While I agree that some countries are concerned, I disagree with the premise that the U.S. is unable to follow through on its commitment to the rebalance and is, therefore, a poor security partner. The Rebalance is real and being realized now. I firmly believe our allies and partners are confident about the U.S. commitment to the region. In fact, in meetings I've had with civilian and military leaders across the region, countries are consistently turning to the U.S. as their security partner of choice.

Additionally, I have not observed evidence to suggest any significant alignment or accommodation to China among our allies and partners. To the contrary, China's provocative behavior troubles them greatly, which has created a demand signal for greater partnership with the U.S. Most nations (including the U.S.) have increased their economic relationship with China over the past few years -- this, of itself, is not a bad thing as it helps promote a strong and prosperous Asia-Pacific region. However, economic arrangements do not portend security relationships. I do not see the demand signal for partnership with the U.S. abating.

Engagement Policy

One of the central pillars of our national security strategy has been military engagement as a means of building relationships around the world. Military-to-military contacts, joint combined exchange training exercises, combatant commander exercises, humanitarian assistance operations, and similar activities are used to achieve this goal.

If confirmed, what modifications, if any, would you make to the engagement activities of the U.S. military in PACOM? What would be your priorities for such activities?

If confirmed, I would not modify Admiral Locklear's approach to engagement in the region, which is properly focused on strengthening existing alliances and partnerships and building new relationships. Our deepening partnerships with Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore and Indonesia are examples of recent progress. I would continuously assess and adjust engagement activities based on changing regional dynamics and adjustments to national guidance and initiatives. Should I be confirmed, my priority would be to continue this process of expanding our network of partners to improve the stability and prosperity of the region.

In your opinion, how do these activities contribute to U.S. national security?

Military engagement activities strengthen the network of alliances and partnerships in the Asia-Pacific, reinforce deterrence, and build partner capacity and competence which, in turn, advance common interests, address shared threats, and facilitate freedom of movement and access. Military engagement builds partnership capacity in order to reduce risk to U.S. forces and postures the U.S. as the security partner of choice.

In February 2014, General Herbert Carlisle, commander of U.S. Pacific Air Forces, warned in an interview that America's cancellation of a number of military-to-military exercises in Asia is "incredibly concerning amongst our friends, partners and allies," and added: "If there is any angst out here [from allies], it is the budget situation we are facing; the rebalance of the Pacific; and if, given the fiscal constraints that the U.S. has, if we are going to be able to follow through on that."

Do you share General Carlisle's assessment regarding "angst" about the ability of the United States to properly resource and execute its Asia Rebalance strategy?

General Carlisle made those comments after Pacific Air Forces, Pacific Fleet, and the other PACOM components cancelled or down-scoped numerous exercises, large and small, in 2013 due to the sequester. I agree with him completely that continuous changes in fiscal fact and assumptions hamper our ability to execute mid- and long-term plans and exercises. This leads to poor utilization of resources. These budget uncertainties affect not only our ability to exercise and operate with our allies and partners, they also affect our people, equipment, and infrastructure by reducing training and delaying needed investments. These delays reduce our readiness and the ability to reliably interact with our allies and partners in the region.

Do you believe that in order to demonstrate a serious U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific, that Pacific Command will need significantly more resources than would be permitted under the Budget Control Act?

Continued reductions to meet sequestration-mandated resource levels will diminish our military's size, reach, and margin of technological superiority. All of these factors will impact the U.S. rebalance to the Pacific. For example, there will be fewer aircraft and ships, and these will be under-maintained; there will be fewer troops, and they will be under-trained; and we will have to fight with older weapon systems and equipment.

What specific military risks do you think the U.S. and its allies and partners in Asia will incur if the Budget Control Act goes forward?

The cumulative effect of continuing resolutions and sequestration will result in significant reductions to the readiness, presence, capability, and interoperability of U.S. forces in the region. It will decrease our ability to train, exercise, and engage with Allies and partners throughout the Asia-Pacific, which will limit the progress in building capable partners that can operate in coalition with, or in lieu of, U.S. forces. As a result, the U.S. will bear more significant risk in the event of a regional contingency.

Building Partner Capacity

In the past few years, Congress has provided the Department of Defense a number of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner nations, including the global train and equip authority ("Section 1206") and Global Contingency Security Fund.

What is your understanding of the purpose of the Section 1206 global train and equip authority and Global Contingency Security Fund?

Congress approved Section 1206 global train and equip authority in 2006 in part to give the State Department and DoD a more flexible capacity building authority to address urgent and emergent threats before the threats destabilize theater partners or threaten the Homeland. I worked with this authority when I was assigned to U.S. Southern Command as its Director of Operations in 2007-2008. In 2009, the scope expanded to assist coalition partners as they prepare for deployment. This rapid funding tool is PACOM's most agile mechanism to address counter terrorism capability gaps in partner nations.

The Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) is an initiative to pool the resources of the Departments of State and Defense, as well as the expertise of other departments, to provide security sector assistance for emergent challenges and opportunities.

The GSCF has no appropriated funding; rather State and DoD can transfer funds from other appropriations into the GSCF. DoD can transfer up to \$200M from defense-wide Operations & Maintenance and State can transfer up to a combined \$25M from Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF). The GSCF can provide assistance to (1) national military and security forces, as well as the government agencies responsible for overseeing these forces; and (2) the justice sector

when civilian agencies are challenged (including law enforcement and prisons), rule of law programs, and stabilization efforts in a country.

PACOM currently has two GSCF projects in progress, one in the Philippines and one in Bangladesh. The Bangladesh project is valued at \$3.5 million and focuses on increasing interoperability between the Bangladesh Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Home Affairs. The Philippines project is valued at \$40 million and focuses on strengthening maritime domain awareness and transferring internal security from the military to law enforcement agencies. Both of these projects are in the execution phase now and should enhance security in those nations.

In your view, what are our strategic objectives in building the capacities of partner nations in the Asia and Pacific region?

The U.S.'s primary objective in building the capacity of foreign partners is to help them develop effective and legitimate security institutions that can provide for their countries' security while contributing to regional and multilateral responses to shared threats. Capacity building provides opportunities to build defense relationships and promotes both interoperability between our forces and access to the region during peacetime and contingency operations. Lastly, building this capacity in our allies and partners lessens the burden on U.S. forces responding to security threats outside the U.S.

In a resource-constrained fiscal environment, how would you prioritize the types of programs or activities that should receive support under these security assistance authorities?

If confirmed, I would prioritize the most critical partner capability shortfalls in the PACOM AOR that present risk to the U.S., our allies, and our partners first. In order to receive the most value from these programs, regardless of the fiscal environment, I would aggregate the critical gaps from PACOM's country plans, find common gaps and areas of concern such as maritime security and counter-terrorism, and identify gaps in overlooked and under-resourced areas. Additionally, I would work closely with our Ambassadors to synchronize our efforts with other U.S. government entities to ensure a whole of government approach to the region.

In your view, what should be the role of the Department of Defense, vis-à-vis other civilian departments and agencies of the Government, in the exercise of instruments of soft power (civilian expertise in reconstruction, development, and governance)?

The Department of Defense does, and in my view should, play a role in supporting other USG departments and agencies to create a whole-of-government effort when exercising soft power. For example, following a natural disaster, the Department of Defense often responds to U.S. Agency for International Development requests for humanitarian assistance. DoD and partner agencies and departments have liaisons embedded in each other's major headquarters to enable the DoD to effectively provide that support. At PACOM, for example, there are liaison officers from the Department of Energy, Department of the Interior, U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of State, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), among others. The Department of Defense also plays a key role in working specifically with partner nation defense institutions in order to build capacity by contributing perspectives and lessons learned

that reside uniquely within the Department; however, it is critical that these efforts be undertaken in close coordination with other federal agencies, particularly the Department of State.

What is your assessment of the effectiveness of these building partner capacity programs conducted in the PACOM area of responsibility in supporting U.S. strategic objectives?

I believe the building partner capacity programs are very effective. PACOM's planning priorities directly support U.S. strategic objectives and PACOM's Theater Security Cooperation operations, activities, and actions receive the coordination and resourcing rigor necessary to ensure the best use of resources to achieve those objectives.

China

China's defense spending has had double-digit increases annually for about the past 20 years.

How would you characterize the current U.S. relationship with China?

The senior-most leaders of our two countries have consistently affirmed the need for a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship. It is a relationship which includes elements of cooperation and competition. It is one of the most complex and important relationships in the world. China's efforts to cooperate with the international community, such as help with the removal of chemical weapons from Syria, counter piracy in the Horn of Africa, and participation in humanitarian and disaster relief operations during the search for Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 and Typhoon Haiyan should be encouraged. At the same time, China is rapidly modernizing its military and engaging in aggressive behavior against its neighbors, particularly in the East and South China Seas.

What do you believe are the objectives of China's steady increase in defense spending and its overall military modernization program?

China appears to be building the capability to fight and win short duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery, including, potentially, countering U.S. military intervention in regional conflicts. In this respect, we are watching carefully China's investments in so-called anti-access/area denial capabilities. Its near term focus appears to be on preparing for potential contingencies involving Taiwan. Its modernization efforts emphasize anti-access and area denial capabilities. China is also devoting increasing attention and resources to conducting operations beyond Taiwan and China's immediate periphery. Beijing's growing focus on military missions other than war includes humanitarian assistance, non-combat evacuation operations, and counter-piracy support. Lastly, China is strengthening its nuclear deterrent and enhancing its strategic strike capabilities through modernization of its nuclear forces. Additionally, China is improving other strategic capabilities such as in space, counter-space, and computer network operations.

How should the United States respond to this Chinese military growth and modernization?

I believe the U.S. should continue to monitor developments in China's military concepts and capabilities while encouraging Beijing to be more transparent about its military and security affairs. The U.S. has been, and should remain, the pivotal military power in the Asia-Pacific region in order to preserve the conditions that have fostered peace and prosperity. The U.S.'s response to China's military

modernization should be flexible and supported by the continued transformation of our force posture in the region, the maintenance of our global presence and access, the modernization of our own capabilities in areas such as countering anti-access and area denial, and the strengthening of our alliances and partnerships.

What are your views of China's deployment of warships to counter piracy in the western Indian Ocean and how does this deployment contribute to China's ability to project power?

Counter piracy is an area of mutual concern as Indian Ocean pirates threaten the commercial shipping of both our countries. Ultimately, we want to see China become a net contributor to global stability. These operations allow China to take a more active role in contributing to the international effort of safeguarding sea lines of communication. It demonstrates to China the value of multilateral approaches to global problems. China's power projection ability is progressing and we recognize the evolution of its military modernization. Operations like those off the Horn of Africa can improve China's ability to operate at greater distances from China.

What do you believe are the Chinese political-military goals in the Asia-Pacific region? Globally?

The overarching objectives of China's leaders appear to be ensuring the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party, continuing China's economic development, maintaining the country's domestic political stability, defending China's sovereignty and territorial claims, and securing China's influence and status. Within this context, leveraging its political, economic, and military clout to move toward unification with Taiwan is a key part of Beijing's strategy.

What effect is China's military growth having on other countries in the region?

China's rapid rise and the relative lack of transparency surrounding its intentions are increasingly a source of instability in the region. Other countries in the region are closely watching the growth of China's military and how its military acts. Tensions between China and its neighbors in the East and South China Seas have increased, spurring regional actors to modernize their forces.

Security concerns regarding Chinese military intentions have contributed to a greater focus on regional forums such as ASEAN, where issues may be addressed multilaterally. Such security concerns have also led to stronger and more welcoming relations between Asia-Pacific countries and the U.S. as a security partner of choice.

How do you assess the current cross-strait relationship between China and Taiwan, and how can we help prevent miscalculation on either side?

Both China and Taiwan have made significant strides to reduce tensions in the Taiwan Strait. These initiatives should be encouraged and we welcome the progress made by both sides. I believe the U.S. can help contribute to cross-strait stability by continuing to abide by our longstanding policies, based on the one-China policy, three U.S.-China Communiqués, and the Taiwan Relations Act, including making available to Taiwan "defense articles and services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability."

How do China's efforts to establish a strategic presence in the Indian Ocean by securing and maintaining access to seaports in various South and Southeast Asian countries affect its political-military posture and influence in the region?

China looks to South and Southeast Asia as areas of strategic importance, which includes political objectives, access to ports, and access to resources, trade, and investment. I remain concerned with how China intends to use its presence. As China increases its naval deployments to the region, including ongoing participation in counter-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden, China will require greater forward logistics capabilities to sustain operations. We have already seen Chinese submarines pull into Sri Lanka, for example. Establishing access to various seaports will require improving ties with states along the Indian Ocean littoral and closer cooperation with other regional navies, which could expose them to more non-traditional security challenges such as terrorism. The U.S. retains strong relationships in South and Southeast Asia and should continue to monitor China's growing presence in the region.

What is the role of DOD in helping to ensure that China's nuclear power industry does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region?

China is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the U.S. should continue to insist that China meet its obligations under that accord. DoD participates in the USG effort to execute the President's vision to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, along with related technologies and material throughout the globe. DoD must maintain robust Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities to ensure we are aware of developments in this area. Finally, I believe that DoD should continue to work with the interagency to ensure that any proliferation concerns relating to China are expressed to the Chinese Government in the appropriate forums.

What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-China military-to-military relations?

I believe the U.S. and China desire a healthy, stable, reliable, and continuous military-to-military relationship. There are recent examples where we have seen improved practical cooperation, such as counter-piracy, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and military medicine exchanges. The PLA (Navy) participated -- at U.S. invitation -- in this year's Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) maritime exercise in the Hawaiian operating areas (even though they also deployed an intelligence-collecting ship in the U.S. exclusive economic zone during the exercise). China hosted the Western Pacific Naval Symposium in Qingdao earlier this year, during which the Navies for the region (including the PLA Navy) adopted the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). I attended, was treated extremely well, and had frank discussions with its Chief of Navy, Admiral Wu Shengli. The PLA (Navy) leadership attended the International Seapower Symposium in Newport this September where I again met with Admiral Wu. The PLA and the U.S. military have made strides in the Rules of Behavior Working Group forum as well, which culminated in the Secretary of Defense and China's Military of Defense signing a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the rules of behavior for safety of air and maritime encounters. However, a deeper U.S.-China military-to-military dialogue is needed to address many of the sources of insecurity and potential competition that may arise as our two forces come into closer and more frequent contact. For example, the PLA routinely conducts close and unsafe intercepts of our aircraft operating in international airspace.

The U.S. military continues to pursue opportunities to cooperate where there is clear, mutual benefit while establishing a dialogue on areas where there are differences. I believe we should continue to use military engagement with China to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the security of the Asia-Pacific region, to encourage China to play a constructive role in the region, and to press China to partner with the U.S. and our friends in the region to address common security challenges.

Do you believe that the United States should make any changes in the quality or quantity of our military relations with China? If so, what changes and why?

If confirmed, I would look for ways to strengthen the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship, consistent with U.S. law. The U. S.-China military-to-military relationship has experienced positive momentum over the past two years. Our approach should continue to pursue this positive development consistent with U.S. interests in a sustained, substantive dialog with China; concrete, practical cooperation where it makes sense; and enhanced risk reduction measures to manage our differences constructively. At the same time, I would seek to ensure that we balance these exchanges with continued robust interactions with allies and partners across the region.

What is your view regarding the longstanding U.S. policy of selling defense articles and services to Taiwan despite objections and criticism from China?

I personally strongly support the Taiwan Relations Act. U.S. policy on arms sales to Taiwan is based on the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which provides that the U.S. will make available to Taiwan defense articles and services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. The Act also states that the President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan. It is my view that this policy has contributed to peace and stability in the region for more than 30 years and is consistent with the longstanding U.S. calls for peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

In your view, to what extent, if at all, should China's possible reaction to such sales be considered by the United States when making decisions about the provision of defense articles and services to Taiwan?

Our decisions about arms sales to Taiwan are based solely on our assessment of Taiwan's defense needs. The Taiwan Relations Act states the U.S. will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. In my view, we should not stray from our commitments out of concern for how China may react.

By most accounts, China has become more assertive in its claims of sovereignty in various domains, including maritime, air and space. There are numerous examples of this assertiveness, including: China's increased aggressiveness in asserting its maritime claims in the South China Sea, the recent declaration of its Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), and its stationing of an oil rig in waters claimed by Vietnam which led to a series of unsafe encounters between Vietnam and China this past summer. Other incidents include a Chinese vessel intercepting the USS Cowpens and a Chinese fighter plane flying dangerously close to a Navy P-8 Poseidon surveillance

plane off the coast of China. These incidents underscore the nature of Chinese maritime claims and the Chinese sensitivity associated with U.S. Navy operations in these areas.

What role should the United States play in the ongoing maritime disputes in the South China Sea?

I agree with the assessments of the Departments of State and Defense that the U.S. should not take a position on the competing territorial claims over land features in the South China Sea. I believe all parties should resolve their disputes through peaceful means and in accordance with customary international law, without resorting to the threat or use of force.

The U.S. is a Pacific nation that has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia's maritime domain, the maintenance of peace and stability, free and open commerce, and respect for international law in the South China Sea. The U.S. should sustain its presence in the South China Sea and uphold its commitments to its allies and partners in order to maintain peace and stability in the region.

How does the presence of the U.S. Navy in the South China Sea influence this maritime dispute and, in your view, would an increase in U.S. activity in that region serve to stabilize or destabilize the situation?

Although the U.S. does not take a position on the territorial and maritime disputes, I believe it is essential for the U.S. Navy to maintain its presence and assert its freedom of navigation and overflight rights in the South China Sea in accordance with customary international law. The U.S. Navy is a key provider of the military presence that underlies peace and stability across the globe, including in the South China Sea.

If confirmed, I will work with our military commanders to evaluate the appropriate level of naval activities in the South China Sea to maintain regional peace and stability as well as unimpeded access for lawful commerce and economic development.

What should the United States do to help prevent dangerous encounters in the South China Sea?

To reduce the risk of conflict in the South China Sea, I believe the U.S. should continue to support initiatives and confidence building measures that will help claimant states reach agreement on a binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. Additionally, the U.S. should continue serving as a positive example of a nation that adheres to the international norms of safe conduct through policy implementation, effective training, and proper accountability. The U.S. should also continue to engage China through the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) as a positive bilateral mechanism to address operational safety issues in the maritime domain.

Additionally, the U.S. should continue to promote existing international "rules of the road," such as the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs) and other established international safety and communication procedures, such as the new Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). The U.S. should also encourage all South China Sea claimants to abide by these international standards of safe conduct to ensure greater operational safety and reduce the risk of dangerous incidents at and over the sea.

How should the United States view China's recent declaration of an ADIZ zone that includes the area over the Senkaku Islands and does the declaration increase the risk for instability in the region?

The U.S. has been very clear that every nation has a right to establish air defense identification zones, but should not do so unilaterally without collaboration and consultation. We view this development as a destabilizing attempt to alter the status quo in the region. The way China announced its East China Sea ADIZ -- uncoordinated and without consultation -- increased the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation. Contrast this with the Republic of Korea's new ADIZ in the same general area -- it was done in consultation with its neighbors, including Japan. China's unilateral approach and unclear procedures have certainly increased tensions in the region.

The March 14, 2014 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission report said "Particularly since 2012, China has increased control over some disputed areas by stepping up enforcement of its territorial claims with coercive but nonkinetic measures."

What specific capabilities, strategy, tactics, techniques and procedures do you think are required to counteract China's "coercive but nonkinetic measures"?

China's "coercive but non-kinetic measures" have primarily been through non-military means, but backed up by threat of force. For example, Chinese coast guard and fishing ships have harassed Japanese shipping vessels near the Senkakus, Vietnamese ships in the Paracels, and Philippine resupply of its outpost on Second Thomas Shoal with shouldering and water cannon, but no kinetic responses from military combatants. While the U.S. military has many options available to address PRC coercion, military actions should be a supporting element of the overall USG strategy, not the main effort. Just as the rebalance to the Pacific is a whole of government effort, so are the potential solutions to current territorial disputes. That said, forward presence and support to our allies, partners and friends are critical. Discussion of specific capabilities is a conversation best reserved for a classified forum.

Cyber space has become a critical realm for civilian and military applications and also represents a potentially substantial vulnerability. There are reports that China is aggressively pursuing cyber warfare capabilities, and would likely seek to take advantage of U.S. dependence on cyber space in the event of a potential conflict situation.

What is your understanding of China's efforts to develop and deploy cyber warfare capabilities?

As part of China's military modernization, it is making efforts to degrade the effectiveness of critical enabling nodes of modern warfare, such as space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum. China's military modernization efforts are aimed at increasing its relative military advantage and closing what it perceives as a technological capability imbalance between its armed forces and modernized militaries.

As does the U.S., China fully understands the critical importance of cyber as an element of modern warfare. Chinese military writing clearly shows that China views itself at a disadvantage in any potential conflict against a nation with a modern high-tech military, such as the U.S. To overcome this disadvantage, China has developed organizations and capabilities that are designed to reduce its

perceived technological gap and to reduce the effectiveness of U.S. and other advanced militaries' core competencies in a crisis.

If confirmed, what would you do to help ensure our military is protected in cyber space and prepared to defend against a cyber attack?

If confirmed, I would work closely with other parts of DoD and interagency partners to include USSTRATCOM, USCYBERCOM, and Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Commerce, to facilitate a coordinated approach to cyber threats, not only from China, but from any potential adversary. While an increased cyber defensive posture is important, it is not enough for us to build thicker walls and continue to absorb daily cyber-attacks. Defense in itself will not deter our nation's adversaries. We must work together as a government to defend, and take appropriate response measures to deter, against future exploitation and attack. As the President stated in his International Strategy for Cyberspace, we reserve the right to use all necessary means – diplomatic, informational, military, and economic – as appropriate and consistent with applicable international law to defend our Nation, our allies, and our interests against hostile acts in cyberspace.

In January 2007, China used a ground-based missile to hit and destroy one of its weather satellites in an anti-satellite test creating considerable space debris and raising serious concerns in the international community. Since then, China has continued its active pursuit of defense and anti-satellite technology.

What is your view of China's purposes for its pursuit of these capabilities?

The U.S.'s goal should be to promote the responsible use of space. In my view, this test was a troubling incident. It was yet another element of China's comprehensive, long term military modernization effort to develop and field disruptive military technologies, including those for anti-access/area denial, as well as for nuclear, space, and cyber warfare.

What do you see as the long term implications of such developments for the U.S. military, for U.S. national security, and for U.S. interests in space?

The U.S. should seek ways to protect our interests in space. Space systems are vital to our national security and our economy. I believe we need to enhance our deterrence and ability to operate in a degraded environment. Therefore, U.S. space policies and programs should be informed by China's space and counterspace capabilities, which have contributed to today's challenging space environment. At the same time, the U.S. should seek to engage China, a major space-faring nation, to promote the responsible use of space. However, our concern should not be focused on only one country, but on the range of actors that make space increasingly congested, contested, and competitive.

What are your views regarding the potential weaponization of space and the international agreements to prevent space weaponization?

I support the principles outlined in the 2010 National Space Policy, especially that all nations have a right to explore and use space for peaceful purposes, and that all nations should act responsibly in space to help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust.

I support our longstanding national policies of affirming the right of all nations to use outer space for peaceful purposes, the right of free passage through space, and the right to protect our forces and our nation from those that would use space for hostile purposes.

But space is vital to U.S. national security and that of our allies and partners. We must not concede this truly high ground to anyone.

Taiwan

What is your view of U.S.-Taiwan security relations?

I personally strongly support the Taiwan Relations Act. U.S. policy on arms sales to Taiwan is based on the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which provides that the U.S. will make available to Taiwan defense articles and services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. The Act also states that the President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan. It is my view that that policy has contributed to peace and stability in the region for more than 30 years and is consistent with the longstanding U.S. calls for peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. To achieve these ends we maintain a strong military-to-military engagement with Taiwan.

What do you believe should be the priorities for U.S. military assistance to Taiwan?

We closely monitor the shifting balance in the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan's defense needs. Given the rapid pace of PRC military modernization, I believe our priorities should include assisting Taiwan with its joint operations capabilities and training; streamlining, modernizing, and integrating its existing (and aging) defense programs to be more effective; helping Taiwan develop its new all-volunteer force; and seeking innovative solutions to complement its traditional military capabilities.

What is your opinion of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)? Enacted 30 years ago this year, do you see any need to modify the TRA to reflect the current state of affairs in the region? If so, how?

The Taiwan Relations Act, which guides our unofficial relations with Taiwan, has been in force now for over thirty years and plays a valuable and important role in our approach to the Asia-Pacific region. As called for in the TRA, our long-standing policy to assist Taiwan with maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability helps ensure security and stability in the region. I would not recommend any changes to the law at this time.

Given the increasing military imbalance across the Taiwan Strait, do you think Taiwan is making appropriate investments in its defensive capabilities? If not, what is the best way to encourage Taiwan to invest more in its military?

Taiwan must ensure that it adequately resources its defense programs and defense transformation to include considering increasing its defense budget. We can (and should) proactively help Taiwan see where it should improve its capabilities in the face of the imbalance across the Strait. I believe the best way to encourage Taiwan to invest more in its military is to send strong and consistent messages from

the U.S. Government to Taiwan, and to demonstrate our resolve to engage them in a positive and professional manner. Finally, I believe that we must continue to emphasize to our friends in Taiwan that they must be resolute in protecting and securing sensitive and classified military and technological information, particularly as they move forward with its all-volunteer force modernization program.

What military capabilities do you believe would be most effective in improving Taiwan's self-defense capability over the next 5 to 10 years?

Capabilities that deter the PRC -- especially an amphibious invasion -- and increase the Taiwan military's survivability are critical. No less important are non-materiel solutions such as improved jointness, recruitment, training, integration and innovative solutions. Finally, one of the most cost effective solutions Taiwan can adapt from the U.S. military is to continue developing its NCOs and Junior Officers.

What do you believe should be appropriate criteria for the consideration of potential United States sales of military aircraft to Taiwan?

The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act states the U.S. will make available to Taiwan the defense articles and services required to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. The Act also states the President and the Congress will determine the nature and quantity of required defense articles based on the needs of Taiwan. Taiwan's self-defense strategy should dictate the need for specific military capabilities, and the U.S. should make available to Taiwan the defense articles and services required to maintain a sufficient self-defense, consistent with its defense strategy.

Specific to military aircraft, Taiwan may need a replacement airframe for its aging and outdated F-5 E/F and MIRAGE 2000 fighters in order to maintain a sufficient self-defense. However, Taiwan should look more broadly across its armed forces in all domains to determine what capabilities are best to ensure a sufficient self-defense. We should help them with this analysis.

What is your opinion of Taiwan's proposed plan to develop an indigenous submarine program?

I believe a Taiwan military equipped with a credible defensive undersea warfare capability will directly contribute to its self-defense and to long-term stability in the region.

North Korea

North Korea still represents one of the greatest near term challenges to security and stability in Asia and deterring conflict on the Korean peninsula remains a top U.S. priority.

What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula and of the diplomatic efforts to date to persuade North Korea to comply with international mandates regarding its ballistic missile and nuclear weapon programs?

Following the consolidation of power under Kim Jong Un, North Korea remains my number one security concern. It is what "keeps me awake at night." While Kim Jun Un's consolidation appears to have eliminated de-stabilizing factors inside the country in the near term, the nation's volatility and

unpredictability are troubling. The frequent reshuffling of senior leadership surrounding Kim Jong Un heightens our concern as new variables have been added to North Korea's decision making calculus. Diplomatic and other outreach efforts underscore Kim Jong Un's national strategy of promoting economic development and nuclear deterrence together. However, enduring U.S. and allied concerns – North Korea's past provocative behavior, large conventional military, provocations, proliferation activities, and pursuit of asymmetric advantages through its ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs (including uranium enrichment) – present the most serious threat to the U.S., our allies and partners in the region, and the international community.

The U.S. State Department is best positioned to assess diplomatic efforts, but U.S. Special Envoy for North Korean Policy Glyn Davies testified this summer that “We have no misconceptions about North Korea's willingness to give up its arsenal voluntarily. All of North Korea's actions over the past few years, from its nuclear tests to the amendment of its constitution to declare itself a nuclear state, signal that it has no interest in denuclearizing. We take this threat seriously, and remain ironclad in our commitment to the defense of our allies, the Republic of Korea and Japan. Together with our allies and partners, we are working to shift Pyongyang's calculus from believing that a nuclear program is necessary for regime survival to understanding that such a program is incompatible with its national interests...That is why our policy mix includes sanctions and traditional deterrence measures. In short, ours is a comprehensive approach that seeks to denuclearize North Korea through diplomacy while ensuring deterrence of the North Korean threat.” Well said!

What is your understanding of the threat posed to the United States and our allies by North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD capabilities, and the possible export of those capabilities?

North Korea's potential use of WMD presents a clear and present threat. We must ensure our forces are prepared to respond and that North Korea is deterred from using WMD. North Korea has an ambitious ballistic missile program that poses a significant threat to the entire Pacific region. As witnessed in 2014, North Korea continues to develop and flight-test short and close-range ballistic missiles – demonstrating the capability to target South Korea and Japan. North Korea also continues to develop the Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2), which Pyongyang claims to have tested in a space launch configuration but could also reach the U.S. if developed as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Furthermore, North Korea continues to develop newer systems – including an intermediate-range ballistic missile and a road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile known as the KN08, which was first publically paraded in Pyongyang in April 2012. Though never flight tested, the KN08 could reach the continental U.S.

North Korea's continued proliferation efforts pose a significant threat to the Pacific region and beyond. It is a proven proliferator of ballistic missiles and associated technologies to countries like Iran - creating a serious and growing capability to target U.S. forces and our allies in the Middle East. North Korea assisted Syria in building a covert reactor in the early 2000s, which would have been capable of producing plutonium for nuclear weapons. As such, we must continue to work with our allies and partners to build a regional capability to combat North Korean WMD.

How has the new government of Kim Jong-Un changed the Department's risk assessments of North Korea?

Kim Jong Un is approaching his third year in power in December 2014. We assess that his actions throughout his first years were intended to consolidate power and project his capacity for dealing

ruthlessly with his enemies, both foreign and domestic. His actions reaffirm that North Korea's pursuit of nuclear and missile capabilities poses an immediate and evolving threat to the U.S. and our allies. Our assessments of the risk have not changed, and we continue to conduct operations and refine plans to address these threats.

What concerns you most about North Korea and, if confirmed, what would you do to address those concerns?

North Korea maintains a large and offensively postured conventional military, continues to develop long-range ballistic missiles, seeks to develop nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them intercontinentally, and engages in the proliferation of ballistic missiles in violation of international norms and law. North Korea has also conducted provocative attacks against the Republic of Korea. Most concerning about this range of threats is that they come from a single state standing on the outside of the international community. If confirmed, I will continue the strong relationship with USFK/CMC/UNC to drive intelligence, refine forecasts and warnings, sustain and advance our military readiness, and coordination with allies and partners. I will continue to work closely with my friends and counterparts in the Korean military. Finally, I will both seek and welcome opportunities to apply all means of national power to affect North Korean behavior.

The February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report established a policy and program priority for defending against near-term regional ballistic missile threats, and elaborated on the Phased Adaptive Approach to regional missile defense, including to defend against North Korean ballistic missile threats.

Do you support the missile defense policies and priorities established in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, including a tailored phased adaptive approach to missile defense in the Asia-Pacific region to defend against North Korean regional ballistic missile threats?

Yes. The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review provides the PACOM region with an integrated effort to strengthen regional deterrence architectures against North Korea. It aligns our defensive strategy, policies, and capabilities to the strategic environment. Today, we are deploying a second TPY-2 radar to Japan to enhance early warning and tracking. In 2013 we deployed a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery to Guam, and as the Secretary of Defense first announced in April 2014, we will soon deploy additional Aegis BMD-capable ships to Japan. These additional sensors and shooters will enhance a robust missile defense capability to defend the U.S. homeland and support PACOM's regional missile defense mission against ballistic missile attack.

According to South Korean press reports, recent Nodong missile tests conducted by North Korea appear to have been designed to fly the missiles at higher altitudes, and relatively shorter ranges. For example, although the Nodong has an estimated range between 1,000 and 1,500km, the March 2014 tests flew about 650km before landing in the Sea of Japan. In addition, because the missiles attained relatively high altitudes, they would challenge the ability of the Patriot system to intercept them.

Do you believe that these tests represent an attempt by Pyongyang to overcome missile defense systems currently emplaced in South Korea, and if so, what steps do you recommend in order to meet this threat?

We assess North Korea is developing mobile ballistic missiles for various reasons, which obviously could include trying to mitigate the effectiveness of U.S. and allied missile defense systems. But, we have no specific information to confirm that hypothesis. It is possible that these missiles were simply fired at a shorter range to demonstrate North Korea's capability without actually firing into another country's territory and thereby creating increased diplomatic friction. Whatever the motivation, North Korea is a threat to the region and to us.

Republic of Korea

What is your understanding of the current status of the U. S.-South Korean security relationship?

The U.S.-ROK alliance is a linchpin of security in East Asia. This was most recently reaffirmed by the Secretary of Defense during participation in the Security Consultative Meeting in Washington, DC in October of this year. Our security relationship is based on the mutual commitment to common interests, shared values, continuous dialogue, and combined planning to ensure a comprehensive strategic alliance. It is robust and enduring.

If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to improve this security relationship?

I believe it is important to ensure the U.S. and Korean publics continue to understand the enduring mutual benefits derived from this alliance, and that the U.S. effectively works with the ROK as it plays an increasing role in regional and global security issues commensurate with the ROK's economic status and influence. If confirmed, I would work hard to maintain close contact with ROK military leadership and General Scaparrotti as we work together to improve a vitally important security relationship built upon an amazing foundation of 60 years of alliance.

What is your view regarding the timing of the transfer of wartime operational control from the United States to South Korea that was planned for December 2015 and has now been delayed?

The U.S. and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have a comprehensive way forward to transition wartime operational control (OPCON). If confirmed, I will work with ROK military leadership and General Scaparrotti to complete this process, ensuring the transition is implemented methodically and that the combined defense posture remains strong and seamless. I support the current plan for OPCON transition, which calls for the ROK to assume wartime OPCON when critical ROK and alliance military capabilities are secured and the security environment on the Korean Peninsula is conducive to a stable transition. The conditions for the transfer are based on meeting capability-based milestones, including acquisition of weapon systems, command and control systems, ISR platforms, and adequate supply of munitions, along with the right certification process to validate the readiness for the transfer. The ROK military is a very capable force, but it has had some setbacks in funding to achieve these milestones. General Scaparrotti and his team at U.S. Forces Korea are working hard in concert with the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet the certification and capability requirements. If confirmed, I will help them.

Do you believe that the security relationship with South Korea should remain focused on defense of the Korean Peninsula, or should U.S. forces stationed in Korea be available for regional or global deployments?

In accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and the ROK, U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula serves to deter potential aggressors from taking hostile actions that would threaten the peace and security of the Republic of Korea. In my view, this presence has both deterred further war on the Korean Peninsula and contributed to the stability of the Northeast Asia region. As ROK military forces have served, and will continue to serve, with the U.S. military in places off the Peninsula (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, and in the Gulf of Aden), I believe the U.S.-ROK Alliance will continue to serve an important role regionally and globally. With regard to deploying U.S. forces stationed in Korea to other AORs, the forces in Korea serve an important mission there and we remain committed to maintaining current troop levels on the Korean Peninsula. Before deploying any forces from the Korean Peninsula to other AORs we will have to carefully weigh the potential risk to regional security and stability with competing national security objectives. We would not do anything that diminishes the Alliance's capability to fulfill its objectives.

What is your assessment of the security benefits of the force repositioning agreed to under the Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan Relocation Plan and how does repositioning U.S. forces change the way they will operate on the Korean Peninsula?

The two plans work to consolidate and relocate U.S. forces from north of Seoul and from the Seoul Metropolitan area to locations south of Seoul, primarily to the U.S. Army Garrison at Camp Humphreys and to Daegu. The movement of units and facilities to areas south of the Han River improves force protection and survivability, placing the majority of personnel and equipment outside of the effective tactical range of North Korean artillery. In addition, the move to a central location outside of Seoul provides efficiencies, reduces costs, contributes to the political sustainability of our forward presence, and improves military readiness on the Korean Peninsula. If confirmed, I will support it.

Is the relocation plan affordable?

The majority of costs associated with the Yongsan Relocation Plan will be paid by the ROK. However, costs associated with the Land Partnership Plan will remain a concern in today's fiscal environment.

What is your understanding of the U.S. obligations in the event of an attack on South Korea by North Korea, and under what circumstances do you believe U.S. armed forces should be committed to engage North Korean forces in response to an attack on South Korea?

Under the Mutual Defense Treaty, when the political independence or security of South Korea or the U.S. are threatened by external armed attack, the U.S. and South Korea will consult together and develop appropriate means to deter the attack. Given the pattern and future likelihood of North Korean provocations, the two sides should continue to consult closely so that responses are effective. The U.S. and South Korea also recognize that an external armed attack would be dangerous to peace and safety and will act to meet the common danger in accordance with our constitutional processes. Because of the uncertainty of actions by Kim Jung Un, we must be ready to fight tonight.

Japan

How would you characterize the current U.S.-Japan security relationship?

The U.S.-Japan relationship is a cornerstone of security in East Asia. Japan is a valued ally and anchor of democracy and prosperity in the region. Our alliance has held fast through the turbulence of the Cold War, the Vietnam era, the post-Cold War period, through political turnover and economic woes in Japan, and through periods of very contentious trade disputes. Our alliance stands poised as a truly global one. The U.S. and Japan are in the middle of a complicated realignment process that is part of a larger alliance transformation agenda which includes a review of roles, missions, and capabilities to strengthen and ensure the relevance, capability, and cohesiveness of the alliance for the next several decades. In terms of our military-to-military relationship, it is stronger than ever. We welcome Japan's reinterpretation of its constitution.

How does Japan's relationship with its regional neighbors, mainly China, North Korea and South Korea influence the U.S.-Japan relationship?

I believe it is important for Japan to continue to maintain and further develop constructive relations with all of its neighbors. Japan can and should increase its security cooperation with South Korea. Working with other U.S. allies and partners in the region, Japan can increase its contribution to peace, security, and prosperity throughout Asia and globally. Japan is a valued and essential partner in the Six-Party Talks process and in other important regional security architectures. Progress made to bolster trilateral security dialogues in Northeast Asia effectively links Japan, U.S. and South Korean approaches. That said, I remain concerned that the Japan - South Korea relationship is strained and exacerbated by historical animosities and territorial disputes. This is distracting to us and doesn't allow for the full realization of truly transformative defense architectures in East Asia. I worry that other powers may try to use this friction to drive a wedge between us and either ally.

What steps, if any, do you believe Japan ought to take to become a more active partner in security activities with the United States and in the international security arena?

Japan is already a strong security partner with the U.S. and is increasingly contributing to international security activities. Japan is taking a number of domestic policy measures that will enable a greater degree of cooperation with us and with other like-minded international partners. For example, Japan has passed and will soon implement a new law regarding the handling of classified information which will strengthen information sharing ties with the U.S., permitting a greater degree of cooperation. The Prime Minister's office also announced its intention to permit the limited exercise of collective self-defense and is embarking on the legislative process to implement that change.

Earlier this year, Japan announced a revision to its self-imposed prohibition on the export of military technology, permitting export in certain situations where it contributes to the peace and security of Japan, does not violate UN sanctions, and the recipients have appropriate safeguards to prevent unauthorized third party transfer, thereby opening the door to increased security cooperation and capacity building efforts in the region. In August 2014, Japan agreed to the transfer of 6 coastal patrol boats to Vietnam and is considering other transfers of military technology to partners in the region. This

is a positive development that complements U.S. security cooperation activities, and assists the U.S. in developing ally and partner capabilities and capacities throughout the region.

The changing security environment in Asia will present new challenges and the U.S. and Japan must continue to work together to deal with these challenges, including greater interoperability between our armed forces at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

If confirmed, I will encourage Japan's development of joint doctrine and organizations that will enhance Japan's ability to undertake complex missions to build security in Asia. I will also encourage trilateral and multilateral security cooperation with the Republic of Korea, India, and Australia, as these kinds of activities effectively strengthen the functional capacity of the emerging regional security architecture. Regarding international security activity, Japan has actively participated in combined counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, deployed a battalion-sized Reconstruction and Support Group to southern Iraq from 2004-2006, is participating in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, has been a significant donor to the ongoing Afghanistan reconstruction, and sent forces to help the Philippines during the Typhoon Haiyan crisis last year, among many other such activities. I believe Japan's participation in such global operations is a very positive development, and I would encourage future Japanese participation in such missions.

What is your view of the United States-Japanese joint development of the Standard Missile-3, Block IIA missile defense interceptor, and of the overall program of cooperation between the United States and Japan on ballistic missile defense?

Ballistic missile defense cooperation with Japan is a success story for the alliance and has resulted in Japan's fielding of both sea and land-based missile defense systems. Japan is one of our most important ballistic missile defense partners and U.S.-Japan bilateral cooperation on ballistic missile defense plays an important role in supporting our common strategic objectives on defense. The SM3 Block IIA is an important cooperative program that will result in a significant increase in ballistic missile defense capability.

The current plan is for the closure of the Marine Corps Air Station on Okinawa after the construction of a Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab on Okinawa. While the Governor of Okinawa has signed the landfill permit to allow construction of the FRF to go forward, local opposition and a long construction timeline make the completion of the FRF uncertain.

What is your opinion of the prospects for the successful construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab on Okinawa?

I believe the Government of Japan, like the U.S. government, remains committed to the Futenma Replacement Facility. This was restated in the October 2013 2+2 and October 2014 Assistant Secretary of Defense-level meetings. Currently, the Futenma Replacement Facility Roadmap is scheduled to be completed in 2022. Recent significant progress includes the signing of the required landfill permit by former Okinawa Governor Nakaima in December 2013 and the start of a preliminary construction geotechnical survey. Of course, there will be future challenges with continued implementation and we are committed to working closely with the Government of Japan to see this through to completion.

Is the cost-sharing arrangement between the United States and Japan to pay for the relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam and the costs associated with the continued presence of U.S. forces in Japan equitable and appropriate? Why or why not?

I believe the cost-sharing arrangements with the Government of Japan (GOJ) to be among the best we have. From an alliance perspective, the current laydown in Okinawa is not politically sustainable; the relocation of approximately 10,000 Marines and the return of land to Japan are critical. Guam is the only location outside of Japan where the GOJ has agreed to provide funds to offset the cost of relocation. For the GOJ, funding the construction of facilities for the use of U.S. forces on U.S. sovereign territory was an unprecedented step. Japan will provide \$3.1B in FY12 dollars towards this effort. To date, the GOJ has provided over \$900M towards fulfillment of that commitment. For relocations within Japan, the GOJ is paying the majority of the costs to develop new facilities. In April 2011, we entered into a new, five-year host nation support agreement with Japan that maintained the overall level of support we receive from Japan for labor and utilities while, for the first time, putting a floor on the amount the GOJ provides for facilities construction.

How, in your view, does building an unpopular new airfield on Okinawa, one that could take 7 to 10 years to finish at a cost of at least \$3.6 billion, serve to improve the U.S.-Japan relations in general and the U.S. military-Okinawa relations in particular?

The governments of Japan and the U.S. agreed to construct a Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab, in conjunction with reducing the number of U.S. forces on Okinawa and consolidating U.S. basing on the island. The Futenma Replacement Facility will enable the closing of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma), which is located in a very densely populated portion of Okinawa. At the same time, the plan preserves U.S. forces' ability to meet our security commitments to Japan, in accordance with the Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty. Thus, when fully executed, this new force posture will improve U.S.-Japan relations in general and the U.S. military-Okinawa relations in particular.

Is Japan carrying a fair share of the burden of the cost of the U.S. presence in Japan under the current Special Measures Agreement?

The Government of Japan's contribution under the Special Measures Agreement covers the cost of approximately 90% of the Japanese labor force that work on our bases, 70% of utilities used on our bases and the cost of relocating training that the Government of Japan views as politically sensitive. Negotiations for a new Special Measures Agreement will begin in 2015. In my view, what Japan provides for overall Host Nation Support is fair, but as the current agreement runs its course, we must carefully evaluate how it was implemented and identify areas where Japan's contributions will be especially value-added in the future, considering the regional environment and our own fiscal challenges.

The United States and Japan are currently negotiating updated Bilateral Security Cooperation Guidelines which will, according to a recent update, support "a more balanced and effective Alliance" and will "reflect" the cabinet decision by the Government of Japan to allow its Self Defense Forces to engage in collective security operations.

What specific steps do you believe the United States and Japan should take to strengthen security cooperation, particularly with regard to China's aggressive behavior in the East China Sea?

Maintaining regional peace and stability is a shared goal between the U.S. and Japan, and I firmly believe the actions both countries have been taking to strengthen our alliance contribute to that end. Under our rebalance to the Pacific, the U.S. has increased our force posture in Japan by deploying our most advanced equipment, such as the AN/TPY-2 radars, MV-22 Ospreys, U.S. Navy P-8 aircraft, and announced future initiatives, to include replacing the USS GEORGE WASHINGTON with the USS RONALD REAGAN. Under Prime Minister Abe, Japan has embarked on a multi-pronged effort to improve the capabilities of the Self-Defense Forces, which range from collective self-defense, relaxing the restrictions on arms sales, and strengthening information security regimes, to operational initiatives such as increasing the missile defense, cyber, and amphibious capabilities of the Self-Defense Forces. Japan recently announced its intention to purchase U.S.-made E-2D Hawkeye early warning/command and control aircraft, Global Hawk unmanned surveillance aircraft, and MV-22 Osprey aircraft. This significantly increases Japan's capabilities and interoperability with the U.S. The way ahead will leverage the relationships we have forged with Japan over the past sixty years to increase the interoperability and synergy between our forces. Seamless coordination between our forces provides the most effective deterrent against aggression and best underwrites regional peace and stability.

What updated division of military roles and missions do you hope to see reflected in the Bilateral Security Cooperation Guidelines going forward?

The U.S. and Japan are currently revising the bilateral Guidelines for Defense Cooperation which will support "a more balanced and effective Alliance." Additionally, the revised Guidelines will reflect an expanded scope of cooperation to reflect the global nature of the alliance, encompassing areas such as space, cyberspace, counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, peacekeeping, capacity building, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and equipment and technology enhancement. I hope that the cabinet decision by the Government of Japan to allow its Self-Defense Forces to engage in collective self-defense operations will be reflected in the final product, but that is ultimately a decision for the Government of Japan.

India

What is your view of the current state of the U.S.-India security relations?

A close, continuing, and expanding security partnership with India is important for security and stability in Asia and for effectively managing Indian Ocean security in the twenty-first century. The U.S. and India have a range of common security interests that include maritime security, counter-terrorism, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Over the past decade, there has been a transformation in the U.S.-India defense relationship. What was once a nascent relationship between unfamiliar nations has evolved into a strategic partnership. Today, U.S.-India defense ties are strong and growing stronger, including a robust slate of dialogues, military exercises, defense trade, personnel exchanges, and armaments cooperation. Efforts over the past ten years have focused on relationship-building and establishing the foundation for a long-term partnership. The strong ties between our two militaries reflect this, but there is much more room to grow. The U.S. remains committed to a broad defense trade and technology relationship that enables transfers of some of our most advanced technologies to assist

India's military with its modernization efforts. The continued growth of our partnership should focus on working closely on common interests in a true partnership.

If confirmed, what specific priorities would you establish for this relationship?

India is critical to regional economic development, security and stability, and wide-ranging cooperation to counter extremism and radicalization. This comports with U.S. goals in the region. If confirmed, I will focus on increasing maritime security cooperation, expanding the military-to-military relationship across all Services, and deepening cooperation on defense trade and production. I believe there is real potential to meaningfully cooperate on counter-proliferation, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, counter-piracy, counter-terrorism, greater intelligence sharing on common threats, and stability in Afghanistan and the broader Indian Ocean region.

What expectations do you have for a change or shift in the defense relationship with India now that Narendra Modi has been elected as Prime Minister of India?

I am optimistic that our strategic partnership will continue to mature in the coming years and we are on the correct path to do so. Right now, our partnership is strong in defense trade. We are also India's partner of choice in military exercises -- but this is an area where I would like to see more routine and regularity. The Indian Navy's (INN) first-ever participation in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise with one of its most advanced warships this past summer was an enormous boon to that exercise and I look forward to the INN's growing participation in this and other engagements in the future. Pacific Fleet has an exceptional exercise relationship with India's MALABAR series. While this is normally a bilateral exercise between our Navies, I have encouraged the Indian Navy to make MALABAR a trilateral event. The Indians agreed and this year MALABAR included India, U.S. and Japan. The exercise was successful and was conducted at the higher end of the operational/tactical level complexity. This effort adds to our interoperability and understanding among India, Japan and my Pacific Fleet forces which improves our ability to advance confidence building measures within the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, Pacific Fleet has an excellent USN-INN dialogue program. The annual Naval Engagement Steering Group discussions involve a wide range of issues to include exercises, foreign military sales, maintenance practices, subject matter expert exchanges and an emphasis on safety at sea and in the air, particularly with the Indian Navy submarine force. The INN is very appreciative of the ongoing efforts to assist them in submarine safety and to have the expert exchanges address issues involving operational/tactical mission areas to both increase its professionalism and our naval interoperability in the maritime domain. Finally, I have emphasized the need to share information so that we can work together in the maritime domain to ameliorate transnational crime which benefits every nation in the region. If confirmed, I will do all that I can to continue and further our dialogue with India.

What, in your view, is the effect on DOD interests, if any, of the civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India?

The civil-nuclear cooperation agreement was a landmark agreement that significantly transformed the U.S.-India bilateral relationship. The agreement deepened the level of trust between the U.S. and India and will have positive effects on DoD interests leading to greater military-to-military cooperation and

increased defense trade. Successful implementation of this agreement will serve to strengthen and mature U.S.-India ties.

What is your assessment of the relationship between India and China and how does that relationship impact the security and stability of the region?

The current relationship between the region's two fastest growing powers, India and China, is complicated by a trust deficit stemming from China's longstanding relationship with Pakistan, India's defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian war, and increasing competition for resources. The ongoing border dispute, trade imbalances and competition for influence across South and Southeast Asia complicate efforts to reduce the mistrust, and ultimately complicate the security and stability of the region. Some regional states seek to exploit the competitive Sino-Indian relationship, seeking favorable aid packages from New Delhi and Beijing to enable their own development. New Delhi and Beijing do find common ground and cooperate in international forums such as BRICS, the G20, and in Climate Change Conferences where both countries leverage their convergent interests to shape international trade rules to ensure their continued domestic development and economic growth.

What do you believe the United States should do to assist the Indian government in the prevention of and response to terrorist events in India?

As the world's largest democracy, I believe India is a significant strategic partner of the U.S. Both India and the U.S. share a strong interest in preventing terrorism. Cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistan against shared militant threats has increased since 2012, and the U.S. should continue its efforts to ensure Pakistan takes effective action against all militant groups within its borders.

Regarding capability and capacity building, counterterrorism efforts in India are primarily a Ministry of Home Affairs responsibility that employs domestic intelligence assets in conjunction with police and paramilitary forces. Therefore, counterterrorism cooperation with India is through a whole-of-government approach led by the Departments of State (via the Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative) and Homeland Security (via the Homeland Security Dialogue), with support from the Department of Justice and DoD. If confirmed, I will work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to support this whole-of-government approach to address counterterrorism efforts with India and seek to expand the relationship.

What is your assessment of the current relationship between India and Pakistan?

Since 1947, India and Pakistan have fought four wars and weathered recurring border crisis. The election of India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi generated some hope that Indo-Pakistan relations may improve, but that has yet to occur. India and Pakistan share a legacy of animosity, mistrust, and conflict. Violent extremist organizations strain the relationship and are the most likely catalyst for the next military conflict. We are, of course, concerned that a conventional military conflict between these two nuclear powers could escalate with devastating consequences. Dialogue is currently at a standstill and substantive progress on core security issues and territorial disputes is unlikely in the near term. Neither side has the political space to make unilateral concessions, yet both know that regional stability is absolutely essential to achieve their national interests. Barring military miscalculation or another major

terror attack in India, Pakistan's focus on internal stability and New Delhi's desire to restore economic growth will likely preclude significant conflict along the border that could potentially escalate.

In your view, what impact has the ongoing tension between Pakistan and India had on the stability of Central and South Asia generally, and on the prospects for lasting security in Afghanistan?

India's actions in South and Central Asia generally align with U.S. goals – increasing economic growth and political stability through strengthened democratic institutions and developmental assistance to help prevent radicalization. India shares our interest in ensuring Afghanistan does not become a safe haven for violent extremists. As New Delhi continues to provide financial and training support to the ANSF, Pakistan could grow concerned about Indian influence, but regional stability depends on cooperation between India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Transparency in Afghanistan's bilateral relations with both India and Pakistan is essential to reduce India-Pakistan misunderstanding and mistrust.

If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to ensure the close coordination of U.S. security policy with respect to South Asia, much of which is in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, and in particular coordination with respect to India-Pakistan relations?

If confirmed, I will coordinate across the combatant command boundary, as is being done today, to continue to minimize opportunities to exploit the seam in that part of the world by malign actors. The PACOM and CENTCOM J5s (Plans) regularly hold cross-boundary coordination meetings to discuss issues that not only exist on the physical boundary between India and Pakistan, but also conceptual seams such as proliferation both to and from each other's AORs. We have significant collaboration between both combatant command J2 (Intelligence) sections. The South Asia security policy of the U.S. is not a military-only effort; it is an interagency effort with State's South and Central Asia Affairs Bureau, which strides both PACOM and CENTCOM areas of responsibility, and a number of other departments and agencies playing significant roles -- and in many cases the lead role. I will actively seek to travel to India and Pakistan with the CENTCOM commander at the first opportunity so we can meet with the right folks on both sides of their border and our shared boundary.

Burma

There has been a lot of discussion recently about increasing military to military engagements between the U.S. and Burmese military, which has a long history of human rights abuses.

What is the strategic importance of Burma to PACOM and how does it fit within PACOM's overall Southeast Asia strategy?

Burma represents economic, diplomatic, and developmental opportunities with its untapped potential and strategic location. But, since 1962, the Burmese people have been on a hard and long road to get to democracy. They are attempting to shake off over fifty years of brutal military junta rule, oppressive and documented egregious human rights violations, and bitter ethnic and religious conflict -- all of which combine to make a difficult environment in which to grow democracy. Although there have been some steps toward reform, Burma remains firmly under military control. In my opinion, the time is not right to expand or elevate military-to-military activities. Ambassador Derek Mitchell's approach is exactly what is needed -- a limited and calibrated engagement designed to promote and further reforms.

His cautious and reciprocal step-for-step approach, while looking for opportunities, will help democracy take root. Any U.S. military effort must demonstrate robust civilian and military teamwork, with the civilian side unquestionably in the lead, both for efficiency of effort and to provide the Burmese a template for success.

Republic of the Philippines

What is your view of the current state of U. S.-Philippine military relations?

The Philippines is one of the America's five treaty allies in the Pacific and remains a committed security partner facing regional challenges characteristic of current geo-strategic realities. Our alliance is strong and the foundation of our security partnership. The U.S. military-to-military engagement with the Philippines is mature and focused, allowing the Philippines security forces (military, coast guard and police) to better address security needs as evident by enhanced counter-terrorism performance, expanded maritime security activities, increased multilateral engagement, and effective participation in UN Peacekeeping operations.

What do you believe the U. S. goals should be in the Republic of the Philippines and how best can we achieve those goals?

The primary goals of the U.S. should be to strengthen the alliance with the Philippines and assist in building and maintaining the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Our network of alliances in the Asia-Pacific, including with the Philippines, are the bedrock of U.S. security strategy in the region. A Philippines that is capable of mitigating terrorist threats, providing a secure maritime environment that ensures freedom of navigation within its region, and leading multilateral approaches towards peace and stability will enable it to fulfill its treaty obligations to the U.S., directly benefit U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region, and contribute to regional security and stability.

What is your assessment of U. S. military efforts in the Philippines and the effectiveness of the U. S. assistance being provided to the Philippine military in its fight against insurgent groups?

U.S. military efforts and assistance in the Philippines support the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. The U.S., however, does not operate in a combat role alongside the Philippines in its fight against insurgent groups, such as the New People's Army and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. U.S. military assistance is focused on helping the Philippines fight terrorism by assisting with the development of skill sets that are no different than those needed to adequately help and protect its civilian populations. As detailed in the 2010 Government of the Philippines Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) "Bayanihan", we continue to see progress with the Philippines accomplishing its goal of transitioning from a military focused on internal security to one focused on territorial defense.

Do you anticipate a reduced U. S. military footprint or change in mission for U. S. military forces in the Philippines in the near to mid-term?

The U.S. and the Philippines are discussing arrangements that will allow greater flexibility for U.S. and Philippine security forces to train and work together. We do not seek a return to the basing and bases of

years past. Through the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, we may, on a rotational basis, increase U.S. military engagement with the Philippines in the future.

What policy guidelines, if any, would you establish, if confirmed, to ensure that U. S. personnel do not become involved in combat or law enforcement in the Republic of the Philippines?

Current U.S. guidelines in place for the conduct of U.S. forces in the Philippines adequately address the roles and responsibilities of our military forces. All U.S. military personnel are in the Philippines under the Philippines-U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement and operate under the auspices of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Board and Security Engagement Board. Its activities, which will always be in consultation with, and agreement by, the Philippine government, are limited to conducting Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response; assisting Philippine security forces to improve its capacity and capability including training and upgrading equipment; and supporting Philippine counter-terrorism operations through activities such as intelligence fusion and sustainment support. Our forces in the Philippines continue to operate "by, with, and through" their Philippine Armed Forces counterparts in a strictly non-combat role.

Indonesia

Indonesia is a key Asian power and is the largest Muslim country in the world. Consequently, it is important to build on opportunities to improve and expand U. S. relations with Indonesia where possible. In July 2010, Secretary Gates announced that DOD intended to resume working with elements of the Indonesian Special Forces, known as Kopassus. DOD engagement with Kopassus had been suspended for more than a decade because of past human rights violations by some of its members.

What is your view of the current state of military-to-military relations with Indonesia and, specifically, Kopassus?

In 2010, Presidents Obama and Yudhoyono inaugurated the U.S.-Indonesian Comprehensive Partnership. A key element of this broad partnership is the security component. Our defense relationship with Indonesia – a pivotal country to U.S. national interests – is managed through the Defense Framework Arrangement and facilitated through several forums and mechanisms. Our military-to-military relations with Indonesia are robust and continue to progress and mature, with over 140 theater security cooperation activities scheduled for this fiscal year. These security cooperation engagements include a wide range of activities focused on four main areas of emphasis: Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief, Peace Keeping Operations, maritime security and continued professionalization/reform of the Indonesian Defense Forces (TNI). Beginning with the normalization of military-to-military relationship in 2005, engagements have increased in number and evolved from initial small-scale bilateral exchanges into more complex bilateral and multilateral activities.

The Indonesian Army Special Forces (known as Kopassus) has undergone a near-complete transformation over the past decade and is at the forefront of TNI professionalization and adherence to human rights standards. Following a 12-year pause in bilateral activities, PACOM established a measured and gradual program of security cooperation activities with Kopassus. These security cooperation activities have consisted of key leader engagements and small-scale subject matter expert

exchanges in areas such as military decision making, medical planning, law of war, and safeguarding human rights. I expect future activities of this type to continue and gradually expand at a pace commensurate with the demonstrated progress in TNI transparency and reform efforts. Chief among these reform efforts are the fulfillment of commitments made by Indonesian leaders to then Secretary Gates in 2010 to continue to safeguard human rights and accountability throughout the Indonesian military through the unequivocal investigation and prosecution of those military personnel accused of human rights abuses and, if convicted, their removal from military service.

What is your understanding of the extent to which the Indonesian government is cooperating with the United States in the war on terrorism?

The Government of Indonesia has cooperated closely and effectively with the U.S. and our partners in combating global terrorist networks in the region. Indonesia has shown tremendous success in arresting and convicting terrorists. Additionally, Indonesia has leveraged its leadership role within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) by electing to co-chair the Executive Working Group on Counter-Terrorism with the U.S. in the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus forum for the 2011-2013 cycle. This initiative seeks to encourage greater regional counter-terrorism cooperation, reinforce military support to civil authorities, build capacity, and collectively address regional security issues in an open consultative forum.

Do you favor increased U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military contacts? If so, under what conditions? Why?

Yes. If confirmed, I will support increased military-to-military contact within the context of the Comprehensive Partnership, guided by close consultation with the Departments of State and Defense, and within the boundaries of existing legal mechanisms. I believe close military-to-military relations with Indonesia are integral to achieving U.S. national interests in the region. I also believe that one of the most effective methods for encouraging reform is through interaction between Indonesian and U.S. service members. Regardless of their mission, any interactions with U.S. service members reinforce professional military practices, to include respect for human rights and the rule of law. Increased interactions facilitate greater understanding and reinforce professional values.

What is your view of the commitment of the Indonesian military leadership to professionalization of its armed forces, adhering to human rights standards, improving military justice, and cooperating with law enforcement efforts to investigate and prosecute those military personnel accused of human rights abuses?

Indonesian defense reform progressed at a rapid pace after the resignation of President Suharto in 1998, with the separation of the police from the military, the elimination of formal political roles for the TNI, increased accountability, and the establishment of widespread human rights training initiatives. While reform efforts appear to have slowed, they have not reversed. According to several public opinion polls, the TNI enjoys the respect of the majority of the Indonesian populace and is often noted as the most respected government institution. This is a concrete indicator of progress. Continued reforms that the U.S. should continue to encourage include accountability for past human rights abuses, strengthening civilian control and oversight of the military, and continued professionalism of the TNI officer corps.

If confirmed, what would you do to encourage respect for human rights and accountability in the Indonesian military?

If confirmed, I will support TNI's continued progress by encouraging senior Indonesian leaders to fulfill its stated commitments with particular emphasis on accountability, transparency and respect for human rights. We can accomplish this through bilateral security discussions, joint training, and military assistance, including military training programs. Our engagements with the TNI, and especially its Special Forces (Kopassus), frequently involve Human Rights and Rule of Law Training. We have seen significant improvement in Human Rights and Accountability from the senior leadership. I view U.S. interaction with TNI counterparts as an effective method to encourage professionalism and continued reform within the Indonesian military.

Operational Access and Freedom of Action

Much has been made in recent years of the development of anti-access/area denial capabilities of certain countries, and the impact such capabilities might have on the United States' freedom of action and ability to protect power.

What is your understanding of the emerging challenges associated with anti-access and area denial strategies in the Asia-Pacific?

As discussed in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review and specifically the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, "China will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power projection capabilities." This would include China's pursuit of anti-access/area denial strategies. The U.S. maintains robust regional and global power projection capabilities that provide a full range of options to succeed in defense of national interests and of our allies. To this end, if confirmed, I will work closely with OSD and the Services in support of policy and programmatic inputs based on assessed operational risk, to ensure we have the ability to project power throughout the theater and preserve the capabilities necessary to maneuver within it.

The Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) released on January 17, 2012 broadly describes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's intent for how joint forces will respond to the operational challenges associated with potential adversaries' anti-access and area denial capabilities.

What, in your view, is the JOAC's contribution to better understanding and dealing with the challenges of military operations in the USPACOM AOR?

The JOAC's primary contributions are illuminating the variety of challenges for which U.S. forces must be prepared across an increasingly diverse and rapidly evolving set of domains – air, sea, land, space, and cyber – and identifying Cross-Domain Synergy as the central tenet for addressing these challenges in order to assure operational access. The JOAC provides Strategic Guidance focused on overcoming A2/AD challenges and is intended to guide how the U.S. military is organized, trained, equipped and employed.

The JOAC identifies 33 capabilities required for its implementation, but this list of capabilities is not exhaustive nor is it prioritized.

In view of the USPACOM mission, how would you prioritize the required capabilities listed in the JOAC and what capabilities, if any, would you add?

Unlike Joint Concepts in the past, JOAC has an implementation plan that bridges the gap between concept and operational reality. The 2014 JOAC Implementation Plan (JIP), which is a classified document, provided a priority for the 30 JOAC capability areas. In general, I would agree with the prioritization in the JIP, but more importantly the JIP was designed to provide a comprehensive view of all JOA related activities within the DoD to provide coherence and guide the development of the future joint force. What I can say about the JIP is that all DoD Components participated equally in its formulation. Additionally, the JIP currently has 165 actions, 84% of which are non-material activities focused on finding better ways to employ the material capabilities currently planned for the Joint force. Annual updates to the JIP will be conducted to maintain currency with strategic guidance and Combatant Commander requirements. The implementation plan will ensure the Department stays focused on the important and innovative capabilities needed to ensure operational access now and in the future.

What new technologies would you suggest DOD pursue in order to develop or improve these capabilities?

In general, I would suggest pursuit of technologies that improve situational awareness, command and control, and interagency coordination. As Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, we contributed to the development of PACOM's Integrated Priority List (IPL), which details the commands warfighting capability gaps and the many specific technologies we will be pursuing over the next several years. Additionally, PACFLT, in conjunction with PACOM, will develop and test these concepts and capabilities in realistic joint exercises that will be used to evaluate the operational utility of a given technology. PACOM's requirements are well documented and, if confirmed, I will continue to pursue those priorities set out in the Sep 2014 IPL.

With respect to air, sea and land capabilities, some proponents of the "air-sea battle" concept appear to de-emphasize ground combat forces.

What are your views on the requirement for land forces before, during, and after operations to gain and maintain assured access?

Land forces are necessary for all phases of an operation, including peacetime and steady-state. Most notably, in Phase 0 "Shaping", land forces are critical to tangibly demonstrate U.S. commitment to allies and partners, as well as resolve to potential adversaries. Land forces, as an integrated part of the Joint force, engage with allies and partners in the region to influence, train with, and improve, the capabilities and integration of those capabilities enabling allies and partners to better defend themselves against aggression. In many cases land forces may also facilitate relationship building, as many Pacific defense establishments are dominated by their armies. Ground forces allow rapid and effective response, not only to conflict, but also to natural disasters and humanitarian crises.

During conflict, we must be able to credibly project ground forces in a maritime environment consisting of numerous islands, archipelagoes, and littoral population centers. Expeditionary land forces provide

indispensable capabilities which complement our navy and air forces in the region. Land force headquarters and staffs also provide a Joint Task Force command and control capability that is necessary to pursue multiple operations simultaneously, a necessity for a region that spans fifty-two percent of the globe.

If confirmed, I will work closely with the CNO, Chief of Staff of the Army, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and COMUSTRANSCOM on ground force sourcing and lift.

What, in your view, are the required size and capabilities for ground combat forces in the Pacific region, and what capabilities, if any, may be needed to improve their effectiveness?

PACOM is resourced to Admiral Locklear's demand signal for U.S. Army ground forces. However, PACOM's ability to employ them throughout the theater is a shortfall. U.S. Army Pacific, in coordination with TRANSCOM, has identified solution sets that will enable U.S. Army employment in the Western Pacific.

PACOM routinely experiences a shortfall of Amphibious Readiness Groups/ Marine Expeditionary Units (ARG/MEU). Shortfalls in amphibious shipping, coupled with global demand for both the ARG/MEU teams and Afloat Forward Staging Bases, leave PACOM at about 40% of requirement.

Land forces are necessary throughout the range of military operations. Most notably, land forces are critical in demonstrating U.S. commitment to allies and partners as well as the resolve to dissuade, disrupt, or defeat potential adversaries. Land forces, as an integrated part of the joint force, engage with allies and partners in the region to influence, train with, and improve their ability to defend themselves against aggression. Ground forces allow rapid and effective response, not only to conflict, but also to natural disasters and humanitarian crises, events which are commonplace in the PACOM Area of Responsibility.

Expeditionary land forces provide indispensable capabilities which complement our naval and air forces in the region. The land force headquarters and staffs also provide a Joint Task Force (JTF) command and control capability that is necessary to pursue multiple operations simultaneously, a necessity for this expansive region.

Potential categories that may need improvement include expeditionary basing, mobility, and ISR technologies. Adequate access to basing and logistical support throughout Asia Pacific is necessary to address the whole of the region, and the vastness of the AOR means that forces must have adequate mobility in the form of sealift and air transportation to allow them to engage, train, and respond to crises. Adequate ISR is also needed to enable the rapid and focused application of limited resources to the point of greatest necessity.

High Altitude Reconnaissance Platforms

The Department of Defense intends to retire the U-2 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) fleet in the middle of this decade and replace these aircraft with the Global Hawk RQ-4. Under the Air Force's plans, the RQ-4s will apparently be a USPACOM-wide asset,

flying missions throughout the region, whereas the U-2s have been dedicated to supporting U.S. and Korean forces on the Korean peninsula.

The Chairman of the JROC recently sent the Armed Services Committee a letter indicting that “I certify that the Combatant Commanders will have nearly equivalent” ISR capability when the U-2 retires in fiscal year 2016.

What is your view of the plan to retire the U-2?

If confirmed, it will be my responsibility to place an ISR demand signal for the Services to fulfill. PACOM currently has an enduring requirement that, even with the U-2, the Services struggle to fulfill. Any PACOM commander would be concerned about the possibility of a diminished ISR capability and capacity as result of retiring any platform prior to full RQ-4 sensor parity. As a result of our shift toward the Asia-Pacific region and rising tensions throughout the theater, any decrement to existing capability and capacity concerns me in my current assignment, and would do so as COMUSPACOM, should I be confirmed.

Does a ‘nearly equivalent’ ISR capability meet PACOM ISR requirement?

Deep-look multi-intelligence collection capabilities support both U.S. and ROK daily intelligence requirements. If confirmed, I would be agnostic to platform as long as "nearly equivalent" provides equal or greater capability and capacity to what is currently employed in the PACOM AOR. If "nearly equivalent" means less, then I would be concerned.

Do you believe there will be an ISR capability gap created by its retirement?

If the U-2 is allowed to retire prior to full Global Hawk system parity, then there could well be an ISR capability gap globally, not just in the PACOM AOR. Competing priorities could significantly impact theater operations if the U-2 is allowed to retire prior to system parity in follow-on platforms.

Based on your military expertise, can the Global Hawk provide “nearly equivalent” ISR capability today?

Today, no. When Global Hawk system is on parity with the U-2 there is reason to believe the platform will be able to satisfy theater collection requirements with equivalent capability; that is not the case today and is of concern to me.

What is the risk if sequestration requires further cuts into our ISR platforms to include not funding Global Hawk improvements needed to bring it closer to parity to the U-2?

I believe PACOM would assume much greater risk and have to re-assess the impact of gapping or operating sub-optimal systems for standing and crisis ISR requirements.

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

A number of the nations in the USPACOM area of responsibility contribute large numbers of police and troops to multilateral peacekeeping operations.

What role, if any, do you believe USPACOM should play with regard to engaging the troops from Asia-Pacific nations which contribute to peacekeeping missions?

If confirmed, I will continue engagement with Asia-Pacific nations in regards to peacekeeping contributions. This is important opportunity and venue for military-to-military cooperation that allows us to increase partner capacity in military capability, professionalism, and increased awareness of human rights issues such as the protection of civilians in a UN mission area. I believe that it is in our best interest that countries contributing peacekeepers provide quality troops that are capable, respected, and have the requisite tactical and technical ability, and will enforce the UN mandate of that particular mission.

Combating Terrorism

If confirmed, what would be your role within DOD with respect to counter terrorism?

If confirmed, I will continue PACOM's highly successful "by, with, and through" approaches to counter-terrorism that have produced measurable success in the Asia-Pacific region. These efforts rely on a capacity, capability, and network building approach that emphasizes working together with regional host nation partners, other U.S. government agencies, and key allies, such as the Australians, to deny al Qaeda, adherents, affiliates, and associated forces the ability to operate in the region.

What do you believe is the terrorism threat from al Qaeda and affiliated groups in the Asia-Pacific region?

The threat of attack by al Qaeda, its affiliates, and like-minded groups and individuals against U.S. and partner nation interests in the PACOM AOR remains a serious concern. The possible re-emergence of other terrorist organizations, like Jemaah Islamiya and the Abu Sayyaf Group, that have been weakened but not defeated by the counter-terror efforts of our allies and partners, could quickly affect the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Compounding the concern, other decentralized groups and individuals ideologically linked to al Qaeda, as well as organizations based primarily outside the PACOM AOR (like Lashkar-e-Tayyiba), desire to support their agendas by conducting destabilizing attacks inside the region. Additionally, al Qaeda affiliated groups operate in the PACOM AOR using facilitation networks that support threats to U.S. interests throughout the world. Finally, emerging terror groups such as Islamic State (ISIL) are of concern, particularly as sympathizers from some of the countries in the region go off to the Middle East to fight and then return to their home countries.

Is there a nexus between terrorist groups and criminal networks in the Asia-Pacific?

Yes, there is a nexus and it is a serious impediment to regional stability. Transnational crime and terrorism thrive on common enablers such as illicit transportation networks, weapons trafficking, corruption, trafficking in persons, counterfeiting, and movement of money to support nefarious activities. These threats impact political, social, and economic systems by eroding the rule of law and undermining the legitimacy of governments and institutions.

In Southeast Asia, most notably in the Philippines and Indonesia, U.S. engagement with partner nations has helped combat violent extremist ideology and activities. The integration of operations

by host nation security forces with U.S. capacity building, development, and information support operations has dramatically reduced the ability of violent extremist organizations to operate.

What more can the United States do in Southeast Asia to help combat the threat of terrorism perpetrated by violent extremists?

The U.S. should sustain current engagements with individual nations in the region and continually look for opportunities to assist with ally and partner efforts. Additionally, we should continue multilateral efforts, specifically through organizations like the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), to build regional networks that deny transnational violent extremist and global terrorist facilitation networks the ability to operate within or through Southeast Asia. A sustained effort to build and enhance the capacity of our allies and partners is the cornerstone of our counter terrorism strategy in Southeast and South Asia. We are encouraged by the persistent pressure that partner nations are placing on these networks.

Which Southeast Asian countries are most important in the fight against terrorism in that region and what should the United States do to enhance relations with those countries?

Even though Indonesia and the Republic of the Philippines have seen tremendous counter-terrorism successes, they remain vulnerable to violent extremism through radicalization and recruitment and are potential terrorist safe havens. Additionally, Malaysia and Thailand have been used as facilitation hubs by violent extremist organizations that operate across the region. Recent well-publicized efforts by Australia to arrest or detain at least 16 persons suspected of supporting or sympathizing with terrorists point to the subversive nature and determination of these organizations to gain footholds throughout the region. PACOM must maintain its robust presence and continue its “by, with, and through” engagement strategy in Southeast Asia.

Section 1208 Operations

Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375), as amended by subsequent legislation, authorizes the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism.

What is your assessment of the overall effectiveness of this authority?

Section 1208 funding is most effective in the Central Command and Africa Command AORs, and currently limited in its application in PACOM. I worked with this funding stream when I was the Director of Operations at US Southern Command in 2007-2008. It is an extremely effective authority for specific threats. If confirmed, I will work with the DoD to identify any potential possibilities for using 1208 authority, similar to the way we have used Section 1206 successfully in building capacity in the Philippines and Cambodia.

Department of Defense Counternarcotics Activities

On an annual basis, DOD's counternarcotics (CN) program expends approximately \$1 billion to support CN operations, build the capacity of certain foreign governments in Asia and around the globe, and analyze intelligence on CN-related matters.

What is your understanding of the illegal narcotics industry in the PACOM AOR?

The illegal narcotics industry within the PACOM AOR is primarily focused on feeding the Asian demand for methamphetamine and supplying the growing Australian and Chinese demand for both cocaine and methamphetamine. Growth in market share within Asia for Eurasian, West African, Iranian, and Mexican based drug trafficking organizations has been reported – a clear demonstration of the globalization of the illicit narcotics trade.

Countries in South and Southeast Asia have become increasingly attractive as bases for drug trafficking organizations' production and smuggling operations. Many nations in the PACOM AOR have experienced an increase in the production, transshipment, trafficking, or consumption of narcotics in recent years.

In terms of direct impacts on the U.S., licit chemicals produced in Asia are the primary precursors that are diverted and used to produce methamphetamine trafficked to the U.S. Much of the violence on our southwest border is a result of methamphetamine trafficking by the Mexican cartels.

What role, if any, should DOD play in countering – either directly or with our Asian partners – the illegal narcotics industry in the PACOM AOR?

In cooperation with other U.S. Government, and Partner Nation Agencies, PACOM executes activities within DoD counter-drug authorities to address the threats to U.S. national security posed by the illegal narcotics industry. As PACOM's executive agent for counterdrug operations, the Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-West) plans, integrates, synchronizes, conducts, and assesses DoD counter-drug activities in the region in order to shape the theater and disrupt organizations that threaten U.S. interests in the region. DoD should continue to play a critical role, through information sharing and building partner nation capacity, working with U.S. and foreign law enforcement agencies responsible for counter-narcotics.

Transnational Organized Crime

What, if any, threat does transnational organized crime pose to U.S. national security interested in the PACOM AOR?

The organizations that have amassed unprecedented wealth from illegal activities, including the illicit trafficking of people, drugs, weapons, or other contraband, pose a significant threat to our National Security. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are not only expanding their operations, but are also diversifying their activities, resulting in a convergence of transnational threats that is becoming even more complex, volatile, and potentially destabilizing. The major players use their amassed wealth

to buy influence and subvert governmental institutions – creating instability, disrupting legitimate commerce, putting civilian populations at risk, and undermining democratic processes.

TCOs are becoming increasingly globalized and interconnected. As the global economy continues to grow, change, and innovate, so will criminal organizations, and they will react quickly to changes in both licit and illicit economies. The permissive environments, loose financial controls, corruption, and fraudulent document facilitation networks fostered by transnational organized crime are also key enablers for the freedom of movement of international terrorist organizations operating in the region.

The United Nations estimates 2.5 million people worldwide are victims of human trafficking at any given time. With more than half the world's population resident in the Asia-Pacific, it is logical to assume a significant percentage of those victims are in PACOM's area of responsibility.

What role, if any, should PACOM play in countering the threats posed by transnational organized crime?

PACOM intelligence capabilities can contribute significantly to the identification of threat networks and provide the necessary analysis to support law enforcement and other activities required to disrupt TCO operations. As part of the whole of government approach, DoD can provide critical resources to interagency efforts countering TCOs.

Further, PACOM lead capacity building efforts and the development of regional cooperative networks provide critical reinforcement to partner nation governments. These efforts provide opportunities to hinder the growth of TCOs and reduce risks to the U.S. homeland. Beyond just being a "force multiplier", these efforts are essential to addressing the problems where they begin. By addressing the regional environment -- strengthening relationships with, and capabilities of, international partners throughout the PACOM AOR -- we shrink the operational space within which both extremists and criminals can grow and prosper.

Law of the Sea

Do you support U.S. accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea? If so, why?

Yes. Accession to the Law of the Sea Convention serves the enduring interests of the U.S. to lead the promotion of the rule of law, including in and on the world's oceans. Accession would send a clear signal to the world that we remain committed to advancing the rule of law at sea. Acceding to the Convention would *not* affect or limit our rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea and airspace needed to project power, reassure allies and partners, deter adversaries, respond to crises, sustain deployed combat forces, and secure sea and air lines of communication. Accession would put the U.S. on the firmest possible international legal foundation for those rights, freedoms, and uses. We currently rely on customary international law and physical presence to secure global freedom of access. Customary international law depends in part on states' practices and is subject to change over time. This is less so in the case of treaty- or convention-based international law, which comes from written and agreed-upon terms and conditions that are contained in such treaties or conventions. Ironically, by not being party to the Convention and relying on customary international law, our rights within the maritime

domain are less well-defined than the rights enjoyed by the 165 other nations around the world who have acceded to the Convention.

Would U.S. accession to the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention benefit the U.S. military's mission in the Asia-Pacific region? If so, how?

Yes. U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention would advance U.S. national security interests in the Asia-Pacific region by enabling the U.S. to *legally* reinforce and assert protections contained within the Convention for our navigational rights and freedoms, over-flight rights and freedoms, military activities beyond the territorial seas of any coastal state without notice or permission, and our rights to transit international straits and choke points without impediments. Clearly, we are powerful enough to do so anyway, but acceding to the Convention gives us the moral high ground to criticize those countries that would seek to inhibit freedom of maneuver in the oceans and airspace around the world, including the Asia-Pacific region.

As the Asia-Pacific continues to rise, competing claims and counter claims in the maritime domain are becoming more prominent. Nowhere is this more prevalent than the South China Sea. Numerous claimants have asserted broad territorial and sovereignty rights over land features, sea space, and resources in the area. The U.S. has consistently encouraged all parties to resolve their disputes peacefully through a rules-based approach. The Convention is an important component of this rules-based approach and encourages the peaceful resolution of maritime disputes. Accession would send a powerful and affirmative message to the international community that the U.S. believes the legal regime reflected in the Convention is worth supporting and upholding against any nation that might seek to manipulate the ordinary and intended meaning of certain provisions in its self-interest.

POW/MIA Accounting Efforts

The Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command is critical to the recovery and identification of remains of missing military members. Recovery of remains of U. S. service members from World War II, the Korean War, and the Viet Nam War continues to be a high priority. Section 541 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires that the Secretary of Defense ensure that sufficient resources, personnel, and funds are provided to attain at least 200 identifications per year by fiscal year 2015.

What is your view of the Department's and the POW/MIA community's ability to achieve this goal?

Earlier this year Secretary Hagel directed the Department to transform how it accounts for its personnel missing from past conflicts. Specifically, he directed that he be provided with a plan to organize the Department most effectively to increase to the maximum extent possible the numbers of missing Service personnel accounted for annually while ensuring timely and accurate information is provided to their families.

As a result of the plan that was presented to Secretary Hagel, the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command will soon be merged with two other organizations to form a new Defense Agency that will be overseen by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I believe the Department's budget request

provides the necessary resources to increase its capability and capacity to achieve this goal and implement Secretary Hagel's direction. I fully understand the priority our Nation places on this issue. If confirmed, until the consolidation of these agencies is completed, I will fully support JPAC in its efforts to account for personnel from past conflicts. After the merger occurs, I will fully support the new Defense Agency.

On October 20, 2011, the Department of Defense announced an agreement with North Korea that will allow U.S. personnel to return to North Korea to resume recovery of remains of U.S. service members missing from the Korean War. Recovery operations in North Korea were suspended in 2005.

What is your understanding of this recent agreement to resume recovery operations in North Korea?

The arrangement negotiated in 2011 covered one year and is no longer valid. The operations negotiated as part of the arrangement did not occur and were suspended due to North Korea's provocative actions. This is truly unfortunate.

How might the resumption of recovery efforts in North Korea impact the future of the Six Party talks or the stability on the Korean Peninsula?

The U.S. Government's mission to account for our personnel is not linked to the Six Party talks or to Korean stability.

If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to enhance POW/MIA recovery efforts in the PACOM area of responsibility?

I fully understand the priority our Nation places on this issue. If confirmed, I will ensure the necessary resources are available to JPAC until the new Defense Agency assumes the mission. When that happens, I will ensure the necessary resources are available to the new Defense Agency, as well as the full support of PACOM in the conduct of their important mission.

Quality of Life

Combatant commanders have an interest in the quality of life of military personnel and their families assigned within their AOR.

In your view, what is the role and responsibility of combatant commanders for the quality of life of personnel assigned to their AOR?

The Combatant Commander is a strong advocate for programs which will ensure the needs of our Service members and their families continue to be met, even during an era of fiscal constraint. The Commander advocates for sustainment of critical quality of life programs and for improvement where needed in the quality of life (QoL) of assigned personnel. The Commander ensures that QoL issues are articulated to community leaders, military installation commanders, DoD policy makers, and members

of Congress. If confirmed, I will continue Admiral Locklear's strong advocacy of the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coastguardsmen assigned to PACOM, and their families.

If confirmed, what would you do to enhance quality of life programs for military members and their families within the USPACOM AOR?

Even though QoL programs fall under the purview of the individual Services, if confirmed, I will make QoL for Service members and families assigned to PACOM a top priority. I will work with my Service Component Commanders to ensure our Service members' and their families' needs are met.

What is your view of the challenges associated with global rebasing on the quality of life of members and their families in the USPACOM AOR (including adequate health care services and DOD schools)?

Preserving the QoL for our service members and their families while we realign our forces in theater is a big challenge. Throughout the transition process, we must focus efforts on maintaining quality housing, excellent DoD schools, commissary and exchange services, medical/dental facilities, higher education, work life, family and community support programs for our people.

In-kind Military Construction

The committee released a report on April 15, 2013, titled "Inquiry into U.S. Costs and Allied Contributions to Support the U.S. Military Presence Overseas." Among other things, the committee's inquiry found that in-kind payments from partner nations to support the overseas presence of U.S. military forces in Germany, South Korea, and Japan, have been used to fund questionable military construction projects. In response, the Committee's version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 includes a provision (section 2801) that would require that all future military construction projects funded using in-kind payments pursuant to bilateral agreements with partner nations be submitted for congressional authorization in the Military Construction Authorization Act.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that in-kind payments be utilized for identified U.S. priorities to offset costs that the Department of Defense would otherwise pay with appropriated funds?

If confirmed, I will work with OSD, my staff, and my subordinate commanders to ensure we effectively and efficiently prioritize and apply every taxpayer dollar, won or yen, regardless of the type of project or the source of the appropriation. As we press ahead under section 2801, we must be sensitive to the appearance of encroaching on another country's sovereignty if our actions appear to be directing allied budget procedures.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response

The Department has developed comprehensive policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and response to incidents of sexual assaults, including providing appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault.

What is your view of the steps taken to prevent and respond to sexual assaults in U.S. Pacific Command, including assaults by and against U.S. civilian and contractor personnel?

Sexual assault is a crime. I have seen great focus by commanders and subordinates to address the issue of sexual assault and a deep commitment towards prevention of incidents and appropriately and adequately responding to reported incidents. Commanders monitor their command climate as it relates to sexual assault more than ever and are proactive in taking steps towards ensuring they maintain a climate free from sexual assault and reprisals against victims. Zero is the only acceptable level for sexual assault in our military.

What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources in place in U.S. Pacific Command to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?

PACOM Components have adequate resources and training in place to investigate and respond to allegations. All Services have established guidelines for a 24 hour, 7 day a week sexual assault response capability for victims in all locations. Additionally, PACOM provides oversight for ensuring that adequate resources are present at deployed locations to maintain the appropriate level of resources to respond to incidents. With regard to investigations, the Department has multiple efforts underway to improve the utilization of existing resources and enhance its ability to investigate and respond to sexual assaults.

What is your view of the willingness and ability of military leaders to hold assailants accountable for their acts?

I believe my colleagues take this seriously and are able to hold perpetrators accountable. I personally have a strong public record in this regard. Through actions and words, we reinforce this on a continuing basis. We have the responsibility to enforce regulations and hold our personnel accountable to the high standards that our core values demand. That said, we as leaders must also be held accountable for our actions regarding those in our commands that commit sexual assault and the victims of those assaults.

What is your understanding of the adequacy of the resources and programs in U.S. Pacific Command to provide victims of sexual assault the medical, psychological, and legal help they need?

Service components within the U.S. Pacific Command have appropriate resources and programs in place to offer victims of sexual assault medical, psychological, investigative, and legal support. Service components have enhanced the support services available through the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Coordinators and established Victims' Legal Counsel (VLC) Programs wherein Judge Advocates will help protect a victim's rights through the investigative and adjudicative stages of the military justice process.

What is your view about the role of the chain of command in providing necessary support to the victims of sexual assault?

Leaders and commanders set the tone for their organization and ensure that all applicable services are available and rendered to the victim. Proactive and positively engaged commanders are vital to

providing the necessary support to victims. Beyond this, commanders are responsible for maintaining a climate and culture free from reprisal against victims. We must hold our commanders and leaders accountable to get this right.

What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults have occurred?

Change starts and momentum continues from the top of organizations. If confirmed, I will set PACOM-wide expectations for conduct through guidance on core values and will demand that subordinate leaders set the example in their organizations. Commands shall monitor their climates and the climates of their subordinate units. Chains of command shall be proactively engaged in resolving issues pertaining to command climate and commanders will be held accountable for their units' actions.

In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a judge advocate outside the chain of command to determine whether allegations of sexual assault should be prosecuted?

The commander's role in military justice is long-standing and essential to the effectiveness of command in our forces. Removing commanders from the military justice system would signal a lack of confidence in our commanders that would undermine good order and discipline. It would foster doubt in our Service members in the competency and abilities of their commanders that are entrusted with their lives. The maintenance of good order and discipline is the responsibility of the commander. Removing this responsibility would certainly erode the ability of a commander to effectively command his unit. That said, I believe in and support the assignment of Judge Advocates as formal Victim Advocates and Victim's Legal Counsel. We as leaders must also be held accountable for our actions regarding those in our commands that commit sexual assault and the victims of those assaults.

Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on restricted reporting, to be effective?

Yes. Restricted reporting allows victims of this crime to come forward and receive needed services while maintaining confidentiality. Survey data shows that confidentiality is a key driver in accurately assessing the extent of sexual assault in the military. Without restricted reporting, many of these victims would be left without an avenue to access needed services as they would simply forgo reporting.

If confirmed, what actions will you take to reassess current policies, procedures and programs and to ensure senior level direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond to sexual assaults in U.S. Pacific Command?

If confirmed, I will establish clear policies and procedures for my leaders, at all levels, to take action to prevent sexual assault, protect and support victims, hold offenders accountable, and to ensure a safe and healthy environment for those in their charge. As is the case in most major commands, subordinate commanders in PACOM are required to immediately notify the combatant commander of any sexual assault report made. I will ensure all personnel (military and civilian) are fully aware, trained, and committed to eradicating sexual assault.

What methods for monitoring overall trends and gauging the sufficiency of component commanders' efforts in preventing and responding to incidents of sexual assault do you consider appropriate and intend to implement as Commander, U.S. Pacific Command?

If confirmed, I will ensure Commanders comply with all requirements in accordance with DoD Directive 6495.0 and other established Department policies. Additionally, I will require commanders provide me assessments of their prevention efforts as well as their responsiveness to incidents. From these assessments, I will monitor trends and provide further guidance and direction as necessary. I will emphasize the importance of commanders monitoring their command climate with respect to sexual assault and ensuring sexual assault response capabilities continue to be available at all locations in my AOR. I will demand victims be treated with fairness and respect and that sexual assault incidents be given the highest priority and treated as emergency cases. I will not allow sexual assault to injure our personnel, our friends, our families, destroy our professional values, or compromise readiness. I will hold my subordinate commanders accountable.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

What should be the role for the U.S. military in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) in the Asia-Pacific region?

PACOM continues to provide Foreign Disaster Relief in the Asia-Pacific on an “as needed” basis. When countries request assistance, PACOM either provides immediate assistance within the initial 72-hours of a disaster based on life and limb or after USAID validates the request against an urgent and unique capability that only PACOM can provide. PACOM continues to assist Asia-Pacific nations with their disaster preparations by engaging in multinational forums to share best practices, participating in various bi/multilateral humanitarian assistance / disaster relief exercises, as well as partnering with the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance and USAID in country resiliency training. Overall, PACOM should be viewed as a quick response force for countries in dire need with an ability to respond rapidly, for short duration, and to provide assistance when requested.

Additionally, steady-state Humanitarian Assistance activities are an important part of PACOM’s Theater Campaign Plan. PACOM provides humanitarian assistance annually to countries within its AOR. These HA activities are low cost, non-obtrusive, but highly effective efforts that improve DoD access, visibility, and influence in a partner nation or region, generate positive public relations and goodwill for DoD, and build collaborative relationships with the partner nations’ civil society.

Are the resources necessary to fulfill this role currently available to the U.S. Pacific Command commander? If not, what additional resources are necessary?

Yes. PACOM receives adequate funding from the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation, under 10 USC 2561 for humanitarian assistance activities, and 10 USC 404 to respond to disasters within the PACOM AOR.

Additionally, USAID/OFDA has embedded two representatives within the PACOM staff to synchronize and coordinate crisis response in situations where DoD is requested to provide “unique capabilities” that exceed host nation or USAID/OFDA partner capacity.

How should the PACOM Commander incorporate “lessons learned” from prior HADR operations in the PACOM AOR?

The Asia-Pacific’s tectonic plate structure produces its well-known Ring of Fire, which regularly triggers earthquakes, volcanoes, and tsunamis in the region. Weather extremes and anomalies also continue to plague the region, and understanding the scope and severity of long-term climate change, unexpected climate shocks, and inter-annual climate variability such as El Nino, attest to the shared challenges we face with our partners and allies. Capturing lessons learned is critical to properly planning and responding to these enduring challenges.

PACOM, in accordance with the established Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff policy, uses the PACOM Lessons Learned and Issue Resolution Program to incorporate "lessons learned" from prior humanitarian assistance / disaster relief (HA/DR) operations in the PACOM AOR. These lessons are analyzed and validated to identify issues requiring resolution for staff process improvement and/or to address gaps in plans or resources. The issues are then either resolved internally by PACOM or forwarded up the chain of command for resolution. Once resolved these "lessons learned" are used by PACOM during future HA/DR operations.

Additionally, the Center for Excellence (CFE) in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, a PACOM direct reporting unit, focuses on pre-crisis preparedness and capturing lessons learned from HA/DR operations. They provide regional and global information sharing across foreign and domestic government agencies, work to improve multilateral civil-military cooperation, and offer a small but rapid response capability to disasters and humanitarian crisis.

Science and Technology

As with other combatant commands, a Science and Technology (S&T) advisor is assigned to support USPACOM.

If confirmed, what would be your priorities for the USPACOM Science and Technology advisor?

If confirmed, I will rely on the PACOM Science and Technology (S&T) Advisor to discover, develop and demonstrate innovative solutions to meet war fighter challenges, help ensure adversary technology advancements are identified early and mitigated, help build requirements for Service resourcing, and help build science and technology partnerships among USPACOM component commanders and industry, the private sector, academia, the Interagency, and regional allies and partners. I would expect that the PACOM S&T Advisor continues to expand collaboration with the national research enterprise composed of Service, DoD, and Department of Energy laboratories, as well as international partners. Additionally, I would expect the S&T Advisor to continue to provide expert advice to the PACOM staff on new and emerging capabilities that can aid the command in meeting theater objectives.

What role do rapid fielding programs play in developing and delivering new capabilities to the warfighter?

Rapid fielding programs are designed to be primarily focused on Combatant Command priorities. PACOM has aggressively leveraged rapid fielding programs such as Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTDs) and the Quick Reaction Capabilities (QRCs) through the Joint Urgent

Operational Needs (JUONS) program. If confirmed, I intend to continue placing significant emphasis on these processes. Rapid fielding provides a pathway to innovative, agile and affordable solutions for the Combatant Commands and we must continue to build on the excellent work in this area.

The Secretary of Defense has established a Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) to develop new systems and technologies to counter anti-access and area denial capabilities. How would you work with SCO to prioritize their programs and support the development and deployment of new capabilities?

Prioritization of SCO programs is accomplished through close coordination between the SCO-West office created within PACOM and the central SCO stakeholders at the Pentagon. If confirmed, I would be in the unique position of offering the forces and exercise venues necessary to effectively test the new and innovative strategic capabilities which SCO puts forward. Additionally, the Asia-Pacific offers the opportunity for operationally realistic scenarios which will help to validate the OT&E prerequisites for new capabilities and allow them to move forward more rapidly in the acquisition process.

The Department of Defense has, in recent years, put greater emphasis on research and development of persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.

In your view, how can persistent ISR improve operations in the Pacific theater, and how would you utilize new platform and sensor technologies?

Persistent ISR in the Pacific Theater provides real time situational awareness for increased ability to gain indications and warnings and to hold strategic threats at risk. By working with allies and partners we can enhance our understanding of the region in real time and share this information, as needed. New and improved capabilities would provide more reaction time to indications and warning allowing more time to find off-ramps to de-escalate the situation. More capacity and capability would provide actionable intelligence to support theater operations while minimizing delays and keeping us ahead of potential crisis, natural disasters and other unplanned contingencies.

Do you believe that airship platforms can be effectively employed in the Pacific theater?

Yes. I believe that persistent ISR is one of the most important capabilities for PACOM as it increases the ability to anticipate and react to potential crises to enable the commander to gain a better understanding of activities in the region. To satisfy PACOM's ISR requirements, a broad array of platforms is needed. Airship platforms have demonstrated an exciting potential to fulfill part of this requirement, especially in permissive environments in missions such as air and surface domain awareness. Furthermore, airships of sufficient scale also offer a promising capability to conduct mobility operations independent of traditional aerial or seaport facilities in missions such as disaster response. If confirmed, I would be interested in *any* platform that could meet my ISR requirements, including airships.

Minerva and Social Science

Since 2009, DOD has been funding, under the Minerva Initiative, academic research focusing on the evolving relationship between technology and national security in China. The goal of this research is to create a better understanding of China's dynamic science, technology and innovation enterprise and its impact on its military.

Are you aware of this research and in your view, should DOD continue to fund activities like this to increase its breadth and depth of the Chinese military-industrial enterprise?

Yes to both questions. China is increasingly emphasizing the fusion of civil and military research and development as a key to accelerating the technological advance and modernization of the People's Liberation Army. As the relationship between China's science and technology sectors and the PLA grows closer, the type of research that the Minerva Initiative provides becomes more important in helping us to assess the pace and longer-term trajectory of China's military modernization.

The Human Terrain System has been effectively used to support efforts to better understand the socio-political environment in which military forces have deployed.

Are you aware of the work of the Human Terrain System teams, and in your view, should similar capabilities be developed to support the PACOM area of responsibility?

It is very important to have socio-cultural understanding of the people and places where we engage and operate. I am aware of the Army's Human Terrain System, and its use in Iraq and Afghanistan. PACOM employs analysts and foreign area specialists throughout the command in an effort to best integrate that knowledge into our efforts. Several initiatives with similar capabilities are underway, leveraging a variety of knowledge sources as we work to continue expanding this important area. One challenge we face is the size and complexity of the Asia-Pacific. The region is home to over half the world's population who represents thousands of groups, tribes, and societies, and collectively speak over 1000 languages. The PACOM staff is currently assessing how the Human Terrain System might be utilized in the PACOM AOR. I am very interested in the outcome of that assessment.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.